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424

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

CLOSED UNTIL 1973

RESPECTING

TURKEY.

PART II.

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1922.

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART II.

[E 10996/27/44] No. 1.

[This Paper should have appeared in Part I.]

Memorandum on the Russo-British Agreement of 1915 *as to the Future of Constantinople and the Straits.*

FOR nearly 200 years the control of the Straits and the annexation of Constantinople had been regarded by Russian national feeling as a great historical task of the Russian nation; to this all other objects would, if necessary, be subordinated or postponed. During the 19th century the chief obstacle had been the constant opposition of the British Government. The first immediate objective had since the Crimean war been the "opening of the Straits"; the acquisition of Constantinople was allowed to remain in the background. The arrangements of the *Entente* between Great Britain and Russia brought about a change in British policy which was also justified by our control of the Suez Canal and occupation of Egypt, and in 1908 Sir Edward Grey informed the Russian Government that His Majesty's Government agreed in principle to the opening of the Straits; he only asked that the definite settlement should be postponed to a convenient time.

2. As a result of the Balkan wars of 1912–13 and the defeat of Turkey, the question of Constantinople itself came into the foreground. The Russian Government were seriously alarmed lest they might be anticipated by the Bulgarians, and, as they explained at the time, if the Bulgarians occupied Constantinople, the Russian fleet would at once have been sent to the Bosphorus. Their apprehensions were increased by the control which the Germans were securing over Constantinople, and in the spring of 1914 all the arrangements were considered for despatching a joint military and naval force to occupy the city if occasion arose.

3. As soon as war broke out with Turkey at the beginning of November 1914, there was a general conviction that the time had now come to achieve the secular object of Russian ambitions. On the 12th November, Sir Edward Grey, in discussing the question whether the offensive should be taken against Turkey, or the war for the present be confined to defensive measures, added :—

> "But I should like Minister for Foreign Affairs to know that however much we or Russia may assume a defensive attitude in the war with Turkey, while the issue against Germany, on which all other issues depend, is pressed to a successful conclusion, we regard the conduct of the Turkish Government as having made a complete settlement of the Turkish question, including that of the Straits and Constantinople, in agreement with Russia inevitable. This will, of course, be effected after Germany is defeated, whether or not Turkish rule is overthrown in the course of hostilities meanwhile."

In conversation with Count Benckendorff, he had made a verbal statement, which Count Benckendorff communicated to M. Sazonof in the following words :—

> "Si l'Allemagne est écrasée, le sort des Détroits et de Constantinople ne pourrait cette fois pas être décidée autrement que conformément à nos convenances."

This statement was approved by Sir Edward Grey as correct.

4. On the 20th November, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an *aide-mémoire*, stated that his Government would be prepared to recognise the annexation of Egypt to Great Britain "after the declarations made by Sir Edward Grey with reference to the ultimate fate of the Straits and Constantinople." At this stage, therefore, the Russian Government, understanding that it was the intention to annex Egypt, gave their assent on condition that their wishes with regard to the Straits and Constantinople were fulfilled. It was explained to them immediately afterwards that His Majesty's Government did not propose to annex Egypt, but only to declare a protectorate, but M. Sazonof said that the declaration he had given would hold good should His Majesty's Government annex Egypt later.

5. At this time His Majesty's Government did not know precisely what were the Russian proposals regarding the Straits and Constantinople. Information on this point is conveyed in a telegram from Sir George Buchanan of the 22nd November:—

> "From language held hitherto by Minister for Foreign Affairs in course of academic conversations settlement which his Excellency eventually contemplates will apparently comprise expulsion of Turks from Europe, complete freedom of Straits and acquisition by Russia of territory on both sides of Bosphorus, so as to enable her to guard entrance into Black Sea in war time, as he has more than once declared he could never allow Bulgaria to go beyond Enos–Midia line. I gather he will claim territory to east of that line for Russia. He has hitherto spoken as if Russia would be content with an arrangement under which Constantinople and a certain radius of territory would be neutralised or given the status of a free port. Since Turks commenced hostilities, question of Constantinople and Straits has engrossed the attention of the Russian public to such a degree that I doubt whether they will in the end be prepared to renounce long-cherished idea of incorporating Constantinople in Russian Empire."

6. After this nothing more is heard of the matter for some time. During the month of February it came up in a more urgent form owing to the proposed attack on the Dardanelles. It was at this time anticipated that within a very short period the Allied forces might actually be in occupation of Constantinople. The Russian Government clearly desired that before this happened they should receive a precise and formal agreement to their claims. Moreover, the British Government were using all their efforts to procure the military assistance of Greece and of Bulgaria. This, especially the former, aroused the strongest opposition at St. Petersburg. The Tsar himself had declared "in most positive terms that he could in no circumstances consent to any naval or military action by Greece in the neighbourhood of the Straits." They obviously feared that if a Greek force were once established there it would be very difficult to get rid of them. The Greek Government itself disclaimed any territorial ambitions in this district, but desired that Greek soldiers should take part in the recovery of St. Sofia to Christianity. For military reasons it was most important that the Russian veto should be withdrawn, but clearly this would not be done unless a binding declaration were made as to the future of Constantinople. On the 25th February, Sir Edward Grey, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, said that a statement "that the events on the Russo-Turkish frontier will bring Russia nearer to the realisation of the political and economic problems bound up with the question of Russian access to the sea, was an inspiration with which he was in entire sympathy." He evaded, however, the question about the future of Constantinople, saying that the precise form in which Russian aspirations would be realised would no doubt be settled in the terms of peace. This answer seems to have aroused apprehensions in Russia, and he was pressed to give a more definite and binding declaration.

7. On the 2nd March, Count Benckendorf presented a memorandum, in which he said that the study of the Russian demands was not completed, but at the moment could be summarised as follows:—

> In Europe the Ottoman power must come to an end; the line Enos–Midia would serve as frontier between Russia and Bulgaria. On the continent of Asia the course of the Sakaria might serve as a frontier line.
>
> Finally, the security of our position in the Straits will have to be guaranteed on the side of the southern shore of the Sea of Marmora.
>
> Russia will take into consideration the economic interests of Roumania, of Bulgaria and of the probable remains of Turkey, as well as of the interests of European commerce.

8. On the 4th March, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir George Buchanan pointing out that the British and French were undertaking the operations in the Dardanelles solely for the common cause. His Majesty's Government had no intention of establishing a footing there for themselves; no direct gain would come to Great Britain from the operations. He therefore pressed strongly against the Russian refusal to permit the Greeks to take any part in the occupation of Constantinople. As to the future of Constantinople and the Straits, he said:—

> "I have endorsed in public the formula of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and have made no objection to anything he has said to you about it, though a formal and precise agreement must be reserved for discussion with France in accordance with the British-French-Russian Alliance of the 5th September, and can probably not be completed except in final terms of peace. . . . We readily admit that Greece must not have a footing on the Straits that will conflict with Russian interests. We had never contemplated the annexation of any part of the Straits by Greece. The compensation contemplated for Greece out of Turkish territory is Smyrna."

At this time, then, Sir Edward Grey clearly hoped to avoid a more precise undertaking than that which he had already given.

9. On this very day, however, M. Sazonof presented to Sir George Buchanan an *aide-mémoire* (which has been published by the Bolsheviks) to the following effect:—

> "Course of latest events leads His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas to think that the question of Constantinople and the Straits must be definitely solved in accordance with traditional aspirations of Russia.
>
> "Any solution would be unsatisfactory and precarious if it did not incorporate henceforward in Russian Empire the city of Constantinople, western shore of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora and of the Dardanelles, as well as Southern Thrace up to the Enos–Midia line.
>
> "*Ipso facto* and by strategic necessity, part of Asiatic shore included between the Bosphorus, River Sakharia and a point to be fixed on the Gulf of Ismid, islands of the Sea of Marmora, Islands of Imbros and Tenedos, ought to be incorporated in the Empire.
>
> "Special interests of France and of Great Britain in the region above described will be scrupulously respected.
>
> "Imperial Government likes to hope that above considerations will meet with sympathy of the two Allied Governments. Said Governments are assured of meeting with, at the hands of Imperial Government, the same sympathy for realisation of desiderata which they may form in other regions of Ottoman Empire and elsewhere."

10. From Sir George Buchanan's telegrams we learn that the French Ambassador had given these demands an unfavourable reception; he was opposed to the annexation of Constantinople by Russia. Sazonof, however, was absolutely firm, and said that if the demands were not accepted he would resign: the Tsar, basing himself on Russian public opinion, also insisted on their full acceptance. It appears also that M. Delcassé was at first much disturbed by these demands, but, after further consideration, was prepared to accept them, the great thing being to avoid friction with Russia. There was obviously considerable anxiety lest refusal might give strength to the attempts which were being made at this time to detach Russia from the alliance.

11. After discussion in the Cabinet, a telegram was sent on the 11th March to Sir George Buchanan, authorising him to present an *aide-mémoire* to M. Sazonof to the effect that "His Majesty's Government would agree to the Russian *aide-mémoire* about Constantinople and the Straits subject to the war being prosecuted to a victorious conclusion, and to Great Britain and France realising the desiderata in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere as referred to in the Russian *aide-mémoire*."

12. The next day the following draft telegram was despatched to Sir George Buchanan, after being approved by the Prime Minister; it was also communicated to the leaders of the Opposition:—

> "In giving the Minister for Foreign Affairs the *aide-mémoire* about Constantinople and the Straits you should make the following observations:—
>
> "The claim now made by the Russian Government goes much beyond what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated as probable a few weeks ago,

and Russia is asking for a definite promise in her favour as regards the greatest prize of the whole war before we have had time to consider what our own desiderata would be elsewhere in the eventual terms of peace.

"I hope, therefore, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will realise that the *aide-mémoire* now given him is the greatest proof of friendship that it is in our power to give. It involves the complete abandonment of what has been our traditional policy, and runs counter to opinions and sentiments once universal and still by no means extinct in this country, and will, I hope, be recognised as a most loyal and ample fulfilment of our previous general assurances made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs recently. It is given now in the hope and belief that the settlement proposed will, when realised, make lasting friendship between the two countries. It follows that our own desiderata, however important to us elsewhere, will not include any conditions to impair Russian control over the territory described in her *aide-mémoire*.

"We shall ask that there should be commercial freedom of the Straits for merchant vessels, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs has already promised, and that, as Constantinople will always be a trade entrepôt for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, Russia should, when in possession of it, arrange a free port for goods in transit to and from territory other than Russian.

"His Majesty's Government are engaged in operations in the Straits which it is now clear cannot, however successful, be of any advantage to them in the terms of peace, except in so far as they contribute to the general cause. The direct fruits of these operations will, if the war is successful, be gathered entirely by Russia. We think, therefore, that Russia should not now raise objection to the co-operation of any Power which offers its help as an ally on reasonable conditions. Greece is the only Power which is likely to participate in the operations in the Straits, and the Greek flotilla, if we could have secured its aid, would already have been of inestimable value, as Admiral Carden is asking for more destroyers, and we have none to spare for him.

"One of the great objects in undertaking the operations in the Dardanelles was to bring the Balkan States over to our side. We trust that Russia will now do all in her power to prevent Roumania and Bulgaria from being apprehensive that future Russian possession of Constantinople and the Straits will be to their disadvantage, and that Russia will do all she can to make the prospect of participation in the war on the side of the Allies attractive to those two States.

"I cannot formulate British desiderata as to the Ottoman Empire except in consultation with the French as well as the Russian Government, and it is clear that the whole question of ulterior British and French interests, in what is now Asiatic Turkey, must come under consideration, but whenever it becomes known that Russia is to have possession of Constantinople at the end of the war, as stated in our *aide-mémoire*, I shall want to state that His Majesty's Government have throughout all the negotiations stipulated that in all circumstances Arabia and the Mussulman Holy Places shall remain under independent Mussulman rule.

"One of the British desiderata will be the revision of the Anglo-Russian Agreement about Persia, recognising the present neutral sphere as a British sphere, but I am not yet in a position to make any definite proposals on this or any other subject.

"If the Minister for Foreign Affairs asks whether we propose to make any conditions as to the fortification of the Straits or passage of ships of war, you may reply in the negative, though it would seem reasonable for Roumania and Bulgaria to have special privileges accorded them by Russia as regards their ships of war.

"It is very desirable that the understanding now come to between the British, French and Russian Governments should not become known until the Allies are able to assure the Balkan States as to their position and prospects generally, especially Roumania and Bulgaria, with regard to the territories adjoining their frontiers, which they are known to desire, and until an agreement as to British and French desiderata in the ultimate terms of peace is more advanced.

"You can let Minister for Foreign Affairs have a memorandum of these observations, but it should be separate from the *aide-mémoire* of my telegram of 10th March, which gives the official assent of His Majesty's Government.

"Copies of what is given to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can be given by you personally to the Emperor."

13. This telegram speaks of an understanding having been arrived at by the British, French and Russian Governments, and Sir Edward Grey seems to have received information that the French were prepared to accept the Russian *aide-mémoire* of the 4th March. It appears, however, that the French Government did not, in fact, give their official approval till nearly three weeks later. A telegram from M. Sazonof to M. Isvolsky of the 8th March, which is among the documents published by the Bolsheviks, runs as follows:—

"On the 23rd February/8th March the French Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, announced to me that France was prepared to take up a most favourable attitude in the matter of realisation of our desire as set out in my telegram to you, No. 937, in respect of the Straits and Constantinople, for which I charged you to tender Delcassé my gratitude.

"In his conversations with you, Delcassé had previously more than once given his assurance that we could rely on the sympathy of France, and only referred to the need of elucidating the question of the attitude of England, from whom he feared some objections, before he could give us a more definite assurance in the above sense. Now the British Government has given its complete consent in writing to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople within the limits indicated by us, and only demanded security for its economic interests and a similar benevolent attitude on our part towards the political aspirations of England in other parts.

"For me, personally, filled as I am with most complete confidence in Delcassé, the assurance received from him is quite sufficient, but the Imperial Government would desire a more definite pronouncement of France's assent to the complete satisfaction of our desires, similar to that made by the British Government."

From this it appears that, at any rate, on the 18th March the French formal acceptance had not been given. It is clear from the correspondence that M. Delcassé and the French Government were at first surprised and embarrassed by the Russian demand for the actual annexation of Constantinople. They first suggested a personal conference with M. Sazonof; this he was unable to arrange, but it looks as if the British Government acted rather in advance of the French. The question of Constantinople and the opposition to Russian annexation had always been a special British point, and the French might not unreasonably have held that it would be better for them to wait and leave the responsibility with the British.

14. We can see that both of the Allies were surprised and annoyed at the rather peremptory attitude suddenly assumed by the Russians on this matter; they gave their consent with some reluctance; it was to be foreseen that this decision would have an unfavourable effect on the Balkan States; there were many Greeks who held that it was not worth while going to war with Turkey to win Constantinople for Russia. The French in giving their consent seem to have been more influenced by their apprehension that in case of a refusal Russian loyalty to the alliance could not be depended upon; the English, who were just at that time becoming fully pledged to the Dardanelles expedition, were chiefly influenced by the desire to remove the Russian veto on the presence of a Greek force in the expedition.

15. The results of this agreement were very far-reaching. As soon as Constantinople was promised to Russia the other Allies were compelled to place on record and ask for the adhesion of their Allies to the territorial claims which they would make in Turkey. The British required Mesopotamia, the French Syria; the British, in addition, were strongly interested in Central Asian problems, especially Persia, and including even Tibet. It also became necessary when Italy entered the war to take more account of the Turkish ambitions in Asia than probably would otherwise have been done. It leads, therefore, inevitably to the whole series of agreements with regard to the partition of Turkey which were later to give so much trouble.

16. Clearly the action of the Russian Government in making a separate peace with Germany in 1918 deprives them or any future Russian Government of the legal right based upon the assent g[illegible]n to their claims by the exchange of notes in 1915. On the other hand, what has been done can never be completely undone, and it will always remain on record that the British Government formally assented to the Russian annexation of Constantinople and control of the Straits. The policy of a great nation such as Russia is not permanently changed by abnormal events, even though they are of so violent a nature as those by which Russia has been distracted during the last four years. It at any time in the future Russia is reunited under a Government which commands the full allegiance of all parts of the Empire and

classes of the population, the claim to Constantinople and the Straits will again be made, and it will certainly be urged that, notwithstanding the *débâcle* of 1917, Russia deserves this recompense for her immense sacrifices in the earlier years of the war. It will be represented that it would be intolerable that in the partition of the Turkish Empire, Russia should be left entirely out of account. That which Russia in the past always feared was, not the continuance of Turkish domination, but the substitution for Turkish sovereignty of that either of Greece or Bulgaria. A farseeing and patriotic Russian statesman would therefore desire that Turkey should be left with nominal sovereignty over Constantinople and all of Thrace east of the Enos–Midia line.

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY.

February 22, 1922.

[E 10271/27/44] No. 2.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 2286.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 30th September, respecting Smyrna refugees.

Paris, September 30, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 2.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 30 *septembre* 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR une lettre en date du 23 septembre, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que Mustapha Kemal avait répondu à une démarche collective des amiraux et des consuls par un refus de permettre aux réfugiés grecs du sexe masculin, âgés de 18 à 36 ans, de quitter Smyrne et aux autres réfugiés de quitter Smyrne après le 30 septembre. Votre Excellence ajoutait que le commandant des forces navales anglaises à Smyrne avait reçu l'instruction de protester contre cette décision et d'insister pour que les réfugiés obtinssent la permission de s'embarquer. Le Gouvernement britannique souhaitait qu'il fût prescrit à l'Amiral Dumesnil d'agir dans le même sens.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence qu'en ce qui concerne le premier point, il ne m'apparaît pas qu'il puisse donner lieu à une protestation. Le refus d'autoriser des sujets grecs mobilisés ou mobilisables à quitter Smyrne est, en effet, conforme aux lois de la guerre.

En ce qui concerne le deuxième point, l'Amiral Dumesnil vient de me télégraphier qu'après avoir réuni hier les commandants supérieurs alliés et américains et leurs consuls, il a demandé, au nom de tous, à Nourredin Pacha d'accorder aux réfugiés un délai d'évacuation de quinze jours. Le Général Nourredin en a fait la promesse, sauf événements politiques ou militaires éventuels. Le commandant de nos forces navales ayant demandé au général si les hommes entre 18 et 45 ans qui ont été arrêtés recevaient une nourriture suffisante, a obtenu de lui sur ce point une affirmation formelle.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
POINCARE

[E 10269/27/44] No. 3.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer, ci-joint, à sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon of Kedleston le compte rendu de la première conversation entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et Mustapha Kémal.

M. Poincaré a répondu à M. Franklin-Bouillon en lui signalant la nécessité de l'évacuation de la zone neutre par les Turcs.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 30 *septembre* 1922.

Enclosure in No. 3.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to M. Poincaré.

(Télégraphique.) *Smyrne, le* 29 *septembre* 1922.

DES mon arrivée, j'ai vu Mustapha Kémal. Son accueil, ainsi que celui des Ministres et commandants particuliers, a été émouvant. Une conversation de quatre heures, continuée le soir et toute la nuit, parce qu'il me demande instamment de partir avec lui à Angora pour lutter contre l'intransigeance du Parlement, où prendrai la parole à ses côtés.

Situation pour lui très difficile. Armée exaspérée en présence destruction absolue du pays presque totalement incendié par Grecs. Renforts britanniques et présence troupes anglaises Tchanak cause irritation à militaires victorieux.

Conversation commencée par cette déclaration de Mustapha Kémal: "Si je n'avais pas reçu votre dépêche, je n'aurais pas pu arrêter même une minute mes troupes. Aujourd'hui encore, elles croient que j'ai compromis l'intérêt du pays. Il faut agir immédiatement. Mais à quoi bon nous rendre la Thrace si c'est un désert comme l'Anatolie? Je ne puis arrêter mes 300,000 hommes que si vous me garantissez contre les incendiaires."

Mustapha Kémal appuyait ces déclarations en refusant de prendre la responsabilité du délai. J'ai suggéré, en mon nom personnel, occupation immédiate interalliée de la Thrace. Il voulait la France seule. J'ai refusé, pour éviter tout froissement entre Alliés. Voici les chiffres que je crois suffisants: 1,000 hommes à Andrinople; des détachements de trois sous-officiers et de vingt hommes à Tcherkeskeuy, Babaeski, Rodosto, Kirk-Kilissé, Ipsala, Enos, Gallipoli, Midia, Kechan. Ils prendraient administration et assureraient évacuation des Grecs. Commission serait accompagnée par gendarmerie de grande Assemblée et remettrait dans un délai maximum de trente jours administration aux Turcs. C'est le système qui nous a réussi en Cilicie. Troupes turques rentreraient seulement après mise en vigueur du traité définitif. Simultanément, Turcs s'engageraient à rester sur positions actuelles à Tchanak. Il faudrait agir nécessairement quarante-huit heures en raison des destructions et cruautés que faciliteront encore révoltes troupes se trouvant désormais sans chef. Si nous obtenons par télégraphe solution immédiate, arriverons, je crois, à gagner temps nécessaire pour discussion des conditions [? transitoires] de la paix.

Arrangements sur ces deux points seraient conclus à Moudania, où généraux se borneraient, après avoir reçu instructions expresses des Gouvernements, télégraphiées de Paris, à signer accord sans perdre temps à discuter. Cela montrerait à l'Europe que sommes véritablement entrés dans période négociation paix. La Turquie serait représentée par Ismet Pacha, Généralissime. J'aurai grosses difficultés à faire accepter participation petite Entente et Japon, et exclusion Russie. Je ne puis compter que sur action personnel de Mustapha Kémal. Mais il faut d'abord arrêter les soldats et sauver la Thrace. J'ai conscience de toutes mes responsabilités.

Soyez assuré que les Alliés n'auront qu'à vous remercier de mon effort. En ce qui concerne lieu réunion conférence, les nécessités militaires et politiques empêchent Turcs accepter Europe ou environs Constantinople. Ils demandent Smyrne.

Les questions de Thrace et Tchanak étant immédiatement réglées, conférence pourrait se réunir vers 15 octobre, et je pense que je serai auparavant à Paris.—FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

No. 4.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 528.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 30, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 483.

Official communiqué, dated 28th September, from army commander in Thrace states that on 27th September a Turkish company under an officer named Dervish Rejeb crossed neutral zone from Istranja area, killed Greek post of eleven men at Safala, and occupied that village. On 28th Greeks counter-attacked Turks, who retired, leaving one officer and twenty-five other ranks dead on the field. Communiqué asserts that this Turkish company had been formed at Constantinople, and had arrived near Istranja ten days before attack.

This communiqué tends to confirm General Harington's suspicions mentioned in last paragraph of Sir H. Rumbold's telegram.

These events possibly explain French Minister's statement to me this morning that Turkish troops were continually crossing the Black Sea to Midia. He spoke seriously of danger of complications in Thrace if these passages were not checked by Greeks' landing forces. I presume this is official French view intended to discredit stories of Turkish bands passing zone guarded by French.

I will make representations desired by Sir H. Rumbold, but venture to point out that no one here exercises any real authority over Thrace, and that, until Greek army there is reorganised, violence is inevitable amongst a mixed population excited by presence of tens of thousands of starving refugees, who have suffered nameless horrors at the hands of the Turks before they escaped from Asia Minor.

No. 5.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 531.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 1, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 528.

I made representations yesterday to Colonel Plastiras, who has most authority here. He expressed his thanks for bringing danger to his notice, and entirely agreed in necessity of keeping order. He said that it would help him if he could be given detailed information.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 6.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 532.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 1, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 487.

I have been careful not to raise question of Eastern Thrace in my informal conversations with *de facto* Greek authorities because I consider it certain that in their present mood they would decline to accept decision of Powers.

The idea underlying revolution was to save Thrace. It is possible, of course, that they will modify this idea, perhaps quickly, but it holds the field at present.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 7.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 30, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 61.

Serbian Government have consulted French Government with regard to manner in which to deal with telegram from Soviet Government, which was also addressed to

Belgrade. I met French Chargé d'Affaires this afternoon on his way to Ministry for Foreign Affairs to give answer, which is to the effect that French were opposed to admission of Russians to conference, and that, moreover, admission of latter would entail admission of Bulgarians, which would lead to complications.

I had happened this morning to ask Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, in absence of M. Nincic, how tripartite *démarche* was viewed here, and he professed to know nothing, nor did he show any interest in English point of view. He was to-day very reserved, unlike his previous self, and when I alluded to matter which formed subject of my telegram No. 129 he evinced no interest, and could only talk of how exhausted this country was and how it could not think of war until it had recovered.

The "Samouprava," the organ of Radical wing of the Government, has a long article this morning preaching a pacifist and cautious attitude, avoidance of any adventure and reservation of all efforts for occasion of any direct menace to interests of this country. Such menace did not substantially exist.

I mention all above as indications that this Government is tending to follow French rather than English lead.

No. 8

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, September 30, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

It would appear that telegram of Soviet Government is designed to embarrass Roumanian Government at the moment and render impossible any resistance to Allies or action against Turkey.

This is also view of Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen to-day. He asked me to call attention to this further threat of Soviet Government, who seem to wish to quarrel with Roumania. He is most anxious that His Majesty's Government should understand that he is in entire sympathy with their policy at Constantinople, but that it is of vital importance for Roumania to watch her [? Bessarabian] frontier and be prepared for all eventualities there.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed personal apprehension at attitude of Mustapha Kemal at present moment, which was not reassuring. He is of opinion that Soviet influence on Angora Parliament is responsible for non-recognition of neutral zone.

I found M. Duca on the whole somewhat nervous, as is also public opinion in the press, which fears general conflagration. I secretly reassured him by quoting privately our General Staff view that Russian forces are not apparently meditating any movements of troops against Roumania at present. He was most grateful for this indication.

(Secret.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs' private opinion of French policy at Constantinople past and present is not favourable. He said that it is incomprehensible.

No. 9.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 498.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 1, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 489 and my telegram No. 493.

At meeting with General Harington and Admiral Brock this morning former stated that Kemal was making dispositions which would enable him to attack neutral zone in Ismid Peninsula with force of 50,000 rifles. We agreed that he must not be allowed to play for time indefinitely, and decided to bring question of Mudania meeting to a head. I sent Mr. Ryan to Hamid Bey this afternoon with verbal [group omitted] on following lines:—

(R.) "British High Commissioner confirms what he said yesterday about growing impatience of His Majesty's Government in presence of situation which silence of Nationalist authorities and continuous presence of their troops in neutral

zone tends to prolong indefinitely in spite of His Majesty's Government's efforts to bring about peaceful solution.

"In view of uncertainty in which he is left regarding Nationalist intentions, General Harington declares his readiness to proceed to Mudania on 3rd October at 11 A.M. in accordance with proposal of Allied Governments for preliminary meeting. He expects Nationalist commander to meet him. If Nationalist authorities do not comply, British High Commissioner and General Harington will draw their own conclusions."

Mr. Ryan explained that General Harington would be accompanied by Allied generals and that object of meeting would be as defined in Allied note of 23rd September. He added that we had reason to believe that Nationalists themselves contemplated meeting on 3rd October.

Hamid confirmed this. He said that he had received communication from Smyrna which he had been unable to act on, as text was corrupt. He was expecting repetition at any moment. Sense, however, was that Ismet Pasha, commander of Western Army, would come to Mudania on 3rd October to discuss delimitation and evacuation of Thrace. Question of neutral zone was not mentioned, but message added for his information that orders had been given to arrest all forward movement in direction of Constantinople, Chanak, and even against Greeks. It also stated that meeting would take place in hope of preparing the way for conference. He himself was instructed to attend Mudania meeting.

Mr. Ryan said that admiral could not see his way to allow installation of wireless on Turkish vessel, but would give all facilities for transmission of messages in cypher or otherwise from Mudania if meeting took place. (End of R.)

(Repeated to Athens, No. 158.)

No. 10.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 500.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 1, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 498.

In subsequent private conversation Hamid mentioned Western Thrace and said Turks would [group omitted] on plebiscite at conference. He said population desired reunion with Turkey. No one wanted autonomy.

He used uncompromising language about Capitulations, even as regards substitution of modernised system with guarantees for foreigners against abuses.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 160.)

No. 11.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

[By Telephone.]

(No. 494.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 1, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 2285 of yesterday.

M. Poincaré has communicated to me text of further telegram received from M. Franklin-Bouillon, who states that after two days' discussion, and with extreme difficulty, he has been able to persuade Mustapha Kemal to order the immediate and total halt of his troops on the positions occupied by them on the day of M. Franklin-Bouillon's arrival, on condition of cessation of British disembarkation of troops and organisation of intrenchments.

He states that this result is due solely to personal authority of Mustapha Kemal, whose desire for peace is absolutely sincere. He adds that the conflict is inevitable if British Government does not accept compromise at present possible without discussing limits of neutral zone or evacuation of villages occupied by Kemalists. Mustapha Kemal accepts this date of 3rd October for meeting at Mudania of conference of generals, which will settle arrangements for inter-Allied occupation of Greek evacuation of Thrace. He presses for Allies' acceptance of this plan, which alone can ensure peace.

Mustapha Kemal is telegraphing to Allied Governments to propose 15th October for meeting of conference at Smyrna. M. Franklin-Bouillon promises details of a scheme which he hopes will prevent question of presence of Little *Ententes* or of Russia being raised.

Copy of this telegram by messenger to-night.

No. 12.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

[By Telephone.]

(No. 495.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 1, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

In communicating to me M. Franklin-Bouillon's telegram, M. Poincaré informs me that he has, in reply, urged the necessity of not allowing Turkish troops to approach the immediate neighbourhood of Chanak, in order to avoid even involuntary incident.

M. Poincaré firmly trusts that His Majesty's Government will agree with French Government in accepting 3rd October as date for the Mudania meeting; which is, he is convinced, the best means of rapidly settling present situation.

I request that I may be informed of any instructions sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner or General Harington in the above sense.

No. 13.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sofia, September 30, 1922.*

BULGARIAN Government state that considerable number of Turkish refugees from Thrace have arrived in frontier towns in destitute and starving condition, who allege that Greek troops are committing excesses against Turkish population.

I have received from Malco Tirnovo telegram of protest purporting to be from 600 Turkish refugees from Kirk Kilisse district accusing Greek troops of worst excesses and stating that twenty-eight villages have been destroyed and inhabitants driven away. Prefects of Malco Tirnovo and Svilengrad have been instructed to admit refugees and distribute them in country districts.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 14.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 455.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 1, 1922.*

HIS Majesty's Government are glad to hear that Mudania meeting is to take place without delay, and have considered very carefully form of instructions to be sent to military commanders who will take part in it. Under Paris Agreement sole object of this meeting is to fix line of retirement of Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, in accord with Greek and Turkish military authorities, the Angora Government in return for this intervention to undertake not to send troops either before or during final peace conference into neutral zones and not to cross Straits of Marmora.

These conditions must be borne strictly in mind. In accordance with them General Harington, as Allied Commander-in-chief, was instructed by War Office on 28th September to communicate with Allied generals and the representative of Greek forces, and to arrange for their presence. It is presumed that this has been done.

When Mudania meeting takes place, on 3rd October, the commanders should proceed with the duty assigned to them at Paris, and should discuss and fix the line in Eastern Thrace. At the same time they should inform Mustapha Kemal that the

Allied Governments cannot exercise pressure upon the Greeks to withdraw behind the line determined until—

1. The Kemalist forces have, in accordance with the Paris terms, withdrawn entirely from the neutral zones; and

2. Until satisfactory arrangements have been made for the preservation of order, and the protection of minorities of whatever nationality, in the evacuated areas.

This will raise at once the question of the provisional administration of Eastern Thrace pending the meeting of the peace conference. The generals at Mudania will obviously have no authority to settle this question, which is one for the Allied Governments, acting on the advice of their High Commissioners.

It is necessary, therefore, that the latter should at once proceed to draw up a scheme and should forward it to their several Governments with as little delay as possible. We have duly considered the opinions on this subject put forward in your telegrams Nos. 469, 474 and 487, and have further received representations from the French and Italian Governments on the subject. There seems to be a general agreement—

1. That the administration should be controlled by Allied officers.

2. That local gendarmerie should as far as possible be employed to maintain order, and should, if the necessity arises, be reinforced by Allied troops.

3. That it will be useless to hand over the civil administration to the Constantinople Government, which is powerless to exercise it.

The French Ambassador has communicated to us a proposal of M. Franklin-Bouillon for the employment of Allied detachments at selected places which M. Bouillon will doubtless communicate to you on his arrival in Constantinople to-day. He admits that Turkish troops could not be admitted until treaty of peace has been concluded and put into operation: and this is obvious, seeing that the admission of Kemalist forces now would not only provoke a violent conflict, but would render peace conference superfluous by anticipating its decisions. Upon the principle of inter-Allied occupation there is therefore complete agreement.

We are informing French and Italian Governments of these proposals, and are asking them to instruct their High Commissioners in above sense. We hope that you will proceed with latter to immediate elaboration of scheme in order that there may be no unnecessary delay. We cannot contemplate Mudania meeting being spun out from day to day in order to enable Mustapha Kemal to strengthen his position at Ismid with a view to invading Europe. We recognise immense danger of such an invasion in its effect, not merely on the general situation, but on the population of Constantinople.

In the meantime, we are glad to hear from your telegram No. 483 that three or four inter-Allied commissions are starting at once or have already started for Eastern Thrace, to calm apprehensions both of Greeks and Turks. Their advice should be of value in drawing up scheme of provisional administration.

Object of above instructions, which are, I trust, clear, is—

1. To confine Mudania decisions of commanders to purely military rôle assigned to them at Paris.

2. To require of Kemal loyal acceptance of Paris terms as condition of Allied influence to secure evacuation of Thrace.

3. To refer to High Commissioners all questions of a political character, upon which generals will, of course, report views of Kemal, but which they are not themselves competent to decide.

For your own information: General Harington is at the same time authorised to inform Mustapha Kemal that Great Britain cannot participate in above measures, which are designed to bring about peaceful settlement, while Kemalist forces are taking hostile action against Kurdistan and Irak, and that these must be suspended. Kemal cannot go on making war in Asia while we are endeavouring to make peace in Europe.

In the course of Mudania meeting Mustapha Kemal may raise several points upon which you should instruct Harington, who has been duly advised, in following sense:—

It is extremely undesirable that we should be drawn into any agreement about the stopping of British reinforcements to the Turkish theatre. Such an agreement

would be bound to lead to disputes and to allegations of breach of faith in view of our complicated troop movements, which may be necessary from one point to another and to the general service of the Empire. Moreover, the stipulation which we should have to exact against the forward movements of Kemalist troops and guns towards the neutral zones would certainly not be accepted by him, or observed by him if accepted. Harington should therefore leave it to him to raise the question, and confine himself in the first instance to showing all the objections and difficulties.

If, however, an arrangement of this kind is indispensable to the achievement of an otherwise satisfactory settlement we should be willing to agree to the following:—

That no reinforcements of fighting units for the army or Royal Air Force shall be embarked from any territory under the control of the British Government for the purpose of reinforcing the British forces in your command, over and above what has actually embarked before the date of this agreement, and the British Government will ask the Dominions not to despatch any forces after that date. But we must retain liberty to add such medical and administrative personnel as may be necessary, and to replace sick wastage.

It must be clearly understood, however—

(*a.*) That the above undertaking only refers to the fighting units of the army and Royal Air Force and not to the supplies and stores required to maintain the said forces in an efficient condition.

(*b.*) That the transport of drafts to and from India and other British territory, through the Mediterranean, is not restricted.

The whole of the above must be subject to such reasonable undertaking by Mustapha Kemal as Harington may deem necessary, and will hold good so long as Kemal observes his undertakings.

We must retain the right to carry out air reconnaissance over the neutral zones in the Dardanelles and the Ismid Peninsula.

These instructions are for the general guidance of Harington, who will report if other subjects are raised.

(Repeated to Paris (by bag), No. 334. First part only, up to "For your information," repeated to Rome, No. 296, and Athens, No. 276.)

[E 10313/27/44] No. 15.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 2.)

(No. 2291.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 1st October, enclosing a message from M. Franklin-Bouillon in regard to the Mudania meeting.

Paris, October 1, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 1er octobre* 1922.

J'E vous communique ci-joint un nouveau télégramme que je viens de recevoir de M. Franklin-Bouillon.

En lui accusant réception, j'insiste auprès de lui sur la nécessité de ne pas laisser les troupes turques dans le voisinage immédiat de Tchanak, afin d'éviter des incidents même involontaires.

J'ai le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement britannique sera d'accord avec nous pour accepter la date du 3 octobre pour la réunion de Moudania. Cette entrevue est, j'en suis convaincu, le meilleur moyen de régler rapidement la situation actuelle.

Croyez, &c.

POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

M. Franklin-Bouillon to M. Poincaré.

(Télégraphique.) *Smyrne, le 29 septembre 1922.*

JE suis parvenu, après deux jours de discussion, à décider Moustapha Kémal à ordonner l'arrêt immédiat et total de ses troupes sur les positions qu'elles occupaient le jour de mon arrivée, à condition que, de leur côté, les Anglais cesseraient leurs débarquements et l'organisation de retranchements.

Les forces turques avaient déjà commencé leur marche sur Tchanak et Constantinople. J'ai dû, pour faire revenir les généraux sur cette décision, me livrer à une lutte épuisante.

La raison n'a pu triompher que grâce à l'autorité personnelle de Moustapha Kémal, dont la volonté de paix est absolue. Nous allons à un conflit certain et rapide si le Gouvernement anglais n'accepte pas la transaction actuellement possible sans revenir sur la discussion des limites de la zone neutre, ni insister sur l'évacuation des villages qui pourraient avoir été occupés par les nationalistes. La date du 3 octobre est acceptée par Moustapha Kémal pour la conférence des généraux à Moudania, qui enregistrera les modalités convenues entre les Gouvernements pour l'occupation interalliée et l'évacuation grecque de la Thrace. Je vous demande instamment d'obtenir que les Alliés, sans revenir sur le passé, se rallient immédiatement à ce plan, qui sauvegarde tous les amours-propres. Sinon, il faudrait renoncer à tout espoir de paix.

Ce soir, Moustapha Kémal adresse aux Gouvernements une dépêche en ce sens [deux groupes faux] relative à l'organisation de la conférence de Smyrne, qui demeurerait fixée du 15 octobre. Je préciserai demain une solution que je crois avoir trouvée avec Moustapha Kémal pour permettre à l'Assemblée d'Angora de ne plus soulever la question de la présence de la petite Entente ou de la Russie. En raison de l'action bolchevique, à laquelle Sadoul se livre désespérément à Angora, nous avons décidé de renoncer à me faire entendre par l'Assemblée, mettant notre confiance dans l'action des groupes amis. J'attends pour demain votre réponse au sujet de Moudania.

Le Ministère nationaliste s'associe entièrement à Moustapha Kémal, à la suite de notre entente, pour me demander de rentrer vous mettre au courant de la situation en vue de la conférence, quand les résultats attendus de la conférence de Moudania auront pu être obtenus.

Obligés d'aller charbonner, je partirai pour Constantinople après réception de votre réponse au sujet de Moudania.

No. 16.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 533.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 2, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 532.

Colonel Plastiras, who is real head of the military movement, called on me this morning and asked if it was true that the Allied generals were to meet Kemal at Mudania to-morrow. I said that it was the desire of Allied generals to have the meeting, but I was not yet sure that the other side would come.

Colonel Plastiras then informed me that he was going to Thrace to-night to try to re-form the army there.

Number of officers had already been sent. He asked me what was to be the future of the province. I told him that His Majesty's Government were most anxious for peace, and that if Kemal accepted Allied invitation to conference it would be madness for Greeks to refuse. Greece would have need of the Powers after the long war and would have a fine country left to her. She could not hope for assistance in putting her house in order unless she accepted the decisions of the Powers.

Colonel Plastiras objected that if Greece refused she would be face to face with an enemy also weakened by war, and that the Greeks might well hold their own and even take Constantinople. I replied that whole lesson of the last two years was that Greece could do nothing in the long run if isolated. Should she act as proposed she would be just as isolated as she had been during these two years, and result would be a real catastrophe for her.

Colonel Plastiras admitted the force of these arguments and said that after all he was not a political man. M. Veniselos understood foreign situation and was best judge. He would do what M. Veniselos advised in this matter, but he must lose no time in getting army of Thrace into shape.

I said that I thought a disciplined force was very necessary in Greece, because one never knew how far successes of Kemal might have turned his head. An army might be required on Maritza, and discipline was absolutely necessary in Thrace itself in order to put an end to massacres and excesses, of which I had already spoken to him, and which would do incalculable harm to the Greek cause. Colonel Plastiras said that his first efforts would be directed to stopping this kind of thing, which he hated as much as I.

Impression left by visit was that Colonel Plastiras is a real soldier who will do all he can to put down disorder, and will take political advice from those in whom he has confidence. His personal courage is a byword in the army, and I would sooner deal with him than with any other Greek I have met.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 17.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 534.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 2, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Colonel Plastiras said he was confident that in a month he would be able to put in the field really efficient force of 60,000 men to defend Thrace if necessary. Two more divisions were leaving Athens almost at once for Thrace.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 18.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 535.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 277.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that General Alexander Mazarakis will leave for Mudania on board destroyer "Sphendone" this afternoon. It would be well that Senior Naval Officer, Dardanelles, be warned to let ship through, and see that she is not fired on at Mudania.

Second Greek representative will be Colonel Sariyannis, who is now at Adrianople. Minister for Foreign Affairs does not yet know by what route he will travel, but hopes that all facilities will be given.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 19.

Mr. Hohler to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *Budapest, October 2, 1922.*

VERY great interest is taken here naturally in present situation in Turkey, but Hungarian Government have no intention of making any move whatever.

No. 20.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 501.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 1, 1922.*

IN interview published on 29th September, Grand Vizier stated, in reply to question about position as between Constantinople and Anatolia [*sic:* ? Angora], that there was no duality in nation, that difference hitherto existing was matter of

outward form, and that he hoped that even this would shortly disappear. He replied vaguely to question as to whether Central Government would send representatives to conference and what their line would be, merely saying every effort would be made to uphold legitimate claims of Turkey.

Certain reports credit Grand Vizier with intention of definitely recognising exclusive right of Angora to represent Turkey at the conference, but nothing which I have observed myself supports this.

No. 21.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 503.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 2, 1922.*

AT suggestion of French High Commissioner, Franklin-Bouillon, who arrived here yesterday evening, gave last night to Allied High Commissioners and generals account of his negotiations at Smyrna, and of his views in general.

Following are chief points of this account, which was of an excessively partisan character:—

Out of thirty-six hours spent at Smyrna twenty-seven had been taken up in conference with Mustapha Kemal, Fethi Bey [? Reouf, Yussuf Kemal, Ismet and Fevzi Pashas.

In the whole of his parliamentary career he had never had a more difficult task or met with such determination and resistance.

On his arrival at Smyrna he found 150,000 Turkish troops who wanted to advance were being set in motion against Constantinople and Chanak with absolute intention of occupying former and attacking latter.

Though Mustapha Kemal himself was sincerely anxious for peaceful solution, no victorious army had ever stopped and waited before its own capital.

Turks were incapable of understanding why British troops had occupied Chanak, or why they were being refused permission to at once occupy Thrace, which had been promised to them by the Allies.

One brutal fact had to be borne in mind. Turkish army had just advanced through 400 kilom. of country utterly and completely devastated by the Greeks. It was feared lest same fate would befall Thrace if Greeks were allowed to remain there one day longer.

Though they knew dangers and difficulties, Turks had reached state of mind which made them regardless of risks, losses or consequences

Principal fault of Allied policy in East had always been that they had been too late. This fault must be avoided now if a catastrophe were to be averted.

By dint of argument and persuasion he had at last minute induced Turks to suspend all movements of their troops, in hope that British would take similar action, and not permit further fortifications to be constructed or reinforcements brought out, and provided that Allies gave proof of their good faith by themselves ejecting Greeks from Thrace and preserving that province from the ruin which had befallen Anatolia.

Franklin-Bouillon then read letter addressed to President of the Council by Yussuf Kemal, promising that an answer would be given to conference proposal in a few days, acknowledging assurances of Allied Governments respecting just peace, stating that, trusting in Franklin-Bouillon's assurances, all movements of troops would be suspended, pointing out impossibility of allowing Greeks to stop even a day longer in Thrace, and notifying acceptance of Mudania Conference at which Ismet Pasha would [? omitted: represent] Government of Angora.

Franklin-Bouillon then read proposed instructions for Allied generals at Mudania, which he has apparently also submitted to Paris. Instructions were doubtless drawn up in agreement with Kemalist leaders. In support of point contained therein that British and Turkish troops should remain in positions actually occupied, Franklin-Bouillon urged with great warmth that British should not insist on withdrawal of Turkish troops from positions now held by them in Chanak zone. He said that Turks would never agree to withdraw and could never impose withdrawal on their troops.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 22.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 504.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 2, 1922.*

AT meeting this morning, to discuss attitude of generals at Mudania meeting, French High Commissioner endeavoured to assert that reply addressed to President of the Council by Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs, promising, within a few days, reply of his Government to conference proposal and accepting Mudania meeting, constituted an actual expression of readiness of Angora Government to attend that conference and could be accepted as such by generals, who could therefore proceed at once with arrangements for evacuation of Thrace by Greece and organisation of temporary Administration there.

I told French High Commissioner that I could not admit such an interpretation. In this I was supported by my Italian colleague. I informed High Commissioners that I could not agree to any definite engagements as regards pressure on Greeks, &c., being undertaken until formal acceptance by Kemal of peace conference had been received and held to be satisfactory by Allied Governments. In this connection I notified High Commissioners of terms of your telegram No. 430 to Paris.

It was eventually agreed that there was no objection to generals explaining fully measures which Allied Governments would be prepared to take in the event of, and in anticipation of, satisfactory reply from Kemal.

It will be practically impossible owing to conflicting views [? of our] Governments to ensure that all three Allied generals shall have [? received] identic instructions before meeting. General Harington, however, fully appreciates that our hands cannot be bound and those of Angora left free. French High Commissioner also raised this morning question of exact line in Thrace behind which Greeks should be requested to retire.

He drew attention to inconvenience, throughout its whole course, of line of Maritza River, since railway line from Kuleli Bourgas to Karagatch runs for 38 kilom. west of that river.

French High Commissioner argued that it would be preferable and more practical from point of view of railway communication if line selected between those places were railway line, which should be left to Turks, rather than line of river. Continuity of railway would thus remain unbroken.

I said that without instructions from you I could not agree to any modification of Maritza frontier, which was, in fact, frontier accepted by Turks themselves.

Italian High Commissioner suggested that this complication was capable of adjustment later by means of arrangement regulating travelling facilities and prohibiting customs barriers on this part of railway.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 164.)

No. 23.

M. Karakhan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received October 2.)

Moscou, le 1er octobre 1922.

(Télégraphique.) *En clair.*

APRES les essais infructueux faits aux conférences de Gênes et de La Haye par les Puissances européennes en vue de procéder d'un commun effort à la reconstruction de la vie économique mondiale le Gouvernement russe a été obligé de continuer par ses propres moyens son travail de reconstruction économique de la République russe, dévastée par la guerre et l'intervention des Puissances étrangères. Pour accomplir ce travail, le Gouvernement russe a fait de nombreuses commandes dans les pays européennes et en Amérique.

La plupart des marchandises a été expédiée et continue à l'être par la voie maritime, qui offre le plus de commodité, celle qui conduit par les Détroits aux ports de la mer Noire. Aussi c'est avec la plus grande surprise que le Gouvernement russe a appris que la Grande-Bretagne a fait bloquer par sa flotte le détroit des Dardanelles et celui du Bosphore, et en a interdit le passage aux navires de commerce venant de la mer Noire ou se dirigeant vers les ports de cette mer; en même temps, le Haut-Commandement anglais a donné ordre à ses vaisseaux de guerre d'ouvrir le feu sur tout navire qui en prendrait l'interdiction de passer les Détroits. Le Gouvernement russe proteste de la façon la plus catégorique contre ce blocus établi par la Grande-Bretagne à l'insu et contre les intérêts de la Russie. Les Puissances de

l'Entente ont refusé de renouer avec la Russie, malgré les concessions faites par celle-ci, les relations économiques normales qui devaient faciliter sa reconstruction économique; maintenant en bloquant les Détroits ces Puissances l'empêchent de poursuivre même avec ses propes forces cette œuvre de reconstruction.

La Russie a déjà protesté contre l'établissement dans les Détroits par les Puissances victorieuses d'un régime dirigé contre ses intérêts et ceux de ses alliés. Le blocus des Détroits déclaré aujourd'hui donne une nouvelle preuve de ce que les Puissances pour qui la navigation dans la mer Noire ne présente pas un intérêt vital, mais qui, grâce à leurs forces armées, exercent le contrôle des Détroits, auraient toujours la possibilité de menacer la vie économique pacifique des États riverains de la mer Noire. La liberté des Détroits, au nom de laquelle l'Europe se prépare de nouveau à répandre le sang, ne signifie que liberté pour les Puissances de l'Entente de bloquer à tout instant et sous prétexte quelconque les Détroits et de séparer ainsi toute la mer Noire du reste du monde. Le Gouvernement russe est pour la liberté des Détroits, mais pour une liberté qui appartiendrait aux seuls navires de commerce et qui libérerait complètement aussi bien les Détroits que la mer Noire de la présence de forces navales étrangères.

La Grande-Bretagne et ses alliés ne voient pas leurs routes maritimes d'intérêt vital coupées, grâce au blocus des Détroits; ce blocus ne peut avoir de répercussion sur leur économie nationale—par contre, il bouleverse la vie économique des États riverains de la mer Noire. Ce n'est que par l'indifférence totale aux intérêts de ces États qu'on peut expliquer la légèreté avec laquelle les autorités britanniques agissent dans les mers et aux territoires qui ne leur appartiennent pas.

Le Gouvernement russe insiste sur la levée du blocus des Détroits aussi que de toutes les restrictions édictées et appliquées par la Grande-Bretagne et ses alliés et relatives au passage des Dardanelles et du Bosphore par les navires de commerce.

No. 24.

M. Mdivani to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(Télégraphique.) *En clair.* *Moscou, le 27 septembre* 1922.

LE Conseil fédéral des Républiques transcaucasiennes proteste par la présente contre la réunion d'une conférence destinée à résoudre la question du Proche-Orient, et particulièrement la question des Détroits, sans la participation des États que cette question intéresse particulièrement. Le Conseil fédéral des Républiques transcaucasiennes se joint entièrement à la note du Gouvernement russe du 24 septembre et déclare que, d'accord en cela avec la Russie, l'Azerbeïdjan, l'Arménie et la Géorgie ne reconnaîtront aucune décision touchant les Détroits qui serait prise sans la collaboration des républiques transcaucasiennes et à l'encontre de leurs intérêts.-Le Président du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple et Commissaire du Peuple pour les Affaires étrangères de l'Azerbeïdjan, NARIMANOF. Le Président du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple et Commissaire du Peuple pour les Affaires étrangères de l'Arménie, MIASNIKOF. Le Président du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple et Commissaire du Peuple pour les Affaires étrangères de la Géorgie.

No. 25.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 497.) *Paris, October* 1, 1922.
(Telegraphic.) D.

PRESIDENT of the Council asked me to come and see him this morning at 7 o'clock. He read to me several telegrams which he had received during the day from Constantinople and Smyrna. Amongst them was a telegram from Yussuf Kemal, Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs, practically accepting proposal for conference with certain reservations in connection with evacuation of Thrace, which he expected to be settled by generals at proposed meeting at Mudania on 3rd October, where General Ismet would be Turkish representative.

Amongst other telegrams he read one from General Pellé recording what Hamid Bey had repeated to him of an interview with Sir H. Rumbold, in which latter made communication contained in your telegram No. 328 [? of 20th September]. Hamid Bey complained to General Pellé of stiffness with which this communication had been made.

President of the Council remarked to me that statement made by Sir H. Rumbold appeared to be in contradiction with actual facts, since Greek warship "Averoff" on leaving Constantinople had gone to Rodosto, and, moreover, two Greek destroyers were said to be lying at anchor alongside a flotilla of British destroyers in Golden Horn. I replied to President of the Council that it was perfectly true that our naval authorities were preventing Greek warships and transports from penetrating into Sea of Marmora and Dardanelles, and that, as regards the "Averoff," though she might have stopped at Rodosto she had certainly passed through Dardanelles, and at present moment was at Pirœus.

As for the two destroyers lying in Golden Horn, they were, I understood, for protection of Greek subjects and were not engaged in war service. President of the Council insisted that their presence could not but inspire Turks with a feeling that we were not absolutely sincere in the statement that had been made to Hamid Bey, and expressed opinion that moment chosen for making this communication, when state of tension was being relaxed, was unfortunate. I remarked that tension was then still acute.

Another telegram which was read to me was an interview between Sir H. Rumbold and French and Italian High Commissioners, in which he questioned them as to intentions of French and Italian fleets as regards co-operation with British fleet in preventing Kemalist troops crossing into Europe. I was not told the nature of their replies. It was clear from General Pellé's account that interview provoked some vivacity on the part of those present. Other telegrams which he read were of no special importance, but President of the Council begged that, now that there really was a hope of securing a peaceful solution on all difficulties at issue, great care should be taken at Constantinople, Chanak and elsewhere that nothing should occur which might endanger a peaceful result, which is so much desired on all sides and in every country. He expressed hope that there would be no hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government in sending General Harington to conference at Mudania, of whose moderation and prudence he spoke in highest terms of praise, since he was convinced that the moment conversations were begun danger of hostilities would be removed.

No. 26.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 498.) *Paris, October* 2, 1922.
(Telegraphic.) D.

YOUR telegram No. 336.

I have seen President of the Council and have read him first part of instructions given to Sir H. Rumbold in your telegram No. 455. He appeared to be quite satisfied, remarking merely that there were a few slight divergences presenting no serious difficulty which he would collate with instructions sent by his Government to General Pellé.

I impressed on him importance of adhering most strictly to both spirit and letter of decisions taken in Paris on 23rd September, and warned him that any departure from them would probably lead to danger. He entirely shared these views.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 27.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 499.) *Paris, October* 2, 1922.
(Telegraphic.) D.

YOUR telegram No. 337.

I saw President of the Council this morning, and he agreed as to importance of securing presence of a Greek general at Mudania to-morrow, and he will send instructions to Athens in that sense.

He remarked that it was quite possible that Mustapha Kemal's representative would object to meeting Greek general, in which case difficulty could be bridged by Allied generals holding two meetings at Mudania, one with Mustapha Kemal's representative, the other with the Greek general.

(Sent to Constantinople and Athens.)

[E 10322/27/44] No. 28.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Saint-Aulaire.

Foreign Office, October 2, 1922.

Your Excellency,

WITH reference to your conversation with Sir W. Tyrrell on the 29th September regarding the situation in Thrace, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, suggested on the 30th September that the three Allied Ministers at Athens should collectively press for a Greek withdrawal behind the Maritza, and for the immediate establishment of a Turkish administration and Turkish gendarmerie in the evacuated territory, prior to the meeting of the Allied generals at Mudania.

2. I am informing M. de Martino in reply that, having received an enquiry from His Majesty's Minister at Athens as to when the Greek retirement in Thrace could take place, I have already telegraphed to the British representatives at Paris, Rome, Athens and Constantinople that in the view of His Majesty's Government, which they confidently assume will be shared by the French and Italian Governments, a decision regarding the line to which the Greek troops should withdraw in Thrace must be taken by the Allied generals at the Mudania meeting proposed for this specific purpose in the antepenultimate and penultimate paragraphs of the Allied note of the 23rd September. The actual Greek withdrawal, however, cannot precede Kemal's acceptance of the Allied note of the 23rd September as a whole, and therefore of the invitation to the peace conference as well as to the meeting of the generals at Mudania. Should they pronounce in favour of the Maritza as the line behind which the Greek forces are to withdraw, His Majesty's Government will accept the decision.

3. With regard to the provisional administration of Thrace after the Greek withdrawal, separate instructions have already been issued to Lord Hardinge for communication to M. Poincaré.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 10382/27/44] No. 29.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 834.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report on the destruction of Smyrna received from Mr. Hadkinson, Mitylene.

Constantinople, September 25, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Mr. Hadkinson to Sir H. Rumbold.

Mitylene, September 20, 1922.

Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Excellency's appreciation and consideration, the following:—

With the exception of the Turkish quarter and 200 or 300 buildings situated at the Point, nothing remains of the town of Smyrna.

As an eyewitness, and as one of the last persons who got away, I am in a position to testify that the town was deliberately and systematically set on fire by the Turks—military and civilians—and not by the Armenians as the former now pretend. Incendiary bombs were freely used, and the soldiers, regulars and irregulars, as well as the Moslem population, which had been previously armed, drove the Christians, who tried to escape from the burning houses, back into the flames. Machine guns, rifles and knives also played a prominent part, and the number of victims can be counted by tens of thousands. Words fail me to depict the horrible scene.

What I would particularly like to draw your Excellency's attention to is the deplorable and untenable condition of the Christians who, so far, have escaped from or have been spared being butchered or being burnt to death. They roughly number

200,000, and are at present huddled together along the shore to the right and left of Smyrna town crying for help. Every obstacle is put in their way by the Turks to prevent them from leaving. They are even deprived of food and water.

Kemal has just issued a proclamation, according to which all male Greeks and Rayahs between the ages of 17 and 45 are prisoners of war. All others, including women and foreign subjects, are at liberty to leave up to the end of this month provided they can produce duly visaed passports. This is out of the question, as, apart from the vexatious formalities imposed by the Turks, there exists no staff to cope with such work, not to mention that the majority have lost their passports and papers of identification.

In order to save these Christians from further massacre or from dying from hunger or exposure, it is imperative that urgent steps should be taken by the Allies to force the Turks, firstly, to supply food to these people, and, secondly, to permit them to leave the country freely without subjecting them to formalities they are unable to carry through. The Allies at the same time must supply the necessary transport.

These people are absolutely destitute, all they were possessed of—money, clothing and food—having been taken away by the Turks.

If your Excellency could only have heard the cries for help and seen defenceless women and children unmercifully shot down or rushed into the sea to be drowned like rats or back into the flames to be burnt to death, you would fully have realised the horror and extreme gravity of the situation.

I roughly estimate that over 25,000 lives were lost during the night of the 13th instant, and I am convinced that all those who so far have escaped and are still in Smyrna at the mercy of the Turk will meet the same fate unless immediate steps are taken to rescue them.

I also wish to call your Excellency's kind attention to the condition of the British refugees at Mitylene, Chios, the Grecian islands, Cyprus and Malta. No doubt at the two last-mentioned islands our authorities will give the necessary relief, but at all the other places there will be great distress, as very few of the British colony were able to carry away with them anything of value. As your Excellency is aware, British firms in Smyrna suffered considerably during the war at the hands of the Turks through requisitions and spoliation; so what little was left to them has now disappeared, and they find themselves unprovided for. Personally, I was only in time to take with me about 30*l.* I happened to have at the house, and I have a family of four to support, so I trust your Excellency will kindly make representations to the competent authorities that relief should be granted to all necessitous cases until such time as the situation improves. For your Excellency's information, I am well known at the High Commission, having served during the war in the Naval Intelligence Department, and subsequently for two years was attached to the British High Commission as relief officer.

In conclusion, I would add that the Turk to-day has such a swollen head that the probabilities are not only will he tolerate no interference, but will impose conditions unacceptable to the Allies. Under these circumstances, the latter, and particularly our Government, will either have to accept his conditions and, in consequence, lose the little prestige we have remaining in this part of the world, or else they will have to knock him on the head. In the eventuality of hostilities breaking out, may I ask you kindly to inform the commanders-in-chief, naval and military, that I am prepared to re-undertake and organise an intelligence bureau here? Practically the whole of the staff which worked during the war here under Commander C. E. Heathcote-Smith, also several of my Smyrna agents, are available.

I am, &c.

P. HADKINSON.

[E 10383/27/44] No. 30.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 836.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the report of the British member of the Inter-Allied Commission which recently proceeded to Broussa.

Constantinople, September 25, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Secret.) *September* 18, 1922.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your information, two copies of a report from Major H. G. Howell, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.A., British member of the Inter-Allied Commission which recently proceeded to Broussa.

I have, &c.

(For Lieutenant-General, Commanding-in-chief, the Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey)),

W. H. GRIBBON, *Colonel*.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

Report on the Turkish Nationalist Offensive in Anatolia by Major H. G. Howell, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.A., British Member of the Inter-Allied Commission proceeding to Broussa.

(Secret.)

ACCORDING to instructions contained in your note dated the September, 1922, I reported myself to H.M.S. "Sepoy" at 7 A.M. Sunday, the 10th September. We sailed at 9·15 A.M., after waiting two hours for the French and Italian members of the Inter-Allied Commission. Arrived at Mudania at 12·30 P.M., and found that the rest of the commission had left Mudania for Broussa. The general manager of the railway informed me that no other train was leaving on that day. I therefore proceeded to the Greek headquarters to try and obtain transport, but met with difficulties. Luckily Major Strover turned up about 1 P.M., and his influence with the Greeks enabled me to obtain seats for myself and my two orderlies—Corporals Gilbert and Benton—in two Ford cars which were proceeding to Broussa.

2. Left Mudania at 3·30 P.M. The place crowded with refugees, and absolute state of chaos. Greek officers, of whom I knew several, and men in state of funk. The road was blocked with vehicles, and no one appeared to take any interest other than to protect his own skin. All along the route to Broussa the villages were burning, having been set alight by the Greeks themselves. A Greek officer with me told me this.

3. Arrived 3 miles short of Broussa at 5 P.M., where the headquarters of the Greek army was established. There I met Lieutenant-Colonel Ciampi and Commandant Oliveur, the rest of the commission. They were demanding guarantees for the safety of Broussa from the Greek G.O.C., General Soumelas, also rifles to arm the Turkish gendarmerie who police the town. Both requests General Soumelas absolutely refused to grant. He would do nothing. Commandant Oliveur requested permission to bring up one French company from Mudania to act as gendarmes, but this General Soumelas stated was impossible as he had no communication with Mudania—the wires had been cut. I agreed to this proposal upon the distinct understanding that the company would act as police only, and immediately vacate Broussa directly the town was occupied by the Kemalists. The state of the staff did not impress me, and from General Soumelas down they were all in a state of funk.

4. As nothing could be got out of General Soumelas, the commission, now reinforced by Captain Kocher, French consul, and Captain Renedino, commandant of Turkish gendarmerie, continued to Broussa and took up their quarters at the Hôtel d'Anatolie (Mme. Brotte). The commission immediately proceeded to the commandant de la place (Colonel Ciola-Kapulo) and demanded guarantees for the safety of the town, and also arms for the gendarmerie. These latter numbered thirty all told. Colonel Ciola-Kapulo flatly refused either, and stated that he could not be responsible for anything. The Greek evacuation would be completed by 8 P.M., and he would then come to the hotel and hand Broussa over to the Inter-Allied Commission officially. The Turkish irregulars were pressing the Greeks, and rifle-fire was taking place all round the southern portions of the town. A few shells were fired by the Turks, but they were bursting too high up to be effective. Colonel Ciola-Kapulo was in a pitiable state. His nerve had completely gone, and it was quite hopeless to expect him to do anything. The European population and Christian elements had already been concentrated at various centres—the French consulate, Spanish ditto, French convent, Hôtel d'Anatolie, &c., and guards of the gendarmerie were posted to protect the inmates. The commission toured

the principal streets in the motor-car of the French consul, and were received with cheers by the very few inhabitants who chose to poke their noses outside their houses. However, it must have given them confidence. The commission returned to the hotel to await events and the arrival of the commandant de la place.

5. About 6·30 P.M. it was reported that the Greek soldiers who inhabited the house adjoining the French consulate had set fire to the house, apparently hoping that it would not be discovered until too late to save the consulate. Luckily the fire was discovered and put out.

6. At the same time the Greeks destroyed the bridges inside Broussa, and also blew up and set fire to their principal church. This building was completely destroyed and also some forty houses along with it. There is no doubt but that the Greeks did this themselves, as they were at that hour holding a line between the church and the Kemalists.

7. At 7 P.M. the Greeks started retiring, and much rifle fire took place. Even outside the hotel it was not quite healthy. The Turkish inhabitants apparently knew what was on, and much cheering took place. By 8 P.M. the Greeks were clear of Broussa, and the streets full of Turks yelling themselves hoarse and waving flags.

At 8·20 the chief of the Turkish irregulars, Puskulsuz, came to the hotel with his staff, all brigands, and was received with much applause, the French members being particularly cordial. These irregulars, all good fighters, were armed and very keen. I fear they give little quarter. When introduced and our names and nationality mentioned, I was the only one they offered their hands to.

Shortly afterwards the two leaders left in the French consul's car—no doubt to inform the Nationalist advance guard that Broussa had been evacuated.

8. In the meantime the French and Italian flags, large pattern, had been hoisted over the hotel. Directly the Greeks evacuated the town a similar Turkish flag was hoisted between the French and Italian flags. My original regret that I had not brought a Union Jack was therefore somewhat tempered. All firing died down by 8·45 P.M.

9. During one tour of the town numerous parties of Greek troops were encountered. They were all demoralised and no kick left in them. Very little effort on the part of the Turks would have led to an utter rout.

10. A large demonstration of the inhabitants of Broussa turned up outside the hotel, when cheers were raised for the Allies. The inhabitants believed that the town would have been destroyed if we had not arrived.

11. The night of the 10th–11th was quite calm. Very few rifle shots. Several bodies of cavalry passed through *en route* to Mudania. Horses small and fagged out. All shops (Turkish) were opened. Streets crowded, but very little excitement. At 9·30 the commission went to meet the advance guard of the Turkish troops. The 1st division under a Colonel Nafiz Bey; headquarters at the railway station. Upon the request of gendarmes safeguarding the lives and property of the Christian population he regretted he could not, as he expected the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps, General Shukri Pasha, to arrive at any moment. He referred the commission to the General Officer Commanding. Colonel Nafiz Bey was most courteous. The commission then proceeded to the hôtel de ville, where General Shukri Pasha had just arrived. He was also most courteous and obliging, and at once promised every assistance to protect the Christian population. Europeans need feel no alarm. They were quite safe. He was very grateful to us, as he considered our presence had saved the sack of Broussa.

12. I saw about half of the 1st division. The men must average 32 to 33 years of age, and look a hard-bitten lot. They have excellent discipline, and always salute us when we pass them. They always salute their own officers; they appear to be well clothed and fed. Well shod, though many of them had the native slipper with bandages. They prefer this footgear, especially in rough country. Their arms were not too well looked after; the Mauser predominating, though I noticed many other pattern rifles. I saw also four guns, Krupp, of sorts, light field pieces. They were well looked after. The guns were drawn by horses; but the ammunition wagons, by bullocks.

The officers and men wear no numbers, so it is difficult to find out their regiment, corps, &c.

13. General Shukri Pasha was asked to communicate with Constantinople and request a destroyer to be sent to Mudania to take the commission home, as, their work being finished, there was no need for them to remain in Broussa. The general stated that he regretted that he was not able to, as his wireless installation had not arrived.

He had received no information regarding the Inter-Allied Commission from Constantinople. The general was given a list of the houses the commission wished guarded, and he at once gave orders to the Turkish commandant de la place to post regular soldiers to guard them.

Shukri Pasha informed the commission that the Greek 11th division failed to get orders to retire from Gemlik, and he hoped to capture the lot. The 3rd and 10th Greek divisions were retiring upon Panderma.

Shukri Pasha appeared quite confident that there would be no trouble between the local people and the Christians.

14. At 7 P.M. fairly heavy fire from the north. Shells could be seen bursting on the Mudania hills, the commencement of the attack on the 11th division.

15. The night passed quietly. Gunfire from the north continued all day. The commission called upon General Neury Bey, commandant de la place. He was most agreeable, and complied with all requests regarding the safety of Christians. He promised to issue a proclamation to the inhabitants of Broussa not to molest the Christian population. Those found wandering about or in hiding the gendarmes were to arrest and take to the civil prison, where they would be protected.

This promise was carried into effect.

16. The town was most tranquil. The commission received most hearty welcome from the natives wherever they appeared. Frequent demonstrations at the hotel.

Shops full of food of all kinds. Prices 50 per cent. cheaper than at Constantinople. No lack of food.

17. At 5 P.M. the first batch of prisoners arrived, some 700 of them. Very depressed and sad-looking crowd. Great joy on the part of the Turks, but, beyond yelling, no harm was attempted. The town was *en fête* in the evening, but very orderly.

18. The Italian consul, M. Minzi, reported that he had just visited a Turkish village, where the Greeks had slaughtered some sixty odd women and children. Most of them had been violated before being killed. Women had their breasts cut off.

This was afterwards corroborated by Captain Kocher, the French consul, who also visited the scene of the atrocity.

19. A telegram was despatched to Constantinople via Mudania requesting a destroyer to be sent there to take the commission to Constantinople.

During the morning the commission called upon the newly-appointed Vali. He was most pleasant and very grateful to the commission for what they had done.

20. At 5·30 P.M. about 2,000 Greek prisoners of war arrived; most of them very exhausted. The most pathetic part of the show was that 90 per cent. of them were wearing their caps and shouting "Vive Kemal!" This pleased the inhabitants. They looked like a crowd who would do anything to save their skins. I saw one soldier of the escort strike one prisoner with his whip.

21. Early on the 14th the commission paid a farewell call on Colonel Neury Bey. He informed us that Shukri Pasha had gone towards Panderma. The Greek army is penned in near Panderma, and the Turks expect to round them up shortly.

The commission left Broussa at 2·15 P.M., and are at Mudania at 5·30 P.M. Several corpses along the road. Among the olive groves close to Mudania the Greeks had apparently made a short stand. Some 200 dead lying about. Still 5,000 refugees at Mudania, mostly women and children; no food and very little water. From various reports the Greeks stampeded and rushed the ships which were taking off refugees. They pushed a large number of women and children into the sea. Their bodies are still floating about. The Turks are guarding the refugees, but they wish someone would take them away. The stench is most dreadful.

22. Mudania full of supplies, stores, &c.; innumerable motor vehicles; many field guns and ammunition; numerous cattle.

23. The commission embarked at 6 P.M. on the French destroyer "Toures," which arrived at Tophane 10·45 P.M.

24. In conclusion, the Greek troops are utterly demoralised and not a kick left in them. They will be a negligible quantity for some time to come.

The Kemalists are well disciplined, very keen and a dangerous quantity. They will be sure to suffer from swollen heads. Up to date they have behaved well. They have not permitted any atrocities. How long this will last no one knows.

H. GWYNNE HOWELL, *Major, R.A.*

Constantinople, September 15, 1922.

[E 10387/27/44] No. 31.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 840.)

Constantinople, September 25, 1922.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd instant to speak to him about the situation.

2. I pointed out that, in view of the tension which prevailed here in consequence of the uncertainty of Mustapha Kemal's intentions, it was absolutely necessary that the Central Government should do nothing which could contribute to provoke disorders in the town. I said that the arrests of Armenians and Greeks coming from the southern ports of the Marmora must cease, and I spoke to his Highness in particular about the case of an Ottoman Greek who is under sentence of death and who, I had learnt, was to be executed at any moment.

3. Izzet Pasha agreed with me that moderation was necessary in the present circumstances. He promised to take up the case of the Ottoman Greek at once and he appeared to be impressed by what I said with reference to the arrests of Armenians and Greeks. I may mention that the pretext given for these arrests is that the persons in question have been implicated in looting the houses of Mussulman subjects before and during the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor.

4. We then spoke of the possibility of disorders in the town. I said that we knew that there had lately been an influx of bad elements, who would take the first opportunity to create disorders. There were also a fair number of Russian Communists, who would not be slow to fish in troubled waters. I said that it was certain that large numbers of Turks were armed. Izzet Pasha replied that the Turks had no doubt armed themselves for protection against the Greeks, many of whom it was known were armed. I told Izzet Pasha that we had good reason to believe that some 20,000 Turks in this city had arms. In this connection I may mention that the Œcumenical Patriarchate recently stated in writing that it could place 30,000 armed Greeks at the disposal of the British authorities if their services were required. I need hardly say that, whilst I forwarded a copy of this note to General Harington, I do not propose in any circumstances to avail myself of the Patriarchate's offer, for I cannot conceive anything more dangerous than to utilise the Greeks of Constantinople in the manner suggested.

5. Izzet Pasha then read me a note which had been prepared for the Council of Ministers on the subject of the capacity of the Turkish police to put down disorders. This note stated that Constantinople was policed by a Turkish force consisting of 300 gendarmes and 300 ordinary police. If the inter-Allied police lent their assistance the Turkish authorities felt themselves capable of suppressing all disorders. They suggested, however, that the force of gendarmes might be increased. I am informing General Harington of this suggestion, but I do not suppose it will commend itself to him.

6. We then reverted to the position of the Sultan. Izzet Pasha said that His Majesty was resigned to the course of events and was bearing himself with a dignity which commanded respect. Although Izzet Pasha has no particular reason for attachment to the Sultan, he spoke with considerable feeling regarding His Majesty's demeanour and he said that the Sultan was the best member of the House of Osman at the present moment. Nevertheless, His Majesty had many enemies, and I inferred that, in Izzet Pasha's opinion, the Sultan's position was a critical one. His Highness scouted the idea that Mustapha Kemal, whose ambitions are considerable, could put aside the House of Osman and found a new dynasty in his own person.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 10422/27/44] No. 32.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 511.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, September 26, 1922.*

IT appeared to me probable that, as soon as the precautions to be taken by the British Naval Commander-in-chief at Constantinople for the purpose of regulating traffic in the Bosphorus and with the Black Sea becomes known, some outcry in the ill-informed section of the Roumanian press might arise to the effect that a blockade had been declared which was injuring the sea-borne trade of the country.

During a visit which my Greek colleague paid me this morning, he too evinced some anxiety on the subject and spoke of the closing of the Straits as an unfortunate circumstance. I asked him if he would prefer that all and sundry vessels, possibly including Soviet ships, should have the free run of adjacent waters during the crisis, and thereby be enabled perhaps to transport Kemalist troops and ammunition to the European side, to Thrace and elsewhere. I pointed out that any restrictions or inspection would be fully justified at the present juncture, and declared, my conviction that all nations concerned would cheerfully acquiesce in the expediency of such temporary measures as were deemed necessary by those responsible for avoiding further hostilities. M. Panas said he was bound to admit this, and the subject was dropped.

I called later in the morning at the Foreign Office to convey a message from His Majesty's Government to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and thought it advisable to mention that Roumanian public opinion should not be permitted to be nervous, should navigation in the Straits have to be temporarily suspended owing to the necessity of preventing Kemalist troops from penetrating into Europe. M. Duca cordially agreed, saying that such restrictive measures would not only be opportune but probably inevitable for a while. I have since noted an inspired and reassuring leading article in the "Indépendance roumaine" on this very subject:—

> "A telegram from San Paolo announces that the British authorities at Constantinople have ordered the interruption of maritime traffic through the Straits. Although this news is not officially confirmed, there is no reason why such a measure should cause the slightest anxiety, as it can only be of a transitory nature and taken by the British authorities for the purpose of avoiding contact between the Allied troops and those of Kemal Pasha.
>
> "The Oriental crisis seems to be progressing towards pacific settlement; Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and M. Sforza appear to have succeeded in reconciling views which had formerly not coincided, and it seems that the Allies have agreed to restore Constantinople to the Turks.
>
> "As regards Thrace, a formula is being sought which will reconcile Turkish sovereignty with the control of the League of Nations. There is every reason to hope, in regard to the important problem of the Straits, that the principle of internationalisation will be maintained, and that the Allied Powers will be able to ensure complete freedom of navigation."

The latest telegrams of the Lafayette Agency are then quoted in support of this view.

The message to which I refer earlier in this despatch was the enquiry as to whether the Roumanian Government would be able to supply oil, wheat and fresh provisions for a naval force of some 4,000, and whether they would be willing, in the circumstances, to permit the use of Constantza as a base. Having this morning received a telegram from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople indicating that the Naval Commander-in-chief desired the enquiry to be made, I lost no time in consulting M. Duca. He made no difficulty, and said he would at once consult his colleagues particularly concerned, and let me know the reply without delay. Probably before this reaches your Lordship I shall have been able to telegraph an answer, which I will, of course, repeat to Sir Horace Rumbold.

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING.

[E 10389/27/44] No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 844. Secret.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September 26, 1922.*

THE sweeping successes of the Kemalists and the consequent menace to the Allied position in Constantinople have produced a feeling of alarm amounting almost to consternation in the capital. The foreign colonies fear general disorder. The native Christians and a large number of Turks who believe themselves to be compromised in the eyes of the Kemalists are in dread of the vengeance of the latter, if they should establish themselves in Constantinople.

2. Though the situation is uncertain and may at any time take a serious turn, I still hope that the fears of the population generally will prove to be exaggerated. There are, however, a certain number of anti-Kemalist Turks, and members of the Greek and Armenian communities, who have played a leading rôle since the armistice, whose fears for their personal safety are only too well founded.

3. I have received numerous appeals from individuals belonging to these various categories for assistance in leaving Constantinople. My first concern is of course for the British colony, for whose evacuation, in case of need, all preparations have been made. I cannot, however, ignore the fact that many of the natives who have appealed to me have a moral claim to receive some assistance. This applies more particularly to certain Turks who identified themselves with efforts to combat the Kemalist movement at a time when His Majesty's Government were strongly in favour of all such efforts and to certain Greeks and Armenians who have been closely associated with the work of this High Commission on behalf of the minorities.

4. In these circumstances I have arranged with General Harington for a limited issue of passes to enable such persons to proceed to destinations abroad. It appeared to me preferable that the passes should be given in the name of the general officer commanding-in-chief, acting as chief of the Allied forces of occupation, rather than in my own, as I wished to avoid as far as possible the appearance of affording protection on purely political grounds. General Harington has been good enough to concur in this procedure, and has arranged for the passes to be issued on his behalf to selected persons indicated by this High Commission.

5. I shall endeavour to limit the issue of passes to a relatively small number of persons, but once it is known that they are being issued applications will be numerous, and the extent to which they are granted or refused must depend a good deal on the course of events. I am also endeavouring to vary the destinations, and I do not propose to ask General Harington to issue passes for Egypt or Palestine except to a limited number of persons for whom in the abnormal conditions I feel I can accept responsibility. I am asking Lord Allenby and Sir H. Samuel to give admission to persons provided with these special passes.

6. The claim of the persons mentioned above, especially the Turks, is a moral one. In one case, however, namely that of Damad Ferid Pasha, I have had to recognise a claim of an even stronger and much more definite kind, for reasons of which your Lordship is aware and which came into existence when he vacated the office of Grand Vizier after authorising the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres. He returned to Constantinople from his recent journey in the height of the excitement created by the Kemalist victory over the Greeks. A week or so later he wisely decided to return to Europe accompanied by his family. He himself with his wife, Princess Mediha, his stepson, Prince Sami Bey, and two servants left some days ago for Italy. Prince Sami's family with some other servants and a Colonel Tahir Bey, who is closely associated with Ferid Pasha, left for Malta a day earlier with the assistance of the naval authorities and will probably join Ferid Pasha in Italy or in France. Both parties were provided, as an exceptional measure, with passes issued at this High Commission under my authority.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
High Commissioner.

[E 10419/27/44] No. 34.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 413.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, September 28, 1922.*

ON the 24th instant, M. de Lens, the French Chargé d'Affaires, communicated to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs in the name of Great Britain, France and Italy the text of the note which was being despatched to the Grand National Assembly at Angora. On its terms being made public, the newspapers expressed generally disappointment at the retrocession to the Turks of Adrianople and Thrace to the Maritza frontier: and M. Nincic, on his return from Paris late on the night of the 25th, met the reproaches of some reporters at the railway station with the pertinent remark that if the Serbs had been willing to furnish an army of 200,000 men some other solution might have been possible.

Having allowed M. Nincic a day or two to settle himself back in his Ministry, I asked yesterday for an interview, and he received me this morning.

M. Nincic expressed the pleasure he felt at the reception which had been given him in London and at the personal relations which he had now established with so many of His Majesty's Ministers, at Genoa, at Geneva, and now in London and Paris. He is also much satisfied at having served in some degree as a bridge between the conflicting British and French points of view. To this service, I may here mention, and to the respect which M. Nincic says he has found to exist in the west for the capabilities of the Serb-Croat-Slovene army, considerable publicity has been given and the self-esteem of the nation has been raised.

M. Nincic then proceeded to speak of the detachment of 200 soldiers which it appears he promised, subject to ratification by the Council of Ministers, to despatch to the Straits to demonstrate the solidarity of this country in the Near East question. As this demonstration carried with it the potentiality of a recourse to arms, the equipment of the army became a matter of immediate importance. The French Government had recently given this Government a credit for 100,000,000 fr. for purposes of armament. It was feared that the French might take offence at any decision of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to despatch this contingent and might cut off or defer this credit. The question of this detachment would be brought before the Council of Ministers as soon as M. Pasic returned, and M. Nincic was desirous of being in a position to meet the objections of his colleagues as regards the bad condition of the equipment of the Serbian army and the want of funds for its re-equipment by an assurance that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give the same credit as the French and furnish the equipment, in the event of the French taking the obstructive line thought possible. M. Nincic added that he thought 100,000,000 fr. was much too little, and he also seemed in his confused way to wish to secure the credit from the British Government, even if the detachments were not furnished. He added the proviso that the charges for the British material should not be at a higher rate than the French were offering.

I may here mention that a few days ago I heard from a fairly good source that the French had offered a credit of 300,000,000 fr., and that General Martic had started for Paris to select the material. It has also been announced that General Martic was to represent the Serbian army at the French manœuvres.

In my telegram No. 129 of to-day conveying this request, I mentioned, as I have done above, that M. Nincic described the despatch of the contingent as destined to mark the solidarity of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. But I could not elucidate exactly the solidarity with whom: that is to say, with Great Britain, or with joint action of Great Britain and France. Your Lordship will, of course, know what you asked from M. Nincic and what he promised. In reply to my questioning, I gathered that the contingent was only for the European shore of the Straits: and whether the employment of the Serbian army, of which the rearming was desired, was contemplated in contingencies arising from what I understood to be the intention of His Majesty's Government, viz., the defence by force of arms of strategical points on the Asiatic shore, was not at all clear. In default, however, of any instructions from your Lordship I did not press the point.

M. Nincic dwelt on the dangers of the situation. He had heard that the Soviet Government was preparing to take military action. He was sure in that eventuality Germany would also act. He expressed, of course, his usual fear of the Hungarians and the Bulgarians, and repeated his usual reproaches against the Powers for not having more effectively disarmed those peoples. He said that the Bulgarians possessed more rifles than the Serbs.

As some paper had attributed a remark to M. Nincic to the effect that Bulgaria had asked for an autonomous Western Thrace and that some parties in this country were not unfavourable to such a project, I questioned him on this point. He said "No, Thrace must remain Greek." It was true that M. Stamboulisky, whom he had seen at Geneva, had made that proposition to him, at the same time offering, as that statesman usually did, Salonica. I gathered from M. Nincic that he had not turned down M. Stamboulisky's proposition as regards Western Thrace so categorically as he might have done.

I also asked M. Nincic whether he had any fears with regard to the effects of Kemal Pasha's victories on the Mussulman population of this country. He said as regards the Macedonian Mussulmans he had fears of an insurrection, but the Moslems of Bosnia were all of Serbian race.

Apropos of this point, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Sarajevo containing a selection of press articles.* These articles rather confirm the impression which I have formed that if events in the Near East should take an unfortunate turn in respect of which Great Britain may have to look for armed assistance from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom there are considerable factors in the internal situation of this country which may influence its Government towards a course of extreme prudence. These particular articles were of course written before the generous concessions to Kemal Pasha's demands were decided on and made known.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have received a long telegram from Moscow, which is doubtless a replica of similar messages sent by the Soviet Government to the other Allies. It protests against any decisions being taken in regard to the future of Constantinople and the Straits without the presence of the representatives of Russia, and would appear to conclude by summoning a conference of its own. This Government have not yet decided what reply to send, but it is likely that, as on previous occasions, no reply will be sent at all.

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

[E 10421/27/44] No. 35.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 416.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, September 28, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 413 of to-day respecting the attitude of this Government towards the Near East question, I have the honour to state that the "Zagreb Tagblatt," which is generally well informed, in reporting the proceedings at the Ministerial Council held on the return of M. Nincic, states that—

> "M. Nincic described the activity in the west of himself and M. Pasic, and explained the divergence in the views of England and France, and what M. Nincic had done to bring about so speedy a reconciliation of views. The Minister reported that the English Government had requested that a detachment of 150 to 200 soldiers should be sent to Gallipoli. He had promised this in London. His personal opinion was that these soldiers should be sent in order thereby to mark the Serbian solidarity with the Great *Entente*. Some members of the Government opposed this course, insomuch as they thought that its adoption would as much as signify the adhesion of our State to the English point of view. As matters, since the departure of M. Nincic from Paris, had changed in some respects, the Government decided to wait for the return of M. Pasic.
>
> "In regard to this interview with M. Stambolisky, M. Nincic explained that M. Stambolisky had requested the support of our Government in connection with the question of the autonomy of Thrace. M. Stambolisky would engage that, if our Government gave this support, he would in the future completely abandon the Macedonian-Bulgarian question. In regard to the Bulgarian komitajis, M. Stambolisky had been very reserved and manœuvred with the same phrases which the Bulgarian Government had always paraded. There could, of course, be

* Not printed.

no question of a support on the part of our Government to Bulgaria in the question of Thrace. All questions raised in M. Nincic's report were only informally discussed, and no decisions were taken, the Ministers agreeing that the return of M. Pasic must be awaited."

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG

[E 10413/27/44] No. 36.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 882.)

My Lord, *Rome, September* 29, 1922.

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd September I called at once upon the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and pointed out to him that the allegation of the Italian press that there had been an attempt on your part to exclude Italy from the deliberations at Paris was a gross misrepresentation of the facts of the case. I gave his Excellency the explanations contained in your telegram, and requested him to issue an immediate *démenti*.

Signor Schanzer replied that to his great regret he was unable to do anything of the kind. He would give your Lordship every credit for not having desired to wound Italian susceptibilities. But it was perfectly obvious that any such meeting as you had had in Paris with M. Poincaré at the present juncture could only be in reference to affairs in which Italy was vitally interested. He could not accept any analogy between such a visit and those which he might himself have paid to the French Foreign Minister on other occasions. Your Lordship's action was bound to be regarded throughout Italy, and indeed throughout the world, as an attempt to reach a settlement of the Near Eastern question in conjunction with France without Italian participation. He had fully expressed his own views on the subject in the correspondence which had passed between Count Sforza and Lord Hardinge. In the circumstances the animadversions in the Italian press were entirely justified, and he could not possibly issue a *démenti*. He added that the Italians were a susceptible race, and that their feelings were easily wounded. With this remark I could cordially agree. I said that in view of his Excellency's refusal I proposed to issue a *démenti* myself. He answered that I was of course at liberty to do so, but that he would strongly advise me not to, as it would serve no useful purpose and would only aggravate feeling.

I had taken the opportunity at the same time of calling Signor Schanzer's attention to the abominable tone recently adopted by the Italian press in its references to Great Britain, and the abuse which it was showering upon His Majesty's Government, and more especially upon the Prime Minister. Little attention had hitherto been paid in the British press to these slanders, but if they continued Anglo-Italian relations must inevitably suffer. With this his Excellency entirely agreed. He promised to send that afternoon for the representatives in Rome of the Italian press and to speak to them very strongly on the subject, insisting that they should modify their tone. I consider this more important than the issue of a *démenti*; for the explanations contained in your telegram of the 22nd September have already been discounted in the Italian newspapers and were unlikely to produce any useful effect. I have referred to the above subject in a separate despatch.

With reference to an allusion to Anglo-Italian friendship, Signor Schanzer declared that it had always been his personal policy to favour a close understanding and co-operation with His Majesty's Government, and he had done everything that lay in his power towards this object. But the fulfilment of any such policy was now out of the question. Italian public feeling, after the conference at Genoa had, as I was aware, been strongly pro-British and anti-French, but he regretted to record that there had been a complete reversal of opinion. This was due to the attitude adopted towards Italy since the conference by His Majesty's Government, from which Italy had suffered a series of failures, slights and humiliations. He had, with great reluctance arrived at the conclusion that His Majesty's Government attributed little, if any, importance to Italian friendship. I protested strongly against such an idea, and requested his Excellency to furnish me with further explanations. He quoted the recent incident with Count Sforza in Paris, the British refusal to accept the Italian proposal for an immediate conference at Venice, the ill-success that had attended his own visit to London, and Lord Balfour's attitude on the League of Nations at Geneva, especially in regard to Italy and Austria.

The discussion then turned to the situation in the Near East. I asked Signor Schanzer what the Italian Government had meant in their note of the 13th September (see my telegram No. 278), when they had stated their agreement with His Majesty's Government on the question of the Straits, and had declared that the necessary instructions had been issued to the Italian civil and military representatives in Constantinople. If, as appeared to be the case, this assurance signified that Italian naval and military co-operation was at once to be withdrawn I could only say that its terms were singularly misleading. His Excellency showed considerable discomfort, and could only maintain that Italian public opinion would not for a moment tolerate that the life of one Italian sailor or soldier should be sacrificed in conflict with the Turks. He feared that the British attitude would be regarded as provocative by the Turks, and might precipitate a collision. I said that if the Allied Governments were free to quote the plea of public feeling as a reason for evading their obligations, the precedent was one of extreme danger. There had, in the past, been a divergency of opinion between the British and Italian Governments in the Turco-Greek conflict, although we were in no sense hostile to the Turks, but in the present situation there was surely only one possible attitude. The Allied Powers must defend the Straits at all costs, and not trust to Turkish promises. Orientals were excellent at bargaining and would always present a maximum demand. If they saw that there would be no effective opposition to this demand they would obviously insist upon obtaining it in full. I could not see what use there would be in a conference if Constantinople and the Straits lay at the mercy of the Turk. I had some experience of the East, and knew that while the policy of firmness paid, that of propitiation and scuttle never produced satisfactory results. In any case, whatever France or Italy might do, the policy of His Majesty's Government was perfectly clear; it was in the best interests of a permanant peace, it would not only safeguard the results of the war, but also prevent the spread of the conflict to Europe. This policy would be supported by adequate force, and had the approval of the British Empire. In this connection I begged his Excellency not to believe a word of what appeared in the "Daily Mail" and other papers, which were, for personal reasons, hostile to His Majesty's Government. The "Daily Mail" was widely read, but had no influence upon instructed opinion and very little even upon that of the mass of its readers. Nor could Moslem feeling in India or elsewhere, however strong, be allowed to carry undue weight in matters of vital imperial interest. Great Britain meant to see the matter through, and the moment a shot was fired national feeling would sweep every trace of internal opposition away. But I begged his Excellency to consider whether, if we were left to face the Turk alone, the death knell of existing alliances would not have been rung. Signor Schanzer replied that he had no doubt that all I told him was perfectly true. The British Empire was a mighty Power with vital interests to defend. But in the present instance there were no similar Italian interests, and he could only repeat that any Italian Government which attempted to fight the Turks would be swept from office at once. However, he trusted that the situation which I had depicted would never arise. Both the French and Italian Governments were pouring good advice upon Mustapha Kemal, and were imploring him to take no aggressive action. In his opinion Thrace was the danger point. According to all the information at his disposal the Greek civil and military administrations there were in full dissolution, and the Turks had already succeeded in introducing large numbers of disguised officers and emissaries.

I spoke to his Excellency in the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 280, and he promised that the Italian Government would do everything that lay in their power to help the Smyrna refugees. The Italian naval authorities had already saved over 5,000 Greeks as against a far smaller number of Italians and had incurred considerable criticism and even odium on this account.

He enquired whether I knew anything of a French proposal that M. Franklin-Bouillon should be sent on a mission to Kemal on behalf of the three Powers. He strongly deprecated any such idea. He had no confidence in M. Franklin- Bouillon, and in so far as Italy was concerned could not entrust her interests to him. I had at that time no information on the subject.

Finally, Signor Schanzer begged me to assure your Lordship that his own friendly feelings towards His Majesty's Government had suffered no change, and that you could count on his full support in every effort to secure a peaceful solution of the present crisis.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 10414/27/44] No. 37.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 885.) *Rome, September 28, 1922.*

My Lord,

IN my telegram No. 285 of the 23rd instant I referred to the extreme ill-feeling manifested in this country at the attempt, which is attributed to His Majesty's Government, to exclude Italy from a rightful share in the discussion of the Near Eastern crisis at Paris. The hostile comments were not confined to criticism of the propriety of your Lordship's conversations taking place without the presence of Count Sforza, but took the form of a general abuse, which in some quarters went so far as to include offensively-couched suggestions that the wealth of Sir B. Zaharof was of very immediate moment in the policy of the Prime Minister. Under these circumstances I thought it advisable, as reported in my telegram No. 285 of the 23rd instant, to draw the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to this exaggerated press campaign, which could serve no useful Italian interest, while it exceeded the widest bounds of inter-Allied courtesy.

There are some indications that Signor Schanzer's promise to bring official pressure on the Italian journalists has been carried out. This is apparent from one or two more friendly references in the "Tribuna," the paper with which the Italian Government is at present most closely in touch. "It must be admitted to the credit of the British Government," writes this paper (26th September), "that, having once recognised the error of its first programme of intransigence, it has not taken up a line of obstinacy or *amour-propre*, but has been open to persuasion, and has, in these last days, shown no other desire than to subordinate its private views to the cause of peace and of inter-Allied solidarity—a merit which is far from detracting from that of the French and Italian delegates, who succeeded in inducing a more realistic view of the situation of the mind of the British representative."

The columns of the "Tribuna" have also been used by the Consulta to discourage the prevalent tendency to insist at all costs on the choice of Venice as the seat of the conference, and, with the exception of leading articles by Rastignac (who is a free lance), this paper has recently been studiously moderate in tone.

I cannot, unfortunately, say that Signor Schanzer's intervention has had any serious effect on newspapers less officially linked with the Government. A slightly less abusive tone is noticeable in the "Giornale di Roma," but the "Popolo d'Italia," to whose violent anti-English propensities I have several times had occasion to refer, has in no way mitigated its language, and leaves little hope that the Fascista section of the country is likely to be converted from the Anglophobia, which seems to have become a party tenet.

A more serene atmosphere is nevertheless prevalent this week in the press at large, and if fewer hard words are being used, this is to be attributed, I think, less to any mitigating action on the part of the Consulta, than to the relief and satisfaction which is felt at the presentation of the joint note, which is regarded not only as a step towards peace, but as a very signal success of Italian diplomacy. The opinions generally expressed on the joint note and on the present phase of the crisis are briefly reported in my telegram No. 293 of to-day's date. I have the honour to enclose herewith a more detailed summary of press comments.*

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 10427/27/44] No. 38.

M. Diamandy to Mr. Lloyd George.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 3.)

(Translation.) *Roumanian Legation, London, September 29, 1922.*

Mr. Prime Minister,

IN order to bring into harmony the points of view of the British Government and of the Roumanian Government in regard to the present situation in Europe, and in regard to the consequences which might follow on military operations in the Near East, my Government, as a result of the message which your Excellency was so good as to

* Not printed.

cause to be transmitted to M. Bratiano, has instructed me to proceed to an exchange of views with the British Government and to establish a common agreement on the following special points:—

Roumania regards the complications which have arisen in the Near East as capable of threatening European peace and the territorial *status quo* as established by the treaties not only in the Balkans, but also in Central Europe.

In the opinion of the Roumanian Government, the affairs of the Near East should be considered not from a local point of view, but in the wider light of the general developments to which they may give rise.

The relationship, in the nature of an alliance, between Angora and Moscow, not to mention the less open relationship with Sofia, which the official representatives of the Soviets specially and openly insisted on even at Genoa, leave no doubt as to the close solidarity which binds the Kemalists to the Bolsheviks.

If the point of view of the Roumanian Government is correct, Roumania may be called to defend herself against attacks on all her frontiers; but circumstances make it her duty to devote her principal attention to her eastern frontier, which at any moment may be faced with a sudden threat from Russia—a threat which would not fail to entail for the whole of Europe the most disastrous consequences.

The Roumanian Government would be glad to learn that His Britannic Majesty's Government, influenced by the same considerations, recognised the principle of the unity of all the fronts which may be attacked in Europe.

In order to guard against these eventualities, the Roumanian Government begs His Britannic Majesty's Government to be so good as to supply the complement of arms, equipment and military stores required by the Roumanian army, of which a list can be supplied to the War Office. This would enable the necessary precautions to be taken. The Roumanian Government ventures to request that steps should be taken to send this material with the least possible delay in order to avoid the grave consequences which in this respect we all had to deplore during the last war.

In the event of a Russian attack taking place on the Dniester frontier, the Roumanian Government would be particularly grateful if it might be assured of the presence of the British flag by the side of the Roumanian army, if only by the despatch of a single British detachment to that front.

As regards the Roumanian detachment to be sent to Constantinople, the Roumanian Government, not possessing itself sufficient means of transport, begs His Britannic Majesty's Government to be so good as to undertake the transport of this contingent both going and coming. It also hopes that, in so far as the provisioning of the detachment is concerned, in territory regarding which it is completely ignorant, it may be able to obtain from the British military authorities all necessary facilities.

Roumania expresses the desire to participate with rights equal to those of the interested Powers in the conversations, conferences and decisions on those questions which affect her vital interests in the affairs of the Near East, of Central Europe and of Russia.

With special reference to the question of the Straits, the Roumanian Government considers that the solution which would conform most closely to the general interests of all the Powers would be one which should maintain the liberty of the Straits by the institution of a mixed commission similar to the former European Danube Commission, and which should extend its right of control on both shores of the Straits, both shores being demilitarised.

The participation of Roumania in this commission would be established on the lines indicated above.

The Roumanian Government is opposed to the establishment of common frontiers between Turkey and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, if this should lead to divergences of view between our great Allies, a solution might be considered by which a neutral zone in military occupation should be created between the two States.

The Roumanian Government reserves its right to conclude, should this prove desirable, similar arrangements with the Italian and French Governments.

The Roumanian Government would be glad to receive from the British Government a reply by which it might be assured that there is a complete agreement of view on all these points.

Please accept, &c.

CONST. DIAMANDY.

[E 10374/27/44] No. 39.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 2308.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 2, 1922.*

JUST before the departure of the bag this evening, I received the accompanying note with its enclosure from the Quai d'Orsay, in which a comparison is drawn between the various points of M. Franklin-Bouillon's programme for the conference at Mudania and the instructions sent to Sir Horace Rumbold contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 455 to Constantinople, of which I communicated the first portion to M. Poincaré this morning.

The divergencies between M Franklin-Bouillon's programme and the instructions sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner do not seem to me to merit very serious attention, since some of the provisions of the programme are not in absolute conformity with the Allied decisions of the 23rd September which form the basis of the conference. I propose to point this out to the President of the Council.

I have, &c

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

P.S.—A copy of the note which I am addressing to-night to M. Poincaré is also herewith enclosed. H.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 2 octobre* 1922.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL m'a prié de vous communiquer d'urgence la note ci-jointe, qui résume les points de vue exposés, d'une part, par la note que votre Excellence lui a remise ce matin et, d'autre part, dans le dernier télégramme de M. Franklin-Bouillon.

En transmettant d'urgence par le télégraphe cette note au Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople, M. Poincaré a dit au Général Pellé qu'il croirait dangereux de lui proposer dès maintenant des solutions immuables. Il a prié notre Haut-Commissaire de prescrire au Général Charpy de s'efforcer, d'accord avec son collègue italien, de concilier les points de vue en présence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

E. DE PERETTI DE LA ROCCA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

Note on the Divergencies between M. Franklin-Bouillon's Programme and the Instructions sent to Sir H. Rumbold.

LES Kémalistes demandent avant tout l'évacuation de la Thrace orientale. Le Gouvernement anglais déclare qu'aucune pression ne peut être exercée sur les Grecs pour l'évacuation de la Thrace au delà de la ligne qui sera fixée par les généraux avant que, d'une part, les forces kémalistes n'aient évacué les zones neutres et, d'autre part, les arrangements soient intervenus pour le maintien de l'ordre et la protection de toutes les minorités dans les régions évacuées.

2. Les Kémalistes proposent que les troupes alliées, c'est-à-dire anglaises, et les troupes turques restent sur leurs positions actuelles. Le Gouvernement anglais exige l'évacuation complète des zones neutres par les Turcs.

3. En Thrace, les Kémalistes prévoient un contrôle et une occupation restreints et une administration interalliée *pendant trente jours*. Le Gouvernement anglais prévoit un contrôle interallié appuyé par une gendarmerie locale renforcée au besoin par des forces alliées *pendant la durée de la conférence*.

4. Les Kémalistes demandent qu'après trente jours l'administration soit confiée à des fonctionnaires et à des gendarmes kémalistes. Le Gouvernement anglais déclare inutile de remettre l'administration au Gouvernement de Constantinople et ne prévoit pas sa remise au Gouvernement d'Angora.

5. Les Turcs demandent que des troupes alliées soient intercalées entre les Grecs et la Thrace à l'ouest de la Maritza, pour protéger la Thrace orientale, laissée provisoirement sans troupes turques. Le Gouvernement anglais n'envisage rien à cet égard, sans doute parce qu'il prévoit que l'occupation alliée sera maintenue pendant la conférence.

6. Les Kémalistes pensent que toutes les conditions de l'évacuation et l'organisation de l'administration provisoire doivent être fixées par les généraux à Moudania. Le Gouvernement anglais entend que les généraux ne s'occupent que des questions militaires telles que la fixation de la ligne d'évacuation, les questions de l'administration provisoire, du maintien de l'ordre et de la protection des minorités, c'est-à-dire de l'administration provisoire de la Thrace devant être réglées *par les Hauts-Commissaires*.

Par contre, les Kémalistes et le Gouvernement anglais sont d'accord pour que les troupes turques ne pénètrent en Thrace qu'après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix.

Enfin, les Kémalistes fixent, d'une part, un délai de huit jours après le protocole de Moudania pour l'évacuation des troupes grecques sous la direction et par les soins des Alliés et prévoient, d'autre part, que les tribunaux alliés auront à connaître des violations du protocole et des abus commis par les Grecs pendant la période d'occupation interalliée. Les instructions du Gouvernement britannique ne visent pas ces deux points.

Enclosure 3 in No. 39.

Lord Hardinge to M. Poincaré.

My dear President of the Council, *Paris, October 2, 1922.*

I AM much obliged to your Excellency for sending me the note, through M. de Peretti, pointing out the divergencies between M. Franklin-Bouillon's latest telegram and the instructions sent to Sir Horace Rumbold.

I feel confident that at to-morrow's meeting a complete agreement will be arrived at, but I think that it is my duty to point out that the instructions sent to Sir Horace are based strictly on the decisions arrived at in Paris on the 23rd September.

Believe me, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

No. 40.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 536.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 278.

Greek army air service. Machines at present serviceable:—

Bregueis: Thrace, 6; Salonica for Thrace, 4. Total, 10.

Repairable: [?20] Bregueis when spares arrive from France.

Machines ordered: First expected a week hence and remainder within a month, 15 Armstrong-Siddeley single-seater scouts with spares. An English pilot will accompany machines to instruct.

Pilots, 50, of whom 10 have flown Spads. Observers, 25. Mechanics, about 80 in all.

Navy. Useful war machines:—

At Tatoi: D.H.9, serviceable, 12; unserviceable, 12. Vallilla (Italian single-seater fighters V.A. type), serviceable, 2; unserviceable, 7. At Phaleron: Hamble Baby seaplanes, possibly serviceable, 3.

Other machines, 4 serviceable Avros at Tatoi.

Pilots effective for land work, 10; observers, 10. Numbers have been recently reduced more by politics than by war. National movement, if effective, may give 50 per cent. increase.

Other ranks, 500, including fitter [groups omitted by cable company] good (mostly warrant and petty officers) and 50 moderate.

Spare parts, scarce.

Organisation, poor.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 41.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 539.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 2, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 329 to Paris.

Minister of Public Assistance much gratified.

It is suggested by his Excellency and by British Committee that, as there are now almost 50,000 refugees at Salonica and many more in Thrace, part of train might remain at Salonica with part of staff. Rest might come on to Athens, which would be best centre for organisation and administration.

Flour is greatly needed owing to serious bread shortage.

No. 42.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 540.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 2, 1922.

MY telegram No. 535.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that General Mazarakis will be accompanied from Athens by Colonel Plastiras and two junior assistants. "Sphendone" will call at Rodosto to pick up Sariyannis, and so will only reach Mudania very early on 4th October. As Greek Government are not fully informed of objects of conference, they have only been able to instruct Mazarakis on the assumption that it will deal exclusively with questions of delimitation line in Thrace. Should discussions extend beyond this, therefore, their delegates will have to keep in close touch with Greek Government at Athens, and Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that every facility for correspondence between the two may be granted.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 43.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 505.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 2, 1922.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

In course of discussion respecting the impossibility of the Allies making definite engagements prior to Kemalists' acceptance of conference proposals, I asked French High Commissioner, in support of my own argument, what the attitude of his Government would be if Turks subordinated acceptance to certain reservations, such as participation of Soviet Government at conference.

French High Commissioner declared that French Government would not be prepared to admit proposal.

It was also arranged at meeting that questions affecting movements and dispositions of British troops were matters for direct arrangement between General Harington and the Turkish general. General Harington mentioned in this respect that his Allied colleagues had given him assurances of their loyal support in endeavouring to prevent any outbreak of hostilities between British and Turkish forces.

No. 44.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 506.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October* 3, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 456 (second part of No. 455).

I entirely share your views as to undesirability of spinning out Mudania Conference.

I cannot, however, see how generals can avoid settling in principle question of civil administration of evacuated area during transitional period.

There is general agreement that it would be useless to propose to hand over civil administration to Constantinople Government, main reason being that Kemal would refuse.

My Allied colleagues and I consider only alternative is to consent to Kemalists taking over civil administration. Once Greeks have evacuated militarily it would be impossible to maintain present civil administration, which is Greek. It would be equally impossible for Allies themselves to construct temporary civil administration.

If His Majesty's Government agree that Kemalists must be allowed to take over civil administration at once, it would be useless for us to attempt to exercise any general control of it.

Our efforts would in that case necessarily be confined to endeavouring to prevent violent upheaval and exodus of Christians by insisting on maintenance of Allied commissions and, if necessary, military detachments and attachment of Allied officers to local gendarmerie.

It appears to me that these are points which generals must have power to settle at Mudania meeting if it is to produce definite results.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 165.)

No. 45.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 507.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 3, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 456.

Three inter-Allied commissions are leaving Constantinople to-day for Rodosto, Lule Burgas and Adrianople. Greek High Commissioner has been notified and requested to procure necessary facilities for these commissions. Their task is to exercise a calming effect on population and to prevent excesses and incidents as far as possible.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 166.)

No. 46.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 508.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 3, 1922.

I AM informed that Franklin-Bouillon has left on board French warship with French general for Mudania. Nationalist agent also went on French warship.

Though General Harington before leaving, and in contemplation of this eventuality, agreed with me that it would be out of the question to permit Franklin-Bouillon to attend meetings, I consider his presence at Mudania somewhat unfortunate. It was agreed that no journalists should be allowed to go to this military meeting. British correspondents have conformed to this decision, but I hear Americans will attempt to evade it. Correspondent of "Chicago Tribune" has in any case succeeded in getting in advance to Mudania. As their only sources of information are likely to be French or Turkish, their reports should be accepted with great reserve.

No. 47.

Sir H. Rumbold (*No.* 107) *to Mr. Lindley.*—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October* 3.)

(No. 509.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 3, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 527 to Foreign Office.

I am not passing information to Senior Naval Officer, as he reported 1st October that evacuation of Smyrna is apparently completed, except for stragglers.

I am unaware of arrangements made for [group undecypherable] evacuation of refugees from islands to mainland, but assume this is being arranged by Greek authorities themselves, and that vice-consul at Mitylene can best provide you with information.

Part of Royal Navy has hitherto only been supervision of evacuation of Smyrna.

No. 48.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Moscow, October 2, 1922.*

KARAKHAN'S note of 30th September, in which he holds Allies up to odium for closing the Dardanelles to merchant vessels, was, as he informed me to-day, based on wireless [group undecypherable] [? field] message which appears to have no official character. I should be glad to learn if passage of the Dardanelles has been in fact stopped. Vessels with cargo for Russian ports are being warned that Straits are closed and are being held up.

No. 49.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 500.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 2, 1922.*

I NOTICE a tendency in the French press towards better comprehension of British attitude in regard to Kemalist danger. Millet has conveyed to readers of "Petit Parisien" unpalatable truth that friends of France in British War Office were much disappointed by her action in withdrawing her troops from Chanak; and mention is made in other papers of unfortunate effect of this on public opinion in England. In yesterday's "Petit Parisien," Millet admits no doubt of France's intention to honour the obligations entailed by the Allied note of 23rd September.

"Pertinax," whose articles have reappeared to-day in the "Echo de Paris" after a long pause, expresses real apprehension as to the course of events in the Near East. He considers that the Turks undoubtedly aim at recovering possession of the Straits, and that their present protest against a British garrison at Chanak will be followed by a similar protest against a British garrison at Gallipoli. Are the Turks to be allowed to resume their uncontrolled possession of the keys of the Straits which they handed over to the Germans in 1914? The recent Paris conference has, he says, only disguised the problem under the tattered cloak of the League of Nations. As for Thrace, the Allies may not find it easy to bring about the departure of the seven Greek divisions there. He concludes with a serious warning to Frenchmen not to ignore gravity of issues at stake in an attempt to take "sentimental reprisals" for the injuries inflicted on French cause in German affairs.

"Eclair," "Victoire" and "Journal des Débats" also insist that French compliance with Kemalist demands must not be allowed to go too far.

Appreciation of General Harington's patience and moderation is very generally expressed by the press, which is, I think, beginning to realise that pro-Turkish policy will be dangerous to France if pushed beyond a certain point, and that the friendship of Great Britain is, after all, more valuable to her than that of the Kemalists.

No. 50.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received October 3.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sofia, October 2, 1922.*

OFFICIAL communiqué states that Minister of Justice has been sent to northern frontier to ensure execution of Government's instructions with regard to observance of strictest neutrality, and that he has also been instructed to admit Turkish, Greek and Armenian refugees, who are arriving in large numbers.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 51.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 464.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 3, 1922.*

I AM a good deal surprised at suggestion of immediate displacement of Greek by Kemalist civil administration in Thrace, and would like to know its exact meaning. Only information we have here as to actual administrative machinery in Thrace is report from His Majesty's consul-general at Constantinople to Department of Oversea Trade, No. 49. If control is to be exercised by inter-Allied military missions, or officers, or detachments, pending peace conference, why is it impossible to retain existing civil officials, and how are you to persuade them to go? Further, do you contemplate importation of an entirely new hierarchy from Angora, and if so, will their appearance tend to pacification of country or appeasement of racial animosities?

Lastly, how do you meet the point that there was no mention of such a proposal in the Paris note, by which our proceedings have been and must continue to be guided? It may be difficult enough to induce the Greek forces to withdraw. But at least that was contemplated in Paris note, whereas this is a new demand for which no sanction can be claimed but expediency.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 342; Rome, No. 303; and Athens, No. 287.)

[E 10550/27/44] No. 52.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens).

(No. 687.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 3, 1922.*

YESTERDAY evening M. Veniselos, having informed me in the course of the afternoon that he had received the communications which he was expecting from the new Greek Government, came to the Foreign Office soon after 6 o'clock for the projected meeting with the Secretary of State for War and myself.

Before the former came in, M. Veniselos had had time to explain to me his general attitude towards the peace conference. Realising that, so far as Eastern Thrace was concerned, the case of Greece was lost, he said that, as a statesman, he would bow to the decisions of the conference, and would tell his countrymen that it was quite useless to continue a struggle which would end only in defeat. He understood that Eastern Thrace was gone, but there remained much more for which it was necessary to fight. He then produced from his pocket and read to me some brief reports from Athens which, although they did not differ substantially from our own information as regards the numerical strength of the Greek army still in existence, contained a wholly different account of its armament, equipment, *moral* and capacity to fight.

I had just informed him that our information upon the latter point did not bear out these statements when the Secretary for War entered the room.

M. Veniselos repeated his Athens reports, and Sir Laming Worthington-Evans then proceeded to give him the gist of the reports of our officers in Constantinople, and of the General Staff here, without, however, mentioning the precise allegations which would have been wounding to Greek pride. M. Veniselos had, however, previously told me that M Countilis, who had made in Constantinople the damaging avowal on his return from Thrace last week that, if the Turks reached that country, nothing but the Gulf of Corinth would stop the Greeks from running, was an officer of high military reputation in whom he (M. Veniselos) placed much confidence.

M. Veniselos appeared to be much astonished at the War Office reports, which he declined to believe, arguing with much persistence that the revolution in Athens was not a Veniselist, but a Nationalist revolution, having in view the continuance of the struggle in Thrace, and that it was incredible that its leaders should be misinformed as to the actual state of affairs. If, however, matters were as depicted from Constantinople, he more than once repeated that it would be useless, in his judgment, to continue the struggle.

In the course of our conversation there transpired what M. Veniselos had in mind. When I explained to him the object of the projected meeting in Mudania, which was firstly to draw a line behind which the Greek army should be asked to withdraw in Thrace, and secondly to prepare for the setting-up of some form of

inter-Allied occupation in Eastern Thrace pending the peace conference, he revealed at once that that was not at all his idea. He declined to consider the possibility of the Greek army being withdrawn until the peace conference had given its final judgment, and he argued passionately for the necessity of its remaining in occupation, in order to secure the protection of the Greek inhabitants, and to give Greece something in hand for the safeguarding of her remaining interests when the conference assembled. How otherwise, he asked, would his Government be in a position to retain Western Thrace, to resist the demand for the surrender of the Greek fleet and the demand for an indemnity, and to recover the Dodecanese from Italy? Was I prepared to give him absolute and definite guarantees upon this point?

It was not always easy to follow, and it was physically impossible to interrupt. M. Veniselos in his declamation, which occupied the best part of an hour, and in which he appeared at times quite unable to retain his ordinary equanimity. My colleague and I endeavoured to point out to him that the situation was not quite as he had described it. When, in all probability within two days' time, an inter-Allied decision would be arrived at in Mudania as to the line behind which the Greek army was to be asked to withdraw—a line which we did not yet know, but which might be the Maritza—did M. Veniselos mean that, while prepared to agree to the decision of the peace conference in a few weeks' time that the Greek army should withdraw beyond that river, he seriously contemplated fighting to retain the present position of the Greek army during the interval? If he adopted that course, and if the Constantinople reports as to the condition of the Greek army in Thrace were true, was there a chance of his policy being carried out with success? It might very well be that, in a few months' time, the *moral* of the Greek forces would be sufficiently restored to give them a reasonable chance, but could that be expected now? Again, we pointed out to him that, at the present moment, the Kemalist forces were massed in numbers alleged to approximate 40,000 to 50,000 behind the Ismid lines, and, in the event of the Greeks refusing to accept the line to be laid down in Mudania, what was there to prevent Mustapha Kemal, already thirsting to get at Constantinople, from making their refusal an excuse for bursting into Europe, and carrying fire and sword into Eastern Thrace? In such a situation, what chance could there be for the Greek forces? Might not M. Veniselos be jeopardising the very interests that he had in view in Western Thrace and elsewhere, and rendering it even more difficult to vindicate them in the face of a triumphant enemy?

As regards guarantees, I could of course not speak except from the point of view of my own Government. Certainly, if I were at the peace conference, I should fight hard for Western Thrace and the other Greek interests to which M. Veniselos had referred.

As to this, he was somewhat contemptuous in replying, declaring that England would be in a constant minority against France and Italy and that the Greek chance of success would be small.

Both my colleague and I endeavoured to impress upon M. Veniselos the need for some reflection before he embarked upon the line which he contemplated, and which both of us thought would be fraught with great danger to his own interests.

His reply was an indignant complaint as to the way in which the Greeks had been treated when they were not allowed to march upon Constantinople, and an assertion that, in the circumstances predicated, the Greek army still in Thrace would have no alternative but to advance upon Chatalja and to seize the Chatalja lines: then, he said, holding the country from sea to sea, they would be able to resist successfully for many months any attack that the whole of the Kemalist forces might be able to make upon them.

When we indicated that such a course of action was, in the circumstances, quite impracticable, and would not be tolerated by the Allies, M. Veniselos swept aside our arguments and declined to recede from his position.

It is very difficult in a short summary to give an account of a conversation that lasted for an hour and a quarter, in the course of which M. Veniselos spoke with a very pardonable emotion, and used at times language which it was not pleasant to hear.

He said that he was going over to see M. Poincaré to-day, and would not make up his mind until he had seen the French Premier.

The meeting left me with the impression that M. Veniselos was imperfectly acquainted with the real condition of the Greek forces upon which he is tempted to rely; that he hardly realised the position in which the Greeks would be placed if they resisted altogether the Allied decisions to be taken in Mudania; and that he

had not given due weight to the fact that, pending the peace conference, the Allied policy was, not to surrender Thrace to the Kemalist army, but to set up some form of interim administration and control which should maintain the peace until the peace conference assembled.

[E 10483/27/44] No. 53.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 3010.)

Foreign Office, October 3, 1922.

My Lord,

THE French Ambassador asked to see me yesterday afternoon to communicate some information from his Government.

Among the papers he brought with him was a further telegram to M. Poincaré from M. Franklin-Bouillon, reporting his conversations with Mustapha Kemal in Smyrna. As, however, this did not carry matters any further than an earlier telegram which had already been handed to the Foreign Office, and the substance of which had appeared in the press, it was not necessary for me to make any comment upon it. It contained a number of untenable demands on the part of the Turks, and a not over-modest laudation of M. Franklin-Bouillon's own Herculean labours in the cause of the Allies, and of Great Britain in particular.

A second paper contained a repetition by M. Poincaré of the suggestion that had been made by your Excellency ten days ago, that an arrangement might be considered by which both the British and the Kemalists should retire from their positions in the Chanak area. I pointed out to the Ambassador that, whatever might have been said for such a proposal some time ago, now that the British forces were in a position of such overwhelming advantage that Mustapha Kemal was not in the least likely to attack them, the proposal was entirely out of the question, and might even be dismissed as absurd. To this the Ambassador raised no objection.

We exchanged views for some time upon the order of procedure at the impending meeting in Mudania, concerning which I gave him our latest information, and I outlined to him the scheme of action that I had proposed to the Allies and with which I believed the French Government to be in general sympathy. But I told him that I desired to call his attention and that of his Government more especially to three aspects of the case.

It might be that, at the Mudania meeting, Mustapha Kemal would absolutely refuse to obey that part of the Paris note which required him to respect both neutral zones. In that case he could not expect to derive the advantages in Europe which had been promised him, and I wished the French Government to consider the attitude they should adopt in these conditions. It was true that they had withdrawn their troops from Chanak—an action which, however deeply I felt upon it, I did not propose at the moment to discuss—but that action had been defended by M. Poincaré, not as a desertion of the alliance, but as a military necessity; whereas, if the conditions of the Paris note were flouted, it could not be denied that the alliance itself was challenged, and that each party to the note would be directly involved.

The second question I desired to submit for the consideration of his Government was this: supposing the generals in Mudania fixed a line in Eastern Thrace behind which the Greek forces were to retire, and the latter declined to do so, we might be confronted with a situation which again would call for Allied co-operation, and which would require very careful scrutiny.

Further, if, either in consequence of such a refusal, or from a deliberate intention to flout the alliance, Mustapha Kemal should advance into the Ismid zone, descend upon Constantinople, and attempt to advance into Europe, what attitude would the French Government adopt? Upon their own admission, the alliance, military as well as political, on the European side of the Straits remained unimpaired. What then was to be done in such a case to save Constantinople from a serious rising and from probably still more serious massacres, and to prevent the affront that would be inflicted upon all of us by a Kemalist invasion? It might be that, in the event of a Kemalist advance of this description, military considerations would compel the British to withdraw either the whole or a portion of their forces and transfer them to the positions they had taken up in Chanak and Gallipoli. I should be most reluctant to see any such course adopted, but it might conceivably become a military necessity. What would the French Government be prepared to do on their own account? They and the Italians could hardly sit still while they allowed the British to be involved. On the other hand, assuming, as I did, that the

alliance would remain firm in the face of such an assault upon it, how best should we maintain the defence of Constantinople, or, if we could not do that, at any rate prevent the Kemalist army from advancing into Eastern Thrace?

I put these questions to his Excellency in order that he might refer them to his Government for consideration while the Mudania meeting was still sitting, on the chance that, for any of the reasons which I had indicated, it might break down and confront us with a more serious situation than any that had yet occurred. The problems that I had submitted to him were, I added, being anxiously considered by us. The Paris Agreement was the pivot of our action, and we had every right to assume that, in the face of any fresh challenge, that agreement would be maintained.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 10481/27/44] No. 54.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 4.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères le texte de la réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora adressée à M. Poincaré en sa qualité de président de la Conférence de Paris, en réponse à la communication des Gouvernements alliés du 23 septembre dernier.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a été chargé de demander à sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon de Kedleston de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le plus tôt possible la réponse officielle du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à cette communication, afin que la conférence de Moudania puisse se réunir le 3 octobre. Il saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 2 octobre 1922.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Texte de la Réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora à la Note des Gouvernements alliés du 23 septembre 1922.

A son Excellence M. Poincaré, Président de la Conférence de Paris.

Smyrne, le 29 septembre 1922.

M. le Président,

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que la réponse à la note adressée en date du 23 septembre 1922 par les trois Puissances alliées au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie sera donnée dans quelques jours par mon Gouvernement, confiant dans les assurances que M. Franklin-Bouillon, qui vient d'arriver chez le commandant en chef des armées turques, a données d'accord avec les représentants des Puissances de l'Entente réunis à Paris et persuadé qu'on procédera tout de suite aux négociations afin d'établir une paix juste. L'ordre est donné d'arrêter immédiatement nos opérations militaires, qui se développent sans arrêt dans la direction de Constantinople et de Tchanak à la poursuite des armées helléniques. Les assurances données par M. Franklin-Bouillon ont établi les sentiments de justice dont sont inspirées en réalité les propositions de l'Entente en vue d'assurer les droits de la Turquie. Cependant, le maintien de la Thrace, ne fût-ce qu'un seul jour de plus, sous l'administration et l'occupation de l'armée hellénique, étant la cause des dangers de toutes sortes ainsi que la douleur des populations de Turquie, il est indispensable d'évacuer immédiatement et de restituer d'urgence au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie la Thrace jusqu'à l'ouest de la Maritza, y compris Andrinople. La convocation à Moudania d'une conférence des généraux alliés, afin de fixer des questions urgentes répondant aux désirs et aux propositions des Puissances de l'Entente. La réunion de cette conférence est proposée pour le 3 octobre 1922.

Le Général Ismet Pacha, commandant les armées du front de l'ouest, est personnellement désigné pour nous représenter à la conférence de Moudania. Dans le cas où la date précitée conviendrait, je vous prie de vouloir bien faire désigner les généraux devant se rendre à cette conférence et de nous en faire connaître les noms.

YOUSSOUF KEMAL,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

[E 10476/27/44] No. 55.

Conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Diamandy, October 1, 1922.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 4.)

Present :

British Prime Minister.	M. Diamandy.
Sir Edward Grigg.	

M. DIAMANDY began by saying that he was very glad to have an opportunity of meeting the Prime Minister, as he had been specially deputed to come to England for that purpose by M. Bratiano. He would like to state the views of Roumania briefly.

In her opinion the menace caused by the present Kemalist advance was very dangerous. The entry of the Kemalist army into Europe might have reactions which would disturb the whole of the territorial *status quo* in Eastern Europe. It would inevitably involve both Russia and Bulgaria, and Roumania feared a very grave situation. Her view, therefore, was that Kemal should be kept out of Europe. In this matter she agreed entirely with Great Britain, and deplored the French point of view. In particular, she deplored the French idea that the relations of Europe with Turkey could be settled by colonial considerations.

Roumania was threatened on three frontiers by restless Powers—Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria. He remembered that at Genoa M. Chicherin had expressly stated that, in the event of war with Turkey, Russia would not be bound by the pact of non-aggression.

Roumania had been surprised—if he might speak frankly, disagreeably surprised—by the fact that she had not been consulted regarding the terms of the Paris Allied note to Mustapha Kemal. She was so deeply interested in the question, and had, as she believed, stood so faithfully by the Allies in the war that she thought she had a reason to be invited to give her opinions before the decision was taken, and to be trusted fully by the great Allies.

Roumania held two views strongly regarding the Eastern question :—

1. That there should be no common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria, and that, if such a frontier were permitted, there should at least be a neutral zone guaranteed by the Allies.
2. That the freedom of the Straits should be safeguarded by the demilitarisation of both the European and Asiatic shores under the control of an Allied commission. In this respect Roumania was not quite satisfied with the guarantee of the League of Nations, as she feared that her very vital interests might be overruled by States with very limited interests, such as Salvador and Guatemala.

He ended by handing the Prime Minister a note which contained the views of the Roumanian Government.

(He also remarked that the non-settlement of Eastern Galicia was causing considerable embarrassment to Roumania. Unrest among the Ruthenians reacted on Roumania, and they hoped that a settlement might soon be possible.)

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was glad that the Roumanian Government had decided to send M. Diamandy over to take the British Government into its confidence, and he would talk quite freely. Lord Curzon had approached the representatives of both Roumania and Serbia before he went to Paris, and did his best to see that their views were taken thoroughly into account. There was, however, a good deal of hesitancy shown. We made no complaint of that, but the crisis at that moment required prompt decisions and an arrangement had to be made at once. There had, however, been no idea of leaving Roumania out of the conference which would settle the peace.

We did not know at present what Kemal Pasha would do. He was very elated, although, in point of fact, he had won not a military but only a political victory. He was, however, undoubtedly in an intractable frame of mind, and therefore very dangerous. Our military authorities informed us that he was massing eighteen divisions behind the Ismid Peninsula ready to cross into Europe, and there was no telling what the Turkish leaders would do in these circumstances. We had heard that a meeting

was probably to be held next Tuesday at Mudania between the Allied generals and the two combatants. Kemal might demand the right to occupy Eastern Thrace immediately. That we could not allow. He might also demand that we should evacuate Chanak. To that also we would not consent. Chanak was an essential feature in the rights which we demanded. It was an emblem of the freedom of the Straits, and we would refuse absolutely to evacuate it. On the other hand, if Kemal proved reasonable the next stage would be a full peace conference.

We were pledged in the event of the conference taking place to invite the Greeks to retire west of the Maritza and to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey. He could not see that in such circumstances Greece would refuse. Bulgaria would then become the heir to the troubles of Thrace, and he had no doubt that the troubles of Thrace under Turkish misgovernment would be very terrible. If Greece was out of those troubles Bulgaria would inevitably be in. She would take steps in her own time and become the most formidable Power in the Balkans. He quite understood, therefore, that the Roumanian position between Bulgaria, the Magyars and the Russians was a serious one, and he also recognised that Roumania's most formidable immediate danger was Soviet Russia.

He thought, however, that Soviet Russia was still anxious for friendly relations with Great Britain. Great Britain was the only Power, except the United States, able to help Russia to her feet. The Urquhart Agreement was a practical step in that direction. When one capitalist started others followed, and he did not think that the Soviet Government would wish to interrupt this process. For that reason he thought that we might be able to exercise a restraining influence upon Russia and to persuade her to remain neutral. He did not wish to exaggerate our influence, which was uncertain, but he thought that we might succeed in preventing Russia from making any attack on our Roumanian ally.

With regard to equipment, he said that he would ask the Secretary of State for War to go into the matter. He could make no promises, but he was ready to say that if other conditions were satisfactory we would do our best to help. Certainly if Roumania found herself fighting on our side she could count on our supplying her necessities.

With regard to the despatch of a Roumanian contingent there were two eventualities to be considered.

If peace were preserved, Roumania would certainly be asked to provide one of the contingents necessary for the international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits.

If war unfortunately broke out, we should like to know exactly where Roumania would stand. The British Empire would, as it seemed, almost inevitably be involved Its forces would come rather slowly into play. Some of them would be sent from Australia and New Zealand. The presence, therefore, of immediate contingents on the spot in the first stage of operations would be very valuable. We wished, therefore, to know whether Roumania in such circumstances would assist in preventing Kemal from establishing himself in Europe.

With regard to the sea, we should probably need Constanza, and arrangements would have to be made with Roumania for that purpose.

In any case we were prepared to see that Roumania should be guaranteed participation in the peace conference and that she should be invited to participate in the international guarantee of the Straits. The discussion was at present in the air, and he would not ask for an immediate reply as to Roumania's intentions. We should probably have no news of how things were going to develop before Thursday, and he would like to see M. Diamandy again later in the week.

M. DIAMANDY said that Roumania was perfectly convinced that French policy in the Near East was mistaken, but, nevertheless, she would always regret a division between Great Britain and France.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we desired also to act in close co-operation with France, but that we could not sacrifice the primary interests of the British Empire for France's sake. He was quite sure that, even if France found herself unable to act with us, she would remain the spectator of events. There could be no question, of course, of her intervention upon the other side.

M. DIAMANDY said he was sure of that.

No. 56.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 541.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 3, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 284.

In addition to representations reported in my telegrams Nos. 531 and 533, I yesterday called serious attention of Minister for Foreign Affairs to question and left with him memorandum giving such details as I had received from Sofia.

It is unfortunate, from point of view of conditions in Thrace, that Colonel Plastiras has gone to Mudania.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 57.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 542.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 539.

It now appears that bulk of refugees at Salonica are Greeks from Russia, who have been there some time and are more or less being looked after. There are only 2,000 fresh refugees there from Asia Minor.

I regret that my telegram may have misled you, and advise that relief train come on direct to Athens, as originally intended.

No. 58.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 543.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 3, 1922.*

GENERAL PALLIS has been appointed Chief of the General Staff. This morning he gave military attaché following outline of military situation :—

1919–22 classes are now returning as their leave expires. Order enforcing brigandage law permitting removal of families will hasten laggards. 1917 and 1918 classes will be recalled after four younger classes have been absorbed.

There are now in Athens five divisions, namely, 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th and 12th, greatly reduced in strength, and containing only young classes, but retaining organisation.

The five divisions in Thrace average 8,000 strong. The independent division, with only two regiments and 6,000 strong, is now beginning to move from [? this] country to Thrace. The old classes present in the divisions are to be replaced by men of young classes. Beta division, which was improvised formation, will be broken up and replaced by a division formed on one of existing cadres. This process is expected to take a fortnight, when army in Thrace should have six divisions, 10,000 to 11,000 strong, and rearward services about 10,000. Total 70,000, of which about 25,000 rifles, or, as Chief of General Staff put it, 48,000 fighting men including artillery and machine guns.

In Mitylene are remains of three divisions (4th, 9th and 12th), which will be absorbed in other formations.

First Army Corps will be re-formed in Athens with 1st, 2nd and 13th divisions at greatly reduced strength. In two months as 1917–18 and 1923 classes become available this army corps will be brought up to war strength if necessary.

Probable appointments are General A. Mazarakis, Chief of General Staff. Thrace, and General Spiliades to command 3rd Army Corps. General Mazarakis commanded Smyrna division in 1920, and now represents Greek army at Mudania Conference. General Spiliades commanded Cretan division 1918 to 1920 (see General Fairholme's despatch of 9th January, and Colonel Nairne's despatch of 2nd August, 1919).

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 59.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 508 of 3rd October: Journalists at Mudania.

Exclusion of journalists is very likely wise, but do not lose sight of the fact that unless all are excluded it is unfair to British journalists, and publicity given to events will be unfair to Great Britain.

[E 10527/27/44] No. 60.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No 2331.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré respecting the participation by the Greek general in the conference at Mudania.

Paris, October 4, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 60.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

PAR une note en date du 2 octobre dernier, l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire connaître à M. le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, que le Général Harington avait reçu l'instruction de s'efforcer d'obtenir la présence d'un commandant grec à la réunion de Moudania, conformément aux termes de la note de Paris du 23 septembre. Lord Hardinge était chargé de s'assurer que le Gouvernement français couvrirait des instructions semblables à son représentant à Athènes

M. Poincaré a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre que, il y a plusieurs jours, interrogé par le Général Pellé sur l'opportunité de la présence d'un général grec à la réunion de Moudania, il avait répondu qu'il n'y avait pas d'objection, sous réserve toutefois que cette présence ne fournirait pas aux Turcs une raison pour ajourner ou retarder la réunion.

Une démarche à Athènes paraît, d'ailleurs, sans objet, puisque, d'après des nouvelles reçues par le Gouvernement français, un général grec a déjà quitté Athènes à destination de Moudania.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 3 octobre 1922.

No. 61.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 545.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 4, 1922.

GENERAL Staff inform military attaché that General Nider left Athens last night to assume command of troops in Thrace and Macedonia. He commanded 1st Greek Army Corps with distinction in South Russia in 1919 and afterwards in Asia Minor until removed in February 1921. (See also General Fairholme's despatch of 9th January, 1919.)

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 62.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 546.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October* 4, 1922.

I AM informed on very good authority that Italian Government have provided export permit for 20,000 aeroplane bombs, nominally for Afghanistan, but ordered by Mustapha Kemal, and that order for twenty-five aeroplanes and a quantity of anti-aircraft guns has also been given. Above to be loaded at Venice. Italian steamer "Remo," now *en route* for Constantinople and Black Sea, had motor-lorries on board.

I am also informed that there is submarine at Suez, commanded by Italian officer Bellani, intended for pearl-fishing. Mustapha Kemal is said to be buying this vessel, which Bellani is to command.

(Repeated to Constantinople, Rome, and last paragraph repeated to Cairo.)

No. 63.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 547.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 4, 1922.

I SAW Acting Prime Minister to-night and found him much agitated at the tenor of interrupted wireless messages to the effect that the Allies were going to demand immediate evacuation to line of Maritza under threat of blockade. Turkish police to be installed at once.

I told Acting Prime Minister that evacuation would be inevitable in the event of settlement, but that I knew nothing about anything else in telegrams. He said that he would advise acceptance of almost any settlement if he thought it definitive. But what was to stop Turks on Maritza from making further demands, such as for Greek fleet? No Greek Government could accept such a demand, and Greece should have some guarantee that a definite limit would be put on Turkish demands.

I trust that no threats will be made in notifying decision of the Powers to Greece. They might do very great harm in present state of feeling, and those in authority here are well aware that Greece is at the mercy of the Powers.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 64.

Mr. Lindley (No. 236) *to Sir H. Rumbold.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October* 5.)

(No. 548.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 5, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 167 to Athens.

According to your telegram No. 473 to Foreign Office, there are 70,000 refugees in addition to those at Smyrna. Have they been evacuated?

I also understood that the ten or fifteen British ships lent by Board of Trade would be used for this purpose. There were on 20th September 55,000 refugees at [? Mitylene] and many more have probably arrived since in starving condition. Greeks have said from the beginning that they had not sufficient ships for this purpose, and Foreign Office telegram No. 255 to me, repeated to you, led me to hope that ten British ships were to be made available. Your telegram No. 460 to Foreign Office mentioned fifteen British vessels.

Would it not be possible for Senior Naval Officer to continue assistance with vessels lent by Board of Trade? If so, it would be best to communicate to him this telegram and my telegram No. 527 to Foreign Office, which contained details asked for in your telegram No. 473.

No. 65.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 549.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 5, 1922.*

I TRUST that question of refugees will not be lost sight of in dealing with fate of Constantinople and Thrace. All our information here points to probability of exodus *en masse* of Christians as soon as it is realised that Turks are really coming back, and it would be deplorable if this exodus took place under conditions such as those prevailing in Asia Minor. It would seem essential that sufficient time should be given for orderly evacuation before Turks are actually allowed in, nor can Greece be justly called upon to support all these people without the help of the Powers, who will be responsible for decision necessitating this departure.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 66.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 510.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 4, 1922.*

FOLLOWING summarises report addressed to Deputy High Commissioner of League of Nations by Colonel Treloar, returned 2nd October from investigating refugee conditions in Thrace:—

Silivri area: 32,000 refugees, besides 8,000 in transit, mostly moving westward, of whom 50 per cent. are children up to 14 years, 30 per cent. women, 20 per cent. mainly old men and boys.

These are without adequate clothing and have little food. This is having the worst effect on children and mothers. Lack of water is also most serious.

Chief needs: milk, foods, disinfectants, clothing, medicines, blankets, soap for use in sea water. These conditions obtain also in following districts:—

Chorlou area: 11,600 refugees gradually moving towards Dedeagatch.
Rodosto: 31,000, of whom 10,000 are Armenians.

Lule Burgas and Adrianople are without refugees at present.

Such relief as is possible is being given by Near East Relief and Greek Government officials, but needs are still most urgent.

Please inform "All-British Appeal."

No. 67.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 511. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 4, 1922.*

LORD HARDINGE'S private and secret telegram of 25th September to Foreign Office.

I should think it quite possible that Franklin-Bouillon's personal influence and intervention with Mustapha Kemal have been prejudicial to British interests. In his anxiety to be set up as a peacemaker he has probably offered Turks more than Great Britain, and perhaps even France, is prepared to give. From one well-informed source I hear that he has undertaken that France will support at conference full realisation of National Pact, including total abolition of Capitulations, which would hit French interests here, in view of larger capital sums involved, quite as hard as British. From the same source I heard that he informed Mustapha Kemal that England was not only unwilling but incapable of going to war owing to hostility of labour and England's fear of complications in her Moslem possessions. Intervention of this nature, by conveying a totally false impression, would have effect of increasing chances of war rather than of promoting those of peace.

If war proves to have been averted, it is due to Britain's display of force and her evident determination, however reluctantly, to accept war if forced upon her.

There are indications also that Franklin-Bouillon's activities have taken direction of promising, by means of French pressure on Great Britain, full satisfaction to Kemal in return for commercial concessions to Franklin-Bouillon.

However this may be, no effort is being spared by French sources to set up Franklin-Bouillon as saviour of the cause of peace in Near East. As instance of this, I would mention rumours spread last night that there were no [? group omitted] French High Commission [? there], that proceedings of first meeting had been most unsatisfactory, that deadlock had been reached, but that Franklin-Bouillon was using good offices to smooth matters over.

No. 68.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 512. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 5, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is substance of private letter just received by destroyer from General Harington:—

He states he has had a most difficult time. The so-called Military Conference has been surrounded by every sort of [? politician] from Angora. Hamid Bey is actually a member of conference, and in attendance on Ismet Pasha.

General Harington describes Franklin-Bouillon as a perfect curse. The whole trouble is that Nationalists consider Eastern Thrace is already theirs and they do not want any foreign interference. The line they take is that they intend to have Eastern Thrace. They will endenvour to get it peacefully, but if that is not possible they will continue operations at once. Nationalists will not give one single point, and came near to breaking down the whole conference last night. They adjourn on every point they do not like and telephone to Angora. General Harington had to face most serious threat yesterday that Nationalists would resume operations. Conference sat till midnight yesterday to see if it could come to some arrangement over the outstanding four points. The generals will put up their final document to-day. If this can be signed, well and good, but, if not, they will come straight back to Constantinople and consult Allied High Commissioners.

Greek representatives arrived late yesterday and will meet Allied generals at 9 this morning.

General Harington speaks in warm terms of the way in which Allied generals have backed him up, and says that he and they have shown great patience and forbearance throughout. He states that they have certainly held their own under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. The foregoing is not encouraging, and I foresee that if Greek representatives are not prepared for big concessions conference may break down to-day.

Whilst Franklin-Bouillon may have done good work at Smyrna [one group undecypherable], he has presented attitude of Allied Governments in such a way as greatly to encourage Nationalists in their pretensions.

No. 69.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 513.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 5, 1922.*

ALLIED High Commissioners have just considered situation at Mudania as revealed by their latest information from Allied generals.

French High Commissioner states that Turks demand Karagatch, which is a suburb of Adrianople on western bank of Maritza. Franklin-Bouillon has urged on French President of the Council that British and Italian generals should be empowered definitely to sign at Mudania the instrument recording decisions of conference instead of signing *ad referendum*. He points out that three valuable days will be wasted by referring to Allied Governments decisions reached at Mudania. In absence of Italian High Commissioner, who is ill, Italian Counsellor of Embassy suggested that question of Karagatch could be reserved for discussion at peace conference. He also suggested that Allied generals might sign instrument recording decisions of Mudania Conference with a clause stipulating that instrument

was subject to acceptance of Allied Governments. This would give Turks a certain measure of satisfaction.

French and Italian generals have great latitude in negotiations at Mudania. I explained that His Majesty's Government had gone to extreme limit in agreeing to Paris proposals and that it was for Kemalists to fulfil conditions attaching to offer made to them under Paris proposals. I said that I could not give instructions to General Harington about Karagatch, nor could I authorise him to sign Mudania protocol in the manner suggested by Franklin-Bouillon.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 168.)

No. 70.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 514.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 5, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 464.

All my information shows that present civil administration of Eastern Thrace is run by Greek superior officials, many of whom come from Old Greece, and that subordinate staff also is mainly Greek. Police and gendarmerie are directly controlled by military authorities.

If Greek army were to evacuate and existing civil administration were retained difficulty would be to get officials to remain unless their lives were assured by complete Allied occupation.

Proceedings of first day at Mudania show that Kemalists would never accept such proposal. Greek administration, and more particularly police and gendarmerie, cannot fail to go to pieces once Greek army evacuates. Problem is to provide substitute. Allies cannot organise temporary administration of their own. Constantinople Government has been ruled out. There remains no alternative but to let Kemalists take over. This will certainly not of itself tend to pacify the country or appease racial animosity, but it will not defeat these objects any more than would the maintenance of Greek administration. It is better, anyhow, than chaos. My proposal is that Kemalists should take over administrative services generally, that we should not attempt to establish control of all such services, but that we should endeavour to obviate panic and mutual vengeance by continued presence of Allied commissions, by attaching Allied officers to gendarmerie and by reserving the right to send Allied detachments to Eastern Thrace.

Question of officials is one of detail. Principal officials would doubtless come from Anatolia, but Kemalists can, if they like, draw on local notables and unemployed officials here to fill subordinate posts.

My French and my Italian colleagues share views indicated in my telegram No. 506. While expressing readiness to join me in elaborating scheme for civil administration as proposed in your telegram No. 456, they have both stated that this procedure does not seem to them to answer the requirements of the situation, which necessitates speed above all. French High Commissioner states in this, as in all other matters, agreement with Turks is necessary, and that he has empowered General Charpy to settle question, on which agreement depends. In these circumstances it is useless to attempt to formulate scheme until general principles are settled as result of Mudania meeting, as contemplated in your telegram No. 441.

I realise my proposal prejudges future of Thrace to greater extent than your note contemplated, but we have promised Eastern Thrace to Turks, and expediency seems to be only possible guide on this question.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 169.)

No. 71.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 515.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 5, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 467.

Arrangements were made to exclude all.

No. 72.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 516.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, October* 5, 1922.

FOLLOWING is short summary of Angora Government's reply to Allied invitation, dated 4th October :—

It appreciates desire for just and durable peace. Allied note touches on two sets of facts, namely, present military situation and negotiations for treaty of peace. Mudania meeting will deal with our point of view regarding military situation, which we communicated in our note of 29th September, and its decisions will be executed in all respects as to peace negotiations. We agree to send representatives to negotiate and conclude treaty between Turkey, Greece and the Allies. As Allies admit possibility of meeting elsewhere than at Venice, we suggest that the conference should meet on 20th October at Smyrna. Besides the Four Great Powers and Greece, only two States are invited to the conference, not because they are belligerents, but presumably because they are most interested in certain questions to be settled by the treaty of peace. Only important question of this kind is the future control of the Straits. We cannot but express surprise that Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, who are deeply interested in this, should not have been invited, as the participation of these three States would only help in making the settlement more lasting, and to avoid all future cause for conflict. We definitely propose that they should be invited in the same way as the other two States already invited by the Allies, and we hope that the invitation will be addressed to them before the conference. We thank the Allies for recognising our rights in Thrace. There is no disagreement in principle regarding the freedom of the Straits, to secure the safety of Constantinople and the Marmora, and the safeguard of minorities within the limits compatible either with the independence of sovereignty of Turkey or the exigencies of an effective settlement in the Near East. We will in due course make known our views regarding our admission to the League of Nations. We are glad to note the renewed assurances regarding the evacuation of Constantinople by the Allied troops. We are convinced that the Allies appreciate the impatience with which we await the realisation of the promised evacuation. We are impressed by the appeal with which the Allied note concludes, and can assure the Allies of our loyal and sincere assistance in re-establishing and maintaining peace.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 73.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 518.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 5, 1922.

NATIONALIST representative has just handed me reply of Angora Government to Allied note of 23rd September, with request that I would communicate it to you. Text is contained in my immediately following telegram.

No. 74.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 519.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, le 5 octobre* 1922.

LE Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie remercie les trois Gouvernements alliés de la note qu'ils ont bien voulu lui communiquer en date du 23 septembre 1922. Il apprécie pleinement l'esprit qui l'a inspiré le désir d'une

paix juste et durable, qui répond si parfaitement à la volonté que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale n'a cessé de proclamer depuis qu'il a commencé sa lutte pour l'indépendance. La note vise deux ordres de faits : la situation militaire présente et les négociations pour conclure un traité de paix. Notre point de vue en ce qui concerne la situation militaire a été communiqué par notre note du 29 septembre 1922. La conférence de Moudania, qui a été la conséquence de cette note, s'est réunie le 3 courant. Il va sans dire que ses décisions seront intégralement exécutées par les Puissances signataires. Quant au second point, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie accepte avec empressement d'envoyer ses représentants à la réunion devant avoir pour objet de négocier et de conclure le traité de paix définitif entre la Turquie, la Grèce et les Puissances alliées.

Les Puissances alliées admettent dans leur note que la conférence pourrait se tenir dans une ville autre que Venise. Profitant de cette possibilité et considérant que les négociations de paix en seraient facilitées davantage, mon Gouvernement estime qu'il serait très utile de fixer Smyrne comme lieu de réunion. Il propose donc que la conférence réunisse le 20 courant.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie croit devoir émettre les considérations suivantes au sujet des Puissances invitées à la susdite conférence en dehors des quatre grandes Puissances alliées et de la Grèce. Deux Etats seulement sont invités à assister à la prochaine réunion. On en conclut que cette invitation leur est adressée, non parce qu'ils sont des belligérants, mais parce qu'on les considère comme plus particulièrement intéressés dans certaines questions qui seront résolues par la paix turque. La seule question présentant ce caractère étant celle concernant le régime futur des Détroits, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ne peut s'empêcher de constater avec surprise que la Russie, l'Ukraine et la Géorgie, qui par le seul développement de leurs côtes sur la mer Noire ont un grand intérêt dans la fixation de ce régime, semblent avoir été oubliées, alors que les deux Etats en question ont été conviés à la future conférence. Il est, d'ailleurs, hors de doute que la participation de ces républiques à l'élaboration du statut susmentionné ne pourrait que contribuer à le rendre plus durable à écarter toute cause de conflit. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie propose tout particulièrement d'inviter à la conférence projetée les représentants de ces Puissances au même titre que ceux des deux Etats dont l'invitation a été déjà décidée par les trois Gouvernements alliés. Il espère que cette invitation sera adressée avant la conférence, dont la réunion est proche.

Mon Gouvernement prend note avec satisfaction de la reconnaissance de ses droits incontestables sur la Thrace et exprime à cette occasion ses remerciements aux Gouvernements alliés. La liberté des Détroits, à la condition d'assurer la sécurité de Constantinople et de la mer de Marmara, ainsi que la sauvegarde des droits des minorités dans la limite où elle est compatible soit avec l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Turquie, soit avec les exigences de la pacification effective de l'Orient, étant également désirés par nous, il n'y a pas en principe de désaccord à ce sujet.

Tout en remerciant les trois Puissances alliées de l'appui qu'elles veulent bien lui promettre pour son admission à la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie tient ajouter qu'il fera connaitre en temps opportun son point de vue à ce sujet. C'est avec une vive satisfaction que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie prend acte du renouvellement de l'assurance au sujet de l'évacuation de Constantinople, siège du Khalifat musulman, par les troupes alliées; cependant, mon Gouvernement est convaincu que les Puissances alliées apprécient à sa juste valeur l'impatience avec laquelle est attendue la réalisation au moment plus tôt de cette promesse.

L'appel contenu à la fin de la note des Gouvernements alliés a vivement impressionné le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie. Les Puissances peuvent certainement compter sur l'aide loyale et sincère en vue du rétablissement et du maintien d'une paix à laquelle aspire toute l'humanité civilisée d'une Turquie, dont les légitimes aspirations auraient été satisfaites. Elles peuvent également être persuadées de trouver en elle une collaboratrice dévouée dans le travail pacifique, que tous sont tenus de s'imposer pour panser les plaies de la guerre.

No. 75.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 521.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 5, 1922.*

I HAVE just received a wireless message from General Harington stating that three Allied generals are returning in "Iron Duke" to-night. They are due back at Mudania at 2·30 to-morrow afternoon, and request a conference with Allied High Commissioners early to-morrow. This has been arranged.

I shall see General Harington to-night, but I infer that an *impasse* has been reached at Mudania, and that Allied generals have come for instructions.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 172.)

No. 76.

M. Semionof (Chef du Service télégraphique, Moscow) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 5.)

(Télégraphique.) *En clair.* *Moscou, le 5 octobre 1922.*

DANS la note du Conseil fédéral des Républiques transcaucasiennes du 27 septembre passé les signatures sont à lire comme suit :

"Président du Conseil fédéral des Républiques transcaucasiennes, Narimanof; membre du bureau du Conseil fédéral des Républiques transcaucasiennes, Miasnikof; membre du bureau du Conseil fédéral des Républiques transcaucasiennes, Mdivani."

No. 77.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 469.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 5, 1922.*

YOUR No. 516.

When you send us full text of reply of Angora Government to Paris note, you will doubtless give us your opinion about suggested date and place of conference, and proposed admission of States other than those agreed upon at Paris.

If conference is to retain character contemplated at Paris, it seems to me impossible that it should be held within a fortnight, on Turkish soil, and in a place destroyed by fire.

As to seats at the conference, it must be remembered that its object will be not merely to make provision for future freedom of Straits, which will be left in the main to League of Nations, but to conclude peace between Turkey and the Powers with whom she is still at war, the terms of which peace must deal with a large number of issues unconnected with the Straits or with the States for whom admission is now demanded.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 345; Rome, No. 305; and Athens, No. 292.)

No. 78.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 470.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 5, 1922.*

M. VENISELOS, who, when I saw him on Monday was inclined to adopt an obdurate attitude about the possibility of immediate withdrawal of Greek troops from Thrace to line about to be laid down at Mudania, came to Foreign Office to-day and said that he had upon reflection urged his Government to agree to immediate evacuation, on condition that administration of the evacuated territory should not at once be confided to the Turks, but be placed under effective Allied control. Only if this advice were accepted would he be willing to serve his Government. This attitude appears to remove difficulty attending Greek military withdrawal. But it brings into immediate prominence the question which I raised in my telegram

to you No. 464, viz., the arrangements to be made for provisional administration in evacuated areas. I still await your views about this. But Greek anxieties seem to be eminently reasonable, and general attitude of Kemalists at Mudania, which is evidently very trying, does not predispose us to make any concessions outside Paris note.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 346; Rome, No. 306; and Athens, No. 293.)

No. 79.

Mr. Lindley (No. 328) to Sir H. Rumbold.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October 6.)

(No. 550.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 326.

I am informed by Ministry of Relief that they have received telegram from Patriarch to the effect that many refugees remain in Erythrea Peninsula.

Patriarch asks whether vessel can be sent to take them off.

Please inform Senior Naval Officer.

No. 80.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 522.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 519.

Reply of Angora Government is more satisfactory than might have been expected. I trust, however, that His Majesty's Government will never agree to Smyrna as meeting-place. Omission to mention Bulgaria is presumably in order to lay stress on Angora's treaty obligations to Russian States. If latter are admitted to participate in discussion of Straits régime it would seem logical that Bulgaria should be also. Form of reply respecting League of Nations is somewhat cavalier.

Attempt to distinguish between military situation to be settled at Mudania and negotiations for peace treaty seemed to be a manœuvre to arrive at permanent decisions in advance on political matters, which should properly be included in scope of peace negotiations.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 173.)

No. 81.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 523.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 5, 1922.*

GENERAL HARINGTON has returned from Mudania and has explained situation.

He has shown me protocol drafted by Allied generals as result of three days' discussion with Ismet Pasha. This protocol gives very great and important concessions to Turks. Generals hoped that this protocol would have been signed to-day, but at the last moment Ismet Pasha demanded that Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks before Peace Treaty and that all the Allied contingents and missions should be withdrawn. This demand is, of course, entirely at variance with Allied proposal of 23rd September.

Ismet Pasha intimated that he would set his troops in motion if Allied generals did not agree to this proposal, which annuls the whole basis of the conference.

General Harington proposed that [? omitted: conference] should adjourn until 2·30 to-morrow afternoon, in order that generals should have time to refer to their Governments and High Commissioners. After some discussion Ismet agreed that he would not move his troops until 2·30 P.M., *i.e.*, 11·30 G.M.T., to-morrow. French general then announced that he was authorised by his Government not only to [group omitted] protocol, but to restitution to Turkish authorities of Eastern Thrace, before

Peace Treaty, and without Allied supervision. He had informed General Harington of these instructions before [? this] last sitting. In view of this situation, which hopelessly weakens the Allied front, the generals had no alternative but to return to ask for instructions.

Allied generals had no knowledge of reply from Angora accepting peace conference until after they had left Mudania this afternoon. You will have noticed that reply is entirely silent on the subject of acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of conditions attaching to promise of support of Turkish claims to Eastern Thrace.

Turkish claim to consider Eastern Thrace before Peace Treaty seems difficult of acceptance. I imagine that Paris proposals contemplated setting up of machinery by peace conference for adequate protection of minorities. This would go by the board under new Turkish claim.

Turks [? omitted: have] just requested permission to transport to Eastern Thrace an unlimited force of gendarmerie, which in effect be an army. They also claim Karagatch and the right to carry on military operations even [? after] signature of military convention until latter is ratified by Governments concerned.

Allied High Commissioners are meeting Allied generals immediately to consider deadlock [group undecypherable] at Mudania.

My colleagues will probably wish unofficially to advise in an identic telegram to three Governments. In view of French attitude, which can only be characterised as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin-Bouillon, it was necessary for me to send this separate telegram. In view of General Harington and Admiral Brock the only way to avoid a conflict [? is] for His Majesty's Government to authorise General Harington to tell Turks that His Majesty's Government will summon Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once, and Allied troops will be sent there forthwith to replace Greeks.

Please get Admiralty to send your instructions to General Harington by wireless to-morrow to "Iron Duke."

No. 82.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 524.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 5, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Allied High Commissioners and generals met to-night to discuss deadlock reached at Mudania.

I asked French High Commissioner whether French Government was, as stated by Franklin-Bouillon, really ready to agree to Turkish demand for restoration of Eastern Thrace in full sovereignty previous to entry into force of Peace Treaty, and without adequate guarantees through Allied commissions for minorities there. If so, it was quite contrary to Paris decisions.

French High Commissioner said that Franklin-Bouillon was very affirmative on this point, and that his own instructions to the effect that it was desirable, if possible, to maintain Allied commissions and contingents there till conclusion of peace indicates that their maintenance in view of French Government was not indispensable. I immediately said that I did not recognise Franklin-Bouillon as representing my Government and that I considered his impolicy had been pernicious.

Italian High Commissioner, having said that Franklin-Bouillon had had no authority to speak for Italian Government at Smyrna, argued strongly in favour of yielding to Turks. French High Commissioner took the same line. They said that two points left outstanding, namely, Karagatch and maintenance until conclusion of peace of Allied commissions in Thrace, did not constitute justification for possible world war; question of Karagatch was of comparative unimportance, and as a suburb of Adrianople, Paris note might be interpreted as including it in that city, while Thrace was, in any case, to be restored in a few months' time to full Turkish sovereignty and that during that time conference would be sitting.

French High Commissioner pointed out that at base of Turkish demands was their distrust of vague promises of Allies, and suggested that it might be possible to allay this by some immediate gesture giving proof of our good faith, such as despatch forthwith of several Allied battalions into Thrace. All three generals agreed that without some such gesture Turks would not agree to further delays and would order their troops to advance.

Italian High Commissioner urged that if war resulted world would attribute it to unwillingness of Allied High Commissioners and generals to take responsibility for concessions which were of small account in comparison with issues involved.

I replied that world would attribute it to intractability of Turks, that the more we yielded to Turks the more demands they would make, and that the next might well be evacuation of Constantinople, that General Harington, Admiral Brock and I had done our utmost to avoid war, that there were limits to forbearance of His Majesty's Government, and that I must now report facts to my Government and leave it to them to appreciate whether in refusing these demands they were prepared to contemplate war.

In the meantime, pending the receipt of your views, I have requested General Harington to make every effort to gain time, to point out to Ismet Pasha on his return to Mudania to-morrow that Powers have now received reply of Angora Government, and to ask him how he can reconcile readiness of that Government to attend conference with threat to recommence military operations.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 175.)

No. 83.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 525.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 472.

General Harington [? has] received instructions mentioned in second sentence of your telegram under reply. French High Commissioner has succeeded in getting Nationalist representatives at Mudania to adjourn the conference until this evening. General Harington [? will] therefore leave for Mudania at 3·30 P.M. this afternoon, but will not land until he has received instructions from the Cabinet.

No. 84.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 526.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is text of final draft convention which Allied generals stated that they were prepared to sign at Mudania :—

"1. Conformément aux intentions de la note adressée au Gouvernement d'Angora par les Puissances alliées le 23 septembre 1922 et de la note adressée par le Gouvernement d'Angora le 29 septembre, une réunion entre les généraux alliés (le Général Harington pour la Grande-Bretagne, le Général Mombelli pour l'Italie, le Général Charpy pour la France et le Général Ismet Pacha pour le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale, le Général Mazarakis pour la Grèce) a été tenue à Moudania les 3, 4 et 5 octobre 1922.

"2. La réunion a pour but de préciser la ligne au delà de laquelle les forces grecques sont invitées à se retirer de la Thrace orientale et de préparer les modalités d'évacuation et de contrôle de cette région pour éviter des troubles, des destructions et, d'une façon générale, d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique, en vue de la remise de la Thrace orientale, y compris Andrinople, au Gouvernement d'Angora.

"3. Il est établi, tout d'abord, qu'à la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention, les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques.

"4. La ligne derrière laquelle les troupes helléniques de Thrace doivent se retirer dès la mise en vigueur de la présente convention est constituée par la Maritza jusqu'à la frontière bulgare, la portion de voie ferrée longeant la rive droite de la Maritza à partir de Kuleli Bourgas, et en amont de ce point jusqu'à Svilengrad (Jisr Mustapha-Pacha), sera l'objet d'une surveillance, à régler par une convention spéciale, par une commission mixte interalliée turque et hellénique, qui devra maintenir intégralement le libre parcours de cette section de voie qui permet l'accès de la région d'Andrinople.

"Se basant sur la note des Alliés du 23 septembre, dans laquelle est envisagée la remise à la Turquie de la Thrace orientale, y compris Andrinople, le représentant du

Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale interprète cette note de la manière suivante : La forteresse d'Andrinople dans son ensemble, y compris Karagatch et les forts situés sur la rive droite de la Maritza, sera remise au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale. Les généraux alliés afin d'éviter toute complication jusqu'à la conclusion du Traité de Paix, décident que la partie de la forteresse d'Andrinople située sur la rive droite de la Maritza jusqu'à la ligne des forts inclus et comprenant la gare et la ville de Karagatch, sera évacuée par les troupes grecques, et qu'un détachement de troupes alliées y sera établi.

"5. L'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes grecques commencera aussitôt que possible. Elle comprendra les troupes elles-mêmes, les services et formations militaires diverses, et approvisionnements, stocks en matériel de guerre, munitions, dépôts de vivres. Cette évacuation sera effectuée dans le délai d'environ quinze jours.

"6. Au fur et à mesure que les autorités helléniques se retireront de chaque région administrative, les pouvoirs civils seront remis aux autorités alliées, qui les remettront, autant que possible le jour même, aux autorités turques. Dans l'ensemble de la région de Thrace cette remise devra être terminée dans un laps de temps aussi court que possible, au maximum de trente jours. Les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement d'Angora seront accompagnés de forces de gendarmerie nationaliste d'effectif strictement nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité locale.

"7. Cette transmission des pouvoirs, ainsi que les diverses opérations de retrait des troupes grecques, s'effectueront sous le contrôle de missions interalliées, qui seront installées dans les principaux centres. Le rôle de ces missions est de s'entremettre pour faciliter la transmission des pouvoirs et les opérations ci-dessus. Elles s'effectueront d'empêcher les excès de toute nature, de quelque côté qu'ils viennent, à se produire.

"8. En outre de ces missions, seront envoyés en Thrace à l'est de la Maritza des contingents alliés, qui occuperont les centres les plus importants de la région, y assureront le maintien de l'ordre, et serviront de soutien aux missions interalliées ci-dessus. Ces contingents, composés d'environ sept bataillons, resteront en principe groupés dans les centres principaux.

"9. La date du retrait des missions et des contingents alliés sera décidée par les Gouvernements alliés d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale.

"10. La présente convention sera soumise d'urgence à l'approbation des Gouvernements respectifs, en vue de son entrée en vigueur dans le plus bréf délai possible.

"11. Jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, le Gouvernement grec s'engage à se porter garantie de la vie de tous les otages pris par leurs armées et leur accordera le traitement réservé aux officiers prisonniers d'après la Convention de La Haye. Par contre, la grande Assemblée nationale empêchera toute molestation des habitants de la Thrace orientale pour tout acte politique ou militaire qu'ils auraient commis avant la ratification de la présente convention.

"12. L'appui qui sera donné à l'acceptation de cette convention dépend de la conclusion d'un accord entre le général commandant en chef des forces britanniques en Turquie et le Général Ismet Pacha au sujet des mouvements de troupes vers la zone délimitée dans la proclamation des Hauts-Commissaires alliés en date du 18 mai 1922."

No. 85.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 527.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 472 has crossed my telegram No. 523 and my telegram No. 524, which partly answer your telegram under reference. My comment on four points mentioned by General Harington's telegram No. 2616 is as follows :—

(*a*.) Turkish claim to Karagatch is not entirely unreasonable, as it is a suburb of Adrianople. The restitution of Karagatch will, however, enable Turks to complete chain of fortifications round Adrianople.

(*b.*) If Turks were allowed to send gendarmes to Eastern Thrace in unlimited numbers they might very well build up an army in a very short time. This is the danger.

(*c.*) Turkish demand that Allied missions should withdraw until after Turks have taken over administration of area evacuated by Greeks would leave Christian minorities at the mercy of Turks.

I do not think we should concede this.

(*d.*) As one of the principal objects of Mudania meeting is to bring about cessation of hostilities, demands of Turks to have the right of military operations until military convention is ratified by Allied Governments is both novel and unreasonable.

I am telegraphing separately text of military convention which Allied generals handed to Kemalists and which latter refused to accept.

I understand that impossible proposals mentioned in General Harington's telegram No. 2015 included suggestions that Greek troops should be withdrawn to a distance of 100 kilom. from Adrianople. This would facilitate Turkish aggression against Western Thrace. It is becoming more and more evident that Turks hope to get back Western Thrace. Impossible proposals, I understand, also included demand that Eastern Thrace should be restored to Turkey before signature of peace treaty.

Generals had no time to speak about neutral zones at Mudania. They were occupied throughout three days with question of Eastern Thrace.

It seems to me impossible that we should accept Turkish demand for restitution of Eastern Thrace before signature of peace conference.

I am not convinced that mere statement to Kemalists that we would summon Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once and send Allied contingents forthwith will satisfy Kemalists, who are evidently out to get Eastern Thrace at once by hook or by crook.

No. 86.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 528.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 470.

Possible solution of deadlock might be to induce M. Veniselos to withdraw condition respecting handing over of administration of evacuated territory to Turks and to authorise General Harington to inform Ismet Pasha that Greek Government is prepared to evacuate immediately on sole condition that effective Allied control be maintained there till the conclusion of peace.

This appears to me not unreasonable compromise, especially if number of Turkish gendarmes in Thrace be limited to what is strictly necessary.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 87.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

SHOULD Mudania Conference unfortunately break down, I have instructed General Harington to make following declaration to Ismet Pasha, subject, of course, to other instructions from you. If General Harington can get his colleagues to endorse this declaration so much the better: -

"In my desire to arrive at a peaceful solution of questions which Allied generals were empowered to discuss at Mudania, I have gone to extreme limit of concessions and forbearance. I regret to have to state that Nationalist representatives have not shown a similar spirit. Their demands went far beyond proposals made to Angora Government on 23rd September, and are designed to prejudge the proceedings at contemplated conference at Venice or elsewhere. I find it inexplicable that in order to obtain his demands, which are anyhow inconsistent

with procedure outlined in Allies' note of [? 23rd September], Ismet Pasha should have threatened to resume march of his troops at very moment when Angora Government have accepted to attend proposed conference, and have themselves suggested that conference should meet on 20th October. I cannot reconcile these conflicting proceedings on the part of Angora Government.

"In view of foregoing, I decline all responsibility for the consequences resulting from any resumption of march of Kemalist troops. This responsibility will fall on Angora Government."

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 88.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 530.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

PROCEEDINGS at Mudania, coupled with passage in Angora note of 4th October relating to Mudania Conference, clearly reveal manœuvre of Nationalists. Before sending their reply to invitation to Peace Conference Nationalists had hoped to obtain a document signed by Allied generals conceding practically all their territorial demands. This manœuvre has been foiled. Franklin-Bouillon did his utmost to get generals to sign protocol telegraphed in my telegram No. 526 with addition of concession restoring Eastern Thrace to Turkey before signature of peace treaty.

No. 89.

Sir P. Loraine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 363.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 354.

I view situation as follows:—

Russians are profiting by Kemalist victory, threat of renewal of war between Great Britain and Turkey and our difficulties in Irak to redouble their activities in an endeavour to deal final blow to British position and influence in this country or to blackmail His Majesty's Government into recognising Soviet. Weakness of Persian Government, corruption of the press, influence of anti-British party in Medjliss and credulity of pseudo-demagogues and extreme Nationalists are playing into Russia's hands. [? Pro-Russians] have thus been able to acquire practical control of articulate public opinion. Immediate object of press campaign is to force rupture of Anglo-Persian relations; ulterior aim is to sweep Persia into alliance of Islamic Powers under [? Russian] auspices [group undecypherable] "colony."

Western Powers.—Near Eastern crisis enormously facilitates appeal to Mahommedan solidarity, and is being exploited with certain brutal skill. Total lack of statesmanship, debased political standard, instability of finance and politics of Government, and its reckless opportunism and economic decline in Persia are such that Russian hope is not forlorn if pressed energetically.

On the other hand, result of patient, loyal non-interventional policy of His Majesty's Government has been to bring the majority of thinking and influential Persians round to preference for British connection. There is, in reality, numerous but inarticulate pro-British party, but process of intimidation is such that no individual dare speak his mind or act on it. They will not dare until they are given a lead and rallying point.

No. 90.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 472.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 6, 1922.*

HARINGTON'S telegrams have reached us in a form which is partly unintelligible and partly corrupt. We have therefore sent orders to him not to return to Mudania until we have been able to consider his full reply, and to receive your opinion upon the situation as it now stands. We should also like your views upon the four points of Harington's telegram, which we do not fully comprehend, particularly those relating to gendarmerie and Allied missions.

Please also telegraph to us copy of document handed to Kemalists by Allied generals, and inform us of nature of impossible proposals referred to in Harington's telegram No. 2615. Further, we should like to know what happened at Mudania about respect of neutral zones. You will, of course, have understood that words "effective Allied control" in my telegram No. 470 meant control by Allied troops.

No. 91.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 473.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, October 6, 1922.*

HIS Majesty's Government take so grave a view of the situation revealed by your telegrams Nos. 523 and 524 that I am proceeding myself to Paris to-day for the purpose of a personal discussion with M. Poincaré.

Please inform Sir C. Harington that pending result of this Paris discussion he should not return to Mudania. In the event of his having meanwhile already returned to Mudania, he should be warned not to commit himself on any important point without further instructions.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 354; Rome, No. 314; and Athens, No. 297.)

[E 10679/27/44] No. 92.

Note of Conversation between Sir Eyre Crowe and the French Ambassador, October 6, regarding the Mudania Conference.

THE French Ambassador called upon me to-day. He immedintely began to talk about the Eastern crisis. He opened by reading to me a telegram from M. Poincaré reporting that an unfortunate delay was being caused in the negotiations at Mudania by General Harington, who, while personally showing the greatest conciliation in the discussion, declared that he was bound not to go beyond his very precise instructions, and therefore considered it necessary to refer a number of questions to his Government, while his French and Italian colleagues were quite ready to settle there and then. These were such questions as the Turkish demand to be allowed to occupy not only Adrianople, but also Karagatch on the opposite side of the Maritza. These and other matters of the same kind surely might be left to the judgment of the Allied generals. And M. Poincaré earnestly begged that instructions might immedintely be sent to General Harington, giving him the fullest discretion to agree formally to any proposals and points on which he found he could arrive at an understanding with his colleagues. Owing to the rapidity and constantly shifting situation in the East, it was impossible that negotiators should be hampered by instructions given at a distance a considerable time beforehand. I replied that I found it difficult to express in adequate words my surprise at his proposal, coming as it did at a moment when the attitude of the French negotiators at Mudania was threatening to wreck all possibility of an understanding. I asked the Ambassador whether he was unaware that the French general and M. Franklin-Bouillon, who, for some reason or other, had thought fit to intrude himself into the military conference, in which he really had no business, were taking

a line absolutely contrary to the terms of the Allied note of the 23rd September, and thereby destroying the harmony which the three Allied Governments had with so much care established when they formally sent the note. Was I to understand that, in requesting us to give full latitude to General Harington, M. Poincaré wished us to commit ourselves to approval or endorsement of the attitude which the French negotiators were adopting towards the Paris Agreement? If so, I could tell the Comte de Saint-Aulaire at once that His Majesty's Government could not possibly agree to such a thing.

The Ambassador said he failed to understand how anything that had arisen at Mudania could have caused such an impression. He had no idea that anything was being done that went beyond, or was contrary to, the Paris Agreement, and he expressed, not so much surprise as incredulity, when I read to him the various passages from the telegrams we had received from Sir H. Rumbold and from General Harington, reporting the extraordinary demands of the Turks, to which the French had declared themselves ready to agree. He refused to believe that the French Government could have authorised the acceptance of the proposal that the Kemalists should enter into immediate possession of Thrace before the peace treaty, and without adequate guarantees for the safety of the minorities under the surveillance of the Allied commissions, and that these commissions and all Allied contingents should be withdrawn. I said there could be no doubt, from Sir H. Rumbold's telegram, not only that these demands had been made, but that both the French general and M. Franklin-Bouillon, knowing the objections strongly expressed by General Harington, had, in the latter's presence, declared to the Turkish negotiators that they were ready to accept their proposals.

I asked the Ambassador how, in his opinion, it was possible to carry on Allied negotiations on the basis of previous Allied agreement by methods such as these. I explained that His Majesty's Government took so grave a view of the situation thus created that they had charged Lord Curzon to proceed at once to Paris, in order to obtain from M. Poincaré a definite statement whether or not he stood by the agreement of the 23rd September, or whether he wished to repudiate it. The Comte de Saint-Aulaire continued to exclaim that he was convinced that all this must be a misunderstanding. There could be no question of M. Poincaré receding in any way from the Paris Agreement. I repeated that, while I was only too anxious to believe in M. Poincaré's good faith, the Comte de Saint-Aulaire must not be surprised if I found it difficult to reconcile this with the French proceedings at Mudania and Constantinople. I added that I could not but recall that this was not the first time that a solemnly registered agreement between the Allies, respecting the course of a common policy to be pursued in Turkey, was thrown to the winds by the French Government, when the ink was hardly dry on their signature. In every successive case of such agreements it sufficed for the Turks to raise objections, to induce France, without hesitation, warmly to espouse the Turkish objections and to abandon the ground on which she had undertaken to make a stand. I was very much afraid that we had now only a repetition of these distressing occurrences; but I warned the Ambassador that, if on this occasion we were to be told that France was not prepared, on the 6th October, to stand by the agreement which she signed as lately as the 23rd September, in a form drafted by M. Poincaré himself, the effect which such an attitude must have on the alliance of our two countries must be serious indeed.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, October 6, 1922.

[E 10662/10102/44] No. 93.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.— (Received October 7.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, October 6, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a redraft of the economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey which has been prepared in the light of the discussions of the subject since the Treaty of Sèvres and of the revised form now proposed for the financial clauses of the treaty.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston will no doubt consider whether any further modification is required in article 261 of the Treaty of Sèvres (which becomes article 1

of the enclosed draft), and I am to refer to the observations on this subject contained in the minutes of the discussions of the Juridical Commission at Constantinople which were forwarded with your letter of the 13th June. Article 4 of the redraft has been prepared for consideration for the purpose of carrying out the decision reached at the conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris last March.

His Lordship will no doubt consider how far the treaties section of the economic clauses, and other articles in the Treaty of Sèvres relating to treaties, may require modification in view of recent international conventions. So far as regards conventions in which this Department are interested, I am to refer to the conventions concluded at Barcelona last year relative to freedom of transit and international waterways, to which it appears desirable that Turkey should be required to adhere, and to which it may be considered desirable that reference should be made either in the treaties section or in the ports, waterways and railway part of the treaty.

The redrafting of the financial clauses leads to a modification of article 287 of the Treaty of Sèvres (see article 27 of the draft enclosed herewith), and the disappearance of the provision therein for an arbitral commission. It appears to the Board that the duties formerly imposed upon this commission by a number of other clauses of the treaty might, in most cases, be undertaken by the Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission at Constantinople if, as they understand, it is intended that this body should be maintained for some time after the conclusion of peace, and they would see no objection to the Mixed Judicial Commission being substituted also for the Consular Courts in article 308 (article 43 of the enclosed draft).

It will be observed that the provisions for the retention and liquidation of Turkish property in Allied territory and its charging with Allied claims against Turkey have been deleted from the redraft of the economic clauses. The Board understand that the French and Italian Governments are not retaining this property, and, so far as this country is concerned, the amount becoming available from it after the release of property belonging to persons who are to be regarded as nationals of the Allied Powers under article 317 (article 52 of the redraft) or who acquire a new nationality under the Treaty of Peace, or who belong to friendly communities, is likely to be so trivial as compared with the claims as to be hardly worth retention. The deletion of these provisions will satisfy the representations which have from time to time been made by His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

Some further modification of article 294 (article 31 of the redraft) may be decided upon as a result of the communications which are passing with the French Government concerning the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways.

In view of the extreme difficulty with which agreement was reached upon the clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres relating to concessions, the Board have endeavoured to avoid, so far as possible, any modification in these articles; but some change has been rendered necessary in article 310 (article 45 of the redraft) by the modifications made in other articles. Should opportunity occur it would be desirable to substitute "make" for "propose" in the second paragraph of article 311 (article 46 of the redraft).

I am to take this opportunity to refer to one or two other suggestions made in the minutes of the Juridical Commission referred to above to which effect has not been given in the present redraft of the economic clauses. So far as concerns the proposal relating to claims by Allied subjects against persons to whom property is returned under article 144 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and the suggested addition to paragraph 4 of the annex to the contracts clauses, the Board await further information which they understand is being obtained by your Department from Constantinople. The Board doubt the usefulness of making the addition suggested in article 300 (article 36 of the redraft), and it appears to them that any provisions that may be considered necessary to meet General Harington's point would be better made in a more general form elsewhere in the treaty. They are disposed to think that it may be left to the French Government to bring forward again any proposals relating to companies such as are suggested on p. 9 of the print of the Juridical Commission's minutes. As regards article 418 of the Treaty of Sèvres, it may be pointed out that this is a reproduction applied to the case of Turkey, of article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles.

I have, &c.

H. FOUNTAIN.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(Modified in accordance with conclusions reached at meeting with representatives of Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Treasury, October 2, 1922.

PART .—*Draft of proposed revision of Economic Clauses.*

Section I.—*Commercial Relations.*

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions in favour of Turkey contained in articles [136] and [4 of the economic clauses] of the present treaty, the capitulatory régime resulting from treaties, conventions or usage shall be re-established in favour of the Allied Powers which directly or indirectly enjoyed the benefit thereof before the 1st August, 1914, and shall be extended to the Allied Powers which did not enjoy the benefit thereof on that date. The latter Powers agree that they will accept such modifications of the régime as may be approved by the Principal Allied Powers in accordance with articles [136] and [4 of the economic clauses].

ARTICLE 2.

The Allied Powers who had post-offices in the former Turkish Empire before the 1st August, 1914, will be entitled to re-establish post-offices in Turkey; but in the event of a reorganisation of the Turkish Post Office on lines suggested by a commission of experts, the Allied Powers will consider a request by the Turkish Government for the suppression of their own post-offices in Turkey.

ARTICLE 3.

The convention of the 25th April, 1907, so far as it relates to the rate of import duties in Turkey, shall be re-established in force in favour of all the Allied Powers subject to such modification of these duties as may result from the provisions of article 4.

ARTICLE 4.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty, a commission composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan and of Turkey shall be appointed to prepare proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters. The commission, which shall sit at Constantinople, shall invoke the assistance of technical experts representing those capitulatory Powers not represented upon it

The proposals shall aim at providing for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and shall also provide means for effecting any necessary modification of the customs taxes with the consent of the Powers concerned.

The scheme prepared by the commission will be submitted to the Governments of the Allied and neutral Powers concerned. As soon as the Principal Allied Powers have approved the scheme they will inform the Turkish Government, which hereby agrees to accept the new system.

The Principal Allied Powers reserve the right to agree among themselves, and, if necessary, with the other Allied or neutral Powers concerned, as to the date on which the new system is to come into force.

ARTICLES 5-8.

(Same as articles 266-268 of the Treaty of Sèvres.)

Section II.—*Treaties.*

ARTICLES 9-20.

(Articles 269-280 of Treaty of Sèvres, subject to such modifications as may be required.)

Section III.—*Industrial Property.*

Articles 21–26.

(Articles 281–286 of Treaty of Sèvres, subject to—

(1.) Deletion of words " or which may be so dealt with by virtue of article 289 " at the end of article 281.

(2.) Substitution of " Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission " for " Arbitral Commission referred to in article 287 " in the first paragraph of article 284.)

Section IV.—*Property, Rights and Interests.*

Article 27.

The property, rights and interests in territory under Turkish sovereignty on the 1st August, 1914, of nationals of Allied Powers who were not during the war Turkish nationals, or companies controlled by them, shall, if they still exist and are identified, be immediately restored.

The Turkish Government shall take such steps as may be within its power to restore the property free from all encumbrances or burdens with which it may have been charged without the owner's assent.

Article 28.

The property, rights and interests in Turkey of former Turkish nationals who acquire, *ipso facto*, the nationality of an Allied Power or of a new State in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty, or any further treaty regulating the disposal of territories detached from Turkey, shall be restored to them in their actual condition.

Article 29.

Turkish nationals who acquire, *ipso facto*, the nationality of an Allied Power or of a new State in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty, or any further treaty regulating the disposal of territories detached from Turkey, will not be considered as Turkish nationals within the meaning of the fifth paragraph of article 21, articles 22, 24, 30, 37 and 43.

Article 30.

The Government of an Allied Power or new State exercising authority in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present treaty, or any other treaty concluded since the 17th October, 1912, may liquidate the property, rights and interests of Turkish companies or companies controlled by Turkish nationals in such territory; the proceeds of the liquidation shall be paid direct to the company.

This article shall not apply to companies in which Allied nationals, including those of the territories placed under mandate, had, on the 1st August, 1914, a preponderant interest.

The provisions of the first paragraph of this article relating to the payment of the proceeds of liquidation do not apply in the case of railway undertakings where the owner is a Turkish company in which the majority of the capital or the control is held by German, Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals, either directly or through their interests in a company controlled by them, or was so held on the 1st August, 1914. In such cases the proceeds of the liquidation shall be paid to the Liquidation Commission.

Article 31.

The Turkish Government shall, on the demands of the Principal Allied Powers, take over the undertaking, property, rights and interests of any Turkish company holding a railway concession in Turkish territory as it results from the present treaty, and shall transfer, in accordance with the advice of the Liquidation Commission, the said undertaking, property, rights and interests, together with any interest which it may hold in the line or in the undertaking, at a price to be fixed (on the basis of their value on the 1st August, 1914), by an arbitrator nominated by the Council of the League of Nations. The amount of this price shall be paid to the Liquidation

Commission and shall be distributed by it, together with any amount received, in accordance with article 30, among the persons directly or indirectly interested in the company, the proportion attributable to the interests of nationals of Germany, Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria being paid to the Reparation Commission established under the Treaties of Peace with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria respectively; the proportion of the price attributable to the Turkish Government shall be retained by the Liquidation Commission for the purposes referred to in article 2 (second paragraph) of the financial clauses of the present treaty.

Article 32.

Until the expiration of a period of six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, the Turkish Government will effectively prohibit all dealings with the property, rights and interests within its territory which belong, at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, to Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or their nationals, except in so far as may be necessary for the carrying into effect of the provisions of article 260 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany or any corresponding provisions in the Treaties of Peace with Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria.

Subject to any special stipulations in the present treaty affecting property of the said States, the Turkish Government will proceed to liquidate any of the property, rights or interests above referred to which may be notified to it within the said period of six months by the Principal Allied Powers. The said liquidation shall be effected under the direction of the said Powers and in the manner indicated by them. The prohibition of dealings with such property shall be maintained until the liquidation is completed.

The proceeds of liquidation shall be paid direct to the owners, except where the property so liquidated belongs to the German, Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian States, in which event the proceeds shall be handed over to the Reparation Commission established under the Treaty of Peace with the State to which the property belonged.

Article 33.

The Governments exercising authority in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present treaty may liquidate any property, rights and interests within such territory which belongs at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty to Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or their nationals, unless they have been dealt with under the provisions of article 260 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, or any corresponding provisions in the Treaties of Peace with Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria.

The proceeds of liquidation shall be disposed of in the manner provided in article 32.

Article 34.

The validity of vesting orders and of orders for the winding-up of businesses or companies and of any other orders, directions, decisions or instructions of any court or any department of the Government of any of the Allied Powers made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights and interests in their territories is confirmed.

The interests of all persons shall be regarded as having been effectively dealt with by any order, direction, decision or instruction dealing with such property in which they may be interested, whether or not such interests are specifically mentioned in the order, direction, decision or instruction.

No question shall be raised as to the regularity of a transfer of any property, rights or interests dealt with in pursuance of any such order, direction, decision or instruction.

Every action taken with regard to any property, business or company in the territories of the Allied Powers, whether as regards its investigation, sequestration, compulsory administration, use, requisition, supervision or winding-up, the sale or management of property, rights or interests, the collection or discharge of debts, the payment of costs, charges or expenses, or any other matter whatsoever in pursuance of orders, directions, decisions or instructions of any court or of any department of the Government of any of the Allied Powers, made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights or interests, is confirmed.

ARTICLE 35.

The validity of any measures taken between the 30th October, 1918, and the coming into force of the present treaty by or under the authority of one or more of the Allied Powers in regard to the property, rights and interests in Turkish territory of Germany, Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria or their nationals is confirmed. Any balance remaining under the control of the Allied Powers as the result of such measures shall be disposed of in the manner provided in the last paragraph of article 32.

ARTICLE 36.

No claim or action shall be made or brought against any Allied Power or against any person acting on behalf of or under the direction of any legal authority or department of the Government of such a Power by Turkey or by or on behalf of any person wherever resident who on the 1st August, 1914, was a Turkish national, or who became such after that date, in respect of any act or omission with regard to the property, rights or interests of Turkish nationals during the war or in preparation for the war.

Similarly, no claim or action shall be made or brought against any person in respect of any act or omission under or in accordance with the exceptional war measures, laws or regulations of any Allied Power.

ARTICLE 37.

Debts, other than the Ottoman Public Debt referred to in article 47 of the financial clauses of the present treaty, between the Turkish Government or its nationals resident in Turkish territory on the coming into force of the present treaty (with the exception of Turkish companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals), on the one hand, and the Governments of the Allied Powers or their nationals who were not on the 1st August, 1914, Turkish nationals, on the other hand, which were payable before the commencement of a state of war between the Allied Power concerned and Turkey, or became payable after this date and before the coming into force of the present treaty and arose out of transactions or contracts of which the total or partial execution was suspended on account of the war, shall be paid or credited in the currency of such one of the Allied Powers, their colonies or protectorates, or the British Dominions or India, as may be concerned. If a debt was payable in some other currency, the conversion shall be effected at the pre-war rate of exchange.

For the purpose of this provision the pre-war rate of exchange shall be defined as the average cable transfer rate prevailing in the Allied country concerned during the month immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the said country and Turkey.

If a contract provides for a fixed rate of exchange governing the conversion of the currency in which the debt is stated into the currency of the Allied Power concerned, then the above provisions concerning the rate of exchange shall not apply.

The provisions of this article regarding the rate of exchange shall not affect debts due to or from persons resident in territories detached from Turkey in accordance with the present treaty.

ARTICLE 38.

The provisions of articles 27 to 37 apply to industrial, literary and artistic property which has been or may be dealt with in the liquidation of property, rights, interests, companies or businesses under war legislation by the Allied Powers, or in accordance with the stipulations of the present treaty.

Section V.—*Contracts, Prescriptions, Judgments.*

ARTICLE 39.

Subject to the exceptions and special rules with regard to particular contracts or classes of contracts contained in the annex hereto, any contract concluded between enemies will be maintained or dissolved according to the law of the Allied Power of

which the party who was not a Turkish subject on the 1st August, 1914, is a national, and on the conditions prescribed by that law.

ARTICLE 40.

All periods of prescription or limitation of right of action, whether they began to run before or after the outbreak of war, shall be treated in the territory of the high contracting parties, so far as regards relations between enemies, as having been suspended from the 29th October, 1914, till the coming into force of the present treaty. They shall begin to run again at earliest three months after the coming into force of the present treaty. This provision shall apply to the period prescribed for the presentation of interest or dividend coupons or for the presentation for repayment of securities drawn for repayment or repayable on any other ground.

Having regard to the provisions of the law of Japan, neither the present article nor article 39, nor the annex hereto, shall apply to contracts made between Japanese nationals and Turkish nationals.

ARTICLE 41.

As between enemies no negotiable instrument made before the war shall be deemed to have become invalid by reason only of failure within the required time to present the instrument for acceptance or payment, or to give notice of non-acceptance or non-payment to drawers or endorsers, or to protest the instrument, nor by reason of failure to complete any formality during the war.

Where the period within which a negotiable instrument should have been presented for acceptance or for payment, or within which notice of non-acceptance or non-payment should have been given to the drawer or endorser, or within which the instrument should have been protested, has elapsed during the war, and the party who should have have presented or protested the instrument or have given notice of non-acceptance or non-payment has failed to do so during the war, a period of not less than three months from the coming into force of the present treaty shall be allowed within which presentation, notice of non-acceptance or non-payment or protest may be made.

ARTICLE 42.

Judgments given or measures of execution ordered during the war by any Turkish judicial or administrative authority against or prejudicially affecting the interests of a person who was at the time a national of an Allied Power, or against or affecting the interests of a company in which such an Allied national was interested, shall be subject to revision on the application of that national, by the [Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission], and where such a course is equitable and possible the parties shall be replaced in the situation which they occupied before the judgment was given or the measure of execution ordered.

Where a contract has been dissolved by reason either of failure on the part of either party to carry out its provisions or of the exercise of a right stipulated in the contract itself, the party prejudiced may apply to the [Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission]. The commission may grant compensation to the prejudiced party, or may order the restoration of any rights in Turkey which have been prejudiced by the dissolution wherever, having regard to the circumstances of the case, such restoration is equitable and possible.

ARTICLE 43.

All questions relating to contracts concluded before the coming into force of the present treaty between persons who were or have become nationals of the Allied Powers or of the new States whose territory is detached from Turkey and Turkish nationals shall be decided by the national courts of the Allied Power or new State of which one of the parties to the contract is a national or by the [Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission].

ARTICLE 44.

Judgments given by the national or consular courts of an Allied Power or new State whose territory is detached from Turkey, or orders made by the [Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission] in all cases which, under the present treaty, they are competent to decide, shall be recognised in Turkey as final, and shall be enforced without it being necessary to have them declared executory.

Annex.

(Unchanged, except for substitution in the last sentence of paragraph 2 of "Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission" for "Arbitral Commission provided for in Article 287.")

Section VI.—*Companies and Concessions.*

Article 45.

In application of the provisions of article 27, Allied nationals and companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals holding concessions granted before the 29th October, 1914, by the Turkish Government or by any Turkish local authority in territory remaining Turkish under the present treaty, or holding concessions which may be assigned to them in accordance with the advice of the Liquidation Commission in virtue of article 31, shall be replaced by such Government or authorities in complete possession of the rights resulting from the original concession contract and any subsequent agreements prior to the 29th October, 1914. The Turkish Government undertakes to adapt such contracts or agreements to the new economic conditions, and to extend them for a period equal to the interval between the 29th October, 1914, and the coming into force of the present treaty. In cases of dispute with the Turkish Government the matter shall be submitted to an arbitrator appointed by the Council of the League of Nations; the expenses of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the Turkish Government and the concessionnaire.

All legislative or other provisions, all concessions and all agreements subs-quent to the 29th October, 1914, and prejudicial to the rights referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be declared null and void by the Turkish Government.

Article 46.

In territories detached from Turkey to be placed under the authority or tutelage of one of the Principal Allied Powers, Allied nationals and companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals holding concessions granted before the 29th October, 1914, by the Turkish Government or by any Turkish local authority, shall continue in complete enjoyment of their duly acquired rights, and the Power concerned shall maintain the guarantees granted or shall assign equivalent ones.

Nevertheless, any such Power, if it considers that the maintenance of any of these concessions would be contrary to the public interest, shall be entitled, within a period of six months from the date on which the territory is placed under its authority or tutelage, to buy out such concession or to propose modifications therein; in that event it shall be bound to pay to the concessionnaire equitable compensation in accordance with the following provisions.

If the parties cannot agree on the amount of such compensation, it will be determined by arbitral tribunals composed of three members, one designated by the State of which the concessionnaire or the holders of the majority of the capital in the case of a company is or are nationals, one by the Government exercising authority in the territory in question, and the third designated, failing agreement between the parties, by the Council of the League of Nations.

The tribunal shall take into account, from both the legal and equitable standpoints, all relevant matters, on the basis of the maintenance of the contract adapted as indicated in the following paragraph.

The holder of a concession which is maintained in force shall have the right, within a period of six months after the expiration of the period specified in the second paragraph of this article, to demand the adaptation of his contract to the new economic conditions, and, in the absence of agreement direct with the Government concerned, the decision shall be referred to the arbitral tribunal provided for above.

Articles 47–51.

(Same as articles 312–316 of Treaty of Sèvres.)

Section VII.—*General Provision.*

Article 52.

The term "nationals of the Allied Powers," wherever used in this Part, covers—

1. All nationals, including companies and associations, of an Allied Power or of a State or territory under the protectorate of an Allied Power on the 1st August, 1914
2. The protected persons of the Allied Powers whose certificate of protection was granted before the 1st August, 1914, and, in the case of ex-Turkish nationals, who are members of the Allied diplomatic or consular services.
3. Turkish financial, industrial and commercial companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals, or in which such groups or nationals possessed the preponderant interest on the 1st August, 1914.
4. Religious or charitable institutions and scholastic establishments in which nationals or protected persons of the Allied Powers are interested.

The Allied Powers will communicate to the Liquidation Commission, within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty, the list of companies, institutions and establishments in which they consider that their nationals possess a preponderant interest or are interested.

No. 94.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October 7.*)

(No. 551.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 6, 1922.*

FOLLOWING changes in Greek army given to military attaché by Ministry of War :—

1. *Formations now in Athens.*—First army corps: divisions will be located in their own depot areas; 2nd division, Athens; 1st, Larissa; 13th, Chalkis.

They will be brought at any rate to full peace establishment, second division being given first urgency after Thrace.

7th and 12th will very shortly go to Thrace, where 12th will absorb independent division.

2. *Thrace.*—11th division will absorb Adrianople division. Beta division broken up. Thus army in Thrace will be with new commanders (all generals unless specified).

Army commander, Nider; chief of staff, A. Masarakis; deputy chief of staff, Colonel Saryannis.

3rd army corps. Commander Ebrgalides (commanding 11th division in 1920).
3rd division, Colonel Tsiroyannis (commanding infantry of 9th division 1920).
10th division, Tsimichalis (commanding Athens area 1920).
12th division, Colonel Stavrianopoulos (regimental commander 1920).
4th army corps. Leonardopoulos (divisional commander since 1919).
6th division, Papathirasiou (commander of 1st division 1920).
7th division, Constantine Manetas (commander of 13th division 1920).
11th division, Colonel Kondyles is appointed to command infantry division and temporary division (regimental commander 1920, and since then national defence at Constantinople).

Military attaché knows nothing of Stavrianopoulos's or Kondyles's capabilities; otherwise believes above to be good soldiers.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 95.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 552.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 6, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 542.

Since this telegram was sent more than 50,000 refugees have arrived at Salonica, and their condition is appalling.

Bread is first requirement.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 96.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 554.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 6, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegrams Nos. 514 and 528.

I submit that whole question depends on whether Turkish soldiers or gendarmerie are to be allowed to enter Thrace before conclusion of peace settlement.

If they are, it is useless to consider expedients, since repetition of Asia Minor experiences is inevitable.

If they are not I would venture to suggest that the only vital Greek administrative services are those of gendarmerie and police. They could remain as they are until settlement, but take their orders from Allied commissioners in Thrace instead of from Greek military authorities. There does not seem to be any reason why they should collapse with withdrawal of Greek troops, provided there is some show of Allied force, and provided they and the whole community are positively assured that there will be no sudden inrush of Turks. This assurance is a necessary condition to any orderly settlement, and sooner we are in a position to give it the better.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)
(Repeated to Paris by Foreign Office.)

No. 97.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 555.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 6, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 552.

Following received from Canea :—

" Total number of refugees in Canea should have been 17,500; 10,000 in Candia.

" As a result of personal inspection to-day, I am convinced that, failing properly organised assistance from outside, large numbers of women and children must die. Risk of epidemic very serious."

This is [? typical, ? typhoid]

No. 98.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 556.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 6, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 554.

Every day I receive most terrible reports from consular officers of condition of refugees who are pouring in from Asia Minor and who must number by now nearly

500,000. It is simply inhuman to let their numbers to be more than doubled, as they will be if Turks are allowed to enter Thrace at once. Such a capitulation to pure barbarianism will utterly destroy our prestige and that of all civilisation. Cannot case be stated in such a way as to rouse the whole civilised world?

(Repeated to Constantinople.)
(Repeated to Paris by Foreign Office.)

No. 99.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 558.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 7, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just told me that French Minister called last night and urged that no steps should be taken to strengthen Greek forces in Thrace.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has replied that Greek Government were prepared to abide by decisions of Powers, but that it was necessary to strengthen army both in interests of population and in order to be ready for any eventualities.

No. 100.

Lord D'Abernon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 6, 1922.*

RUSSIAN sources of information here put out quasi-confidentially that an agreement was signed about 29th September between Angora and Franklin-Bouillon, giving special privileges to France and containing secret clauses of which Russians have no knowledge. It is not improbable that among the reasons for letting this leak out is the wish that we should understand that Herriot is a potential Franklin-Bouillon.

Russians assert that they are exercising influence at Angora in favour of peace, but they do not venture to push too far in this direction lest they should lose their influence there. For same reason also they have delayed ratification of Urquhart Agreement.

Berlin is becoming increasingly a central exchange between Angora and Moscow. Agents for both sides are in close contact, and leading Soviet representatives who come here to seek medical advice and telegraphic facilities are in constant communication with Moscow by aeroplane. German authorities appear to be exercising influence through Russia in favour of peaceable solution.

No. 101.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 531.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 472.

Though question of neutral zone [group undecypherable] was not reached at Mudania discussions, General Harington informs me that he has a draft convention ready for presentation to Ismet Pasha on this subject.

This convention states that General Harington will only sign general convention so far discussed, subject to Kemalist undertaking to withdraw their troops to neutral line. Neutral zone convention further specifies that neutral line in case of Chanak zone means line which has been held by British troops for past three years.

In case of Ismid Peninsula line means line agreed to by Kemalists themselves last year.

(Repeated to Paris by Foreign Office telegram No. 363.)

No. 102.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 532.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 6, 1922*

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON leaves for Mudania this afternoon prior to departure from here of Allied generals.

He came with French High Commissioner to appeal for authority from me to hold out to Turks prospect of concessions by His Majesty's Government to Turkish demands. I told him I had reported, very fully, to your Lordship, and that I could not prejudge decisions of His Majesty's Government.

In the meantime, Franklin-Bouillon, with authorisation of French High Commissioner, telegraphed in his own name and that of Nationalist agent here to Ismet Pasha asking that reassembling of conference, fixed for 2·30 P.M. to-day, should be delayed till late afternoon in order to enable Paris and London decisions to arrive.

No. 103.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 533.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 469.

As you will have seen from my No. 552 [*sic*], I am absolutely opposed to Smyrna, and consider proposal for [group omitted] or some other town in Italy should be maintained. Question of date is subordinate to rapidity with which Allied Governments can make preparations for conference. While a fortnight would seem inadequate for this purpose, conference should, if possible, be held by 30th October, or say a fortnight after actual issue of invitations.

I do not think His Majesty's Government should object to participation of Russian States mentioned, provided it be limited to that part of negotiations relating to the freedom of the Straits. In that case, Bulgaria has every right to be similarly invited. Danger of Allies being out-voted owing to presence of three Russian States might be met by insistence on separate votes for British dominions, to which they would seem no less entitled than Georgia and Ukraine.

It is matter for consideration whether Straits régime should not form subject of entirely separate negotiation. This would obviate many difficulties and present certain desirable advantages. Above views are based on presumption that it will be Allied Ministers and not High Commissioners who will represent their Governments at the conference.

(Repeated to Athens and Paris.)

No. 104.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 538.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Constantinople, October 7, 1922.*

ATHENS telegrams Nos. 554 and 556.

I am fully alive to danger to Christian population. Difficulty of Mr. Lindley's proposal is that Allied organs and forces would have to be on sufficient scale and sufficiently permanent to give them effective control over the country until peace settlement is complete. This is what Turks are fighting at Mudania. They are prepared for Allied commissions and detachments, perhaps even for Allied occupation in force for short period until their own administration is installed, but they want to see the last vestige of Allied control disappear at end of that period, estimated at one month. This is point on which Mudania Conference threatens to break down. In order to avoid this I suggested in my telegrams Nos. 506 and 514 minimum which I considered might suffice to obviate panic flight of Christians and general disorder.

(Repeated to Paris and Athens.)

No. 105.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 539.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1922.*

ATHENS telegram No. 549 is an additional demonstration of impossibility of handing over Thrace to Turks without effective Allied control and before conclusion of peace.

Question of expediency of arranging for eventual transfer of Christian population of Eastern Thrace to Western Thrace, and *vice versâ*, might be considered at general conference. I doubt whether it would be favoured by Turks, who in present mood contemplate possibility of recovering Western Thrace also by means of plebiscite.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 106.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 540.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1922.*

IN the event of possible outbreak of hostilities and evacuation by British forces of Constantinople, withdrawal of High Commission will become necessary.

In its eventuality, I presume myself and staff should return to England and leave High Commission in charge either of Dutch or American diplomatic representative here.

May I have authority in above eventuality to release for service with army members of temporary staff who may desire it, and whom general headquarters may be willing to accept?

British colony will be advised to leave as soon as general headquarters recommend it.

No. 107.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 541.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 7, 1922.*

A KEMALIST force consisting of cavalry and about 3,000 infantry with artillery is reported to have advanced 4 miles within neutral zone of Ismid Peninsula. It stated it had come peacefully. It has been told to clear out at once.

General Harington has been informed, in order that he may take requisite action at Mudania. In addition to above, party of Nationalists thirty to forty strong has turned up at Chile in Black Sea and another of about twelve at Kayalar on central or military road in Ismid area. A destroyer has been sent to former place and a cavalry patrol to the latter, with instructions to request these parties to go away peacefully.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 108.

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 32) to Lord Hardinge.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October 8.)

(No. 542.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 8, 1922.*

[? FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:—]

Following is text of a letter which I have just received from General Harington and which was brought by destroyer which left Mudania just before midnight:—

"I hope that you will expedite any reply that has been received from Cabinet, as I have already twice postponed conference here pending this reply, and in meantime

Turkish cavalry and infantry have crossed into neutral zone on Ismid Peninsula. I am concerting action with admiral as a reprisal, but do not actually intend to commence hostilities until I know what has passed in Paris. Kindly consider matter as extremely urgent, as I cannot allow my military direction to be compromised any longer through delay in negotiations.

"I am issuing an ultimatum to Ismet to-morrow (*i.e.*, this 8th October) morning to say that latter has broken faith regarding frontier and cessation of movements, and that unless he withdraws I will oppose him with all available forces."

I have informed General Harington by wireless that I interpret delay in receipt of a telegram from you as indicating that you are having great difficulties at Paris.

No. 109.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 7.)

Paris, October 7, 1922.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon for Prime Minister:—

"I have just returned from a conversation of three and a half hours with M. Poincaré. I had left it to him whether or not to invite Count Sforza to join in the conversation. It appeared that he had left Paris in consequence of the death of his father; but after a time his counsellor, M. Galli, was found and joined us at the table.

"I began by referring to the Paris Agreement, and claimed that every action of our representatives so far had scrupulously conformed to its provisions. To it I proposed to adhere, and to judge every action by that test. I then narrated the history of the Mudania Conference, giving the contents of the very remarkable convention which the three generals had been prepared to sign, and which had reached me (telegraphed by Sir Horace Rumbold) just as I left London. It showed that the generals had been willing to go to the extreme limit of concession—perhaps beyond what their Governments might have sanctioned. But at the last moment the Turks had put forward a series of preposterous demands (the four points of Harington's telegram) to which it had been impossible to accede. And finally, General Charpy, acting upon instructions from his Government, had seceded from his colleagues, and had supported the demand of the Turks, reinforced by a threat to set their troops in immediate motion, for the withdrawal of all Allied missions and contingents and the immediate handing over of Eastern Thrace to the sovereignty and occupation of the Turks. This demand, I said, was wholly inconsistent with the Paris note, it ignored the peace conference, and it would, if acceded to, place the Turks in a position where they could hold the conference at their mercy.

"Such a course was peculiarly foolish at the very moment when the Allied generals had been in complete accord, and when M. Veniselos was exerting himself to bring about the voluntary and peaceful retirement of the Greek army. I concluded by asking M. Poincaré whether he was prepared to adopt the sole feasible course by which the Paris note and the alliance could be maintained, viz., by agreeing to the temporary occupation of Eastern Thrace by Allied troops, pending the gradual transfer to Turkish administration.

"M. Poincaré commenced his reply by expressing the menacing fear that Mustapha Kemal had already carried out his threat, and had crossed the neutral lines. It subsequently turned out that this was a bluff; and before the end of the meeting a telegram was read of precisely the opposite character. M. Poincaré went on to defend the pacifying influence of M. Franklin-Bouillon, which I had vigorously challenged, and exculpated General Charpy on the ground that, while he was not acting as he had done under direct orders from the French Government, the latter had given him complete liberty to 'reconcile the British instructions to the general with the possibilities of the case,' or, in other words, to make any concession which the Kemalists might demand as a condition of keeping the peace.

"A rather sharp controversy ensued as to the manner in which General Charpy had acted upon his instructions, and as to the loyalty of the French Government in issuing them; and the persistence with which M. Poincaré reverted to this subject throughout the discussion indicated the anxiety which it had caused in his own mind.

"M. Poincaré then went on to report a conversation to-day with M. Veniselos, in which the latter had gone far beyond the position he had taken up in London, had expressed his willingness to cede to Turkey, not merely the Maritza frontier, but the frontier of 1914, had asked only for the presence of Allied troops for one month while the Greek army and population were evacuating Eastern Thrace, and had demanded no protection of minorities, being satisfied with his policy of expatriation within that period.

"In the course of a rather heated arugment, M. Poincaré went on to claim that the demand of the Turks to which General Charpy had acceded was in strict accordance with the Paris note, and that the generals had no alternative, also in accordance with that note, but to grant it. This provoked an exchange of somewhat pointed civilities between us, delivered, in M. Poincaré's case, with that peculiar timbre of voice which he always affects in moments of exceptional emotion. At intervals during this fusillade I kept reiterating the questions: Did M. Poincaré accept the four Turkish demands? Was he prepared to abandon the idea of sending Allied officers, commissions and contingents to Eastern Thrace, and to admit the Turks at once with an army thinly disguised as a gendarmerie? And finally, if, as he anticipated, the Turks were to cross or had even already crossed the Ismid zone, what was he prepared to do? To this he answered: "In no circumstances anything"—a reply which also provoked a somewhat caustic reference from me to the Paris note, which apparently meant nothing and only existed in order to be torn to pieces by the Turks, while the French looked on.

"A revulsion from these dialectics was fortunately brought about by the discovery, which was presently made, that M. Poincaré's information from Mudania differed materially from mine, that he had never heard of the draft convention, or of the Turkish claims, and that what he thought General Charpy had agreed to was merely a demand for the institution in Eastern Thrace of a civil administration by the Turks.

"It further transpired that he was quite pleased with M. Veniselos's proposals, and that he had already telegraphed out urging their acceptance by the French representative and the Turks.

"This rather surprising discovery enabled me to say, on the one hand, that I could not go as far as M. Veniselos in conceding a frontier much beyond what even Kemal had asked for, and that I should consequently adhere to the Maritza frontier of the Paris note, but, on the other hand, that I warmly welcomed M. Poincaré's acceptance of an Allied occupation of a month or more, and would be glad to know what contribution he proposed to make to it.

"Then ensued a discussion as to the actual strength of the French and Italian forces in European Turkey, in the course of which M. Poincaré promised, if required, to send as many as were desired of the French troops now at Constantinople and Chatalja, or, if necessary, all; while Signor Galli, not to be outdone, declared the Italian willingness to make a substantial contribution out of what I believe to be a purely mythical Italian force of 2,000 said to be at Constantinople or in the neighbourhood.

"I safeguarded the British position by saying that if we were attacked by Kemal we might find difficulty in sending any troops at all, as we should require to move every man to Chanak or Gallipoli, but that, in the event of war being avoided, I would consult my Government as to their contribution.

"Finally, I suggested that, as we appeared to be so near to each other's views, and as it was desirable to be precise, M. Poincaré should himself draw up the conditions which he was prepared to recommend for acceptance at Mudania, and that we should meet again at 9 in the morning to consider his draft.

"This was agreed to, and we separated.

"Whether M. Poincaré will recede from his position in the morning I cannot say. But I judged from his general demeanour (1) that he is greatly embarrassed by the position into which he has got himself, (2) that he is genuinely afraid of a rupture, and (3) that he thinks he has the Kemalists pretty well in hand."

No. 110.

Telephone Message from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received October 7, 1922.)

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon:—

"When we reassembled this morning at 9 o'clock, M. Poincaré startled me by stating that information had been received from Rome that French and Italian generals had come to an agreement reducing the suggested month for Allied occupation of Eastern Thrace to a fortnight. Whether this proposal had been communicated to the Turks was not clear, though it seems highly probable. I at once said that I could accept no such reduction of time, which was obviously impracticable, since the provisional administration would barely have been set up before it was called upon to withdraw, and Turks would be admitted to a province still in a state of complete chaos, and I asked M. Poincaré to send instructions to General Charpy that this plan could not be accepted. This he declined to do, taking up the extraordinary position that he could not instruct but could only advise General Charpy, who must be at liberty to make any arrangements that he thought necessary in order to avoid war. I pointed out the unparalleled character and the dangerous implication of this attitude, to which I declined to be a party, and said that I was convinced that my Government would not authorise General Harington to re-enter Mudania Conference on any conditions less than I had proposed.

"I further pointed out the risk that M. Veniselos might recede from his undertaking about evacuation if the corresponding obligations for a delay of one month were departed from.

"After a prolonged argument the following text was proposed:

"'The three Allied Governments agree in accepting that the Greek troops shall be invited to retire as soon as possible to the west of the Maritza. The Allied Governments will ensure, by means of a provisional inter-Allied occupation, the installation in Eastern Thrace of a Turkish civil administration and gendarmerie.

"'This installation shall take place within a period not exceeding a month after the evacuation of Greek troops. At the expiry of this period, the Allied troops shall only continue to occupy during the conference certain points on the right bank of Maritza and the places where they are at the present moment.'"

(Continuation follows.)

No. 111.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received October 7, 1922.)

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon (continued):—

"I am not quite satisfied with these words myself, and I have, since the meeting, shown them to M. Veniselos.

"The latter denies that he ever accepted the frontier ascribed to him by M. Poincaré, and was grateful for my insistence on the Maritza. He also denies having expressed no anxiety concerning the Christian population, of whose fate he is very apprehensive at the end of the period of Allied occupation.

"I shall therefore endeavour to make more clear at the further meeting with M. Poincaré this afternoon the conditions under which the Turkish return is to be admitted, and shall press for some such formula as follows:—

"'In the territories thus evacuated the Allied Governments will ensure by means of a provisional inter-Allied occupation the maintenance of order and public security during thirty days after the evacuation by the Greek troops, which will be necessary for the installation in Eastern Thrace of the Turkish administration and Turkish police.'

"When I asked M. Veniselos whether Greek Government had accepted his advice and instructed their generals at Mudania in the above sense, he said he had no definite assurance, as he had been urging them to make one unpalatable concession after the other, but he felt reasonably confident that they would accept—to revert to the draft, you will observe that the month is to date from the completion of the Greek

evacuation, not from the beginning, a point on which I insisted. But the question of Karagatch is dealt with by the suggestion of a continued Allied occupation of the right bank of the Maritza after the withdrawal of the Allied forces elsewhere and during the peace conference, and that the last words cover the continued Allied occupation of Chanak, Gallipoli, Ismid and Chatalja.

"I said that I could only accept this proposed draft if my Government approved and were prepared to instruct General Harington to re-enter Mudania Conference on these terms. It must be understood that all the other fantastic Turkish demands will continue to be rejected.

"General Harington will, I judge from his various telegrams, be willing to agree on above lines and to join in immediate despatch of troops if His Majesty's Government approve. I suggested, therefore, that he should be instructed from London in this sense.

"I told M. Poincaré quite plainly that I could not accept position that decision of majority at Mudania should prevail. Either there must be Allied concord or no agreement at all.

"I further made clear that, in accordance with Paris note, evacuation of Greek zones could not be arranged without corresponding engagements on the part of Kemal to respect neutral zones.

"M. Poincaré had heard of arrangement proposed by General Harington in this respect, but did not contest my unqualified reassertion of principle.

"Finally, discussing the contingency of Turkish refusal of the terms proposed, in which case M. Poincaré seemed prepared for a still further climb down, I once more made clear British position, which is that, should the Ismid zone be invaded and the British position attacked, we shall retire from Scutari, and, if Constantinople be attacked, shall retire from there also, leaving our allies to bear the entire responsibilities of the consequences that might ensue.

"M. Poincaré retorted that in that case the French would go too.

"This afternoon I am to discuss with M. Poincaré question of peace conference, its date and place and composition, but shall not commit His Majesty's Government in any of these particulars, my object being to ascertain the views of our allies rather than to express my own.

"I hope to return to-morrow."

No. 112.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received October 7, 1922.)

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon for Cabinet:—

"I had already been in session for half an hour this afternoon when your telegram arrived. Meeting had been arranged to enable M. Poincaré to leave at 4 P.M. for a long-standing public engagement in the east of France, from which he does not return till Monday night. I commenced by referring to my interview with M. Veniselos this morning, and to import[?ance] to be attached to presence of Allied troops in Eastern Thrace as a guarantee for maintenance of order and security of population, and I proposed the amendment to draft which I had telephoned to you at midday. After some discussion this was accepted in following form:—

"'In the territories thus evacuated the Allied Governments will ensure by means of provisional inter-Allied occupation the maintenance of order and public security, until establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish administration and gendarmerie. This establishment shall take place within a period not exceeding a month after the evacuation of Greek troops. At the expiry of this period, the Allied troops shall only continue to occupy during the conference certain points on the right bank of Maritza and the places where they are at the present moment.'

"M. Poincaré then read a telegram which he had sent after this morning's sitting to General Charpy enjoining the latter to press urgently upon Kemalists acceptance of arrangement now proposed.

"A long wrangle next took place upon a telegram which Signor Galli wanted to send to Italian representative at Mudania authorising him to inform the Turks that, if the Allied generals were agreed, a shorter period than a month might be conceded. This was to cover foolish action of General Mombelli in proposing, along

with General Charpy, a delay of only a fortnight. I absolutely declined to agree to this telegram, which would lead the Turks to think that they might squeeze something more, and would suggest, and perhaps produce, a disagreement between the generals, who, moreover, could, if they were agreed, make any proposition to their Governments that they pleased. M. Galli's proposal was finally dropped.

"It was perfectly understood that agreement arrived at was subject to approval of His Majesty's Government, and that no definite action could be taken until this was received.

"I then initiated an exchange of views upon reply of Angora Government to invitation to peace conference, and upon date and composition of latter. It is not necessary to telegraph these opinions. No decision was arrived at as we found our views in close unison. I will lay these results before the Cabinet on my return."

No. 113.

Sir Eyre Crowe to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 369.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon from Prime Minister:—

"We have considered carefully your final formula. The Cabinet accepts this formula, provided M. Poincaré, on his part, accepts the following conditions:—

"'1. That agreement on any other point must be contingent upon Turkish withdrawal from, and respect for, neutral zones.

"'2. That any agreement for admission of Kemalist gendarmerie before conclusion of treaty of peace must contain a limit on the numbers of such gendarmerie, failing which, it might easily become, in fact, the Kemalist army under another name, and endanger the position of the Allied occupying troops. The numbers to be allowed should be left to be fixed by the Allied generals in consultation with the High Commissioners.

"'3. That there shall be no withdrawal of the Allied troops from Eastern Thrace before the termination of the period of thirty days agreed to by M. Veniselos unless the Allied Governments are agreed that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of order and the protection of the non-Turkish population.'

"The new formula does not make these points sufficiently clear.

"We repeat to you a message sent by M. Veniselos to the Greek Legation here, and communicated to the Foreign Office yesterday, which bears on point No. 3 above.

"This message has already been circulated."

No. 114.

Message by Telephone from Lord Curzon to Prime Minister.— (Received October 7, 1922.)

YOUR No. 369 of to-day.

1. This point was made at this morning's meeting and not challenged.

2. It also has been repeatedly laid down in meetings that numbers were not to be unlimited, and that therefore limitations will have to be agreed on by the Allied High Commissioners and generals.

3. Lord Curzon has rejected any attempt to diminish, and has made clear that no abridgment of that period will be agreed to except unanimously. He also made clear that instructions to Harington would also be not to agree to any reduction, and, therefore, as any reduction can only be achieved by unanimity, if unanimity is not secured no reduction can take place.

He thinks it will be very undesirable to engage in telephonic correspondence with M. Poincaré, who is now in the country. He therefore proposes to write a letter saying that he has communicated with His Majesty's Government and has assured them that all points therein raised are provided for and specifically agreed to during conversations.

No. 115.

Telephone Message from Lord Hardinge.—(Received October 7, 1922.)

Paris.

LORD CURZON'S message to the Prime Minister of 7·30 P.M. to-day.

The points mentioned have been referred by telephone to M. Peretti.

He says that they are "entendus et bien compris."

Lord Curzon is going to write to-night to M. Peretti to get this confirmed in writing.

No. 116.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.—(Received at Foreign Office, October 7.)

(No. 84. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *October 6, 1922.*

IN view of the fact that the French and Italians have in effect gone back on the Paris note if Turkish advance takes place in neutral zone across Ismid, you are not to take hostile action until you receive further instructions. If, on the other hand, we are attacked at Chanak, this will be an act of war against British Empire.

Acknowledge.

No. 117.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.—(Received at Foreign Office, October 7.)

(No. 86. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *October 6, 1922.*

CONTINUATION of my No. 84. In event of Turkish advance on Ismid neutral zone your orders to stop Greek men-of-war and transports entering Sea of Marmora are cancelled.

No. 118.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Paris).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 370.) *Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.*

THE Cabinet is going to meet at 9·30 this evening to consider your reply on the three points. Prime Minister will propose that Sir H. Rumbold, to whom a short account of Paris discussions and of present position has already been telegraphed, should now be directed to inform General Harington that the formula has been approved by His Majesty's Government on the condition of the French agreeing to the three points; that you consider the points, in fact, covered by the reservations and declarations made by you at the meeting with M. Poincaré and understood to have been accepted by him; but that you are writing a letter to him to confirm this understanding.

In these circumstances Sir H. Rumbold should authorise General Harington to resume negotiations on that basis.

No. 119.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 479.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 473.

As a result of prolonged discussions between Secretary of State and French President of Council at Paris, following draft formula laying down conditions under

which Turkish return to Eastern Thrace shall be admitted was provisionally agreed upon subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government :—

"The three Allied Governments agree in accepting that the Greek troops shall be invited to retire as soon as possible to the west of the Maritza. In the territories thus evacuated the Allied Governments will ensure, by means of a provisional inter-Allied occupation, the maintenance of order and public security until the establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish administration and gendarmerie; this establishment shall take place within a period not exceeding a month after the evacuation of Greek troops. At the expiry of this period, the Allied troops shall only continue to occupy during the conference certain points on the right bank of Maritza and the places where they are at the present moment."

French and Italian representatives at the meeting had strongly urged reduction from one month to a fortnight of the period of proposed inter-Allied occupation, but although they said that their generals at Mudania had actually agreed to this, Lord Curzon firmly declined to accept the proposal. He, moreover, insisted on making the month date from the completion of Greek evacuation. The question of Karagatch is held to be covered by the stipulation that there is to be a continued Allied occupation of the right bank of the Maritza after the withdrawal of the Allied forces elsewhere, and during the peace conference. The last words of the draft formula are to ensure the continued Allied occupation of Chanak, Gallipoli, Ismid and Chatálja.

Lord Curzon made it clear (1) that in recommending the formula to His Majesty's Government he did so on the understanding that all the other Turkish demands not covered by the terms of the Paris note of 23rd September will continue to be rejected; (2) that in Mudania Conference no decision by majority was admissible, but that there must be Allied concord or no agreement at all; (3) that the evacuation of Greek zones could not be arranged without corresponding engagements on the part of Kemal to respect neutral zones.

The Cabinet have to-day informed Lord Curzon that they accept the draft formula provided M. Poincaré on his part accepts the following conditions :—

1. That agreement on any other point must be contingent upon Turkish withdrawal from, and respect for, neutral zones.

2. That any agreement for admission of Kemalist gendarmerie before conclusion of treaty of peace must contain a limit on the numbers of such gendarmerie, failing which it might easily become, in fact, the Kemalist army under another name, and endanger the position of the Allied occupying troops. The numbers to be allowed should be left to be fixed by the Allied generals in consultation with the High Commissioners.

3. That there shall be no withdrawal of the Allied troops from Eastern Thrace before the termination of the period of thirty days agreed to by M. Veniselos unless the Allied Governments are agreed that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of order and the protection of the non-Turkish population.

Cabinet are awaiting reply from Paris to above telegram.

Please now inform General Harington that Paris negotiations are not yet completed, but seem to promise satisfactory solution. We shall send instructions as soon as final solution is reached. Meanwhile, he should, as already instructed, not commit himself. He of course realises that Franklin-Bouillon has no authority to represent us, and that no confidence can be placed in any statement of his as to Allied intentions.

No. 120.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 480.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 7, 1922.

MY telegram No. 479 of to-day.

The Cabinet learns from Lord Curzon that the three conditions subject to which His Majesty's Government have accepted the Paris draft formula were in

his opinion fully understood and agreed to by the French in the course of the discussions. This impression has now been confirmed to him by the Director-General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (he used the expression that the points referred to were "entendus et bien compris") and Lord Curzon is writing to him, in the absence of M. Poincaré, who had already left Paris, to obtain written confirmation. We have no reason to believe this will not be forthcoming.

This being the position, your Excellency is now requested to inform General Harington of the above, and to authorise him to resume the negotiations at Mudania on the basis of the Paris formula as regards Eastern Thrace, but on the clear understanding that the reservations and conditions insisted upon by the Cabinet here and by Lord Curzon in Paris are accepted and embodied in the convention to be signed by the generals.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 371; Rome, No. 320; and Athens, No. 301.)

No. 121.

Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Rumbold.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October 8.)

(No. 508.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October* 8, 1922.

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon :—

"French Government have explicitly accepted conditions referred to in Foreign Office telegram of 7th October, and have so informed their representative at Constantinople. It is not doubted that Italian Government are doing likewise. Inform General Harington accordingly and instruct him to proceed on these bases."

No. 122.

Lord D'Abernon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October* 8, 1922.

URQUHART left for London to-day. General view in competent circles is that ratification of his agreement is only delayed.

Alleged reason for refusal is England's unfriendly attitude regarding Russian representation at Dardanelles Conference, but real reason is rather to play up to Angora.

Behind this was temptation of a supposed opportunity for political blackmail in order to secure *de jure* recognition.

Private reports from Moscow state that Soviet Government considers speedy recognition so vital that it would consent to almost any sacrifice to obtain it.

No. 123.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 469.)
(Telegraphic.) *October* 8, 1922.

INFORMATION received that Nationalists have crossed Ismid neutral zone, and are 6 kilom. inside it at Karayakobi.

In view of your No. 84, request immediate instructions.

No. 124.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 545.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 8, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 542.

Admiral Tyrwhitt has received instructions from Admiral Brock to stop all traffic at night across the Bosphorus. No ferry steamers will be allowed to run after 6 P.M. as from to-day. Admiral Brock has also instructed Admiral Tyrwhitt to consult me as to advisability of commencing to clear the Bosphorus of Turkish craft this afternoon.

I have replied that I am [? strongly] opposed to this latter measure at present as it would create a real panic here. I have said that we must allow Ismet time to consider and agree to proposals contained in your telegram No. 479.

I have telegraphed to General Harington that in view of agreement reached in Paris he will no doubt consider advisability of demanding withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Ismid neutral zone as part of arrangement reached in Paris instead of in form of an ultimatum. I have pointed out that Nationalist troops who crossed neutral zone yesterday may have been genuinely unaware of its limits. The parties at Chile and Yarimje are, in fact, reported to be retiring to the east.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 35.)

No. 125.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 546.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 8, 1922.*

TURKS have started arresting Christians here, especially in Asiatic suburbs, where Kemalist influence is strong. I consider this intolerable while Allied occupation lasts. I have sent very strong message to Grand Vizier, and will see him myself to-morrow. Diplomatic pressure alone, however, will produce little result. I am in communication with General Officer Commanding as to other action.

No. 126.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 547.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 8, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 479 and 480.

French and Italian generals returned from Mudania this afternoon to fetch their instructions, which had not yet arrived. Those instructions came this afternoon, and meeting was held this evening to compare them with those of His Majesty's Government.

I read out to my colleagues your telegram No. 482; nevertheless, I found that French instructions respecting conditions insisted upon by Cabinet differed from those in your telegrams in following respects:—

1. First condition in your telegram No. 479 mentioned Turkish withdrawal and respect for "neutral zones," as if referring to neutral zones laid down by Allied High Commissioners' proclamation of May 1921. French instructions mention "neutral zone to be laid down by Allied generals."

2. Second condition in your telegram states that number of gendarmerie shall be fixed by Allied generals in consultation with High Commissioners. French instructions omit this sentence altogether, and merely state that gendarmerie shall be limited to number strictly necessary.

3. Third condition is [? identic].

Allied generals (Colonel Gribbon representing General Harington) declared categorically that Turks would never accept neutral zones of 1921, which had never been recognised by them. Generals agreed that difficulty could be got over if French

formula were accepted, and General Harington had contemplated this [? even] as regards Chanak as the most practical one previous to receipt of your instructions. I feel this is mainly a military question, and should be left to discretion of General Harington.

As regards gendarmerie, Allied generals stated that Turks had consistently refused to fix exact number as constituting limitation of Turkish sovereignty. While I strongly upheld views of His Majesty's Government at meeting, I was forced to conclude that a deadlock will be reached unless some formula be found, such as inducing Turks to state a number which Allied generals should accept if they thought it reasonable, and which could then be inserted in convention as being number considered strictly necessary for maintenance of law and order.

It was agreed that convention should come into force three days after signature.

Please telegraph immediate instructions by wireless to General Harington at Mudania as to manner in which Cabinet wishes him to interpret conditions, as next meeting is fixed for to-morrow, 9th October, at 3 P.M. (South Europe time).

(Repeated to Paris and Athens.)

No. 127.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Moscow, October 8, 1922.*

DECISION of Council of People's Commissary to reject Urquhart concession, published 7th October, states as grounds absence of "friendly stability and definite relations" with Great Britain, which grant to a British company of a concession of such importance presupposes. In this connection reference is made to Near East and Black Sea, where "British Government in fact excludes Russia from discussion on equal terms with other Powers of her vital economic interests." Leaders in the press develop this thesis at considerable length.

I am reporting fully by despatch.

No. 128.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 305.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 7, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 530.

In conversation to-day Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged that immediate surrender of Eastern Thrace to Turkey, although not defensible in principle, was preferable to war and should be accepted.

His Excellency said that he also had unfavourable report from [? Mudania] regarding Franklin-Bouillon, who had insisted on French General signing protocol at once. Italian general had protested and had supported General Harington in demanding [? delay] to ask for instructions. [? Franklin-Bouillon] had complained to Paris regarding General Mombelli's attitude, and Italian Government had received strong representation from M. Poincaré on the subject. Signor Schanzer reiterated his thorough mistrust of Franklin-Bouillon.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Paris.)

No. 129.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).**

(No. 372.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 8, 1922.*

ANGORA Government is demanding at Mudania the inclusion in military convention now being negotiated of acceptance of clauses agreeing to immediate

* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 321.

release of (*a*) all civil hostages in Greek hands, and (*b*) of all prisoners of war in Greek hands before peace conference, and without reciprocity.

Allied generals have addressed following identic note to their respective Governments:— (End of R.)

"Ismet's declaration that his Government has released all Greek civil prisoners having been taken note of, the Allied generals consider that request for immediate release of all Turkish civil prisoners in Greek hands is just and fair. In addition, they have undertaken to recommend that their respective Governments shall examine request for release of prisoners of war in order to secure favourable solution at earliest possible moment. Exchange of prisoners of war is definitely refused consideration by Ismet."

No. 130.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1922.

MY telegram No. 481 to Sir H. Rumbold of to-day.

We presume that Italian proposal for joint remonstrance through High Commissioners at Constantinople has also been made to French Government. We trust French High Commissioner will receive authority to join.

No. 131.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 481.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1922.

EXCHANGE of Prisoners.

With reference to General Harington's telegram D. 10 of 7th October, your Excellency is requested to inform him that, whilst welcoming the release of any prisoners of war or hostages, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to press the Greeks beyond the point of reciprocity.

According to a communication made to us by Italian Ambassador here Kemal has announced intention of trying as rebels or traitors the men who served as volunteers in Greek forces, and whom he now holds prisoners. If condemned they would be shot. We can hardly believe that, whatever might be advanced as technical legal justification, Kemal seriously contemplates such wholesale fusillades, but the possibility must be borne in mind in any arrangement made with regard to civilian or regular military prisoners.

Italian Government propose joint remonstrance by High Commissioners at Constantinople. Your Excellency is authorised to associate yourself with your Italian colleague in such action, and should endeavour to obtain co-operation of French High Commissioner also.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 374; Rome, No. 323; and Athens, No. 304.)

No. 132.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 482.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1922.

MY telegram No. 480 of 7th October.

French Government have accepted in writing the three points stipulated for by Cabinet.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 482; repeated to Rome, No. 324, and Athens No. 305.)

[E 10777/27/44] No. 133.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 864.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 3, 1922.

I HAVE endeavoured, in my telegram No. 503, to give your Lordship a résumé of the principal statements made by M. Franklin-Bouillon to the Allied High Commissioners and generals on the night of the 1st instant, and this despatch supplements my above-mentioned telegram.

2. I should explain that M. Franklin-Bouillon arrived at Constantinople on the afternoon of the 1st October in the French cruiser "Metz." Immediately afterwards I received a visit from the French counsellor of Embassy, who stated that M. Franklin-Bouillon wished immediately to make an important statement regarding the results of his visit to Smyrna. It was suggested that the Allied High Commissioners should meet that evening with the Allied generals to hear this statement. I agreed, and fixed 10 P.M. for this meeting, assuming that it would, as usual, take place at this High Commission. I subsequently learnt that the intention was that the Allied High Commissioners and generals should meet at the French High Commission, but I was unable to admit that I should be practically summoned to a conference by M. Franklin-Bouillon, and I replied definitely that the meeting must take place here, which it accordingly did. I found that my Italian colleague entirely shared my view, and had resented the apparent summoning by M. Franklin-Bouillon of a conference at the French High Commission. I mention these details, which may appear trivial, in case M. Franklin-Bouillon, whose vanity is egregious, should complain of a want of courtesy on my part. It was evident, indeed, that he was much ruffled when he came into the room, but he calmed down during the course of the evening and departed in a good temper.

3. M. Franklin-Bouillon gave the Allied High Commissioners and generals a very clear, if somewhat theatrical and exaggerated, account of his proceedings at Smyrna. He had met there the half-dozen men who now rule Anatolia, and had found them determined to advance against Constantinople and Chanak. He stated that they had 150,000 men at their disposal, behind whom were another 150,000 men; behind these, again, were the 200,000,000 Moslems of the world. In his opinion the 300,000 men would be willing to sacrifice their lives in heaps in front of the British positions at Chanak if necessary. After much persuasion, M. Franklin-Bouillon had succeeded in inducing the Turks to suspend all movements of their troops in the hope that the British military authorities would do the same.

4. M. Franklin-Bouillon then spoke of the proposal made to him that the Allies should get rid of the Greeks from Thrace and take over that province pending its final return to Turkey. He said that the Nationalists had suggested that the French should occupy Adrianople with a force of 1,000 men. This, said M. Franklin-Bouillon, with a dramatic gesture, he had refused. He had insisted that the provisional occupation of Thrace must be of an inter-Allied character.

5. Throughout this statement M. Franklin-Bouillon spoke in the most slighting manner of the Greeks. He said that one never saw the face of a Greek general, but only his back. Moreover, all Greek generals were now prisoners of war. The Greek general was, in fact, a myth. These remarks were called forth by the statement that, in accordance with the Paris proposals, Greek military authorities would be present at Mudania to discuss the line behind which the Greek troops were to be summoned to retire. M. Franklin-Bouillon affirmed with great insistence that the arrival of a Greek general at Mudania would produce the worst impression on the Kemalists, who might even refuse to commence proceedings whilst he was there. Events will show whether this forecast is correct. Throughout his statement M. Franklin-Bouillon spoke as if he had been the *deus ex machina* who had averted hostilities, whilst his sentiments would have done credit to the most chauvinist of the Turks. It must, however, be recognised that M. Franklin-Bouillon has rendered considerable service in inducing a more reasonable frame of mind amongst the Nationalist leaders.

6. I hear that M. Franklin-Bouillon has left for Mudania to-day, although he will not be allowed to take part in the conference there. He will no doubt play the rôle of *amicus curiæ*. I also understand that, in spite of the fact that the Allied High Commissioners decided yesterday that no correspondents should be allowed to proceed

to Mudania, American correspondents will probably be found to have hired a boat and to have gone there.

7. I enclose herewith copies of two documents which M. Franklin-Bouillon read out at the meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals and which he was subsequently good enough to communicate to me.

I have, &c.
H. RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 133.

Copies of Telegrams Nos. 105 *and* 106 *from M. Franklin-Bouillon to French Government.*

(No. 105.)

JE vous envoie texte officiel réponse turque, arrêtée hier minuit, qui me fut remis pour gagner temps. Paris communiquera où nécessaire.

Instructions pour généraux acceptées par Turcs et conformes aux indications que vous ai déjà télégraphiées :

"A son Excellence M. Poincaré, Président du Conseil des Ministres, Président de la Conférence de Paris.

"M. le Président,

"J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que la réponse à la note adressée en date du 23 septembre 1922 par les trois Puissances alliées au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie sera donnée dans quelques jours par mon Gouvernement.

"Confiant dans les assurances que M. Franklin-Bouillon, qui vient d'arriver chez le commandant en chef des armées turques, a données d'accord avec les représentants des Puissances de l'Entente réunis à Paris, et persuadé qu'on procédera tout de suite aux négociations afin d'établir une paix juste, l'ordre est donné d'arrêter immédiatement nos opérations militaires, qui se développaient sans arrêt dans la direction de Constantinople et de Chanak-Kalé à la poursuite des armées helléniques."

(No. 106.)

"Les assurances données par M. Franklin-Bouillon ont établi les sentiments de justice dont sont inspirées les Puissances de l'Entente en vue d'assurer les droits de la Turquie.

"Cependant, le maintien de la Thrace, ne fût-ce qu'un seul jour de plus, sous l'administration et l'occupation de l'armée hellénique étant la cause des dangers de toute sorte ainsi que de la douleur des populations de la Turquie, il est indispensable d'évacuer immédiatement et de restituer d'urgence au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie la Thrace jusqu'à l'ouest de Maritza, y compris Andrinople.

"La convocation à Moudania d'une conférence des généraux alliés afin de fixer les questions urgentes répondant aux désirs et aux propositions des Puissances de l'Entente, la réunion de cette conférence est proposée pour le 3 octobre 1922.

"Le Général Ismet Pacha, commandant les armées du front de l'ouest, est personnellement désigné pour nous représenter à la Conférence de Moudania.

"Dans le cas où la date précitée conviendrait, je vous prie de vouloir bien faire désigner les généraux devant se rendre à cette conférence et de nous en faire connaître les noms.

"YOUSSOUF KÉMAL,
"*Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.*

"*Smyrne, le* 22 *septembre* 1922."

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 133.

Copies of Telegrams Nos. 108 *and* 109 *from M. Franklin-Bouillon to French Government.*

(No. 108.)

SUITE à mon télégramme No. 105 :

Instructions à donner aux Généraux allant à la Conférence de Moudania.

Le Gouvernement d'Angora consent à ne pas poursuivre les hostilités en territoire européen à condition que des garanties immédiates lui soient données par les Alliés en ce qui concerne la restitution de la Thrace orientale, la protection des biens et des populations de cette région. Ces garanties seront les suivantes :

1. Envoi d'une force interalliée de 1,000 hommes à Andrinople pour imposer aux autorités helléniques les décisions des Alliés relatives à l'évacuation immédiate et au maintien de l'ordre dans tous les centres habités.
2. Envoi de commissions militaires interalliées dans les principaux centres ci-dessous : Rodosto, Tcherkès-Keuy, Kirk-Killisé, Baba-Eski, Kechan, Ipsala, Gallipoli, Enos-Midia. Ces commissions, composées d'un ou de deux officiers et de trois à cinq soldats par grande Puissance alliée, auront pour mission de se faire remettre l'administration du pays et de s'assurer de l'exécution des mesures arrêtées pour l'évacuation du pays par les troupes et les fonctionnaires helléniques.
3. En même temps que ces commissions, des fonctionnaires et des détachements de gendarmerie du Gouvernement d'Angora se rendront dans ces centres et, dès que les forces et les fonctionnaires helléniques auront évacué les divers centres, ils recevront de ces commissions l'administration et la direction de la sécurité publique. Dès que les nouvelles autorités seront installées, au plus tard dans un délai de trente jours, les commissions ci-dessus rentreront à Constantinople en même temps que la force interalliée envoyée à Andrinople.

(No. 109.)

4. Les troupes turques seront installées en Thrace dès la mise en vigueur du traité de paix.
5. Les troupes helléniques seront évacuées par voie de terre et par voie de mer sous la direction et par les soins des Alliés, dans le délai de huit jours à partir de la signature du présent protocole.
6. Toute violation de cette convention et tout abus commis par les troupes et les fonctionnaires helléniques seront punis par les tribunaux militaires alliés, qui jugeront les coupables sur dénonciation justifiée des autorités turques et cela durant la période ci-dessus prévue de trente jours.
7. Les troupes alliées occuperont la région située à l'ouest de la Maritza et d'Andrinople, afin d'assurer la protection de la Thrace orientale, laissée provisoirement sans troupes turques.
8. Les troupes turques et alliées conservent les positions actuellement occupées et cesseront tout travail de fortification et tout renfort.

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

[E 10779/27/44] **No. 134.**

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 866.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 3, 1922.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday. It is probable that one of the main objects of his visit was to give me a description of Ismet Pasha, who is to meet the Allied generals at Mudania to-day.

2. Izzet Pasha said that he knew Ismet Pasha very well, the latter having been on his staff for a considerable time. He spoke well of him, and said that he was a reasonable man, but lacking in experience. The Allied generals must not attach too

much importance to any appearance of intractability on Ismet Pasha's part. Unfortunately Ismet Pasha was very deaf. I subsequently informed General Harington of the foregoing.

3. Izzet Pasha went on to say that he was convinced that there would not be any disorders in Constantinople. If this prediction is verified, it will undoubtedly, in my opinion, be more due to the increase in the British forces of occupation than to any other factor. Izzet Pasha again suggested that the Turkish police force should be increased, and added the suggestion that the three weak Turkish battalions at present at Constantinople, which number 200 men each, might be increased to 500 men per battalion. I am referring this suggestion to General Harington.

4. I then told Izzet Pasha that a responsible English correspondent had recently called on me and had stated that he had authentic information to the effect that the Sultan had abdicated, or was about to abdicate, and that the Grand Vizier had resigned. The correspondent in question, who is Reuter's agent, although I did not tell Izzet Pasha this, had informed me that he proposed to telegraph this information to London. I had, however, dissuaded him from doing so, because I had told him that I had heard nothing to corroborate the information in question. Izzet Pasha declared categorically that there was not a word of truth in either statement. Izzet Pasha then alluded to a declaration recently made by the Grand Vizier, which I reported in my telegram No. 501, regarding the disappearance of the duality of Government at present existing in Turkey. Izzet Pasha confessed that he did not in the least understand what the Grand Vizier meant, and he implied that the Grand Vizier was failing.

5. It is freely reported that when the Kemalists take over authority in Constantinople they will depose the present Sultan, pass over the Crown Prince and proclaim Prince Selim Sultan. The latter personage is nearly half-witted, and if the report should be true, it will prove that the Kemalists intend the Sultan to be a mere figure-head.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 10781/27/44] No. 135.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 897.)
My Lord, *Rome, October 4, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the serenity of tone of recent Italian press comments on the Near Eastern crisis, referred to in my despatch No. 885 of the 29th ultimo, has, during the past few days, steadily increased. A *détente* may now be said to have occurred, and the subject, which for a space of nearly a month occupied the entire front page of most newspapers, is now relegated to the back columns to make way for topics of more local interest, such as the split in the Italian Socialist Party.

The only aspect of the Near Eastern problem which now appears to remain acute for Italian sensibilities is the return to political activity and possibly to power of M. Venizelos. But even on this topic a distinctly less alarmist tone is noticeable than at the date of my above-mentioned despatch. The press describes M. Venizelos's reception in London as chilly, and it is reiterated that not even he can materially alter the logical results of the Turkish victory.

Yet, although a characteristic press transition from exultation through anxiety to indifference has generally taken place, there remains one outstanding feature to which I have several times referred in recent despatches, namely, the persistent anti-British campaign of the Fascista section.

Signor Mussolini writes in the "Popolo d'Italia" (1st October): "Signor Schanzer has vaguely announced that Italy will take no military part. But this is not enough. We must prepare ourselves for the eventuality of giving active force to a practical anti-British policy. The mass of the Italian people sympathises with Kemal. It is not in Italy's interests to contribute to support the British Empire. Italy's interest is to collaborate in its destruction."

The writer of this paragraph is the most popular political leader in Italy to-day, and he is the idolised chief of a party confidently expecting to take a predominant

rôle after the next elections, which can hardly be long deferred. No doubt there is a large element of frivolity and rhetoric in all Fascista utterances, yet in a country where Fascismo no longer encounters serious opposition, rhetoric acquires to some extent the significance of fact. Were the Fascisti to assume the reins of Government, their attitude would no doubt be rapidly modified by responsibilities with which they have never yet been confronted; but in the more probable case of their becoming a powerful parliamentary force, only partially responsible for the executive, their influence in questions of foreign affairs may prove embarrassing.

"For four years," continues Signor Mussolini, "England, under cover of her policy of reconstruction, has perpetrated the greatest conceivable mystification at the expense of Europe . . . . The pretence was bound to be dissipated at the first shock of facts. This question of the Straits is a mere pretext. . . . . In any case this British pretension of monopolising all the straits of the universe is intolerable. . . . . England, with her prestige in danger, has fomented the Greek revolution at Athens, and hypocritically created the myth of neutral zones at a moment when the Treaty of Sèvres is admittedly broken to bits."

In another article the "Popolo d'Italia" writes: "The promises of Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George count for nothing. The liberty of the Straits is a myth. It is inevitable that some Power should predominate, even if it does not despotically rule, over the Straits. Since this cannot be Italy, it had better be Turkey than England, who will use her power at the Dardanelles for repeated purposes of blackmail."

Elsewhere the Fascista organ accuses the British troops of turning the Italian inhabitants at Chanak out of their houses and leaving them homeless and unprotected.

In considering these Fascista attacks it is to be noted that they are not occasioned by a divergency of views on the particular point of the Straits, but the question is used as the vehicle of a spirit of Anglophobia which persistently reappears on every topic.

While it would be a mistake to give undue importance to such unrealistic prejudices, or to predict their permanence it is perhaps worth emphasising the fact that this active anti-British campaign is no longer, as during the past four years the crusade of a noisy but numerically small group, but of a highly organised and successful party which, outside Parliament, has theatrically secured the dominant political influence.

The rest of the press continues, on a more subdued note, to advocate the various arguments which I have distinguished in previous despatches. The "Epoca" is still principally concerned with the fear of an Anglo-French rapprochement at the expense of Italy, though the visit of M. Barrère to Paris is generally taken as an indication of a consolidation of Italo-French Eastern policy. The "Corriere della Sera" and the "Tribuna" issue solemn and impartial appeals to Kemal and Mr. Lloyd George to show "a sense of responsibility suitable to the gravity of the occasion." Signor Nitti attacks British Eastern policy in the columns of the "Berliner Tageblatt"; and the "Osservatore Romano" publishes an appeal from Pius XI to Kemal to refrain from unnecessary massacres, an admonition which Kemal, in courteous terms, indicates should have been addressed to Athens.

The crucial question of the liberty of the Straits excites little enthusiasm, and is generally felt to conceal a British predominance. The "Gazetta del Popolo" observes: "We may logically recall to Great Britain her own definition of the freedom of the Straits in 1856 and 1878. England made one war and two treaties to vindicate against Russia the thesis that the Straits were not 'free' if warships could pass the Dardanelles. Our apprehensions as to England are even better grounded than were the English fears of Russia.

The "Corriere della Sera" (3rd October) states that the war party in the British Cabinet, including Mr. Lloyd George, obtained the upper hand on the 29th September, and war was only averted by the coolness with which General Harington treated his instructions.

The "Paese," alone in the Italian press, affirms that the apparent successful termination of the crisis implies a great access of British prestige. "Italy in all this crisis has been conspicuous by her absence."

I feel bound to add that this view of the policy of His Majesty's Government, although finding so little expression in the press, is, nevertheless, shared by many well-informed Italians in non-official circles. Several of these have congratulated me on the stand taken by His Majesty's Government, which has, in their opinion, saved the situation. The violent diatribes of the newspapers are by no means universally endorsed, but I am under the impression that, if not actually encouraged, they have not been seriously discouraged by the Government, which is glad to see public

attention and feeling diverted from the very disturbed condition of internal affairs into other channels of less immediate danger to their own position.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 10784/27/44] No. 136.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 424.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, October* 5, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 415, 416 and 417, which tend to demonstrate that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom is in no mood to take any military action with a view to opposing Mustapha Kemal Pasha if he advances into Europe in defiance of the Allies, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum from the military attaché to this Legation, who has just returned from leave of absence, recording his impressions of the attitude of this Government and country towards the Near East question.

It would seem that Colonel Blair, though finding full appreciation of the disadvantages to this State to be expected from a Turkish renaissance in Europe, is unable to detect any desire to assist in thwarting this eventuality by force of arms. Even the contingent of 150 to 200 men is no longer talked about, so far as Colonel Blair can ascertain.

I certainly agree with the conclusions expressed in the last two paragraphs of the memorandum, in which Colonel Blair testifies to the general aversion from any talk of hostilities at the present time, and to the universal consciousness that the Serbian army is not in a condition of preparedness to do justice to its intrinsic merits.

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

Enclosure in No. 136.

Memorandum respecting Jugoslavia and the Near East Situation.

(The following notes are derived from a study of the press and from conversations.)

1. *Jugoslav Interests in the Near East Situation.*

LEAVING Asia Minor and the question of the freedom of the Straits, matters which do not vitally affect Jugoslavia, out of consideration, it may be said that Jugoslavia's interests in the Near Eastern crisis lie in the situations that would be created—

(*a.*) By the occupation of Thrace by the Turks.
(*b.*) By Bulgaria and Turkey having a common frontier
(*c.*) By the proposal that Thrace should be autonomous.

To take these points in order :—

(a.) *The Occupation of Thrace by the Turks.*

The return of the Turks to Thrace is considered tantamount to the raising of Turkey to the position of a European Power, and brings Jugoslavia's bitterest enemy back into Europe, after having been banished, it was hoped for ever, to Asia, where it was felt that the danger, from which the inhabitants of this country were so recently freed, was remote.

It is held that Turkey must remain an Asiatic Power, and only have sufficient territory in Europe to develop and defend Constantinople.

Automatically the occupation of Thrace would bring the frontiers of the two countries nearer, in every respect an undesirable contingency in that intrigues and disorders are sure to result. It is held that this country is already hemmed in by a sufficient number of possible enemies without having another added.

A further danger foreseen is that Kemal's troops, once in Thrace, might look for vengeance, and aspire to reconquer territory which once belonged to Turkey.

Finally, and most important, the possibility of Turkey becoming not only a European Power but a European military Power is looked on with the greatest apprehension. The restoration of Adrianople to the Turks is held in this country to denote that this will be the case.

(b.) *Common Frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey.*

It is remarkable how bitter the feeling in this country still is against Bulgaria. Post-war Bulgaria is held to be comparatively harmless, except for fostering the constant komitaji trouble in South Serbia, and has not been classed as a formidable enemy.

A contiguous frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey would, however, alter the situation completely, because, supported by Turkey (who is in turn supported by Moscow), with direct railway communication between the two countries, it is held that Bulgaria immediately becomes a dangerous enemy.

If a joint frontier is inevitable, it is only permissible in the hilly country on the Black Sea littoral, where no communications exist.

Further, from a political point of view, this contingency constitutes a danger in that it would considerably facilitate the spread of Bolshevism into Europe through Bulgaria and Thrace.

(*c.*) The proposal made that Thrace should be autonomous is absolutely unacceptable in this country. The view is held that, in the Balkans, to give autonomy to a district which possesses no facilities for an independent existence constitutes a two-fold danger :—

(1.) In that it is a bad and contagious example for certain "districts which formerly had an unnatural and false political upbringing and which, on this account, could again become the objective of unscrupulous propaganda."
(2.) In that such autonomous districts become the bait for any neighbouring State which looks on autonomy as the first stage to complete annexation.

It is held that if autonomy was given to Thrace, it would be only a matter of time before it became Bulgarian or Turkish.

Further, it is unfortunate, as one paper has pointed out, that Jugoslavia also has her "irridenti," who are always ready to energetically assist States adjoining Jugoslavia's frontiers in the fermentation of interior dissension.

In summing up the situation, the "Politika" remarked that Jugoslavia's policy must be—

(1.) Against Adrianople coming into Turkish hands
(2.) Against any nearer approach of Turkey to the frontiers of Jugoslavia.
(3.) Against the autonomy of Thrace.

2. *Views held in Jugoslavia on the Situation.*

It has been quite remarkable throughout the crisis how very moderate the tone of the Jugoslav press has been.

All through it has advocated settlement of the situation by peaceful methods, and at no time have there been any signs of a bellicose or aggressive attitude. Any action tending to lead to hostilities has been deprecated, and for this reason, to begin with, there was a distinct tendency to favour the politics of France as against those of Great Britain, which were held to be aggressive and aiming at war with Turkey.

The publication of the Allied note gave satisfaction in so far as it seemed to offer hope of settling the question by peaceful methods. The terms of the note were not, however, received with the same amount of satisfaction, for reasons easily deducible from what has been stated in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*).

As a result, feeling appeared, if anything, to veer round from the French to the British point of view, in that the British policy appeared to be to keep the Turks on the Asiatic side of the Straits.

In the press of the Government, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were all criticised for the parts they had played in the negotiations leading up to the publication of the note.

Fault was found with the Government because it had formulated no policy at all. The Prime Minister was criticised for having spent his time in trying to avoid

doing anything indiscreet, and at the same time would not allow any one else to do anything. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was blamed for having too many opinions about the situation, and especially for having paid more attention to being a peace-maker in the squabble between England and France than to the interests of Jugoslavia in a situation of which every detail was of the greatest importance.

In army circles, there seems to be no doubt that opinion is decidedly against military intervention in any form, or the despatch of even the smallest contingent for operations in the Dardanelles or neutral zone.

At the Ministry of War there exists a sincere hope that hostilities may be avoided, and I was assured that no military measures have been taken as a result of the present crisis, nor were any contemplated at present.

Colonel Markovic, who may be looked upon as the mouth-piece of the Minister of War told me that they were prepared to make any concessions that would lead to the maintenance of peace. He did not look upon the return of the Turks to Europe as necessarily a danger, provided that conditions were imposed. Such conditions should be—

The razing of all fortifications at Adrianople.
Refusal to allow the Turks to organise any military base in European territory.
Strict limitation of Turkish forces in Europe to gendarmerie necessary for the maintenance of order.
Guarantees for the freedom of the Straits.

Colonel Markovic was even prepared to allow Bulgaria an outlet to the sea, provided that Jugoslavia was given commercial facilities for using Salonica.

Should, however, Turkey be given Thrace without these conditions being imposed, he considered that the situation would then become one that seriously threatened Jugoslavia.

The crisis has revealed the existence of a genuine desire in this country for a period of peace to be undisturbed by hostilities of any kind, in order to give time to recover from the recent war and to develop.

It seems certain, also, that the military unpreparedness of the country at the present time is fully realised by all classes of society, and there has been a singular absence of any aggressive tone or of the slightest desire for war, in fact quite the contrary.

JAMES M. BLAIR, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Assistant Military Attaché.

Belgrade, October 3, 1922.

[E 10746/27/44] No. 137.

The Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)

LE Gouvernement français vient d'inviter le Comte de Saint-Aulaire à communiquer, à toutes fins utiles, au Gouvernement britannique le texte de la réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora à la note des Gouvernements alliés, en date du 23 septembre dernier.

L'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de faire parvenir, ci-joint, à sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon of Kedleston ce document tel que M. Poincaré vient de le recevoir du Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 7 octobre 1922.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Government of Angora to Allied Governments.

LE Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie remercie les trois Gouvernements alliés de la note qu'ils ont bien voulu lui communiquer en date du 23 septembre 1922. Il apprécie pleinement l'esprit qui l'a inspirée : le désir d'une paix

juste et durable, qui répond si parfaitement à la volonté que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale n'a cessé de proclamer depuis qu'il a commencé sa lutte pour l'indépendance.

La note vise deux ordres de faits : la situation militaire présente et les négociations pour conclure un Traité de Paix.

Notre point de vue, en ce qui concerne la situation militaire, a été communiqué par notre note du 29 septembre 1922. La conférence de Moudania, qui a été la conséquence de cette note, s'est réunie le 3 courant. Il va sans dire que ses décisions seront intégralement exécutées par les Puissances signataires.

Quant au second point, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie accepte avec empressement d'envoyer ses représentants à la réunion devant avoir pour objet de négocier et de conclure le Traité de Paix définitif entre la Turquie, la Grèce et les Puissances alliées.

Les Puissances alliées admettent dans leur note que la conférence pourrait se tenir dans une ville autre que Venise. Profitant de cette possibilité et considérant que les négociations de paix en seraient facilitées et accélérées davantage, mon Gouvernement estime qu'il serait très utile de fixer Smyrne comme lieu de réunion. Il propose donc que la conférence s'y réunisse le 20 courant.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie croit devoir émettre les considérations suivantes au sujet des Puissances invitées à la susdite conférence. En dehors des quatre grandes Puissances alliées et de la Grèce, deux États seulement sont invitées à assister à la prochaine réunion. On en conclut que cette invitation leur est adressée, non parce qu'ils sont des belligérants, mais parce qu'on les considère comme plus particulièrement intéressés dans certaines questions qui seront résolues par la paix turque. La seule question présentant ce caractère étant celle concernant le régime futur des Détroits, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ne peut s'empêcher de constater avec surprise que la Russie, l'Ukraine et la Géorgie, qui, par le seul développement de leurs côtes sur la mer Noire, ont un grand intérêt dans la fixation de ce régime, semblent avoir été oubliées, alors que les deux États en question ont été conviés à la future conférence. Il est, d'ailleurs, hors de doute que la participation de ces républiques à l'élaboration du statut susmentionné ne pourrait que contribuer à le rendre plus durable et à écarter toute cause de conflits. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie propose tout particulièrement d'inviter à la conférence projetée les représentants de ces Puissances au même titre que ceux des deux États dont l'invitation a été déjà décidée par les trois Gouvernements alliés. Il espère que cette invitation sera adressée avant la conférence, dont la réunion est proche.

Mon Gouvernement prend note avec satisfaction de la reconnaissance de ses droits incontestables sur la Thrace et exprime, à cette occasion, ses remerciements aux Gouvernements alliés. La liberté des Détroits, à la condition d'assurer la sécurité de Constantinople et de la mer de Marmara, ainsi que la sauvegarde des droits des minorités, dans la limite où elle est compatible soit avec l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Turquie, soit avec les exigences de la pacification effective de l'Orient, étant également désirée par nous, il n'y a pas, en principe, désaccord à ce sujet. Tout en remerciant les trois Puissances alliées de l'appui qu'elles veulent bien lui promettre pour son admission à la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie tient à ajouter qu'il fera connaître en temps opportun son point de vue à ce sujet. C'est avec une vive satisfaction que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie prend acte du renouvellement de l'assurance au sujet de l'évacuation de Constantinople, siège du Califat musulman, par les troupes alliées. Cependant, mon Gouvernement est convaincu que les Puissances alliées apprécient à sa juste valeur l'importance avec laquelle est attendue la réalisation un moment plus tôt de cette promesse d'appel convenue à la fin de la note des Gouvernements alliés, qui a vivement impressionné le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie. Les Puissances peuvent certainement compter sur l'aide loyale et sincère en vue du rétablissement et du maintien d'une paix à laquelle aspire toute l'humanité civilisée, d'une Turquie, dont les légitimes aspirations auraient été satisfaites et peuvent également être persuadées de trouver en elle une collaboration dévouée dans le travail pacifique que tous sont tenus de s'imposer pour panser les plaies de la guerre.

YOUSSOUF KEMAL,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Angora, le 4 octobre 1922.

[E 11463/27/44] No. 138.

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay, on October 6, 1922, at 11 P.M.—(Received at Foreign Office October 9.)

Present:

For France	M. Poincaré.	
	M. Peretti.	
For Great Britain	The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	
	Lord Hardinge.	
For Italy	Signor Galli.	
Secretaries	M. Massigli.	
	M. Barjeton.	
	M. Clinchant.	
	Mr. Vansittart.	
	Signor Boscarelli.	

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON said that a grave situation had arisen and that recent events at Mudania seemed to His Majesty's Government to render desirable an immediate conversation. He regretted the trouble to which M. Poincaré had been put at this late hour, but the issues raised were very serious and immediate decisions were necessary. The conference would remember that it was only a fortnight since representatives of the three Powers had made an agreement calculated to bring peace in the Near East, to maintain Allied solidarity and to end the lamentable series of events which had taken place there. Lord Curzon had made, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, substantial concessions with a view to arriving at peace. He had then regarded and still regarded the Paris Agreement as pivotal, a point to be adhered to as the sole guarantee for the execution of the objects in view. Since that date, so far as His Majesty's Government were responsible, everything had been carried out in scrupulous accord, both as regards the substance of the agreement and the order in which the different stages should be taken. He regarded the agreement, therefore, as guiding and continuing to guide the action of His Majesty's Government in the troublous times which might still be ahead.

When the meeting at Mudania had been agreed upon, it was decided that it should be a meeting of Allied generals whose business it would be to lay down the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw. The Greeks also had been invited to attend. So far as His Majesty's Government knew, no one else was to be invited to take part; and he had therefore been somewhat surprised when Ismet Pasha had appeared accompanied by Hamid Bey, who apparently was actually taking part in the conference. Lord Curzon had also heard that Franklin-Bouillon was at Mudania, though not actually in the conference; and he was not sure that the latter's influence had proved very pacific. The Allied generals had discussed the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw, but the Greek representatives had arrived late and other questions had been discussed, although decisions in these matters could only be taken *ad referendum* to the High Commissioners and the Allied Governments. At every point, questions of vital importance had been raised by the Turks, and there had been constant objections and references to Angora. Yet the three generals, acting in accord, had been able to draw up a draft protocol or convention to be put before the Turks as a basis of possible agreement.

M. POINCARÉ said that the French Government had not received this document.

LORD CURZON said he would explain it and show how far the spirit of conciliation had been carried. The convention had been handed to the Turks on the second day of the conference. The following were its principal features:—

Hostilities were to cease at once. The line of withdrawal was to be the Maritza up to the Bulgarian frontier. A special convention was to be concluded for the supervision of the railway on the right bank of the Maritza by a Greek and Turkish

Commission. (The Turkish general had said that he interpreted "Adrianople" as including Karagatch and the forts on the right bank, which must be evacuated by the Greeks and ceded to Angora at once.) The draft protocol also provided that the complete evacuation by the Greeks was to be begun at once and carried out in fifteen days. The Greek civil administration was to retire, and civil powers were to be handed to the Allies, who would at once begin to transmit them to the Turks and complete the operation in thirty days. The Angora officials, who were to be placed in charge, were to be accompanied by a limited gendarmerie to secure order. All this was to be done under the supervision of Allied Missions in the principal centres, where their presence would be a guarantee against excesses. Allied contingents were to be placed east of the Maritza to keep order and support the missions which had already been sent out from Constantinople. These contingents would amount to seven battalions. The date of the retirement of the missions and the contingents was to be decided by agreement between the Allies and the Turks. This convention was to be submitted for immediate approval. Until the execution of the Treaty of Peace, the Greek Government was to guarantee the lives and good treatment of the hostages in its hands, and the Turks on their part were not to molest the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace for any previous acts.

The conference would agree that this document had been drawn up in a spirit of liberal and generous concession, going beyond the Paris proposals and showing an extreme desire to meet Angora.

In the course of discussions on the draft convention the representatives of Angora had advanced further claims. These could not be accepted for they lay entirely outside the scope of the Paris note. The claims were four in number:—

1. That the gendarmerie now to be introduced into Thrace should be unlimited. This was absolutely impossible, because the Kemalists would then introduce an army under the thin disguise of another name. It was, moreover, quite inconsistent with the Paris note.
2. That in reoccupying Adrianople the Kemalists should also occupy Karagatch and the forts on the right bank of the Maritza. This might be held to be not unreasonable, but it was a matter to be considered by the Peace Conference and not by the generals.
3. That after the signature of the convention the Kemalists should have the right to continue military operations until ratification by the Allied Governments. This was both unreasonable and impracticable.
4. That the Allied missions, which had already started from Constantinople, should be withdrawn immediately after the Greek evacuation. This would be tantamount to saying that there should be no protection for Christians. These and other such preposterous claims had, of course, to be resisted.

The draft convention had been agreed to by the three Allied generals. But two days ago Ismet Pasha had demanded that the whole of Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks at once, and that all Allied officers, missions and contingents should be immediately withdrawn. He had threatened to set his troops in motion if these demands were not at once conceded.

Here the French general, who up till then had acted in accord with his Allies, had suddenly announced that he had instructions from the French Government to agree to the Turkish demands. The meeting had accordingly broken up, and the generals had returned to Constantinople to consult the High Commissions. His Majesty's Government had instructed General Harington not to return or resume negotiations until the matter was cleared up.

Lord Curzon did not know what explanation M. Poincaré would be good enough to favour him with about these alleged orders to the French generals, but he hoped that he might at once point out that the Turkish demands were utterly inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. They anticipated the agreement of the Greeks, ignored the Peace Conference and destroyed all provision for minorities; if the Kemalists were now allowed to establish themselves fully in Eastern Thrace they would be able to exact what terms they wished for Western Thrace or for anything else, because they would already be in full possession, whereas the Allied aim was to attach conditions to such possession. If this claim were upheld, and if the French Government supported General Charpy, it would render all co-operation between the Allied Governments well-nigh impossible and the situation even more dangerous and disquieting than it now was. M. Poincaré had, he believed, seen M. Venizelos. Lord Curzon had also seen him three days ago, and had informed Count Saint-Aulaire of the conversation. Lord Curzon had advised M. Venizelos to accept the Allied line of withdrawal.

M. Venizelos had, of course, found the advice unpalatable, but two days later he had returned and said that he had advised the Greek Government to acquiesce, provided that there were guarantees for the Christian population in the shape of Allied contingents pending the Peace Conference. Whether the Greek Government had accepted this advice Lord Curzon did not know. But clearly when the Greeks were showing this good disposition, this was not the moment for the surprising attitude apparently adopted by some of the Allied representatives at Mudania. M. Poincaré might ask what, in the view of His Majesty's Government, should be done? Lord Curzon thought the answer was clear.

The Kemalists' demands with regard to the possession of Eastern Thrace without delay or withdrawal should be firmly rejected. The four additional claims, which were part of the same proposal, should also be rejected or at least referred to the Peace Conference. Finally, it was essential that, if the Greek army would withdraw, the Allies should make themselves responsible for order and security in the interval between now and the Peace Conference by sending in Allied missions and contingents, while allowing the Turks to set up a civil administration with a strictly restricted gendarmerie. This was the least that the Allies could do unless they tore up the Paris note that night.

Ismet Pasha had announced his intention to advance at two o'clock that day unless these conditions were granted. If he had done so it would be he who had torn up the Paris note. In such case the whole position would have to be reconsidered, but for the moment Lord Curzon would assume that this was bluff, and that the Turks were not so foolish as to execute the threat; and he would hope that the situation still allowed the Allies to act together under the Paris note.

M. POINCARÉ said that he associated himself with the hope expressed by Lord Curzon. He trusted that the irreparable had not occurred, but he feared that Mustapha Kemal was already carrying out his threat. The seriousness of that threat had been the reason why General Charpy had given way. He wished also to protest against any suggestion that M. Franklin-Bouillon was not inspired by a friendly spirit. M. Franklin-Bouillon was animated by the best intentions in the world, and had done all he could. He had gone to Mudania in this pacificatory spirit; he had gone without instructions from the French Government, and had acted on his own initiative. The case was not the same as when he went to Smyrna; he had been officially sent there. Before leaving Smyrna he had sent home a Kemalist draft indicating their present claims. The French Government were therefore prepared for them and for this threat.

M. Poincaré's own opinion was that we ought to stand by the Paris note. When he had seen Lord Hardinge the latter had asked him to join in the British instructions to Constantinople. He had replied that he would join, in so far as these instructions were capable of realisation and could be reconciled with the possibilities of the case.

General Charpy had not had orders; he had only had an authorisation with wide latitude to use his judgment on the spot. If the instructions could not be realised he was to try to harmonise them with Turkish claims.

SIGNOR GALLI said that the Italian representative had instructions to acquiesce in three out of the four points, but not in the immediate Turkish possession of Thrace.

M. POINCARÉ said General Mombelli had entirely adhered to the French point of view.

LORD CURZON said that General Mombelli might have been overruled, but at first had adopted the same attitude as General Harington.

M. POINCARÉ repeated that General Charpy had no orders but only latitude to avoid war. The general thought that point had been reached, and M. Poincaré did not hesitate to say that, if these concessions were necessary to avoid war, we must resign ourselves to them.

LORD CURZON said that he could see no difference between instructions and this "authorisation."

M. POINCARÉ repeated that General Charpy's action had been necessary to avoid war.

LORD CURZON replied that he understood this contention, but did M. Poincare realise where this course was leading him? General Charpy had consented to something entirely inconsistent with the Paris note.

M. POINCARÉ asserted emphatically that there was no inconsistency. He asked leave to read the Paris note to prove this; and did so with some signs of irritation.

LORD CURZON said he must wholly disagree with M. Poincaré's assertion. Did the Paris note contemplate the immediate handing over of Thrace to the Turks?

M. POINCARÉ then read his instructions to General Charpy, and added that it was dangerous to propose anything immutable. General Charpy was to support the British, placate the Turks and refer home any case of difficulty.

LORD CURZON enquired if General Charpy had done so.

M. POINCARÉ replied, "No." But communication took thirty-six hours. General Charpy had thought himself empowered to accept the Turkish claims in order to avoid war. His Majesty's Government did not agree; but let them realise that, if war broke out, it would be against Russia and Bulgaria as well as Turkey. Was His Majesty's Government ready for that? The French Government would not contemplate it, or have it at any price. What did the Turks claim after all? Only that the Allies were not to remain when the Turkish gendarmerie and civil authorities were installed.

LORD CURZON said that the demand was for an unlimited gendarmerie.

M. POINCARÉ said that even the Greeks did not oppose this demand. He had seen M. Venizelos, who had said that he would not object to a return to the frontiers of 1914. There was, therefore, no difficulty in regard to Karagatch. M. Venizelos only asked for Allied troops for a month in order to enable such Greeks as wished to be evacuated, and M. Venizelos now asked for nothing more in regard to the protection of minorities After one month let Turkey do as she please.

M. Poincaré then read a telegram from General Pellé saying that the Patriarch of Adrianople and the local Greeks did not wish any resistance to be made in regard to the retrocession of Thrace. There was, therefore, no case for a stiff attitude on the part of the Allies. In any event, being at Constantinople, at Chanak and Gallipoli, the Allies would still be masters of the situation, and have their hands full of levers at the Peace Conference. But even now the Turks might be marching; he had been told that their advance was imminent. M. Poincaré then read snatches of corrupt telegrams which did not appear to bear out this statement.

LORD CURZON replied that M. Poincaré had assured him of his fidelity to the Paris note, and had also defended M. Franklin-Bouillon as a peace-maker. Lord Curzon could give evidence in a very opposite sense, but he had no desire to rest his argument on personalities. He was dealing with far larger issues.

What General Charpy's instructions really amounted to was that, if the Kemalists threatened or bluffed, General Charpy was authorised to separate himself from the Allies and make concessions inconsistent with the Paris note.

Lord Curzon was at a loss to understand how such an attitude could be defended. It was due to General Charpy's sole initial action that the Mudania Conference had broken up.

M. POINCARÉ defended General Charpy, repeating that the general had to consider that war might result from refusal, a war in which Russia and Bulgaria would join.

LORD CURZON said that on this showing the Allies must invariably give way to any Turkish demand, no matter how outrageous, if it were coupled with a threat. He could accept no such proposition, and he could not picture the reception that His Majesty's Government would give to such an idea. M. Poincaré had urged that the action was not inconsistent with the Paris note. Lord Curzon would also read the Paris note which stipulated for the full protection of Christian minorities, and that pending this the Kemalists were not to cross with troops to Europe. But if the Turks were to be in immediate occupation, how would it be possible to protect minorities? The crossing in itself, moreover, would be an infringement of the agreement.

As for M. Venizelos, Lord Curzon was greatly surprised to hear M. Poincaré's statement. M. Venizelos must have gone much further than when Lord Curzon had seen him. M. Venizelos had then said nothing in regard to territory west of the Maritza, nor of the retention of Allied troops for one month only.

To Lord Curzon, M. Venizelos had pleaded for an hour on behalf of the minorities in Thrace, or indeed the majorities as he claimed them to be. M. Venizelos had said he was considering the evacuation of the whole Christian population. Counting

Constantinople with Eastern Thrace, this would amount to over a million souls. How would this be possible in a month? Transport was deficient, and there were in reality few destinations to which these unfortunate people could be directed, even supposing that they were willing to pluck up their own roots from the soil on which they had grown.

M. Poincaré had seemed to suggest that this was a matter of small relative importance. Was it? The protection of minorities was part of the Paris note. Were they going to tear up that part? If so, would not more of it be gone next week? And the next stage would be that it would go altogether.

M. Poincaré's statement was the most serious that Lord Curzon had ever heard him make. Lord Curzon had come to Paris to appeal to the Paris note, but it seemed to be gone or going. He had come to appeal for adherence to the draft convention of the Allied generals, but General Charpy had thrown it over in a fit of terror. The Turk had held up his sword, and all Allied conditions were to vanish. If that were indeed the case, he would have to tell the conference what view his Government would take of so grave a situation.

But Lord Curzon was still wondering whether he had not misunderstood M. Poincaré, and he would still ask for a clear answer whether his first propositions were accepted or rejected. In the latter event the whole position must be reconsidered. He would, moreover ask whether M. Poincaré was really prepared to concede the four Turkish points, and finally he would enquire what M. Poincaré proposed to do at Mudania. His Majesty's Government were not prepared to make, and would not make, these concessions. Were Generals Charpy and Mombelli to be allowed to break the Allied front? Was the conference to be suspended? And if Mustapha Kemal attacked again what would M. Poincaré propose to do? The Paris note spoke of the respect of the neutral zones, but M. Poincaré thought Mustapha Kemal might already have attacked. If so, what course was M. Poincaré going to adopt?

M. POINCARÉ retorted that if the Turks advanced he would do nothing. Let there be no doubt about that. He would do nothing in any circumstances. French troops should never fire a shot in the East. He had said that before. France could not fight in the East, and would not. If concessions must be made she would make them reluctantly.

LORD CURZON said that this seemed to be a most humiliating position, and he could not conceive that any Great Power should adopt it.

M. POINCARÉ replied with great heat that there was no question of humiliation. He needed no lessons from anyone and would take none. He represented France, and France required no lessons. He wished to make it clear once and for all that he would tolerate no criticism of any word or action of his. Moreover, matters were not as Lord Curzon represented them. The three generals had at first drafted together a project giving entire satisfaction to the Turks. It was General Harington who had gone back on them. Again he repeated that he had not given General Charpy any liberty inconsistent with the Paris note, but only as regards provisional measures. Lord Curzon's expression seeming to convey some incredulity, M. Poincaré declared that Lord Curzon was laughing at him, and that, as he tolerated no criticism, he would tolerate no smiles.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the Allied generals were only authorised to draw a line of evacuation.

M. POINCARÉ claimed that it had never been laid down that the Allies should undertake the burden of supervision in Thrace. Ways and means must therefore be left to the generals. (At this point M. Poincaré was fumbling for arguments, and became somewhat incoherent. The following passages are reported so far as he could be understood.)

Thrace was the property of Turkey, and it was only natural and in conformity with the law to return property, even when it was territory, immediately to its possessor *de facto*. The *de jure* possession would be regulated by the peace. During the provisional period the Turks only asked for the progressive transfer to them of the civil administration. This was necessary precisely in order to prevent the passage of troops and renewed warfare. Here M. Poincaré drew an obscure analogy with the French re-entry into the possession of Alsace-Lorraine. He proceeded to say that the Allies could attain what they desired by staying at Constantinople and Gallipoli; but even so, if they could only attain what they wanted by war, France would not stay.

Reverting to M. Veniselos, M. Poincaré read a telegram saying that M. Veniselos had urged his Government to retire behind the Maritza, and had accepted the idea of a Turkish administration within a month.

SIGNOR GALLI interpolated that the Italian Government had coupled their instructions to General Mombelli with some observations. They had thought the danger so pressing that the Thracian régime would have to be dealt with to some extent by the generals. The Italian Government also would not oppose Mustapha Kemal by arms, even if his force was small. Between General Mombelli's first and second attitudes the situation had become more dangerous. He had therefore joined the French. Signor Galli asked whether the conflict could not somehow be avoided without loss of prestige. The Italian Government would agree to anything to avoid a fight.

M. POINCARÉ said that those were the principles of the French Government. The Turks were not bluffing; they would attack.

LORD CURZON replied that was just what General Charpy's attitude was calculated to encourage. M. Poincaré had begun by answering Lord Curzon's last question; what would the French Government do if the Turks attacked the neutral zones? For the British part they should defend Chanak. What about Ismid? M. Poincaré had said definitely that he would do nothing. Why then had they put into the Paris note that the Kemalists were not to send troops to the neutral zones or cross the Straits?

M. POINCARÉ replied that the penalty for that would be that the Allies should not press the Greeks to withdraw. He had never said that the French would fight about it.

LORD CURZON pointed out that it might now be hoped that the Greeks would withdraw; but a Turkish attack would ruin the prospect of this peaceful solution. And the French Government would do nothing! M. Poincaré argued that, when the generals drew the line, they had no alternative but to prepare the installation of a Turkish administration, and that territory automatically reverts to a quondam possessor. Why then, after full discussion at the last conference, had the duties of the generals been clearly limited? M. Poincaré need only look at the agreement to verify this. Moreover, this was not a question only of civil administration; that had been conceded by the protocol of the three Allied generals. What the Turks now asked was immediate occupation, the transport of unlimited gendarmerie, the cession of Karagatch, the continuance of military operations, and the withdrawal of any Allied contingents. Once again, Lord Curzon asked, did M. Poincaré agree to the four points? M. Veniselos had agreed to something quite different—the evacuation of the Greek army and population in a month under provisional Allied administration. Angora and Charpy proposed something quite different. What did M. Poincaré accept or refuse?

Once again, this was not a question of civil administration: Angora now demanded that Eastern Thrace should be taken out of Allied hands altogether. Did M. Poincaré agree? Lord Curzon could get no reply.

M. POINCARÉ asserted that he had never heard of the four points or of the draft protocol. He understood that the Turks asked only for the introduction of Turkish gendarmerie, not for military occupation. The latter the Allies would refuse. The only real difficulty was that of the civil administration. But were not the Allies agreed upon that?

LORD CURZON said that his information was evidently fuller than that of the French Government. General Harington asked for specific instructions on a number of points unconnected with civil administration. Lord Curzon quoted General Harington's telegram, and asked for the views of the French Government. He referred M. Poincaré to the generals' protocol; if General Charpy had confined himself to the point of civil administration, the conference would not have broken up. What had split it, was the point of full and immediate Turkish possession of Thrace.

M. POINCARÉ said that the Allies were agreed upon Greek evacuation, and they were also agreed in regard to the civil administration. But the Turks would not tolerate Allied troops or missions alongside their administration. Only the British Government held out on this point. Generals Charpy and Mombelli had acted rightly in yielding.

LORD CURZON pointed out that, beyond drawing the line of evacuation, the generals had only the right to make suggestions.

M. POINCARÉ then argued that there was really no difference between the Allies, but only a misunderstanding. He read a telegram from General Pellé, who had taken M. Franklin-Bouillon to give explanations to Sir H. Rumbold.

LORD CURZON read out General Harington's telegrams, which proved that there was more than a misunderstanding. But time was passing; it was already past 2 A.M., and he still could not get a clear answer. Would the French Government tell him later that morning, if not that night, what exactly they were prepared to accept or refuse?

Lord Curzon had explained the real nature of the Turkish demands. What attitude did M. Poincaré adopt in regard to Allied officers, missions and contingents?

M. POINCARÉ replied that the Turks accepted them, but they would not have them after the Turkish Administration was installed.

LORD CURZON retorted that this was really too transparent. The Turks asked that their possession should be immediate; in other words, the Allied contingents would disappear before birth, or even before conception. What did M. Poincaré really mean? Would he formulate the exact conditions of the Allied rôle in Thrace as he understood them?

M. POINCARÉ said he would draft something, but if the Turks did not like it he would not stand to it. He would do anything to avoid war, but added that the Allies were in reality very close to an agreement.

LORD CURZON said he was glad to hear it, and he would be still more encouraged if M. Poincaré would be precise.

M. POINCARÉ repeated that he would produce something, but nothing rigid. The great thing was to avoid war. He then produced another soothing telegram from M. Franklin-Bouillon to Mustapha Kemal, and added that M. Venizelos did not object to the cession of Karagatch.

LORD CURZON enquired if the Allies were really to go beyond the original Turkish demands. For his part, he could not do so. Even if M. Venizelos had given way as regards the territory west of the Maritza, he doubted whether the Greek Government would do so.

M. POINCARÉ said he had not discussed the matter at great length with M. Venizelos. His suggestion had been that the Greeks should leave Karagatch and that Allied troops should be put in.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the French Government would send troops, and M. Poincaré replied in the affirmative, as did also Signor Galli.

LORD CURZON explained that His Majesty's Government could only provide troops for Thrace if they were not at war, *i.e.*, if Mustapha Kemal did not cross the neutral zones. In that case, the British forces might all be needed at Chanak and Gallipoli.

M. POINCARÉ said that French troops might be sent to Thrace first.

LORD CURZON enquired what contingents the French Government could provide locally.

M. POINCARÉ answered that there were eight or nine battalions handy, and only partly coloured.

LORD CURZON asked Signor Galli how many troops the Italian Government could dispose of.

SIGNOR GALLI, after some hesitation, replied, 2,000; but he added, if it was only a question of peaceful sojourn at Karagatch, the Italian Government might perhaps contribute more troops from home.

M. POINCARÉ assured Signor Galli that there was no danger in regard to Karagatch. The Turks had indeed asked for Allied troops on the right bank of the Maritza.

LORD CURZON said he must revert again to what he had already pointed out, and ask a last time for their attention. Let them as practical and humane men face the facts. The evacuation of the Greek population could not be carried out in a month. There was nowhere to send them; and the Smyrna refugees were already starving. It had been suggested that the populations of Eastern and Western Thrace could be exchanged. That might sound like, but it was not really, a solution. A peasant population could not be lightly transplanted. The time allowance should be liberal, and in any case if the Allies were not there to supervise the partial attempt there would be excesses. There should also be more security for the remnants when the transportable portion had gone.

M. POINCARÉ replied that was not possible. Moreover he was not anxious on this score. He had received information of atrocities by the Greeks, but of none by the Turks. The latter might get excited in Asia, but they would behave in Europe. He was, however, quite ready to send French troops to Thrace from Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that the three flags should be shown.

It was finally arranged that M. Poincaré should formulate his views as to the conditions under which the evacuation of Thrace should be carried out.

(*The conference adjourned at* 3 A.M. *until* 9 *that morning.*)

[E 11538/27/44] No. 139.

British Secretary's Notes of Second Meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 7, 1922, *at* 9 A.M.—(*Received at Foreign Office, October* 9.)

Present:

For France	M. Poincaré.	
	M. Peretti.	
For Great Britain	The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	
	Lord Hardinge.	
For Italy	Signor Galli.	
Secretaries	M. Massigli.	
	M. Barjeton.	
	M. Clinchant.	
	Mr. Vansittart.	
	Signor Boscarelli.	

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

M. POINCARÉ said he had nothing new to report, except a telegram from Rome to the effect that Generals Charpy and Mombelli had accepted a period of fifteen days for the evacuation of Thrace and the withdrawal of Allied contingents.

LORD CURZON replied that he could not accept this. The conference was faced with another remarkable performance. Generals Charpy and Mombelli had again broken away from General Harington and had made another concession on their own initiative.

M. POINCARÉ said the telegram only came from Rome. It might possibly not be authentic. Had General Harington referred to his Government in the matter?

LORD CURZON said that he would if necessary refer to his Government, but must state plainly that he would never advise his Government to accept, all the less as he had said at the earlier meeting, that even thirty days were really too short a period, and he had only agreed to that because M. Poincaré had advocated thirty days on M. Venizelos's own suggestion. M. Poincaré should surely now instruct General Charpy to act in the sense of the agreement reached at the previous meeting.

M. POINCARÉ said he would give no instructions but only advice to General Charpy, to whom he must leave full discretion. Personally, he remained of the opinion already expressed as regards the period of thirty days; but, if Generals Charpy and Mombelli had accepted fifteen days, he could not go back on an undertaking given to the Turks. The point at issue was whether troops should be withdrawn when the administration was established. He did not mind saying that personally he thought fifteen days insufficient.

LORD CURZON repeated that he had said even thirty days were not enough for the uprooting of this large population. The thing was a physical impossibility. How could a civil administration be imported and installed in a fortnight? Such things did not spring from the soil. Moreover, order had to be maintained; a gendarmerie could not at once be properly organised; Allied occupation was absolutely necessary. The conference had discussed its composition earlier that morning, but if all Allied supervision was to be withdrawn in fifteen days the thing would be a joke. For his part he would associate himself with no such idea, and, if it was persisted in, the Mudania Conference would be at an end. The responsibility for that would not be Great Britain's; and if war followed, the responsibility would not be Great Britain's; and if British troops had then to retire from Ismid and Constantinople, the responsibility would not be Great Britain's. The blame in this case would not lie on His Majesty's Government who here and now disclaimed it. But did the President of the Council really seriously say that he could not send orders to his own representative? Would not M. Poincaré be surprised if Lord Curzon were to say the same about General Harington? So far as Lord Curzon knew this was the first time that the head of a Government had ever taken such a line; and again, as Lord Curzon had said earlier, it would mean that the Allies must accept whatever General Charpy said after Kemal had threatened. Such a decision would be too derogatory for Lord Curzon to in any way be a party to it.

M. POINCARÉ retorted that there was nothing derogatory in General Charpy's decision; in any case France was the best and only judge of that, and needed and would take no lessons from anyone. He had said that he would not give orders without knowing the situation. Such information he would only take from his own representatives and not from any foreigner. It would not be the first time in history that such a course had been adopted. If it was a novelty he would be proud of it, but reiterated that he would accept no criticism.

LORD CURZON said the point was that M. Poincaré, as he had already admitted, had not received information. Generals Charpy and Mombelli continually ceded without reference. For his part Lord Curzon was prepared to assume the responsibility of giving orders, but not in that sense.

SIGNOR GALLI suggested that perhaps the two generals had only accepted fifteen days *ad referendum*, and as between themselves.

M. POINCARÉ said No. If they had agreed definitely, as he thought, there could be no going back on it.

LORD CURZON pointed out that this again meant that the Allies must always yield to the Turks. It was the thin end of the wedge: the month would become fifteen days and then a week, and then nothing. General Charpy had instructions to give way on anything to avoid war. Lord Curzon did not criticise M. Poincaré's instructions, but they meant the breakdown of the Mudania Conference and of common action. He thought it had been arranged that M. Poincaré would submit instructions to be sent to General Charpy, and Lord Curzon had hoped to have been able to send them to his Government, and to recommend that similar ones be sent to General Harington. But the situation had apparently again changed.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had perhaps explained himself badly. A period of fifteen days was a regrettable innovation, and perhaps it had not really been accepted; but if such was the case he could not go back on it without putting France in a bad light in Turkish eyes. If fifteen days had not been promised he would stand out for thirty days; if a promise had been made he would not accept an increase.

LORD CURZON emphasised that there was another aspect of the matter. He referred to M. Veniselos. Lord Curzon had understood that M. Veniselos's willingness to recommend withdrawal depended on the adoption of a period of thirty days. If that period were now to be reduced, M. Veniselos would be relieved of his promise, and the Greeks might refuse to withdraw.

M. POINCARÉ said he had made no arrangement with M. Veniselos. He would not do such a thing without consulting his Allies. He was not even clear what thirty days meant. Did they run from the date of evacuation, or from the signature of the Mudania Conference?

LORD CURZON replied that he understood the matter thus: A provisional administration with Allied officers and contingents was to be set up and would remain for a month during which arrangements for the departure of the Greeks and the installation of the Turks would proceed. In practice this would work out at more than a month. Personally he had been astonished that M. Veniselos had agreed to a month. If fifteen days were now substituted, everything would go by the board, and the result would be chaos. The period of fifteen days was not a practical proposition for practical men. The concession made by the two generals was obviously impossible; it was surrender to an unjustified Kemalist demand, and in no wise compatible with the Paris note. To adopt this proposal would lead to disaster. Was the conference, he asked, to break down over a difference between a month and a fortnight?

M. POINCARÉ said that if fifteen days had been promised by two out of the three generals, the promise must be observed.

LORD CURZON replied that such decisions could only be reached by unanimity.

After further discussions, the following formula was proposed:—

"Les trois Gouvernements alliés sont d'accord pour accepter que les troupes grecques soient invitées à se retirer le plus tôt possible à l'ouest de la Maritza. Les Gouvernements alliés assureront à l'aide d'une occupation alliée provisoire l'installation dans la Thrace orientale de l'administration turque et de la gendarmerie turque. Cette installation devra avoir lieu dans un délai qui ne dépassera pas un mois à partir de l'évacuation des troupes grecques. A l'expiration de ce délai les troupes alliées ne continueront à occuper pendant la durée de la conférence que certains points de la rive droite de la Maritza et les endroits où elles se trouvent en ce moment."

(At this point Mr. Vansittart left the room to telephone the formula to London.)

LORD CURZON said it must be clear that the last words of the formula covered Chatalja, Constantinople, Ismid, Gallipoli and Chanak.

M. POINCARÉ assented.

LORD CURZON said that he must have time to examine the draft more closely, and if necessary to propose modifications. Suppose the administration were set up with Allied officers and contingents in the country; at the expiry of the month would the Allies be absolutely pledged to withdraw? He would like to see a little more elasticity. The moment for departure might be ill-chosen. He agreed to the spirit of the formula and thanked M. Poincaré for his assistance, but the draft seemed somewhat too rigid. Lord Curzon would be reluctant to be committed to withdrawal whatever might be happening at the moment. If disturbances were just then arising, withdrawal might have disastrous consequences.

M. POINCARÉ said that the object of the conference was to avoid a Turkish attack. If the present crisis could be smoothed over an amicable extension might be arranged later.

LORD CURZON asked if the words "à partir de l'évacuation" meant after the completion of the Greek evacuation? He would prefer to substitute "après" instead of "à partir de" in order to make this clear, for he must insist on this point.

M. POINCARÉ accepted the substitution of the word "après." He claimed again, however, that if two out of the three generals were committed to a period of fifteen days he also considered himself committed. In any case if the Allies were at Karagatch and Chatalja, they were masters of Thrace.

LORD CURZON enquired how one could be master of anything if one would not do anything in any circumstances.

M. POINCARÉ replied that that was not precisely what he had said or intended. Police work was different to war. Policemen shot in the streets of Paris, but that was

not a Parisian war! French troops would be prepared to maintain order but not to make war. In regard to the formula he would prefer the expression "in the shortest possible delay not exceeding one month."

LORD CURZON claimed that his Government would only send General Harington back to Mudania with definite instructions and even so perhaps reluctantly. General Harington was awaiting instructions now. His Majesty's Government would certainly not authorise General Harington to resume discussions at Mudania on any conditions less than those that Lord Curzon had proposed. The other fantastic Turkish demands must be rejected.

M. POINCARE suggested that if unanimity on the period of fifteen days was not attainable, all that could be done was to say that His Majesty's Government refused, and to try to persuade the Turks to accept a month in order to ensure unanimity.

LORD CURZON declared that this would be creating a most invidious position for His Majesty's Government. Hitherto the Allied representatives had proceeded in common accord; Lord Curzon would never agree to two of them overruling the third. A united front must be preserved; there must either be concord or no agreement at all. It was not contended, he presumed, that Generals Charpy and Mombelli should have the right to commit three Governments. What would the French and Italian Governments say if General Harington had gone behind their backs?

M. POINCARÉ said he supposed the Turks knew that two of the generals had accepted fifteen days, but also that His Majesty's Government had not yet even accepted one month. Could they not be frank with the Turks and say that the three Governments, after consultation, proposed one month.

LORD CURZON said this might be acceptable, if Generals Charpy and Mombelli were clearly instructed accordingly.

M. POINCARÉ replied that that was of course understood.

LORD CURZON said in that case he would agree.

SIGNOR GALLI urged that if the Turks stood out for fifteen days it would not be worth while to wreck the conference for so small a difference.

LORD CURZON replied that in such a case a reference would be necessary to their respective Governments, and that he knew what his own Government would say. He would further like to emphasise the fact that there must and could be no deviation from the Paris note in regard to the evacuation of Greek troops as conditional upon the Kemalist engagement in respect of the neutral zones. General Harington would be bound to insist on the strict application of this clause of the Paris note.

M. POINCARÉ replied that he had heard of no difficulties on this point, but that there had been some suggestion of a restricted zone.

LORD CURZON answered that there might be a slight variation in the Chanak zone if it were judged desirable for practical purposes. He however was contending for a principle Mustapha Kemal was adopting a very menacing attitude in regard to the Ismid zone.

M. POINCARÉ interrupted to contend that the Turks were entitled to continue their concentration during the Mudania Conference, inasmuch as British reinforcements continued.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the real contingency to be considered was that of Mustapha Kemal trying to cross the neutral zones.

M. POINCARÉ declared that France would never make war. He had already said so frankly.

LORD CURZON answered that if Mustapha Kemal violated the Ismid zone, and if Great Britain were deserted by her Allies, His Majesty's Government would withdraw from Ismid, and if necessary from Constantinople, and would wash their hands of the matter. The French and Italian Governments must bear the entire responsibility. In his turn he said so frankly.

M. POINCARÉ said that the French troops would go out with the British.

LORD CURZON presumed that M. Poincaré had fully considered the consequences.

M. POINCARÉ said he had done so.

LORD CURZON concluded by saying that he must consult his Government, but before he left he would like to have a few words about other points arising in connection with the Angora note, *i.e.*, in regard to the date and place of, and the participants in, the eventual Peace Conference. Lord Curzon was not now empowered to make any final decision, but it might be helpful if M. Poincaré and Signor Galli would say what was in their minds. Smyrna was of course unacceptable. Again, were the Soviet Government, Georgia and the Ukraine to be admitted?

M. POINCARÉ asked if it were really necessary to answer the Angora note except as to the place of the conference? The date need not now be specified. As to Soviet participation, M. Franklin-Bouillon had told him that the Turks would not insist: the point had only been put in as a sop to Soviet pretensions.

LORD CURZON said that the Allies should come to an understanding in these matters, not necessarily for communication anyhow as yet to Angora.

M. POINCARÉ said he did not like the idea of Taormina which had been suggested as a meeting place. Smyrna of course was impossible. Why should not the conference be held at Prinkipo?

LORD CURZON expressed doubts as to the desirability of a conference on Turkish territory. In such an event, for instance, who would convoke the conference, and who would preside?

M. POINCARÉ suggested that the presidency might be held in rotation, but he would at present sooner not consider that point.

(The conference then adjourned until 2 P.M.)

[E 11539/27/44] No. 140.

British Secretary's Notes of Third Meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 7, 1922, at 2 o'clock.—(Received at Foreign Office, October 9.)

Present:

For France	M. Poincaré.	
	M. Peretti.	
For Great Britain	The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	
	Lord Hardinge.	
For Italy	Signor Galli.	
Secretaries	M. Massigli.	
	M. Barjeton.	
	M. Clinchant.	
	Mr. Vansittart.	
	Signor Boscarelli.	

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON began by saying that he had asked leave to study the draft drawn up at the previous meeting. It seemed capable of improvement. The changes he had to propose would be in strict accord with its principle. It might be made clearer that, in the interval of one month after the evacuation of the Greek troops, the presence of Allied officers and contingents was intended to maintain order. The morning's draft seemed to suggest that public security was less the object of occupation than the speedy introduction of a Turkish régime.

This brought Lord Curzon to the question of minorities. He had seen M. Venizelos since the last meeting. On this point M. Venizelos had the gravest fears, and must

have given an incorrect impression when he saw M. Poincaré. M. Venizelos had said that he was advising his Government to withdraw, although they had already been highly tried by a series of concessions. But M. Venizelos felt that the only security for the Greek population would be, firstly, a distinct period for the evacuation of Greek troops, and, secondly, a clear month under Allied supervision during which the evacuation of the inhabitants might be peaceably effected; otherwise the moment the Allied troops departed the peasants would be persecuted in every conceivable way, and their existence rendered intolerable, even if there were no massacres. The doubtful words were those beginning, "The Allied Governments will ensure," &c., which had the implication already alluded to, viz., that the Allies would be in Thrace less to keep order than to instal the Turks. A more precise drafting would be preferable. He suggested the following:—

"Dans les territoires ainsi évacués, les Gouvernements alliés assureront à l'aide d'une occupation interalliée provisoire le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique pendant les trente jours après l'évacuation des troupes grecques, qui seront nécessaires à l'installation dans la Thrace orientale de l'administration turque et de la gendarmerie turque."

His Majesty's Government would find this easier of acceptance.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could not accept this text. He had shown the previous draft to the French Cabinet, who had accepted it. He would not, however, object to the following formula:—

> "In the territories thus evacuated, the Allied Governments will ensure, by means of provisional inter-Allied occupation, the maintenance of order and public security until the establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish civil administration and gendarmerie. This establishment shall take place, ..."

Lord Curzon's suggestion seemed to him incompatible with the spirit of the previous draft as establishing a minimum of thirty days. The French view was that that period was a maximum with possible reductions, and the French Government had not felt able to go beyond the first text.

LORD CURZON said that he would accept M. Poincaré's amendment, but he would remind him that the morning's text had not been accepted by His Majesty's Government, to whom it had merely been referred.

M. POINCARÉ reverted to the point that the French and Italian generals might wish to abridge the period of thirty days.

LORD CURZON replied that such a decision could not be taken by a majority, but only by unanimity, and that he should instruct General Harington to insist on a full month.

SIGNOR GALLI read a telegram from his Government saying that, as regards the four Turkish conditions, Italy was in agreement with France. He suggested that the three Allied generals might in agreement contemplate a delay of less than thirty days.

LORD CURZON repeated that there could not be unanimity on such a suggestion, as General Harington would be told not to be unanimous. He deprecated the idea, because it might lead the Turks to press again for only fifteen days. The French and Italian Governments could, of course, say what they wished to their own generals, but nothing of the sort should be said to the Turks, who would only be encouraged to think that they could squeeze yet further concessions from the Allies. Moreover, the proposal would only bring about disagreement between the generals and end by throwing the sole responsibility on General Harington. Lord Curzon would not make the position of His Majesty's Government or its representative more difficult than necessary.

SIGNOR GALLI again pressed his proposal, and was supported by M. Poincaré, who urged that it offered the Turks a premium on good behaviour. The two generals would probably not press for abridgment. The proposal was a means of preventing the Turks from breaking off on some point of detail. Could it not be said that the generals might have latitude for abridgment?

LORD CURZON asked why it was necessary to talk at all about a shorter period. A month was really insufficient. He had agreed to a month, but that was a minimum, and even now he was not sure that his Government would consent.

M. POINCARÉ agreed to drop the subject, the more readily, he added, in that he considered the text as it already stood to admit of the possibility of a time-reduction.

LORD CURZON said that he would submit the final text to his Government. Meanwhile he would like to revert to the last note of the Angora Government. It raised the questions:—

1. Smyrna as a meeting-place.
2. The 20th October as the date.
3. The participation of Russia, Georgia and the Ukraine.
4. It was very vague on the subject of the Straits.
5. It was ambiguous about admission to the League of Nations.
6. It raised the question of the evacuation of Constantinople.

It seemed to Lord Curzon unnecessary to reply on the last three points, but on the first three the Allies should come to an understanding. He reminded the meeting, however, that he had not yet had an opportunity of discussing the matter with his own Government.

The freedom of the Straits was a most important issue, but there were States interested in it who had no concern with the rest of the treaty. The freedom of the Straits might have to be discussed by all the interested parties, but the drawing up of a new Treaty of Peace should in any case be restricted to the Powers who had been, and in fact were, at war with Turkey.

M. POINCARÉ thanked Lord Curzon, and said he was glad to have this talk with a view to smoothing various susceptibilities. There were other difficult points, for instance, Bulgaria's economic access to the Ægean—all being agreed, of course, that there should be no territorial access. Such access was a servitude on Greece, as the freedom of the Straits was a servitude on Turkey.

M. Poincaré agreed with what Lord Curzon had said on the latter point: the rest of the treaty certainly did not concern the Powers not at war with Turkey. He suggested that the conference might examine the questions relating to the conclusion of peace, and reserve for another meeting the question of the Straits, after having obtained from Turkey in advance precise engagements to satisfy the Allies. He recalled that in 1856, when the Treaty of Paris had been signed, the Straits were the subject of a special convention. A new convention might be elaborated by all the Powers concerned; in any case, as regards *de facto* Governments, the rights of the countries that they represented should be reserved.

As to the date, the 20th October was too soon, but any long delay should be avoided: it was advisable to strike while the iron was hot. As to the place of meeting, he agreed with Lord Curzon that Smyrna was impossible, but it would be difficult to get the Turks to consent to any conference outside their own territory. He suggested Prinkipo. In that case the presidency of the conference could be held in rotation. Anyhow, this was a detail which could easily be solved. It was just as well that peace should not be made under the auspices of any one Power. He and France, for instance, were not proud of the Treaty of Sèvres.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Prinkipo would be highly inconvenient. The delegates would have to go to and from Constantinople daily in a rough sea, losing at least an hour morning and evening.

LORD HARDINGE suggested Constantinople or Scutari, which would be easier of access and much better accommodation.

M. POINCARÉ preferred Scutari to Constantinople and Prinkipo to Scutari. He did not think the Turks would come to a conference under Allied cannon.

LORD CURZON said that he must consult his Government.

SIGNOR GALLI remarked that he had no instructions, but that Lord Curzon's views seemed to him reasonable and he would transmit them to his Government.

LORD CURZON suggested as a possible date the first week in November.

SIGNOR GALLI emphasised the necessity of choosing a spot of easy access. Signor Schanzer would have desired that the conference be held in Italy, but Signor Galli would communicate to him the suggestions advanced at this conference, and he

did not doubt that his Government would take full account of it, and that Italy would renounce the honour of holding the conference on her soil.

M. POINCARÉ said that, in his views, the suggestion of Lord Curzon as to the separation of the conference into two parts was ingenious and valuable.

LORD CURZON said there was another point. If Georgia claimed admission to the Straits Conference as a Black Sea State, Azerbaijan might claim also on account of the vital necessity to her of her oil exports.

M. POINCARÉ suggested that the question of participation might be left for the moment, and that as regards the date and place of the conference the High Commissioners should be authorised to tell the Turks that it should be held at Scutari as soon as possible after the 1st November.

LORD CURZON said that he would discuss this with his Government and send M. Poincaré an answer by Lord Hardinge as soon as possible. His Majesty's Government would, of course, have to consider very carefully the manner in which the freedom of the Straits should be dealt with.

M. POINCARÉ asked if the Government of Angora could be told that the details of the freedom of the Straits would not be treated by the main conference. In that case, participation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia would not immediately arise.

LORD CURZON repeated that he must consult his Government, and raised the further question of the status of the delegates who should represent their Governments. There had been a suggestion that the High Commissioners might act at the preliminary stages, and M. Poincaré had thought that the plenipoteutiaries might attend either at the beginning or at the end, or both. The discussion might well be a long one and, so far as Lord Curzon himself was concerned, he would find it very difficult to go to such a distance as Constantinople; indeed, his official and parliamentary duties would make it well-nigh impossible, and, of course, he could not be continually going to and fro. France would presumably be in same case. M. Poincaré might not be able to go himself and would wish to be represented by a Minister of some rank.

M. POINCARÉ replied that, from the constitutional point of view, there was no difficulty. Treaties were negotiated in the name of the President of the Republic, and the Government could name any representative—Minister, diplomatist or general. From the moment he was invested with the requisite authority he represented France. On Lord Curzon referring to the position of M. Barthou at Genoa, M. Poincaré added that M. Barthou was not a plenipotentiary. He had only a letter from M. Poincaré, but not full powers. It would be necessary for a plenipotentiary to be present at the Peace Conference

LORD CURZON said that he also was not discussing any constitutional difficulty; he only wished to know what type of representatives the Allies should select. Were High Commissioners sufficient, or did the French contemplate sending a Minister?

M. POINCARÉ replied that special representatives should, he thought, be sent, probably political personages accompanied by experts, who might even in certain questions act as plenipotentiaries.

LORD CURZON said he understood M. Poincaré also to adhere to the view that the participants in the main conference should be confined to those decided upon at the time of the last meeting in Paris.

M. POINCARÉ replied in the affirmative, but added that he would like to say that the Straits would form the subject of special deliberation.

No. 141.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, October 7, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent Secretary-General to me to-day to report information from Sofia to the effect that Turco-Macedonian committee are stated to

be increasing in activity, and to be awaiting orders from Kemal to further trouble. Further telegram reports orders given by Bulgarian General Staff to commence census of animals in various districts.

I replied all this sounds like rumours spread by Greeks for their own purposes. As Bulgarian Prime Minister may pass through here on his way to Sofia, I suggested that Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak most seriously to him, which might have good results and obtain categorical assurances. There is, however, no further news of his early arrival.

(Repeated to Sofia.)

No. 142.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 548.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 9, 1922.*

I HAVE just sent following message to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, at Mudania:—

"Admiral Tyrwhitt has just shown me your instructions to him to prepare to put into force to-morrow orders for clearing the Bosphorus. You say definite instructions will be given to him after meeting to-night.

"I assume that these orders have been given either because you anticipate that conference at Mudania will break down to-day or because of continued advance of Kemalist detachments from Ismid towards Constantinople. In the absence of reports to-day, I do not know what explanation Ismet has given to these movements.

"General Harington has definitely summoned Ismet to withdraw them within a specified period, failing which action would be taken. I am of opinion that such a summons to withdraw should precede enforcement of measures for clearing Bosphorus. In instructions received from Admiralty on this subject, I think you were asked to consult General Harington and myself as to proper moment at which to put orders for clearing Bosphorus into force.

"Whilst I am most reluctant to mix myself up in any way with military or naval matters, have you considered the expediency of sending a couple of battleships into Gulf of Ismid in order to make show of force? Such action might possibly exercise an excellent deterrent effect, and could not be considered as provocation, having regard to violation of Ismid Peninsula by Kemalists.

"I am greatly impressed by panic and enormous inconvenience which will be caused by putting into execution one moment before it is necessary measures for clearing Bosphorus. These measures, among others, would entail cutting off all traffic between Stamboul and Galata.

"Please show telegram to General Harington."

My own view is that this measure should only be put into force in the last resort.

No. 143.

Sir R. Graham to Mr. Lindley.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October 9.)

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, October 9, 1922.*

GREEK Minister informs me that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for him yesterday, and told him that in view of new situation in Near East, which differed substantially from that existing at Treaty of Sèvres, Italian Government considered their special arrangement with Greece regarding Dodecanese as cancelled.

Greek Minister, who was taken completely by surprise, protested that there was no change except for Greek evacuation of Asia Minor, which Powers had approved in March last. Further, that Count Sforza, when Minister for Foreign Affairs, had informed M. [? Gounaris] that Italy would return islands to Greece.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that if islands were handed back to Greece population would be exposed to danger from Turks, and then declined to discuss question further.

Above information is confirmed in Stefani communiqué which has just appeared. There seems to be no doubt that action of Italian Government has been dictated to them by Fascista Party.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is accompanying King to Brussels.

No. 144.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.—(Received at Foreign Office, October 9.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Admiralty, October 9, 1922.*

FOR information of Foreign Office, please confirm, with reference to your Nos. 362 and 365, that these orders are still in abeyance, and that there has been and is no interference with Soviet merchant shipping or other shipping proceeding to Soviet ports.

No. 145.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 438.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 9, 1922.*

YOUR No. 547.

The phrase "neutral zones" in my No. 479 undoubtedly referred to zones laid down in May 1921. But we had understood from your No. 531 that Harington had prepared neutral zone convention specifying that, in the case of Chanak, neutral line meant line which had been held by British troops for past three years. This is further alluded to in Harington's telegram No. 114, Personal, for C.I.G.S., of 5th October; and this proposal was well known at Paris, where I agreed that Chanak neutral line meant line as interpreted by Harington. I have never heard of any proposal for modification of Ismid line, which was originally laid down in conjunction with Turks. When, therefore, Harington in his telegram to War Office D 19, cypher, of 8th October, said he hoped to secure signature to protocol, including definite undertaking to withdraw from neutral zones at once, we interpreted it in this sense. Matter is one that may confidently be left to discretion of Harington.

As to limitation of number of gendarmerie, words in our instructions were accepted by Peretti with concurrence of Poincaré. It does not matter whether this limitation is effected on initiative of generals or by acceptance of number suggested by Turks and regarded by generals as reasonable and strictly necessary for maintenance of law and order.

War Office have accordingly instructed Harington by wireless in above sense.

No. 146.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 486.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 9, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 533.

In course of discussions at Paris question of date, locality and composition of peace conference was raised, and the three Powers exchanged views without coming to any decision.

As to date, it was suggested that this should be as soon as possible, and first week of November was suggested.

As to locality, Smyrna was regarded as absurd. The Italians are willing to forgo their claim for Venice, if a spot in or near to Turkey is deemed essential. M. Poincaré suggested Prinkipo; but I urged that difficulties of accommodation and necessity of daily sea voyages to and from Constantinople must rule it out. Scutari was suggested, as possessing certain conveniences of accommodation and being within easy reach of capital. It has further advantage, unless military situation is changed in interim, of being in Allied occupation and in neutral zone.

It was assumed that Constantinople, though preferable to any other site, would be rejected by Angora Government until they enter into occupation.

Please give us your view upon all these alternatives. Matter has to be looked at from point of view of physical convenience, rapid despatch of business, and self-respect of Powers.

As regards composition, French Government indicated probable intention to appoint plenipotentiary from France, and I had a horrid suspicion that Franklin-Bouillon might be in contemplation. But it may be that both they and we may prefer to be represented by High Commissioners, if it be decided that work can best be done by them, plenipotentiaries of higher rank being perhaps sent out if their services are thought necessary at a later date. Presence of latter would, of course, depend largely (1) upon place selected, and (2) upon scope to be given to conference.

Suggestion was made at Paris that work of peace conference should be confined to Powers named in Paris note, on ground that object of conference is to conclude peace between Turkey and the States with whom she is still at war, and that outside States (whose main interest is in future regulation of Straits) are not entitled to any voice in the settlement of such matters as Capitulations, protection of minorities, financial provisions, future armed forces, territorial boundaries, &c.

There is much force in this contention, and, if it be acted upon, the question of Straits might be, as you have suggested, subject of entirely separate negotiations. Whether these should be conducted by a separate conference, sitting at a slightly later date, and possibly elsewhere, or whether assistance of League of Nations should be invited, are matters that remain for consideration. Clearly, the Treaty of Peace could not be signed until the question of the Straits is settled.

The whole matter is beset with difficulty, and will come up for examination by Cabinet in next few days.

We shall be grateful for your considered views on the matter.

[E 10556/27/44] No. 147.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Sthamer.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1922.*

WITH reference to your conversation with Sir William Tyrrell on the 4th October, I have the honour to thank you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, for the offer by the German Government of their good services with a view to promote a settlement of the Near Eastern crisis.

2. His Majesty's Government appreciate the reasons which have prompted the German Government to take this step, but they regret their inability in existing circumstances to avail themselves of the friendly proposal of your Excellency's Government.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 148.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 549.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 10, 1922.*

MILITARY convention, including stipulations respecting neutral zones in Ismid Peninsula and Dardanelles, was handed to Turkish general last night at Mudania. French and Italian generals agreed that convention was the last word.

Turks thereupon asked for adjournment till 5 P.M. to-day for Angora Government to consider convention.

Neutral zones as confined by General Officer Commanding are in Ismid—a line just east of Chile Guetze—and in the Dardanelles, 16 kilom. from coast between Kara Bigha–Besika Bay.

General Harington returned last night, and meeting with Allied High Commissioners was held here at noon to-day.

It has been definitely decided between General Harington, Admiral Brock and myself that if [? group omitted] refuse to sign convention to-night in view of

modifications which they wish inserted in respect of Thrace and other matters not concerned with neutral zones, Allied generals are authorised to accept slight modifications of form and to refer back to High Commissioners and Governments larger questions of principle, provided that Turks accept neutral zones as defined by General Harington and give satisfactory guarantees for their observance. This procedure was agreed to by my Allied colleagues.

On the other hand, if Turks decline to agree to withdraw from and to accept neutral zones, General Harington will give Ismet Pasha written ultimatum calling upon Turks to withdraw from these zones within a specified period (probably thirty-six hours), at expiration of which he will take all necessary measures to expel them by force.

As soon as ultimatum is delivered, Admiral Brock will issue his proclamation (see my telegram No. 548) for clearing Bosphorus of all traffic, which will be rounded up in Golden Horn. That proclamation gives twenty-four hours' warning. Restricted traffic will be permitted between Haidar Pasha and islands, and admiral will endeavour to interfere as little as possible with Allied and neutral shipping.

It was made clear to French and Italian High Commissioners that ultimatum and consequent measures were necessary to ensure as far as possible safety of British troops, whose position was being endangered by gradual infiltration of Kemalist forces, not only in neutral zones, but into Constantinople, and that General Harington could not accept responsibility for further delay.

French and Italian High Commissioners admitted force of this consideration, but former added that he had received a telegram from French Minister for Foreign Affairs stating definitely that France would in no case go to war with Turkey, and that he had so informed you in Paris.

No. 149.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 550.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October* 10, 1922.

MY telegram No. 549.

There were six points in final draft convention to which Ismet Pasha demurred, and on which he said he must take instructions of his Government:—

1. Karagatch.
2. Fixed limit for gendarmerie effectives.
3. Area of neutral zones.
4. Extension of time limit to forty-five days.
5. Omission of clause respecting civilian hostages.
6. Prisoners of war.

French High Commissioner stated that principal point to which Angora Government would take objection was Karagatch.

He urged, inasmuch as Karagatch was suburb of Adrianople, abnormal and difficult situation would be created by separating it from that city, and that it would be preferable to include it at once in area to be restored within forty-five days to Turkish administration. I replied that this point had been considered in Paris on 7th October, and that Allied occupation of Karagatch, until conclusion of peace, was held as temporarily covering that point.

After some discussion respecting civilian hostages, which we finally agreed was also covered by your telegram No. 481, and similar instructions received by Italian and French High Commissioners, latter asked what instructions High Commissioners were to give their generals in the event of Turks refusing to sign convention as a whole, and insisting on further discussion as to modifications and reservations. Instructions of his Government were that no irrevocable action should be taken before French Government had been consulted. In his opinion, generals should refer back to High Commissioners for submission to their Governments any important points.

I said I had discussed question with General Harington, and that I could consent to no further delays, which would put safety of *status quo ante* in danger. Small detachments of Kemalist troops were being continually pushed forward, and behind them main body of their forces was being concentrated. By last Paris agreement

three Powers had expressly stipulated that neutral zones should be respected; for this reason clause in regard to them had been inserted in convention, and we could not take responsibility of agreeing to any prolongation of discussions at Mudania on the subject of those zones.

General Harington added that, in spite of verbal and written assurances, Kemalist patrols were gradually approaching the Bosphorus. He wished to know, in view of important decision which he had to take in a few hours, whether he could count upon French and Italian support.

At this stage French High Commissioner announced that he had been categorically informed by President of the Council that France would in no case go to war with Turkey. Italian High Commissioner associated his Government in this attitude.

Decision was then taken as reported in my telegram referred to, and French High Commissioner concluded with very warm tribute to General Harington's great patience and tact during Mudania Conference, which, he said, world would recognise.

General Harington left again for Mudania at close of our meeting, and I have since requested him by wireless to get his Allied colleagues to associate themselves in warning Turks that refusal to respect neutral zones will mean that Allied decision respecting Thrace automatically lapses.

No. 150.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 551.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 10, 1922.

SIGNIFICANT feature of last evening's conference at Mudania was effect produced on Ismet by General Harington's clear intimation that Allies, after showing utmost generosity, had reached limit of possible concessions. For the first time he took refuge in necessity for obtaining instructions of his Government. He expressed surprise at fact that French and Italian generals now seemed ready to agree to less than in earlier conversations; he obviously realised that French and Italians had had to come into line with us and was duly impressed.

No. 151.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 552.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 10, 1922.

MY telegram No. 550.

I think both French and Italian High Commissioners were much relieved that ultimatum, if it had to be presented, should in effect have referred to neutral zones in [? Asia], where British troops alone are exposed, thus affording a loophole for their Governments to decline responsibility.

No. 152.

Sir G. Clerk to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Prague, October* 10, 1922.

BULGARIAN Prime Minister arrived at Prague yesterday. He is staying with some members of Agrarian Party for private visit, and he will not be received by President, but Ministry for Foreign Affairs expects that he will try to discuss attitude of this country towards Turkish question and Bulgaria's claim to Dedeagatch.

(Sent to Sofia.)

No. 153.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).**

(No. 376.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1922.

HIS Majesty's Government have received a telegram from the Soviet Government, dated 1st October, alleging that British navy have declared a blockade of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and are preventing the passage of merchant vessels to and from the Black Sea.

We propose to reply that there is absolutely no truth in these accusations, and we should be glad to learn whether the French (Italian) Government will return a similar reply to the telegram, which we understand has also been addressed to them.

No. 154.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 487.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1922.

MY telegram No. 481 of 8th October: Christians in Asia Minor and Thrace.

Unless you see any objection you should make your representations to Hamid cover the question of a full amnesty for the non-Turkish population of Asia Minor. If possible, you should secure co-operation of your Italian and French colleagues. Latter is understood already to have made such representations during Greek retreat.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 377; Rome, No. 326; and Athens, No. 307.)

[E 10895/9024/44] No. 155.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 870.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Smyrna, dated the 29th September, respecting the situation at that town.

Constantinople, October 5, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 155.

Acting Vice-Consul Urquhart to Sir H. Rumbold.

Sir, *Smyrna, September* 29, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that the last British family requesting to be evacuated from Smyrna was placed on board a British refugee ship to-day.

The evacuation of Greek refugees is proceeding rapidly under the supervision of the British and American warships in this port, but cannot be completed within the period allowed by the Turkish authorities for the departure of refugees. A meeting of the Allied and American naval and consular representatives on the 26th September accordingly decided to request from the Turkish authorities an extension of the period until the 15th October, and Nureddin Pasha agreed to grant such extension as might be found necessary.

It is estimated that over 180,000 have been evacuated under the supervision of H.M.S. "Cardiff" and H.M.S. "Curacoa" and of the American destroyers up to date, and this total is being added to at the average rate of 30,000 per day. The most divergent estimates are given of the numbers remaining on shore, and it is quite impossible to give even approximately the exact figures. There is no apparent diminution in the numbers clamouring for admission to the embarkation jetty.

* Also to Sir R. Graham, No. 325.

While openly rejoicing in the disappearance of the Armenians and the departure of the Greeks, certain Turkish officials continue to deplore the absence of the British and of their capital. I have continuously encouraged them to expect the return of British families as soon as life and property are guaranteed, in the hope of obtaining a guarantee for the safety of such British property as remains unburned and unlooted. The vali did, indeed, assure me on the 25th September that such property would be guarded pending the return of its owners, but as I indicated in my telegram of the 26th September, I have little confidence in his ability, given his sincerity, to restrain the military from seizing all abandoned property in accordance with the terms of their proclamation of the 24th September, a translation of which is enclosed. It was only with considerable difficulty that they could be induced to cancel the order for the evacuation of the depots referred to in my telegram, and they only did so pending the early return of the owners.

To increase the difficulties of the situation, cavasses left in charge are decamping on all sides from fear or lack of pay, and there must be numerous British warehouses entirely abandoned and therefore liable to seizure.

Since the presence of actual owners is necessary to save property from confiscation, I would venture to suggest that, should the negotiations with Kemal result in a definite prospect of a peaceful settlement, steps be taken to urge the British refugee subjects congregated in Constantinople, Athens and Mitylene to return to Smyrna forthwith. So long as the existing uncertainty continues, however, their presence here would only serve to embarrass the senior naval officer, who feels responsible for their evacuation in the event of hostilities being unavoidable.

It is my duty to add that all the Turkish officials with whom I have come in contact have shown every desire to be courteous and helpful so far as a policy of strong Turkish self-assertion permits them.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

Enclosure 2 in No. 155.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

IT is found necessary to give the following explanations in order to dispel doubts arisen upon the application of Proclamation No. 5:—

(*a.*) The foreign nationalities obtained by those who were Ottoman subjects at the armistice are invalid unless the change is in conformity with the law on nationality. Such persons will be considered Ottoman subjects.

(*b.*) Those who, being Ottoman subjects, have received a foreign protection, will be treated as Ottomans.

(*c.*) Those of the above who are men of the ages of 18 to 45 will be sent to garrisons for prisoners of war.

2. In view of the necessity of preparing means of transport for those Greeks, Armenians and Jews of Hellenic nationality, who, being inhabitants of the coast, do not leave the country before the evening of the 30th September, 1922, and remain in Smyrna or along the coast, the heads of the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities will inform the local military and civil authorities of the numbers of men and women who will remain and not leave by sea.

3. Those who hide in their houses or elsewhere arms of war and Greek soldiers or obnoxious men being searched for by the Government will at once hand them up to the military. Forty-eight hours from now searches will be made with this object, and those who have contravened this order will be executed.

4. The army needs all merchandise and movable property left without owner in Smyrna and district owing to fire or military operations or flight of the owners or through any other cause. It cannot be allowed that such goods and belongings should furnish an opportunity for illegitimate gain. Therefore, those who got possession of these by finding them unowned or by fictitious contracts or by other means, are obliged to deliver them immediately to the commandant de la place. Those who venture to act in contravention of this order or to give themselves up to speculation or who obtain possession of abandoned things in any way whatsoever will be condemned to ten years' hard labour and to a fine of from 100*l.* to 5,000*l.*

5. It is forbidden to take possession without authority of houses, shops or oth u buildings. The vali will order the manner in which such property will be administere d Action contrary to this rule is punishable with ten years' hard labour.

MAJOR-GENERAL NOUREDDIN,
Army Commander.

September 24, 1922.

[E 10918/27/44] No. 156.

Memorandum communicated by Greek Legation.—(Received October 11.)

BY order of the Greek Government, the Greek Legation has the honour to draw the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the necessity of including in the military arrangement now under discussion between the Allies, Greece and Turkey, the granting of a complete amnesty not only for the Greeks in Thrace, but also for all Christians in Asia Minor.

On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that the exchange of prisoners of war between Turkey and Greece should be stipulated in the contemplated accord, to avoid that, owing to the great numbers of prisoners detained by them, the Turks should put forth excessive demands at the forthcoming conference of peace.

The severe treatment of Greek prisoners at the hands of the Kemalists, and the risk of their spending the winter months on the Anatolian plateaux, give this appeal the most urgent character.

Greek Legation, London, October 10, 1922.

No. 157.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 564.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 10, 1922.*

THRACIAN Deputy Antoniades, deputed by Greek Government to deal with evacuation of Greek population of Thrace, called this morning before leaving for Constantinople. He gave the following information:—

There are 148,000 Asia Minor refugees in Eastern Thrace. There are also 220,000 Christian inhabitants, without counting those in regions of Karagatch and Demotika, of which there are 20,000. It is physically impossible to evacuate all these within a month, especially if they are allowed to take their agricultural implements, which are necessary to their future life. He hoped, therefore, that period of evacuation would be prolonged to three months. He laid particular stress on necessity for avoiding panic, which would probably produce massacres of Turks. He hoped, therefore, that some assurance would be given to population that they would be unmolested for certain period. He asked whether I thought it possible for population to remain, as evacuation even in best conditions would mean ruin and great loss of life. I said that I could give no opinion, but that it was in the interests of the population to remain if they safely could. Finally, he expressed great fear of Turkish gendarmerie, who seem to be chosen for ferocity. Limitation of their numbers was absolutely necessary.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 158.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 567.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 11, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 562.

Return of Colonel Plastiras seems to have improved situation for the time being. Captain Hadjikyriakos has been put into Revolutionary Committee, and it is to be hoped that they will be able to control him better than when he was outside.

I explained yesterday to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to-day to Colonel Plastiras, that Greece was, in my opinion, in a very dangerous position, and that disorder would not only expose her to external dangers which could not be calculated, but would also make it quite impossible for him to find financial assistance on any foreign money market. Both seemed thoroughly to understand position.

Colonel Plastiras stated that he found Greek army in Thrace in much better shape than he expected, and he had no doubt it would be able to defend the country against Turkish aggression. It would, of course, retire behind Maritza when ordered.

I still think a message from M. Veniselos would be useful.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 159.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 569.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 11, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 565.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to inform me that Greek Government have not yet received text of agreement to be signed at Mudania. They had instructed their general to sign agreement on lines of formula contained in your telegram No. 479 on the understanding that the line of Maritza was Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1915. Yesterday, desiring at all costs to avoid a rupture, and in spite of not knowing text, they instructed general to sign under reserve, even if line chosen was frontier of 1913.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just heard that general has left Mudania without signing, and fears that he has not received his instructions.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 160.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 570.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 11, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 569.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called again and asked me to explain that Greek Government reserved to themselves right to examine Mudania Agreement if line was not that of 1915 frontier as understood from M. Veniselos.

It seems clear to me that they are awaiting instructions from M. Veniselos.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 345.)

No. 161.

Lord D'Abernon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, October 11, 1922.*

IN published interview Litvinof states that rejection of Urquhart Agreement by Russia was mainly due to resentment at attitude of England regarding representation of Russia at Dardanelles Conference. Russia knew that exclusion from conference was due to English initiative at Paris meeting, which was proof that anti-Russian influences in English Cabinet had got the upper hand. This indicated a change in the English hostile to Russia and shut out possibility of improved relations which Urquhart Agreement had been intended to initiate. Russian Government had hesitated to reject Urquhart Agreement, and had deferred rejection for a fortnight after Paris Conference to give British Government opportunity to make good mistake and to revert to a basis permitting permanent peace in the East. As, however, British Government had not cleared up misunderstanding and had left notes of Soviet Government on this subject unanswered nothing remained but to refuse ratification.

No. 162.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, October* 11, 1922.

I HAVE received from Egyptian Government request that Egypt should be invited to send a representative to forthcoming international conference on Near East questions, believed to be on 1st November at Prinkipo.

I consider it is most important to agree to this, and hope that I may be authorised immediately by telegraph to inform Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government acquiesce.

No. 163.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 553.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 11, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 486.

1. As Turks have been encouraged at Mudania to hope for speedy meeting of peace conference, I am convinced that it is most important to avoid any delay in convoking it. The Turks are naturally suspicious of us, and that suspicion will be increased by any delays. I am still certain that their object at Mudania was to be in as strong a position as possible from military point of view by the time peace conference meets. I would recommend fixing of a definite date as near as possible to 1st November.

2. As regards its locality, I concur with your Lordship in regarding Smyrna as absurd. Proposal as regards Smyrna was, I understand, encouraged by Franklin-Bouillon. Atmosphere of Constantinople would be a bad one for a conference, and it would be undesirable to hold a conference at any place within easy distance of a strong Kemalist army. This applies to Scutari; Kemalists would, moreover, decline to come to Constantinople whilst it is in Allied occupation. There is no accommodation whatever at Scutari. I cannot too strongly remind your Lordship that, although Kemalists are at present in forefront of picture, contemplated peace conference is definitely to bring to an end armistice between Allies and Turks. Dispute between Kemalists and Greeks is in a sense subsidiary. Owing to Kemalist successes in Asia Minor, many Turks are inclined to believe that it is they who have defeated Allies and not Allies them. This impression will be strengthened if conference were held in a Turkish town. I therefore sincerely trust that His Majesty's Government will formally decline to accept any place on Turkish soil for peace conference. Additional disadvantages are that, if precedent were followed, a Turk might claim to be president, and, moreover, question of position of Constantinople Government will be raised in a more acute form. This will anyhow arise, as I presume His Majesty's Government still intends to invite Constantinople Government.

3. A still more important consideration is that self-respect of Allies would be gravely compromised by a meeting in Turkey. To consent to such a proposal would go far in admitting that a Greek defeat meant an Allied defeat. I therefore see no reason why we should not adhere to Venice proposal, but, failing that, would suggest that suitability of Geneva or Lausanne (where an earlier Turkish treaty was signed) be considered. If settlement of Straits is to be linked up with League of Nations, some such arrangement would be extremely convenient.

4. As regards appointment of plenipotentiaries, His Majesty's Government is in a better position to make suggestions than I am. In order to obviate any possibility of appointment of Franklin-Bouillon as a delegate, I suggest that a formula be adopted by which Allies would concur in sending two plenipotentiaries, the senior to be a Cabinet Minister, the junior the High Commissioner in Constantinople.

5. I concur with your suggestion that only States with which Turkey is still at war should be invited to attend, for reasons given in paragraph 4 of your telegram under reply. I am, however, impressed with practical difficulty of holding two simultaneous conferences. To get over this I suggest following alternatives: (1) The

procedure of the Washington Conference might be followed as far as possible. The main settlement with Turkey would take the place of disarmament proposals at Washington and be discussed at sessions of principal interested Powers. The problem of the Straits, and even minorities, could be discussed by *ad hoc* sub-commissions reporting to main conference. On such sub-commissions Russian and American participation might be encouraged on analogy of attendance at Washington of delegates of minor Powers (such as Netherlands); or else (2) that Council of League of Nations should be urged to convoke a conference to settle future Straits Convention at the same time as peace conference. The invitations to this might be sent out under paragraph 4 of article 4 of covenant to such members of League as council thought suitable, and under article 17 to Turkey and Russia. I do not anticipate that Turkey would refuse to attend, and if Soviet Government refuse, odium for doing so would only fall upon themselves. This procedure would remove from Allies any blame for not inviting Russia to peace conference, in which, as apart from the Straits Convention, Russia can in no way be considered directly interested. If this suggestion were adopted, League's meeting could take place at Geneva and conference at Lausanne, which, from a practical point of view, seems a suitable arrangement.

6. In submitting these comments to your Lordship, I feel it my duty again to urge vital importance of impressing the Turk with the fact that this is to be a final settlement between them [? groups omitted] and that it is irrespective of, though perhaps a corollary to, Kemalist victories. I feel, therefore, that I must stress the point that Scutari, Prinkipo and such other places are only suburbs of Constantinople and thus open to all the objections already enumerated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

No. 164.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 554.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 11, 1922.

MILITARY Convention between Allies and Turks was signed early this morning, and takes effect as from midnight 14th–15th October. Greek delegates declared their inability to sign in the absence of full instructions from their Government. As Greek withdrawal must commence on 15th October it is urgently necessary that Greek Government should issue a statement that it adheres to convention as signed this morning, and of which Greek delegates have a copy.

General Harington has telegraphed full text to War Office.

Signature of convention is largely due to patience, tact and spirit of conciliation shown by General Harington. Factors which probably determined Turks to sign were knowledge of arrival of British reinforcements, presence of British warships, and fact that these would be used in last resort. Policy of His Majesty's Government has, in fact, been fully justified.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 183.)

No. 165.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 555.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 11, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 481.

Joint telegram on the subject of Ottoman volunteers in Greek forces is being addressed to-day to Angora Government through Hamid Bey. In communicating this telegram the three dragomans will make verbal representations concerning full amnesty for non-Turkish population of Asia Minor.

My colleagues were unwilling to confuse the two issues, and preferred not to prejudge by written communication question of general reconciliation which may be raised at conference.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 166.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, October 11, 1922.*

OPINION in responsible American circles has been most favourably impressed by what it regards as strong and tactful handling of Near Eastern situation by His Majesty's Government. France, on the contrary, is regarded as having behaved very badly, and anti-French feeling is becoming very strong.

The prestige attaching to Prime Minister's name, especially in large eastern cities, is higher than it has ever been. When political situation at home permits it a visit by Mr. Lloyd George to this country should, in my opinion, be arranged for, because of results which might confidently be expected.

No. 167.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens).

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, October 11, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 554 of 11th October: Mudania Agreement. Greek signature.

On the assumption that the Greek Government will have received text of convention by the time this telegram reaches you, you should explain that it contains the maximum safeguards for Greek interests and Greek population in Eastern Thrace which Allies were able to secure after prolonged negotiations. By signing the convention the Allied Governments have made themselves responsible for evacuation of Greek army within time-limit fixed. We cannot doubt, therefore, that acting on M. Veniselos's advice Greek Government will at once authorise signature of convention by Greek general, and will arrange forthwith for evacuation as proposed.

You should, if possible, obtain co-operation of your French and Italian colleagues in this communication, but do not delay it on this account.

(Repeated to Paris (by bag), No. 379; Rome, No. 329; and Constantinople, No. 490.)

No. 168.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople.)

(No. 491.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 11, 1922.*

I DESIRE to congratulate you on the wise diplomacy and skilful handling on your part which have enabled us to emerge successfully from the recent very critical stage in settlement of Eastern question, and I beg you to convey a similar message from me to General Harington, who has shown rare qualities of conciliation, courage and statesmanship. I fear that our difficulties are not yet over. But the fact that we can rely upon your combined counsels and action at Constantinople gives His Majesty's Government great encouragement.

No. 169.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 572.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 12, 1922.*

IBRAHIM HAKKI BEY, formerly Civil Governor of Ismid when under British control, claims to represent 7,000 to 8,000 Mussulman Circassians who have fled to Thrace and Greek islands, and besides, some hundreds in Constantinople who will now be obliged to leave. He asks for British protection and help for his people. He says that he is well known to Mr. Ryan of British High Commission at

Constantinople. He says that they have 3,000 fighting men in Thrace, all cavalry, anxious to fight with British, but if there is peace he asks for British support as, being Moslems, Circassians are worse off than Greeks or Armenians. They cannot return to Asia Minor, as after armistice, with encouragement of British, they fought against Kemalists in Ismid area and subsequently jointed Greek forces. There will be no room for them in Greece. He asks whether they could go to Palestine or elsewhere, wherever His Majesty's Government could send them. They are almost all farmers anxious to work on the land.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 170.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 578.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 13, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just communicated to me text of declaration to be made by Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople to Allied High Commissioners.

Following is translation:—

"Greek Government considers that declarations made by Greek delegates at Mudania should have been taken into consideration, especially regarding guarantees and delegations strictly necessary for safety of lives and property of Christian populations of Eastern Thrace.

"Greek Government makes a final appeal to sentiments of humanity of Allied Powers in favour of these populations.

"Desiring, nevertheless, to conform to decisions of Powers, Greek Government see themselves obliged to submit, and declare that they adhere to armistice protocol signed at Mudania on 11th October."

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 171.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received October 12, 1922.)

(No. 492.)
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR No. 99.

It is confirmed that these orders are in abeyance except for Marmora Nationalist ports (*vide* your No. 941 of 20th September). This restriction will be removed on 15th October if the Nationalists comply with their engagement regarding neutral zones contained in Mudania Convention. Concerning Soviet ports, there are no restrictions, except that since the armistice of October 1918 Turkish ships are not allowed to visit any foreign ports. Ex-enemy ships have to get special permission to go to Soviet ports, but there have been no refusals. It is emphasised that the sole restriction applied as a result of present crisis is that clearances have been refused to Marmora Nationalist ports.

No. 172.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin).

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 187.

Attitude taken up by Litvinof in interview to which you refer is both mendacious and absurd. Russia has not been excluded from Dardanelles Conference. On the contrary, it was recognised at Paris that Straits question could not be settled unless she were admitted to the discussion; and we are now considering, with our allies, plans by which this can best be brought about. On the other hand, when the

conference to conclude peace between Turkey and the Allied Powers still at war with her—which is an independent question—was under discussion at Paris, no initiative was taken by England, or indeed by anyone, in proposing exclusion of Russia. It was not necessary even to consider the point, for the obvious reason that Russia is not a belligerent, and that with the bulk of the questions affecting Turkey, with which the peace conference will have to deal, she has nothing whatever to do. As a matter of fact, as far back as 29th September we were given to understand that the French Government objected to the presence either of Russia or Bulgaria at the approaching conference. Litvinof's excuse is therefore merely a piece of political blackmail, characteristic of its author and of Soviet methods in general.

You should make the best use you can of the above, with the view of correcting Litvinof's gross misstatements.

No. 173.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 492.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1922.

MY telegrams Nos. 481 and 487 of 8th and 10th October: Exchange of prisoners.

Since it appears not to have been possible to include arrangements for exchange of prisoners in Mudania Agreement, I leave it to your discretion to endeavour to secure such an exchange through whatever channel seems best to you, after consulting General Harington and your Allied colleagues, whose co-operation you should try to obtain.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 310.)

No. 174.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1922.

NOW that the Mudania Convention has been signed, we must proceed without delay to fix the details of the proposed conference of peace. I have been in communication with Sir H. Rumbold on the matter, and I have discussed it with His Majesty's Government; and the following considerations emerge, on which I shall be glad if you will at once consult M. Poincaré. If France and ourselves are in general agreement, we shall, I hope, be successful in obtaining the consent of Italy.

Date of Meeting:

In order to convince the Turks of the good faith of the Allies, it is very desirable that this should be as soon as possible. The Paris decision to hold it at the beginning of November should stand. We might meet, if possible, in the week beginning 7th November; if not, at the latest on 14th November.

Place of Meeting:

At Paris we discussed a Turkish site. This, for the weighty reasons stated by Sir H. Rumbold, seems to be very undesirable. There is the further objection that I, at any rate, would find it quite impossible to go to such a distance from England or to remain there for any considerable time, and the same difficulty might present itself to other Allied representatives.

If a Turkish locality be rejected, we must fall back upon a European. France and Great Britain have voluntarily withdrawn the claims of Paris and London. Italy offered Venice at an earlier stage, but was willing to withdraw it at Paris. There would seem to be a great advantage in a similar and simultaneous withdrawal on the part of all the three Great Powers, and in the selection of such a neutral and disinterested country as Switzerland.

If this be conceded, the choice seems to be between Geneva and Lausanne. The former, as the seat of the League of Nations, may conceivably be objected to by America (if she is invited to be present in any capacity); by Russia, who ignores the

League; and conceivably by Turkey. On the other hand, Lausanne has the following advantages:—

1. It is on the direct line of the Orient Express to Constantinople (which Geneva is not).
2. It has excellent hotel accommodation and a good climate even in winter.
3. It was the seat of the peace conference between Turkey and Italy in 1912.
4. The League of Nations establishment at Geneva would doubtless be willing to assist in the arrangements for the conference at Lausanne, just as they did in the case of the Genoa Conference. They could supply a large and trained staff of typists, shorthand writers and translators in English and French, and possibly other languages.
5. The central position of Lausanne would enable foreign delegates to go to and fro with comparative ease.

I now come to the conference itself. At Paris it was agreed—

(*a.*) That the States invited to it should be the Great Powers, together with Roumania and Jugoslavia, Turkey and Greece.

(*b.*) That Bulgaria should be heard, but should not be a member of the conference.

This decision should stand as regards the peace conference in its main capacity, *i.e.*, as the framer of a new treaty between Turkey and the Powers who are still at war with her.

On the other hand, one of the main questions to be discussed and decided will be the freedom of the Straits, and as to this, not only will the States already mentioned be entitled to a voice, but Russia, with her satellites, the Ukraine and Georgia (as maritime Black Sea States), has claimed to be admitted also, and will, together with Bulgaria, have a right to be heard.

Two suggestions have presented themselves:—

(A.) That the question of the freedom of the Straits should be handed over *ab initio* to the League of Nations, who should hold an independent, and possibly simultaneous, conference on the matter at Geneva, while the main conference is sitting at Lausanne. I am not inclined to favour this idea for the following reasons:—

(i.) It may be the function of the League of Nations to provide the machinery for and to supervise the execution of whatever arrangement may be arrived at—at a later date. But the arrangement itself is a part of the responsibility of the Powers, and must be embodied in the peace treaty.

(ii.) It is not clear under which article of the covenant the Council of the League could properly assume the initiative at the present stage.

(iii.) It is quite probable that Russia or Turkey might object.

(iv.) There would be considerable difficulty in providing the representation and staffs for two conferences, even though they were only one hour apart.

(B.) My inclination therefore is to think that there should be one conference and one only, and that it should sit at Lausanne; that it should begin with the Constituent Powers and in the manner agreed to at Paris; but that it should announce that at a given date—say, two or three weeks after its inception—it would take the question of the freedom of the Straits, and that the interested States (Russia and her satellites, as well as Bulgaria) should be invited to attend at that date and to join in the deliberations on that subject, and that alone. Everyone should be satisfied by this arrangement, and no important interests would be compromised

The decisions arrived at could then be incorporated in the treaty, and the League of Nations, if it were so decided, could be invited, either at once or a little later, to meet and make the necessary provisions for carrying out the plan agreed upon.

Representation:

Sir H. Rumbold's idea of the appointment of two plenipotentiaries by each of the Allies seems a good one, although the number of the delegation would not necessarily be confined to that figure. For instance, certain of the British Dominions, as well as India, will no doubt desire to be represented, particularly when the question of the Straits is discussed.

My general idea is, as far as possible, to prevent the conference from degenerating into a public meeting, at which the various speakers will get up and make long speeches. I much prefer the plan pursued at the conferences which I have attended, where all the members sit at a table or tables and speak from their seats.

If the meeting takes place, as suggested, in a neutral country, the Great Powers might provide chairmen, not on successive days, which would produce confusion, but for separate subjects; for instance, France might find the chairman while Capitulations or some other subject were being taken, Great Britain for another, and so on.

If M. Poincaré will favour you with the general views of the French Government to-morrow, I will then submit definite proposals to the Powers concerned.

An answer will also have to be sent to Turkey and to Russia.

I assume that both Turkish Governments will have to be invited.

No. 175.

General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office, London.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 13.)

(No. G. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *October* 12, 1922.

FOLLOWING are terms of military convention signed at Mudania:—

"In accordance with the terms of the note addressed to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey by the Allied Powers on 23rd September, 1922, and of the note sent to the Allied Powers by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 29th September, 1922, meetings between the Allied generals, Lieutenant-General Sir C. H. Harington, K.C.B., D.S.O., for Great Britain, Lieutenant-General E. Mombelli, K.C.M.G., for Italy, Major-General C. L. Charpy, C.B., for France, and General Ismet Pasha for the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and General Mazarakis for Greece, were held at Mudania on 3rd October, 1922, and subsequent days, the Allied Governments having decided to hand over Eastern Thrace and Adrianople to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The object of this conference was—

"1. To define a line beyond which the Greek troops shall be invited to withdraw in Eastern Thrace.

"2. To draw up the measures for the evacuation of the Greek troops and civil administration and for the installation of the officials and gendarmerie of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in that area.

"3. To ensure the control of that area during the transitory period in order to secure the maintenance of law, order and public security, the delegates have agreed upon the following terms:—

"(i.) Hostilities between Turkish and Greek forces will cease from the date of the entry into force of the present convention.

"(ii.) The line behind which the Greek forces in Thrace shall be invited to withdraw as soon as the present convention enters into force is the left bank of the Maritza from its outlet into the Ægean Sea to the point where it crosses the frontier of Thrace with Bulgaria.

"(iii.) In order to avoid any possible complications until the establishment of peace, the right bank of the Maritza, including Kara-Agatch, will be occupied by Allies' contingents, which will be stationed at points to be selected by the Allies.

"(iv.) That part of the railway situated on the right bank of the Maritza from Svilengrad (Jisr Moustacha Pasha) to Kuleli Burgas will be supervised (in accordance with a special convention) by a mixed military commission consisting of one representative each of the three Allied Powers, one representative of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and one representative of Greece, with the object of ensuring free communication along that portion of the railway which affords access to the Adrianople area.

"(v.) The evacuation of Eastern Thrace by the Greek troops shall begin as soon as this convention comes into force; it will comprise the troops themselves, services and military formations and transport of all kinds and all stocks of war material, munitions and supply depots. This evacuation shall be carried out within a period of about [? fifteen] days.

"(vi.) The Greek civil authorities, including gendarmerie, shall be withdrawn as soon as possible. As the Greek authorities withdraw from each administrative district, the civil powers will be handed over to the Allied authorities, who will transmit them (as far as possible on the same day) to the Turkish authorities. This transfer shall be wholly concluded throughout Eastern Thrace within a maximum period of thirty days after the evacuation of the Greek troops has been concluded.

"(vii.) The civil authorities of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be accompanied by such forces of gendarmerie as are strictly necessary for the maintenance of law, order and local security, frontier and railway guards. The total strength of these forces shall not exceed [? 8,000] officers and men.

"(viii.) The various operations of the withdrawal of the Greek troops and of the transfer of the civil administration shall be carried out under the direction of inter-Allied missions located in the principal centres. The duty of these missions is to intervene in order to facilitate such evacuation and transfer. They will do their utmost to prevent excesses of all sorts.

"(ix.) In addition to these missions, Allied contingents shall occupy Eastern Thrace. These contingents, amounting to about seven battalions, will ensure the maintenance of law and order and act in support of the inter-Allied missions.

"(x.) The withdrawal of the inter-Allied missions and contingents will take place thirty days after the completion of the evacuation of the Greek forces. This withdrawal may take place at an earlier date provided the Allied Governments are agreed that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of law and order and protection of the non-Turkish population. Thus, as soon as the Turkish administration and gendarmerie shall function in a regular manner in any administrative area, the inter-Allied missions and contingents may be withdrawn from that particular administrative area before the expiration of the thirty days.

"(xi.) In Asia all troops of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall stop upon the following lines, which shall not be crossed pending the opening of or during the peace conference:—

"In the Chanak area, a line at a distance of approximately 15 kilom. from the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles, starting from Kum Burnu in the south and ending at Boz Burnu (north of Lapsaki) in the north.

"In the Ismid Peninsula, a line from Daridje, on the Gulf of Ismid, passing through Guebze to Shile, on the Black Sea, these localities inclusive to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The road from Daridje to Shile shall be used in common by the Allied troops and those of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

"The lines mentioned above will be traced by mixed commissions consisting of one officer of each of the Allied armies and one officer of the army of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Allied Governments and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, whilst taking all necessary precautions to prevent any incident, undertake not to increase the numbers of their troops and not to construct any fortifications or military works in the following areas:—

"*Chanak Area:* From the Dardanelles to a distance of 15 kilom. east of the line Boz Burnu–Kum Burnu.

"*Ismid Peninsula:* From the Bosphorus to a distance of 30 kilom. east of the line Daridje–Shile.

"The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey undertakes not to mount any artillery within a distance of 15 kilom. of the coast between Boz Burnu (north of Lapsaki) and Kara Burnu (north of Kari Bigha).

"(xii.) The presence of the Allied troops shall be maintained in the areas where they are now stationed, areas which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey undertakes to respect until the decision of the peace conference, namely:—

"*Constantinople Peninsula:* All that part of the Constantinople Peninsula east of a point on the Black Sea 7 kilom. to the north-west of Podima, Istrandja–Murtekli–Kishlak–Kihaghi–Sinekli–Cara Sinan–Tchiflik–Kadi Keui–Yenidje–Fladina–Tchiflik–Kalikratia, all inclusive.

"*Gallipoli Peninsula:* That part of the Gallipoli Peninsula south of the line Bakla Burnu (Cap Xeros)–Bulair–mouth of Soghuk, all inclusive.

"(xiii.) The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey undertake

not to transport troops nor raise and maintain an army in Eastern Thrace until the notification of a peace treaty.

"(xiv.) The present convention will come into force three days after its signature, that is to say, at midnight on the 14th–15th October, 1922.

"Done at Mudania in four pages in French this 11th day of October 1922.

"For Great Britain:
"C. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-General.*
"For Italy:
"E. MOMBELLI.
"For France:
"C. L. CHARPY.
"For the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey:
"N. ISMET.
"For Greece:
"(Blank)."

No. 176.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 557.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 12, 1922.

MY despatch No. 873.

Following is summary of a note received from Colonel Proctor regarding relief to be given to Greek refugees in Thrace:—

Committee of all relief organisations has now been established here in order that effort may be co-ordinated.

In view of inadequacy of funds hitherto placed at the disposal of the League of Nations, would His Majesty's Government consent to anticipate grant of 50,000*l* which they generously offered? Need of money is most pressing.

It having been proposed that League should take over protection of minorities, His Majesty's Government might wish to suggest that League appoint accredited representative and administration empowered to deal with Governments concerned on such questions.

Text follows by post.

No. 177.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 559.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 12, 1922.

GENERAL HARINGTON and I are very grateful for your kind message of appreciation, which is a great encouragement to us. General Harington desires me to say that it was only due to action of His Majesty's Government in sending reinforcements—naval, military and air—so promptly, and to the wonderful restraint of troops that he was able to score some measure of success at Mudania.

He desires to express his thanks for confidence and support given to him by His Majesty's Government. I would like to associate myself with this.

No. 178.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 560.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 553.

Following is summary of views expressed by Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation with Mr. Ryan to-day:—

He agreed as to undesirability of holding conference anywhere in Turkey. He disliked the idea of Russian participation. Question was for Powers to decide.

Russia might perhaps legitimately claim share in settlement of Straits question which was international. Perhaps this could be arranged without giving them voice in settlement of purely Turkish questions.

He had no indication whether Kemal would actively contest right of Constantinople Government to seat at the conference. Constantinople Government consider they have right to attend as legal Government. He did not think that Kemalists were ill-disposed towards Constantinople Government, though they were unfortunately inflexible regarding the Sultan. He was trying indirectly to modify latter's attitude, but expressed no hope of success.

If Kemal did contest right of Constantinople Government, his idea would be to address formal remonstrance, throwing on them responsibility for any consequent difficulty in assembling conference. Once both delegations were there working agreement could probably be made.

Reverting to the question of locality, he expressed fear that French, or, at any rate, Franklin-Bouillon, favoured Smyrna. Mr. Ryan expressed opinion that, though Franklin-Bouillon had rendered service, he had greatly outrun his authority, and said he did not think that French Government would support choice of Smyrna.

No. 179.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 562.)
(Telegraphic. D. *Constantinople, October* 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 553.

Italian High Commissioner informs me that he has telegraphed to his Government in strong terms representing undesirability of agreeing to any spot on Turkish territory for peace conference. He considers that it would be quite contrary to self-respect of Great Powers to go to a conference on Turkish soil.

If Venice or Lausanne are held to be too far from Turkey, Naples might be considered as a suitable meeting-place for conference.

No. 180.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 13.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 186.

Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna has since been informed that refugees number 3,000, and are not at Adalia, but at Makri and Gurley.

[? Omitted: (Addressed to Athens, No. 189).]

No. 181.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received October 13, 1922.)

(No. 516.)
(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE just seen M. Poincaré and have communicated to him the contents of your telegram of yesterday. He carefully studied your Lordship's suggestions and has asked me to make the following personal observations before he has had time to examine them closely and opportunity to discuss them with his Government:—

As regards the date of the meeting, he considers it important that it should be as soon as possible. He thinks the week of the 7th rather late, and would prefer the first week in November, if that would be possible.

As to the place of meeting, he himself would be quite favourable to the selection of Lausanne, but he has received a telegram from M. Franklin-Bouillon stating that the Turks insist on Smyrna, and begging the French Government to come to no

decision until he has had time to explain to them the very serious objections raised by the Turks to the selection of any place outside Turkey. He feels that he must, under the circumstances, await Franklin-Bouillon's return before coming to any decision, and having heard him must also consult his Government.

I told him that I knew from you that the British Government would not accept any place in Turkey, and I gave him a paraphrase of that part of Sir H. Rumbold's telegram [No. 553] in which he gave his reasons for considering any place in Turkey undesirable for the meeting of the conference.

M. Poincaré reminded me that you had suggested Scutari, and he remarked that, although he himself would greatly prefer a meeting-place in Switzerland, the Allied Governments must not allow the conference to be abortive and war to recommence by the refusal of the Turks to go to any place outside Turkey.

I gathered that Franklin-Bouillon would not be back for two or three days.

As regards the composition of the conferences, he is personally of the opinion that they should be entirely separate with a brief interval between them. He does not wish Russia with her satellites to have any pretension to take part in the main conference, nor does he see in what quality Russia can take part in any way, since the Soviet Government has not been recognised.

M. Poincaré has no objection to the Allies being represented by two plenipotentiaries, and he entirely shares your view as to the manner in which the conference shall be conducted, the members sitting at a table and speaking from their seats.

He must, however, make a reservation as regards the representation of the British Dominions and India, since, if they were represented, it would be impossible to eliminate the representatives of Tunis and Morocco, who, as Mahommedan States, are greatly interested in the peace settlement and the question of the Straits. He remarked that their interest was naturally greater than that of Canada. He also pointed out that the presence of the Dominions could not possibly entitle Great Britain to more votes than the other Allies.

In his opinion, the first thing to be done was to fix a date and place and to invite the Powers as quickly as possible. The question of the scope of the conference was not a matter of such immediate hurry.

M. Poincaré finally remarked that he considers the matter so important that he proposes to deal with the matter in direct correspondence with you, and will, in a personal letter, which, he believes, is not contrary to diplomatic etiquette, explain to you fully his views upon all the points you have raised as soon as he has time thoroughly to examine them and to give you the views of his Government, as he wishes to avail himself at the same time of the opportunity to offer you his personal congratulations on the successful outcome of the negotiations at Mudania.

No. 182.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 493.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1922.

ATHENS telegram No. 564 of 10th October: Thrace.

It seems very important to examine the question of the exodus of the population of Eastern Thrace, and to set up some organisation to act as liaison between the Greek and Turkish authorities, and to ensure gradual and orderly evacuation.

I suggest that you discuss this question with your French, Italian and American colleagues, and, if desirable, with the local representative of the League of Nations, and inform me at an early date of your opinions. The first question to be decided will be the nature of the suggested organisation; an unofficial and impartial body would seem preferable to an official inter-Allied authority. Next, it will be necessary to ascertain the number to be evacuated and their best distribution in accordance with the already overtaxed resources of Greece.

M. Venizelos, who has been consulted on the matter here, seems to have no plan, and to have made no provision to meet the situation which his action in Paris partially helped to create.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 311.)

No. 183.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 381.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 516 of 13th October.

Before forming a final opinion I will await the letter which M. Poincaré kindly intends to write to me. But I may say at once that suggestion of Smyrna as site of conference is wholly unacceptable and could not be acquiesced in by His Majesty's Government. I have looked up the minutes of Paris meetings, and find that M. Poincaré concurred with me in regarding it as impossible, while French Ambassador here has always treated it with ridicule. As regards any other place in Turkey, Scutari was not, as M. Poincaré says, suggested by me. It was suggested by your Excellency as a preferable alternative to Prinkipo, which he had named, and, in discussing it, I more than once made it clear that I could come to no decision without consulting my Government, that, personally, I seriously doubted the desirability of holding the conference on Turkish soil at all, and that, if I were invited to represent my Government, I should find it practically impossible to go to such a distance, or, if I did, to remain there any length of time.

I am still more surprised, however, in view of M. Poincaré's insistence upon meeting of conference within less than three weeks from to-day, that he should propose to defer a decision upon this most important point until the return of M. Franklin-Bouillon to France. I have just told the French Ambassador that I regard the constant intervention of this gentleman and the subordination of Allied decisions to his authority as lacking in any justification, and it would not be amiss if M. Poincaré were made aware of the sentiment which this reiterated deference to the action and opinions of M. Bouillon arouses.

[E 10102/10102/44] No. 184.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1922.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd March and to the letter from this Department of the 13th March regarding the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to enquire whether Mr. Secretary Churchill desires to furnish this Department with any further observations regarding the views of his Department upon the provisions of any revised treaty, so far as the Arab countries are concerned.

2. In particular, Lord Curzon desires to draw attention to the fact that article 1 of the National Pact, the integral fulfilment of which Mustapha Kemal and the Grand National Assembly are understood still to desire to achieve, may be interpreted as providing for the recovery by Turkey of Mosul and the greater part of Southern Kurdistan. Should the Turkish representatives at any forthcoming conference press for the integral fulfilment of this part of the National Pact, Lord Curzon will be glad to learn whether, and if so to what extent, Mr. Churchill will be prepared to meet them. If it is still desired to adhere to the revision of the northern frontier of Irak, as laid in the Treaty of Sèvres, so as to include Amadia in Irak, and in a sense, therefore, more unfavourable to Turkey than the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres on this point, I am to enquire whether there are any counter-concessions, such as participation in Irak oil development, and therefore presumably in the Turkish Petroleum Company, which Mr. Churchill might be prepared to concede.

3. Lord Curzon understands that, in any case, it is the opinion of your Department that Great Britain, as mandatory for Irak, should sign the future treaty on that State's behalf and that no change in this direction should be made upon the procedure followed at the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres.

4. As Mr. Churchill is aware, the revision of the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres has already been discussed at inter-departmental conferences at which the Colonial Office was represented.

5. An early reply to this letter, a copy of which is being sent to the Petroleum Department, is desired.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 10102/10102/44] No. 185.

Foreign Office to Imperial War Graves Commission.

Foreign Office, October 13, 1922.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to refer to section 2 of Part VI of the Treaty of Sèvres, copy of which is enclosed for convenience of reference,* relating to graves in Turkey and Thrace.

2. It is probable that at an early date a conference will be held to negotiate with Turkey the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and that in this treaty the actual sovereignty of Thrace east of the Maritza, including the Gallipoli Peninsula, will almost certainly remain Turkish, whatever provisions as to the garrisoning of that peninsula by Allied or other troops as a guarantee for the freedom of the Straits under the auspices of the League of Nations may be otherwise obtained.

3. I am to enquire to what extent the provisions relating to Gallipoli in the Treaty of Sèvres have already been carried out, and what precise modifications will be required in the treaty on the assumption that the sovereignty of the Gallipoli Peninsula remains Turkish.

4. A reply to this letter at the earliest convenience of your commission is desired.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent to the War Office.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 10102/10102/44] No. 186.

Foreign Office to War Office.†

Foreign Office, October 13, 1922.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to request that he may be furnished at the earliest convenience of the Army Council with their views as to the future revision in a peace conference of the relevant provisions of Part V of the Treaty of Sèvres.

2. With regard to Part VI, section 1 ("Prisoners of War") of the treaty, it would seem that as between Turkey and the Allies, other than Greece, these provisions are obsolete, and to a considerable extent might be omitted. They will, however, require consideration as between Turkey and Greece. Lord Curzon will be glad to receive the views of the Army Council on this point.

3. The question of section 2 of Part VI of the treaty ("Graves") is being referred to the Imperial War Graves Commission for their views.

(To the Air Ministry only.)

(4.) I am to enquire whether it is desired to retain Part X ("Aerial Navigation") of the Treaty of Sèvres, in view of the fact that the Principal Allied Powers have already undertaken to support Turkey's admission to the League of Nations, and having regard to the provisions of article 327 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

(To the Admiralty only.)

(4.) On a point of detail I am to enquire whether the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty desire to retain article 419 of the Treaty of Sèvres regarding the supply of information by Turkey as to the sinking or damaging of vessels during the war.

4. (5.) In considering the revision of the clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres which concern your Department, it should be realised that the concessions which have already been offered to Turkey in the inter-Allied conferences since August 1920, and in particular in the Paris Conference of March last, will probably have to be retained and possibly extended. It should also be realised that, except on matters where British interests are vitally concerned, there can now be little chance of imposing any conditions

* Not printed. † Also to Air Ministry and Admiralty, *mutatis mutandis*.

upon Turkey, with whom the terms of the new treaty, unlike those of other treaties with the enemy, will probably now have to be negotiated.

5. (6.) It is uncertain where the forthcoming peace conference will take place, but it will probably be opened at an early date, and an urgent reply to this letter is therefore desired. It is also hoped that, as far as possible, an indication will be given of the new clauses or of the precise modifications of the old which it is desired to insert in the new treaty.

6. (7.) Similar letters are being addressed to the Air Ministry and Admiralty.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 11289/27/44] No. 187.

M. Venisclos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 14).

My Lord,

Greek Legation, London, October 13, 1922.

ALLOW me to assure you that it is with the greatest misgiving that I have read the protocol of armistice that has been signed. It would seem that the terms of this document are not in accordance with the request which I made to you recently and which, from our last conversation in Paris, I thought had been granted. I had asked that the Turkish Administration and gendarmerie be established in Thrace one month after the evacuation of that province by the Greek army. This would give to those of the unfortunate Christian populations who wanted to leave time to do so. Instead of this, it appears that the Turkish authorities are to be restored immediately after the withdrawal of the Greek troops, and that the whole transference of the province to the Turks is to be accomplished within a month. The satisfaction that is thus given to Turkey on this point is not justified by any vital interest of hers, while a population of 400,000—exclusive of the Christian population of Constantinople—is exposed to the danger either of complete annihilation, if they remain on the spot, or of a sudden headlong rout, as was the case in Smyrna, where the refugees took to flight, leaving every possession behind them in order to save their lives. The tragic situation of these unfortunate populations will be the more increased by the fact that the Turks have not been compelled to give any amnesty to those who, thinking themselves to be Greek subjects for the past two years, either served in the Greek army or collaborated in the Greek Administration, and who will now be prosecuted for high treason, as has already happened in Smyrna, and will be hanged.

I would be guilty of a lack of sincerity, my Lord, if I neglected to state that the Greek nation feels that in this hour of its misfortune it has not been supported in its legitimate claims to the extent it was justified in expecting support from those of its former Allies, with whom it shared the common sacrifice of lives in order that the liberty of the world might be safeguarded. Its chief fault, for which it is so severely treated, has been that, believing the Great War was fought, among other things, to assure the liberty of small nations, it wished to settle its affairs of internal government according to its own aspirations.

I have, &c.
E. K. VENISELOS.

No. 188.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 579.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Athens, October 13, 1922.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that Revolutionary Committee had accepted solely because they were impressed with necessity for agreeing with Allies. Committee believed that from military point of view acceptance was not necessary.

Minister for Foreign Affairs did not hide his conviction that Christian population would be panic-stricken at early return of Turkish gendarmerie, and that it would not be possible to evacuate population in much better conditions than those that had prevailed in Asia Minor.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 189.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 564. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1922.*

I SINCERELY trust your Lordship will be able to prevent any reduction, previous to conclusion of peace, in British military, naval and air forces now in Dardanelles and at Constantinople. General Harington shares my view as to importance of this. As stated in my telegram No. 554, ultimate factor which brought Turks to reason at Mudania was our display of force and their knowledge that we would use it in the last resort.

No reliance whatever can be placed in Turkish assurances, and we cannot count on vigorous support of our allies in resisting Turkish pretensions at conference. The Turks know perfectly well that France and Italy will not break with them on any account, and will make full use of this knowledge at conference. The position of the Turks will be still stronger at the conference than it was at Mudania meeting, owing to foothold which they will have obtained in Thrace and to withdrawal of Greek forces out of striking distance. They will also have had plenty of time in which to collect a strong army on border of Ismid zone.

Chief, if not the only, card in our [group omitted] at the conference will be the presence of British forces of occupation, and I am much impressed by absolute necessity of preventing any reduction of them.

No. 190.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 517.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 13, 1922.*

FRENCH Parliament reopened yesterday. Proceedings in Chamber of Deputies consisted in a confused discussion of a number of "interpellations" on foreign and domestic policy, which is likely to continue for some days.

Two interesting speeches were made by members of Left on foreign affairs, both of which drew somewhat heated replies from the President of the Council. M. Margaine, a Socialist Radical, concluded a long indictment of M. Poincaré's foreign policy by accusing him of having abandoned his British allies by withdrawing the French troops from Chanak. M. Poincaré was obliged to make several interruptions in order to give his statement of the case. The French troops had, he said, been sent without the consent of the French Government to Chanak, where they were incurring serious risks. "We withdrew them and warned England at once. I will add that it was one of the initiatives of which I am most proud, and I consider that it greatly contributed to ensure peace." (This statement was greeted with applause.) M. Margaine still pressed his accusations, however, and M. Poincaré then made the following statement:—

"The British troops were at Chanak, which is part of the neutral zone. There were French troops on the European shore only of that zone. At a certain moment General Harington asked General Charpy and General Mombelli to send contingents to Chanak so that the French and Italian flags might be represented in the Asiatic part of the neutral zone. General Charpy and General Mombelli agreed, and the troops were sent. I was only informed subsequently. I then consulted the French General Staff, Marshal Foch, General Weygand and General Buat; all told me that the Chanak position was untenable if attacked. I at once warned the British Government that the position appeared untenable. I wished to avoid the possibility of Kemalist irregulars approaching our lines, and I insisted on this consideration, which was the most important of all; if a gun had been fired, a general war might have followed. I knew from the experience of 1912 to 1914 what a Balkan war might become. I considered that it was advisable to begin by taking the necessary measures of prudence and precaution, and by advising our allies to do the same. Italy was of our opinion. England considered that she could remain at Chanak, and I am very glad that she remained there without the slightest incident occurring. But, in spite of all, I preferred that our troops should not be exposed to receive shots to which they would obviously have been forced to reply." (Applause.)

To this statement (which conceals the fact that the troops were withdrawn without any warning to His Majesty's Government, who were obliged to enquire of the French Government whether the withdrawal had in fact taken place), M. Margaine replied by expressing his regret that the French Government should be so ill served by its propaganda as to allow the facts to appear in England under the very unfavourable light in which they were now regarded.

Later in the evening M. Albert-Favre (an Independent Radical) made an impassioned speech in favour of a more conciliatory policy towards Germany. In view of the decreasing population of France and the increasing population of Germany, the only hope for France was, he said, to work for a close understanding with England and a rapprochement with Germany. He delivered a strong attack upon M. Poincaré for having alienated the sympathies of Great Britain:—

"Since you have been in power, the friendly relations with England have become cool. For nine months you have been fighting with the British Government on every single subject without having settled one of them, and, with the applause of a certain section of the press, and under the particularly interested gaze of the Germans, you have transformed French policy into a kind of single combat between Mr. Lloyd George and yourself. Instead of employing a certain suavity in your discussions, you have been constantly dry, curt, as disagreeable as a writ from a sheriff's officer. By omitting to exercise on the press a moderating influence, are you not afraid of the reproach of being the 'chef d'orchestre' of all the newspapers which are at present directing against the British Prime Minister a whole series of violent imprecations?"

These remarks were received with a good deal of applause from the Left, but the last portion of them elicited a most indignant reply from M. Poincaré, who declared that M. Albert-Favre's insinuations were unworthy of a French Deputy, and added that no one deplored more than himself the attacks directed against Allied Governments. If it depended on him, they would never have occurred. M. Albert-Favre attacked M. Poincaré for having sent M. de Jouvenel, who was connected with the anti-English "Matin," to Geneva; to which M. Poincaré retorted that M. de Jouvenel was only responsible for what he himself wrote, and that he had been congratulated by the British delegates for his attitude at Geneva. M. Albert-Favre concluded his speech by taunting M. Poincaré for using violent language and then, at the moment for acting, "you are seized by hesitation, by a curious sort of paralysis, and your arm falls back inert." It was to France's real interest to see peace and prosperity re-established throughout Europe; let her not pursue a selfish and isolated policy, and, above all, let her retain her friendship with England, as to which Mr. Bonar Law's letter had come as a warning.

Text of discussion by bag to-night.

[E 10888/27/44] No. 191.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 256.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 14, 1922.*

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 346 of 11th October: Egypt and Turkish Peace Conference.

You should inform the Egyptian Government that technical basis of present conference is revision of treaty already signed with Turkey, and that signatories of that treaty were Powers who had either declared war on, or broken off relations with, Turkey.

It is impossible, therefore, at this stage to give any undertaking that Egypt will be admitted as a signatory of the final treaty of peace. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

The present intention is to limit participation in the conference to the fewest possible States. It is, however, possible that presence at seat of conference of a carefully selected Egyptian, who could be consulted by British delegation and could represent views of Egyptian Government, may prove desirable when clauses relating to Egypt come up for discussion, and in mentioning this to Sarwat you may think it advisable to inform him of modifications for which we propose to press in Treaty of Sèvres. These are contained in my telegram No. 258.

[E 10888/27/44] No. 192.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1922.

MY telegram No. 256 of 14th October: Egypt and Turkish Peace Conference.
Following are suggested modifications of Treaty of Sèvres as regards Egypt:—

Article 101, substitute for last sentence: "Turkey hereby accepts the status of Egypt as defined in the declaration of His Britannic Majesty's Government to His Majesty the Sultan of Egypt on the 28th February, 1922."

Articles 102 and 103, for "18th December, 1914" read "5th November, 1914."

Article 104, insert after "treaty" in first line the words "apart from article 261."

Article 107, omit.

Article 108, insert at beginning "Pending the conclusion of a commercial convention between Egypt and Turkey."

Article 112, see my telegram No. 259.

Article 428, omit in first paragraph and in sub-section (*b*) the words "or by the Alexandria Maritime and Quarantine Board," and also in first paragraph the words "and in any territories which cease, in accordance with the present treaty, to be under the suzerainty of Turkey." Insert at end of article, between the words "Pilgrimage will be represented" and "on a co-ordinating Pilgrimage Quarantine Committee," the words "together with the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt."

[E 11114/10102/44] No. 193.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 259.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1922.

YOUR despatch No. 773 of 13th September: Wording of clause in Treaty of Peace with Turkey relating to service of loans secured on the Egyptian Tribute.

I agree that proposed renunciation of tribute in favour of Great Britain is open to objection. Our only object is to insert some provision in treaty which other Powers concerned will accept as sufficiently safeguarding the position of bondholders in view of the cessation of Egyptian tribute payments.

In the unlikely event of Egypt being a signatory of the treaty (see my telegram No. 256), British representatives at conference could suggest the insertion of the following clause instead of article 112 of the Treaty of Sèvres:—

"Turkey renounces all claim to the tribute formerly paid by Egypt.

"The Government of Egypt undertakes to continue to pay (*a*) to the houses by which the Turkish loans of 1894 and 1891, secured on the Egyptian tribute, were issued, until the final extinction of those loans, the sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to them, and (*b*) to the Bank of England the sum hitherto paid towards the interest of the guaranteed loan of 1855."

If, as is much more probable, Egypt is not a signatory, a binding agreement between Great Britain and Egypt in the terms of the second paragraph of the above clause should be made before the signature of the treaty.

The second paragraph of the article in the treaty would then read: "The high contracting parties take note of the agreement between Great Britain and Egypt under which the latter undertakes," &c.

You should explain situation to Egyptian Government and endeavour to obtain their concurrence in the above arrangements. If they refuse we can see no alternative to the wording proposed in my telegram No. 95 of 18th March.

No. 194.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).**

(No. 383.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1922.

MY telegram No. 48 to Geneva of 21st September: Red Cross Mission to Anatolia, and your despatch No. 2049 of 3rd September (my telegram No. 246 of 7th September).

His Majesty's Government have strong reason to believe that over 100,000 non-Turkish Ottoman refugees—mostly men of military age and young women—are being deported into interior by Turkish authorities from coastal district where they had collected after Greek retreat. It is essential that serious united effort should be made to prevent recurrence of horrors of earlier deportations and to save lives of deportees. Relief is no doubt also urgently required for Moslem population of villages destroyed during Greek retreat.

Although in changed circumstances His Majesty's Government no longer press enquiry into past atrocities, they desire still to support Red Cross Mission, which is primarily intended to study present conditions and bring immediate relief.

Its presence in Anatolia at this moment, in spite of advanced season, would exercise considerable check on Turks and render relief measures possible.

Please urge Government to which you are accredited most strongly in interests of humanity to join His Majesty's Government in offering to International Red Cross at Geneva immediate grant of 25,000 gold francs each already promised, on condition that mission can be sent to Anatolia at once. Purpose of mission would be to study conditions and prepare relief measures for all classes needing relief irrespective of race or creed.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 498, and Washington, No. 307.)

No. 195.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).†

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1922.

IN order to facilitate work of forthcoming Near East Conference, we think it advisable that technical experts of the three principal Allies should have a preliminary and informal discussion on the economic and financial provisions of the new treaty. Results of discussion need not necessarily be regarded as binding on the Governments, but they might usefully prepare the ground and consider probable Turkish objections, and to what extent they can be met.

Please invite the Government to which you are accredited to send such technical delegates to London if possible about 20th October.

[E 11092/11092/44] No. 196.

Mr. Oliphant to Mr. Urquhart.

Dear Mr. Urquhart, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1922.

I HAVE submitted to the Secretary of State your enquiry whether the Foreign Office saw any objection to your embarking on mining and oil research, at the instigation of certain Turks, in Asia Minor.

2. His Lordship directs me to draw your attention to the terms of the agreement relating to Anatolia—of which a copy is enclosed, and by the terms of which Great Britain, France and Italy agreed not to support their respective nationals in making application for new concessions in certain areas of Anatolia as marked on the map in advance of the application of the nationals of the other Powers whose prior rights in those areas were recognised.

3. This agreement signed and published simultaneously as the Treaty of Sèvres, was never ratified, nor recognised by Angora; but the principle embodied in it will probably be upheld as between the three signatories. Further, there is a possible danger

* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome) No. 331. † Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome) No. 332.

of Angora annulling concessions already granted in order to transfer them to new concessionaires.

4. Subject to the above observations, the Secretary of State sees no objection, on the information before him, to your pursuing the negotiations should you so decide.

Yours, &c.
L. OLIPHANT.

No. 197.

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 192) to Mr. Lindley.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October 15.)

(No. 566.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

I HEAR that railway stations in Eastern Thrace are already crowded with civilian Greek population desirous of emigrating *en masse*.

It is of utmost importance that Greek military forces should be evacuated first, civilian population being evacuated gradually, if necessary, during period of thirty days which is to elapse after withdrawal of Greek troops, and before Allied forces retire from Thrace.

No. 198.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 567.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 477.

Financial position of Constantinople Government is momentarily easier. Ottoman Bank has consolidated its previous advances by advance of £T. 1,500,000 in current account, £T. 313,000 of which new cash advance.

On the other hand, declaration which Angora Government is reported to have published to the effect that all Acts, treaties, contracts and official decisions of Constantinople Government since March 1920, including its financial operations, are to be considered as null and void is not calculated to facilitate task of finding in future money for Constantinople Government.

No. 199.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 568.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

ALLIED, United States and Japanese High Commissioners have discussed at meeting with Dr. Nansen question of return to Greece of male refugees detained by Turkish authorities in Asia Minor. These are Ottoman Greeks.

Dr. Nansen proposed to request Angora Government to restore all male Greek refugees now detained, except those between the ages of 20 and 32. [? League of Nations] was prepared to give guarantee that those who returned would not be used in any military capacity. Dr. Nansen laid stress on chaos and starvation which would ensue in Greece if men were not returned to look after their families.

French, Italian and Japanese High Commissioners and I promised Dr. Nansen our warm support in his representations to Angora Government based on grounds of humanity. United States High Commissioner has telegraphed to his Government in a favourable sense requesting permission to associate himself with these representations.

My French and Italian colleagues and I also decided to invite our respective Governments to consider this question as early as possible at Peace Conference.

I am reporting fully by despatch.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 200.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 569.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Dr. Nansen also raised question of Russian refugees at Constantinople. Hamid Bey had informed him that all Russian refugees here, about 25,000, must be evacuated in a short time. This was impossible, as no countries were now willing to receive them. There is reason to believe that Hamid's intimation is result of some arrangement between Moscow and Angora.

High Commissioners decided that only action possible was to suggest to their Governments that question should be considered at Peace Conference. Meanwhile, Dr. Nansen is pressing Angora Government to change its attitude.

No. 201.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 570.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

FRENCH propagandist paper of last night reproduced statement alleged to have been made by M. Venizelos to President of the Council on 6th October that Greece was ready to accept Turkish frontier of 1914. In telegram sections just received I note that M. Venizelos denies he ever accepted frontier ascribed to him by President of the Council. At final meeting of Allied High Commissioners with General Harington, before latter returned to Mudania for the last time, French High Commissioner made use of statement attributed to M. Venizelos to try to get me to agree that Karagatch should be promised to the Turks. I replied that I had no knowledge of M. Venizelos's alleged statement, and that I could not give General Harington instructions suggested. The publication by French propagandist paper of M. Venizelos's alleged statement to President of the Council will do a lot of harm, as it will encourage Turks to demand 1914 frontier at conference. They anyhow demand a plebiscite for Western Thrace. They will probably be supported by French and Italians in both demands.

I assume and hope His Majesty's Government will not consent to any further territorial concessions to the Turks in Europe beyond possibly Karagatch. The line of Maritza is best natural frontier. The 1914 frontier is an artificial one, and if accepted will certainly give rise to trouble in future. Although Karagatch is a suburb of Adrianople, it is 5 kilom. distant from it, and its fortification by the Turks will constitute a permanent menace to Western Thrace.

Point is of great importance in connection with refugee question. The refugees and Christian population in Eastern Thrace are already on the move westward. In a very short time large numbers will be pouring into Western Thrace. If a portion of Western Thrace is to be returned to Turkey, or if there is uncertainty as to final attribution of Western Thrace, Greek Government will have no incentive to provide for definite accommodation of thousands of refugees in Western Thrace.

It would seem essential, therefore, that this matter should be cleared up as quickly as possible by means of an official statement, either by Greek Government or by M. Venizelos, that Greece is not prepared to concede 1914 frontier. The Greeks will also be well advised to concentrate their army in Western Thrace so as to be in a strong position at Peace Conference.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 194.)

No. 202.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 571.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

RELIABLE opinion here is that native Greek and Armenian population at Constantinople, estimated at over half a million, will leave when our troops are withdrawn, as they did from Cilicia when French evacuated.

Reported attitude of Kemalists is very hostile to them. Whilst I think that this anticipation of an emigration *en masse* of Christian population of Constantinople may be exaggerated, we must be prepared for flight of large numbers of Christians when our troops leave. Greeks are estimated to number 400,000 and Armenians about 130,000.

Will His Majesty's Government be prepared, in case of necessity, to assist evacuation of native Christians? Much will depend on results obtained at Peace Conference.

Greeks might be settled in Greece, but I do not know what to recommend as regards Armenians. I presume that they would not be welcome in British colonies or East Africa.

Lord Mayor's Fund has consulted me about removal of Armenian orphanage containing 660 children and staff now accommodated in Moslem quarter on Sea of Marmora. I am asking the navy to watch orphanage.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 195.)

No. 203.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 572.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 555.

Owing to slight [? hitch] [group undecypherable] telegram was not handed to Hamid until 12th October, when dragomans also made verbal representations concerning general amnesty in Asia Minor. They did not specify non-Turks as many Turks are also in danger. Hamid promised to refer both questions to Angora.

Following on this, dragomans made further representations on 14th October in favour of ecclesiastics mentioned in Athens telegram No. 352 to Constantinople.

Circassians mentioned in Athens telegram No. 5[? 72] certainly have claim to consideration. They are compromised by association with Ferid Pasha's attempts to reduce Nationalists at time when we approved his policy, by direct connection with British at Ismid, and most of all by association with Greeks, which was their only alternative after British left Ismid. We can do little for them except work for general amnesty. Those now in Eastern Thrace might pass into Western Thrace with Greeks, who would perhaps agree, as they have stood by them so far. I doubt whether their permanent establishment in Europe is desirable. Best thing to aim at is their eventual re-establishment in former homes in Ismid region under amnesty. This would probably assure safety of rank and file, though leaders like Ibrahim Hakki are hopelessly compromised, and had better not return to Turkey [? in the] near future.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 196.)

[E 11144/27/44] No. 204.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 565.)
My Lord, *Athens, October 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that about a week ago the French Minister said to me, in the course of conversation, that he owed me an apology. One of his secretaries had some time before had a conversation with the Serbian Minister, from whom he had gathered that I had stated that I had informed the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government was ready to help the Greeks to defend Thrace. M. de

Marcilly had telegraphed this information to Paris, and M. Poincaré had made use of it during his recent conversations with your Lordship. In consequence of your Lordship's denial, he had gone to the Serbian Minister himself and found that the French secretary had misunderstood him and that I had said nothing of the kind. M. de Marcilly had telegraphed to Paris to put the matter right. I thanked my French colleague for his frankness and suggested that in the future he would do well to verify his information before informing his Government of my supposed utterances.

I had forgotten all about this incident until I received by the messenger a copy of the minutes of the third conversation at Paris, when I observed that M. Poincaré accused me of asking the Greeks to put 60,000 men at the disposal of His Majesty's Government to defend the Straits. This is presumably another version of the story telegraphed by M. de Marcilly, who, when he mentioned it to me, had perhaps forgotten exactly what I was supposed to have said. I venture to express my sincere thanks to your Lordship for refusing to believe this absurdity and for not even asking me for an explanation.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 11145/10524/44] No. 205.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No 569.)
My Lord, *Athens, October 7, 1922.*

WITH reference to numerous telegrams to your Lordship during the last few weeks on the subject of refugees, and with particular reference to my telegrams Nos. 525 and 556 of the 29th ultimo and the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's consular officers at Salonica and Volo respecting the appalling conditions of the refugees from Asia Minor in their consular districts.

The despatches give a picture of what is happening all over Greece. A telegram reached me yesterday from His Majesty's consul at Canea reporting the arrival there of 17,500 fresh refugees without food, clothing and accommodation. From Mitylene and Chios even worse reports reach me owing to the greater numbers of sufferers. I learnt to-day of the arrival of 100,000 in Chios. Terrible conditions of misery are witnessed daily by the local British committee which has been working for several weeks at Piræus and is now doing what it can in a factory at Phalerum, where about 4,000 refugees have been entrusted to its care.

The Ministry of Relief is kept informed of the reports which reach me from His Majesty's consular officers, and the new Minister, who is a medical man, is most ready to do all he can and to consider any suggestions which I or the local British committee may make to him, but I fear the task is one with which it is quite beyond his capacity to cope. Factories and large buildings are being requisitioned, and empty private houses are to share a similar fate. Each householder is, it is reported in the press, to be obliged to supply board and lodging to two refugees, but there is a serious shortage in the country of such prime necessities as bread and sanitary supplies, and the Government are lacking in funds.

There are already in Greece and the islands 500,000 destitute refugees from Asia Minor, besides about 120,000 new arrivals in Eastern Thrace and Rodosto. Already some are coming to Greece from Constantinople, and Greeks at Gallipoli have requested the Greek Government to send ships to remove them lest they should share the fate of their co-religionists in Asia Minor. I cannot speak too strongly of the awful situation which will undoubtedly arise as soon as British troops evacuate Constantinople and the Turk is allowed to repeat there and in Eastern Thrace the horrors recently perpetrated at Smyrna.

In any case, the support of all these people, who are not only without any resources but also for the most part incapable of work owing to the Turks' allowing no one of military age to leave, is quite beyond the power of this impoverished country, and would seem equally beyond the scope of private charity. I can well understand the difficulty of explaining matters to the British taxpayer, but I venture again to point out that these people are in fact those Christian minorities in Asia Minor about whom the public have heard so much; that they comprise people of many races and languages; that their miserable condition is the direct result of the policy of inaction pursued by

the Allies in the East since the armistice; and that Greece, in opening her doors to them, has already done far more than all the other countries put together to help them.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 205.

Acting Consul-General Mitchell to Mr. Lindley.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Salonica, October 2, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to the notice of your Excellency the very unsatisfactory condition of affairs here with regard to the refugees from Smyrna.

I am informed that there are considerably more than 50,000 now in Saloniea, of which about one-third are under cover. The remainder are here, there and everywhere out in the open and without food. Their condition is little better than it would have been had they remained in Smyrna. These refugees consist of women and children and old men. No men between the ages of 16 and 45 are permitted to leave Smyrna.

The authorities cannot cope with the influx, and there is an utter lack of organisation. When the refugees began to arrive they were drafted out to the old military hospital at Calamaria, and to some refugee accommodation at Lembet which was erected just after the fire. Various British residents here, principally Mr. R. J. Campbell, supplied motor transport to take the refugees to these centres.

The Military Governor, Colonel Tsipouras, has been so far too concerned with the political situation to give more than a passing interest to the refugees. He has now recognised that the question can no longer be ignored, and I am informed he has requested permission from the Greek War Office to accommodate as many refugees at Toumba, just outside the town, as the old military huts there will hold. At his request I sent yesterday by wireless a telegram to the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna requesting that no more refugees should be sent here. The position influenced me in sending this telegram, and I must accept responsibility. I should be grateful for any approval your Excellency may be able to give me in this respect. Late last night I proceeded on board the steamship "City of Oxford" and informed the master of the despatch of this telegram, and requested him, when reporting to the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, to enquire through all possible channels for a supply of food—principally flour—to be brought to Saloniea as soon as possible.

The British colony has interested itself as far as it is possible to do so, and has helped considerably at the disembarkation, especially with the sick, for whose help Colonel E. H. Jarvis, of the Imperial War Graves Commission, has kindly lent his ambulance motor-cars. He has also placed at the disposal of the authorities one lorry for the conveyance of food for the camp at Calamaria and to Lembet. Dr. Clark, M.B., Ch.B., an English medical practitioner, has volunteered his services for the benefit of the sick. Miss Baxter, a certificated nurse, has also volunteered her services. These offers have been accepted with gratitude by the authorities.

A large number of refugees have been accommodated in Turkish mosques, the schools and various other buildings. The authorities are now requisitioning rooms in private houses. It is said that the schools will be closed for upwards of twelve months, and education will be suspended accordingly.

I am of opinion that the matter is beyond the capabilities of the authorities—they have neither the necessary number of men, or the money, or the accommodation. At the present time, as your Excellency knows, there is a bread shortage; what little bread there is is uneatable. The vital necessity is food, although many people disagree with me and claim that the shelter is of paramount importance. Be that as it may, what is necessary cannot be done by Greece, mainly, of course, on the ground of expense. I am informed that it is necessary to organise an undertaking to collect and distribute food, and to immediately put in hand and press the completion of accommodation, however temporary. Tents and marquees might for the moment meet the need, but as the cold weather approaches, this type of shelter will be insufficient. Owing to the exposure and underfeeding the amount of sickness that is inevitable will necessitate the erection of a hospital and the services of a considerable number of doctors and nurses.

I have, &c.
E. H. MITCHELL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 205.

Vice-Consul Knight to Mr. Lindley.

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Volo, October 3, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Asia Minor refugees, it is said to the number of at least 10,000, arrived here yesterday by the Greek transatlantic "Megale Hellas" and other vessels. These are the first civilian victims of the recent happenings in Anatolia to reach this district in considerable numbers, and their plight is pitiable in the extreme. It is stated that from Smyrna they were taken first to Mitylene and then to Salonica, only to be refused permission to land at both places; meanwhile several deaths occurred on board. They finally reached Volo to find that, although they were allowed to disembark, no arrangements had been made for their reception, and one shipload is this morning still waiting in the harbour until those landed yesterday had been moved off the pier, where they spent the night without shelter or attention of any kind.

The local authorities, who have hitherto been left undisturbed by the "Revolutionary Committee" in Athens, might, even if taken by surprise, have done much to cope with the situation by the immediate requisitioning of warehouses, sheds, &c. (the theatre, admirably suited for the purpose, is actually harbouring a troop of comedians who draw large audiences of townspeople). But each official is concerned only to disclaim responsibility for himself, and, were it not for some charitable individuals who took the law into their own hands, it is not improbable that no measures to house or feed the multitude would have been taken twenty-four hours after their arrival.

As it is, bread is very scarce; fresh milk for the numerous children is practically unobtainable, it having been commandeered already for the wounded in hospital; while other articles of food are usually beyond the means of even the moneyed refugees, whose Turkish pounds the heartless rapacity of local money-changers has reduced to about half their proper value.

In these circumstances, if any provisions, medicines or cash were available from the supplies which I understand are on their way from England to Athens, I should be very glad to co-operate in relief work with a few private persons here in whose zeal and discretion I have the fullest confidence. The local British colony is too small and too poor to permit of their response to any appeal of mine being more than a drop of comfort in an ocean of misery.

Four thousand persons, it is said, are to remain at Volo, the rest being intended for distribution among the towns and villages of the interior, where many will doubtless fall victims to the malaria there prevalent.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT.

[E 11130/10524/44] No. 206.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 873.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from General Harington dated the 4th October, with enclosure, respecting the Thracian refugee question.

Constantinople, October 7, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 206.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.

Your Excellency, *Constantinople, October 4, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for such action as your Excellency may consider necessary, the attached copy of a statement of Major M. R. Strover, D.S.O., R.A., late British military representative at Brussa, regarding the situation of Greek and Armenian refugees.

I have, &c.
M. WELCH,
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.

Enclosure 2 in No. 206.

Memorandum by Major Strover respecting Thracian Refugee Question.

IT appears almost certain from the present situation that the Greeks will have to evacuate Eastern Thrace. At present moment, in addition to a large Greek population native to the country, there are above 100,000 refugees in Eastern Thrace from North-Western Anatolia. These refugees are already terrified with the possibility of Constantinople being occupied by the Kemalists, and the whole Greek population have begun to feel nervous.

After the experiences of refugees left behind in Smyrna and Mudania after the evacuation of the Greek army, it is impossible to persuade these refugees that they can remain in safety under Turkish rule.

The whole population of Anatolia was quite decided on this subject six months ago, and in my opinion it is simply shutting one's eyes to the real facts to hope that it is possible, or even humane, to persuade Greeks and Armenians to try to face the danger of existence under the Turks.

I therefore urge most strongly that this be represented to the High Commissioner and that he be asked to be prepared, in advance, to give that protection to the Christian minorities which was guaranteed in Mr. Lloyd George's famous speech in August last.

Dating back to the evacuations of Odessa and Novorossisk, the authorities in Constantinople have consistently failed to provide sufficient ships for refugees until the evacuation should have been over.

Apart from the actual saving of refugees from death, it would seem worth while to save them from the awful terror they have to go through for days during which they are crowded together in the seaports waiting for the ships that never come.

If no other reason appeals the question of economy might be an inducement to commence evacuation of refugees in anticipation of the rush.

When refugees are evacuated at the last moment, they are forced to leave all their baggage, and in consequence thousands of people have to be provided subsequently with clothing and bedding which they could have provided themselves were they able to carry their baggage.

It is so difficult to realise, at a safe distance, what the refugees suffer. When one is among them and can feel the atmosphere of panic, one can realise why it is that even French and Italians, who give out that the panic is caused by Greek propaganda, lose their heads at the last moment and seek safety until they know how things are going to turn out.

This letter is to urge that ships be ear-marked in advance to remove Christians from the danger-zone if the necessity arises, and that a decision be taken now as to where they will be sent and how they will be fed, housed, clothed and provided with work.

Although refugees have lived these three weeks by the efforts of the Greeks and Americans, the promptest measures will be necessary to cope with the next rush, and unless money (and the resultant provision) and the necessary organisation is forthcoming before the rush much necessary suffering will be experienced.

That this suffering is very real is shown by the condition of the children who were babies when the Turks deported the Greeks from the Anatolian littoral.

I have written very fully on this subject as I am the only British person in touch with these refugees in Thrace.

M. R. STROVER, *Major.*

Constantinople, September 27, 1922.

[E 11131/10524/44] No. 207.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 874.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from General Harington, dated the 3rd October, with enclosure, respecting Greek refugees in Eastern Thrace.

Constantinople, October 9, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 207.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Secret.)

Your Excellency, *October 3, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to forward the attached copy of a report recently received from Major Strover (British military representative with the Greek army, Thrace), relative to the future of 300,000 Christian refugees in Thrace.

Major Strover is of the opinion that these refugees will refuse to remain in Thrace under Turkish rule.

I have, &c.

(For Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-chief, the Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey) and British Force in Turkey),

P. H. ROWAN,

Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff.

Enclosure 2 in No. 207.

Memorandum by Major Strover respecting Refugees in Eastern Thrace.

(Secret.)

THE refugee problem, which is already acute, threatens to overpower Greece if Eastern Thrace has to be evacuated.

When 130,000 refugees from Russia suddenly descended on Constantinople a difficulty arose which took months to overcome.

Granted that this was a peculiar difficulty, because Constantinople is at present an isolated city without nationality, it must be remembered that here were representatives of all the nations of the world able to render assistance, whilst in the present case Greece is practically bankrupt, and has to face the problem of accommodation, &c., alone.

Assuming that 200,000 refugees have reached Greece from Smyrna, there are approximately 350,000 already to reckon with, whilst the rough figures for the Christians in Eastern Thrace have been given as 200,000.

The people of Eastern Thrace point out that it is useless to discuss the possibility of remaining if Turk rule returns.

Before the last two years it was possible to live under the Turk, however uncomfortable it might have been, but since then all the Greek young men have fought against the Ottoman. These men can no longer remain in Thrace under Turk rule, and must become refugees, and with them their relatives.

Nothing in the behaviour of the Ottoman to date has gone to disprove the soundness of this belief, and I hear from Brussa that there are grave suspicions of a large scale massacre of young men taken from among the refugees.

Again, no matter what outsiders may desire, the Christians will not stay with the Turk so long as they can walk away.

Armenians fled from Anatolia, and those living in Eastern Thrace further complicate the problem.

They have every reason to know that the Turk does not love them, and at present they are the most nervous and the most desirous to quit.

To settle in Greece is to resign all chance of having a voice in the direction of their affairs, and they want to find a country where they can live and preserve their nationality.

Perhaps if they occupied the Dedeagatch-Bulgaria corridor many other difficult problems could be settled in the same stroke.

The representative of the League of Nations has visited the refugees on the 27th September, and is recommending ships to be sent immediately. This is unquestionably the first need.

M. R. STROVER, *Major,*

Lule Burgas, September 29, 1922. *Military Representative.*

[E 11135/10102/44] No. 208.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 880.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the British, French and Italian chambers of commerce met in joint session on the 4th instant to consider the question of the maintenance of the Capitulations in view of the well-known intention of the Nationalists to demand their suppression. The result of this meeting is embodied in the memorandum copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith, and which the chambers of commerce have also sent to my Allied collegues.

2. There is no doubt that the openly proclaimed intention of the Nationalists to do away with the Capitulations has aroused the greatest apprehension amongst the European communities here. I have always felt that this was the one point on which we could count on the French to make a firm stand. There is indeed reason to believe that the French community is now thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of the régime which will be inaugurated when the Nationalists come to Constantinople.

3. I learn that General Pellé had intended to send M. des Closières to Paris to-day to submit the point of view of the French community to the French Government. M. des Closières' mission was, however, cancelled at the last minute. M. des Closières recently informed Sir Adam Block that General Pellé had told Hamid Bey (the unofficial Nationalist representative here) the other day that France had gone to the extreme limit of concessions to Turkey.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 208.

British Chamber of Commerce of Turkey and the Balkan States to Sir H. Rumbold.

Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a memorandum on the subject of the Capitulations which has been drafted jointly by the delegates appointed by the councils of the British, French and Italian chambers of commerce in this city in special meeting.

This memorandum, in identical form, is being submitted by each of these chambers to their respective High Commissioners with request that it be transmitted to their respective Governments.

I have, &c.
W. SEAGER, *Chairman.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 208.

Memorandum respecting Capitulations.

LES chambres de commerce anglaise, française et italienne, que la gravité des événements a obligées à se réunir au conseil extraordinaire et dans une étroité solidarité les 2 et 4 octobre 1922, n'ont jusqu'à ce jour obtenu aucune réponse aux vœux qu'elles avaient soumis au sujet du maintien des Capitulations, au conseil de Paris du 22 mars 1922. Elles ont, cependant, l'impression que des modifications radicales vont être apportées aux traités connus sous le nom de Capitulations qui constituaient l'héritage de nos colonies respectives et étaient, à ce titre, considérées comme inaliénables. Or, certains de ces privilèges sont d'une telle importance pour les intérêts de ces colonies, que les délégués des trois chambres de commerce précitées croient indispensable de faire appel à leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour solliciter des mesures de protection en faveur de leurs nationaux résidant dans l'Empire ottoman.

Le conseil, ainsi composé, tient à souligner l'importance impérieuse, vitale, du maintien intégral des droits acquis relatifs à l'administration de la justice,* à l'inviolabilité

* En octobre 1914, les Turcs supprimèrent les Capitulations. Ils promirent alors d'effectuer une réforme judiciaire, dont ils reconnaissaient eux-mêmes la nécessité. Or, depuis, huit années se sont écoulées et rien n'a été fait.

des domiciles et des personnes, au respect des privilèges, des usages et en général de toutes les Capitulations. Si, pour satisfaire à l'amour-propre des Turcs, en ce moment si chatouilleux, les Gouvernements alliés croient nécessaire de déclarer que les Capitulations sont abolies, il faudrait absolument rétablir, sous une autre forme, les anciennes garanties et même, en tenant compte de l'expérience acquise durant la guerre, les renforcer. Il faut bien, en effet, se rendre compte que c'est uniquement grâce à ces anciens droits que l'existence des étrangers—qui font du commerce ou de toute autre manière se rendent utiles, en Turquie, à leurs pays respectifs—est possible. L'attention de nos Gouvernements est attirée sur le fait indéniable que nos personnes et nos domiciles se trouveront immédiatement en danger le jour où la protection effective qui résulte pour nous des Capitulations sera amoindrie même de peu de chose.

Au point de vue économique, nous devons reconnaître la nécessité pour le Gouvernement turc d'équilibrer son budget. Il est certain que l'équité commande que tous les habitants de ce pays soient assujettis aux mêmes taxes sans tenir compte de leur nationalité. D'un autre côté, si c'est tout à fait indispensable, on devra laisser le Gouvernement ottoman libre de modifier ses tarifs douaniers sans avoir, comme par le passé, à obtenir l'agrément des grandes Puissances. Mais il serait absolument nécessaire que des garanties soient données que les taxes personnelles—et parmi elles le témettu (impôt sur le revenu)—soient appliquées avec justice et dans des conditions d'égalité absolue pour tous. Quant aux taxes douanières, des conseils amicaux devraient être donnés aux Turcs afin qu'ils n'exagèrent pas, dans leur intérêt propre, les droits d'importation et d'exportation—le tarif douanier établi en Anatolie constitue un indice très inquiétant à ce sujet—et que, dans tous les cas, les droits de douane soient égaux pour tous, chacun de nos pays jouissant de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le conseil se permet d'exposer encore un ardent désir, que son expérience de ce pays justifie : Il voudrait que les concessions accordées dans le domaine des Capitulations ne fussent pas concédées toutes à la fois, mais progressivement, en commençant par les plus légères, toute nouvelle concession dépendant de l'usage équitable fait de la précédente.

Le conseil recommande vivement l'examen de ses vœux à la bienveillante attention des Gouvernements anglais, français et italien, en indiquant qu'il s'agit de l'existence même de leur commerce en Turquie. Il espère que sa prière, née de l'expérience, sera entendue.

Constantinople, le 4 octobre 1922.

[E 11136/27/44] No. 209.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 882. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 9, 1922.*

THE conference between the Allied generals and Ismet Pasha commenced at Mudania on the 3rd instant. The conference had for its main object to obtain the cessation of hostilities between Nationalist Turkey and Greece and to fix a line in Eastern Thrace behind which the Greek army was to be invited to retire. As such it should have been a conference attended only by military representatives. Nevertheless, one of the principal Turkish representatives was Hamid Bey, the unofficial Nationalist agent at Constantinople. Other Nationalist politicians were in the background, whilst the ubiquitous M. Franklin-Bouillon, though not actually present in the conference room, sought to play the rôle of mediator between the Allied generals and the Turks. As this personage appears to be devoted to the Turkish cause, his proceedings were a source of embarrassment rather than otherwise to the Allied generals, for there is no doubt that he encouraged the Turks to believe that the Allies were prepared to go farther in the way of concessions than is really the case. The Turks from the very first attempted to inveigle the Allied generals into discussing political questions, and it was soon evident that they did not mean to yield a single point. Some inconvenience was caused by the deafness of Ismet Pasha, who, I am told, became more arrogant as the conference proceeded.

2. During the negotiations the Turkish representatives were true to the method of their country. I infer, in fact, that the atmosphere was that of the bazaar combined

with that of a coffee-house. In these circumstances negotiation was difficult. When any point was raised by the Allied generals that did not commend itself to Ismet Pasha he said that it was a "point particulier" which must be referred to Angora. The Greek representatives, headed by General Mazarakis, arrived late on the 4th October. The Greek mission made a good impression on the Allied generals. Hitherto the Greek representatives have not met the Turks, but have held frequent meetings with the Allied generals.

3. On the third day a deadlock was reached owing mainly to the demand of the Turks that Eastern Thrace should be restored to Turkey in full sovereignty previous to the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. If conceded, this demand would have meant that there would have been no proper guarantees for the protection of the non-Turkish population. General Harington and his colleagues at once appreciated the fact that their terms of reference precluded the discussion of this demand. They therefore decided to return to Constantinople in order to obtain instructions from their Governments through the respective High Commissions. I had a preliminary meeting on the night of the 5th instant with General Harington and Admiral Brock, and this was followed by a full meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals with their staffs.

4. In my telegram No. 524 I had the honour to report a summary of what passed at this meeting, and this despatch is only by way of supplementing that telegram.

5. I pointed out forthwith to the meeting that the three or four points over which a deadlock had ensued at Mudania went beyond the proposals contained in the Allied telegram of the 23rd September. This applied particularly to the Nationalist demand for the restoration to them of Eastern Thrace previous to the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. I said that I must refer these points to your Lordship and added emphatically that I refused, on my own initiative, to give General Harington instructions which would enable him to accept the Turkish demands. I purposely made this statement at an early stage in the proceedings because I was quite convinced that my colleagues would urge me to give way. This conviction was speedily realised.

6. On my asking the French High Commissioner point blank whether the French Government, as stated by M. Franklin-Bouillon, was really ready to restore Eastern Thrace to Turkey before the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, the French High Commissioner, who was visibly embarrassed, took refuge behind M. Franklin-Bouillon, and implied that the French Government would not in the last resort object to this new Turkish demand. I then told the French High Commissioner bluntly that, in my view, M. Franklin-Bouillon's rôle at Mudania had been "néfaste." General Pellé took this remark very well, for I have good reason to believe that he himself has a strong objection to M. Franklin-Bouillon, who is popularly credited with wishing to succeed him here.

7. The French High Commissioner, who, I think, realises the unfortunate part being played by his country at the present moment, earnestly appealed to me on behalf of the maintenance of the *Entente*, which he said might well be endangered by the present Near Eastern crisis. He argued with great force and emphasis that the *Entente* was the only sheet-anchor in Europe at the present moment. This appeal was designed either to induce me to give General Harington instructions which would enable him to accept the Turkish demands on the three or four points still in dispute, or to get me to recommend your Lordship to give way on these points. I made it quite clear that I would do nothing of the sort, and I pointed out that His Majesty's Government had gone very far to keep in line with the Allied Governments in offering a solution of the Near Eastern question which would satisfy the Kemalists. The Paris Agreement was only twelve days old. It had been signed by all three Powers, and we were now asked to accept demands outside it. I assured him there were limits beyond which His Majesty's Government were not prepared to go.

8. The Italian High Commissioner then addressed the meeting, and after a review of the events which had led up to the Mudania Conference, argued that the three or four points in question were really not worth the risk of going to war and should be conceded. It was clear from the very first that he was going to advocate surrender. The Marquis Garroni even went so far as to state that, if war resulted with the Turks, the world would attribute this to the unwillingness of the Allied High Commissioners to take responsibility for concessions which were of small account in comparison with the issues involved.

9. At this point I entered a strong protest, and said that if war did result it would be because the Turks had proved intractable. I said that the worst way of dealing with the Turks was continually to give in to their demands. The more they obtained,

the more they would ask for, and I added I should not be surprised if they demanded the immediate evacuation of Constantinople by the Allied forces.

10. The attitude of my colleagues was, in fact, deplorable and produced the worst impression.

11. The reply of the Angora Government to the Allied telegram of the 23rd September was handed to the High Commissioners in the afternoon of the 5th instant. Ismet Pasha received it at Mudania much about the same time, and when the Allied generals returned to that port the following afternoon, the 6th instant, they found a better atmosphere. Ismet Pasha expressed gratification at the despatch of inter-Allied commissions to Eastern Thrace. After the return of the Allied generals to Mudania on the 6th instant, negotiations with the Nationalist general necessarily slowed down whilst General Harington awaited instructions from the Cabinet, as a result of your Lordship's visit to Paris. These instructions arrived in the early hours of yesterday morning, the 8th instant, and were immediately forwarded to General Harington. A further delay occurred owing to the non-receipt by the French and Italian High Commissioners, until late that afternoon, of corresponding instructions for their respective generals. The latter came over from Mudania to fetch these instructions, and I immediately called a meeting with my colleagues and the Allied generals in order to discuss and compare the instructions as received from London and Paris. On this occasion General Harington was represented by his chief of staff, Colonel Gribbon.

12. I began by informing the meeting of your Lordship's telegram No. 482, stating that "the French Government have accepted in writing the three points stipulated for by the Cabinet." We found that on two points the French instructions were not identical with those which your Lordship had sent me. As I considered these points to be of importance, and in view of the intimation conveyed in your telegram No. 479 that His Majesty's Government and your Lordship insisted on the three conditions as defined, I informed my colleagues that I must again refer to you. True to the procedure they had adopted at the meeting of the 5th instant, my colleagues again tried to persuade me to adopt the French version in preference to the version you had telegraphed to me. The Italian High Commissioner said that we had already yielded so much that it was hardly worth while haggling over two unimportant points. I replied that we had indeed made great concessions to the Turks, and that the Marquis Garroni was evidently in favour of reaching a solution by giving in all round.

13. Throughout the meetings of the 5th and 8th instant, constant allusion was made by my colleagues and the Allied generals to the *amour-propre* of the Turks and to the necessity of avoiding any action which might offend that *amour-propre*, but not one of them thought it worth while to mention that the Allied countries might likewise have their *amour-propre*.

14. The upshot of yesterday's meeting was that I informed my colleagues that I must telegraph to your Lordship again, and that I hoped that your instructions would reach General Harington in time for the meeting with the Nationalist generals at 3 P.M. to-day.

15. Meanwhile an armistice convention which takes account of your most recent instructions as the result of the Paris meeting has been prepared and will be submitted to the Turks for signature. If they do not agree to sign it, it will be clear to the world that they are intractable and under the influence of their extremists.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 11137/27/44] No. 210.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 883.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary as published in the "Stamboul" newspaper of the 6th October, of a speech delivered by Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the Angora Grand National Assembly on the 4th October.*

* Not printed.

2. This is Mustapha Kemal's first address to the Assembly since his victory over the Greeks. Having regard to the circumstances, his language as to the possibility of achieving the remainder of the national programme without military operations may be regarded as moderate. He used similar language in a message to the people of Constantinople, sent through the editor of the "Wakt," who saw him in Smyrna before he left that place.

3. The message in the "Wakt" runs as follows: "Many, many salutations from me to Constantinople. We shall shortly embrace one another. Peace according to our national desire will be obtained. Its realisation is near. It is not necessary to employ the army in everything. Henceforth the whole world is with us. Humanity is with us. The intelligent elements of the British people are on our side. Even some Western statesmen, who followed the wrong path, have finally seen the truth and they have come over to us."

4. It is noteworthy that neither in the portion of his speech relative to the Straits nor in any other part of it does Mustapha Kemal make any reference to Russia.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 11138/27/44] No. 211.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 884.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 10, 1922.*

I CALLED on the Grand Vizier yesterday to speak to his Highness about the arrests of Ottoman Greeks and Armenians which have been taking place in the villages on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus and even in Constantinople itself. I handed his Highness a list of the Ottoman Greeks who had already been arrested at Beicos and at Pasha Baghtche. I said that whilst we were in military occupation of Constantinople we could not tolerate proceedings which savoured of the persecution of minorities, and I called on his Highness to take steps to put a stop to these arbitrary acts. I pointed out that there was undoubtedly a connection between these arrests and the infiltration of Kemalist troops into the Ismid zone. The Grand Vizier promised to look into the matter at once.

2. I found his Highness preoccupied with the situation at Mudania. He appeared to expect that the armistice convention would be signed that afternoon. I told his Highness that if it were not signed it would be entirely the fault of the Nationalists, as the Allied Governments had gone to the extreme limit of concession. The Grand Vizier agreed that it would be indeed deplorable if, by their obstinacy on one or two points, the Nationalists risked a conflict with Great Britain, which would necessarily result in the loss of all that the Nationalists could have secured by peaceful means.

3. The Grand Vizier seemed to think that the Sultan would see matters through to the end. His Highness knew that the Nationalists accused the Sultan of having followed a policy dictated by England, but there was not a word of truth in this, and the Sultan had throughout been guided by consideration for the welfare of his country.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 11152/27/44] No. 212.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 279.)
My Lord, *Sofia, October 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Daskalof, Acting Minister of the Council, made a long statement in the Sobranje on the 5th instant regarding the attitude to be observed by the Bulgarian Government in the present crisis in the Near East, the occasion being provided by an interpellation from a member of the Agrarian Party, who enquired—

1. The point of view of the Bulgarian Government with regard to events in Eastern and Western Thrace;
2. Whether there was any truth in rumours that Serbian or Russian Soviet troops would be allowed to pass through Bulgarian territory; and
3. Whether it was true that Bulgaria intended to mobilise.

Dealing first with the second and third parts of the interpellation, M. Daskalof replied that he had no information indicating that either Serbia or Russia had any such intention and that he did not believe the report. Should, however, such a violation of her sovereignty occur, Bulgaria would protest before the whole world and would resist it with all the means at her disposal. She was determined to fulfil all her obligations under the Treaty of Neuilly and would devote all her efforts to maintaining her policy of complete neutrality in any armed conflict which might arise. He must therefore give the most categorical denial to the report that the Government intended to mobilise their forces, which he described as the malevolent invention of political opponents with the object of discrediting the Government.

Turning to the question of Thrace, M. Daskalof stated that in ceding this territory to the Great Powers under article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly Bulgaria had every reason to believe that it would be dealt with in accordance with the principle of self-determination. The cession of the province to Greece was a bitter disillusionment to Bulgaria, but, faithful to her undertaking to abide by the treaty, she had contented herself with a vigorous protest against the decision. In contrast with this attitude Turkey had chosen the path of armed resistance to the Treaty of Sèvres, with the result that the Thracian question had now been reopened. Bulgaria would acquiesce in whatever decision was come to, but he felt it his duty to declare that a solution imposed by force rather than in conformity with the wishes of the inhabitants would inevitably give rise to future troubles in the Balkans. From his allusion to article 48 of the treaty it would appear that the above observations had reference to Western Thrace. He then proceeded to enlarge at length on familiar lines on the advantages of M. Stambouliisky's proposal for an autonomous province comprising the whole of Thrace, making no reference to the fact that, by the decision of the Allies as already communicated to Kemal Pasha, that solution had been definitely ruled out.

Speaking of the coming conference, he said that the Bulgarian Government considered it their duty and right to ask permission to participate, in view of the fact that Bulgaria was vitally interested in the problem to be discussed. He specially mentioned the question of the Thracian refugees as one which Bulgaria proposed to raise if admitted to the conference. Not only was she burdened with the maintenance of the many thousands already in the country, but she was now faced with a fresh influx of refugees of all nationalities—Turks flying from Greek persecution and Greeks from fear of Turkish reprisals in Thrace, and Greeks, Armenians and Jews escaping from Asia Minor, and even from Constantinople.

In the course of his statement, which was very long and involved and contained numerous repetitions, but the main points of which I have summarised above, M. Daskalof also dwelt on the dangerous and defenceless situation in which Bulgaria would be placed in the event of the outbreak of hostilities in Thrace.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

No. 213.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 585.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 16, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 570.

You will have seen from my telegram No. 564 that Christian population of Karagatch is estimated at 20,000, and that of Demotika the same. I entirely agree with Sir H. Rumbold that Greece should not be called upon to retire further than Maritza. It will be hard enough to digest all the refugees without further loss of territory.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 214.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 573.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 16, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 492.

I have discussed question of exchange of prisoners of war with my French, Italian and United States colleagues, General Harington and Nansen. Owing to ambiguous attitude of Kemalist representatives at Mudania Conference when question was raised by Allied generals, we consider Allied Powers should not interfere at present, and that initiative should come from League of Nations. We unanimously agreed that Dr. Nansen should propose to Angora and Greek Governments appointment of British delegate at Greco-Turkish Commission to examine problem with League of Nations representatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. Dr. Nansen consented to do so. Proposal will, however, only be made after Dr. Nansen has had a personal interview with Mustapha Kemal. He hopes to see the latter in a few days.

(Repented to Athens, No. 197.)

No. 215.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 574.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 16, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

We also discussed question raised in your telegram No. 493. General Harington has already despatched Allied military missions to Eastern Thrace to ensure order and allay fears of population. We agreed that League of Nations was most appropriate body to act as liaison between Greek and Turkish authorities in order to ensure a gradual and orderly evacuation and to examine the whole question of transfer of population. Representatives of League of Nations could be attached at once to Allied military missions and carry on work after their departure. Rôle of Allied High Commissioners would be limited as far as possible to using their good offices when necessary. Dr. Nansen has telegraphed to Sir E. Drummond requesting permission to institute at once an organisation on above lines. Experts are available in minorities section of League of Nations. We assured Dr. Nansen of our support. Funds will be required for setting up and running of this organisation, which will be called upon to deal with a big problem.

Full report follows by despatch.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 198.)

No. 216

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 575.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 16, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 496.

Requisition of Aidin Railway was reported to me on 10th October. On same day vice-consul at Smyrna reported that he had seen Vali. Vice-consul considered it inadvisable to make strong protest, but asked Vali whether measure might be regarded as taken only in view of anticipated military needs, and one which would be cancelled should such need not arise. Vali concurred and assured vice-consul that there was no threat against rights of individuals or companies.

Next day General de Candolle arrived here. He had already, on 7th October, addressed temperate remonstrance direct to Angora Minister of Public Works. At

end of this he reserved in general terms all rights of company under their conventions.

On 12th October I sent Mr. Ryan to Hamid with de Candolle. Instructions to former were not to make formal protest but to urge desirability of return of railway to company. De Candolle supplied details. Hamid expressed personal sympathy. He referred to some scheme for nationalising railways, but agreed that this would have to be subject to eventual arrangement with company. He promised to telegraph to Angora on lines of my representations and has done so. Answer is awaited.

At present moment I think protest on Parker's lines would produce no effect, and might prejudice chance of railway being returned amicably. De Candolle agrees. I have arranged further conference with him on 17th October. He will see Hamid in the interval, and I shall then be better able to judge desirability of formal protest in name of His Majesty's Government. In any case, I would omit reference [? to] armistice of 1918, to responsibility of Kemalists for damage during Greek retreat, and to London money market. I can use latter argument verbally. Kemalists utterly disregard armistice of 1918, and question of respective liability of Greeks and Kemalists is too controversial to raise prematurely.

No. 217.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 576.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 16, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 488.

I caused Hamid to be asked on 12th October whether employees of Aidin Railway and Eastern Telegraph Company and British subjects generally could return to Smyrna with security for personal liberty and liberty to carry on business. He promised to telegraph to Angora. I asked for early reply on explicit terms.

I have consulted vice-consul at Smyrna independently. He replies that Vali states that all British subjects temporarily absent are free to return to take possession of property and recommence business. Vice-consul favours return of British subjects having property without their families. He suggests that as Aidin Railway is requisitioned and Eastern Telegraph Company's office burnt, presence of managers without staffs is sufficient for the moment.

I will press Hamid for definite reply. Meanwhile, I think vice-consul's report justifies advice to British subjects having property or urgent business to return provided they are prepared to take moderate risk.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 199; repeated to Malta, No. 10.)

No. 218.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 577.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 16, 1922.*

ANGORA Government has nominated Governor for Gallipoli and is replacing [? Central Government] officials in Chanak zone by their own functionaries.

If this is permitted, next step will be to extend this procedure to Constantinople. I do not think that Angora Government should be allowed to interfere with civil administration of zones in Allied occupation so long as that occupation lasts and Constantinople Government continues to exist.

So far as Gallipoli is concerned, matter is complicated by fact that Angora Government, with some appearance of logic which it may be difficult to withstand, will urge that, Greeks having till now had Civil Governor there, Mudania Agreement justifies his replacement by Kemalist Governor and officials.

But Gallipoli, though it is administratively part of Eastern Thrace, is implicitly treated in that agreement as being on different footing from rest of the province, since

Allied troops, which are to retire from rest of Eastern Thrace after forty-five days, will certainly not withdraw from Gallipoli.

I propose, therefore, if you agree, to inform Nationalist agent here that no such interference will be tolerated, except as result of direct agreement between Angora and Constantinople Governments.

I would suggest that French and Italian Governments be approached with view to instructions being sent to representatives here to join with me in making this representation.

No. 219.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 520.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 14, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 376.

M. Poincaré replied on 5th October to Soviet Government's protest by a telegram stating that the Allied Governments had no knowledge of the measures alleged to have been taken in regard to passage of merchant-vessels through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—measures which in any case had never been applied.

[E 11262/27/44] No. 220.

M. Poincaré to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

Mon cher Ministre. *Paris, le 14 octobre 1922.*

LORD HARDINGE m'a donné connaissance des instructions qu'il a reçues de vous au sujet de la prochaine conférence qui aura à traiter les affaires d'Orient. Pour gagner du temps, d'accord avec Lord Hardinge, je me permets de vous répondre directement; ma réponse sera une suite aux conversations si libres et si confiantes que nous avons poursuivies, à trois reprises, à Paris, sur la question d'Orient.

2. En ce qui concerne, d'abord, la date de la réunion, je pense, comme vous, qu'il est très désirable que la conférence ait lieu le plus tôt possible; on pourrait, comme vous le suggérez, se réunir le lundi 6 novembre. Il serait même préférable, à mon avis, de commencer dès le 30 octobre ou le 1er novembre. Je vermis en tout cas de grands inconvénients à ce que l'ouverture de la conférence fût remise à une date plus éloignée.

3. Quant au lieu de la réunion, je reconnais la force des objections que Sir Horace Rumbold et vous, vous faites au choix de Smyrne. Je reconnais également les avantages qu'offrirait le choix de Lausanne et je n'ai pas d'objection à ce choix. Mais, comme je l'ai indiqué à Lord Hardinge, M. Franklin-Bouillon m'a télégraphié qu'il y avait des raisons décisives pour accepter Smyrne. Il doit arriver à Paris demain; il me renseignera à ce sujet et je vous tiendrai immédiatement au courant.

4. En ce qui concerne, enfin, la conférence elle-même, il a été, comme vous le dites, convenu à Paris que les États invités seraient les grandes Puissances, la Roumanie, la Yougoslavie, la Turquie et la Grèce, et que la Bulgarie serait seulement entendue.

5. J'estime, comme vous, qu'il y a lieu de s'en tenir à cet accord. L'objet de la conférence est de préparer le texte d'un traité entre la Turquie et les Puissances qui sont encore en guerre avec elle. Il y aura lieu ensuite de discuter séparément, comme vous l'indiquez, la question de la liberté des Détroits.

6. J'estime, comme vous, que la Société des Nations ne devrait pas être appelée, dès le début, à traiter ce problème avec les Puissances. Le rôle de la Société des Nations serait, à mon avis, comme au vôtre, de pourvoir à l'exécution de l'arrangement auquel on serait arrivé, mais cet arrangement même doit être le résultat d'une discussion préalable entre les Puissances. Toutefois, je ne pense pas qu'il ne doive y avoir qu'une seule conférence qui siégerait à Lausanne et dans laquelle serait, comme vous le suggérez, abordée la question des Détroits dès que les autres sujets auraient été traités.

7. Mieux vaudrait, selon moi, faire savoir à Angora que la question des Détroits ne sera pas discutée au sein de la Conférence de la Paix et que, par conséquent, la question de la participation russe à la Conférence de la Paix ne se pose pas en ce moment. Je préférerais que, suivant la suggestion que vous aviez faite à Paris, la conférence n'examinât que les questions qui se rapportent à la paix proprement dite et qu'on réservât pour une autre réunion l'examen de la question des Détroits. Cette réunion pourrait se tenir dans une autre ville avant la signature définitive de la paix, à Genève, par exemple, si la conférence se tenait à Lausanne. Une telle procédure serait d'autant plus justifiée qu'en 1856, lors de la signature du Traité de Paris, la question des Détroits a fait l'objet d'une convention particulière; cette convention serait signée le même jour que le Traité de Paix, mais elle pourrait, à la différence de celui-ci, être élaborée par toutes les Puissances intéressées à la liberté des Détroits; en ce qui concerne les Gouvernements de fait, il serait possible, après les avoir entendus, de réserver tous les droits des pays qu'ils représentent; le protocole de signature resterait ouvert, et ces pays seraient admis à signer aussitôt qu'il y aurait chez eux des Gouvernements reconnus *de jure* par les Puissances. Une clause particulière indiquerait que la convention pourrait entrer en vigueur dès qu'un certain nombre de signatures seraient obtenues.

8. Je ne vois pas d'objections d'ailleurs à ce que, comme à Gênes, la Société des Nations soit invitée à envoyer à Lausanne des délégués qui pourraient, au fur et à mesure des travaux de la conférence, préparer des propositions en vue de l'exécution du traité.

9. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous sur l'intérêt de ne pas laisser dégénérer la Conférence de la Paix en une réunion publique, où les orateurs se livreraient à de longs discours. Quant à la présidence, elle pourrait être confiée, d'un commun accord, à un personnage suisse tel, par exemple, que M. Ador.

10. Si ces bases étaient acceptées par le Gouvernement britannique et par le Gouvernement italien, il conviendrait de répondre au Gouvernement d'Angora et de notifier la décision des Puissances au Gouvernement de Constantinople et au Gouvernement de fait de Moscou.

11. Quant à l'Ukraine et à la Géorgie soviétiques, elles pourraient être entendues à la conférence, comme le Gouvernement de fait de Moscou, mais il faudrait également entendre le Gouvernement géorgien, qui a été reconnu *de jure* par les Puissances.

12. Enfin, s'il était question que les dominions et l'Inde fussent représentés à la Conférence pour la Liberté des Détroits, la France demanderait que le Maroc et la Tunisie y fussent également représentés, dans les mêmes conditions, car ces deux pays protégés français, mais dont les flottes ont des pavillons spéciaux, ont exactement les mêmes titres que les dominions britanniques et l'Inde à y faire entendre leur voix.

13. Je n'ai pas d'objection à ce que chaque pays soit représenté à la Conférence de la Paix et à la Conférence des Détroits par deux délégués, à la seule condition que ces délégués soient des plénipotentiaires ayant pleins pouvoirs pour discuter et pour signer, conformément aux usages diplomatiques.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

[E 11262/27/44] No 221.

M. Poincaré to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

Mon cher Ministre, *Paris, le 16 octobre 1922.*

M. FRANKLIN-BOUILLON, revenu aujourd'hui à Paris, m'a expliqué que Moustapha Kémal désirerait pouvoir assister lui-même à la conférence et rester en contact avec l'Assemblée d'Angora, de façon à éviter les lenteurs et les retards postaux. C'est la raison pour laquelle Moustapha Kémal désire le choix de Smyrne. J'ai dit à M. Franklin-Bouillon les objections que nous avions contre cette désignation et il s'est rendu à mes raisons. Il craint seulement que Lausanne ne paraisse trop éloignée aux Turcs. Nous pouvons cependant formuler ensemble cette proposition et nous verrons comment elle sera accueillie. Il serait bon, d'autre part, que la date fût aussi rapprochée que possible.

Croyez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

No. 222.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 588.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 17, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 581.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me this morning if I could do nothing to get Allies to interpret Mudania Agreement in such a sense as would allow some delay between date for departure of Greek military forces and arrival of Turkish gendarmerie. This was only hope of saving a catastrophe.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11230/27/44] No. 223.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(Nos. 350 and 351.)
(Telegraphic.) *Ramleh, October 17, 1922.*

(R.) YOUR telegrams Nos. 256 and 257.

I strongly urge that I be authorised somewhat to modify tenor of reply to Sarwat Pasha, and to inform him that His Majesty's Government would welcome presence at meeting place of conference of a representative of Egyptian Government, and that while eventuality of Egypt being invited to sign treaty appears to be excluded by considerations mentioned in your telegram No. 257, His Majesty's Government will support her doing so should those considerations cease to be operative. (End of R.)

I fully appreciate desirability not unduly to widen basis of discussion at conference, but I must impress upon your Lordship extreme inadvisability of appearing once again to seek to exclude Egypt from an international conference at which its affairs are to be discussed. Your Lordship will remember effects of refusal to allow Egypt to be heard at Versailles were unfortunate and far-reaching, and prospect of party friendly to ourselves would be gravely affected by any decision which would be interpreted as casting doubt on genuineness of Egyptian independence. The form in which present request is made by Sarwat indicates precisely such an attitude as we should wish to encourage, and I am persuaded that it would be politic to meet him in most cordial fashion.

I am strongly of opinion that, in replying to Sarwat Pasha, expectation that it would be the rôle of Egyptian delegate to be consulted by British representatives should not be emphasised. The less said on that subject, the more likely is it that relations of confidence between the two delegations would arise and be maintained by logic of facts.

In the event of Egypt not being signatory to treaty, your Lordship may think suggestion deserving of consideration that Egyptians should be given opportunity of signing a protocol of adhesion to those clauses of treaty which relate specifically to Egypt.

Question of representation of Egypt at conference is exciting much interest in all parties, and I am informing Prime Minister that principle of presence of an Egyptian delegation at seat of conference is agreed to, but that precise form of Egyptian participation is being considered.

With reference to your Lordship's suggestion that I should inform Sarwat Pasha of modifications in Treaty of Sèvres, for which His Majesty's Government would press, I am submitting observations on certain points in projected modifications in my immediately following telegram.

[E 11249/10102/44] No. 224.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 352.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Ramleh, October 17, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 258: Articles dealing with Egyptian nationality.

I venture again to urge upon your Lordship propriety of omitting these articles from treaty, and to refer in this connection to my despatch No. 457 and enclosed memorandum by Sir M. Amos, particularly paragraphs 1, 4 and 5.

I venture to emphasise consideration that Egypt cannot be considered as having derived character of a separate State or her independence or consequently new nationality of her inhabitants from Turkey. Furthermore, treaty contains no provisions purporting to regulate nationality of Syrians, Mesopotamians or Palestinians.

I have no reason to suppose that provisions of nationality clauses would be particularly difficult for Egyptians to accept in principle, though they are open to objection that they deal somewhat differently and much less elaborately than does existing Egyptian draft law with definition of original Egyptian nationals, but matter of form is, I am convinced, of considerable importance. These articles, if retained, call imperatively, both on political and legal grounds, for Egyptian signature. In absence of that signature Parliament may be expected to consider with justice that it has a perfectly free hand in the matter, and I am advised that there can be no ground for expectation that any Egyptian court, mixed or native, would support treaty against Act.

[E 11231/27/44] No. 225.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 353. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Ramleh, October 17, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 350.

Sarwat's request mentioned in my telegram No. 346 is in the form of request that His Majesty's Government should bring before interested Powers her desire to be represented at Peace Conference, and it is desirable that refusal to admit her as a signatory should not have any appearance of emanating from His Majesty's Government, who would, on the other hand, have secured admission of a consultative Egyptian delegate to seat on conference.

It is desirable, on the other hand, that acceptance, if acceptance proves possible, should have been obtained through good offices of His Majesty's Government.

It is already being stated in press telegrams from Rome that Italy and Turkey are both favourable to Egypt's participation, and it is rumoured that France is also favourable.

I take it that relation which His Majesty's Government would think most desirable to establish with Egyptian Government is that of *de facto* protection based on general community of interests. The form of Prime Minister's request is already a considerable step in this direction. This tendency will be best fortified if formal subordination of Egyptians to our rulings, whether as to access to conference or as to attitude when there, is not emphasised. Some independence of attitude in theory and form is in conformity with facts and real sentiment of both parties, and collaboration of a kind agreeable to interests of His Majesty's Government will, it may be anticipated, be best secured by reliance upon relations created between the two Governments by long tradition of mutual confidence between individuals and immensely preponderating power and influence of His Majesty's Government, which will be apparent to Egyptians if they are, in form at least, left to stand on their own feet.

No. 226.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 582.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 17, 1922.*

FRENCH High Commissioner informs me that he telegraphed to Paris a few days ago recommending desirability of unity of command for Allied forces which are being sent into Eastern Thrace, and that he has received a reply concurring in proposal, and stating that it has been submitted to London and Rome together with suggestion that command should be vested in General Charpy.

While willing and anxious to make use of General Charpy's expert knowledge of Thrace, General Harington is entirely opposed to any course which would in practice break up existing committee of generals here and place British troops which might be urgently required for defensive purposes under a separate command.

Italian High Commissioner and general are both equally opposed to French proposal, which may have been suggested to French High Commissioner by Hamid.

I do not think that anything should be agreed to which would take supervision of troops in Thrace out of General Harington's hands.

No. 227.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 584.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 17, 1922.*

RED Crescent has informed Dr. Nansen that it wishes to evacuate between 7,000 and 10,000 Turkish refugees from Constantinople to Smyrna and Sea of Marmora ports.

If His Majesty's Government are willing to allow British ships to be used for this purpose, Captain Unwin can make necessary arrangements.

Dr. Nansen considers from League point of view it would be politic as indicating League's humanitarian attitude in readiness to help Turkish refugees as much as Greek. Effect on Nationalists would be good.

There are, however, Turkish ships available, so that if British ships are employed League or Red Crescent should pay for voyages.

I should be grateful for early reply, as British ships will only be available for a few days.

[E 11242/27/44] No. 228.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 1290.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 17, 1922.*

THE Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and I explained to him at length the proposals with regard to the Peace Conference which were being dealt with in private correspondence between M. Poincaré and myself. I acquainted the Ambassador with the points upon which we were agreed, and indicated those which I was still pressing upon M. Poincaré's acceptance. I hoped that he would telegraph fully upon all these to his Government, and that, whether here or in Paris, a common agreement might speedily be arrived at.

At the close of this conversation, he gave me his personal opinion upon the Freedom of the Straits as viewed from the Italian standpoint. It was not to the interest either of Italy or, he thought, of Great Britain, to make Russia a Mediterranean Power. Serbia would, in that case, become the sentinel of Pan-Slavism, and, if Russia and Serbia joined hands in the Mediterranean, a grave situation would arise for Italy.

Regarding the present alliance between Turkey and Soviet Russia as unnatural and destined to come to an early end, he supposed that Great Britain would desire to re-enter into close relations with Turkey, and to resume her policy of the last century.

I made no comment upon these observations, nor was it clear whether Signor de Martino was expressing his personal opinions or reflecting those of his Government.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11289/27/44] No. 229.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Veniselos.

Dear M. Veniselos, *Foreign Office, October 17, 1922.*

I HAVE received, and read with all attention and sympathy, your letter to me of the 13th instant regarding the provision made in the Convention of Mudania for the evacuation of the Greek civil population from Eastern Thrace.

2. I have no need to assure you that during my recent conversations with M. Poincaré in Paris, I used my utmost endeavours to secure for these Greek inhabitants of Eastern Thrace the best terms that were possible, and that in doing so I was guided by the proposals which you had yourself made. A certain latitude had, however, necessarily to be left to the generals on the spot, who, in the face of grave danger, were constrained above all things to maintain Allied unity with a view to conclude without further delay a convention with the Turks. As a matter of fact, we were unaware of the terms that had been agreed upon and signed until two days after the convention had been concluded.

3. Your Excellency may rest assured that the problem of the safe withdrawal of the Greek population has never been absent from our minds, and that you may rely upon us to spare no effort to alleviate the sufferings, and secure the orderly disposal, of these unhappy people. I am glad to say that our latest telegrams on the subject are distinctly reassuring.

Believe me, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11251/10524/44] No. 230.

Dr. Nansen to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 18.)

My dear Lord Curzon, *Constantinople, October 11, 1922.*

I SEND you herewith a short note on a matter which I feel to be of very real importance, which, as High Commissioner of the League of Nations, I have taken the liberty of circulating to the High Commissioners in Constantinople of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States of America and Japan.

May I beg your earnest consideration for the proposal which is made in this note, and which I feel to have a real connection with the reconstruction and pacification of the Near East?

Believe me, &c.
FRIDTJOF NANSEN.

Enclosure in No. 230.

Dr. Nansen to High Commissioners of Allied Powers.

THERE is a matter connected with the arrangements now being concluded by the Principal Allied Powers and the National Government of Angora to which I feel it my duty, as High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees, to draw attention.

During the evacuation of the refugees from Smyrna and the other parts of Asia Minor from which they came, the Turkish authorities retained all male refugees between the ages of 17 and 45, although they had not been enrolled in the Greek army. According to information which has been received, they have drafted these male refugees into military labour battalions.

2. It is evident that this action on the part of the Turkish authorities has very greatly increased the difficulty of the refugee problem for Greece. The refugees now scattered in Thrace, Macedonia and Old Greece consist in an overwhelming majority of women and children. Without their male supporters these refugees will find it excessively difficult, either immediately or in the future, to do anything to become independent of charitable relief. Moreover, the only possible ultimate solution of the refugee problem, which consists in the settlement of these refugees—who are almost all peasants—on the vacant lands of Greece, will be rendered impossible until the males are returned to their families.

It is because the problems which I have to investigate are thus made more difficult by the retention of male refugees that I have thought it right to address this note to the High Commissioners of the Allied Powers.

3. It may be that the action of the Turkish authorities was justified by military necessity at a moment when the war was continuing and there was no certainty that it would come to a rapid conclusion.

It is, however, no longer justified by military necessity when an armistice has been made and hostilities have ceased, and I therefore venture to propose that the High Commissioners of the Principal Allied Powers should endeavour either to insert provision in the terms of the armistice itself, or, if that is not possible, to secure agreement, as soon as possible after the armistice is made, under which the Turkish authorities shall return the male refugees with the least possible delay.

4. It would no doubt be unreasonable to demand the immediate return of the refugees of ages between 20 and 32—the classes which are enrolled in the Greek army; the Turkish authorities might reasonably claim the right to retain these refugees until peace has been made.

There seems no reason whatever why refugees of other ages should not be returned as soon as hostilities cease.

5. If the Turkish authorities maintained that they were unable to return these refugees before peace is definitely made on the ground that they might be enrolled by the Greek Government in the Greek army and subsequently be used if the peace negotiations broke down, it would be possible to ask the Government to give the League of Nations a guarantee that they would not be used in any military capacity whatever. If such a guarantee were given through the League of Nations, and if the High Commissioner of the League took responsibility for its observance, the Turkish authorities could have full confidence that it would not be abused. A few months ago the High Commissioner of the League secured an identical guarantee from the Turkish Government itself in respect of the Turkish prisoners on board the vessel "Heimamaru" who were retained by the Greek Government. The High Commissioner of the League took responsibility that the guarantee would be observed, and on the strength of this guarantee the Greek Government agreed to the immediate repatriation to their homes in Anatolia of 600 Turkish prisoners of military age before the conclusion of hostilities.

It might therefore reasonably be argued that the Turkish authorities should accept similar guarantees after hostilities have ceased.

October 10, 1922.

[E 11232/10102/44] No. 231.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 18.)

(No. 354.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Ramleh, October* 17, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 259.

I will approach Egyptian Government in accordance with your instructions.

Should it become necessary to adopt course proposed in last paragraph I would suggest action outlined in your telegram No. 95 should be modified to extent describing Great Britain's position as a trusteeship for bondholders according to Sir M. Amos's suggestion in second paragraph of enclosure in my despatch No. 457. This would diminish political objections, while not depriving Great Britain of right to enforce Egypt's fulfilment of her liabilities.

No. 232.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 18.)

(No. 585.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 18, 1922.

ALLIED High Commissioners sent for Nationalist representative here yesterday and informed him that Nationalist gendarmerie for Thrace could not be permitted to pass through Constantinople.

Warning was necessary as Turkish press had announced their imminent arrival and street decorations (triumphal arches) were already being prepared for their passage.

Hamid endeavoured to make out that passage through Constantinople had been admitted in course of discussions at Mudania. This was, however, denied by Allied generals, who were present at meeting.

Refusal to allow passage was based on terms of Mudania Convention in regard to respect for zones of Allied occupation, but presence of Nationalist gendarmerie here is clearly undesirable in the interest of law and order and tranquillity of non-Moslem population, as well as in deference to Constantinople Government.

I told Hamid that we intended strictly to observe our part of Mudania bargain, and that we expected Angora Government to follow suit.

No. 233.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 18.)

(No. 586.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 18, 1922.

ALLIED admirals have raised question of continued presence in Sea of Marmora of Greek destroyers and armed merchant vessels, and have suggested representations to Greek Government with a view to their withdrawal by date on which Greek troops retire behind Maritza.

I have mentioned matter to Greek High Commissioner, who is referring to his Government. At the same time he drew attention to seizure in Black Sea of Greek steamship "Ouranca" by Turkish gunboat on [? 8th October] and its internment at Heraclea. Greek High Commissioner remarked that Greek men-of-war having been withdrawn from these waters at instance of Allied and practically British authorities latter could not divest themselves of responsibility.

Contention is not unreasonable, and I propose to draw my Allied colleagues' attention to matter, though I fear that Angora Government will refuse to surrender the vessel on the grounds that she was seized prior to signature of Mudania Convention and adherence thereto of Greek Government.

(Repeated to Athens.)

[E 11232/10102/44] No. 234.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (*Cairo*).

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 350 to 354 of the 17th instant *re* Egypt and Turkish Peace Conference.

You should defer taking any action pending receipt of further instructions.

No. 235.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Constantinople*).

(No. 501.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 577 of 16th October: Civil administration of Constantinople and neutral zones.

I agree to representation suggested in penultimate paragraph, if General Harington concurs, but would prefer not to raise question at Paris and Rome. Your French and Italian colleagues will doubtless ask their Governments for instructions if not prepared to join in communication at once.

No. 236.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 503.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 564 of 14th October: Possible reduction of British forces. I am quite in accordance with your views.

[E 11262/27/44] No. 237.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Poincaré.

Foreign Office, October 18, 1922.

My dear President,

I AM much obliged for the full and frank statement of your views regarding the Near East Conference contained in your letters of the 14th and 16th October, and I am happy to find that we are already agreed on a large number of points.

I am glad that you are willing to accept Lausanne as the seat of the conference. I share your view as to expediting the date of meeting, but there is now barely more than a fortnight before the 1st November, and I think it would be physically impossible for the various delegations to make their arrangements as regards hotel accommodation, &c., by that date, even if we had already fixed on the seat of the conference. Moreover, the uncertainty of the internal political situation both here and in Italy calls for consideration. From this point of view, a too early assembling of the conference might meet with practical obstacles, and it would be unfortunate if, when the conference assembled, a full representation of all the principal countries were not at once forthcoming. To my mind, the important point is to announce a date as soon as possible for the opening of the conference to show the Angora Government that we are as anxious as they for an early meeting. It is comparatively immaterial whether, for physical reasons, the date be fixed at the beginning or the middle of November, and I therefore propose the 13th November as the most convenient and, in all probability, the earliest practicable date in all the circumstances.

We are happily in agreement regarding the rôle of the League of Nations in dealing with the Straits question in its final stage. As regards the conference itself, however, I still prefer my plan that there should be a single conference meeting at Lausanne which should deal on a specified date at a later stage in its sittings with the Straits, admitting other Powers, such as Russia and the Black Sea States, to the discussions, rather than your proposal for two distinct and concurrent conferences in different places, one for the Peace Treaty and the other for the Straits. The latter question cannot in reality be regarded or treated as distinct from the Peace Treaty, of which it forms an inseparable part. We shall almost certainly find it necessary to include in the treaty some general definition of the freedom of the Straits, even if the details of its application be elaborated in a separate instrument and handed for execution to the League of Nations. Further, the Straits question is at once so complex and so important that it is neither desirable nor indeed possible to have it examined and treated by plenipotentiaries and experts other than those who are dealing with the main treaty. These objections make it, to my mind, impossible to hold two different conferences in two different places, and it will be found that the analogy of the Paris Conference of 1856, which you quote, strongly favours my contention. That conference drew up firstly a Peace Treaty to end the Crimean war, signed by Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, on the 30th March (ratifications exchanged 27th April), and secondly, a Straits convention (which, by article 10 of the Peace Treaty, was to be regarded as annexed to the treaty), signed by precisely the same Powers and the same plenipotentiaries on the same day and at the same place, with ratifications exchanged on the same day as the Peace Treaty.

As regards the procedure for admitting the *de facto* Governments to the discussions on the Straits question, I am disposed to accept your Excellency's ingenious suggestion, which seems to be well designed to give legitimate satisfaction to Russia, while avoiding the necessity of any premature or indirect *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government.

To sum up, while accepting your Excellency's suggestions for a separate Straits instrument, annexed, however, to the Peace Treaty, and for the procedure as regards the admission of Russia, I trust that you will now see your way to accept my proposal for the treatment of the Straits question by the main conference at Lausanne.

Touching my suggestion to invoke the assistance of the League of Nations' secretariat, your Excellency uses the words "League of Nations' delegates." I had in

mind only the loan of the assistance of a technical staff of translators, interpreters and typists from Geneva. In so far as we have to consult the League as regards the Straits and minorities in the course of our discussions, I would prefer to employ the regular procedure of a reference to the Council of the League, if necessary summoned to an *ad hoc* meeting.

I have carefully considered your Excellency's suggestion as to a Swiss chairman. M. Ador, himself, has a reputation for tact and impartiality which are universally recognised. His presidency might further promote a peaceful and unacrimonious atmosphere and there would be advantages in thus invoking indirectly the assistance of the Swiss Government for the organisation of the conference, arranging telegraphic facilities and perhaps the requisition of hotel accommodation, &c. On the other hand, I am rather apprehensive as to the dangers of creating so startling a precedent whereby the representative of a neutral, and a small, Power would be asked to preside over a conference between belligerents where there has been no question of a reference to the good offices or arbitration of a third Power. Again, it would in practice be very difficult for the chairman to confine himself to mere formalities, such as deciding when and in what order delegates should speak. Almost inevitably he would be called upon to intervene in controversies between the belligerents, and in questions with which he would *ipso facto* not be *au courant*. On the whole, therefore, I would prefer to confine our invitation to M. Ador or to any other distinguished Swiss, such as the President of the Republic, to the formal opening of the conference, and therefore to attendance only at the first meeting. After that, I would propose to follow my suggestion for a presidency rotating according to the subjects discussed.

On a point of detail, I am not clear as to your argument regarding the rights of the *de jure* Government of Georgia. In my view, the principal Allies recognised the *de jure* independence of Georgia and not the *de jure* existence of certain specified persons composing one particular Georgian Government. At present, His Majesty's Government do not recognise either *de jure* or *de facto* the present Georgian Soviet Government but if Georgia were admitted to the discussion on the Straits, His Majesty's Government would have to regard the present Soviet Government of Georgia as the *de facto* Government for the purposes of admission to that discussion.

I now come to a more important question, that of the status of the Dominions and India in relation to the forthcoming conference. Your Excellency cannot but be aware that this question was examined and settled once and for all at the conference in Paris in 1919. M. Clemenceau readily admitted on that occasion that the independent contribution of the Dominions and India in waging the war, and particularly the war in the Near East, fully entitled them to participation in the conference. Their representatives therefore had seats on the various sub-commissions of the conference. They signed the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, including the Treaty of Sèvres. They became independent members of the League of Nations. I am not aware that any such independent status has been claimed or recognised for Tunis and Morocco, which are protectorates of France, and I regret, therefore, that I cannot admit their right to be accorded the same status as the Dominions and India. Meanwhile, however, and pending consultation with the latter Governments, I am not sure that they will desire to participate in the preparation of the new Peace Treaty or the Straits Convention although they will necessarily have to sign these instruments as they signed the Treaty of Sèvres.

As soon as I learn from your Excellency in reply to this letter that you are prepared definitely to accept the 13th November as the opening date of the conference and that you agree generally to the procedure which I now propose for dealing with the Straits question at Lausanne, and the question of the presidency, we can concert in the drafting of joint notes to be issued in the name of the three principal Allied Governments to Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey (both the Constantinople and the Angora Governments) as well as Russia (including the Ukraine and Georgia) and Bulgaria as also to the Swiss Government regarding the seat of the conference and its formal opening by a Swiss president. I will, in the meantime, prepare such draft notes which I shall be happy to submit to your Excellency for examination and approval in collaboration with Lord Hardinge and Count Sforza. I have to-day explained to the Italian Ambassador in London the main features of the above proposals, for communication to his Government so that they will be fully aware of the lines upon which we are proceeding.

Believe me, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11277/27/44] No. 238.

Mr. Codrington to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 396.) *Tangier, October 12, 1922.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an extract from the "Dépêche marocaine" of the 6th instant, containing the texts of telegrams which have been exchanged between the Sultan of Morocco, Marshal Lyautey and M. Poincaré on the subject of the victory of the Kemalist forces in Asia Minor and the success which is attending the Islamic policy of France.

2. Your Lordship will observe that the Sultan is allowed to express lively satisfaction at the course of events in the Near East, and to express his gratitude for the sympathy which is being shown by France towards the aspirations of the Turks. The exchange of telegrams in these terms is not surprising, for they are entirely consistent with the recent trend of French propaganda, to which your Lordship's attention was called in Mr. Robertson's despatch No. 45 of the 4th February, 1922.

3. That this propaganda has now a stronger anti-British bias than ever there is little doubt. Were French agents to confine themselves to expressing the sympathy of their Government for Islam there would be no cause for complaint, but there is every reason to fear that no pains are spared at the same time to depict Great Britain as the enemy of Islam and as the only obstacle to the realisation of certain Mahommedan aspirations, in which, however, the great majority of the Moors have hitherto taken not the slightest interest. The striking victory of the Turks in Asia Minor and the initial divergence between the points of view of His Majesty's Government and the French Government have naturally stimulated discussion of these subjects and presumably encouraged French agents to further efforts to diminish the regard in which Great Britain is held by the Moors. I may mention as exemplifying this statement that, apart from discussions with educated Moors of the upper classes, several Moors of the lower classes, such as servants, who ordinarily take no interest in such matters, have broached the subject with me within the last few days, and asked whether it is true that England is making war on the Turks, and told me that they were sorry to hear that Great Britain, whom they had always regarded as their friend, was pursuing a policy of hostility to Islam.

4. The wisdom of the French in adopting this attitude, apart from all other considerations, appears to me extremely doubtful from the point of view of their own interests in Morocco. The policy of Marshal Lyautey has all along been to bolster up by every conceivable means the dignity and authority, both temporal and spiritual, of the Sultan. The French, in directing the attention of the Moors to Turkey, run the risk of awaking a spirit of unrest which may in years to come prove in itself a danger to that very structure they have been at such pains to erect.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM CODRINGTON.

Enclosure in No. 238.

Extract from the "Dépêche marocaine" of October 6, 1922.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY THE SULTAN, MARSHAL LYAUTEY AND M. POINCARÉ.

His Majesty the Sultan to Marshal Lyautey.

(1.)

L'ANNONCE des événements qui se déroulent en Asie Mineure est accueillie par notre peuple avec un sentiment d'unanime satisfaction dont nous vous prions de faire part au Gouvernement de la République en votre qualité de Ministre des Affaires étrangères de notre Empire. Les entretiens que nous avons eus avec votre Excellence au sujet des affaires d'Orient nous ont permis de nous rendre compte des sympathies que les musulmans de ces régions ont trouvées auprès de la France. Nous sommes convaincus que leur succès resserrera les liens qui unissent la France et l'islam, dont tant d'intérêts sont communs, et c'est dans ce sentiment que le peuple marocain uni à la France protectrice, se réjouit avec notre Majesté de ces événements.

(2.)

Marshal Lyautey to His Majesty the Sultan.

Me trouvant en traitement à Vichy, je n'ai pu remettre moi-même le télégramme de votre Majesté, mais je le transmets à M. le Président du Conseil. Je suis certain que ce témoignage venant de si haut et émanant du Souverain le mieux qualifié pour exprimer les sentiments musulmans, ne pourra que satisfaire le Gouvernement de la République dans la voie qu'il a suivie avec tant de fermeté dans l'intérêt commun de la France et de l'islam et pour la paix du monde, et je m'honore grandement comme Ministre des Affaires étrangères de votre Majesté d'être l'intermédiaire de cette communication.

(3.)

M. Poincaré to His Majesty the Sultan.

M. le Maréchal Lyautey m'a communiqué le télégramme que votre Majesté lui a adressé au sujet des événements d'Asie Mineure

Je ne doutais pas que la politique que la France poursuit en Orient et qui est à la fois conforme à ses plus anciennes traditions et aux intérêts de la paix, n'obtint la complète approbation de votre Majesté. Je la prie d'agréer mes très vifs remerciements pour les sentiments qu'elle a bien voulu exprimer à ce sujet à M. le Maréchal Lyautey.

[E 11290/27/44] No. 239.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, October 17, 1922.*

I HAVE been instructed by my Government to draw your Lordship's kind attention to the following facts:—

As results from terms 5, 6, 8 and 10 of the protocol of armistice signed at Mudania, the evacuation of Eastern Thrace by the Greek troops will have to be carried out within a period of about fifteen days from midnight of the 14th–15th October, 1922, and Eastern Thrace will be occupied by Allied contingents. The various operations of the withdrawal of the Greek troops and of the transfer of the civil administration shall be carried out under the direction of inter-Allied missions. The Greek civil authorities, including gendarmerie, are to be withdrawn as soon as possible, and as they withdraw the civil powers will be handed over to the Allied authorities, who will transmit them (as far as possible on the same day) to the Turkish authorities.

The clauses contained in the aforesaid paragraphs, however, must be interpreted in connection with paragraph 10 of the protocol, stipulating that "the withdrawal of the inter-Allied missions and contingents will take place thirty days after the completion of evacuation of the Greek forces, &c., provided the Allied Governments are agreed that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of law and order and protection of the non-Turkish population."

The presence of the inter-Allied contingents and missions being the only guarantee of the maintenance of order, in the absence of which the evacuation of the Greek population of Thrace could not possibly be effected without the utmost confusion and panic on their part. I have the honour to request your Lordship, in the name of my Government, to kindly cause the British authorities in Thrace to be instructed that the withdrawal of the Allied contingents and missions should not take place before the Greek authorities have left, and that they should, if necessary, remain for the whole of the period of thirty days.

An interpretation in this sense has also been given to the aforesaid clauses of the protocol by the French Minister in Athens.

I have, &c.

D. CACLAMANOS.

[E 11275/27/44] No. 240.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 2424.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 17th October, respecting the meeting of experts to discuss economic and financial provisions of new treaty with Turkey.

Paris, October 18, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 240.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 17 octobre* 1922.

PAR sa lettre du 15 de ce mois, votre Excellence me fait savoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique invite le Gouvernement de la République à envoyer des délégués techniques à Londres, vers le 20 de ce mois, pour une discussion préliminaire et officieuse, avec des délégués techniques britanniques et italiens, des clauses économiques et financières qui devront figurer au Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

Au cours d'une telle discussion, dont les résultats ne lieraient pas nécessairement les Gouvernements, les experts alliés prépareraient utilement le terrain et envisageraient les objections probables des Turcs et l'accueil à y réserver.

Je me permets de faire observer à votre Excellence qu'au mois de mars dernier les experts alliés ont déjà procédé à l'étude des modifications qu'il conviendrait, au point de vue économique et financier, d'apporter au traité qui a été signé à Sèvres. C'est à Paris que cette étude a été faite. Comme il ne s'agit que d'une nouvelle mise au point, il serait naturel qu'il y fût procédé également à Paris.

Il y aurait, du reste, à mon avis, quelque inconvénient à ce que cette réunion d'experts, dont je suis d'accord avec votre Excellence pour reconnaître l'utilité, se tînt aujourd'hui à Londres. Le choix de cette ville, après le récent discours de Mr. Lloyd George, où, sur divers points, il a pris publiquement parti pour les Grecs contre les Turcs, pourrait être considéré comme une indication de sentiments préconçus chez les Alliés et causer une impression qui risquerait de gêner les négociations ultérieures.

Veuillez, &c.

R. POINCARE.

No. 241.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 591.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 19, 1922.

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 587.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called, and I have informed him of the contents of above-mentioned telegram. He lays stress on the fact that population expect Turkish gendarmerie the moment Greeks have left. I replied that I understood Mudania arrangement to mean that no Turkish gendarmerie could come in before expiration of fourteen days from midnight 14th–15th October. He said that if this was the case it was of first importance that populations should know it. At present they did not know how much time they had, and were leaving without any of their possessions. Minister for Foreign Affairs also asked if British consular officers could not be sent at once to Adrianople. An impartial authority was needed there very badly. I replied that I would represent matter to you, but that it would probably be more practical to send official from Constantinople than from Athens, and that I could not send one from here without sanction. I have long felt want of consul at Adrianople, and urged his appointment. It would be useful to have an impartial man to help Greek authorities and report what happens during evacuation, and I could send Mr. King temporarily. French and Italians have consuls at Adrianople.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11318/10102/44] No. 242.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 359.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Ramleh, October* 19, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 261.

In view of increasing interest and of fact that capital is being made out of delay by hostile press, I should be glad to receive early instructions.

No. 243.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 590. Private.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 19, 1922.

I HOPE Allied Governments will very soon be in a position to notify date and place of meeting of conference. Whilst I do not wish to strike a note of alarm I feel bound to point out that any considerable delay in meeting of conference may render situation here critical. The Turks are very impatient and very suspicious of our intentions. The situation has not been rendered easier from a military point of view by fixing of limits of neutral zone on Ismid Peninsula at a distance of 25 miles from Bosphorus. This means that Kemalist troops could get to Bosphorus in forty-eight hours if they wished to do so, and were not opposed. Delay in meeting of conference will subject Kemalist commanders and troops to a severe strain, and might even induce them to seek some excuse to denounce or break Mudania Agreement.

Preparations which have been made for welcome of Kemalist gendarmerie as well as for arrival of Refet Pasha to-day are not calculated to allay fears of Christian population. A semi-official communiqué has been issued to-day stating that Kemalist gendarmerie will not pass through Constantinople *en route* for Thrace.

There is a good deal of panic in this town already, and I am greatly concerned by consequences to Christian population if a hasty evacuation of Constantinople by British forces became necessary.

[E 11231/27/44] No. 244.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Ramleh).

(No. 263.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 350, 351, 352 and 353 of 17th October: Egypt and Peace Conference.

Question whether, and if so how, Egypt can be admitted to a participation in the conference strictly limited to matters dealt with in Egyptian section of Treaty of Sèvres is being sympathetically considered by His Majesty's Government, and you may so inform Sarwat Pasha.

No. 245.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 388.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 525 of 18th October: Preliminary meeting of financial and economic experts.

We had merely suggested such an informal discussion among the Allied financial and economic experts as a practical method of facilitating and expediting negotiations at Lausanne. We were not suggesting any informal preliminary conference.

In view, however, of the acrimonious spirit in which M. Poincaré has met their suggestion, His Majesty's Government prefer to drop it.

You should so inform M. Poincaré, pointing out that there was no meeting of experts before the March conference in Paris, only during the conference itself.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 388; repeated to Rome, No. 330.)

[E 11267/27/44] No. 246.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Foreign Office, October 19, 1922.

Sir,

THE French Ambassador called upon Sir E. Crowe on the 16th October to support the request of the French Government that the Allied contingents now being sent to Eastern Thrace should be placed under the single command of General Charpy.

2. Sir Eyre Crowe informed Count de Saint-Aulaire that from a recent telegram from General Harington it appeared that the question of the command had been settled locally in a manner satisfactory to all parties. The troops of the three nationalities had been allotted to different sectors of Eastern Thrace, the French occupying the sector north of the Maritza, with the principal towns of Kirk-Kilissé, Lule-Burgas and Adrianople. It appeared from this telegram that the question of a single command had been discussed between the generals, and that neither the Italians nor the French were willing to agree to place their contingents under one single authority. Each of the commanders was, however, reporting direct to General Harington. Sir E. Crowe expressed the hope that the French Government would accept the arrangement made, which was the best possible in the circumstances.

3. Count de Saint-Aulaire regretted that the French Government could not accept the arrangement, as they demanded, as a matter of right, supreme command for the French general. According to the existing arrangement, the inter-Allied command entrusted to General Harington was limited to Constantinople and the zones which were to have been domilitarised under the Treaty of Sèvres. The French Government had found it very difficult to accept even that arrangement, as they considered that the orignal plan was the correct one, under which the land command on the European side wasito be in the hands of France.

4. Sir Eyre Crowe enquired whether the French Government intended to renew the deplorable controversy which had arisen over this question in the past, and strongly deprecated raising such an issue at this moment when complete harmony had with such difficulty been established, and the Allied generals were understood to be working in complete accord in their mutual relations, and with personal regard and confidence.

5. The French Ambassador insisted that under his instructions he could only repeat that the French Government objected to their troops in Thrace being under any but the French supreme command. In fact, they claim that all Allied troops should, as a matter of course, fall under that command in Eastern Thrace. Sir E. Crowe said that he would lay this unexpected demand before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the War Office, but he thought it necessary to tell his Excellency at once that, quite apart from the regrettable impression which this proposal was certain to make, there appeared no prospect whatever of His Majesty's Government accepting it. Sir E. Crowe added that in no circumstances could His Majesty's Government agree to place their troops under a French general in these regions.

6. Count de Saint-Aulaire enquired what would then be the situation. Sir E. Crowe replied that he thought the French Government should withdraw what seemed to be a most unreasonable and somewhat unfriendly request. If they did not, and if they repudiated General Harington's authority over the troops, most of which were actually at present under his orders in the Constantinople area, the Allied contingents would presumably have to act independently of each other in Eastern Thrace. Count de Saint-Aulaire could imagine how a change of this kind would impress the Turks and the local population. Even the French Government could hardly maintain that it would increase the effectiveness of the Allied control and of the measures to be enforced for the protection of the non-Turk population.

7. Lord Curzon has no intention of meeting the demand of the French Government, which appears quite unwarrantable, all the more because it appears, both from General Harington's telegram above referred to and from the enclosed telegram since received from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople,* that the Allied generals on the spot do not agree with it. He would be glad to learn whether the Army Council concur in this view, and to be furnished with any further observations which they may desire to offer.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

* See No. 226.

[E 11323/27/44] No. 247.

M. Aharonian to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 20.)

Délégation arménienne,
Paris, le 18 octobre 1922.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

LA conférence sur les affaires du Proche-Orient devant se réunir dans un avenir rapproché, j'ai l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Le 23 septembre dernier, les trois Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie, ont adressé au Gouvernement d'Angora une invitation "à envoyer sans retard un représentant, muni de pleins pouvoirs, à une réunion qui se tiendrait à Venise ou ailleurs, et à laquelle seraient également invités, avec les représentants de la Turquie, les plénipotentiaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie, du Japon, de la Roumanie, de l'État serbe-croate-slovène et de la Grèce. Cette réunion aurait lieu dès que les dispositions nécessaires auraient été prises par les Gouvernements intéressés. Elle aurait pour objet de négocier et de conclure le Traité de Paix définitif entre la Turquie, la Grèce et les Puissances alliées."

Le Gouvernement d'Angora a, par sa note du 4 octobre, "accepté avec empressement d'envoyer ses représentants à la réunion devant avoir pour objet de négocier et de conclure le Traité de Paix définitif entre la Turquie, la Grèce et les Puissances alliées."

Il semble, dans ces conditions, hors de doute que le problème arménien, qui forme une partie essentielle de la question du Proche-Orient, sera mis à l'ordre du jour de la conférence future. Resté en souffrance à la suite de la non-ratification du Traité de Sèvres, ce problème a préoccupé aussi bien la conférence de Londres de 1921 que la conférence tenue à Paris en mars 1922, par les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie. L'exposé publié le 26 mars 1922 par cette dernière conférence déclare notamment que "la situation des Arméniens à dû être prise en considération spéciale, tant à cause des engagements contractés par les Puissances alliées au cours de la guerre que des cruelles souffrances endurées par ce peuple. En conséquence, l'aide de la Société des Nations est recherchée, en plus de la protection accordée aux minorités, en vue de satisfaire les aspirations traditionnelles des Arméniens et la constitution d'un foyer national."

Les souffrances dont il est fait mention dans l'exposé ci-haut, ont la heure actuelle atteint un tel degré, que le règlement de la question arménienne ne saurait plus être différé, sans compromettre irrémédiablement tout l'avenir de la race arménienne. Aussi le peuple arménien ne doute-il pas un seul instant que la future conférence sur les affaires d'Orient s'occupera de son sort et le réglera conformément aux grands principes de justice et d'humanité proclamés par les Puissances alliées au cours de la grande guerre et aux promesses solennelles faites aux Arméniens.

Dans cet état de choses, j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser, M. le Secrétaire d'État, la demande de la délégation de la République arménienne d'être représentée à la future Conférence sur les Affaires d'Orient, sous la forme que les Puissances alliées jugeront la plus appropriée

Il me sera permis de rappeler à cette occasion que par l'article 88 du Traité de Sèvres les Puissances alliées ont déclaré qu'elles avaient déjà reconnu l'Arménie comme un État libre et indépendant que cette reconnaissance n'a donc pu être atteinte dans ses effets par la non-ratification du traité auquel elle était antérieure ; que le caractère juridique de l'indépendance de l'Arménie ressort également du préambule du Traité de Sèvres, qui la classe parmi les Puissances alliées ; qu'enfin l'Arménie a signé, en sa qualité d'État souverain et indépendant, aussi bien le Traité de Sèvres qu'un traité séparé avec les principales Puissances alliées sur la protection des minorités. Les événements politiques dont depuis cette époque l'Arménie a été le théâtre n'ont pu certainement en rien modifier son statut international d'État indépendant.

Le peuple arménien, confiant en les sentiments élevés de justice des Puissances alliées, espère fermement que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique reconnaîtra le caractère équitable de la présente demande de la délégation de la République arménienne et qu'il interviendra utilement en faveur de la participation de ses délégués à la conférence projetée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
A. AHARONIAN.

[E 11358/27/44] No. 248.

M. Poincaré to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 20.)

Mon cher Ministre, *Paris, le* 19 *octobre* 1922.

JE reçois à l'instant votre lettre d'hier et je m'empresse d'y répondre point par point.

1. En ce qui concerne la date de la conférence, je comprends les raisons pour lesquelles il serait difficile de la fixer, ainsi que je l'aurais désiré, au 30 octobre ; mais la date du 13 novembre que vous indiquez ne pourrait être acceptée que comme date ultime.

Il importe de réunir le plus tôt possible la conférence et en tout cas, comme vous le faites remarquer, d'en annoncer immédiatement la date d'ouverture, pour montrer au Gouvernement d'Angora que les Alliés sont aussi désireux que lui de la voir commencer ses travaux sans délai.

2. Vous préférez à ma suggestion de réunir en des endroits différents deux conférences distinctes, mais simultanées (l'une pour le Traité de Paix et l'autre pour la question des Détroits), la réunion d'une seule conférence siégeant à Lausanne ; cette conférence, à un certain moment, après avoir délibéré sur le Traité de Paix, s'occuperait de la question des Détroits ; à cette seconde discussion seraient entendues toutes les Puissances intéressées, et notamment la Russie et les Etats riverains de la mer Noire.

Tenant compte des raisons que vous exposez, je n'insiste pas pour qu'il y ait deux conférences distinctes et je consent à ce qu'il soit procédé comme vous le préférez.

Quant à la procédure que j'ai proposée pour que les Gouvernements *de facto* puissent faire entendre leur voix sans obliger les Puissances alliées à reconnaître *de jure* d'une manière prématurée ou indirecte les Gouvernements soviétiques, je constate avec satisfaction que vous y donnez votre adhésion.

3. Je ne vois pas, en ce qui me concerne, l'utilité de recourir, si la conférence a lieu à Lausanne, au personnel technique de traducteurs, d'interprètes ou de dactylographes de la Société des Nations. Je préférais que, suivant l'usage établi, chaque Gouvernement utilisât son personnel propre ; mais, par contre, je n'ai pas d'objection à ce qu'au cours de la conférence le Conseil de la Société des Nations soit, le cas échéant, appelé à donner son avis sur tel ou tel point concernant la question des minorités ou celle des Détroits.

4. En ce qui concerne la présidence de la conférence, vous approuvez ma suggestion, si celle-ci a lieu en Suisse, de la confier à un représentant du Gouvernement helvétique et vous êtes d'accord avec moi pour estimer que la réputation de M. Ador le désignerait particulièrement pour ces délicates fonctions ; mais, pour des raisons qui ont leur valeur, vous préféreriez que la présidence ne fût assumée par un représentant neutre que lors de l'ouverture officielle de la conférence à la première séance ; après quoi la présidence serait exercée à tour de rôle suivant la nature des sujets traités.

La question se posera alors de savoir quelles seront les Puissances qui seront appelées à l'exercer ainsi : les Turcs et les Grecs y seront-ils admis, ou seulement les six Puissances alliées qui seront représentées à la conférence ? Sera-t-il possible d'exclure, comme il serait désirable, les deux Puissances belligérantes qui ont fait la guerre malgré les Alliés ? Autant de difficultés sérieuses qui seraient évitées si un représentant neutre présidait toutes les séances sans prendre aucun parti dans les discussions.

5. Vous exposez que les Puissances alliées ont reconnu l'independence *de jure* de la Géorgie, mais non l'existence *de jure* du Gouvernement géorgien, ni de telle ou telle personnalité qui le compose. Vous ajoutez que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'a reconnu, ni *de jure* ni *de facto*, l'actuel Gouvernement soviétique de Géorgie, mais que si la Géorgie était admise à la discussion de la question des Détroits, ce serait ce Gouvernement qui devrait être admis à cette discussion comme Gouvernement *de facto*.

Je me permets de vous communiquer, ci-joint, une copie de la lettre du 27 janvier 1921 adressée à M. Guéguetchkori, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Géorgie, par M. Briand, président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs. Il est indiqué dans cette lettre que la Conférence des Ambassadeurs a été unanime à decider de reconnaître, *de jure*, le Gouvernement géorgien.

Dans ces conditions, il me semblerait difficile que le Gouvernement géorgien reconnu par les Puissances ne fût pas invité à la conférence qui s'occupera de la question des Détroits.

6. En ce qui concerne la participation à la conférence des dominions britanniques et de l'Inde d'une part, et de la Tunisie et du Maroc d'autre part, je ne veux pas engager ici de discussion sur leurs droits respectifs.

En tout cas, je ne pourrais faire accepter par le Gouvernement marocain et par e Gouvernement tunisien qu'ils fussent exclus de toute collaboration à la Conférence des Détroits, si les Gouvernements des dominions et surtout le Gouvernement de l'Inde étaient appelés à y collaborer.

Si le Maroc et la Tunisie ne participent pas à la conférence, il faudra donc que les dominions et l'Inde s'abstiennent d'y prendre part et se contentent de la faculté d'adhérer ensuite. Nous nous réservons, bien entendu, le droit d'avoir dans notre délégation des Algériens, des Tunisiens et des Marocains, dans le cas où les dominions et l'Inde collaboreraient à la préparation de la conférence ou seraient représentés au sein de la délégation anglaise.

7. Je serais très heureux de recevoir le plus tôt possible le projet de note que vous aurez préparé en tenant compte des observations contenues dans la présente lettre. Quand ce projet aurait été approuvé par les trois Gouvernements anglais, italien et français, ils adresseront une note identique aux Gouvernements que vous énumérez ; mais d'autres Gouvernements peuvent émettre la prétention de ne pas rester étrangers à ce qui sera conclu à la conférence, surtout en ce qui concerne la question des Détroits. J'aimerais notamment connaître l'avis du Gouvernement britannique sur la participation éventuelle de l'Egypte et du Hedjaz qui aurait déjà été envisagée et serait désirée à Angora, au Caire et à La Mecque, si j'en crois les renseignements publiés par les journaux. Cette participation rendrait par nous très difficile l'exclusion de nos protectorats musulmans.

Veuillez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure in No. 248.

M. Briand to M. Guéguetchkori.

M. le Ministre, *Conférence interalliée, Paris, le* 27 *janvier* 1921.

APRÈS avoir pris connaissance de la décision par laquelle le Conseil suprême, à la date du 26 janvier, a résolu de connaître *de jure* l'indépendence de la Géorgie, dès que ce pays en exprimerait formellement le désir, vous avez bien voulu, par lettre du 27 janvier, m'adresser la demai de officielle du Gouvernement et du peuple géorgien de se voir reconnus *de jure* par les Puissances alliées.

Je me suis empressé de communiquer votre lettre à la conférence ; celle-ci a été unanime à décider de reconnaître *de jure* le Gouvernement géorgien.

Les Puissances alliées sont heureuses de pouvoir témoigner ainsi à nouveau de la sympathie avec laquelle elles ont suivi les efforts du peuple géorgien vers l'indépendence et de l'admiration que leur inspire l'œuvre qu'il a déjà accomplie.

Veuillez, &c.
A. BRIAND.

No. 249.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 20.)

(No. 591.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 19, 1922.

MY telegram No. 575.

Hamid has had no reply from Angora. I have again urged desirability of handing back railway company, and have dwelt on unfavourable impression created on His Majesty's Government and commercial circles in London, especially in view of discrimination against British interests shown by the fact that French railway has been left alone

I still think it better to refrain from formal protest for at least some days in the hope that Hamid may receive favourable reply from Angora.

De Candolle agrees.

He has postponed return to Smyrna.

No. 250.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 597.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 20, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 567 and my despatch No. 898.

Peace Treaty should contain definite provision against prejudice which would be caused to Allied institutions and interests by enforcement of recent decision of Angora Government against validity of Central Government's Acts and financial operations since March 1920. Clause might, for instance, be added to article No. 417 of Treaty of Sèvres to specific effect that Turkey undertakes to recognise engagements of all kinds entered into by Constantinople Government during armistice period.

[E 11358/27/44] No. 251.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Poincaré.

My dear President, *Foreign Office, October 20, 1922.*

I HASTEN to reply to your letter of the 19th October regarding the peace conference with Turkey, from which I am happy to note that we are now in agreement on nearly all essential points.

2. With regard to the date of the opening of the conference, I find it impossible, for the practical reasons which I have already explained to you, and which have been accentuated since I wrote, to fix any earlier date than the 13th November, but I will accept that date as the opening day of the conference. I agree with you that it is essential to announce that date as soon as possible.

3. Further, I am gratified to see that we are now in accord as to the place of the conference and the procedure to be followed as regards the Straits question.

4. I merely put forward the proposal as regards technical assistance rom the League of Nations Secretariat as a suggestion, and have no wish to press it. Each delegation will now provide their own staff of translators and typists, but I trust that your Excellency will be able, as on previous occasions, to give the conference the invaluable services of interpreters from French into English and *vice versâ*.

5. With regard to the presidency of the conference, I fear that I still regard the objections to a neutral chairman put forward in my letter of the 18th October as insuperable, and I think that we must confine ourselves to inviting M. Ador to open the conference. In order to overcome the difficulty which your Excellency has foreseen with regard to the smaller Powers or Turkey having to preside over the conference, I would propose to confine the chairmanship (by rotation according to subjects) to the four principal Allied Powers. No formal arrangement to this effect need be proposed to the conference, but it could be arranged by a preliminary informal understanding between the four principal Allied representatives, who would propose each other in turn as chairman. The smaller Powers and Turkey would doubtless raise no objection in practice to this arrangement.

6. I have looked up the question of the *de jure* recognition of the Georgian Government. I find that on the 26th January, 1921, the Supreme Council decided to recognise *de jure* the independence of Georgia, provided it was clearly established that the latter desired immediate recognition. Accordingly, the next day (27th January) the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs (at that time in Paris) wrote to the Supreme Council to express officially to M. Briand, as President, the demand of the Georgian Government and of the Georgian people to be recognised *de jure* by the Powers. The Supreme Council (not the Conference of Ambassadors) agreed on the 27th January that this letter was sufficient and M. Briand thereupon wrote the letter of which you sent me a copy; but clearly the decision of the Supreme Council related to the *de jure* recognition of the independence of Georgia, and I cannot accept that the then existing Georgian Government could be regarded as the *de jure* (much less the *de facto*) Government of Georgia to-day, or that it has any right to representation at the conference.

7. I am afraid that I cannot allow the question of the relative rights of the Dominions and India and Morocco and Tunis respectively to participate in the conference to be passed over without any discussion of the reasons—irrefutable, as they appear to

me—put forward in my letter of the 18th October, which render completely distinct the status of the Dominions and India on the one hand and the French protectorates on the other. No British Government could now reverse the decision formally taken at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, regarding the status of the constituent members of the British Empire, and I must formally reserve their right to be represented in the British delegation at the forthcoming conference and to sign the Treaty of Peace and the Straits Convention as they signed the Treaty of Sèvres, should they so desire it. I can, of course, raise no objection to representatives of the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunis being attached to the French delegation.

8. The question whether and, if so, to what extent Egypt should participate in the conference raises certain difficulties. Egypt is not at war with Turkey and did not formally break off relations with that country. On the other hand, the questions dealt with in the Treaty of Sèvres relating to Egypt, while of a technical character, are of considerable importance, especially in their bearing upon the relations of Egypt with His Majesty's Government. Moreover, although Egypt did not sign the Treaty of Sèvres, the status of Egypt has altered since the date of the signature of that treaty. While, therefore, it is probable that an Egyptian delegation will have to be present at the seat of the conference, the question whether she should participate in the preparation of the clauses of the new treaty relating to Egypt and their signature, and, if so, in what form, is a matter which cannot be settled at the present moment. Meanwhile, I am in communication on the whole subject with the Egyptian Government, but it will not be necessary to send Egypt any formal invitation from the three Powers before the conference meets.

9. As your Excellency is aware, the Hedjaz did not actually sign the Treaty of Sèvres, although invited to do so. As King Hussein has consistently refused and still refuses to accept the mandatory principle, I see no reason to suppose that he would participate in the signature of a new treaty in which that principle will again be recognised. There does not therefore appear to be any reason why the three Powers should send an invitation to Mecca.

10. I enclose for your Excellency's consideration drafts of notes—

(*a.*) To the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, Turkey (both Constantinople and Angora); and
(*b.*) To the Russian Soviet and Bulgarian Governments;
(*c.*) To the Swiss Government.

As soon as your Excellency has had time to examine these drafts, I would propose that you should instruct the French Ambassador here to signify your concurrence as to the drafting modification, if any, which you desire to make in them. I would then collaborate with Count de Saint-Aulaire and the Italian Ambassador here, to whom I would ask his Government meanwhile to send similar instructions. I would suggest it should be left to us to fix the date upon which each Government should send off the identic telegrams. In the case of Russia, they would be despatched direct to Moscow. In the case of the United States, Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Switzerland, they would be despatched to the respective representatives of the principal Allied Powers for communication to the said Governments. Perhaps the telegram to the Swiss Government should, as a matter of courtesy, be sent off a few days in advance of the other telegrams. As regards Turkey, I would suggest that the telegrams should be sent to the three High Commissioners for communication to the Government of Constantinople, and to Hamid Bey, for transmission to the Government of Angora.

11. I have not hitherto raised with your Excellency the question of the participation of the United States in the conference, but your Excellency will doubtless have noticed from the press certain indications that the United States might desire to take part in the discussion on the question of the Straits. It would, I feel, be in the general political interests of all the Powers concerned that such participation, if possible, should be secured. I have, therefore, thought it well to prepare for your Excellency's consideration a tentative draft of an invitation from the three principal Allied Governments to the Government of the United States.

Believe me, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 251.

To the Government of Japan.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Japanese Government to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on the 13th November with a view to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

Enclosure 2 in No. 251.

To the Government of Roumania.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Roumanian Government to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on the 13th November with a view to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

Enclosure 3 in No. 251.

To the Government of Jugoslavia.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Jugoslavian Government to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on the 13th November with a view to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

Enclosure 4 in No. 251.

To the Government of Greece.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Greek Government to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on the 13th November with a view to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

Enclosure 5 in No. 251.

To the Government of Constantinople.

IN pursuance of their note of the 23rd September to the Government of Angora and of the reply of that Government of the 4th October, the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Government of the Sultan of Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne to open on the 13th November negotiations to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

Enclosure 6 in No. 251.

To the Government of Angora.

IN pursuance of their note of the 23rd September to the Government of Angora and of the reply of that Government of the 4th October, the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Angora to send representatives to Lausanne to open on the 13th November negotiations to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

Enclosure 7 in No. 251.

To the Government of Soviet Russia.

THE Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy are inviting the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne on the 13th November to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

Among the subjects which will fall to be dealt with by this conference in the course of its proceedings will be that of the Straits. The Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy recognise that this question raises issues which require special treatment and consultation with Powers other than the belligerents in the war between the Allies and Turkey, and in particular with the Powers whose coasts border on the Black Sea. The Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy, therefore, invite the Russian Soviet Government to arrange to send representatives to Lausanne to take part in the discussion on the question of the Straits. The date upon which these discussions will open will be notified later to the Russian Soviet Government.

The three principal Allied Governments will be glad if the Russian Soviet Government will communicate this invitation to the Governments of the Republics of the Ukraine and Georgia, with a view to arrange for representatives of these republics to accompany the representatives of the Russian Soviet Government to Lausanne.

Enclosure 8 in No. 251.

To the Government of Bulgaria.

THE Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy are inviting the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne on the 13th November to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey.

Among the subjects which will fall to be dealt with by this conference in the course of its proceedings will be that of the Straits. The Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy recognise that this question raises issues which require special treatment and consultation with Powers other than the belligerents in the war between the Allies and Turkey, and in particular with the Powers whose coasts border on the Black Sea. The Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy therefore invite the Bulgarian Government to arrange to send representatives to Lausanne to take part in the discussion on the question of the Straits. The date upon which these discussions will open will be notified later to the Bulgarian Government.

Enclosure 9 in No. 251.

To the Swiss Government.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, desiring to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey, and to discuss and settle the future status of the Straits, have decided that these objects would be greatly facilitated if the conference could be held upon neutral soil. They are agreed that, both for political and geographical reasons, no country offers so propitious a meeting-place for such a peace

conference as Switzerland. They have therefore ventured to invite the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on the 13th November to conclude a final treaty. They are also inviting the Governments of Bulgaria and Soviet Russia to send representatives at a later stage in the proceedings of the conference to discuss the question of the Straits.

The three Governments earnestly hope that the Government of the Swiss Republic will welcome the choice of Lausanne as the seat of the conference, and will find themselves able to extend to the conference such material and technical facilities as the Swiss Government may consider possible.

Enclosure 10 in No. 251.

To the United States Government.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy are inviting the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne on the 13th November to conclude a final Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey. They are also inviting the Russian and Bulgarian Governments to send representatives at a date to be fixed later to participate in the discussions which the conference will undertake in the course of its proceedings on the subject of the Straits.

The three principal Allied Powers recall that a representative of the United States Government was present at San Remo in the final stages of the proceedings of the Supreme Council which led to the drafting of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. They would welcome the presence of a United States representative at Lausanne in a similar capacity or in a more active capacity, especially in the discussion upon the question of the Straits.

[E 11416/10102/44] No. 252.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, October* 20, 1922.

IN reply to your letter of the 13th October, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to make the following observations on the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.

2. The general policy which my Lords consider should be kept in view is as follows :—

(a.) *Freedom of the Straits.*

Owing to the altered conditions, it does not now appear possible to include in article 178 the necessary guarantees for the freedom of the Straits. This matter is fully dealt with in Appendix (A).

(b.) *Naval Bases in Turkish Territory.*

To prevent any naval Power being in a position to obtain a base in the territory of the late Turkish Empire (or territory under discussion) which would in any way menace or lie on the flank of the lines of communication to our Eastern possessions.

For this reason it is desirable that the Dodecanese Islands should be returned to Turkey, on the understanding that they will not sell or otherwise transfer them to any other Power. For relative strategical importance of the islands of the Dodecanese see Admiralty letter of the 4th July, 1922.

Existing article 178, paragraphs 1–3, to be amended to read :—

"The Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, Mitylene and Samothrace to be, and to remain, demilitarised."

(c.) *Red Sea.*

Opposition to foreign influence being established in the Red Sea.

(d.) *Oilfields, pipe-lines, &c.*

That no modification of the Mesopotamian boundary with Turkey should be made which would jeopardise our control over the oilfields or pipe-lines.

(e.) *Suez Canal.*

To ensure under the new conditions in Egypt that Great Britain still retains without abatement her former control of the Suez Canal.

(f.) *Limitation of Naval Forces of Turkey.*

As far as Great Britain is concerned, no great importance is attached to limiting the naval forces of Turkey, except in those types of vessels which, in the hands of a weak naval Power, would be capable of interfering with the free navigation of the Straits.

Such types of vessels are submarines, torpedo craft and minelayers.

There are, however, two other factors which must be taken into consideration :—

(a.) If no limitation is placed on the Turkish naval forces, other ex-enemy countries, and in particular Germany, may be encouraged to demand a revision of the scale of naval forces allowed to them.

(b.) The undesirability of allowing the "Goeben" to remain in Turkish hands.

In Appendix (B) will be found the Admiralty proposals for the revision of part V, section 2, naval clauses.

(g.) *Disposal of Greek Fleet.*

It is considered that any demand on the part of the Turks that the Greek fleet should be handed over to them should be resisted for the following reasons :—

(i.) The Greek fleet will act as a deterrent to any further aggressive action on the part of the Turks towards Greece.

(ii.) The dependence of Greece on sea-borne supplies is a justification for the possession of a fleet by that country.

3. *Part VI, Section* 1, *Prisoners of War.*—My Lords are prepared to defer to War Office views on this subject.

4. *Article* 419.—The retention of this article is not considered necessary, as Turkish naval records have been found deficient, inaccurate, and therefore of little value.

5. My Lords do not feel able to formulate more detailed proposals for the revision of those articles in the Treaty of Sèvres in which the Admiralty are interested until they are aware of Foreign Office views as to the general policy which it is proposed to adopt when dealing with Turkey.

It is therefore suggested that a conference be held in the near future between representatives of the Foreign Office and Admiralty, at which—

(a.) An expression of Foreign Office views could be given, thereby enabling the Admiralty to formulate more detailed proposals.

(b.) An exchange of views on the various questions referred to in this letter might take place.

I am, &c.
ALEX. FLINT.

APPENDIX (A).

Freedom of the Straits.

Article 37 of section 2, "Straits," reads as follows in the Treaty of Sèvres :

"The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.

"These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations."

The above article was drawn up when the conditions and intentions were as follows :—

(a.) The neutral zones, both in Europe and in Asia, were to be occupied by the Allies. (See article 178, paragraph 4.)

(b.) The military forces of Turkey were to be subject to drastic control.

Neither of these conditions obtain at the present time.

As frequently pointed out by my Lords, they are definitely of opinion that the safe navigation of narrow waterways, such as the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, can only be guaranteed when both sides of such waterways are militarily occupied by friendly forces.

My Lords are therefore of opinion that, on the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Constantinople and of the British forces from the eastern shore of the Bosphorus, any guarantee for the free navigation of the Bosphorus will depend entirely on the good faith of the Turks, on which little or no reliance can be placed.

To ensure that the free navigation of the Bosphorus is maintained, it is essential that it shall be possible for adequate pressure to be brought on Turkey.

This is only possible if men-of-war can pass through the Dardanelles into the Marmora and maintain a position from which Constantinople can be bombarded.

The passage of men-of-war into the Marmora can only be guaranteed if both shores of the Dardanelles are in Allied occupation, and bombardment of Constantinople can only be carried out if the Turks are prohibited from mounting guns in position which command the Marmora. Additional reasons for guaranteeing free access to Sea of Marmora are as follows :—

(*a.*) Give the British fleet harbours and bases for operations against Constantinople and so avoid some of the difficulties of 1915.

(*b.*) Prevent a hostile fleet (Russian or other) being assembled nearer to the Mediterranean than the Black Sea.

To sum up :—

My Lords desire to emphasise that if the guarantee of the freedom of the Straits is to be a practical and not a theoretical one, it is essential that the Allies should keep the key of the Dardanelles effectively in their own possession in order that the fleet may hammer at the gates of Constantinople and force the Turks to open the door into the Black Sea.

Any failure to maintain this essential guarantee may at any time result in either -

(*a.*) The Allies having to accept the closing of the Dardanelles by the Turks ; or.

(*b.*) Undertaking another Gallipoli campaign.

Appendix (B).

Section II.—*Naval Clauses.*

Article 181.

To remain as at present, not, however, because Admiralty consider it necessary that the Turkish navy should be reduced to this extent. It is considered that this is one of the articles on which we should be prepared to give way except as regards the surrender of the "Goeben."

Article 182.

Should be deleted, as such control indefinitely is not considered to be of sufficient importance to justify the friction it would cause.

Article 183.

No naval importance is now attached to this.

Article 184.

Should be deleted, as there are now none under construction.

Article 185.

Should be deleted, as this would necessitate control

Article 186.

To remain as at present, and no surrender should be made on this point.

Article 187.

Should be deleted and amended to read as follows :—

"All Turkish minelaying vessels shall be disarmed and treated as merchant ships.

"Turkey agrees within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present treaty—

"(*a.*) To remove and destroy all torpedoes, tubes, mine fittings and rails from existing ships ;

"(*b.*) To destroy all torpedoes and mines, whether on board ships or stored in Turkish territory."

Article 188.

To be deleted and a new article 188 to be inserted as follows :—

"Turkey agrees—

"(*a.*) Not to fit any vessels now in their possession or which may be acquired by them with either torpedoes, mines or minelaying fittings ;

"(*b.*) Not to manufacture or acquire any torpedoes or mines for any purpose whatsoever."

Article 189.

No naval importance is attached to this article.

Article 190.

This must depend on the general arrangements for guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits.

[E 11359/10102/44] **No. 253.**

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 21.)

Sir, *War Office, October* 20, 1922.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 13th instant, and to forward for your information a copy of a General Staff memorandum on the proposed new treaty between the Allies and Turkey.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 253.

Memorandum by the General Staff on the Proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey.

(Secret.)

IN Foreign Office letter dated the 13th October, 1922, it is stated that "except on matters where British interests are vitally concerned, there can now be little chance of imposing any conditions upon Turkey, with whom the terms of the new treaty, unlike those of other treaties with the enemy, will probably now have to be negotiated."

The General Staff agree that the situation in the Near East has been fundamentally changed since the Treaty of Sèvres was drafted. This change is due to the creation of a national spirit in Turkey, and this in turn has resulted in the recent successes of the Turkish army, with the result that we can no longer treat the Turks as a conquered nation to whom it is possible to dictate any terms we wish. The effect of the publication of the Treaty of Sèvres, severe as it was in its terms, at a time when the Allied armies were almost demobilised, was to stir the Turkish nation to resistance, and we should do well at this time, when the Allies are in an even worse situation from a military point of view, to avoid insistence on any terms which are not of vital importance directly or indirectly to the British Empire. Any appearance of an intention to coerce the Turks to-day would probably result in war against a united nation.

It is true that we have it in our power to keep control of the littoral of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, but, in order to provide the necessary troops, it would be necessary to mobilise, and we should incur a heavy military commitment, since we can

never hope in such circumstances to secure a friendly Turkey, or, on the other hand, to crush her power in Asia Minor. It is clear also that we can expect no support from our Allies, and should be obliged to undertake the task single-handed.

If, as appears necessary, we must recognise the re-establishment of Turkish power, it will surely be to our advantage to do everything possible to give the new Turkey the chance of restoring order in her own house and defending her territory. The Turks are numerically a small nation, and, surrounded by potential enemies as they are, could not realise ideas of conquest or territorial aggrandisement on a large scale.

Fate, however, has located them in one of the most coveted areas in the world, and if we are to have peace in the Near East they must be strong enough to defend it. They can attack no vital points in the British Empire (neither Irak nor Palestine can be considered as such), and therefore, from the point of view of the General Staff, so long as our relations with them are friendly, it is to the advantage of His Majesty's Government to strengthen them in a military sense rather than the reverse.

2. Bearing the above in mind, the General Staff desire to submit the following remarks on some problems which are likely to arise in connection with the settlement between the Allies and Turkey :—

(a.) *The new Turkish Frontier in Thrace.* (See article 27.)

It is understood that the Greeks are likely to resist the Turkish claim to Karagach and other forts on the right bank of the Maritza. Also that they are likely to press for the 1915 frontier, which, northwards from Adrianople, follows the line of the Tundza River.

The General Staff recognise the fact that the possession of the forts at Karagach will provide the Turks with a bridge-head covering the crossing of the Maritza, and thus confer on them at this point of the frontier a considerable strategical advantage over the Greeks. They also realise that it will complicate the question of the control of the railway. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the General Staff are of opinion that Karagach and the other forts on the right bank of the Maritza, which protect the town of Adrianople, should be considered as a part of Adrianople itself and allotted to Turkey, since Adrianople is indefensible from the left bank of the Maritza.

The General Staff also consider that the triangle lying between the Maritza and Tundza Rivers and the Bulgarian frontier forms a salient which could be of no military value to Greece, but rather the reverse. They would even go so far as to suggest that, from a military point of view, it would be to the advantage of Greece if her frontier followed the line of the Kizil Deli Chai to its junction with the Maritza at Demotika, and thence along the Maritza. Such a line would shorten considerably the length of frontier to be defended, and would avoid a dangerous salient.

(b.) *The Frontier with Irak.* (See article 27.)

Assuming that we are in sight of a satisfactory peace with Turkey, it is hoped that the situation in Irak can be stabilised on its present basis.

Apart from political considerations affecting our relations with King Feisal, the surrender of any portions of Kurdistan and of the Mosul vilayet would react unfavourably upon the position of the Irak local forces and of our Imperial garrison supporting them. So long as Turkey is hostile our position in the Mosul vilayet is insecure, but, provided favourable peace terms can be arrived at with the Turks, the Irak levies and army, as they improve in organisation and efficiency, should be able to maintain sufficiently stable conditions on the northern borders of Irak.

The retention within the Irak frontier of Kurdistan and the Mosul vilayet keeps the Turks at a reasonable distance from Bagdad, and the physical features of the country, as well as the attitude of some of the inhabitants of this area, are an additional safeguard against invasion or interference, should our relations or King Feisal's relations with Turkey at any time become strained.

Were the Turks to be in possession of Kurdistan and Mosul vilayet, our small garrison at Bagdad would be in a most exposed position, and, with the Turks better placed for stirring up rebellion in Irak, a forced withdrawal from Bagdad would become a still more difficult and dangerous operation.

In any rectification of the Irak–Turkish frontier, it is probable that the High Commissioner would like slightly to extend the Irak frontier so as to include Amadia with its Christian Assyrian population. Such rectification would be of military advantage, as the Assyrians can be relied upon to offer some opposition to any attempted Turkish aggression.

(c.) *The Control of the Dardanelles.* (See articles 37–61 and 177–180.)

It is understood that His Majesty's Government have it in contemplation :—

(*a.*) To place the control of the Straits under the auspices of the League of Nations;

(*b.*) To keep a small Allied force in the Gallipoli Peninsula for an indefinite period. (It is not clear whether this force is to come under the orders of the League of Nations or not.)

(*c.*) To demilitarise a zone on each side of the Straits.

There is no way of ensuring that the Turks will respect the demilitarised zone on the Asiatic shore except by the enforcement of some measure of control, which in turn implies permanent military occupation in some shape or form of the Asiatic shore. This does not mean merely the occupation of a small area at Chanak to cover the Narrows; on the contrary, to be effective the forces employed must be large enough to deny access by the Turks at any point along the whole length of the Dardanelles. To hold Gallipoli alone will never enable the Allies to secure the passage of the Straits, and moreover, although in times of peace we might be content with a force of three or four battalions and some artillery to garrison the Peninsula, we should be faced, directly relations became strained, with the very situation which has recently arisen and be obliged either to withdraw or reinforce hurriedly from the Mediterranean pending the arrival of mobilised divisions.

The situation in European Turkey will not in future be similar to that existing to-day, since the Turkish army will be in full control of Thrace and be free to threaten the small Allied force at Gallipoli. Hence we could spare no detachments from this force to secure a foothold on the Asiatic shore until the arrival of mobilised reinforcements, by which time we should be too late.

It appears therefore to the General Staff that the Allied occupation of the zone of the Dardanelles should either be in sufficient strength to hold both European and Asiatic sides (a commitment to which our army is not strong enough to make more than a very small contribution, say, at most, one infantry brigade and one battery), or should be abandoned.

This does not mean that they would advise that no steps should be taken by diplomatic methods to obtain the demilitarisation of the zone of the Straits, whether it be by making use of the League of Nations or by some other means.

As regards the limits of the demilitarised zones, they suggest that they should be as follows :—

(1.) *In Thrace.*—Everything to the southward of a line from Rodosto (exclusive) to Karachal in the Gulf of Xeros (including Gallipoli).

(2.) *In Asia.*—The whole of the Sandjak of Chanak.

They are further of opinion that all gendarmerie or police within the demilitarised zones should be controlled by the League of Nations, or such other authority as may be set up in the new treaty.

(d.) *The Control of the Bosphorus.* (See articles 37–61 and 177–180.)

So long as the Turks occupy Constantinople, which so many other nations covet, the General Staff are of opinion that they must be allowed to defend it. The ability to close the passage of the Bosphorus to Russian or other ships of war is essential to the defence of Constantinople. The General Staff recommend that no attempt should be made to demilitarise any zone on either side of the Bosphorus.

(e.) *The Allied Occupation of Constantinople.* (See article 36.)

The General Staff are of opinion that the Allied troops should be withdrawn from Constantinople as soon as the new treaty is ratified by Turkey and Great Britain.

(f.) *The Strength and Composition of the Turkish Army.* See articles 152–167)

The Treaty of Sèvres laid down that the Turkish army should be reduced to : —

(*a.*) Gendarmerie, 35,000.

(*b.*) Army, 15,000.

The Paris proposals of March 1922, agreed to an increase to 45,000 and 40,000 respectively, though the General Staff, even at that time, were prepared to go further and accept an increase of the gendarmerie to 50,000.

It is idle to deny that to limit the Turkish army in view of the limited man-power of the nation will be to hand her over bound and fettered to one or possibly more of her neighbours which are Russia, Greece and Bulgaria. Turkey's male Moslem population is estimated at perhaps 5,000,000, whilst respectively that of her potential enemies, Russia, Bulgaria and Greece is estimated at 80,000,000, 2,000,000 and 2,000,000. To enable her to resist the pretensions of Russia in the East, Turkey will be compelled to maintain a force sufficient to protect her Transcaucasian frontier. In addition she will require considerable forces to maintain law and order throughout Anatolia. Allowing for these justifiable commitments in Asia, it does not appear to the General Staff that, once we have tided over the present crisis, the Turkish army can ever be large enough to be a dangerous instrument of aggression in Europe unless some new grouping of the nations gives her powerful allies. They recommend accordingly that no attempt should be made to impose limitations on the strength and composition of the Turkish army and gendarmerie in the new treaty.

General Harington in a recent telegram considers that, in reality, the strength of the Turkish army will be governed by what the country can pay for and maintain. He agrees also that it would be very difficult to enforce any limitation.

(g.) *The System of Recruitment of the Turkish Army and Gendarmerie.*
(See articles 165–167.)

The Treaty of Sèvres laid down that the Turkish army must be maintained on a voluntary basis, no conscription being allowed. In March 1922 the Allies stated that they were ready to consider with the Turks in an amicable spirit the determination of the period in which the voluntary system must be established in that country.

The difficulty of enforcing the principle of voluntary service has been exemplified during the last few years in other ex-enemy countries, more particularly in Bulgaria It involves, if it is to be in any degree successful, rigid control for an indefinite period. In the case of Turkey, so much of whose territory lies in inaccessible regions, real control will be impossible, and from this point of view alone the General Staff recommend that any attempt should be abandoned. Turkey cannot afford to maintain an army on its present scale as her financial necessities will automatically reduce her peace establishment to moderate limits. No control would be required to watch the Turkish army in this case. On the other hand, as has been shown in paragraph 2 (f), if Turkey is threatened by outside aggression she should be allowed to defend herself to the best of her ability without interference from the Allies. If all Turkey's neighbours had adopted voluntary enlistment, it would be fair to compel Turkey to do the same; but the fact that the Allies are not in a position to compel Russia, Turkey's hereditary enemy, to abandon compulsory service, provides an adequate reason for omitting any mention of this subject in the new treaty.

(h.) *The Duties of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation.*
(See articles 196–205.)

Under the Treaty of Sèvres an Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Organisation was created—

(*a.*) To control the demobilisation and disarmament of the Turks; and
(*b.*) To organise in collaboration with Turkey the new forces authorised.

The General Staff recognise that the new treaty should provide for a small commission of control to deal with the demilitarised zone.

In view, however, of what has been said above as to the necessity and right of Turkey to keep an adequate army, they are of opinion that it is unnecessary to attempt to force the Turks to employ Allied officers in the gendarmerie, or to accept Allied control officers with their regular formations. They further consider that any Allied control of the army and gendarmerie would be likely to lead to friction and jealousy between the Allies, and that for this reason also the idea should be abandoned. But, in order to prevent any one Power obtaining a monopoly of control of the gendarmerie, with the consent of the Turks, they recommend that a clause be inserted in the new treaty providing that if Turkey desires the assistance of Allied officers, she must accept them in equal numbers from Great Britain, France and Italy, rank for rank.

(i.) *The permission granted to the French Government to recruit in Turkey for the Foreign Legion.* (See article 207.)

Article 207 provides that France shall have the right to recruit for her foreign legion in Turkey. The General Staff wish once again to express their opinion that this permission should not be included in the new treaty. They have pointed out that the French in Syria are on interior lines as regards Egypt and Mesopotamia, that practically the whole of the troops used by the French at present are non-Europeans or foreign legionaries. Should the French be given permission to enlist Turks for their foreign legion, we may soon find a large and efficient Turkish army, under a French staff, in a central position, ready to turn us out of Irak or Egypt.

(j.) *The Admission of Turkey to the League of Nations.*

This is primarily a political question, but the proposal to hand the control of the Straits over to the League of Nations makes it a point of military importance. By joining the League of Nations, Turkey will presumably acknowledge the League's rights and duties in connection with the Straits, and will be bound to accept its decisions, or leave the League. It is therefore important that Turkey should be admitted to the League, if the latter is to be given control of the Straits.

(k.) *The Disposal, &c., of Prisoners of War.* (See articles 208–217.)

This question must be considered under two heads:—

(1.) Prisoners of war taken prior to the armistice of 1918.
(2.) Prisoners of war taken by Greeks and Turks since that date.

As regards (1), it should be insisted that articles 208–217 of the Treaty of Sèvres must be fulfilled in cases where this has not already been done. This is important as uncertainty still exists as to the presence of certain Allied nationals other than Greeks in the hands of the Turks. The suspicion still arises periodically that there are Indians in Asia Minor whose status has never been satisfactorily cleared up. As regards Turks in our hands, we still have one in India whose case is under consideration of the Attorney-General.

As regards (2) above, the General Staff are of opinion that nothing can be done but to use our good offices to enable the Greeks and Turks to come to a mutual agreement. It is hopeless to expect the Turks to give up their Greek prisoners until they are sure of a satisfactory peace.

(l.) *The Protection of Turkish Nationals who have helped the British during our occupation of Turkey.*

This question has already been the subject of correspondence between the Army Council and the Foreign Office. The General Staff are prepared to leave to the Foreign Office the decision as to how these people can be best protected.

3. In the first paragraph of this paper the General Staff have expressed their opinion that a strong Turkey is not necessarily a danger to the British Empire.

More than this, they are profoundly impressed with the advantages which may reasonably be expected to accrue if we can ensure that Turkey will become friendly instead of hostile. Britain is the greatest Moslem Power in the world; but the allegiance of our Moslem subjects to our rule must to-day be qualified by the extent of their sympathy with the Turks, whom, rightly or wrongly, they are inclining more and more to regard as champions of their faith. There can be no real sympathy between us and our Moslem subjects so long as these two allegiances pull in opposite directions.

The General Staff realise that this question is primarily political, but it affects our Moslem soldiers in India, and in other places in the Near and Middle East. We have altogether some 100,000 soldiers of this faith, and though to date there is little sign of their loyalty being impaired, we cannot expect this to continue in the future if the men are to be recruited from a disaffected population. Further, our military responsibilities are directly affected by our relations with neighbouring Mahommedan States. In short, the General Staff consider that it is probable that a peace with Turkey which will leave our relations with her in an improved condition will go far to diminish our anxieties as to the military situation in India, and in the East generally.

General Staff, War Office,
October 19, 1922.

[E 11420/27/44] No. 254.

M. Berzin to Foreign Office.—(Received October 21.)

M. BERZIN, Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain, presents his compliments to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, and begs to enclose herewith a note from his Government, dated the 19th October, relative to the question of the Near East.

London, October 20, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 254.

Note respecting Participation of Russia in the Near East Conference.

PRESQUE un mois s'est écoulé depuis le moment où le Gouvernement russe s'adressa aux principales Puissances de l'Entente et à plusieurs autres États en faisant ressortir à leurs yeux l'intérêt particulier que présente pour la Russie la solution pacifique de la crise du Proche-Orient, ainsi que la nécessité de la participation de la Russie à la conférence qui serait convoquée a ce sujet—condition nécessaire d'une paix réelle et durable. Le Gouvernement russe exprime son vif étonnement de l'attitude des Puissances qui ont laissé sa communication sans réponse, tandis que l'invitation adressée au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie montre que la conférence qui doit résoudre le conflit oriental se réunira dans un avenir prochain. Dans l'opinion du Gouvernement russe, rien ne peut justifier la convocation d'une conférence relative au Proche-Orient dans laquelle participerait une série des Puissances, entre autres, la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie et même le Japon, mais non la Puissance la plus intéressée—la Russie. Le Gouvernement russe rappelle qu'il avait averti les Puissances en son temps qu'une conférence internationale consacrée aux questions de l'océan Pacifique sans la participation de la Russie serait vouée à l'impuissance, et actuellement nous devons constater que des conflits à main armée se produisent de nouveau dans l'Extrême-Orient. De même, le Gouvernement russe avait protesté contre la tentative de régler sans lui le statut international des îles d'Aland, et actuellement il peut encore une fois établir que sa liberté d'action reste pleine et entière vis-à-vis de ces îles. Ces refus systématiques de prendre en considération les intérêts les plus élémentaires et les demandes les plus justes de la Russie, loin de contribuer à la consolidation de la paix générale, créent des conditions favorisant les complications internationales les plus sérieuses. De même, prenant en considération la situation géographique de la Russie et les liens politiques qui la unissent à certains États du Proche-Orient, il doit apparaître clairement à tous que la consolidation de la paix dans cette partie du monde et la solution durable des questions y afférentes ne sont en aucun cas possibles sans la participation de la Russie. Elle est le seul État de l'Europe qui ait reconnu officiellement le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et qui soit uni à lui par un traité régulier et complet. Ayant reconnu par le Traité de Moscou du 16 mars 1921 les frontières de la Turquie indiquées par le Pacte national, le Gouvernement russe a pris par la même une part effective à la solution des problèmes du Proche-Orient sans se borner à la seule question des Détroits. Il est parfaitement clair que de l'ensemble des problèmes du Proche-Orient au moment de leur examen général la question des Détroits ne saurait être isolée et résolue séparément. La sécurité des Détroits, ainsi que la possibilité d'y appliquer tel ou tel régime, dépend de la situation politique générale qui sera établie dans le Proche-Orient. Si la question des Détroits était séparée et soumise à une conférence complémentaire, une telle procédure n'aboutirait à aucun résultat tangible, cette seconde conférence se réduisant alors à l'élaboration des mesures pratiques pour l'application des principes déjà adoptés par la conférence fondamentale ou à la proclamation d'un principe général dénué de forme pratique et d'importance réelle. Vouloir placer la Russie devant le fait accompli des décisions adoptées sans elle serait l'amener à ne point reconnaître ces décisions. Désirant la consolidation de la paix générale et, en particulier, la solution pacifique définitive des conflits internationaux du Proche-Orient, sans laquelle ce but ne peut être atteint, le Gouvernement russe se voit obligé d'insister catégoriquement sur sa participation à la Conférence du Proche-Orient dans son ensemble et sans aucune restriction. Se réservant en même temps le droit de soutenir la stipulation du Traité russo-turc de Moscou, d'après laquelle l'élaboration définitive du statut international des Détroits doit être confiée aux

délégués des Etats riverains de la mer Noire, le Gouvernement russe, vu la date prochaine de la conférence qui devra étudier l'ensemble des problèmes du Proche-Orient, fait savoir qu'il réclame sa participation à cette conférence sur les mêmes bases et dans les mêmes conditions que les autres parties contractantes.

Le Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires étrangères,
TCHITCHERINE.

Moscou, le 19 octobre 1922.

[E 11451/10524/44] No. 255.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, October 21, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that according to an urgent telegram I have just received from Athens, the situation in Thrace in growing daily worse owing to the attitude of the Italian and French military authorities on the spot, and the pretension of the French Chief of the Staff of the inter-Allied contingents in Thrace, to retain stocks of cereals and cattle belonging to the Christian population hurriedly leaving this province.

My Government considers this pretension of General Charpy not only as unjustifiable but inhuman, and I have been instructed to make an energetic protest against such an action of the military authorities in Thrace, and to address the most pressing appeal to the humanitarian feelings of His Britannic Majesty's Government, requesting your Lordship to be kind enough to instruct General Sir Charles Harington, in command of the inter-Allied troops now in the Near East, to issue orders to prevent the retention of cereals and cattle belonging to the Greek population.

Without such a measure taken by the commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, the exodus from Thrace of this wretched Greek population, absolutely destitute, will develop into a complete catastrophe.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

No. 256.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 606.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 21, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 595.

I quite realise that British officers in Thrace are doing everything possible for refugees, but Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that General Charpy has issued orders to all Allied officers that no one is to be allowed to take away any beasts or cereals even if they are their private property. It is to be presumed that the general will prevent still more drastically export of cereals bought by Greek Government. Can nothing be done to protest against this inhuman conduct and to obtain in other places issue of proclamation such as that made at Rodosto, for which Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed greatest gratitude? (See my telegram No. 602.)

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 257.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 595.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 20, 1922.*

ATHENS telegram No. 591.

Introduction of Turkish gendarmerie before expiration of fourteen days from midnight 14th/15th October is not excluded by terms of Mudania Convention.

Evacuation of Greek administrative personnel in certain places before end of fourteen days may make it essential to introduce Turkish gendarmes, but this will

only be done on recommendation of Allied authorities on the spot, to whose discretion question must necessarily be left. I cannot too strongly emphasise fact that Allied authorities in Thrace are doing all that is possible to reassure population, and should be glad if Greek Government could be so informed.

I think there would be some advantage in sending a British consular officer to Adrianople for next few weeks if only to check alarmist and tendencious reports sent here by French consul. Presence of a British consular officer would be useful in many ways, and, subject to your Lordship's sanction, I propose to send Mr. Matthews.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 209.)

No. 258.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 598.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 21, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 507.

Allied contingents and missions can, *if necessary*, remain for whole period of thirty days, Allied Governments, through Allied generals, being sole judges of exact moment when Allied contingents can or should leave.

Principle of evacuation scheme is, however, that it will be gradual. Generals will endeavour to draw up scheme for various districts fixing different dates before which Turkish gendarmerie and administration will not be introduced therein. This will be made known in each district and will give Greek civil administration and population opportunity and time for making their own plans for evacuation. Even after introduction of Turkish Administration it will not be *obligatory* for Allied contingents to withdraw before thirty days have elapsed. They will, however, be withdrawn so far as is possible gradually from various districts if and when Allied generals are satisfied that they can do so without prejudice to public order.

Allied generals and High Commissioners agreed on above interpretation.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 210.)

No. 259.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 515.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1922.*

GREEK Government, whose information is confirmed by Lindley's telegram No. 606 since received, represent that orders have been given by General Charpy, who claims to speak in the capacity of chief of the staff of the inter-Allied contingents in Eastern Thrace, that cereals, flour and cattle belonging to the Greek population now emigrating to Greece are to be retained in Thrace. As justification for this order, the French general is reported to allege the necessity of provisioning the incoming Turkish forces as well as Constantinople. M. Veniselos takes so grave a view of the inhuman cruelty of condemning the Greek population to starvation in order to make provision for the conquering Turks that he has advised the Greek Government to give order for slowing down the movement of retirement of the Greek army from Eastern Thrace until the refugees are enabled to take with them their movable property, particularly cereals and cattle, even if such delay should result in prolonging the stipulated period of fifteen days within which the evacuation was to be completed.

Please communicate at once with General Harington and ask for his observations. If the action of the French general is as reported, there seems strong ground for energetic protest and for insistence on his order being immediately cancelled. According to reports which reach M. Veniselos there is marked difference between attitude observed by British authorities and that of the French under General Charpy in the districts where their respective contingents are distributed. Have we any means of verifying and, if necessary, controlling French proceedings?

(Repeated to Athens, No. 326; and Paris (by bag), No. 389.)

No. 260.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 516.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

M. Veniselos has called my attention to a further demand, stated to have been put forward by General Charpy, that any arms, ammunition and military equipment which the Greek army in Eastern Thrace may not be able to evacuate within the time of their own withdrawal must be delivered to the Turks. I can hardly believe that such demand can have been made, and I presume that in any case matters of this kind have not been left by General Harington to be settled by the isolated action of one of the Allied generals without regard to a line of policy agreed upon by the generals or High Commissioners in common. The demand complained of appears *primâ facie* altogether unjustified. Please report.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 327; and Paris (by bag), No. 390.)

No. 261.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Hodgson (Moscow).

(No. 243.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 214 of 2nd October: Alleged closing of the Straits.

We are informing M. Berzin to-day that there is no truth in the alleged closing of the Straits to Soviet vessels.

[E 11372/10102/44] No. 262.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 21, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 350 to 354 of 17th instant regarding Egypt and Turkish Peace Conference.

I am anxious to explore possibility of Egypt's signing separate treaty with Turkey in order to liquidate situation between the two countries arising out of the war. My immediately following telegram contains outlines of communication which might be addressed on this subject to Sarwat, but regarding which I desire in the first instance to learn your views.

Above proposal is based on following considerations:—

1. If Egypt undertakes (*a*) to guarantee service of tribute loans (see my telegram No. 259), and (*b*) to conclude no agreement with Turkey which would in any way prejudice *status quo* regarding the four reserved subjects of declaration of 28th February, without previous consent of His Majesty's Government, exclusively British interests arising in articles 101, 109, 113 and 114 appear to be safeguarded. Of these Suez Canal and Soudan are clearly comprised in reserved subjects. Provisions of article 101 are much more Egyptian than British interests, but if Egypt gives the two above undertakings, His Majesty's Government will in return try to secure insertion of such an article in revised Turkish treaty.

2. Articles 112 and 428 constitute Allied and not exclusively British interests. Undertaking from Egypt in regard to former is essential part of present proposal. Latter, as being an essentially foreign interest, may be regarded as constituting one of reserved subjects.

3. Egypt might be allowed to make her own arrangements with Turkey regarding remaining articles 102 to 106, 108, 110 and 111, subject to any local considerations for which your Lordship may wish to provide. Memoranda in amplification follow by next bag.

[E 11372/10102/44] No. 263.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 265.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1922.

FOLLOWING is communication referred to in my immediately preceding telegram :—

While His Majesty's Government would welcome presence of any Egyptian representative at the seat of conference, the eventuality of Egypt being invited to sign the treaty is excluded for reasons given in my telegram No. 257. In view, however, of her newly acquired independence under the declaration of His Majesty King Fuad of 28th February, His Majesty's Government would be glad to see Egypt negotiating a separate treaty with Turkey, with the object of liquidating the situation between the two countries, arising out of the war.

In order to permit of such a procedure, His Majesty's Government are willing to endeavour to secure from Turkey, in the Treaty of Peace to be signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers, the recognition of Egypt's independence, and of her condominium in conjunction with Great Britain over the Soudan in the manner provided in article 113 of the Treaty of Sèvres, if Egypt, on her side, is prepared to guarantee the service of the tribute loans in the manner outlined in my telegram No. 259, and to give an undertaking that she will enter into no agreement with Turkey upon any point which conflicts with the maintenance of the *status quo* regarding the four reserved subjects mentioned in the declaration of 28th February, without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government.

[E 11262/27/44] No. 264.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 3189.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3150 of the 18th October, I have received indications from various quarters that the French Government intend to appoint M. Franklin-Bouillon as their chief plenipotentiary at the forthcoming conference at Lausanne.

2. These indications are supported by the significant omission of M. Poincaré in his letter to me of the 14th October of any reference to my suggestion that each Principal Allied Power might be represented by two plenipotentiaries, one a Cabinet Minister and the other the High Commissioner at Constantinople.

3. I shall be glad therefore if your Excellency will seek an early interview with M. Poincaré and explain orally to him that whatever view may be taken of the part played by M. Franklin-Bouillon in recent events, his appointment as a plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference would create a very unfortunate situation. Public opinion in England is unanimous in regarding the political activities of M. Franklin-Bouillon in Turkey with the greatest mistrust, not only owing to his having signed the agreement with Angora of October 1921, which in spite of the assurances of M. Briand's Government has always been regarded as something in the nature of a separate peace treaty by one Ally with one of the enemies of 1914, but also because his attitude in connection with, and during the recent conferences at Mudania has left the impression that there are few, if any, limits to the concessions which he is prepared to offer to Turkey as condition of peace. Furthermore, his activities there were such as very seriously to impair the personal confidence which ought to subsist between the representatives of the Allied Powers at a great international gathering. Whatever the gifts and attainments of M. Franklin-Bouillon, his sitting at the conference table as the plenipotentiary of France could not fail both in Turkey and in this country to be quite justifiably regarded as a demonstration of partisanship on an occasion when the most dispassionate qualities and reputation will be essential to the conclusion of an honourable and lasting peace.

4. Sir E. Crowe gave a general warning in the above sense to the French Ambassador here in conversation on the 15th October. But in order to avoid any unfortunate misunderstanding arising between us and the French Government on the subject, I request your Excellency to make a personal appeal to M. Poincaré in the sense

of this despatch. I cannot bring myself to believe that if he has gone so far as to contemplate it, he will persist in making an appointment, which would be so injurious to the great interests which France and Great Britain equally have in view.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11274/27/44] No. 265.

Foreign Office to M. Berzin.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1922.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state that he duly received the telegram addressed to him by M. Karakhan on the 1st October alleging that the British naval authorities had established a blockade of the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

2. Lord Curzon is surprised that M. Karakhan should have put forward this allegation in such emphatic language, before he had learnt the actual situation. No blockade has in fact been instituted and Russian Soviet vessels are as free to pass through the Straits to and from Russian Black Sea ports as they have been for the past year.

I am, &c.
L. OLIPHANT.

[E 11452/10524/44] No. 266.

Note by Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. VENISELOS called upon me to-day for the purpose of reinforcing what is said in the two attached notes,* which he brought with him, on the subject of the difficulties experienced in connection with the evacuation of the Greek population from Eastern Thrace. I told him that, from the latest reports we have received, we gathered that the arrangements for evacuation, although admittedly difficult, and necessarily accompanied by stress and hardship, were on the whole progressing more satisfactorily than might at first have been expected. M. Veniselos replied that he had no doubt whatever that this was true in those regions where British officers directed the operations; it was not true wherever the French were. He complained bitterly of the almost open hostility of General Charpy, who, he said, acted more like a Turkish agent than a general in command of Allied troops. He gave me, as an illustration of this, the fact (which is not mentioned in the two notes herewith) that the French general was actually demanding that any war material and equipment belonging to the Greek forces which the latter were unable, owing to want of time, to evacuate when the troops themselves withdrew must be delivered to the Turks, to whom, he claimed, it belonged of right, as the victorious belligerent.

M. Veniselos said that no Greek Government could possibly agree to such an outrageous demand; but for the moment the more serious difficulty that had arisen was a French demand that the stores of corn, flour, and stock of cattle belonging to the Greeks should not be allowed to be removed from Thrace except in small quantities, on the extraordinary ground that they were required for the support of the Turkish forces and for the victualling of Constantinople. Neither of these reasons were admissible. As for Constantinople, it had never been dependent on these sources of supply from Thrace; and the idea that the Greek refugees should be given over to starvation in order that the Turkish invader should on arrival find plenty of food, was so monstrous that M. Veniselos had taken upon himself to advise his Government not to yield in any way on this point, and if necessary rather to delay ("ralentir") the movement of evacuation of the troops to the Maritza line for a few days beyond the fortnight stipulated for, than to abandon these supplies.

M. Veniselos said he fully realised the grave responsibility he was taking in giving this advice, but he felt so strongly on the subject that he was unable to take any other course; and he came to express the earnest hope that the British Government would support them in resisting this French demand.

* Nos. 252 and 255.

I said I had not heard of this incident. I was rather under the impression that satisfactory arrangements had been made on the spot for moving the stock of flour, respecting which we had received representations from Athens, but M. Venizelos assured me that his news was dated to-day and was evidently authentic. I said Lord Curzon would no doubt authorise the sending of an immediate telegram to our High Commissioner on the subject.

I submit two draft telegrams herewith accordingly.

E. A. C.

October 21, 1922.

No. 267.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 600.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 22, 1922.

ATHENS telegram No. 606.

General Charpy's instructions to French military authorities, to whom alone he can issue orders, appeared to have been misrepresented in Athens, as, indeed, they have been here, possibly owing to individual and unauthorised action of certain French officers. He has informed High Commissioners that those instructions are that Greek population can take with it all its private property, live-stock, cereals, machinery, &c., but not be allowed to take away Moslem property. The latter is possibly a not altogether unnecessary precaution, and allowance must be made for some *contretemps* in execution of an operation so difficult and hurried as that of evacuation of Eastern Thrace, which, from all reports received hitherto by General Harington, would seem to be proceeding as satisfactorily as could be expected under the circumstances.

As regards cereals, efforts will be made to export all *bonâ fide* stocks of Greek army. Difficulty is to prove what is really Greek property previously acquired and not now requisitioned, but Allied commission is being despatched along railway to adjudicate as far as possible. It is not fair that Thrace should be denuded of stocks which are not Greek property.

It is possible that scheme which has been suggested for purchase of cereals by League of Nations and storage in depots of League in Thrace may materialise. It would possibly be most satisfactory solution of a real difficulty (see my immediately following telegram).

As regards proclamation regarding dates before which Turkish gendarmerie will not enter, please see my telegram No. 598.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 212.)

No. 268.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 536.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Paris, October* 22, 1922.

YOUR despatch No. 3189.

I have seen President of the Council, who assures me that there is no question of appointing Franklin-Bouillon as plenipotentiary at forthcoming Near East Conference.

Report of conversation will go by bag.

No. 269.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 538.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October* 22, 1922.

I TOOK the opportunity this morning of drawing M. Poincaré's attention to the orders given by General Charpy that the cereals, flour and cattle belonging to the Greek population now emigrating to Greece should be retained in Thrace for

provisioning the incoming Turkish forces, as well as Constantinople, as reported in your telegram to Sir Horace Rumbold No. 515 of yesterday. M. Poincaré told me that the Greek Minister had come to see him yesterday on the same subject, and he had expressed to him the opinion that there could be no question of depriving the Greek emigrants of their possessions and that payment would have to be made to the Greeks for their crops in the settlement which would become necessary after the evacuation had taken place. As for prolonging the stipulated period of fifteen days for the completion of the evacuation, he was entirely opposed to any such idea, which would be likely to produce both difficult and disastrous results.

[E 11431/10102/44] No. 270.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 361.)
(Telegraphic.) *Ramleh, October* 22, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 264 and 265.

It is material to my consideration of your Lordship's proposal that I should know whether Powers who will be parties to treaty are agreed in excluding Egypt from being a signatory to that treaty, and will be unable to suggest the contrary.

I should be grateful for information on this point.

[E 11462/10524/44] No. 271.

Secretary-General, League of Nations, to Cabinet Offices.—(*Received in Foreign Office, October* 23.)

Greek and Armenian Refugees from Asia Minor.

IN accordance with article 2 of the first recommendation regarding the financial administration of the League adopted by the Second Assembly on the 4th October, 1921, the Secretary-General has the honour to inform the members of the League that, at the ninth meeting of its twenty-first session, the council adopted the following resolution:—

"The council decides to put at the disposal of Dr. Nansen from the item 'Unforeseen expenditure' (item 25 of the budget for 1922) the sum of 100,000 Swiss francs to enable the necessary administrative measures to be taken for a period which would allow for adequate arrangements to be made from other sources."

League of Nations, Geneva,
October 15, 1922.

[E 11436/10102/44]. No. 272.

Imperial War Graves Commission to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 23.)

Sir, 32, *Baker Street, London, October* 20, 1922.

I AM directed by the Imperial War Graves Commission to refer to Foreign Office letters of the 21st December, 1921, and the 13th October last, and to state, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, that, in addition to those on the Gallipoli Peninsula, there are known British war graves at the following places in Turkey of the Treaty of Sèvres:—

Constantinople and District.

Osmanieh Indian cemetery.
Top-Kapu Moslem cemetery.
Ok-Maidan Indian cemetery.
Feri-Keui Protestant cemetery.
Mashlak Indian and Mahommedan cemetery.
San Stefano Roman Catholic cemetery.

Asia Minor—

As shown in the blue print accompanying this letter.*

Smyrna and District.

Manisa Protestant cemetery.
Manisa Catholic cemetery.
Smyrna Caravan Bridge Anglican cemetery.
Smyrna Catholic cemetery.
Smyrna Zeitun Mezerlik Olive cemetery (Moslem).
Smyrna Campus of American College (Indian).
Budja Protestant cemetery.

There will be concentrated into this area 1,500 graves from the line of the Bagdad Railway.

Island of Mitylene.

Pera Matus Greek cemetery, community of Massagiou.
Nessa old aerodrome site, community of St. Parakeuy.
Loutra—location not known.

These war graves will eventually be concentrated into one of the Greek islands.

2. Provisional plans of the peninsula sites of which concession was required by the commission were forwarded to you in October of last year for submission to the Turkish Government so soon as the treaty might come into force. Those plans have since been modified by certain necessary concentrations and by the addition of the commission's requirements at Kelid Bahr. A set of amended plans for the peninsula, together with a plan of the graves at Kelid Bahr, is forwarded for convenience of reference,* but the commission desire me to say that, having received no lists from the Turkish Government in accordance with article 225 of the treaty, their requirements outside the Gallipoli Peninsula may need amplification as further discoveries of British graves come to their knowledge.

3. The commission assume that, for their requirements in Mesopotamia and Palestine, they are adopting the proper course in negotiating for these through His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that territory west of the Maritza, notably at Dedeagach and Kavalla, containing British war graves, will not be affected by the forthcoming conference.

As to Beirout and Damascus, where there are British war cemeteries, I am to refer to the above-quoted Foreign Office letter of the 21st December, in which it was suggested that, upon the final conclusion of peace with Turkey, these questions should be raised again.

4. With regard to paragraph 3 of your letter, I am to state that the commission, urged by public pressure at home, and in Australia and New Zealand, have established an office on the peninsula for the purpose of concentrating outlying graves and commencing the work of permanent construction of the cemeteries, to that extent anticipating the provisions of articles 219 and 222 of the treaty. The commission, therefore, would not welcome any suggestions for further concentration on the peninsula.

Some time ago contracts were placed for the construction of the cemeteries that the commission have definitely decided to retain, and the work of construction is now nearing completion.

The commission have also, owing to the difficulty of cartage of heavy materials along the then existing roads on the peninsula, reconstructed those roads that give access to the cemeteries, and they would require the Turkish Government to maintain the roads in accordance with the provisions of article 222.

5. In these circumstances I am to submit, for the consideration of Lord Curzon, that there should be made only such modifications in the treaty as would serve to give effect to the change of sovereignty and give recognition to the measures the commission have taken in anticipation of the treaty's coming into force.

6. I enclose a draft showing in parallel columns the existing provisions and the modifications which at present appear to the commission to be necessary to give effect to their requirements, and I am to say that if the transfer of full and exclusive ownership of the land should prove any great obstacle, the commission would not object to the acquisition of the land by the Turkish Government, in the Turkish Government's

* Not printed.

name, for the sole use of the commission in perpetuity, so that without any actual transfer of ownership the concession in perpetuity of all rights necessary for the commission's purposes may be sufficiently assured.

7. I am to remind you that this question is one which has continually caused anxiety to the Imperial Government and the self-governing Dominions concerned, and at the Imperial Conference of 1917 it was definitely dealt with, after much discussion, in the resolution unanimously adopted, viz. :—

> ". . . . The conference places on record its very deep appreciation of the generous action of the French Government in allotting in perpetuity the land in that country where our men are buried, and urges that similar arrangements shall be made, if possible, in the terms of peace with all Governments—ally, enemy or neutral—for a similar concession in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Africa and all other theatres of war. . . ."

8. I am to add that, should at any future time authority extending to these matters be given to the League of Nations, the commission would be glad of the opportunity of considering whether advantage could be taken of ensuring still further the sanctity of British war graves in these territories.

I am, &c.
FABIAN WARE, *Vice-Chairman.*

Enclosure in No. 272.

SECTION II.—*Graves.*

[The modifications in column 2 are made on the assumption that Greece may be given or retain sovereignty over some part of Turkish territory outside the Gallipoli Peninsula.]

Column 1.—*Present Provisions.*	Column 2.—*Suggested Modifications.*
ARTICLE 218.	ARTICLE 218.
The Turkish Government shall transfer to the British, French and Italian Governments respectively full and exclusive rights of ownership over the land within the boundaries of Turkey, as fixed by the present treaty, in which are situated the graves of their soldiers and sailors who fell in action or died from wounds, accident or disease, as well as over the land required for laying out cemeteries or erecting memorials to these soldiers and sailors and providing means of access to such cemeteries or memorials.	The Turkish Government shall transfer to the British, French and Italian Governments respectively full and exclusive rights of ownership over the land within the boundaries of Turkey, as fixed by the present treaty, in which are situated the graves of their soldiers and sailors who fell in action or died from wounds, accident or disease, as well as over the land required for laying out cemeteries or erecting memorials to these soldiers and sailors and providing means of access to such cemeteries or memorials.
The Greek Government undertakes to fulfil the same obligation so far as concerns *the portion of the zone of the Straits and the islands* placed under its sovereignty.	The Greek Government undertakes to fulfil the same obligation so far as concerns the *land* placed under its sovereignty.
ARTICLE 219.	ARTICLE 219.
Within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, the British, French and Italian Governments will respectively notify to the Turkish Government and the Greek Government the land of which the ownership is to be transferred to them in accordance with article 218. The British, French and Italian Governments will each have the right to appoint a commission, which shall be exclusively	Within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, the British, French and Italian Governments will respectively notify to the Turkish Government and the Greek Government the land of which the ownership is to be transferred to them in accordance with article 218. The British, French and Italian Governments will each have the right to appoint a commission, which shall be exclusively

entitled to examine the areas where burials have or may have taken place, and to make suggestions with regard to the re-grouping of graves and the sites where cemeteries are eventually to be established. The Turkish Government and the Greek Government may be represented on these commissions and shall give them all assistance in carrying out their mission.

The *said* land will include in particular the land in the Gallipoli Peninsula shown on map No. 3; the limits of this land will be notified to the *Greek* Government as provided in the preceding paragraph. The Government in whose favour the transfer is made undertakes not to employ the land, nor to allow it to be employed, for any purpose other than that to which it is dedicated. The shore may not be employed for any military, marine or commercial purpose.

entitled to examine the areas, *elsewhere than in the Gallipoli Peninsula*, where burials have or may have taken place, and to make suggestions with regard to the regrouping of graves and the sites where cemeteries are eventually to be established. The Turkish Government and the Greek Government may be represented on these commissions and shall give them all assistance in carrying out their mission.

The land *to be transferred* will include in particular the land in the Gallipoli Peninsula shown on map No. 3, *and other land in the Gallipoli Peninsula that the British, French or Italian Governments may have already established as cemeteries or sites of memorials*; the limits of this land will be notified to the *Turkish* Government as provided in the preceding paragraph. The Government in whose favour the transfer is made undertakes not to employ the land, nor to allow it to be employed, for any purpose other than that to which it is dedicated. The shore may not be employed for any military, marine or commercial purpose.

ARTICLES 220-225 inclusive.

As originally drawn.

[E 11452/10524/44] No. 273.

M. Venizelos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, October* 21, 1922.

AS your Lordship will be doubtless aware from a note of M. Caclamanos of this date, information has reached the Greek Government that General Charpy, Chief of the Staff of the inter-Allied contingents in Eastern Thrace, has ordered the retention of cereals and cattle belonging to the Greek population now leaving this province for Greece.

Your Lordship realises, I am sure, that such a measure deprives the Greek population, in their emigration, of any means of subsistence and aggravates their lamentable exodus to an extent little differing from complete disaster. Cereals and cattle belonging to the Greeks are the sole possession left them after the loss of their homes and lands, and constitutes a product of their personal toil and hard work.

I deem it my duty to inform your Lordship that on the reception of such distressing news I did not hesitate to advise the Greek Government to give orders that the further retirement of the Greek army from Eastern Thrace should be temporarily slowed down until the population leaving that province could be enabled to take with them their movable belongings, this being the only way in which their maintenance in Greece could be facilitated for some time and lessen the burden falling now on Greece, for the assistance of hundreds of thousands of refugees coming from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace.

I have, &c.
E. K. VENISELOS.

[E 11459/10524/44] No. 274.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, October* 21, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to draw your Lordship's kind attention to the following information which I have just received from Athens:—

Owing to the vagueness of the text of the Mudania Protocol, and in the absence of a precise interpretation thereof, the Greek populations of Eastern Thrace, fearing that the arrival of the Turkish gendarmes—whose approach they look upon with terror—will follow almost immediately upon the withdrawal of the Greek troops, abandon their homes as soon as our troops retire. In the panic produced by this precipitate departure, they take to the road utterly destitute and leaving behind them the greater part of their possessions. The congestion of tens of thousands of fleeing refugees on the roadways increases daily, and painful scenes are to be feared if such a situation continues.

I am instructed by my Government to request your Lordship to be good enough to cause a definite and clear interpretation to be given to the Protocol of Mudania, whereby a minimum time-limit would be fixed between the completion of the evacuation by the Greek troops and the arrival of the Turkish gendarmes. If this were to be done, and instructions in this sense forwarded to the inter-Allied authorities of Thrace, it would be the only way of reassuring the panic-stricken populations of that province and of rendering their emigration under more normal conditions possible.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

[E 11460/10524/44] No. 275.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, October* 21, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Lordship's notice the following facts contained in a telegram just received from Athens, and venture to draw your Lordship's kind attention thereto.

According to the information of the Greek Government from Eastern Thrace, the situation of the Christian populations there grows worse every day, notwithstanding the efforts of the Greek authorities for the maintenance of order. The attitude of the French and Italian contingents renders the task of the Greek authorities very difficult, for the former refuse their assistance. Thus the Prefect of Kirk Kilisse reports that his negotiations with the French officer presiding over the Inter-Allied Mission of that locality have been altogether fruitless, the French troops in that region refusing to assist our authorities in maintaining order, which the Greek gendarmerie alone is unable to secure, owing to its small numbers, and to the uprise of the Turkish population and the menace of bands of irregulars. On the other hand, the Greek authorities of Lule Burgas and Vizyi are being prevented by the Italian detachments from transporting even the files of their administration.

I have the honour to request your Lordship, on behalf of my Government, to be so kind as to issue instructions, through the Allied Commander-in-chief, Sir Charles Harington, at your earliest convenience, in order that inter-Allied detachments and missions should not only cause no difficulties to the task of the Greek authorities in their efforts to secure order, but that they should give them every possible aid and assistance.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that these facts are already brought to the knowledge of the French and Italian Governments by the Greek representatives in Paris and Rome.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

[E 11439/27/44] No. 276.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 2468.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 21st October, respecting the association of the French Government in the joint remonstrance against Mustapha Kemal's intention of trying as traitors volunteers in the Greek forces.

Paris, October 22, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 276

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Paris, le 21 octobre 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR une lettre en date du 9 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que, d'après une communication faite par l'Ambassadeur d'Italie à Londres au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, Mustapha Kémal aurait l'intention de juger les prisonniers de guerre originaires de l'Anatolie, sous l'inculpation de haute trahison et de les passer par les armes. Elle ajoutait que, suivant la proposition du Gouvernement italien, le Gouvernement royal avait prescrit au Haut-Commissaire britannique à Constantinople de se joindre à son collègue italien, pour faire auprès du Gouvernement d'Angora une démarche en faveur de ces prisonniers et qu'il souhaiterait que le Général Pellé reçût des instructions dans le même sens.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que, saisi de cette question par la Légation de Grèce à Paris, j'avais, dès le 6 octobre, prescrit au Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople de s'efforcer de faire insérer dans la convention d'armistice une clause visant ces prisonniers J'ajoutais qu'il devait appuyer, auprès du Gouvernement d'Angora, l'action de ses collègues alliés en faveur de cette catégorie de sujets ottomans.

Veuillez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

[E 11441/27/44] No. 277.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 2470.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 21st October, 1922, forwarding the text of a telegram to the French Ambassador in London suggesting certain modifications in the invitation to the Powers to the Near East Peace Conference.

Paris, October 22, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 277.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Paris, le 21 octobre 1922.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

APRÈS avoir pris connaissance de la lettre de Lord Curzon que vous m'avez transmise, et des projets d'invitation à adresser aux Puissances qui doivent être convoquées à la Conférence de la Paix par la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie, j'ai envoyé à M. de Saint-Aulaire un télégramme pour lui dire que je donnais mon adhésion à ces projets, sous certaines réserves de détail. Je m'empresse de vous communiquer ci-joint, pour votre information, le texte de ce télégramme.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 277.

M. Poincaré to Comte de Saint-Aulaire.

(Télégraphique.)

VEUILLEZ faire savoir d'urgence à Lord Curzon que, sous les réserves suivantes, je donne mon adhésion aux projets d'invitation, joints à sa lettre personnelle du 20 octobre :

1. Remplacer dans tous les projets les mots "a final treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey" par les mots "un traité de paix mettant fin à la guerre en Orient." Grecs n'étaient pas, en effet, nos alliés dans la dernière partie de la guerre.

2. Dans les invitations à la Bulgarie et à la Russie soviétique, supprimer les mots "in the war between the Allies and Turkey."

3. Dans l'invitation à la Russie soviétique, supprimer le dernier paragraphe pour ne pas poser nous-mêmes la question de la Géorgie.

4. Dans l'invitation à la Russie soviétique, après les mots "to take part in the discussion on the question of the Straits," ajouter, conformément à ma suggestion, approuvée par Lord Curzon, la phrase suivante : "Le protocole de signature restera ouvert pour permettre au Gouvernement russe de signer dès qu'il y en aura un de reconnu *de jure* par les Puissances, cette admission ne préjugeant en aucune manière la question de la reconnaissance."

Si Lord Curzon accepte ces modifications, je vous prie de me télégraphier le texte français des invitations sur lequel vous serez tombé d'accord avec lui, pour que, suivant la procédure indiquée par le principal Secrétaire d'État, je puisse les faire parvenir aux Gouvernements intéressés.

[E 11442/27/44] No. 278.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 2473.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 22, 1922.

ON receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 3189 of yesterday's date, I called upon the President of the Council at 9·30 this morning, and spoke to him fully in that sense.

M. Poincaré, with his usual attitude of assuming the defensive, stated that he wished to make it perfectly clear that the French Government claimed the right to appoint as plenipotentiaries in the Near East Conference anybody they liked. I at once disclaimed any intention on the part of your Lordship to encroach upon the rights of the French Government, which were indubitable in such a case, although it was at the same time perfectly legitimate on the part of His Majesty's Government to point out to the French Government the disadvantages that might accrue from the appointment of any particular person as their representative.

As regards M Franklin-Bouillon's association with the Angora Agreement of 1921, M. Poincaré reminded me that he had constantly in his articles protested against the manner in which this agreement had been concluded, but, he remarked, the blame was not to be attributed so much to M. Franklin-Bouillon as to the Government who directed him in this matter. He reminded me that you had approved of the despatch of M. Franklin-Bouillon to Smyrna, and that he himself would not have sent him without your assent. On the whole, he considers that M. Franklin-Bouillon did well at Smyrna, although he was not of quite the same opinion as regards his proceedings at Mudania. When M. Franklin-Bouillon returned to Paris, he asked at once if he would be appointed a plenipotentiary in the Near East Conference. M. Poincaré had given an evasive reply, for he did not consider that M. Franklin-Bouillon's relations with Mustapha Kemal would conduce to the efficient protection of French interests, the defence of which must necessarily arise during the progress of the forthcoming conference. He had therefore never seriously thought for a moment of appointing M. Franklin-Bouillon as one of the French representatives. The question of their selection had preoccupied him greatly, and he told me confidentially that he was considering the names of M. Leygues, now President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies, and former President of the Council, and

M. Bompard, former Ambassador at Petrograd and Constantinople, and now a member of the Senate. He asked me my opinion as to the nomination of these two gentlemen, and as I happened to know both of them, I expressed my personal view that they would be very suitable. He mentioned that he had already discussed their appointment with the President of the Republic, who entirely approved of their selection.

I remarked to M. Poincaré that I had seen statements in the press to the effect that the Turks desired the conference to be held at Lugano rather than at Lausanne. M. Poincaré replied that he had made enquiries as to the origin of this rumour, and he had ascertained that the Turks had put forward the suggestion because they feared that they would find Lausanne to be a centre of Greek intrigue, because Lausanne is associated with the Turco-Italian Treaty, which they do not like, and because Lugano is a more cosmopolitan and mundane place. He himself would greatly prefer Lausanne, because Lugano had not been sympathetic to the *Entente* during the war, and because we did not wish the conference to assume the character of some of the previous conferences which had been held at San Remo and elsewhere. Still, he would prefer that the conference should take place at Lugano if the Turks raise an absolute objection to its being held at Lausanne, rather than that it should collapse.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

No. 279.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 613. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 22, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that French President of the Council had said to him in Paris that there could be no question of obtaining anything in nature of Capitulations from Kemalists. They must be treated as absolute equals.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 280.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 605.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 22, 1922.*

FOUR hundred Christian refugees, consisting almost entirely of old women and children, arrived this morning from Chile, which is on the border of the neutral zone on the Ismid Peninsula. Refugees state that young girls were abducted and men detained by the Turks. Turkish gendarmerie forcibly made them embark at Chile and relieved them of their money in payment for this service.

Another report states that there are 7,000 more Christians waiting on the beach at Chile. Greek High Commissioner, with whom I am in touch, is hiring a couple of ships to-morrow to bring away remaining refugees at Chile.

British vice-consul at Smyrna reports that Nationalist troops have desecrated British cemetery at Bournabat. Another report states that they stabled their horses in an English church.

I have mentioned above incidents as an illustration of the attitude of the Kemalists, and of what may happen to Christian minorities which may be left in Eastern Thrace or in Constantinople. Whilst people like Refet Pasha may be sincere in assuring Christians of protection, no confidence whatever can be placed in subordinate officials and gendarmerie, who seem to be animated by a spirit of blind chauvinism.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 215.)

No. 281.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 607.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 515 and 516 have been shown to General Harington.

Charpy has never claimed to speak as chief of staff of the inter-Allied contingents in Thrace, and has certainly never been appointed to any such position, nor would orders by him be received or recognised either by British or Italian contingents.

Demand referred to in first paragraph of your telegram No. 516 has never been put forward by General Charpy, and presumption in last paragraph of same telegram is correct. Local commander of French contingent was reported to have issued certain instructions both as regards cereals and army stores, tending to delay their removal, but General Charpy has sent necessary instructions to have these cancelled.

It must be remembered that cereals now claimed to be part of Greek army stores apparently include whole of cereals in Eastern Thrace purchased by a private syndicate in Athens, who were negotiating for their transport to Greece some three months ago. Claim to regard these cereals as part of Greek army supplies has only been put forward since compulsory evacuation of Thrace was imposed on Greeks.

Allied High Commissioners and generals have agreed that cereals actually belonging to, and necessary for, maintenance of army are to go first [? and] Allied Mission leaves to-day to visit each station to act in name of generals and settle what cereals are to go now and what are to remain. Meantime, Nansen is trying to arrange purchase of all grain left in Thrace to be guarded for the time being by Allied troops.

Stories emanating from Greek sources as regards evacuation of Thrace should be received with utmost caution.

Please see General Harington's telegram to War Office numbered 2816 dated 22nd October, which is based on reports received from all Allied Missions there.

General Harington has received an expression of thanks from General Nider for efforts being made.

British officers are on each Allied Mission in all districts and keep General Harington informed. Allied generals are working together, but difficulty is with management of Orient Railway Company, which is French and obstructive in view of lack of guarantees of payment.

No. 282.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 608.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 23, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is summary of note from Angora to Allied High Commissioners, which has, however, not yet been formally communicated to us:—

"We are receiving from all sources information that Mussulman population in Greece, Macedonia, Crete and Ægean Islands is being maltreated, massacred and evicted from homes. Atrocities also continue in Thrace in spite of Allied promises. Civilians removed there from Asia Minor have not yet been returned. Turkish officer who, at General Harington's invitation, flew from San Stefano to Lule Burgas saw villages and crops burning. Many villages have been sacked by Greeks and inhabitants tortured. We must protest against the indifference shown by Great Powers, which is in marked contrast to interest shown to Christians. The Mussulmans mentioned above, whether in Thrace or deported from Anatolia, should be protected by Great Powers in accordance with their engagements; instead, Allies are constantly interesting themselves in fate of Christians who, having carried arms against their own country, are nothing but simple criminals.

"We formally protest against partial attitude adopted by Powers, which delays pacification. We request you to intervene with Greek Government to stop atrocities in Greece and islands, and to release civilians removed from Asia Minor."

(Repeated to Athens, No. 219.)

No. 283.

[Nil.]

No. 284.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received October 23, 1922.)

(No. 539.)
(Telegraphic.)
FRENCH newspapers of this morning quote statement from the "Observer" that His Majesty's Government have requested French Government that Near Eastern Conference should be postponed to a date later than 13th November. Ministry for Foreign Affairs have telephoned to enquire as to truth of this.

May I reply that His Majesty's Government have no intention of asking for a postponement?

No. 285.

Telegram (by Telephone) to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 539.

There is no truth in the statement. Since new Government is not yet formed, it would obviously not be accurate to refer to any "intention" of theirs.

[E 11323/27/44] No. 286.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).**

(No. 3200.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 23, 1922.*

I TRANSMIT the accompanying copy of a note addressed to me by M. Aharonian regarding Armenian representation at the Peace Conference with Turkey.†

2. On the assumption that a similar note has been addressed to the French and Italian Governments, I shall be glad if you will ascertain from the French Government whether they will concur in a reply in the following sense:—

3. The three Principal Allied Governments regret that, owing to the adoption by the Republic of Armenia, whose *de jure* independence has been recognised, of the Soviet form of Government, they cannot see their way to admit the participation of Armenia in the approaching peace conference or her signature of the new treaty. The case of Armenia was carefully considered at the Paris Conference of March last, not only on its own merits, but also in connection with the protection of minorities in general. The Allied Governments are not aware that anything has occurred to invalidate the broad conclusions which were then arrived at and which will doubtless form the basis of discussions when the question is reached in the preparation of the new treaty.

4. Should the conference consider it desirable to consult Armenian opinion on any of these points in the course of its proceedings, the necessary invitation will be sent by

* Also to Rome, No. 1314, October 23. † No 247.

the conference to the Armenian national delegation in Paris, which is understood to include representatives of both Russian and Turkish Armenians.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 11437/27/44] No. 287.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 886.)
HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Military Convention between the Allied Powers, the Grand National Assembly and Greece, signed at Mudania on the 11th October, 1922.

Constantinople, October 12, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 287.

Convention militaire entre les Puissances alliées, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et la Grèce.

CONFORMÉMENT aux termes de la note adressée au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie par les Puissances alliées le 23 septembre 1922 et de la note adressée aux Puissances alliées par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie le 19 septembre 1922, des réunions entre les généraux alliés:

Pour la Grande-Bretagne	Le Général Harington.
Pour l'Italie	Le Général Mombelli.
Pour la France	Le Général Charpy.
Pour le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de la Turquie ...	Le Général Ismet Pacha.
Pour la Grèce	Le Général Mazarakis,

ont été tenues à Moudania, le 3 octobre 1922 et jours suivants.

Les Gouvernements alliés ayant décidé de remettre au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie la Thrace orientale, y compris Andrinople, le but de cette conférence était:

1. De préciser la ligne au delà de laquelle les forces grecques seront invitées à se retirer de la Thrace orientale;

2. D'établir les modalités d'évacuation des troupes et de l'administration helléniques et de l'installation de l'administration et de la gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie dans ce territoire;

3. D'assurer le contrôle de cette région pendant la période transitoire en vue de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique.

Les délégués se sont mis d'accord sur les points suivants:

1. Les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques à la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

2. La ligne derrière laquelle les troupes helléniques de Thrace seront invitées à se retirer dès la mise en vigueur de la présente convention est constituée par la rive gauche de la Maritza, de son embouchure dans la mer Égée jusqu'au point où elle traverse la frontière de Thrace avec la Bulgarie.

3. Afin d'éviter toutes complications possibles jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, la rive droite de la Maritza (Kara-Agatch inclus) sera occupée par des contingents alliés qui seront installés en des points à déterminer par les Alliés.

4. La portion de voie ferrée longeant la rive droite de la Maritza de Swilengrad (Jizr Mustapha-Pacha) à Kuléli-Bourgas sera l'objet d'une surveillance (à régler par une convention spéciale) par une commission militaire mixte comprenant un délégué de chacune des trois Puissances alliées, un délégué de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et un délégué de la Grèce, en vue de maintenir intégralement le libre parcours de cette section de voie qui permet l'accès de la région d'Andrinople.

5. L'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes grecques commencera dès la mise en vigueur de cette convention. Elle comprendra les troupes elles-mêmes, les services et formations militaires et leurs moyens de transport divers, ainsi que les approvisionnements stockés en matériel de guerre, munitions, dépôts de vivres.

Cette évacuation sera effectuée dans le délai d'environ quinze jours.

6. Les autorités civiles helléniques, y compris la gendarmerie, seront retirées aussitôt que possible. Au fur et à mesure que les autorités helléniques se retireront de chaque région administrative, les pouvoirs civils seront remis aux autorités alliées, qui les transmettront autant que possible le jour même aux autorités turques. Pour l'ensemble de la région de Thrace, cette remise devra être terminée dans un délai maximum de trente jours après la fin de l'évacuation par les troupes grecques.

7. Les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie seront accompagnés de forces de gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, d'effectif strictement nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité locale, à la surveillance de la frontière et des chemins de fer.

L'effectif total de ces forces ne dépassera pas 8,000 (officiers compris).

8. Les opérations de retrait des troupes grecques et la transmission de l'administration civile s'effectueront sous la direction de missions interalliées, qui seront installées dans les principaux centres. Le rôle de ces missions est de s'entremettre pour faciliter les opérations ci-dessus de retrait et de transmission. Elles s'efforceront d'empêcher les excès de toute nature.

9. En outre de ces missions, des contingents alliés occuperont la Thrace orientale.

Ces contingents, composés d'environ sept bataillons, assureront le maintien de l'ordre et serviront de soutien aux missions interalliées ci-dessus.

10. Le retrait des missions et des contingents alliés aura lieu trente jours après que l'évacuation des troupes grecques aura été terminée.

Ce retrait pourra avoir lieu à une date plus rapprochée, pourvu que les Gouvernements alliés soient d'accord pour considérer que des mesures suffisantes ont été prises pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la protection des populations non turques. C'est ainsi que lorsque l'administration et la gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie fonctionneront régulièrement dans une division administrative ; les missions et contingents alliés pourront être retirés de cette division administrative avant l'expiration du délai de trente jours prévu.

11. En Asie, les troupes du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'arrêteront sur les lignes suivantes, qui ne devront pas être dépassées jusqu'à l'ouverture et pendant la Conférence de la Paix :

Région de Chanak : Une ligne à une distance d'environ 15 kilom. de la côte asiatique des Dardanelles, ayant pour origine Koum Bournou au sud et rejoignant Boz Bournou (nord de Lampsaki) au nord

Péninsule d'Ismid : Une ligne allant de Daridjé sur le golfe d'Ismid à Chilé sur la mer Noire en passant par Guebzé ; ces localités incluses au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

La route allant de Daridjé à Chilé pourra être utilisée en commun par les troupes alliées et celles du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Les lignes ci-dessus seront délimitées par des commissions mixtes composées d'un officier de chacune des armées alliées et d'un officier de l'armée du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Les Gouvernements alliés et le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, tout en prenant les précautions nécessaires pour prévenir tout incident, s'engagent à ne pas augmenter les effectifs de leurs troupes et à ne pas entreprendre de fortifications ou travaux militaires dans les régions ci-dessous :

Région de Chanak : A partir des Dardanelles jusqu'à une distance de 15 kilom. à l'est de la ligne Boz Bournou-Koum Bournou.

Péninsule d'Ismid : A partir du Bosphore jusqu'à une distance de 40 kilom. à l'est de la ligne Daridjé-Chilé.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'engage à ne pas placer d'artillerie à moins de 15 kilom. de la côte entre Boz Bournou (nord de Lampsaki) et Kara Bournou (nord de Kara Bigha) inclus.

12. La présence des troupes alliées sera maintenue sur les territoires où elles sont stationnées actuellement—territoires que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'engage à respecter jusqu'à décision de la Conférence de la Paix—savoir :

Péninsule de Constantinople : Toute la partie de la péninsule située à l'est de la ligne marquée par un point de la mer Noire à 7 kilom. nord-ouest de Podima, Istrandja, Kichtaghi, Sinekli, Kara-Sinan-Tchiflik, Kara-Keuy, Yénidjé, Fladina-Tchiflik, Calicratis ; tous ces points inclus.

Péninsule de Gallipoli : Toute la partie de la péninsule de Gallipoli au sud de la ligne Bakla-Bournou, cap Xéros, Boulaïr, embouchure du Soghluck ; tous ces points inclus.

13. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'engage à ne pas transporter de troupes ni à lever ou entretenir une armée en Thrace orientale jusqu'à la ratification du Traité de Paix.

14. La présente convention entrera en vigueur trois jours après sa signature, c'est-à-dire à minuit le 14–15 octobre 1922 (N.S.).

Faite en quatre feuillets[a] à Moudania (en français), ce 11 octobre (N.S.) 1922.

Pour la Grande-Bretagne,
G. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-Général.*
Pour l'Italie,
E. MOMBELLI.
Pour la France,
CH. CHARPY.
Pour le Gouvernement de grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie,
N. ISMET.
Pour la Grèce,

Première Déclaration des Délégués militaires hellènes devant la Réunion des Généraux alliés à Moudania.

La délégation hellénique a déjà exposé devant la réunion des généraux alliés qu'elle considère la proposition qui lui a été faite concernant le retrait des troupes grecques à l'ouest de la Maritza comme une solution politique et non comme une mesure d'ordre purement militaire.

Cette proposition, en effet, préjuge les décisions de la future Conférence de la Paix et leur acceptation par le Gouvernement hellénique, les pouvoirs et les attributions des délégués militaires grecs ne leur permettant pas d'envisager des décisions politiques et de les discuter.

C'est sous ces réserves que les délégués ont pris connaissance du projet qui leur a été remis. Ils ne peuvent pas en discuter les détails, étant donné que, pour les raisons précitées, il leur est impossible d'en accepter le fond.

GÉNÉRAL AL. MAZARAKIS.
COLONEL PT. SARRIYANIS.

Moudania, le 6 octobre 1922.

Deuxième Déclaration de la Délégation hellénique devant la Réunion des Généraux alliés à Moudania.

Les délégués hellènes invités à prendre part à la réunion des généraux alliés prévue par la note du 10/23 septembre se sont trouvés à leur arrivée à Moudania devant des décisions radicales déjà prises qui leur ont été communiquées et à l'élaboration desquelles leur avis n'avait pas été demandé.

Ils ont déclaré qu'ils n'étaient pas autorisés à accepter des décisions tellement importantes et à en discuter les détails de l'exécution.

Se trouvant aujourd'hui devant des décisions définitives des grandes Puissances alliées - décisions qui en réalité sont imposées au Gouvernement hellénique - ils se voient obligés, malgré leur profonde douleur, de s'incliner, et, autorisés par leur Gouvernement de déclarer en son nom :

1. Ils n'acceptent comme ligne maxima de retrait des troupes helléniques de la Thrace orientale (article 2 du projet) que la ligne frontière entre la Turquie et la

[a] This refers to the original typescript.

Bulgarie fixée en 1915, étant donné que la région comprise entre cette ligne et celle proposée dans le projet de convention appartenait à la Bulgarie à partir de 1915, qu'elle fut cédée par celle-ci aux grandes Puissances alliées en vertu du Traité de Neuilly et qu'à leur tour elles en firent cession à la Grèce. Les délégués hellènes ne peuvent, par conséquent, pas accepter l'évacuation jusqu'à la conclusion du Traité de Paix de la partie de la forteresse d'Andrinople sise sur la rive droite de la Maritza et comprenant les forts, la gare et la ville de Kara-Agatch comme située dans la région précitée.

Ils acceptent la surveillance du tronçon de la voie ferrée entre Kuléli-Bourgas et Swilengrad par une commission mixte interalliée, turque et hellénique.

2. Ils acceptent la clause (article 1er du projet) d'après laquelle les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques à la date de l'entrée en vigueur de la convention.

3. Ils acceptent (article 5 du projet) l'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes helléniques avec leurs services, formations, dépôts, &c. Mais, considérant que toutes les opérations qui, d'ailleurs, coïncideraient avec le départ des populations chrétiennes indigènes, exigent un délai plus long pour être effectuées en ordre et sans confusion, les délégués insistent pour que le délai de quinze jours soit porté au moins à un mois.

4. Quant à la transmission des pouvoirs civils (article 6 du projet), ils doivent attirer toute l'attention des généraux alliés sur les conséquences graves que pourrait avoir la remise trop hâtive de l'administration et de la gendarmerie aux mains des Turcs. Si l'on pense aux centaines de milliers d'habitants qui voudront quitter le pays avec tout ce qu'ils peuvent emporter de leur fortune, on comprendra que c'est un minimum d'humanité à accorder à ces populations malheureuses, déracinées pour la deuxième fois de leur pays natal dans l'espace de quelques années, que de leur fournir tout le temps et toutes les facilités nécessaires.

Les délégués hellènes estiment que le seul moyen efficace serait la remise de l'administration aux troupes alliées, qui le maintiendraient au moins pendant un mois jusqu'à ce que ces populations soient évacuées en ordre et en sûreté sous la protection et sous la responsabilité des autorités alliées.

5. Les délégués hellènes estiment que, pour effectuer l'évacuation sans désordre et pour la sécurité des populations, les missions et les contingents alliés prévus par le projet (articles 8 et 9) sont insuffisants. Il faudrait prévoir non seulement des excès possibles de la part de l'élément ou des autorités turques contre les populations chrétiennes, mais aussi l'irruption de bandes d'irréguliers, turques et bulgares, qui pourraient profiter de l'occasion pour se livrer au brigandage et à des sévices contre ces populations.

Sur les questions essentielles (indiquées dans les paragraphes 2 et 5), les délégués hellènes insistent non seulement au nom de leur Gouvernement, mais au nom de la conscience de tout homme vraiment civilisé.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, les délégués demandent qu'avant l'installation des autorités turques, une amnistie générale soit accordée aux populations, afin qu'elles soient mises à l'abri de toute poursuite motivée par leurs actes ou opinions de caractère politique.

GÉNÉRAL AL. MAZARAKIS.
COLONEL PT. SARRIYANIS.

Moudania, le 26 septembre/9 octobre 1922.

Troisième Déclaration des Délégués hellènes devant la Réunion des Généraux alliés à Moudania.

La délégation hellénique constate qu'aucune des remarques qu'elle a formulées dans ses déclarations précédentes n'a été prise en considération dans la rédaction du texte définitif de la Convention militaire.

Notamment sur la question primordiale de la ligne de retrait des troupes grecques, qu'elle a déjà déclaré ne pas pouvoir accepter, elle n'a reçu aucune satisfaction.

Dans ces conditions, la délégation hellénique ne se croit pas autorisée à signer le texte de la Convention militaire.

GÉNÉRAL AL. MAZARAKIS.
COLONEL PT. SARRIYANIS.

Moudania, le 28 septembre/11 octobre 1922.

[E 11508/9024/44] No. 288.

Vice-Consul Urquhart to Sir H. Rumbold.—(Enclosure in Constantinople despatch No. 910; Received in Foreign Office, October 24.)

Sir, *Smyrna, October 13, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report further on conditions in Smyrna.

This morning it was reported to me that the British cemetery at Bournabat had been entered and the graves defiled. In company with Rear-Admiral Nicholson I visited the cemetery this afternoon, and found that, almost without exception, the tombstones had been smashed and overthrown, several holes, about 1 foot deep, dug over graves and many defiled with the filth of human beings and animals.

This event has caused some depression among the few British subjects present. A protest will be made at once to the Governor, but, as I indicated in a telegram some time ago, I have not much confidence in his ability to restrain the military and others from acts which I believe he personally considers deplorable.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the military are out of hand. I have succeeded, without much trouble, in procuring permits for British subjects to take possession of their property. In two cases, however, of which I will send details later, as soon as the military saw that the goods were to be taken out of their possession they seized the first opportunity to have them removed.

I understand that several wives of British subjects desire to return to Smyrna. I have no hesitation in saying that it would be highly undesirable for them to do so for some time, although I am strongly of opinion that men with property here ought to return at once. There is little security for property in the presence of owners; in their absence, none.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

[E 11554/10102/44] No. 289.

Consul-General Waugh to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 14, 1922.*

WITH reference to Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 462 of the 22nd May last enumerating certain provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres which it is important to maintain in the definite peace treaty, I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum drawn up at a joint meeting of the British, French and Italian Chambers of Commerce, emphasising the necessity of maintaining the safeguard of the Capitulations.

Although the French Government appears to believe that the Nationalists can be trusted, the French commercial community in Constantinople in no way shares this illusion. In proof of this I enclose a strongly worded circular drawn up by the French Chamber for distribution in France. A copy of this document fell into the hands of the Turks, and the French High Commissioner has called upon the French Chamber of Commerce to repudiate it; but it represents their sentiments nevertheless.

The burden of the fight at the peace conference will fall on us, and I venture to suggest that the essential conditions affecting British interests should be carefully studied beforehand and, once decided, should be insisted on.

After the freedom of the Straits comes a general amnesty for all races and creeds to protect individuals against prosecution for acts during the war and during the armistice. This amnesty must now be made wider than article 300 of the Sèvres Treaty to cover the period of the armistice and to protect persons who will be accused by the Kemalists of treason, in aiding and abetting the Allies.

The amnesty will not suffice to protect the whole native Christian population against systematic persecution designed to drive them out of Turkey; and I cannot suggest any effective method of protection after British troops are withdrawn.

The longer the withdrawal can be delayed the better.

The third condition directly affecting British prestige and commercial interests is the maintenance of the Capitulations or of adequate safeguards in lieu thereof.

Until Turkey brings her law courts and police up to civilised standard, British subjects in Turkey must be protected against arrest, domiciliary visits and Turkish judgments.

A substitute for the consular assistance provided in the old treaties might be found in Allied organisation of the police and gendarmerie and mixed courts of justice.

If British subjects are to be liable to Turkish taxation, some Allied control must be devised to protect them against extortion.

This control must not be vested in the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. The representatives of the bondholders are here to collect revenue, and it is manifestly improper that they should be charged also with protecting taxpayers against the Turkish Revenue Department.

An independent body of British, French, Italian and American delegates, with a Turkish delegate, should be created to deal with appeals against tax assessments and with general trade questions affecting foreigners.

Such a body already exists in the Advisory Trade Commission of the Allied High Commissions and is well qualified to deal with these questions.

It might be called the Mixed Economic Commission, and, although the Nationalist Turks will no doubt oppose the creation of such a commission, they will probably accept it so constituted rather than allow the smaller Powers a voice in such matters.

I have, &c.

A. T. WAUGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 289.

Memorandum respecting the Capitulations.

LES Chambres de Commerce anglaise, française et italienne, que la gravité des événements a obligées à se réunir en conseil extraordinaire et dans une étroite solidarité les 2 et 4 octobre 1922, n'ont jusqu'à ce jour obtenu aucune réponse aux vœux qu'elles avaient soumis, au sujet du maintien des Capitulations, au Conseil de Paris du 22 mars 1922. Elles ont, cependant, l'impression que des modifications radicales vont être apportées aux traités connus sous le nom de Capitulations qui constituaient l'héritage de nos colonies respectives et étaient, à ce titre, considérées comme inaliénables. Or, certains de ces privilèges sont d'une telle importance pour les intérêts de ces colonies que les délégués des trois Chambres de Commerce précitées croient indispensable de faire appel à leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour solliciter des mesures de protection en faveur de leurs nationaux résidant dans l'Empire ottoman.

Le conseil, ainsi composé, tient à souligner l'importance impérieuse vitale du maintien intégral des droits acquis relatifs à l'administration de la justice,* à l'inviolabilité des domiciles et des personnes, au respect des privilèges, des usages et, en général, de toutes les Capitulations. Si, pour satisfaire l'amour-propre des Turcs, en ce moment si chatouilleux, les Gouvernements alliés croient nécessaire de déclarer que les Capitulations sont abolies, il faudrait absolument rétablir, sous une autre forme, les anciennes garanties et même, en tenant compte de l'expérience acquise durant la guerre, les renforcer. Il faut bien, en effet, se rendre compte que c'est uniquement grâce à ces anciens droits que l'existence des étrangers—qui font du commerce ou de toute autre manière se rendent utiles, en Turquie, à leurs pays respectifs—est possible. L'attention de nos Gouvernements est attirée sur le fait indéniable que nos personnes et nos domiciles se trouvent immédiatement en danger le jour où la protection effective qui résulte pour nous des Capitulations sera amoindrie même de peu de chose.

Au point de vue économique, nous devons reconnaître la nécessité pour le Gouvernement turc d'équilibrer son budget. Il est certain que l'équité commande que tous les habitants de ce pays soient assujettis aux mêmes taxes sans tenir compte de leur nationalité. D'un autre côté, si c'est tout à fait indispensable, on devra laisser le Gouvernement ottoman libre de modifier ses tarifs douaniers sans avoir, comme par le passé, à obtenir l'agrément des grandes Puissances. Mais il serait absolument nécessaire que des garanties soient données que les taxes personnelles—et parmi eux le "temettu" (impôt sur le revenu)—soient appliquées avec justice et dans des conditions d'égalité absolue pour tous. Quant aux taxes douanières, des conseils amicaux devraient être donnés aux Turcs afin qu'ils n'exagèrent pas, dans leur intérêt propre, les droits d'importation et d'exportation—le tarif douanier établi en Anatolie constitue un indice

* En octobre 1914, les Turcs supprimèrent les Capitulations. Ils promirent alors d'effectuer une réforme judiciaire dont ils reconnaissaient eux-mêmes la nécessité. Or, depuis, huit années se sont écoulées et rien n'a été fait

très inquiétant à ce sujet—et que, dans tous les cas, les droits de douane soient égaux pour tous, chacun de nos pays jouissant de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le conseil se permet d'exposer encore un ardent désir, que son expérience de ce pays justifie. Il voudrait que les concessions accordées dans le domaine des Capitulations ne fussent pas concédées toutes à la fois, mais progressivement, en commençant par les plus légères, toute nouvelle concession dépendant de l'usage équitable fait de la précédente.

Le conseil recommande vivement l'examen de ses vœux à la bienveillante attention des Gouvernements anglais, français et italien en indiquant qu'il s'agit de l'existence même de leur commerce en Turquie. Il espère que sa prière, née d'expérience, sera entendue.

Constantinople, le 4 octobre 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 289.

Circular drawn up by French Chamber of Commerce, Constantinople.

AU moment où il va être nécessaire de traiter avec le Gouvernement turc, notre Chambre de Commerce a le devoir de renseigner le Ministère dont elle dépend et tous ceux qui, en France, s'intéressent à la question du Proche-Orient sur une situation à laquelle les événements donnent une singulière actualité.

Par suite d'erreurs nombreuses, dont une grande partie incombe à nos grands Alliés, nous nous trouvons dans des conditions défavorables.

En 1918, après notre victoire, les Turcs étaient craintifs et soumis. Il était alors possible d'organiser le pays sur des bases pratiques et favorables aux Alliés. Aujourd'hui ces mêmes Turcs, se croyant le plus grand pays militaire du monde parce que l'armée grecque s'est débandée devant eux, sont en proie à un orgueil démesuré et veulent dicter leurs conditions. Ils manifestent une grande amitié pour la France, mais nous savons ce que valent ces amitiés turques, qui ne peuvent pas exister réelles envers des non-musulmans. Du reste, il sera prochainement facile de la mettre à l'épreuve.

La France et l'Italie ont si ouvertement déclaré qu'elles étaient bien décidées à ne jamais combattre les Turcs qu'elles ont perdu tout prestige auprès de ce peuple guerrier dont leurs cajoleries détruisent l'estime.

Voici ce que nous avons à redouter :

D'abord, pour nos personnes et nos biens, la suppression des Capitulations.

Etant donné le caractère des Turcs, leurs dispositions actuelles et l'état de leur législation, on peut hardiment déclarer qu'il est impossible à des Européens honorables de vivre en Turquie en l'absence de ces garanties indispensables. Par conséquent, ce qu'il y a de meilleur dans nos colonies, l'élément qui défend notre influence, nos intérêts et assure notre commerce, serait forcé de quitter le pays, ce qui constituerait une perte irréparable pour la France.

Il faut donc absolument—et cette opinion est unanime même chez les plus ardents amis des Turcs—conserver des garanties. Les plus impérieuses consistent dans le maintien de la justice consulaire et des tribunaux mixtes et, comme conséquence, l'inviolabilité de nos personnes et de nos domiciles.

Pour satisfaire l'orgueil turc si développé, on pourrait dire que les Capitulations sont abolies en établissant, sous une autre forme, les garanties indispensables indiquées plus haut. On peut les justifier en indiquant—ce qui est indéniable—que la législation ottomane est absolument insuffisante et a besoin d'être refondue. D'un autre côté, la magistrature turque est au-dessous de tout. Les juges non seulement ne connaissent pas la loi, manquent d'expérience juridique, mais sont encore d'une vénalité scandaleuse. En 1914, lorsqu'ils ont supprimé les Capitulations, les Turcs ont reconnu eux-mêmes la situation inférieure de leur organisation juridique et ont promis des réformes qui n'ont jamais eu lieu. Par conséquent, les garanties judiciaires que nous réclamons doivent subsister tant que les réformes ne seront pas accomplies. On peut assigner un délai minimum de quinze ans pour effectuer ces améliorations. Au bout de quinze ans, si la justice ottomane présente les garanties suffisantes, le dernier vestige des Capitulations disparaîtra ; les Français avertis pourront préparer alors leur départ s'ils jugent utile.

Si le reste des Capitulations disparaît, les Français—et autres étrangers—seront soumis à toutes les taxes perçues des Ottomans. A première vue cela paraît équitable ; ceux qui connaissent le pays comprennent tous les dangers de cette mesure. Il faudra bien stipuler que ces taxes seront égales pour tous les étrangers et les Ottomans.

Ce qui est plus grave, c'est que la Turquie va probablement recouvrer sa liberté économique. Elle pourra donc librement modifier ses droits de douane, jusqu'à ce jour soumis à l'approbation des Puissances, et, comme ses dirigeants ont l'illusion enfantine de pouvoir créer une puissante industrie dans ce pays appauvri et dépeuplé — dans le vilayet de Koniah, le plus prospère, la population, de l'aveu des Turcs, est de trois à quatre habitants par kilomètre carré—ils vont majorer considérablement le tarif douanier qui deviendra protecteur. Nous avons, du reste, publié le tarif en vigueur en Anatolie, dont les prohibitions et les exagérations interdisent l'accès de presque toutes les marchandises françaises.

Ce n'est pas tout; toujours dans le but de favoriser industrie nationale, les Turcs ont l'intention de frapper les matières premières produites dans le pays et dont la France est, après l'Angleterre, le principal acheteur, de droits de sortie élevés afin de les retenir en Turquie.

Le régime sec risque fort d'être appliqué. Il est déjà en vigueur en Anatolie, où il est imposé avec rigueur ; un Français de Zoungouldak a passé plusieurs mois en prison pour avoir porté quelques bouteilles de vin chez son frère. Dès leur arrivée à Smyrne et à Brousse, les nationalistes ont fermé les débits, saisi les vins et spiritueux et promis des perquisitions domiciliaires. Il est presque certain que la prohibition sera imposée ici, ainsi que dans le reste de la Turquie, et c'est un gros débouché—plus de 15 millions par an—perdu pour la France. D'un autre côté, nos compatriotes, dont plusieurs vivent du commerce des vins, seront fort marris de se voir imposer le régime de l'eau pure, ce qui est contraire à la liberté individuelle.

Nos sociétés, françaises de fait et de capitaux, représentant des intérêts si considérables, qui ont été forcées d'adopter l'étiquette ottomane, auront une existence bien difficile. Les Conseils d'Administration, qui se tiennent à Paris, devront venir ici et contenir des Ottomans ; les exploitations seront surveillées de près et sans indulgence ; on exigera que les écritures, la correspondance soient rédigées en langue turque ; que tout le personnel soit turc, ce qui laissera bien des compatriotes sans emploi. Il y a aussi quelques inquiétudes à avoir pour notre navigation, pour nos écoles, nos hôpitaux, nos sociétés d'intérêt général. Les postes française, anglaise et italienne devront disparaître, ce qui nous privera du secret et de la sécurité de nos lettres.

Dans cette triste situation, il faut essayer de sauver quelques épaves de nos anciens privilèges, si on ne peut pas les conserver tous, ce qui serait bien préférable.

Nous avons indiqué le minimum absolument indispensable des garanties individuelles.

Pour le tarif douanier, essayer de faire modérer les taxes frappant nos principaux articles. Obtenir le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, car, si nous sommes les meilleurs amis aujourd'hui, demain cette amitié peut aller aux Russes, aux Allemands et même aux pires adversaires d'aujourd'hui.

En ce qui concerne le régime sec, essayer de tourner la prohibition. Paraître l'accepter pour satisfaire l'orgueil turc, mais faire admettre l'importation par des conditions additionnelles. Au pire, jeter comme lest les apéritifs, eaux-de-vie et liqueurs et conserver les boissons salutaires, les vins, tous les vins. En cas de retour des stocks, se faire restituer les droits de douane perçus à l'entrée en Turquie.

Enfin, tâcher de défendre notre navigation, nos écoles, nos hôpitaux, nos diverses sociétés et de faire respecter nos marques de fabrique.

Ne jamais s'en tenir aux assurances verbales, même pleines d'amitié et d'effusion ; obtenir des écrits bien précis.

Et même si tout ce que nous préconisons est obtenu, l'avenir économique de la France en Turquie se présentera sous des couleurs sombres.

Constantinople, le 5 octobre 1922.

[E 11489/10524/44] **No. 290.**

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 888.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which Dr. Nansen addressed on the 11th instant to the Allied High Commissioners and to the High Commissioners for the United States and Japan on the subject of the refugee problem in Greece and Asia Minor.*

* No. 289.

2. On receipt of this letter I immediately convoked a conference of the High Commissioners, to whom the letter had been addressed, to discuss the situation with Dr. Nansen. I beg leave to enclose herein copy of the minutes of the meeting.

3. Dr. Nansen also raised the question of the Russian refugees in Constantinople, and my French and Italian colleagues and I decided to submit to our respective Governments the recommendation contained in the latter portion of the minutes of the meeting.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 290.

Minutes of a Conference held at the British Embassy on Thursday, October 12, 1922, *to Discuss the Refugee Problem in Greece and Asia Minor with Dr. Nansen.*

President: Sir Horace Rumbold.

Present:

Admiral Bristol.	Dr. Nansen.
Marquis Garroni.	Mr. P. Baker.
General Pellé.	Mr. Mack.
Baron Uchida.	

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD invited Dr. Nansen to put his proposals before the conference.

DR. NANSEN said that the Turkish authorities in Anatolia had retained there all male refugees between the ages of 17 and 50, although they had not been enrolled in the Greek army. All the old men, women and children had been sent away and had crowded into Greece and the islands. This state of affairs was likely to create chaos and Bolshevism in Greece. It must be solved in a satisfactory manner. Hamid Bey said yesterday that the question was not so much military or political as economic. The Turks wished to keep the men for work on the land in the devastated regions. It was very important to come to an agreement with the Angora Government on this question. The Greeks had carried away many Turkish civilians, so there was a basis for negotiation.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL confirmed this statement from his reports.

GENERAL PELLÉ said that this question, according to General Charpy, had not been faithfully treated at the Mudania Conference owing to the disagreement between the Turkish generals.

MARQUIS GARRONI stated that the Greek Government had proclaimed its readiness to exchange all prisoners taken as hostages, but had been unable to trace them all up to the present. In reply to a question from Sir H. Rumbold, Dr. Nansen stated that about 50,000 males had been detained in Anatolia, and that they were all Ottoman subjects.

GENERAL PELLÉ pointed out that this made the question very delicate. It had already been decided to exchange Hellenic subjects in Anatolia for Turkish civilians in Greek hands. For Greek Ottoman subjects the situation was very different.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL suggested that the Emergency Relief Committee now in Greece might set to work to locate the refugees and separate them into families. This would take a considerable time, but would enable preparations to be made to receive the males next spring. If they were sent back now it would only complicate the refugee problem in Greece.

DR. NANSEN pointed out that Noureddin Bey and Hamid Bey had declared that the Turks would keep the males, but would not allow the old men, women and children to return. Even if this declaration were annulled, it would take months to bring the men back. They must be back to work next spring in order to ensure a food supply for their families. Besides, to judge from the previous experience of Turkish labour battalions, they might not live in Anatolia until the spring. The mortality during the war in Turkish labour battalions has been higher than at the front.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL confirmed this point. Labour battalions were fed badly and treated like animals.

DR. NANSEN continued that it was necessary to know before the spring how many men would be available for work in Greece. If a general exchange of prisoners was arranged there would be no extra cost for feeding.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD drew attention to the delicate question of Ottoman subjects.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL said that the Turks would reply to any overtures in this direction by asking at once whether the Greek army had been demobilised on a peace basis.

SIR H. RUMBOLD considered that this objection could be covered by a guarantee. Dr. Nansen concurred.

MARQUIS GARRONI considered that the men could not be allowed to remain in Turkey and their women and children in Greece. He proposed that steps should first be taken to effect an exchange of Hellenic subjects and Turkish civilians who were held as hostages. Dr. Nansen might, on behalf of the League of Nations, take steps for the release of the labour battalions.

SIR H. RUMBOLD declared his readiness to support any representations which might be necessary. Dr. Nansen was prepared to take the question up with the Angora representative in Constantinople, but would like to be able to tell Hamid Bey that he had the support of the High Commissioners present.

The three Allied High Commissioners at once announced their support of Dr. Nansen.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL and BARON UCHIDA said that they would have to refer to their Governments before joining in the *démarche* agreed to by the Allied High Commissioners. They would telegraph immediately to their Governments in a favourable sense.

DR. NANSEN said that he proposed to ask Hamid Bey also whether the Angora Government was prepared to allow the return of those refugees, if any, who had left Anatolia voluntarily.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL suggested that no mention should be made in the proposed *démarche* of an exchange of prisoners of war. That was a matter for Greece and Turkey alone. The United States Government could only join in a protest based on broad humanitarian grounds. He suggested that the Allied High Commissioners should suggest to their Governments that, in addition to the measures taken now, this question might be considered first at the Peace Conference.

In reply to a question from Admiral Bristol, Dr. Nansen stated that, in his opinion, it would take too long to obtain the consent of all the neutral nations to join in the proposed *démarche*. The matter was very urgent. He was confident of their support.

SIR H. RUMBOLD then informed Dr. Nansen that the five High Commissioners present were prepared to support the representations proposed by him as soon as a favourable reply had been received from the United States and Japanese Governments.

DR. NANSEN expressed his deep gratitude for this promise of support in a problem which was for the Greeks the greatest problem of the peace He had already asked for assurances of support from M. Venizelos.

Russian Refugees in Constantinople.

DR. NANSEN said that the evacuation of destitute Russian refugees from Constantinople had advanced at a great pace. He hoped to have the work finished in five months. Hamid Bey had, however, informed him yesterday that he had received instructions from Angora to the effect that all Russian refugees must be evacuated from Constantinople within a very short time. Hamid added that the order emanated from Moscow. They numbered about 25,000, and this could not be done. He was very surprised at Hamid Bey's declaration because Mustapha Kemal had stated a few weeks ago that the Turks would not expel the Russians who had accepted hospitality on their soil.

GENERAL PELLÉ pointed out that in Anatolia Russians who did not accept the Soviet Government were not regarded as Russians. Several were working in the

factories at Zongouldek. They were under decree of expulsion, but had not left yet. They had to choose between accepting the Soviet or the Kemalist régime. The Angora Government evidently intended to introduce the same régime in Constantinople. Many Russians had found employment here. There were also numbers of maimed and invalids who were under the protection of international Red Cross societies. That complicated the question.

MARQUIS GARRONI considered that the only solution, in view of the Angora Government's refusal to allow Russian refugees to remain, was to ask the League of Nations to make every endeavour to solve the question by facilitating their departure from Constantinople.

DR. NANSEN said that he had a long conversation this morning with Russian representatives here. Many Russians had asked him to obtain permission for them to stay. It seemed impossible to evacuate the whole 25,000 (Hamid Bey had 20,000 on his list, but the Russian representative said the number was nearer 30,000), as other countries had refused to receive any. Serbia had recently refused to take any more. He had hopes that Bulgaria might receive a certain number. Russians liked to have a preference as to the country to which they should go. The Powers which might be ready to receive Russian refugees must also be prepared to provide means of transport. There was one more point. All countries had treated Russian refugees well. The Angora Government might be influenced by the fact that if they adhered to their decision they would be the only country in Europe which had refused hospitality. The opinion of the civilised world would be against them.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD said that as the numbers involved were considerable the question would probably arise at the peace conference. They could not be expelled before then. He suggested that Dr. Nansen might represent to Hamid Bey the difference between the treatment accorded by other countries and that proposed by the Angora Government. No action on the part of the Allied High Commissioners seemed possible at present.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL said that the Russian refugees might be treated under the minority clauses of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL PELLÉ pointed out that in Poland the Russians had a committee which represented their interests before the Polish Government. This system had worked well up to the present.

DR. NANSEN asked whether the Allied High Commissioners would suggest to their Governments that this question should be discussed at the peace conference. He would forward a detailed memorandum on the subject.

Decision.—The Allied High Commissioners decided to submit this request to their respective Governments for favourable consideration.

[E 11492/9024/44] **No. 291.**

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 892.)

HIS Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report from the acting vice-consul at Smyrna on the situation in Smyrna.

Constantinople, October 16, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 291.

Acting Vice-Consul Urquhart to Sir H. Rumbold

Sir, *Smyrna, October* 10, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report on conditions in Smyrna as follows:—

At the present moment there is only a comparatively small number of troops in the town, and these are mainly employed as patrols, sentinels and guards among the ruins. There have been no large troop movements for some time. Batteries of guns.

however, probably howitzers of medium weight, have been mounted at three points round the bay and on Chustan Island, ostensibly as a precaution against the possible return of the Greek fleet. The Turks possess no floating craft beyond a few small motor-boats they have requisitioned.

Considerable numbers of prisoners, both military and civil, have been employed in clearing the streets of filth and débris. Bodies have been collected and burnt, while masses of baggage abandoned by refugees have been removed. The military have been very active blowing up dangerous ruins, and the town may be said to be normally clean and, along the quay and in the quarters untouched by fire, safe.

Greek churches are being systematically razed to the ground.

A house-to-house search and the activities of informers have completely cleared the town of Greeks and Armenians, excepting a few domestic servants, and even to them permission to stay was grudgingly given and provisional. The Turks claim to have solved the problem of the minorities. Large numbers left by sea, but many thousands, of males especially, have been marched to the interior, and are stated to be employed on the reconstruction of Magnesia, Alasheir and other burnt towns.

The Jews remain so far unmolested, though at one time there were indications that they might be regarded as a convenient source of revenue. They themselves are nervous, and, in view of the stringent regulations against the possession of looted goods by anybody but the State, they feel insecure, especially with regard to their more recently acquired property. Their enterprise has been especially remarkable during the month of September. Mingling with the departing refugees and the looting soldiers, they have succeeded in concentrating in their hands at small cost most of the wealth remaining in Smyrna.

Despite their apparently cordial relations with the Turks, the French and Italians do not appear to enjoy any special facilities as compared with the British or Americans. The military have requisitioned cars, motor-boats and houses regardless of the nationality of their owners, and all alike find the greatest difficulty in moving or disposing of property. The greatest volume of commercial work since the fire has been done by the Americans, simply because certain of their business men, confident of immunity, were on the spot. I have no hesitation in stating that, had it been possible and desirable for British business men and ships to return as soon as civil administration was established in Smyrna, they could have removed, without much risk or difficulty, a considerable amount of property that has since been looted.

British property, consisting in houses and goods which have escaped fire and looting, safes buried in the ruins and goods in the custom-house, has been a source of anxiety to me owing to the pilferage that went on after wholesale looting had ceased. So far as I can ascertain, however, that has now been stopped, and a certain number of houses remain intact, while many are looted only of clothing and valables; but a large percentage are completely ransacked. In face of my protests, the Vali has urged me to place guards in all British properties; but, as I indicated by telegram, this is not practicable. Wherever employees, relatives or friends of owners presented themselves I have secured the necessary permits and placed them in possession; but I again venture to submit that only the return of the persons immediately interested can enable me adequately to safeguard their rights.

So far as trade is concerned, the outlook is perplexing. The civil authorities profess a desire for the revival of trade, urge the return of the British, and readily grant permits to those British who are present, authorising them to take possession of their property, on a simple application from me. On the other hand, one proclamation has followed another introducing measures which render profitable commerce between Turkey and other countries entirely impossible, and throw grave doubts on any guarantee given for the security of property. Lists are appearing daily of articles of which import is forbidden, and they comprise almost all manufactured goods. On articles which may be imported a duty amounting to 50 per cent. of the value is to be levied. The Ottoman-Aidin Railway, the British hospital, the Williamson Clinic and various private houses have been requisitioned in the last few days. A cumbrous system of notification of sales has been introduced by an order published yesterday, a copy of which is enclosed. It is clearly designed so as to enable the Government to trace and seize looted or unclaimed property, and will greatly add to the series of hindrances placed in the way of traders. Further, the expulsion of the Greeks has made industry impossible, and indeed made life in European style exceedingly difficult.

The conclusion is that the Turks have no commercial or fiscal policy whatsoever to apply to the problems with which they are suddenly faced. Some desire to foster

trade, some despise it, while the majority have no thought beyond seizing at the present moment the property which their blundering entry to Smyrna has caused to escape their grasp, and of which, in their national poverty, they stand so sorely in need. They are, moreover, incapable of formulating one that will meet the situation in their present state of military intoxication and fanaticism, and the outlook for the European trading colonies here is distinctly discouraging. I anticipate that the majority, having saved what they can, will settle elsewhere, for a number of years at least.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

Enclosure 2 in No. 291.

Extract from the "Levant," Smyrna, of October 10, 1922.

DE L'INSPECTION ET LA DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES FINANCES DU VILAYET DE SMYRNE.

TOUS les commerçants sont obligés de présenter à partir de demain une déclaration contenant la quantité et qualité des marchandises qu'ils possèdent d'enregistrer régulièrement toutes leurs ventes et de présenter à leurs clients une facture ratifiée par le président de la Commission des Biens abandonnés qui se trouve à Couzoglou Han et à Odoun Bazar. Les clients doivent aussi à leur tour légaliser leur factures par le fonctionnaire spécial de la Direction générale des Finances.

Les marchandises qui seraient exportées en dehors des conditions ci-haut énumérées seront confisquées et leurs propriétaires seront considérés comme ayant violé la loi concernant les biens appartenant à l'État.

[E 11494/27/44] **No. 292.**

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 894.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a joint Allied note to the Grand National Assembly respecting exchange of prisoners.

Constantinople, October 17, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 292.

Allied High Commissioners to Yussuf Kemal Bey.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 11 *octobre* 1922.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie que leurs Gouvernements respectifs ont reçu des informations selon lesquelles les militaires de l'armée hellénique originaires d'Anatolie qui ont été capturés par les troupes turques auraient été concentrés dans les camps spéciaux; le but de cette mesure serait, d'après la même source, de faire le procès de ces militaires, considérés comme sujets ottomans coupables de haute trahison et passibles de la peine de mort.

Dans un but exclusivement humanitaire et sans nul désir de s'immiscer dans les questions concernant l'administration de la justice militaire ottomane, les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés croient devoir attirer l'attention du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale sur les considérations suivantes qui militent en faveur d'un traitement aussi indulgent que possible des prisonniers dont il s'agit. Il est évident que la nouvelle d'exécutions en masse ou nombreuses soulèverait la réprobation générale de l'opinion civilisée; d'ailleurs, il faut en toute équité tenir compte à ces

hommes soit des entrainements de l'ambiance de surexcitation dans laquelle ils ont vécu pendant la période écoulée, soit des pressions plus ou moins officielles qui se sont exercées pour les obliger à prendre les armes. Enfin, une mesure de clémence aussi générale et aussi complète que possible ne saurait être interprétée comme une preuve de faiblesse, mais constituerait, au contraire, dans les circonstances actuelles, un éclatant témoignage de la sincérité des intentions que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale a déjà proclamées : de joindre ses efforts à ceux de toutes les autres nations civilisées en vue d'aboutir à un régime de paix générale susceptible d'effacer aussitôt que possible le souvenir même des horreurs de la guerre.

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés, au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, espèrent que son Excellence Youssouf Kémal Bey voudra bien signaler à l'attention du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie les observations qui précèdent et user de toute son influence pour qu'elles soient prises en considération, en vue de donner satisfaction aux préoccupations humanitaires qui les ont inspirées. — PELLÉ. H. RUMBOLD. GARRONI.

[E 11495/27/44] No. 293.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 896.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Greek High Commissioner respecting the Hellenic Government's adherence to the Mudania Convention.

Constantinople, October 17, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 293.

Greek High Commissioner to Sir H. Rumbold.

Haut-Commissariat de Grèce, Constantinople,
le 14 octobre 1922.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'AI l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de procéder auprès de votre Excellence aux déclarations suivantes :

"Le Gouvernement hellénique, considérant que les déclarations faites par ses délégués à Moudania auraient dû être prises en considération, surtout en ce qui concerne les garanties et les délais strictement nécessaires pour la sauvegarde de la vie et les biens des populations chrétiennes de la Thrace orientale, fait un dernier appel aux sentiments d'humanité des Puissances alliées, en faveur de ces populations. Toutefois, désireux de se conformer aux décisions des Puissances, le Gouvernement hellénique se voit dans la nécessité de s'incliner et déclare adhérer au protocole d'armistice signé à Moudania le 11 octobre (N.S.)."

Veuillez, &c.

Le Gérant Ministre plenipotentiaire,
CH. SIMOPOULOS.

[E 11496/27/44] No. 294.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 897.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 17, 1922.*

IMMEDIATELY after the signature of the Mudania Convention of the 11th October it was announced from Angora that Refet Pasha had been appointed military Governor-General for the taking over of Eastern Thrace, and that he would be assisted by Shakir Bey. These appointments have been variously described. The correct version appears to be that Refet Pasha has been appointed as a sort of High Commissioner for a limited period to superintend all arrangements for taking delivery of Eastern Thrace up to the moment when the Allied troops finally leave, and that

Shakir Bey has been appointed Vali in the ordinary way, but will be subordinate to Refet Pasha during the period of the latter officer's special mission.

2. General Refet Pasha is a well-known stalwart of the Nationalist movement. It was he who in July 1919 threatened that if the British troops, then at Samsoun, marched inland he would resist them. This led to his recall by the Constantinople Government at the instance of this High Commission. He delayed compliance with the order to return to Constantinople, but promised to do so as soon as he had had time to pack up and take leave of his troops. He failed to keep this promise, joined up with the Nationalists, was in due course promoted General and Pasha, and has held various commands and high offices, including the post of Commissioner for the Interior. Your Lordship will remember that about a year ago, while still occupant of that post, he was closely connected with the unauthorised attempt of Major Henry and other gentlemen to bring about a direct understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Kemalists. He soon after vacated his Ministry in circumstances which still remain obscure.

3. My impression of Refet Pasha, from what I hear of him, is that he is a capable and intelligent officer, but of a very impetuous disposition.

4. Shakir Bey is a young man about 38 years of age. He is a professional civil servant, and held various posts under the Turkish Ministry of the Interior. Of late years he has been an active politician, and has been one of the leading members of the Turkish Committee of Thrace, an organisation which has worked hard under Kemalist auspices for the restoration of Thrace to Turkish rule. He is not, I understand, of Thracian origin, but he has had considerable experience in that country, and he represents Gallipoli in the Grand National Assembly.

5. The press announces various other appointments to subordinate administrative posts in Eastern Thrace. As I have mentioned in my telegram No. 577 of the 16th October, these include the appointment of a Governor of Gallipoli. I have stated my view of the question raised by this appointment in the telegram referred to. My attention has since been called to an interview with Shakir Bey in the "Wakt" newspaper of the 13th October, from which I extract the following :—

> "*Interviewer :* What will be the position in the Gallipoli Peninsula?
>
> "*Shakir Bey :* As it has been decided that the whole of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza shall be evacuated by the Greek Civil Administration and gendarmerie, and shall be handed over to the Turkish civil officials and gendarmerie, the Turkish Administration will naturally be established in the Gallipoli Peninsula also. The only thing is that it is accepted under clause 12 of the military convention that certain Allied forces will remain as heretofore in the part of the peninsula south of Bulair."

6. This suggests that some difficulty will be experienced in persuading the Kemalists that they are not entitled to replace such Greek officials as have been heretofore employed at Gallipoli by officials of their own.

7. The local press publishes daily accounts of Kemalist arrangements for introducing their gendarmerie into Thrace. Some of these are rather premature, and the object appears to be to keep well before the Constantinople public the fact that the new gendarmerie is not to be recruited locally, but it is to be transported bodily from Anatolia.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 11498/27/44] No. 295.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 899.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 17, 1922.*

I HAD the honour, in my despatch No. 882, to report to your Lordship on the various phases of the Mudania Conference up to the 9th October.

2. The text of a final protocol was drawn up by the Allied generals and presented to Ismet Pasha that afternoon as being their last word and the limit of Allied concessions. This show of Allied unity clearly impressed the latter, who, while demurring to certain points in the protocol and expressing surprise that the French and Italian

generals had previously given him to understand that they were willing to agree to less, requested an adjournment of the conference until 5 P.M. on the following day in order to enable him to ascertain the views of his Government.

3. General Harington returned to Constantinople in the "Iron Duke" that night, and I summoned a meeting of the High Commissioners on the morning of the 10th October to discuss with him the situation in the event of the Turks refusing to sign the protocol.

4. Before seeing my Allied colleagues I had a preliminary conversation with General Harington and Admiral Brock, in the course of which we agreed upon the measures which would have to be taken if Ismet Pasha's instructions proved unsatisfactory. General Harington was strongly of opinion that, from a military point of view, further delay was impossible. The Kemalist encroachments, particularly in the neutral zone of Ismid, were endangering the safety of his troops and could no longer be tolerated. In spite of verbal and written promises, the Kemalist patrols continued to advance and were getting round between his advance posts and the Bosphorus.

5. It was accordingly decided that in the event of his failing to obtain, that evening, definite guarantees in respect of the neutral zones, General Harington would present Ismet Pasha with an ultimatum in writing to the effect that if the Turks had not withdrawn from those zones within thirty-six hours all the necessary measures would be taken to expel them by force. Simultaneously with the presentation of this ultimatum, Admiral Brock was to publish a proclamation for clearing the Bosphorus within twenty-four hours of all native craft, which was to be concentrated in the Golden Horn.

6. At the meeting with the High Commissioners which was held immediately afterwards, both my French and Italian colleagues again urged the advisability of yielding to further demands if made by the Kemalists. General Pellé anticipated, in fact, that the Angora Government would insist on the immediate surrender to it of Karagatch. He stated that, in the view of the French Government, Karagatch being a suburb of Adrianople, it was illogical and inconvenient to separate it from that city, even temporarily, especially as M. Veniselos had given M. Poincaré to understand that he was prepared to admit the restoration to Turkey of the 1914 frontier.

7. I replied that I had no knowledge of this declaration by M. Veniselos, and that I was bound by the decisions taken in Paris on the 7th October, which covered the point of Karagatch by specifically stating that it was to remain in Allied occupation until the conclusion of peace. General Harington added that, in drawing up the final protocol he had kept strictly to the latter of those instructions and that the French and Italian generals had agreed with him in notifying Ismet Pasha that it was the last word of the Allies.

8. General Pellé then asked what it was proposed to do if the Turks declined to sign or insisted upon further reservations and modifications. Was the Mudania Conference to break up or were the generals to refer back again to their High Commissioners? In his opinion, the draft convention was the outcome of decisions taken by the three Governments, and the generals should therefore refer back to the High Commissioners, who could, if the points in dispute were of importance, refer them in their turn to their respective Governments. So far as he himself was concerned, his instructions were that no irrevocable action should be taken without consulting the French Government.

9. I said that I could not accept the responsibility for agreeing to anything which might prolong the discussions at Mudania and thereby put the safety of British troops in danger. The last Paris agreement had specifically insisted upon respect for the neutral zones. For this reason a clause in regard to them had been inserted in the convention, and was a matter of concern to all three Governments. General Harington also described the impossibility of allowing the present military situation to be prolonged. He had, he said, to take important decisions in a few hours' time, and he would like to know definitely whether he could count on French and Italian troops being sent to assist him in the defence of those neutral zones which the three Allied Ministers in Paris had insisted should be respected.

10. General Pellé then stated that he had received a telegram from Paris in which M. Poincaré informed him that France would in no event go to war with Turkey, and said that he had made this clear to your Lordship. The Italian High Commissioner said that he must associate his Government in this declaration of policy.

11. I thereupon announced that His Majesty's Government must act alone, and General Harington and Admiral Brock explained to the meeting the measures which it was proposed to take if the Turkish reply that evening respecting the neutral zones proved to be unsatisfactory.

12. General Pellé and the Marquis Garroni made no demur, and were, I fancy, much relieved that the ground for a rupture, if one took place, should be based on the respect of the neutral zones in Asia, where no French or Italian troops would be affected and which would give their Governments an opportunity of declining all responsibility. As a soldier himself, General Pellé, I think, fully appreciated the force of the military arguments against further delay, and spoke at this stage in very warm terms of the extreme tact, forbearance and patience which General Harington had shown throughout the Mudania discussions, and which, he said, the whole world would recognise if war were to ensue.

13. General Harington returned to Mudania after the conclusion of the meeting, and the convention in its final form was signed in the early morning of the 11th October, after a session which lasted almost without interruption for about twelve hours.

14. The Greek military delegates abstained from signing the convention on the ground that their instructions precluded them from accepting any arrangement which did not treat the frontiers of Eastern Thrace as being those of 1915. The adhesion of the Greek Government to the convention was, however, obtained on the 14th October, in the form of a written declaration to that effect which was handed by the Acting Greek High Commissioner here to the three Allied High Commissioners and communicated by them to Hamid Bey, the representative of the Angora Government in Constantinople.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 11499/27/44] **No. 296.**

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 900.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 17, 1922.

THE French High Commissioner asked me on the 15th instant to summon a meeting of Allied High Commissioners to discuss the attitude of the Kemalist authorities at Smyrna in certain matters relating to foreign banks there.

2. My colleagues came yesterday, and the French High Commissioner read to us reports which he had received from his representative at Smyrna regarding the action of the Kemalist authorities in calling on the French banks to make a statement regarding the deposits of Greeks and Armenians in those banks, with a view to their sequestration. The banks had temporised and had asked for instructions.

3. My colleagues and I were unanimous in considering that this action on the part of the Kemalist authorities indicated their resolve to do away with capitulatory rights by a unilateral act and in anticipation of the peace conference. It even appeared to us that it might be the intention of the Kemalists on entering the conference to say that, as they did not recognise the Capitulations and had done away with them where they could do so, there was no point in discussing the maintenance of the Capitulations. The Italian High Commissioner reminded us that, when Turkey entered the great war, the then Turkish Government had abolished the Capitulations by a stroke of the pen.

4. My colleagues and I decided that we must lose no time in making our position clear by reserving all our rights. We have therefore instructed the Juridical Commission to prepare an immediate note to the Angora Government on the subject, as well as an identic telegram to our respective Governments.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 11500/27/44] **No. 297.**

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 901.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 17, 1922.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegrams No. 492 of the 12th October and No. 493 of the 13th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the minutes of a meeting which was held at this Embassy on Sunday, the 15th October, to discuss

the questions of an exchange of prisoners of war, hostages, &c., between the Angora and the Greek Governments, and the transfer of the Greek civil population from Eastern Thrace. I have informed your Lordship of the decisions reached in my telegrams Nos. 573 and 574.

2. Copy of General Harington's letter referred to in the first paragraph of the minutes of the meeting is also enclosed.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 297.

Minutes of Conference held at the British Embassy on Sunday, October 15, 1922, *at* 12 *noon, to discuss—*

(a.) Exchange of prisoners of war between the Angora and Greek Governments;
(b.) The evacuation of the Greek civil population from Eastern Thrace.

President: Sir H. Rumbold.

Present:

Admiral Bristol.	Mr. Henderson.
Marquis Garroni.	M. Arlotta.
General Pellé.	Colonel Baird.
General Harington.	Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood.
Dr. Nansen.	Major Sims-Marshall.
	Mr. P. Baker.
	Mr. Mack.

SIR H. RUMBOLD read a telegram which he had received from the Foreign Office instructing him to arrange at his discretion in concert with his Allied colleagues and General Harington the best means of concluding an agreement for exchange of prisoners of war between the Greek and Angora Governments. He then read General Harington's letter of the 14th October, in which the general declared that it was decided at Mudania that the Angora Government should make a formal demand to the Greek Government for the return of the hostages taken and that the Allied generals would refer to their Governments. Ismet Pasha stated that his Government had released all civil hostages. The question was complicated by the fact that a large number of the civilians in Kemalist hands were Ottoman subjects. Ismet Pasha had also refused to consent to the question of the military prisoners of war being dealt with on a reciprocity basis. General Harington considered that the best solution would be for the Greek Government to give an undertaking to accord the treatment of first-class prisoners to their hostages in return for which the Angora Government might be disposed to stay their hands against Ottoman Greeks until the issue was decided by the Peace Conference.

GENERAL PELLÉ said that no combined action seemed possible on the prisoners of war question. The Turks claimed restitution without reciprocity. The French Government agreed with this claim, while the British Government supported a reciprocal exchange. Let the Greeks and Turks endeavour to come to an arrangement between themselves. The Turks were right in considering their civilian hostages as Ottoman subjects.

SIR H. RUMBOLD considered that the question should await the Peace Conference, as there was a lack of agreement between the Allied Governments. He was in favour of General Harington's proposal, and suggested that Dr. Nansen should take the initiative with the two Governments.

GENERAL PELLÉ admitted that General Harington's proposal would be the most effective, but said that he was in favour of non-interference.

DR. NANSEN said that he had discussed the question with Hamid Bey. Hamid had told him that the Turks had given a list of their prisoners of war, but that the Greeks had not. He was pressing the Greek Government to supply the list.

MARQUIS GARRONI suggested the appointment of a Greco-Turkish commission with League of Nations delegates to discuss the questions of prisoners of war hostages

and refugees. The Allied High Commissioners should only come in in order to facilitate discussion and to use their good offices as far as possible. A conclusion might thus be reached. If not, preparations would have been made at all events for the discussion of the question at the Peace Conference.

GENERAL PELLÉ agreed that the Allied High Commissioners should not engage their Governments in any way. He supported Marquis Garroni's proposal and emphasised the importance of paving the way for the discussion of the minorities question at the Peace Conference.

DR. NANSEN stated that he had not yet made representations to Hamid Bey in favour of the return of male refugees. Sir Horace Rumbold had informed him that the Japanese High Commissioner had declared his readiness to support him. He was now awaiting the reply of the United States Government to Admiral Bristol's telegram.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL said that all kinds of claims about citizenship would arise between Ottoman Greeks and Hellenes. These should be left for the Turkish and Hellenic Governments to settle alone. He approved of Marquis Garroni's proposal.

SIR H. RUMBOLD pointed out that it was important not to complicate the question before the Peace Conference met. Why had the Turkish representatives fought shy of the question at Mudania? Who would propose the formation of the commission to the two Governments?

DR. NANSEN proposed that, as this question was bound up with that of the transfer of population, no decision might be taken until later in the proceedings.

Dr. Nansen's proposal was adopted and the conference proceeded to discuss the question of the evacuation of the population of Eastern Thrace.

SIR H. RUMBOLD read a telegram which he had received from the Foreign Office instructing him to concert with his French, Italian and United States colleagues and General Harington, with a view to establishing an organisation to superintend the evacuation of the Greek population in Eastern Thrace. The Foreign Office suggested the formation of an unofficial commission. Sir Horace then read a telegram which Dr. Nansen had received from M. Venizelos. The latter stated that the number of refugees who had left their homes and taken shelter in Greece exceeded 1,000,000. Greece, her finances exhausted by the war, was not equal to dealing with them. The material assistance of the world was necessary. The Minister of the Interior of the Angora Government had declared that no Greeks must remain on Turkish soil. There should be a forced exchange. It was less difficult to feed these refugees than to lodge them. The transfer of population should take place before peace was signed.

DR. NANSEN said that he understood that the principle of an exchange of population was agreed to by the Turkish and Greek Governments in 1919. M. Venizelos proposed a general transfer.

SIR H. RUMBOLD said that both sides seemed to agree to an exchange in principle. One of the Deputies for Adrianople had told him yesterday that 320,000 Greeks wished to leave Eastern Thrace. He understood that about the same number of Turks wished to be transferred there. There was thus no difficulty about numbers. The main question was to appoint a commission to arrange the exchange. He proposed the appointment of the commission outlined in the Foreign Office telegram which he had read.

DR. NANSEN remarked that it was difficult for him not to accept the task. On the other hand, it was a tremendous responsibility and a large staff would be necessary. He had asked the chief of the Minorities Bureau of the League of Nations to provide the staff. Experts were available and the work could be begun at once. He agreed with Sir H. Rumbold that the commission should be international, *e.g.*, under the secretariat of the League of Nations and not Allied. He had already telegraphed to Sir E. Drummond in this sense.

MARQUIS GARRONI agreed that the work should begin at once on humanitarian grounds.

GENERAL PELLÉ said that the proposal before the conference was to create an unofficial commission, an organ of the League of Nations, to foresee events and to take

the necessary measures for those Greeks who wished to leave Eastern Thrace and for those Turks who wished to remain. He suggested that Dr. Nansen might ask Kemal Pasha whether he really held to the principle that all Hellenic subjects should leave or whether he was disposed to limit the exodus. The exodus should be as small as possible. Greece had already too many to feed. If all the Christian refugees of Eastern Thrace were added, the feeding of the refugees in Greece would be impossible. There was also the transport question. Again, from the Turkish point of view, merchants and the economic machinery should not leave. The Turks will want to keep them. The Turks were naturally incensed against the Greeks on account of the devastations in Asia Minor. The population of Eastern Thrace was partly imported and partly indigenous. Many of the latter would not wish to leave. The French Minister at Athens considered it advisable that the Greek population of Thrace should remain. It must not be forgotten that there were more than 300,000 Greeks in Constantinople, who were very necessary for the economic life of Turkey. The Greeks of Constantinople and Eastern Thrace would work well for the good of Turkey if they were given adequate guarantees by the Angora Government.

DR. NANSEN said that, according to Hamid Bey, all Greeks were to leave. Hamid had said that the 320,000 Greek peasants in Eastern Thrace could be exchanged against a similar number of Turkish peasants. The Allied troops should work to encourage the population to remain. Many Greeks must remain in Constantinople.

SIR H. RUMBOLD said that thousands of Greeks would leave Constantinople. If guarantees were given at the Peace Conference the number might be diminished. For the moment it was urgent to create an organisation to ensure order in Thrace. He proposed to inform His Majesty's Government that he agreed with Dr. Nansen's proposal that the commission should be composed entirely of representatives of the League of Nations.

GENERAL HARINGTON stated that Allied military missions had already been despatched to Eastern Thrace and were now engaged in trying to keep the population calm. The Greek authorities had agreed to all the preparations which had been made and ad given orders against any destruction taking place. According to his information, the Greek population was flocking to Rodosto and trying to board the trains everywhere. He foresaw grave trouble. As soon as the Turkish gendarmerie arrived there would be a general exodus. He suggested that the League of Nations representatives might be attached to the inter-Allied missions and carry on the work when they had left

SIR H. RUMBOLD said General Harington had anticipated the instructions which he had received. There was now time to create a regular organisation.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL suggested that the question of the transfer of population might complicate the evacuation of Eastern Thrace. Refugees from Anatolia and Russia, whose lives would be in danger, should leave first, the others should be asked to stay.

SIR H. RUMBOLD supported General Harington's proposal, which he considered would go far in creating confidence among the population.

MARQUIS GARRONI pointed out that the Allies could not give the population assurances to remain. Dr. Nansen should endeavour to see Mustapha Kemal and ascertain his views on the proposed League of Nations Commission. Meanwhile the military missions could carry on.

SIR H. RUMBOLD considered the question too urgent for delay. The organisation should be created at once.

GENERAL PELLÉ agreed with Sir H. Rumbold. The military missions can ensure order, but as soon as the exodus begins the League of Nations must come in. The movement of population may begin at once.

ADMIRAL BRISTOL suggested that to take up the question of the transfer of population now would only embarrass the re-establishment of the Turkish Government. Moreover, the refugees now in Greece should be the first concern of the Greek Government.

DR. NANSEN said that he had already instructed his representative at Athens to take this question up with the Greek Government.

The following decisions were then taken :—

(*a.*) Dr. Nansen will invite the Angora and Greek Governments to nominate a Græco-Turkish commission, with League of Nations representatives, to discuss the question of an exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and refugees.

(*b.*) Dr. Nansen will request the secretary-general of the League of Nations to assist him in forming at once a commission of League of Nations experts to proceed to Eastern Thrace to superintend the evacuation of the population which desired to leave, to allay the fears of the others and to control the exodus.

Dr. Nansen was informed that the Allied High Commissioners and Admiral Bristol assured him every support in his undertaking. Dr. Nansen will endeavour to arrange an interview with Mustapha Kemal as soon as possible in order to ascertain his views. He will not take action on decision (*a*) before the interview.

Enclosure 2 in No. 297.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.

General Headquarters, Constantinople,
October 14, 1922.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to state that at the conference at Mudania, which concluded on the 11th instant, the representative of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, General Ismet Pasha, raised the question of the return of civilian Turks who had been taken to Greece as hostages by the Greek forces. At the same time he emphasised the fact that his Government had released all civil hostages.

After the matter had been discussed it was proposed that an exchange should be effected upon the basis of reciprocity. The use of the word "Greek" instead of "Hellenic" was objected to by Ismet Pasha, and eventually it was decided that his Government should make a formal demand to the Greek Government for the return of the hostages, and in the meantime the Allied generals would on their part refer to their Governments.

It is correct that, according to international law, the practice of taking hostages for general purposes is to be discouraged on the ground that war is a contention between armed forces and civilians are to be affected as little as possible, and had this been a simple issue between two nations the Allied generals would have given their full support to the release of these persons

The issue is, however, not so direct. It is believed that there are large numbers of civilian prisoners in the hands of the Turks who are of the Greek race, but Ottoman subjects. These persons, if they in any way assisted the Greek forces or Greek Administration, are probably guilty of high treason, and the reports of the newspapers show that some have already been condemned to death. Humanity demands that these persons should be treated as though they were Hellenic subjects. The attitude of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey towards them is, however, clearly shown by the objection of Ismet Pasha to the use of the word "Greek" in case it might be held to include Ottoman Greeks, and the announcement that all changes of nationality, unless carried out according to Ottoman law, would not be recognised, and, further, that no protection by foreign nations would be admitted.

Coupled with the question of the civil hostages was the matter of the military prisoners of war, and here Ismet Pasha definitely stated that he would not consent to this question being dealt with upon a reciprocal basis. Curiously enough, in the last two or three days this side of the question was not referred to by him I was informed that the Greeks had 100,000 prisoners of the Turks and the Turks 30,000 of the Greeks, but, of course, I am unable to vouch for these figures.

Having in mind the discussion which took place upon this subject at Mudania, I find it difficult to assist your Excellency with any proposals which might be acceptable to both parties.

If the Greeks generally fear that Greek Ottoman subjects will be shot for assisting them, it appears reasonable that they should hold hostages to endeavour to prevent this by threat of reprisals.

In my opinion, the best solution would be for an undertaking to be given by the Greek Government to accord the treatment of first-class prisoners to their hostages, in return for which the Angora Government might be disposed to stay their hands against Ottoman Greeks until the issue is decided by the Peace Conference.

In the alternative, exchange might be made by treating Ottoman Greeks for this purpose only as Hellenic subjects.

I have, &c.
C. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*
Commanding-in-chief British Forces in Turkey.

[E 11502/27/44] No. 298.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 903.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 17, 1922.*

I HAVE not attempted, since writing my despatch No. 801 of the 12th September, to present to your Lordship any general review of the course of events in this country. Even in the short interval between drafting that despatch and sending it off, certain portions of it became out of date. By the 13th September it had become evident that the plight of the Greeks in the Brousa area was hardly less grave than it had been in the Smyrna hinterland on the eve of the rout. From Smyrna itself I had received news of the deplorable events which culminated in the destruction of the most flourishing portion of the city.

2. There has been no moment since that date when, even had it been possible for me to find the necessary time, I could have summed up the situation in despatch form without risk of being overtaken by events before my account of it had reached your Lordship. We have now, however, arrived at so definite a turning-point that I take advantage of the pause following the signature of the Mudania Convention to submit, not a detailed review of what has passed, but an attempt to appreciate the situation as it is to-day and the outlook which confronts the Allies.

3. Once the Kemalists had finally settled their account with the Greeks in Asia Minor, it was evident that the centre of gravity of the situation must shift to the Straits and Thrace. Any differences which had existed among leading Nationalists on fundamental matters affecting their relations with Western Europe were, for the time being, obliterated. It became simply a question of the best method of taking the next step towards the complete realisation of the National Pact. Some were for a frontal armed attack on the Allies; some for turning the Allied position astride the Straits in one way or another and carrying the war against the Greeks into Thrace; some for diplomatising, in the confident expectation that all immediate aims, *e.g.*, the whole of the National Pact, could be secured at a conference. The firm determination of His Majesty's Government not to abandon the Straits prematurely and not to tolerate the continuance of the Turco-Greek war in Thrace turned the scale in favour of the third of these alternatives. Mustapha Kemal, who for the time has recovered all the authority which began to slip from him a year ago, himself rallied to it, and the Mudania Conference was the result.

4. The Kemalists realised at Mudania that His Majesty's Government still held a dominant position in the counsels of the Allies, and that, unless they were prepared for war with Great Britain, a war in which they had no absolute assurance of Russian support, they must concede something to the British point of view. They would be less than human, however, if they did not consider that the result was a great diplomatic victory for them. They have secured Eastern Thrace without striking a blow. They have at last forced the Allies as a whole to treat with them as the real Government of Turkey on questions which, despite the technically military character of the conference, are of great political import. The concessions which they were forced to make gave away nothing of a permanent nature.

5. This last consideration is really the most important of all in its bearing on the general outlook from the Allied point of view. The Kemalists will come into conference with a strong military position. They will come with the National Pact in one hand and a drawn sabre in the other. They have less than ever any intention of abating a jot of the Pact, except possibly as regards the Caucasus, in the coming negotiations. They know that they have only one serious adversary to contend with, even at a green table, and they realise only too well that that adversary, namely, His Majesty's

Government, is being attacked in the rear by the combination of forces represented by labour, the "Daily Mail" and the politicians who imagine that the way to placate Islam is to yield on every point to a militant Turkey. The spirit in which the Kemalists will approach the great issues is summed up in a sentence from a speech just delivered by the Angora Foreign Minister:—

"Saisissant l'occasion de la signature de la Convention militaire de Moudania, nous nous adressons de nouveau au monde civilisé et lui disons, 'Nous nous battons pour obtenir nos droits légitimes; plus tard nous serions en Orient un important facteur de la paix, un facteur qui comptera aussi plus ou moins sur sa force.'"

6. The Treaty of Sèvres is dead, but it is only necessary to glance at some of its headings to see at how many points the Allies will come up against the National Pact. The frontiers of Turkey must be defined. It is the settled determination of the Kemalists to demand a plebiscite in Western Thrace. They will certainly demand the restoration of Mosul, and they may even ask for a further rectification of the Franklin-Bouillon frontier between Turkey and Syria. On the Straits question, they will make every use of the clause in the Pact to the effect that the freedom of the Straits must be assured on lines compatible with the security of Constantinople. I shall be surprised if, in their present mood, they agree readily to any thorough plan for demilitarisation and non-fortification. They will fight harder than ever any proposal to give the minorities greater protection than is afforded by the minority clauses of European treaties. It will be difficult to get them to agree to definite limitations of their armed forces, and, if they do, they will stand out for much greater effectives than were contemplated at Paris last March. They will strive against any kind of financial or economic control, even in the form of security for reparations. There is no question now outstanding on which they will be more unbending than that of the Capitulations. It is a settled principle with them that nothing must be done to go back on the *fait accompli* of September 1914, when their predecessors, the Young Turks, abolished the privileges of foreigners by a unilateral act. It is useless to talk to them of the necessity of a substitute for the Capitulations in the shape of safeguards without privileges for foreigners. Their one answer is that Turkey must be sovereign and independent.

7. It would be easy to make a list of minor points on which trouble must be expected at the conference. I have contented myself with indicating the attitude which the Kemalists will take up as regards the larger issues. In my opinion, no opportunity should be lost of educating public opinion at home on the importance of these issues, and of mobilising such foreign support as is possible for the points of view which His Majesty's Government will have to sustain. On such a question as the Capitulations even the weak-kneed French may be induced to help us. There is a very strong movement in the French colony here against the policy of the Quai d'Orsay and the big financiers, to which the ordinary Frenchman here considers his interest to have been sacrificed. The French High Commissioner is doing his best to stifle this movement, but an agitation has been started which cannot fail to have some repercussion in France. This question is also of great concern to the United States of America and all countries having any considerable colony here. On other questions, such as the Straits and minorities, it should be possible to secure the backing of public opinion and, perhaps, the Governments of the United States of America and other countries, and in dealing with minorities the support of the League of Nations should be valuable.

8. I have elsewhere pointed out to your Lordship the importance of in no way reducing the forces concentrated by His Majesty's Government in this part of the world pending the meeting of the conference, and of discreetly encouraging the Greeks to maintain their army in being in Western Thrace. Mudania has shown that nothing but the possession of force and the will to use it impresses the Kemalists. This consideration will apply with infinitely greater force during the peace negotiations.

9. I have spoken throughout of the Kemalists. One of the inevitable consequences of the recent events, especially the decision to deliver Eastern Thrace to the Angora Government, has been to reduce the Constantinople Government to a still lower ebb of ineffectiveness than before. That Government is naturally pleased with the outcome of the Mudania Conference. When Smyrna fell it made no official sign of rejoicing, but the Porte has been beflagged for the signature of the recent convention. Tewfik Pasha and his colleagues nevertheless realise that their last hour is approaching. *Morituri te salutamus* is their attitude towards Mustapha Kemal. They will doubtless linger on and hold solemn councils, but they count for so little that it is doubtful

whether they will amount to more than a minor complication when the invitations to the conference are issued. Indeed, were it not that their disappearance would inevitably raise the grave question of the Sultan's position, it would probably be better that they should depart from the scene before the conference meets.

10. I have spoken of the realisation of the National Pact as being the *immediate* object of the Kemalists. In stressing the word "immediate," I wish once more to remind your Lordship that for many of them that is only the first step. It is a step at which they will pause, and there will not be the same union afterwards regarding a completely revolutionary policy at home and a policy of expansion abroad. Many of the leaders and the majority of ordinary Turks will wish them to preserve traditional institutions and to "cultivate their garden" in peaceful conditions. It would, however, be folly to forget that others among the leaders cherish the dream of reconstructing the Turkish Empire, if only on a federal basis, and establishing Turkey in a position of hegemony in a great Islamic combine. For these Great Britain not only is, but will remain, the enemy. They desire nothing less than the collapse of our position, first in Mesopotamia, then in the East generally. The really vital issue at the Peace Conference will not be any of the questions enumerated above, important as they are, but whether Turkey is to be placed in such a position as to enable these men to dominate her internally and so carry forward their plan.

11. In conclusion, I would point out that the Kemalists at this moment hang more than ever between Bolshevik Russia and the Western Powers. I have always maintained that Mustapha Kemal adjusted the closeness of his relations with Russia to the necessities of his immediate situation, never going further in that direction than it was absolutely necessary to do, and that Russia has at no time acquired such influence as to be able to dictate the foreign policy of Angora. Recent events appear to me to have justified this theory. The Russians have been far more expansive about the victory of the Turks than the Turks have been about Russian assistance. I read between the lines of M. Karakhan's recent notes about the Straits question a great nervousness lest Turkey should try to leave Russia out in the cold now that the realisation of her own immediate aims *vis-à-vis* of the Allies appears to be in sight. This situation may be turned to account either by using the Russians against the Turks or the Turks against the Russians; but in the latter alternative we should endeavour not to play too much in the hands of the aggressive type of Kemalist described in the last paragraph, whose ultimate ideal will be to make Turkey independent, on an Islamic basis, either of Russia or the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 11507/27/44] No. 299.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 909. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 16, 1922.*

I HAVE read with interest in the Confidential print which reached me by the last bag, a letter, dated the 21st September, from M. Poincaré to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, which was enclosed in Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 2221 of the 23rd ultimo. In this letter M. Poincaré states that, at the request of the French High Commissioner, General Harington gave the order for the withdrawal of the French troops at Chanak to Kilid-Bahr. He adds that I made no observation about this order.

2. I am referring to General Harington for information with regard to the circumstances in which the order for the withdrawal of the French troops from Chanak was given. As far as I am concerned I can only state that, as soon as I heard of their withdrawal, which was notified to me by the Acting French High Commissioner, I entered a vigorous protest. I reported my action in my telegram No. 438 of the 20th September.

3. In the same letter M. Poincaré states that I had asked my French colleague whether the rapid summoning of a conference "which would settle territorial questions in conformity with Turkish demands," &c., would not be the best way of stopping the advance of the Kemalist troops. I have no recollection of putting this question in such a manner to my French colleague, and still less of suggesting that the conference should settle territorial questions in conformity with Turkish demands. I did lay stress at the time on the desirability of an immediate conference.

4. I have further read with interest in the last telegram sections Lord Hardinge's telegram No. 467 recording a visit which he paid to M. Poincaré, and in the course of which the latter read out some telegrams from General Pellé. One of these telegrams mentioned the question I had asked my Allied colleagues as to whether Admiral Brock could count on the co-operation of the Allied admirals in preventing the passage of the Kemalist troops from Asia to Europe. General Pellé implies that this question provoked a certain vivacity. This is pure imagination. I asked the question and merely took note of the answer, and there was no discussion on the subject.

5. I am inclined to infer from the foregoing that General Pellé's reports of what passed between us were not very accurate.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

No. 300.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 616.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 24, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 600.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday how he reconciled positive information he had given me with his telegram. He said notices had actually been posted up in the sense complained of. He has, of course, never made any claim that Greeks should be allowed to take away other people's property, and I am sure he understands that some may try to do so.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 301.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 609.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 23, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I believe this protest to be nothing but a tissue of misrepresentations. Dr. Nansen, on his return, will be able to give information on situation in Thrace. I shall communicate protest to him.

It is doubtless designed to furnish Angora Government with an excuse for rejecting recent intervention of Allied High Commissioners in favour of Ottoman Greeks, who have fought against Kemalists, and of forestalling similar interventions in future.

I am consulting General Harington regarding air report.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 220.)

No. 302.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 611.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 504.

Press announces that preliminary meeting of experts has been abandoned.

I should be grateful to know whether this means that preliminary meeting will not be held or whether it is merely postponed.

There is good reason to believe that Angora Government is most anxious to prevent any united standpoint being adopted by the Powers on financial and economic questions prior to conference, and has been exercising pressure on French Government to this end.

No. 303.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 615.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 24, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 611.

French High Commissioner to-day spoke to me expressing opinion that, in view of present attitude of Angora Government, it was absolutely essential that preliminary meeting of experts should be held in order to obtain Allied unity of views before Peace Conference in respect of financial and economic questions. He enquired whether Italian High Commissioner and I would join him in representations to our respective Governments in this sense.

I said that I shared his opinion, and it was agreed that we should each telegraph accordingly.

I gather from French High Commissioner that meeting of experts had been abandoned at the request of French Government. French High Commissioner is, however, undoubtedly impressed by strong attitude in regard to Capitulations, &c., adopted by almost all Frenchmen here, and holds, in consequence, much saner view than his Government would appear to hold on disastrous results which would ensue from [? excessive] concessions to exaggerated Nationalist demands.

If meeting of experts be held, I would urge desirability of utilising Sir H. Lamb's long experience and valuable judgment.

No. 304.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 617.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 24, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 607.

Inter-Allied Railway Commission has gone to Thrace to deal with question of transport of cereals.

Allied Governments can accept no responsibility for cost of actual transport, for which Greek Government must assume financial liability.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 223.)

[E 11564/10102/44] No. 305.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 363.)
(Telegraphic.) *Ramleh, October 24, 1922.*

MY telegrams No. 264 and No. 265.

Suggestion that Egyptian Government should be invited to make a separate treaty with Turkey is open to following objections, for reasons explained in my immediately following telegram:—

1. That Egyptian Government would probably be unwilling to sign proposed guarantee.

2. That such a suggestion would give them false idea of our diplomatic weakness.

3. That it seems injudicious to put into their minds idea that it might be open to them to take separate lines with Turkey.

I do not exclude the possibility of such a treaty, but I am disposed to think that appropriate time would be after hands of Turks have been tied by main treaty.

It is difficult to explore situation adequately without ascertaining the attitude on specific points which Sarwat would wish to adopt at Conference. He has independently expressed his desire to consult us immediately as to joint programme. The initial stages of such a consultation would enlighten me, but it would be difficult for me to enter upon this ground until I could tell him formally that an Egyptian delegation would be present at seat of conference.

I suggest therefore that I be authorised to communicate to Sarwat first paragraph of your telegram No. 265, modified as follows:—

"While eventuality of Egypt being entitled to sign treaty appears improbable for reasons given in my telegram No. 257, His Majesty's Government would welcome presence of Egyptian representative at seat of conference to watch Egyptian interests."

[E 11570/10102/44] No. 306.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) *Ramleh, October 24, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Reasons indicated are as follows:—

1. I realise necessity to tie Sarwat's hands as far as possible as a preliminary to signature of treaty with Turkey, but I think that he would be unwilling to conclude a convention destined, presumably, eventually for publication, of which secrecy at any rate could not be assured.

Ex hypothesi it would be purporting to change his diplomatic position, and *quid pro quo* offer, far from being advantageous, would be illusionary if not damaging to him.

Turkish recognition of Egyptian independence is here publicly believed already to have been voted by Angora Parliament, while acceptance of a condominium in Soudan would be regarded here as a concession by him and not to him.

2 and 3.—(*a.*) Leading him to think that we are uneasy about tribute, which had better, for the time, be taken for granted.

(*b.*) It would suggest to him possibility of his going behind our backs with Turkey, and would indicate an uneasiness as to our power of control over him in this direction. It would suggest that we are seeking to tie his hands because we foresee difficulty in tying those of Turks.

Our present effective hold over Egyptian Government is for following reasons, amongst others, much greater than would be implied by these suggestions. These reasons are:—

(*a.*) Possible conflict with King, in which my support would turn the scale.

(*b.*) Anxiety of Egyptian Government on account of fall of Coalition Government which granted independence to Egypt.

(*c.*) Continued need of our support against revolutionary opposition.

(*d.*) Natural fear of deep waters into which they would plunge themselves and their country if they provoke conflict with Great Britain.

[E 11637/27/44] No. 307.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 25.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a fait part à son Gouvernement de l'avis formulé par Lord Curzon, le 23 de ce mois, au sujet de la rédaction de l'invitation à adresser à la Russie à la prochaine conférence sur les affaires d'Orient.

M. Poincaré vient de répondre au Comte de Saint-Aulaire:

1. Que le Gouvernement français est toujours partisan de la suppression du dernier paragraphe du projet d'invitation. Cette suppression n'empêchera pas le Gouvernement de Moscou d'adjoindre, s'il le désire, à sa délégation des délégués du Gouvernement de Tiflis et de Kharkof, dont l'existence n'est pas démontrée comme Gouvernements indépendants de celui de Moscou. Si, au contraire, le dernier paragraphe est maintenu, les Alliés posent eux-mêmes la question de la représentation d'un Gouvernement géorgien qui se trouve avoir été reconnu *de jure* par une lettre du Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.

2. Qu'il préférerait voir insérer dans l'invitation au Gouvernement de Moscou la formule suggérée par le Gouvernement français pour réserver la signature des Soviets après leur reconnaissance. Si, toutefois, Lord Curzon insistait pour que cette formule ne figurât pas dans l'invitation, M. Poincaré y consentirait.

En ce cas, il devrait être bien entendu que cette formule lierait les Alliés entre eux quant à la procédure à suivre, et qu'en toute hypothèse une signature quelconque donnée par les Soviets ne préjugerait pas la reconnaissance de droit.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 octobre 1922.

No. 308.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 618.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 24, 1922.

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegrams Nos. 608 and 609.

Reports from His Majesty's consul, Canea, confirm that a certain number of Mussulman farms have been seized by refugees. One of the sufferers was an Egyptian subject, and I addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs on his behalf, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 584 now on the way.

It is certain that Mussulman population is getting nervous, and it is possible that other excesses have occurred of which I have not heard. I have repeatedly called the attention of Greek Government to necessity of protecting Mussulmans, and I believe they do their best.

I suggest that League of Nations should propose to Angora that they should ask Greek Government to allow them to make enquiry into Turkish allegations provided that Turks agree to similar enquiry in Turkey.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 309.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 619.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 24, 1922.

REPRESENTATIVE of League of Nations here has proposed to Greek Government that a member of Red Crescent be sent here immediately to look into condition of Turkish prisoners of war in conjunction with representative of League of Nations.

Greek Government have agreed on condition that Dr. Nansen approves of individual chosen, who must confine himself to his proper work. Representative of League of Nations asks that above be communicated to Nansen for communication to Angora, and suggests that Red Crescent representative return here with Dr. Nansen.

I have pointed out that Turkish prisoners are looked after by Dutch Minister, who is thoroughly satisfied with their treatment. Colonel Corfe replies that object of proposal is to show Turks that League of Nations is anxious to look after Turkish as well as Greek interests, and he will explain matters to Netherlands Minister.

There seems to be force in this agreement.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 310.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 626. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October* 25, 1922.

MY telegram No. 582.

Italian Minister told me the other day that he hoped to arrange Dodecanese question amicably, and I now learn that he has been approaching through third

parties Dr. Zervos, head of Dodecanese party here. The most interesting of several suggestions made to Dr. Zervos was that all the islands should be returned to Greece in exchange for an offensive and defensive alliance between Greece and Italy, and a promise not to renew Greek alliance with Serbia.

General impression of Zervos was that Italians anticipated considerable trouble in islands, and were anxious to come to an understanding.

(Repeated to Rome.)

No. 311.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 519.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 25, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 611 of 23rd October: Preliminary Allied meeting.

Our proposal for preliminary meeting of experts here was abandoned owing to acrimonious spirit of French reply and their insistence on Paris.

It seems improbable that any preliminary Allied meeting will now take place before conference, but if not we shall endeavour to arrange at conference that preparation of new proposals shall be carried out and agreed upon by Allies sitting separately, before they are made to the Turks.

[E 11425/10524/44] No. 312.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Caclamanos.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 25, 1922.

IN your note of the 17th October you discussed the interpretation of the Mudania Convention and asked that the British authorities in Thrace might be instructed that the Allied contingents and missions should not withdraw before the departure of the Greek authorities, and should, if necessary, remain for the whole period of thirty days mentioned in the convention.

2. In reply, I have the honour to inform you that the principle of the evacuation scheme is that it should be gradual. While the Allied contingents and missions can, if necessary, remain for the full period of thirty days, it is for the Allied generals, representing the Allied Governments, to determine the exact moment at which they can or should leave. It is proposed to draw up a scheme fixing various districts for progressive evacuation and various dates before which Turkish administration and gendarmerie will not be admitted to these districts. Arrangements will be made known in each district so as to allow the Greek civil administration and population time and opportunity for preparing to withdraw.

3. Even after the installation of the Turkish administration it will not be obligatory for the Allied contingents to withdraw before the expiry of the thirty days; but they will be withdrawn, so far as possible, gradually from the various districts if and when the Allied generals are satisfied that their withdrawal will not endanger public order.

4. I trust that these explanations will satisfy your Government that all precautions possible in the circumstances are being taken to maintain order and ensure the minimum of danger and distress to the civilian population.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11452/10524/44] No. 313.

Sir Eyre Crowe to M. Veniselos.

(Confidential.)
My dear M. Veniselos, *Foreign Office, October* 25, 1922.

IN your conversation with me on the 21st you spoke of the difficulties connected with the evacuation of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace, and mentioned certain alleged unfriendly and obstructive measures on the part of the French authorities, notably their demands that war material which the Greek forces were unable to

remove within the period fixed for their withdrawal should be delivered to the Turks, and that only small quantities of the stocks of cereals and cattle should be removed, as they were necessary for the support of the Turkish forces and for the victualling of Constantinople.

We telegraphed at once to our High Commissioner at Constantinople. In reply, Sir H. Rumbold states that General Charpy—who, incidentally, does not hold or claim the position of Chief of the Staff of the inter-Allied contingents—certainly never made or authorised the alleged demand respecting the delivery of the war material. It appears that a subordinate officer of a French contingent issued certain instructions both as regards cereals and army stores tending to delay their removal. But General Charpy had these orders cancelled.

As regards the stocks of cereals, a difficulty appears to have arisen in consequence of a claim that the Greek army stores include all the cereals actually in Eastern Thrace recently purchased by a private syndicate at Athens, whilst it is represented on the other side that a proportion of the grain ought equitably to be utilised for local consumption. A special Allied commission has now been sent to adjudicate on what is Greek property and to decide what proportion ought to be allowed to go. There are further difficulties in the limited carrying capacity of the railway and in the guarantee of payment for transport. Every effort is, however, being made to ensure the removal of all *bonâ fide* Greek stocks, and Dr. Nansen will endeavour to purchase any stocks remaining after evacuation.

The orders issued by General Charpy are to the effect that the Greek population will be allowed to take with it all private property, including cattle and cereals, but not, of course, Moslem property. And Lord Hardinge reports from Paris that M. Poincaré has assured the Greek Minister there that there can be no question of depriving the Greek emigrants of their stocks, and that payment will have to be made to the Greeks for their crops in the settlement necessary after evacuation.

I trust that the foregoing information will relieve your anxiety, and I may add that all our reports indicate that the evacuation, both of the army and of civilians, is proceeding as satisfactorily as could be expected in the difficult and distressing circumstances.

Believe me, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[E 11637/27/44] No. 314.

Foreign Office to Count de Saint-Aulaire.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the French Ambassador, and in reply to the note from Count Saint-Aulaire of the 25th October regarding the Near Eastern Conference, has the honour, by direction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state that in deference to M. Poincaré's views Lord Curzon is reluctantly prepared to agree to the suppression of the last paragraph of the draft invitation to the Russian Soviet Government. Lord Curzon wishes it, however, to be clearly understood that should the omission of any reference to the Ukraine and Georgia lead to any delay in the arrangements for the conference, the responsibility must rest with the French Government. In any case, Lord Curzon adheres to the views regarding the Government of Georgia expressed in paragraph 6 of his letter to M. Poincaré of the 20th October.

Lord Curzon is happy to note that M. Poincaré accepts his point of view regarding the insertion in the draft invitation to Moscow of the formula suggested by the French Government, reserving the signature of the Soviet Government until after their *de jure* recognition. Lord Curzon agrees that M. Poincaré's formula shall be regarded, however, as binding between the Allies so far as the procedure to be followed in Lausanne is concerned, and unless and until it is modified by another Allied agreement.

As the texts of the invitations to the conference have now been agreed upon, Lord Curzon is arranging that the invitations to Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, Turkey (both to the Constantinople and Angora Governments), Bulgaria, Switzerland and the United States shall be telegraphed to-morrow, the 26th October, to the British representatives in the capitals concerned, with instructions to concert with their French and Italian colleagues in presenting simultaneously the invitations to the Governments concerned. Lord Curzon presumes that the French and Italian Governments will desire that their texts of the identic notes shall be communicated in French and Italian, and

has instructed the British representatives concerned to compare the translations before the notes are actually handed in. His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople will be instructed to arrange with his Allied colleagues as to the most convenient manner of communicating the identic notes simultaneous to the Angora Government.

His Majesty's Government intend to transmit the invitation to the Russian Government through their representative at Moscow, and the French and Italian Governments will doubtless choose their own channels for communicating their invitations to the said Government.

The Italian Ambassador has concurred in the above procedure and in the texts of the invitations on behalf of his Government.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1922.

No. 315.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 620.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 26, 1922.

FOLLOWING is text of identic telegram addressed by three High Commissioners to their Governments:—

"As result of communication made by Angora Government's representative to financial institutions in Constantinople (reported in my telegram No. 567), Allied High Commissioners and Provisional Financial Commission have examined possibility of assisting [? groups omitted] present deficit is about £T. 370,000 and deficit up to end of February will be £T. 1,400,000. Provisional Financial Commission declared that it had no solution to propose for making good this deficit. As result of Nationalist communication no Constantinople bank will make an advance to Central Government. Officials will thus remain unpaid.

"The three High Commissioners have already protested to Hamid Bey in strongest manner against decision of Angora Government. Are the three Governments prepared to concert as to measures to be taken to assure existence of Constantinople Government until a peace is concluded? To achieve this, will the three Governments agree to impose on Nationalist Government, by an article in treaty, recognition of all administrative and financial acts and operations of Constantinople Government between the armistice and conclusion of peace? Only some such guarantee from the three Powers would successfully enable Constantinople Government to find means to make up budget deficit, which threatens to bring about its total collapse."

No. 316.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 621.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 26, 1922.

MY telegram No. 605, last paragraph.

One local paper published on 24th October statement attributed to Shakir Bey, now new Vali of Eastern Thrace. It accuses Greeks of misbehaviour, whitewashes Turkish bands, and says decisions taken in Asia Minor regarding Greeks and Armenians will be applied in Thrace, *i.e.*, men of military age will be interned in concentration camps and traitors will be punished, but innocent and peaceable persons will enjoy complete tranquillity.

I immediately drew Hamid's attention to this. He replied on 25th October that he had not seen Shakir, but that Refet Pasha had authorised him to deny statement regarding internment, and to say that the Greeks would be treated exactly like the Moslems. If liable to military service they would be enlisted, but they would not be treated as prisoners. Refet himself made somewhat similar statement in interview published in local French organ on 25th October.

Question of treatment of Greeks is becoming academic owing to exodus. I would, however, observe that Refet's assurances up to date appear to amount to

nothing more than promise to apply laws of Grand National Assembly. This in practice means application of laws on "treason," enlistment of men of military age with well-known consequences and practical confiscation of property of those who leave the country.

Nothing but very wide amnesty would make it safe for Christian population to remain. I do not see the slightest indication that Angora Government contemplate such amnesty. Even mild representation of High Commissioners in favour of Ottoman Greeks who served in Greek army in Asia Minor (see my despatch No. [?8]94) has provoked outcry in Angora on the ground that we are intervening in internal affairs.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 225.)

No. 317.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 624 Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 26, 1922.*

DR. NANSEN leaves for Angora to-morrow by arrangement with Refet Pasha. He will take up with Angora Government question of exchange of populations. This exchange would naturally include Ottoman Greeks of military age and girls and young women who have been detained in Anatolia by Kemalist authorities.

I am not hopeful that he will succeed in this mission. His failure will mean the disappearance of the young generation of Ottoman Greeks left in Anatolia, as men will no doubt die from hardship or be forcibly Islamised, whilst girls and young women will be taken into Mussulman houses and also Islamised.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 227.)

No. 318.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 625. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 26, 1922.*

"TIMES" correspondent has informed me in confidence of an interview he had yesterday with Rahmi Bey, former Vali of Smyrna, who is well disposed towards him. Rahmi, who has connections with Angora, stated that British community at Constantinople would be well advised to leave this place before they were pushed out. There was a feeling at Angora that England had aimed in past at destroying Turkey completely, and hoped in the present to maintain at least some form of control over her. This language is significant.

No. 319

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 323.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 26, 1922.*

MR. LINDLEY'S telegram of 25th October confirms my impression that there was something behind Italian move. In recent conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs and secretary-general, they have both hinted that recent action did not necessarily signify that Italy intended to retain all the islands. In talking to Minister for Foreign Affairs, I alluded to Nationalist cry for immediate annexation and asked him what were Italian intentions. He replied that he could give no answer. But press campaign on the subject has been dropped.

(Sent to Athens.)

No. 320.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens).**

(No. 333.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 26, 1922.*

MY immediately following telegram contains the text of the invitation to the conference at Lausanne from the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the Government to which you are accredited.

You should concert with your French and Italian colleagues for the simultaneous presentation of the identic notes to the Government to which you are accredited. If the French and Italian representatives desire their text to be in French and Italian, you should satisfy yourself as to their translation of the note, the original text of which was in English, before the notes are presented.

(Constantinople only.)

Invitations should be presented to Constantinople Government and to the Angora Government through whatever channel you and your Allied colleagues consider most suitable.

[E 11637/27/44] No. 321.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo).†

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 26, 1922.*

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Japanese Government to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on 13th November with a view to conclude a Treaty of Peace to end the war in the East.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

No. 322.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 522.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, October 26, 1922.*

IN pursuance of their note of 23rd September to the Government of Angora, and of the reply of that Government of 4th October, the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy have the honour to invite the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Angora (the Government of the Sultan of Turkey) to send representatives to Lausanne to open on 13th November negotiations to conclude a Treaty of Peace to end the war in the East.

It has been agreed by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy that their representatives shall have full powers, but that these plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the number of two.

No. 323.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Erskine (Sofia).‡

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, October 26, 1922.*

THE Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy are inviting the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send

* Also to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo), No. 113; Sir H. Dering (Bucharest), No. 91; Sir A. Young, (Belgrade), No. 76; Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople), No. 521; and Sir A. Geddes (Washington), No. 312.

† Also to Sir H. Dering (Bucharest), No. 92; Sir A. Young (Belgrade), No. 77: and Mr. Lindley (Athens), No. 334; *mutatis mutandis.*

‡ Also to Mr. Peters (Moscow), No. 250, *mutatis mutandis.*

representatives to Lausanne on 13th November to conclude a Treaty of Peace to end the war in the East.

Among the subjects which will fall to be dealt with by this conference in the course of its proceedings will be that of the Straits. The Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy recognise that this question raises issues which require special treatment and consultation with Powers other than the belligerents, and in particular with the Powers whose coasts border on the Black Sea. The Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy therefore invite the Bulgarian Government to arrange to send representatives to Lausanne to take part in the discussion on the question of the Straits. The date upon which these discussions will open will be notified later to the Bulgarian Government.

No. 324.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1922.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy are inviting the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne on 13th November to conclude a Treaty of Peace to end the war in the East. They are also inviting the Russian and Bulgarian Governments to send representatives at a date to be fixed later to participate in the discussions which the conference will undertake in the course of its proceedings on the subject of the Straits.

The three principal Allied Powers recall that a representative of the United States Government was present at San Remo in the final stages of the proceedings of the Supreme Council which led to the drafting of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. They would welcome the presence of a United States representative at Lausanne in a similar capacity or in a more active capacity, especially in the discussion upon the question of the Straits.

[E 11637/27/44] No. 325.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Russell (Berne).

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1922.

MY immediately following telegram contains the text of the invitation from the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the Swiss Government to facilitate the holding of the Peace Conference with Turkey at Lausanne.

You should concert with your French and Italian colleagues for simultaneous presentation of identic notes to the Swiss Government. If the French and Italian representatives desire their text to be in French and Italian, you should satisfy yourself as to their translation of the note, the original text of which was in English, before the notes are presented.

[E 11637/27/44] No. 326.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Russell (Berne).

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1922.

THE Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, desiring to conclude a treaty of peace to end the war in the East, and to discuss and settle the future status of the Straits, have decided that these objects would be greatly facilitated if the conference could be held upon neutral soil. They are agreed that both for political and geographical reasons, no country offers so propitious a meeting-place for such a peace conference as Switzerland. They have therefore ventured to invite the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne to open negotiations on 13th November to conclude a treaty. They are also inviting the Governments of Bulgaria and Soviet Russia to

send representatives at a later stage in the proceedings of the conference to discuss the question of the Straits.

The three Governments earnestly hope that the Government of the Swiss Republic will welcome the choice of Lausanne as the seat of the conference, and will find themselves able to extend to the conference such material and technical facilities as the Swiss Government may consider possible.

[E 11637/27/44] No. 327.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1922.

MY despatch No. 1311 of 23rd October: Invitations to conference at Lausanne.

Invitations to conference at Lausanne are being sent off to-day by British, French and Italian Governments through their representatives in the capitals concerned. Texts of invitations are those enclosed in my letter to M. Poincaré of 20th October, with following alterations: Substitute the words "to end the war in the East" for the words "to conclude a final treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey" throughout, and omit the words "in the war between the Allies and Turkey" in the second paragraph of the draft invitations to the Governments of Russia and Bulgaria. Omit last paragraph of draft invitation to the Russian Government.

Italian Ambassador is dealing with matter direct with Italian Government.

No. 328.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1922.

MY telegram No. 318 of 7th October: Italian military supplies to Nationalists.

Please bring this report to the attention of the Italian Government, and point out that Angora Government clearly intend to exert pressure on the Allies at forthcoming conference by maintaining and strengthening their army, although they have already attained their main original objects. You should therefore urge Italian Government, in the interests of the Allies, to stop this and other shipments of war material.

[E 11570/10102/44] No. 329.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 363 and 364 of 24th October regarding Egypt and Turkish Peace Conference.

I gather from your telegram No. 351 that you have already informed Sarwat that presence of an Egyptian delegation at seat of conference is agreed to in principle, and I am anxious, if possible, to meet his wishes in this matter, but before His Majesty's Government are further committed, it is important that present situation should be cleared up and the alternatives before us thoroughly understood.

Your Lordship has made two suggestions in your telegrams Nos. 351 and 352 respectively:—

(*a.*) That in event of Egypt not being signatory to treaty, she might be given opportunity of signing protocol of adhesion to Egyptian clauses of treaty.
(*b.*) That nationality clauses should be excluded from treaty.

Procedure suggested under (*a*) has this in common with that described in my telegrams Nos. 264 and 265, that both proposals involve, as emphasised in the final sentence of my telegram No. 269, preliminary agreement with Egypt in respect of form and substance of Egyptian articles in treaty. Former procedure will, however, entail retention in treaty of articles 101, 104, 108 to 111, 113, 114, and 428, as modified by my telegram No. 258, and of article 112 in its original form.

Procedure suggested by me reduced Egyptian clauses of treaty to articles 101, 109, 112, as modified by my telegram No. 259, 113, 114, and 428, but is contingent on a definite promise by Sarwat, which need not be published and might take the form of a letter to your Lordship, recognising that the four reserved subjects of the declaration of 28th February are outside the scope of any Turco-Egyptian treaty which may subsequently be concluded.

Your Lordship's proposal under paragraph (*b*) might be adopted under either of above procedures, but some clause will be required in treaty under which high contracting parties recognise that status of ex-Ottoman nationals in Egypt will be regulated by an Egyptian nationality law, provided always that law in question does not conflict with nationality section of the Treaty of Sèvres. Your Lordship in considering this clause will bear in mind that the French are likely to insist on Syrians resident in Egypt being allowed to opt for Syrian nationality without leaving Egypt.

I shall await your Lordship's further suggestions as to the way in which preliminary agreement with Egyptian Government can best be secured.

[E 11459/10524/44] No. 330.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Caclamanos.

Foreign Office, October 26, 1922.

Sir,

IN reply to your two notes of the 21st October asking that a time-limit may be fixed between the evacuation of the Greek troops in Thrace and the arrival of the Turkish gendarmerie and also that the Allied commander-in-chief may be instructed to cause the inter-Allied contingents and missions to give all possible assistance to the Greek authorities, I have the honour to inform you that there is little to add to the information regarding Thrace conveyed to you in my note of the 25th October and to M. Venizelos in Sir E. Crowe's letter to him of the 25th October.

2. As regards the progressive replacement of Greek by Turkish authority, it is clearly impossible for His Majesty's Government to announce a uniform time-limit for the whole of Thrace, but arrangements have been made for the gradual installation of Turkish administration and gendarmerie in different districts within successive periods and the dates before which the Turkish gendarmerie will not reach the areas in question are being widely published. This arrangement seems to satisfy the request in your first note.

3. General Harington is being informed of the statements contained in your second note, but they are not corroborated by his reports. On the contrary, in a telegram dated the 23rd October he states that, though extremely difficult and painful, evacuation is proceeding better than he anticipated, with only minor incidents; he adds that the withdrawal of the Greek army is to programme and that there is reason to hope that the shipment and rail transport of refugees will be similarly effected.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11621/27/44] No. 331.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Foreign Office, October 26, 1922.

Sir,

IN reply to the letter from Mr. Marsh to Mr. Vansittart of the 25th October, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state that, in connection with his personal correspondence with M. Poincaré regarding the scope and character of the forthcoming peace conference at Lausanne, he has been carefully examining the question of the participation of the Governments of the Dominions and India in the new treaty with Turkey. In view of M. Poincaré's attitude towards the representation of these Governments at the conference, and his apparent desire either to make difficulties on the subject or to obtain in return for his consent to such representation the widening of the basis of the conference and the admission of Tunis and Morocco as separate entities—a procedure to which there are obviously strong objections—Lord Curzon considers that the only desirable and convenient procedure will be to follow the

precedent of the Treaty of Sèvres, the revision of which is the immediate business of the forthcoming conference.

2. The Dominion Governments, in pursuance of this precedent, will be kept informed from time to time of the general line of policy on which His Majesty's Government propose to proceed, and of the course of the negotiations, and will be invited to sign the new treaty and any separate instruments regulating the status of the Straits. According to the arrangements agreed upon with the French and Italian Governments, each Government will be represented at Lausanne by two plenipotentiaries. The British plenipotentiaries will be the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

3. Lord Curzon is confident that this procedure will commend itself to the Dominion Governments, and that they will be satisfied to entrust the representation of the interest of the British Empire to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is fully acquainted with the Imperial aspect of the problem, and with the interest that is taken by the Dominion Governments in its solution.

4. Lord Curzon will be glad if the Secretary of State for the Colonies will communicate with the Governments concerned in this sense at as early a date as possible, informing them at the same time that invitations are to-day being sent by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the Japanese, Roumanian, Jugoslav, Greek and Turkish Governments (both of Constantinople and of Angora) to send representatives to Lausanne on the 13th November to conclude a treaty to end the war in the East. The Russian Soviet Government and the Bulgarian Government are also being invited to send to Lausanne, at a date to be fixed, representatives to take part in the discussions on the question of the Straits which the conference will undertake at a later stage in the course of its proceedings. An enquiry is also being addressed by the three Governments to the United States Government, expressing the hope that they will permit a United States representative to be present during the course of the negotiations at Lausanne in a capacity similar to that in which an American representative was present during the negotiations at San Remo in 1920, or to take a more active part in the negotiations, especially on the question of the Straits.

5. A similar letter is being addressed to the India Office.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

No. 332.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 27.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October* 27, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 333.

We presented identic note this morning. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Greece would be represented by MM. Venizelos and Caclamanos.

No. 333.

Mr. T. Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Berne, October* 27, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 25.

Identic notes were presented at Political Department this afternoon by my French colleague and my Italian colleague and myself after a careful comparison of texts. Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his own name as well as in that of the whole Federal Council, who, it appears, had discussed the matter in anticipation, extended a most cordial welcome to the conference on Swiss soil, and will to-night instruct cantonal and communal authorities of Lausanne to make all appropriate arrangements and to place themselves in communication with the consuls of the three Powers in that city. As Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded us, Lausanne is not without experience, as a peace conference was held there in 1912, and our Governments could rest assured that all possible assistance would be rendered.

With regard to possibility of Swiss participation, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had evidently been sounded through Paris, emphasised very strongly that,

while preferring to remain entirely aloof, Federal Government would, if pressed, consent to opening ceremony being performed by President of the Confederation, but by no other Swiss subject. I gathered that Swiss took no part in 1912 conference, and would prefer to confine their rôle to that of mere hosts on this occasion if Powers are agreeable.

After thanking Minister for Foreign Affairs cordially on behalf of our Governments for kind welcome extended to conference we took our departure.

No. 334.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 626.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 27, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 620.

Eastern Telegraph Company has received identic communication from Hamid and has consequently enquired whether it should pay to Constantinople Government usual monthly royalty amounting to nearly 6,000*l*. Telephone Company, which is also British concern, has not received notice, but is doubly affected in that it pays monthly royalty and has also concluded new contract since March 1920 with Constantinople Government. It also asks advice as to payment.

I have informed both companies that matter is being referred to Governments, that vigorous protest has been addressed to Angora Government, but that pending further advice payments should be suspended.

It is intolerable that Nationalist agent here should in this manner, under the nose of inter-Allied military occupants, institute financial blockade of Constantinople Government and give orders to Allied institutions. I would strongly urge that French and Italian Governments be invited to join in categorical intimation that this interference will not be permitted, and in guarantee that peace treaties will include clause protecting Allied institutions from prejudice as result of Angora declaration.

Am I authorised to advise Eastern Telegraph Company and Telephone Company to make payments in meantime? Constantinople Administration cannot continue to function if all its sources of revenue are in this manner dried up.

No. 335.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 628.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 521.

Dragomans handed invitation to Minister for Foreign Affairs and Hamid this afternoon. Each High Commissioner sent separate note in his own language. Texts were carefully compared beforehand.

Central Government have been apprehensive of being ignored, and Minister for Foreign Affairs manifested gratification at receipt of note.

Hamid offered no comment, but discussed routes to Lausanne in manner suggestive of probable acceptance.

Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs has resigned. Ismet Pasha is reported to have succeeded him, but this is not certain.

Fethi is also possible candidate.

No. 336.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 629. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 27, 1922.*

THERE is evidence that French Government and French authorities here are becoming increasingly disillusioned and irritated by recent proceedings of Nationalists at Smyrna, and their attitude towards French institutions here.

French High Commissioner told me to-day that he had, under instructions from his Government, recently addressed two very stiff notes to Angora Government with regard to desecration of French cemetery at Smyrna, and measures tending to hamper arrival at and departure from Smyrna of foreign, including French, subjects, which constituted a hindrance to trade. He also stated that French agent at Angora had been instructed to inform Angora Government that France would not be able to support Nationalists at Peace Conference unless they changed their methods. This admission is somewhat remarkable.

No. 337.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 525.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 609 of 23rd October and 619 of 25th October: Turkish protest against alleged Greek atrocities.

I leave it to your discretion to decide what, if any, reply should be returned.

No. 338.

Mr. Lindley (No. 395) to Sir H. Rumbold.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received October 28.)

(No. 631.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 28, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 226.

Locations given by Greek General Staff are: Fourth corps headquarters, Dedeagatch; 6th division, Suffi; 7th division, Demotika; 11th division, area west of Adrianople. Third corps headquarters and 10th division, Gumuljina; 3rd division, Xanthi; 12th division, Ferejik. General Staff maintain these locations sent by Nider on 25th October, but it seems possible that Dedeagatch may be clerical error for Demotika as 4th corps headquarters.

General Staff say the only regiments now being retained in army are those shown in military attaché's order of battle (see my telegram No. 599 of 20th October and military attaché's despatch No. 13 of 22nd October), and that at any rate for the present distinguishing numbers shown in the order of battle will not be changed. All other previously existing regiments either have been or are being broken up and their personnel absorbed.

Second, 3rd and 4th corps are under Nider. [? First] corps (5th division) and 5th corps are directly under Ministry of War, and each receives orders from General Staff at Athens. Fifth division is under orders of General Officer commanding troops in interior, *i.e.*, in Old Greece and islands.

Military's attaché's despatch of 22nd October stated wrongly that 4th division had disappeared from army. This division is being re-formed at Salonica as shown in order of battle.

No. 339.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 630.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 628.

I hear that Nationalists have recently shown less eagerness for an immediate meeting of Peace Conference. Hamid has been putting it about that conference would not meet until 25th November. This date nearly coincides with date on which Angora Government will have taken over administration of Eastern Thrace. The Nationalists will then be in a stronger position, and there are somewhat persistent rumours that it is their intention to create a kind of army in Eastern Thrace, of which gendarmerie would form nucleus. Nationalists no doubt also hope to have completely paralysed Constantinople Government in another month.

No. 340.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 631.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 628.

Election of Ismet as Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs is now announced definitely. He will be almost certainly head of Angora delegation at conference.

This is not reassuring. It portends sabring at conference. Ismet's attitude at Mudania was most intractable until last day, when some concessions were reluctantly made under instructions from Angora. If he goes to conference he may attempt to play rôle of Hoffman at Brest-Litovsk.

His extreme deafness adds to difficulty of discussion.

No. 341.

Mr. Peters to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Moscow, October 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 249.

I presented invitation this evening to Chicherin, who, after cursorily examining it with M. Litvinof, raised following points without prejudice to his eventual reply :—

1. On what principle have Powers been selected to discuss Peace Treaty—if as Allies, why not Belgium; if as interested parties, why Japan and not Bulgaria?

2. Were Russian representatives invited to discuss question of the Straits or only issues raised thereby? Would they actually have a voice in decisions or merely be required to express views?

3. Was invitation extended to Ukraine and Georgia?

4. Was date of opening of conference liable to be conditional by British election?

I should be glad to receive such information as can be supplied on above points.

No. 342.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 633.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 599, and military attaché's despatch No. 13 of 22nd October.

Greek General Staff give following revised strength and distribution of artillery :—

Field artillery: Thrace, 54 guns; present distribution uncertain, but probably [? two] groups with each of 3rd and 4th corps, and six guns spare. Macedonia and [? Epirus], nil. Athens, one regiment of nine batteries now in course of formation. Total, 90 guns.

Mountain artillery: First corps, 1st division, one battery of 65 mm.; 2nd division, one group 65 mm. and two groups 75 mm.; 13th division, one battery 65 mm.; 5th division, nil. Total guns, 16—65 mm. and 16—75 mm. Second corps, 4th division, nil; 9th, one group 75 mm.; 14th division, two groups 75 mm. Total guns, 24—75 mm. Third corps, 3rd, 10th and 12th divisions, each one group of 65 mm. Total guns, 24—65 mm. Seventh and 11th divisions, each two groups of 65 mm. Total guns, 40—65 mm. Fifth corps, 8th division, one group, 65 mm. and one group 75 mm. Total guns, 8—65 mm. and 8—75 mm. Grand total of mountain artillery, eleven groups, equal to 88 guns of 65 mm.; and six groups, equal to 48 guns of 75 mm

This united total of 226 field and mountain guns, of which 142 are in Thrace and Macedonia, includes practically all known reserves. General Staff express confidence that numbers given actually exist, but military attaché will check figures when fresh returns are received.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 343.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 634.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 29, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that General Harington has congratulated General Nider warmly on success of evacuation, which is practically concluded.

Minister for Foreign Affairs requests me to convey thanks of Greek Government to His Majesty's Government for help, sympathy and protection accorded by British authorities to Greek troops and population of Thrace.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11758/10102/44] No. 344.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 368.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, October 29, 1922.*

IN eight of your Lordship's recent telegrams, more particularly first paragraph of your telegram No. 274, I apprehend that you consider, as I do, that to seek completely to exclude presence in some capacity of an official Egyptian delegation at seat of conference is, and has been, a political impossibility. Consequently, though I had not, in fact, so far informed Sarwat that such a delegation was approved in principle, I have, in view of short time available to reach common ground, now done so.

At the same time, I invited him to let me have his views as soon as possible, taking present text of draft peace treaty as basis for his observations, with a view to a joint programme.

Only modifications which I have so far indicated to him as possible are :—

1. Substitution of a reference to February declaration for reference to protectorate in article No. 101.

2. Probable readiness of His Majesty's Government to readjust nationality articles.

3. A possible readiness to support Egyptian views as to right of recourse against Turkey in respect of post-suzerainty tribute payments (see my telegram No. 370).

I indicated to Sarwat that I contemplated an exchange of notes or letters defining joint programme to be followed so soon as that can be settled. As to this, he appeared to feel no difficulty. His attitude on the whole subject is so far satisfactory. He volunteered expression of gratitude to His Majesty's Government and of loyalty to declaration, and I have good hopes of being able to procure full realisation of your Lordship's wishes. Possibility, of course, to be contemplated that Sarwat may harden somewhat after consulting his colleagues, but I do not anticipate much difficulty if he is carefully handled. I will postpone fuller discussion of proposed joint programme until I get Sarwat's views, which I hope I may do on 31st October.

[E 11759/10102/44] No. 345.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 369.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 29, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram :—

Meanwhile, I venture to refer to a consideration which doubtless has not escaped your notice, viz., that it may prove difficult to get Turks to acquiesce in formulæ which Sarwat would *primâ facie* be willing to accept in regard to such matters as declaration, Suez Canal and Soudan. They may seek to take up a more pro-Egyptian Nationalist attitude in these matters. The possibility of this attitude being taken by them would have been equally strong, if not stronger, even were no official Egyptian delegation to be present at Lausanne, as it will be stimulated by unofficial Nationalist emissaries. For this reason, it may be desirable for your Lordship to consider formulæ, which go somewhat further than what it will occur to Sarwat to ask.

[E 11760/10102/44] No. 346.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 370.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, October 29, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 386.

1. I should perhaps have drawn your Lordship's attention earlier to memorandum by late Lord Edward Cecil enclosed in Cairo despatch No. 180 of 3rd August, 1916. In this memorandum Lord Edward Cecil contended :—

(*a.*) That it was doubtful whether, after termination of Turkish suzerainty by protectorate, Egypt was still liable in respect of any of the three annuities charged on Egypt's tribute to Turkey for service of 1851, 1891 and 1894 loans respectively, and further,

(*b.*) That, if it be held that that liability continues in respect of all three or any one of the loans, any payments made by Egypt created in Egypt's favour corresponding to right to be indemnified by Ottoman Treasury.

2. I am advised that Lord Edward Cecil somewhat overstated first part of his case, and that rights of bondholders in respect of Egypt's tribute may justly be assimilated to those of mortgagees or to those of assignees under a cession *en garantie* with notice to debtor, whose rights it would be difficult to regard as being defeated by forfeiture incurred by Turkish mortgagor. Precise nature of rights accruing to bondholders as against Egypt may be evidently dependent in a considerable degree upon nature of transactions between their representatives and Turkish Government at time loans were contracted. This is aspect of question which was perhaps somewhat insufficiently emphasised by Lord E. Cecil, and which, in my turn, I cannot fully explore with materials accessible to me here.

Your Lordship will notice that at one moment Treasury appears to have been inclined to admit discussion put forward on behalf of Egyptian Government.

3. I am advised, on the other hand, that there appears to be some substance in Lord E. Cecil's second contention that Egypt is entitled to look to Turkey for indemnity.

4. I understand that Sidky Pasha discussed question of Egypt's liability with Treasury last summer, having in his possession memorandum referred to, and that he at that time expressed full readiness to accept contingent charges, the 1855 charge being terminable with others. Treasury doubtless have note of this conversation. His object was not to evade payment, but to deprive it of its tributary character. This is, I believe, still his attitude, and I have little doubt that it will be shared by Prime Minister and his other colleagues. At the same time, I would be grateful if your Lordship would inform me whether further research into transactions between Turkey and representatives of bondholders throwa any light upon Lord Edward Cecil's thesis of Egypt's non-responsibility. If result is to show that something in the nature of a mortgage or a cession *en garantie* was created in each case, and consequently that Lord E. Cecil's contention is untenable, this fact

would greatly fortify Egyptian Government against criticisms for signing a further acknowledgment of their liability, while it would also render such signature of less importance should the exigencies of your Lordship's negotiations lead you for any reason to wish to disencumber yourself of that item of your desiderata.

[E 11761/10102/44] No. 347.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 371.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 29, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram :—

5. I have little doubt that Egyptians will seek to argue for Egypt's right to recourse in respect of payments made for service of three loans since termination of suzerainty against Turkey. I have therefore, as stated in my telegram No. 368, thought it prudent to take initiative by hinting at possibility that His Majesty's Government might be persuaded to offer their support in this direction. Were this question raised at conference, it would presumably tend to create a conflict between Egyptians and Turkish interests which might not be without advantage to His Majesty's Government. Such conflict, if it cannot be resolved in Egypt's favour at conference, appears to be proper subject for arbitration.

No. 348.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 431.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, October 28, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 312 and 313.

I at once placed myself in communication with my colleagues, who had, however, not yet received instructions. French Chargé d'Affaires' instructions reached him a little later, and were to the effect that communications should be in language of respective countries. Italian Chargé d'Affaires received his instructions yesterday evening, too late for visit to Secretary of State. Invitation was therefore presented by my two colleagues and [? omitted : me] simultaneously this afternoon at the earliest moment Secretary of State would receive us.

Secretary of State confined himself to stating that a statement in regard to American position had already been sent to American representatives at London, Paris and Rome, and would be communicated through them to inviting Governments on 30th October.

French and Italian translations were carefully checked.

[E 11814/27/44] No. 349.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 920.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 20, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 909 of the 16th October, and to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from General Harington regarding the circumstances in which the withdrawal of the French detachment at Chanak took place.

2. General Harington has further informed me that he was at no time in direct communication with General Pellé with regard to the withdrawal of the French forces.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 349.

General Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Personal.)
My dear Sir Horace, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1922.

WITH regard to the enclosed, as far as I can recollect, General Charpy came to me in a very distressed state to say that General Pellé had received orders some four days previously from his Government to say that the French troops which had been sent to Chanak were to be withdrawn, and that he (Charpy) had asked for permission to come and break this news to me himself. All I did was to say that I was very sorry and to give the necessary orders to my commander at Chanak to arrange for their withdrawal, details to be arranged between the French and British staffs. I asked him particularly whether that also applied to Ismid, and he said "No." A short time afterwards General Mombelli gave me similar information about the Italian detachment, and I took similar action. I think it was the next day that General Charpy again came to see me with reference to the Ismid detachment, and I again took the same steps, and a few minutes afterwards Colonel Vitelli was sent by General Mombelli to give me similar information about the Italian detachment at Ismid. The necessary staff arrangements were made, and the withdrawal of the Allied detachments completed on the 22nd September. I knew nothing further about it. The detachments themselves were sent under arrangements which you will remember, but the fighting value of them was never sufficient to affect the situation one way or the other, and it never even occurred to me to enter a protest through you to the Governments concerned.

My action, from start to finish, has been honest and straightforward, and I never had any ulterior motive such as M. Poincaré seems to have ascribed to me. The situation was becoming difficult, and I thought and hoped that the presence of Allied unity, even as represented by flags, would have acted as a deterrent to the Kemalist troops.

Yours very sincerely,
C. H. HARINGTON.

[E 11820/27/44] No. 350.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 930.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 24, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 897 of the 17th October, I have the honour to state that General Refet Pasha arrived in Constantinople on the 19th October.

2. As I reported in my telegram No. 585 of the 18th October, elaborate preparations had been made for the reception of the Kemalist gendarmes for Thrace, whom it was the intention of the Nationalist authorities to march through Constantinople. Flags were displayed in greater profusion than ever, shop-fronts were gaily decorated and triumphal arches of a flimsy but gaudy kind were erected in many parts of the town.

3. The decision of the Allied authorities that the gendarmes must not pass through Constantinople deprived these preparations momentarily of their *raison d'être*. They were, however, kept intact and served the Nationalist organisers as a setting for the arrival of Refet Pasha. It is, indeed, not impossible that this was the object in view all along, and that the expected arrival of the gendarmes was used as a blind.

4. No effort was spared to give Refet Pasha's advent the character of a triumphal entry into a practically recovered capital. Arriving by sea in the Turkish vessel "Gul-Nihal," he landed at Cabatash, about a mile and a half from the Galata end of the bridge, and drove through the town to Stamboul amid the acclamations of a dense crowd.

5. A strong religious flavour was imparted to the proceedings by the saying of prayers at appropriate places, and by the slaying of sheep at frequent intervals along the route. The latter is a recognised form of thanksgiving on special occasions, but it is, so far as I am aware, without precedent in Constantinople, at any rate, in recent

times, that sacrifices on such a scale should be publicly offered up in connection with the movements of an individual, except, perhaps, some such occasion as the accession of a new Sultan.

6. Refet Pasha was welcomed on his arrival by representatives of various public authorities and corporations of every kind. The Sultan himself sent an aide-de-camp to meet him, with a message, which is reported as follows: "I welcome you in the name of His Majesty." The Pasha's reply, as reported in the press, reads literally, "Convey to the High Office of the Caliphate my sentiments of religious devotion." The Heir-Apparent also sent a message of welcome, adding that he had always been confident that the efforts of the nation would be crowned with success, and that he was convinced that the restoration of the natural administration in down-trodden Thrace would bring with it honour (a play on the meaning of the name Refet), justice and security. The Pasha's reply was, "The Heir-Apparent, Abdul-Medjid Effendi, is heir to the high office of the Caliphate, and one of the aims to which we have pledged ourselves from the start is the liberation of the Caliphate. I therefore return to him my thanks." In reply to the congratulations of the Grand Vizier, Refet Pasha paid a tribute to Tewfik Pasha's past services to the State, which had earned the gratitude and respect of the nation, but he emphasised the fact that he was speaking of the past and not of the present, and he did not use the title of Grand Vizier. He made his attitude towards the Constantinople Government still clearer in an answer to the prefect of the city, who welcomed him on behalf of the city and the Minister of the Interior. After thanking the citizens and the Minister, he said, "Our Government is a democratic Government wholly directed by the people on the principle of national sovereignty, but I cannot recognise a Minister of the Interior in the name of my Government."

7. The spirit of the occasion was so infectious that on the morning of the 19th my French colleague enquired whether I intended to send anyone to meet Refet Pasha. I replied that I had no such intention.

8. It will be observed that in the carefully measured utterances quoted above, Refet Pasha exerted himself to combine a rather blunt politeness with a still more blunt refusal to recognise in any way the Constantinople Government or to recognise in the Sultan any quality but that of Caliph.

9. Refet Pasha has stayed on in Constantinople since the 19th October, and has shown great zeal in working up still further the Nationalist feeling evoked in connection with his arrival. It is difficult to keep pace with his activities, and I am unable to say whether he has any more definite object in view, though I have heard it suggested that one of his tasks is to make an end of the Constantinople Government. He has attended various functions and made several speeches. That which has attracted most attention is a speech delivered at the University on the 21st October. As your Lordship is aware, this institution has been one of the strongholds of Kemalism in Constantinople. Various versions of the speech have come to my notice. They agree in their main lines, but there are considerable differences of detail.

10. The most important portion of the speech is that which deals with Constantinople and the Caliphate. The gist of this portion is that Muhammad the Conqueror won Constantinople for the Turks and Sultan Selim I won the Caliphate. Angora recognises the institution and intends that Constantinople shall be its seat for ever. Selim I, however, went wrong in not discovering the true national basis and in involving the Ottoman Turks—the heirs of the Seljuks—in wars in the East which were really fratricidal, for Persians, Azerbaijanis and Caucasians were all alike Turks, according to Refet Pasha. The true national principle has now been born after much travail, and has brought with it the establishment of the only true sovereignty, namely, the sovereignty of the people. The foreign policy of Angora is defined in the National Pact, its home policy in the "Fundamental Law" adopted early last year by the Grand National Assembly. It is wrong to regard Angora as Republican, for there is no essential difference between constitutional monarchy and republicanism, and Angora has got a long way past both.

11. According to another version of the same speech, Refet Pasha is reported to have made the further point that the early Caliphs found no necessity for the added title of Sultan, and in a later speech delivered at the prefecture of the city he went into a long disquisition on responsibility and irresponsibility under the constitutional system. The report is somewhat difficult to follow, but the gist of what he said appears to be that the fully responsible sovereign people must take the place of the technically irresponsible monarch, and that when full sovereignty is vested in the people it will be possible to have a really sacred and irresponsible Caliphate. The conclusion

of the report is worth quoting, as it may have some bearing on the attitude of the Kemalists in regard to the Sultan. It reads as follows :—

"This office (of the Caliphate), which of old we recognised as sacred and irresponsible, will now too be considered sacred and irresponsible. This country has grown tired of absolutism, but it has also grown tired of depositions. In history we observe the depositions of sacred personages every other day. This is not right. The truth, whatever it may be, must be stated. Everyone must know the truth. This is the object of popular rule and popular sovereignty."

12. Refet Pasha's oratory is more remarkable for fervour than lucidity. He would appear, however, to be endeavouring to familiarise Constantinople with the doctrines that it is possible to do away with the Sultanate without destroying the Caliphate, and that constitutional government as hitherto understood in Turkey is as repugnant as absolutism to a true conception of popular sovereignty. It is difficult to extract any really constructive programme from his utterances, but his references to Persia, Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, combined with his insistence on the compatibility of an extreme form of popular sovereignty with the maintenance of the Caliphate, suggest that the Kemalists hope now to be able to give concrete form to the idea of a confederation of Moslem States, which would have the Caliphate as a common bond, and in which Turkish hegemony would be secured by the fact of the Caliphate being established in Turkey.

13. Refet Pasha has been careful to make no direct reference in his public utterances to the person of the present Sultan. It is not without the bounds of possibility that, if the latter could be induced to accept the rôle of Caliph on the basis indicated in the preceding paragraph, the Kemalists might consent to tolerate him for the time being, if only to avoid the shock which his deposition would give to a large body of Moslem sentiment. I fear, however, that they are much more likely to get rid of him as soon as they are in a position to do so. The violence of the attitude of the Extreme Left in Angora towards his person is illustrated by the enclosed translation of an article which appeared in the Angora newspaper "Yeni Gyun" of the 1st October.

14. To return to Refet Pasha himself, I feel it my duty to warn your Lordship that, however amiable he may appear in conversations with those Allied authorities here with whom he has had to come in contact, and however rosy the pictures he may draw of the ideal conditions which the Kemalists intend to establish in Thrace, he is as chauvinistic as any of the military clique who run the Angora Government, as determined as any of them to exact the letter of the National Pact, and apparently as obsessed as any of them with revolutionary and expansionist ideas.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 350.

Extract from the "Yeni Gyun" of October 1, 1922.

(Translation.)

THE victory of the Turkish nation has caused the traitor Padishah to abandon the throne and crown.

After Constantine, the Padishah whom we have overthrown is about to flee with the British.

Vahideddin, who, ever since the day when he commenced his reign under the title of Mehemmed Khan VI, has betrayed his nation and acted against it in league with the British and the Greeks, has abdicated.

We are informed in a telegram which we received yesterday from our special correspondent in Constantinople that Vahideddin has abdicated, abandoning his crown and throne. Vahideddin who, in face of the victory of his nation, sees himself condemned to the fate which has befallen the ruler of the enemy country, should have abandoned not only his throne and crown, influenced at any rate as a man by that resemblance which for a man of dignity and self-respect is very painful and very tragic, but ought also to have made an end of his life. But Vahideddin, in face of the nation of which he claims to be the Padishah, has been able to swallow the indignity of fleeing like the sovereign of the vanquished enemy country. He has not been able to display

even the last courage which would be shown by respectable people in such a situation. He has only been able to sacrifice his crown.

We have been expecting this for a long time. In particular the situation became completely understood after Vahideddin had been taken to the Selamlik under the protection of Marshal Plumer, Governor of Malta, who had come to Constantinople.

At that time we drew the particular attention of our Constantinople correspondent to the situation, and made plans to assure that news of the event which we expected might reach us as soon as possible. Owing to the possibility of the British censorship not allowing mention of the event before it had been announced officially, the first of these plans was to decide between us the manner in which we could be informed without attracting the attention of the censorship. Yesterday our correspondent communicated the news to us in the following form. We publish the actual text of the telegram :—

"*Constantinople, September* 28.—Your elder brother has resigned. He is preparing to go together."

The last passage informs us that Vahideddin is preparing to leave with his protectors, the British. Let him go to hell. . . .

[E 11772/27/44] No. 351.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 2525.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 28, 1922.

THE Chamber continued yesterday the discussion of the various interpellations on foreign and domestic policy, to which it has decided to devote the Fridays of each week until further notice. I have the honour to enclose copy of the *procès-verbal* of this sitting,* as the speeches by MM. Soulier and Bellet on the Near Eastern policy of the French Government seem to me worthy of perusal, more especially as both are members of the Bloc national.

M. Soulier, who belongs to the Groupe de l'Action républicaine et sociale, began by pointing out that although, owing to the number of her Mussulman subjects, France was a great Mahommedan country, she was nevertheless and above all a Christian Power. It was for this reason that what had happened in Smyrna had caused many people profound emotion. M. Soulier then proceeded to give an account of the events immediately after the occupation of that town by the Turks, which followed closely the reports which have reached your Lordship from Vice-Consul Hole. M. Soulier quoted in defence of his assertion that the Turks and not the Greeks had fired Smyrna, the evidence of Englishmen, Americans and French priests. He ironically reminded his hearers that Nero had attributed the burning of Rome to the Christians. This part of M. Soulier's speech was much interrupted by M. Lenail and M. l'Abbé Wetterlé, two Deputies who returned a few days ago from a visit to Smyrna, Palestine and Egypt, and who denied the accuracy of the evidence quoted by M. Soulier. They were supported in this point of view by M. Poincaré, who stated that the French admirals' reports in no wise bore out M. Soulier's contentions. M. Soulier then went on to argue that these actions of Turkey showed her real nature and her innate hostility to Christians. He deduced from this that French efforts on behalf of Christians in the Near East, which had been carried on for hundreds of years, would now, owing to the success of Turkey, helped as it had been by the French Government, have to cease. He claimed that this had already happened to the various French religious institutions in Cilicia since the evacuation of that district by the French. Moreover, no effort had been made by the French Government to demand reparation for the destruction of French property in Anatolia during the war. As a Turk was reported to have said to a Frenchman, "What shameful thing did the French do during the war that the French Government did not insist on us repairing damage done to their interests during the war?" In order to disguise this weak attitude, the French public opinion had been fed on untruths. It had been encouraged to form its opinion of Turkey from the writings of Pierre Loti, Claude Farrère and Pierre Bénoit—authors whose works had little or no historical value. Then the press had been forbidden to publish news which did not tally with this policy, *e.g.*, the recent resolution passed by the French

* Not printed.

Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople, pointing out the dangers of French policy in Turkey, and the disastrous effect which the abolition of Capitulations would have on French religious and business interests. M. Soulier then read long extracts from this resolution, copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 2526. (M. Wetterlé interrupted to exclaim that while the Turks were masters of Asia Minor, French institutions had flourished. It was only since the British had obtained Palestine that French interests there were in jeopardy.) Continuing, M. Soulier said that when the recent crisis had taken place, if he had been in M. Poincaré's place he would immediately have offered Great Britain the close co-operation of France and the maintenance of her troops in Chanak side by side with those of her Allies. This statement resulted in a lively passage of arms between M. Soulier and M. Poincaré, the latter of whom stated that, had M. Soulier been as well informed as he himself was, he would never have adopted such a policy. M. Poincaré added as justification of his policy that Franco-British relations were better now than they had been six months ago. This was denied by M. Soulier, who pointed to Mr. Bonar Law's letter of the 7th October in refutation of M. Poincaré's thesis. He ended up with an eloquent appeal for the adoption of a policy by the French Government which would secure the sympathy of the United States and the close friendship of Great Britain – the two essentials for a durable peace in the world.

M. Bellet (a member of the group of the Entente républicaine démocratique), who followed, said that the Near Eastern problem resolved itself into three points:—

Firstly, the freedom of the Straits. No mere international convention could guarantee this freedom. The free passage of the Suez Canal was assured by the international convention of 1888; but could anyone believe that if German cruisers had presented themselves at Port Said during the war the British would have allowed them to pass through the canal? The same thing would occur inthe case of the Straits; the guarantee of the League of Nations was unfortunately insufficient. He therefore suggested to M. Poincaré the advisability of a permanent international occupation of the Straits, and proposed for this purpose the stationing of guard-ships in the Sea of Marmora.

Secondly, there was the question of minorities. Everyone was in agreement that they must be assured of protection to enable them to live in the districts where they now were. He included under this heading the Armenians. To permit such wholesale evacuation as was taking place at the moment was, in his opinion, a blot on the civilisation of the twentieth century.

Thirdly, there was the question of the Capitulations. He had long lived in the East and could affirm that it was essential some form of Capitulations should exist. He thought that the fiscal immunity which Europeans now enjoy in Turkey was unjust, and could certainly be abolished without grave results. The question, however, of consular jurisdiction was quite different. Europeans, in the present stage of Turkish civilisation, could not expect to obtain justice in Turkish courts. He therefore suggested the institution in Turkey of a system analogous to that of the Mixed Tribunals in Egypt, which, he asserted, had worked on the whole extremely well. He could not see on what grounds the Turks could object.

Finally, he urged that, although the Turks were victors over the Greeks at the moment, it must not be forgotten that the Greeks came to the help of the Allies during the war and that Greek representatives were admitted to the Versailles Conference as equals. This statement immediately gave rise to a scene, and M. Bellet was attacked from all sides by Deputies, who reminded the speaker of the action of Constantine and the murder of the fifty-four French sailors at Athens in 1917. This anti-Greek and pro-Turkish attitude of his colleagues led M. Bellet to indulge in an interesting analysis of French policy towards the Turks in recent years, in the course of which he asserted, and gave grounds for his belief, that the French have never been friends of the Turks nor had the Turks been friends of France since the advent of the Young Turkish Party to power. He ended up by pointing out that if no effort were made to restrain Turkish pretensions at the forthcoming Peace Conference, their victory would everywhere be taken as a victory of might over right. He had no need to remind his hearers of what moral encouragement that would give to the ex-enemies of France in their desire to upset the Treaty of Versailles.

I have ventured to quote this debate at some length, as it is, I think, interesting as showing the extent to which, in spite of the change of Government at Athens, anti-Greek bias still dominates the majority of the present Chamber and French public

opinion. This is borne out by the fact that to-day's papers (with the solitary exception of the "Eclair," which, as your Lordship is aware, has always opposed M. Poincaré's Near Eastern policy), in reproducing a summary of the debate, make no mention of those portions of MM. Soulier and Bellet's speeches, which were pro-Greek and anti-Turkish, but merely record the interruptions in the debate in which M. Poincaré and his followers defended the action of the French Government and its Turkish friends.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

No. 352.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Erskine (Sofia).

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1922.

MY telegram No. 47 of 26th October: Bulgaria and Peace Conference.

You may inform M. Stambouliisky and let it be generally known that no objection will be raised by His Majesty's Government to Bulgaria being heard at the conference on the question of her outlet to the Ægean. I myself suggested this to M. Poincaré, who raised no objection, and there is no reason to believe that Italian Government will dissent. It will be well, therefore, that Bulgarian delegation should be prepared to attend at Lausanne for above purpose, apart from their participation at later stage in discussion on Straits.

No. 353

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 399.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1922.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegrams Nos. 620 and 626 of 26th and 27th October: Financial position of Constantinople Government.

Please enquire of Government to which you are accredited whether they will join in such an immediate intimation to the Angora Government through the three High Commissioners at Constantinople, and whether they are prepared to insist on insertion of a clause in new treaty recognising validity of all acts of this nature concluded by the Constantinople Government with Allied nationals, &c., since the armistice.

(Also to Rome, No. 345; repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11890/27/44] No. 354.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 1602.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1922.

THE American Ambassador called upon me this afternoon in order to present to me the reply of his Government to the invitation which had been extended to them to participate in some form or other in the forthcoming Peace Conference in Lausanne. As a matter of fact, the reply of the American Secretary of State was an answer, not to the formal invitation, which had reached Washington only the day after Mr. Hughes's communication had been despatched, but to the informal suggestion which I had made to the Ambassador in conversation on my own responsibility some weeks ago. In the *aide-mémoire* which the Ambassador now placed in my hands, the American Government indicated seven subjects likely to be raised at the conference, in which the United States would be particularly interested. They went on to say that, in order to safeguard their interests in this matter and to facilitate the exchange of views, they would be prepared to send observers to the proposed conference, if this action was agreeable to the Powers concerned. A sentence was added that, without participating in the negotiating of the Treaty of Peace, these observers would be able to indicate the position of the American Government in greater detail, and could also keep the latter informed of the attitude of the other Powers.

I said that I was gratified to learn that, as I had all along hoped, America would take her share in a settlement which was of far more than local or European concern; but I should like to know what exactly the functions of the American observers would be. Would they be silent participants in the proceedings of the conference, as I had seen at more than one preceding conference; or would they take part in the discussions and express opinions? If they adopted the latter course, would they be prepared to sign the treaty that would result from the conference?

Mr. Harvey said that the American representatives would certainly be fully empowered to express the views of their Government upon all the important points in which they were concerned, and that they would not hesitate, if asked, to do so. This, he thought, would involve their almost continuous presence at the proceedings. As to the signature of a treaty: in this America could not have a hand, inasmuch as she had not been at war with Turkey.

When I pointed out, however, that the future regulation of the Straits would in all probability be the subject of a separate and special convention, to be signed by other States who had also not been belligerents, the Ambassador thought it not impossible that, in such a case, American signatures might be appended to such an agreement.

Before the Ambassador left the room, I told him that I had reported to Washington the very disquieting remarks that he had made to me on a recent occasion about the state of feeling alleged to have been produced in America by Lord Balfour's note. In reply, I had been assured by your Excellency, after you had taken steps to consult authoritative opinion, that these views were much exaggerated and did not faithfully represent the state of opinion as existing in the States at the present time.

Mr. Harvey pointed out that this might very well be the case as regards Washington and New York, the atmosphere of which was often quite different from that of America as a whole. But his own experience as a newspaper man brought him into contact with every shade of opinion in all parts of the American Continent, and, further, no American Congressman or Senator passed through Loudon without making his views known to the Embassy. He was therefore sorry to say that he could not recede from the position he had formerly taken up. Personally, he very much regretted the despatch of the Balfour note, because he believed it to be quite possible —and in this he expressed the views of the American President and Secretary of State as well as his own—to reduce the obligation, which Great Britain had acknowledged and accepted, to the minimum point that would be compatible with acquiescence by Congress. He believed a solution to be practicable which would be equally acceptable to the British and American peoples. For the moment, he desired to know whether we adhered to the plan of sending to the States the Chancellor of the Exchequer or some other Treasury representative, and, if so, at what date the mission would proceed. The Ambassador would then be prepared to discuss with me the exact steps by which the very sanguine ideas that he had adumbrated might be carried into effect.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11885/10524/44] No. 355.

Further Notes on Recent Turkish Atrocities based on Information received between March and October 1922.

THE Foreign Office memorandum of the 20th March, 1922 (1),* contained a summary of information regarding massacres and persecutions by the Turks of the non-Turkish native inhabitants of Anatolia, received up to the end of February 1922. Since that date much further neutral information has been received by His Majesty's Government, of which the following is a brief summary. Some of this information has already been given to Parliament (2), and a number of independent first-hand neutral accounts have also appeared in the press (3).

2. The names of most of the American Near East Relief workers quoted have already been made public, but, for obvious reasons, it is important that those of others, who are either still in Anatolia or hope to return there, should not be disclosed. Such names appear below in brackets.

* See references in annex.

3. No Greek evidence has been used in the compilation of the present note, but a large collection of sworn statements by Greek survivors will be found in a book recently published by the Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople (4), and a few such statements have also been published in the British press (5).

4. The greater part of our recent information deals with the deportations of Ottoman Greeks from all parts of Asia Minor, but especially from the Pontic districts, where the original Greek population had successfully survived nearly five centuries of Turkish rule. The deportations were generally directed south-eastwards towards Diarbekir and Bitlis, but some appear to have taken a southerly and westerly course, as we hear in certain accounts of the passage through Kharput and Arabkir of a number of Greeks and Armenians from north-eastern districts such as Kars (17). The principal routes seem to have passed through (A) the Erzinjan–Erzeroum region (especially in the case of the Trebizond deportations), (B) the Sivas region (especially in the case of those from Samsun) and (C) the Kharput region, including the side routes through (*a*) Arabkir and (*b*) Malatia. No doubt a number of deportees passed through more than one region, and many of those who passed through Sivas were certainly sent on to Kharput; but, on the other hand, there must clearly have been many other routes regarding which we have no information. Our fullest data deal with the deportations which passed through Kharput itself, where there was a large American Near East Relief station.

5. On the 10th May, Sir H. Rumbold reported (6) that, since the proposal for an armistice between the Turks and Greeks, there had been a marked recrudescence of deportations, which were carried out under conditions of terrible hardship, and from which no classes of the population were exempt.

6. On the 25th April, American relief workers informed Sir H. Rumbold (6) that the entire remaining Ottoman Greek male population from the age of 15 upwards in Trebizond and its hinterland was being deported apparently to labour battalions at Erzeroum, Kars and Sari Kamish. It may be noted that Colonel (Rawlinson) stated on the 24th May (7) that, from his experience while a prisoner of the Turks in Erzeroum, the life of a Greek in a Turkish labour battalion was generally about two months.

7. On the 10th May, Dr. (Kennedy) reported (8) that persistent and rigorous deportations of Armenian and Greek men, women and children, accompanied by horrible outrages, were taking place from the Black Sea coast to Diarbekir, beyond which point the fate of the deportees was unknown.

8. On the 3rd April an American woman relief worker who had just arrived from Kharput informed His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout (9) that up to the 12th February at least 20,000 Ottoman Greek deportees had passed through Kharput on their way to Bitlis. The men came first and mostly died from hardship, overwork, starvation or disease. The women and children who followed came in droves of 2,000 to 3,000, and arrived practically naked, sometimes in snow up to their knees, with just some sacking as covering. According to a report forwarded by His Majesty's consul at Aleppo on the 25th March (10), 6,000 of these deportees had been seen passing through Diarbekir, going eastwards, during the preceding few weeks. The mortality among them was stated to be very great.

9. The most complete account of the deportations in the Kharput district is contained in the diary and statements of Dr. Ward, who had worked in Anatolia for the Near East Relief for over three years, and in the report by Major Yowell (written with Dr. Ward's co-operation), which were the occasion of Mr. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on the 15th May. These were transmitted in full to the Foreign Office by Sir H. Rumbold on the 31st May (11). They have been confirmed by every other American Relief worker acquainted with the district in question who has been personally interviewed, and by many subsequent independent accounts. Turkish propaganda organisations published denials over the signature of certain other Americans, including Mr. Jaquith, subsequently director of the Near East Relief in Constantinople, who was then in Anatolia, which were even quoted in Parliament (11 A). His Majesty's Government have since received conclusive proof (12) of the falsity of these denials and of the fact that Mr. Jaquith's statement was a Turkish fabrication. Mr. Jaquith, in fact, subsequently, in strict confidence, himself confirmed Dr. Ward's and Mr. Yowell's accounts, which he stated fell short of the truth (12).

10. Dr. Ward's diary shows that from the 26th May, 1921, to the 23rd February, 1922, 20,526 deported Greeks and Armenians passed eastwards through Kharput. This number excludes those who died on the way, estimated by the Americans at not less than 8,000, and Dr. Ward considers that the majority of these deportees died soon

afterwards on their way east. The deportees came from all parts of Asia Minor, and not only from Pontus. Large numbers were from Konia, Cæsarea and the regions near the Greek front. Their condition was simply appalling. The detailed and businesslike accounts given in the diary under the different dates of the deaths of hundreds of these unfortunate people from starvation, thirst, cold, ill-treatment and fatigue make horrible reading. Many convoys were not allowed to halt at Kharput although, owing to their long marches, they could hardly crawl. On one occasion (the 15th December, 1921) the Turkish official in charge of the convoy admitted to Dr. Ward that 300 deportees had been frozen to death while crossing the mountains near Diarbekir. The December and January entries record the passage and departure of numerous convoys in heavy snowstorms. The following are two typical extracts from the Ward–Yowell statement :—

> "One American, whose name cannot be given now for obvious reasons, counted 1,500 dead Greeks on the road between Sivas and Malatia last December (1921); another counted 128 dead Greeks on the road between Malatia and Kharput, and was compelled to run a truck out of the road on many occasions to keep from running over the dead. I have personally seen hundreds of Greek bodies unburied and being devoured by dogs and vultures."
>
> The men "taken by the Government to work on the roads between Kharput and Diarbekir . . . . were given no pay, and their entire food allowance consisted of 200 grammes of bread per day, and a little thin soup once a day. They had no shelter and were compelled to sleep out of doors in bitterly cold weather without bedding or covering, and when they are too ill to work their food allowance is discontinued and they are allowed to die without medical care. Of the 9,000 Greeks . . . . sent on towards Bitlis nothing further is known."

11. Dr. Ward reported that many of the Near East Relief buildings in Kharput were seized by the Turks on frivolous pretexts, and that finally orders were received that no girls over 15 must remain in the Christian orphanages. The Near East Relief was eventually forced to turn out some 500 of these girls, who were removed by the Turks (13). He further reported that the actual Government of the vilayet of Kharput (Mamuret-ul-Aziz) was entrusted by Mustapha Kemal to a Kurdish chief named Hadji Khyahia, who boasted of having caused the death of 10,000 Armenians in the vilayet, and of having killed the Armenian Catholic bishop with his own hand (14).

12. On the 30th May, Miss Wood, an American Relief worker who left Malatia in April, reported (15) that during her two weeks' journey to the coast she saw every day groups of deportees, mostly women and children, all starving, and a great number of bodies along the road. She stated that the entire remaining population was being deported without food or clothing, and that the conditions at Malatia, where the deportees died at the rate of forty or fifty a day, were far worse than in Kharput. She attempted to start an orphanage, but the Turks refused all assistance and refused even to bury the dead.

13. At the end of May a British and an American relief worker, Miss Murdoch and Mr. Knapp, reported to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout (16), and subsequently to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople (17), that between the 21st July, 1921, and the 22nd April, 1922, they estimated that some 10,000 Greek and Armenian deportees, mostly women and children, passed through Arabkir, where they had been stationed. These deportees came not only from Pontus, but also from Konia and Southern Asia Minor, and some even came from Kars. Frequently they were not given even bread and water, except for payment (in one case this happened while they were camped 200 yards from a river and were dying of thirst), and as they had usually already been robbed of all they possessed, many of them starved. It appeared that bad weather was, when possible, deliberately chosen for moving the caravans, and in one case eighty corpses were counted on the road the day after one convoy had left. The mortality from typhus was very heavy owing to the exhaustion of the deportees. In many places the Turkish authorities would not allow the relief organisation to collect and care for the abandoned children whose parents had died. Miss Murdoch and Mr. Knapp again laid stress on the refusal of the Turks to give food to members of labour gangs who fell ill.

14. Two American relief workers, Miss (Hawes) and Miss (Phelps), who left Sivas early in May, confirmed the previous reports (18 and 19), including the earlier report of the massacre at Kavak (20). They estimated the number of Ottoman Greek deportees who passed Sivas at 70,000, and the deportations were then still proceeding. On their journey they met one group of about 200 women and children being driven south in a

state of utter exhaustion, of whom twelve died of collapse on 10 miles of road. Others were seen dying along the roadside all the way to the coast. They informed Sir H. Rumbold that the deportees who passed through the Sivas district were clothed in verminous rags and ravaged by smallpox, typhus and dysentry. Most of the deported men, however, were formed into labour gangs to work on the roads without any shelter. They were only fed while able-bodied and then received one loaf of bread daily. Sir H. Rumbold was shown a sample of this bread, and reported that it apparently consisted of nothing but straw and dirt.

15. There is strong reason to believe (7, 12, 13) that deportations on a larger scale and of a more severe description took place in the districts where there were no foreign observers, and this appears to have been especially the case between Erzeroum and Erzinjan (7), through which district the greatest number of Pontine deportees are believed to have passed.

16. The fate of the few Greeks who remained on the coast appears to have been little better than that of those who were taken to the interior. Dr. Gibbons, formerly a professor at Robert College, Constantinople, visited Trebizond on the 20th May and informed Sir H. Rumbold on his return (21) that the Turks were then collecting Greek boys from 11 to 14 (practically the only Greeks left in the town) and imprisoning them in a filthy dungeon, half-underground. He estimated that 300 were thus collected on the 20th May. They were being sent subsequently to an internment camp near Jevizlik, where older men and boys from Trebizond had been collected. No person was allowed to leave the camp and no food was given them, except what was brought or sent by their remaining womenkind from the coast. Dr. Gibbons stated that certain Turks had protested against the shutting up of these Greeks in the barbed-wire enclosure to die of starvation, but had been beaten for their interference and removed from the district.

17. Reports have also been received of massacres of Armenians in the Kars and Alexandropol districts, but these appear for the most part to have occurred in 1920 and 1921. The Foreign Office are in possession of photographs taken by Americans (22) of the scene of one of these massacres as revealed by the melting snow. The corpses, many of which are mutilated, and from the position of which the peculiarly horrible manner in which the massacre was carried out can easily be seen, are nearly all of women and children. Dr. (Grant), an American working at Karakilisse, as the result of a personal inspection on the 28th April, 1921, of the site of the massacre of Djadjour (near Akbulak, south-west of Ararat), of which he gives a detailed description, estimates the number of victims of that massacre (almost entirely women and children) as over 12,000 (23). These massacres occurred, however, in districts where hostilities had occurred between Angora and the Republic of Erivan, and information regarding them is scanty.

18. The latest massacre regarding which we have reliable information is that which occurred soon after the Turkish entry into Smyrna in September 1922 (24). It must, of course, be regarded to a large extent as a retaliatory act for the widespread destruction caused by the Greek army in its disorderly retreat during the preceding few weeks, but it appears to have been carried out in a most systematic manner. The Turks entered Smyrna on the 9th September, and for the first two days order was maintained. On the evening of the 10th a meeting of the Turkish authorities was held in the Konak "for the purpose of coming to a decision with regard to the deportation of the Armenians." The report on the subject of the massacre by His Majesty's vice-consul at Smyrna continues as follows :—

> "The result of this meeting was evident on the 11th, when the whole of the Armenian quarter was surrounded by a cordon of Turkish soldiers and a systematic hunt organised. A large number of Armenians were shot out of hand, a continuous fusillade being maintained; while women and children were herded together and marched away.
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> "On the second day of the massacre the Turks proceeded more discreetly, and apparently orders were given and strictly enforced, not to fire, but to use the butt or the blade. The American consul-general told me of women stabbed at his consulate steps, and a constant stream of fugitives came to the consulate to seek shelter and recited their sufferings." "Women used to come to the consulate gate with blood all over their faces and dresses, and ask for protection which we could not give" (25). "The procedure was uniform; the Turks knocked at the door, and on gaining an entry said they had come to look for bombs; then followed looting, rape and murder. Much of this was observed from our ships by officers

on deck, who were able to follow through their glasses the course of the massacre at an Armenian suburb on the sea-front. Sir Harry Lamb himself succeeded in penetrating the cordon in an attempt to reach a British house in the Armenian quarter, which was reported to be in the hands of looters, and found the streets strewn with bodies. He counted twenty in 50 yards. He was, however, not allowed to push on.

"On the morning of the 13th, fires were started in several points in the Armenian quarter, mostly on the windward boundary; the Turks asserted that this was done by the Armenians themselves, with the object of bringing the Turks into discredit, but it is far more probable that the battue was relatively complete, and that the Turks wished to drive out any stray fugitives who had succeeded in evading them or merely to cover up their tracks. In any case no serious effort—if indeed any effort at all—was made to deal with the fire; and during the evening, when the fire died down in one direction, a new one was lit up in such a situation that it would cover the part of the quarter which had so far failed to burn. The conflagration was encouraged to spread to the European quarter by the liberal use of oil. The street that runs parallel with the consulate building was saturated. The bundles of the refugees on the sea front must also have been sprinkled with petrol, for at about 1 in the morning, when a cinema burst into flames on the quay, I saw a line of fire leap along the quay from one lot of gear to the next.

"The following morning the deliberate intention of the Turks to burn down the Christian quarter became even more apparent. The wind had changed completely during the night and was now blowing straight back along its original course. Nevertheless, a series of buildings on the quay, half-a-mile to windward of the nearest point of the conflagration, one by one took fire from the roof, bursting immediately into a mass of flames. In the quarter at the back of the harbour, I saw a number of buildings take fire in the same manner, there being no fire which could possibly have been communicated to them in the ordinary way."

19. That the massacres did not cease after the fire is attested by the following entries in the British official naval diary of events (26):—

"*September* 16. . . . . Massacres estimated at 1,000 in Bournabat. Believed only 25 per cent. of Armenians in Smyrna have escaped."

And later:—

"It is known that large numbers of corpses have been disposed of by lime and fire in the burnt area, and these people must have died since the fire."

According to subsequent reports from the British consular officers who were in Smyrna at the time, the casualties among the non-Turkish population during the massacre and fire which followed cannot have been less than 5,000 (27).

20. It now appears that deportations on a very large scale have again begun. As soon as the question arose of the evacuation of the non-Turkish refugees who had flocked down to the coast of Asia Minor, the Turkish authorities announced that no men of military age would be allowed to leave. According to reports from His Majesty's consular officers on the spot, practically all males between 18 and 45 were removed to concentration camps to be formed into labour battalions for service in the interior (27, 28 and 28A). The same officers have reported that very few good-looking women between 16 and 35 were allowed to leave, and this statement is also recorded by His Majesty's Minister at Athens (29). These statements are further borne out by the statistics of shipments of refugees, which show a vast majority of old women and children. The following is a typical shipment in the steamship "Worsley Hall" on the 20th September (26 and 27):—

Women, mostly old	1,460
Children	1,099
Men, all over 48	594

In another shipment of 900 refugees on the night of the fire there were only twelve women between the ages of 15 and 35 (24). As, nevertheless, over 500,000 refugees are stated by His Majesty's Minister at Athens (30) and by the representatives of the Save the Children Fund (31) to have reached Greece from Asia Minor, it is comparatively easy to calculate the minimum number of men—certainly not less than

100,000—who have again been deported into the interior. It is difficult to believe that the conditions of these deportations differ from those of the deportations which took place earlier in the year, and unless their release is secured in the near future, few of the deportees are likely to survive.

G. W. RENDEL.

Foreign Office, October 30, 1922.

Annex.

REFERENCES.

1. Memorandum on Turkish massacres and persecutions since the Armistice, 20th March, 1922 (E 3148/19/44).
2. See particularly the statement by Mr. Chamberlain on 15th May, 1922, and the replies given to the following parliamentary questions:—
   Mr. Aubrey Herbert, 17th May (No. 51), Colonel Wedgwood, 22nd May (Nos. 68 and 69), and Mr. T. P. O'Connor, 31st May and 15th June (private notice).
   See also minutes on entered copies of questions.
3. See particularly the accounts in the "Daily Telegraph" of 16th May (American letter), 18th May (Major Anson, Mr. Allen and Mr. Mason), and 17th August (Miss Thompson).
4. Les Atrocités kémalistes dans les Régions du Pont et dans le reste de l'Anatolie. - Constantinople; Patriarcat oecuménique, 1922 (E 11128/10524/44).
5. See particularly "Manchester Guardian," 1st June (Survivors from Bafra) and 5th July (Survivor from near Ordu).
6. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 242 of 10th May (E 4869/19/44).
7. Record of conversation with Colonel Rawlinson, 24th May (E 5362/19/44).
8. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 245 of 10th May (E 4870/19/44).
9. Mr. Satow's despatch No. 45 of 3rd April (E 3920/19/44).
10. Mr. Morgan's despatches Nos. 30 and 49 of 25th March and 15th April (E 3854/19/44 and E 4529/19/44).
11. Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 494 of 31st May (E 5695/19/44).
11A. Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy on a question by Mr. T. P. O'Connor in the House of Commons, 31st May.
12. Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 639 of 18th July (E 7286/19/44).
13. Record of conversation with Dr. Ward, 7th June (E 5581/19/44).
14. For the appointment by the Angora Government of notorious minority-exterminators to high administrative posts see also Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 381 of 24th April, and minutes and memoranda written thereon (E 4425/27/44).
15. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 262 of 30th May (E 5584/19/44).
16. Mr. Satow's despatch No. 80 of 31st May (E 5857/19/44).
17. Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 557 of 20th June (E 6349/19/44).
18. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 263 of 1st June (E 5618/19/44).
19. Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 498 of 2nd June (E 5899/19/44).
20. Foreign Office memorandum of 20th March (see No. 1), paragraph 28.
21. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 259 of 27th May (E 5466/19/44).
22. Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 718 of 28th July, 1921 (E 9020/8783/58 (1921)).
23. Statement by Mr. Charles P. Grant relative to massacres in 1921, transmitted by General Bagratouni on 19th May, 1922 (E 5158/19/44).
24. Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 823 of 18th September (E 9883/27/44).
25. Supplementary notes by Vice-Consul Hole, 13th October (E 9883/27/44).
26. Admiralty letter of 25th October (E 11667/27/44).
27. Detailed verbal reports by Sir H. Lamb and Vice-Consul Hole, October 1922.
28. Dr. Nansen, Constantinople, 11th October (E 11251/10524/44).
28A. Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 583 of 16th October (E 11163/10524/44).
29. Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 525 of 29th September (E 10245/27/44).
30. Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 624 of 24th October (E 11575/10524/44).
31. Statistics transmitted by the "Save the Children" Fund, 30th October (E 11870/10524/44).

[E 11859/27/44] No. 356.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 300.)

My Lord, *Sofia, October* 20, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that I called on M. Stamboliisky yesterday to pay my respects on his return from abroad. After expressing his appreciation of the courteous hearing given to him at Geneva by Lord Balfour and Mr. Fisher, with whom he said he had had long conversations, he turned to the Near Eastern crisis and said

how much he regretted that his proposal for the autonomy of Thrace had not been adopted and that His Majesty's Government had not insisted on carrying through their original policy of expelling the Turks from Europe. He thought that His Majesty's Government did not fully realise how deep an impression their firm attitude at Mudania had made on the Turks. He believed that the prestige then acquired would have sufficed to prevent the return of the Turks to Europe and he still hoped that circumstances might arise which would enable the matter to be reconsidered, especially if, as he understood was the case, it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to let the negotiations drag on as long as possible. I replied that, as far as I knew, he was entirely mistaken in attributing this intention to His Majesty's Government, who, I felt sure, would, on the contrary do all in their power to hasten the conclusion of peace. It was entirely due to their firm attitude that Kemal Pasha was not already in occupation of Constantinople and Eastern Thrace, and possibly a good deal more territory besides, but they had been forced to recognise the new situation created by his victory and having, in conjunction with their Allies, formally promised him the possession of Eastern Thrace, they would not go back on their word.

I gained the impression that M. Stamboliisky is genuinely concerned at the prospect of the return of the Turks to Thrace. This attitude may appear inconsistent with the eulogistic observations regarding Kemal Pasha's victory which he made in public a few days ago, as reported in my despatch No. 292 of the 17th instant. It is, however, one of his Excellency's peculiarities that he sees no objection to expressing diametrically opposite views on different occasions to suit his audience or what he regards as the necessity of the moment. On the occasion referred to, his object was clearly to allay the resentment aroused in Turkey by his proposal for Thracian autonomy.

M. Stamboliisky then referred to the question of the Bulgarian outlet to the Ægean, which he earnestly hoped would be settled at the coming conference in a manner satisfactory to Bulgarian interests. Any arrangement depending on transit through Greek territory would be useless, as was sufficiently proved by the complete failure of the Serbs, though they were the Allies of the Greeks, to come to a satisfactory arrangement for a commercial outlet at Salonica. Failing the establishment of an autonomous régime he advocated the neutralisation of a zone including both banks of the Maritza and the railway from the Bulgarian frontier to Dedeagatch, the latter place being assigned to Bulgaria. Unless Bulgaria obtained Dedeagatch in full sovereignty it would be impossible to carry out the necessary harbour works. I replied that I had no information as to the intention of His Majesty's Government and their Allies in regard to this matter, but that I thought it extremely unlikely that they would assign Dedeagatch in full sovereignty to Bulgaria and had no reason to suppose that the final settlement would differ essentially from that already provided for in the treaty between them and Greece which had been concluded at Sèvres.

I believe that the value attributed by public opinion in this country to an outlet on the Ægean is much exaggerated and that, even if Bulgarian aspirations in this respect were fully met, the bulk of the country's trade would for various reasons continue to pass through the Black Sea ports. At the same time, if it should be found possible to some extent to meet the Bulgarian objections to the arrangement provided by the Treaty of Sèvres, it would, besides eliminating a probable cause of trouble in the future, undoubtedly enhance M. Stamboliisky's prestige and the stability of the Government—a matter of some importance at the present moment.

While I am satisfied that there exists no understanding between the Bulgarian and Soviet Governments and that the fears felt by the Roumanian Government of aggression by this country in conjunction with Russia and Turkey are groundless, so long, at least, as M. Stamboliisky's Government remains in power—his one settled principle being the avoidance of any foreign adventure—there is evidence since the Greek defeat of the initiation of an active campaign backed by Russian propaganda in favour of such a policy as the only means of enabling this country to escape from her present isolation and from the burdens imposed upon her by the Treaty of Neuilly. The danger of this movement, which may make a strong appeal to the Nationalist elements and provide them with a ground for common action with the Bulgarian Communists, cannot be ignored, and I regard the surest safeguard against it to be the maintenance in power of a strong Agrarian Government.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

[E 11886/27/44] No. 357.

Mr. Harvey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 31.)

United States Embassy, London,
October 30, 1922.

My Lord,

ACTING under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to deliver into your Lordship's hands the attached memorandum relative to my Government's participation in the conference proposed for the purpose of drawing up a Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

I have, &c.
GEORGE HARVEY.

Enclosure in No. 357.

Memorandum respecting Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

THE conference proposed for the purpose of drawing up a Treaty of Peace with Turkey will have primarily to deal with the problems resulting from the state of belligerency between the Allied Powers, Turkey and Greece. The United States was neither at war with Turkey nor a party to the armistice of 1918, and does not desire to participate in the final peace negotiations or to assume responsibility for the political and territorial adjustments which may be effected.

While maintaining this reserve in regard to certain phases of the Near East settlement, the Government of the United States does not desire to leave the impression that its interests are less entitled to consideration than those of any other Power or that it is disposed to relinquish rights enjoyed in common with other Powers or proper commercial opportunity or that it is unconcerned with the humanitarian interests involved.

For the purpose of clarity, certain subjects of particular American concern may be briefly summarised:—

1. The maintenance of Capitulations, which may be essential to the appropriate safeguarding of non-Moslem interests.
2. The protection under proper guarantees of philanthropic, educational and religious institutions.
3. Appropriate undertakings in regard to the freedom of opportunity without discrimination or special privilege for commercial enterprise.
4. Indemnity for losses suffered by Americans in Turkey as a result of arbitrary and illegal acts.
5. Suitable provisions for the protection of minorities.
6. Assurances touching the freedom of the Straits.
7. Reasonable opportunity for archæological research and study.

This brief summary, while not exhaustive, may serve to indicate the general nature of American interests. To safeguard such interests and to facilitate the exchange of views, the Government of the United States is prepared to send observers to the proposed conference, if this action is agreeable to the Powers concerned. Without participating in the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace, these observers would be able to indicate this Government's position in greater detail than is possible in this memorandum, and they could also inform the American Government of the attitude of other Powers in matters where there are mutual interests.

As the object of my Government in submitting this suggestion is the elimination of any possible cause of misunderstanding, it is considered appropriate to call attention to the attitude of the United States in respect to secret treaties and agreements. It is not felt that arrangements previously made with respect to Turkish territory, which provide for the establishment of zones of special commercial and economic influence (such, for example, as the Tripartite Agreement of 1920), are consonant with the principle of the equality of economic opportunity. It is assumed that the Allied Powers will not now desire, and do not now intend, to carry into effect previous arrangements of this nature.

The United States has no desire to take any action which might embarrass the Allied Powers in the proper effort to secure peace. It desires nothing which need

conflict with the interests of other countries, if the principle of commercial opportunity for all nations is recognised at the outset. The United States has no intention of seeking for itself or its nationals a position of special privilege, but it desires to protect its rights and to assure the open door. Finally, it wishes to afford protection to its citizens who wish to continue the humanitarian work which has been carried on for generations in the Near East and is rendered more essential than ever by the present conditions.

United States Embassy, London,
October 30, 1922.

[E 11834/27/44] No. 358.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 31.)

(Confidential.)

Downing Street, October 30, 1922.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th October regarding the proposed arrangements for the forthcoming peace conference at Lausanne, and to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, copies of telegrams which have been sent to the Governors-General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa on the subject. The terms of these telegrams were discussed semi-officially with Sir E. Crowe before despatch.

2. Copies of the enclosures are being forwarded to the India Office.

I am, &c.
C. T. DAVIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 358.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors-General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.

(Telegraphic.) *Downing Street, October 27, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for your Prime Minister:—

"Yesterday invitations were sent by Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the Japanese, Roumanian, Jugoslav, Greek and Turkish Governments (both of Constantinople and of Angora) to send representatives to Lausanne, 13th November, to conclude treaty to end war in East which would replace Treaty of Sèvres; Russian Soviet Government and Bulgarian Government also being invited to send to Lausanne, at a date to be fixed, representatives to take part in discussions on questions of the Straits, which the conference will undertake at a later stage. Enquiry is also being addressed by the three Governments to the Government of the United States expressing hope that they will permit United States representative to be present during Lausanne negotiations in a capacity similar to that in which United States representative was present during negotiations at San Remo in 1920, or to take more active part in the negotiations specially on question of the Straits.

"According to arrangements agreed upon with French and Italian Governments, each Government will be represented at Lausanne by two plenipotentiaries. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will personally act as chief British plenipotentiary, and it is proposed that he should be accompanied by British High Commissioner at Constantinople. Dominion Governments will be kept informed from time to time of the general lines of policy on which British plenipotentiaries propose to proceed and of the course of negotiations, and, as in case of the other treaties arising out of the peace settlement, they will, of course, be invited to sign new treaty and any separate instruments regulating status of the Straits.

"His Majesty's Government trusts that this procedure will be in accordance with wishes of your Government.

"British plenipotentiaries are fully acquainted with the imperial aspect of the problem and with the keen interest taken by the dominion Governments in its solution. Similar telegram sent to other Prime Ministers."

Enclosure 2 in No. 358.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors-General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.

(Personal and Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Downing Street, October 27, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for your Prime Minister:—

"My code telegram of to-day's date. You have been sent by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs prints containing correspondence between M. Poincaré and himself as to arrangements for Near East Conference. You should know that M. Poincaré, in course of the discussions, informed Lord Curzon privately that if the dominions and India were represented at Lausanne, the French Government would demand that Morocco and Tunis should equally be represented. Lord Curzon replied to this that the status of the dominions and India was once and for all settled in Paris in 1919 with full concurrence of M. Clemenceau, that they signed the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, including the Treaty of Sèvres, and that they became separate members of the League of Nations. He was unable to admit that similar status could be accorded to Tunis or Morocco. M. Poincaré replied that at that moment he did not wish to engage in discussion on this point, but he continued to press claim as regards Tunis and Morocco. M. Poincaré's precise object in raising question is not clear, but you will see that Lord Curzon fully maintained right of dominions. Arrangements outlined in my code telegram of to-day for representation of British Empire by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs follow those adopted in connection with Treaty of Sèvres, and in any case practical considerations render it desirable to limit the number of the plenipotentiaries at Lausanne."

[E 11899/10102/44] No. 359.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 31.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, October 30, 1922.

Sir,

IT has occurred to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace, signed on the 10th August 1920, at Sèvres, with Turkey may be under consideration at the present time prior to the Near East Conference, and my Lords desire to invite attention to the fact that several ships in an incomplete state, building in this country on Turkish account, were taken over by the Admiralty, both when Turkey was neutral and after she joined the Central Powers.

2. As regards such ships it seems important to my Lords that under the revision of the Peace Treaty the interests of the Admiralty and of the British exchequer should be fully safeguarded, as the amounts involved may be considerable.

3. The largest sums would be at stake in connection with the battleships "Agincourt" (late "Osman I") and "Erin" (late "Reshadieh") which were being built by Messrs. Armstrong and Messrs. Vickers in August 1914, on behalf of the Turkish Government, and were then requisitioned by the Admiralty whilst Turkey was neutral.

4. In respect of the "Agincourt," the Ottoman Government had already paid Messrs. Armstrong 2,194,000*l.*; in respect of the "Erin," the Ottoman Government had paid Messrs. Vickers 1,486,650*l.* To pay the cost of the "Erin" Turkish bills were issued, and English bondholders held these bills to the amount of 621,200*l.*, apart from bills held by Vickers to the amount of 225,200*l.*, in part payment of the purchase price. These latter sums have been a matter of separate adjustment, but, even with the deduction of the sum of 621,200*l.* from 1,486,650*l.*, there is the large sum of 865,450*l.* in respect of the "Erin" for which the Ottoman Government may possibly demand compensation. Claims for interest on 865,450*l.* and 2,194,000*l.* may also be advanced by the Turkish Government. Whether these ships are regarded as ships or as naval war material (in so far as the vessels were not completed), and whether they are claimed to have been requisitioned under a right of angary or other principle, there is a danger that Turkey will strongly assert her claims for compensation or indemnity, or press for her claims to be referred to a court of arbitration unless the Peace Treaty specifically debars such action. From the point of view of Turkey, it is

probably immaterial whether the "property" in the ships had or had not passed to the Turkish Government, as at any rate the Turkish Government had "rights or interests" connected with these vessels. Further, it is presumably desirable that the sums in question shall not be treated as money in which the other Allies have any interest, and that they are not set-off against, for example, debts owing to Allied nationals by Turkish nationals.

5. Another case is that of the "Wayward" and "Waterwitch," the position as regards which is explained in the accompanying enclosure. The ferry companies had advanced 12,000*l.* in the case of the "Wayward" and 11,000*l.* in the case of the "Waterwitch" before these vessels were taken over; if these vessels were now sold they might realise, say, some 4,000*l.* each. (The Disposal and Liquidation Commission are the Department responsible for the disposal of these vessels.) Whether any "property" had passed to the Turkish purchasers or not it seems advisable that the liability of the Crown under the indemnity which was given to the shipbuilding firms when the ships were requisitioned should be definitely safeguarded against in the Peace Treaty.

6. Three motorgunboats building on account of the Turkish Government were also used by the Royal Navy, but no question should presumably arise in their case as the three vessels have been condemned in the Prize Court.

7. This letter has been sent also to the Treasury and the Board of Trade.

I am, &c.
ALEX FLINT.

Enclosure in No. 359.

Position as regards the "Wayward," late "Wave," late "Buyak Ada," and "Waterwitch," late "Rechid Pasha."

AT the outbreak of war both these vessels were building in England for Turkish contractors.

The "Waterwitch" was building by the Fairfield Company for the Chirket-i-Hairie Company, and the "Wayward" by Messrs. Rennie, Forrestt for the Seiri-Sefain Company.

In February 1915 they were requisitioned by the Admiralty, and as they were then the subject of Prize Court proceedings, advice was obtained as to the course which the Admiralty should adopt.

The Admiralty was advised as follows:—

> "I think the Admiralty should take over these vessels on terms that they pay the amount outstanding from the Turkish contractors in respect of work already performed by the builders, and also, of course, the cost of completing the vessels to Admiralty order, and that they should also undertake to indemnify the builders against any claim by the Turks at the end of the war in respect to which the builders have been placed in a worse position by reason of the requisitioning of the vessels. If the Admiralty agree, the prize proceedings should then be withdrawn.
>
> "The Attorney-General is averse to proceeding to trial in the prize proceedings as he has very grave doubt whether, in the circumstances of the case, any property has passed to the Turkish purchasers, and I read his note to Mr. Runciman of the 11th instant as proposing that the cases should be settled on the lines above mentioned."

On the 28th February, 1915, Messrs. Fairfield and Rennie, Forrestt were informed that the Admiralty would take over the vessels on the following terms:—

1. The Admiralty to pay the amounts outstanding from the Turkish contractors in respect of work performed and the cost of completing the vessels to Admiralty order. The amounts outstanding from the Turkish contractors were 5,500*l.* for the "Waterwitch" and 3,721*l.* for the "Wayward."
2. The Admiralty to indemnify the builders against claims by the Turks at the end of the war in respect of which the builders have been placed in a worse position by reason of the requisitioning of the vessels.

The result of the foregoing arrangements was that the two vessels became the property of His Majesty's Government under agreement with the builders, as from the date of the requisition.

The legal position as regards these vessels was gone into in November 1919, and again in April 1921. On both occasions this Department was advised that it might sell the ships as, and to whom, they desired. The question of sale to Turkish nationals was subsequently raised and, after consultation with the Foreign Office, the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, was informed that there was no objection to such sale.

The "Wayward" was accordingly advertised for sale locally at Constantinople, but the "Waterwitch" had been lent to the military authorities and was still required by them.

(NOTE.—The vessels had been placed in custody of Prize Court; they were released to the Crown without condemnation.)

On the appearance of the advertisement of the sale of "Wayward," the two ferry companies, who had placed the orders for them to be built and had contributed towards their cost, represented that they urgently needed the vessels for their work and that the offer of the vessels for sale was unfair to them. The Commander-in chief thereupon again asked for a definite pronouncement as to the position of the two ferry companies with regard to the vessels in view of their pre-war payments. These payments were 12,000*l.* in the case of the "Wayward" and 11,000*l.* in the case of the "Waterwitch." It was pointed out that the two companies were not on the same footing, the Seiri-Sefain being an Ottoman Government concern and the Chirket-i-Hairie a privately owned company.

The question was again reconsidered.

It was not clear what the position of the Admiralty would be as regards payment of indemnity in the event of a claim being made on the builders by the ferry companies in respect of the sums advanced by them. If the vessels should be sold for amounts less than these respectively and an action were brought against the builders by the ferry companies with success the Admiralty would lose, and it would have been more profitable to have handed the vessels back to the original purchasers for nothing. The case was referred to the Treasury solicitor for this aspect of it to be considered.

The solicitor's opinion is as follows:—

> "I think the legal position, apart from the effect of the provisions of a Treaty of Peace, is that the contract between the shipbuilding firms and the Turkish purchasers was dissolved at the declaration of war between this country and Turkey. On the assumption that no property in the ships in question had passed at that date, the purchasers have no claim to the instalments of purchase money paid by them.
>
> "The above position may be modified by the terms of the Treaty of Peace which is still to be concluded between the Allies and Turkey.
>
> "It is not, therefore, possible at the present time to give definite advice in regard to the liability of the Crown under the indemnity which was given to the shipbuilding firms when the ships were requisitioned."

The position therefore seems to depend upon the inclusion in the Peace Treaty with Turkey of a provision throwing the onus of compensation upon the Turkish Government.

Meanwhile, in view of the position in the Near East and the naval and military requirements for such vessels, telegraphic action was taken in September to suspend the negotiations for sale of both the vessels concerned.

The estimated gross tonnage of the "Wayward" when requisitioned was 589 tons, and that of the "Waterwitch" 450 tons.

[E 11891/10102/44] No. 360.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, October* 31, 1922.

MY telegram No. 368.

I received visit yesterday from Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who stated that he had been authorised by Sarwat to explore in frankest possible manner possible basis of common programme. He explained that Prime Minister

was anxious to go as far as he could to bring views of Egyptian Government into line with those of His Majesty's Government, but hoped that your Lordship would appreciate the difficulties he would have to face with his critics in this country.

Under-Secretary of State brought with him rough draft embodying what I took to be maxima of what Egyptians hope to secure, and, from conversation that followed, it seemed to me that it would not be difficult to reach common ground at once except in respect of articles 109 and 113, and I am not unhopeful that a compromise may be made in regard to them should your Lordship be willing to admit it.

Discussion began on article 101. Memorandum provided that independence should be recognised as from 15th March, 1922, and made no mention of declaration of 28th February.

I replied that His Majesty's Government would certainly insist on independence being recognised as derived from that declaration and on insertion in this article of a formal recognition by Turks of that declaration. Under-Secretary of State eventually acquiesced.

Discussion of articles Nos. 102–108, 110–112, and 114 and 428 show that our respective views were not widely divergent.

Under-Secretary of State did not, however, understand full import of article No. 104, and asked for enlightenment, which I was unable to give.

In regard to article No. 109, Egyptian view was that Turkish rights should be ceded to Egypt, His Majesty's Government relying on reservations to declaration of independence. Under-Secretary of State said that Egyptian Government fully appreciated the necessity for maintaining rights of His Majesty's Government, and claimed that language contemplated would not prejudice subsequent negotiations.

Same line of argument was followed in regard to article No. 113.

[E 11928/10102/44] No. 361.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 30, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram :—

I did not point out that His Majesty's Government had to bear in mind, as regards Suez Canal, relations other than those with Egypt, but I said Egyptian Government must dismiss idea that His Majesty's Government could agree in respect of either articles Nos. 109 and 113 to assignment of Turkey's rights to Egypt, and that I feared that Sarwat would find it difficult to make any alteration to proposals that would be acceptable to your Lordship. Under-Secretary of State answered, while at first sight these points appeared to lead to deadlock, Prime Minister was most anxious to meet our views in every possible way.

At this point he indicated with great emphasis a danger to which, without knowing it was already in minds of Egyptian Government, I adverted in my telegram No. 369, namely, that Turks would seek to make political capital out of public offer to Egypt of their rights in respect of Suez Canal and Soudan. He pointed out that unless they could be checkmated they would probably [group undecypherable] whether Egypt were represented at seat of conference or not, and that it would be difficult for any Egyptian Government to refuse such an offer and retain office unless an alternative were open to them, adoption of which would not expose them to undue criticism here.

This appears to me to be of serious import. Your Lordship will appraise better than I its full bearing. In the course of conversation which followed, Under-Secretary of State threw out a few tentative suggestions as to a middle course between ground taken up by His Majesty's Government and that of Egyptian Government :—

1. That Turks should abandon their right in respect of Suez Canal and their rights, such as they may be, in Soudan without specifying an assignee. He dismissed this, however, as being of too negative a character to relieve Egyptian Government of their anticipated embarrassment.

2. That right should be conferred in trust to League of Nations pending negotiation of general Anglo-Egyptian settlement. He seemed to like this solution,

and urged that it would enable Egyptian Government to resist both blandishments of Turks and criticism of their enemies here.

In anticipation of some such proposal as this being made by Sarwat, my legal adviser has endeavoured to give it expression in such a form as to embody greatest possible degree of support to maintenance of *status quo*. Text follows in my immediately following telegram.

I concluded interview by arranging to discuss with Sarwat to-morrow any further proposals he may have to make in the light of my conversation with Under-Secretary of State.

[E 11929/10102/44] No. 362.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 376.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, October 30, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram :—

" Turkey assigns all rights accruing to her under convention of 29th October, 1888, relating to the Suez Canal, as well as all her rights in Soudan, to League of Nations to be held in trust for the benefit of Great Britain and Egypt jointly pending the conclusion of conventions between the two Governments determining final disposition of the said rights."

No. 363.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 635.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 31, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 620.

Three Allied High Commissioners decided to-day to take upon themselves responsibility of ordering Ottoman Bank to sell a sufficient part of £T. 252,000 gold, which were sequestered by them in 1919, to provide sum of 500,000*l.* paper to to meet payments due to-day for priorities and salaries of officials.

Situation was such that it was indispensable to take immediate steps to procure money for Treasury.

I am reporting more fully by despatch and trust that our action may be approved.

No. 364.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, October 30, 1922.*

FOLLOWING are principal points in a speech which Secretary of State will deliver to-night at Boston in support of candidate, Senator Lodge ;—

Speech is a review of achievements and policy of Administration, which had negotiated peace treaties with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Yap Agreement; had instituted reorganisation of Cuban finances, Tacna–Arica arbitration, summoning of conference of Central American republics and stabilisation of Hayti and Santo Domingo.

Sentiments of United States towards Mexico are friendly, although they are unwilling to recognise any Mexican internal policy based on confiscatory measures against foreigners.

United States Government, although interested deeply in some phases of Near Eastern question, cannot appropriately attend Lausanne Conference, because it was called to settle a war to which United States was not party.

By lead it took in Arms Conference and by its efforts to ensure harmony amongst nations of Western Hemisphere, Administration had set up record far beyond what was expected of it.

President and his advisers had always been ready to lend helping hand in Europe where it would do most good, but are not willing to fritter away influence of United States in controversies rooted in age-old rivalries. Chief trouble in Europe is that Great Powers have not been able to agree as to questions which, being distinctly European questions, directly concern them, while military establishments are out of all proportion to financial resources of State maintaining them. For United States international co-operation does not mean that she should embroil herself in controversies not involving her own interests; but no appeal to United States for charity has been in vain.

In spite of present delay, Washington treaties would no doubt be ratified by signatories. In any case, ultimate failure of conference programme was precluded by ratifications already voted by United States, Great Britain and Japan. There was no sign of a desire on the part of Powers to enter into any construction or acquisition or operation contrary to treaty provisions pending ratification.

Secretary of State believes that suitable arrangements can be made for participation of United States in election of judges of International Court.

No. 365.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 530.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1922.

THIS afternoon French Ambassador asked me to instruct you to join your colleagues in Allied protest against alleged attempt of Nationalist Turks to establish recruiting offices in Thrace, with a view to raising Turkish army of two divisions in Europe. His Excellency said that this was entirely inconsistent with Mudania Agreement, and should be stopped at once. Attitude of Kemalists was, he added, becoming insupportable, and must be met by exhibition of inflexible solidarity of Allies. I was gratified at this sudden and surprising conversion on part of French, and promised to consult you without delay.

Since then I have seen Harington's No. 2875 to War Office, but am not clear that this relates to same organisation, since the force there alluded to was to have been raised by Constantinople Government, with connivance of French.

Please report, and, if joint protest is now required, act accordingly.

No. 366.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1922.

MOSCOW telegram No. 228 of 27th October: Russia and Lausanne Conference.

I propose to reply to first three questions as follows:—

1. As those Allies and signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres most immediately interested in the questions likely to arise in the new treaty.

2. To discuss question of the Straits, which involves having a voice in the decisions.

3. No, but the Russian Government are free to include representatives of these republics in their delegation as they did at Genoa.

Please enquire of M. Poincaré as soon as possible if he agrees, pointing out as regards (2) that to my mind the expression "having a voice in the decisions" does not imply more than that Russia will be perfectly free to take a full part in the debate and that due weight will be attached to her views in arriving at a decision, but not that she will be allowed by exercising a veto to prevent a final decision being arrived at by the conference.

I of course regard myself as bound by M. Poincaré's suggested procedure for the signature of the Straits Convention, but the Allies should do all they can to avoid giving Russia the opportunity, which she doubtless desires, of proclaiming that the Allies intend to decide the Straits question without her.

No. 367.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 433.

I am somewhat surprised at categorical character of statement concerning Lausanne Conference, foreshadowed in fourth paragraph, since only yesterday American Ambassador handed me reply of United States Government to invitation to attend that conference. This reply declares American special interest in seven subjects which are likely to come before conference and indicates willingness of American Government to send observers to it. Further, the note explicitly states, and the Ambassador stated in answer to my enquiry, that these observers would attend meetings of conference whenever requested in order to express views of their Government on above points, concerning which they would receive full instructions beforehand. He added that they would not sign treaty; but when I said there would probably be a special Straits Convention outside the treaty, he did not seem to regard their adhesion to such an instrument as impossible.

I warmly welcomed American reply and should be sorry to think that it meant nothing.

[E 11761/10102/44] No. 368.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1922.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to refer to my letter of the 18th October transmitting, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, a copy of a telegram, No. 259, which was despatched on the 14th instant to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt on the subject of the wording of the clause in the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with Turkey relating to the service of the loans secured on the Egyptian tribute.

2. The problem connected with these loans formed the subject of conversation last year between Mr. Waley of the Treasury and his Excellency Ismail Sidky Pasha, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, and the matter was again discussed at a recent conference between a representative of the Treasury and members of this Department before the telegram under reference was sent.

3. Since that date, however, the whole question of Egypt's participation in the forthcoming conference has formed the subject of considerable correspondence with Lord Allenby. Two proposals have been but forward, viz:—

(a.) that Egypt, having given certain preliminary assurances to His Majesty's Government, should conclude a separate agreement with Turkey in order to liquidate the situation between the two countries arising out of the war;

(b.) that she should sign a protocol of accession to the treaty itself, a preliminary arrangement having been arrived at with His Majesty's Government as to the form and substance which these portions of the treaty relating to Egypt should take.

4. The procedure contemplated under the first of these alternatives was that an endeavour should be made to secure from Egypt an undertaking in the form of a convention, that she would continue to meet the service of the tribute loans, and in addition, an assurance that she would conclude no agreement with Turkey which would in any way prejudice the *status quo* regarding the four reserved subjects specified in the Declaration to Egypt of the 28th February, without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government. In return, His Majesty's Government would aim at the insertion in the treaty to be signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers of clauses involving the recognition by Turkey of Egypt's independence and of her condominium with Great Britain over the Soudan. The inclusion of further clauses would be required whereby the High Contracting Parties would take note of the above-mentioned convention between His Majesty's Government and Egypt regarding the service of the loans and whereby Turkish rights in respect of the Suez Canal would be renounced in favour of His Majesty's Government. It was hoped by this means to exclude the direct participation of Egypt in the conference without at the same time wounding her susceptibilities as a sovereign State or endangering essential British or Allied interests.

5. Under the second alternative it would be necessary to retain in the Peace Treaty the major portion of the original Egypt chapter of the Treaty of Sèvres with certain modifications entailed by the change in Egypt's status, though the articles regulating the nationality of Egyptians and of ex-Ottoman subjects resident in Egypt might be excluded. It would, however, be necessary for His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government to reach agreement as to the form and substance of the chapter in question before the Egyptian delegation proceeded to the conference. Lord Allenby appears to regard this alternative as preferable to the one outlined in paragraph 4 above.

6. Their Lordships will observe that both alternatives involve a preliminary undertaking on the part of the Egyptian Government to continue to meet the service of the tribute loans. This matter consequently has been engaging Lord Allenby's attention, and in the accompanying telegrams Nos. 370 and 371 of the 29th instant, he discusses various aspects of the question which, in view of the insufficient materials at his disposal in Egypt, he is unable fully to explore.

7. I am accordingly to enquire what reply should, in their Lordship's opinion, be returned to the points raised by Lord Allenby regarding Egypt's liability in respect of the service of these loans and regarding the theory that Egypt is entitled to claim repayment from Turkey of sums expended for this purpose since the termination of Turkish suzerainty. A copy of Lord Edward Cecil's memorandum referred to in Lord Allenby's telegram No. 370 was forwarded to the Treasury under cover of a letter from this Department of the 19th August, 1916. A copy of the telegram No. 368 referred to in Lord Allenby's telegram No. 370 is transmitted herewith for convenience of reference.

8. If, in their Lordships' opinion, the preparation of a suitable reply to Lord Allenby can be expedited by informal discussion, the members of this Department specially concerned in the question will be ready to attend a conference for this purpose. The matter is urgent in view of the fact that, as stated in paragraph 6 above, preliminary agreement must be reached with the Egyptian Government before arrangements can be made for the Egyptian delegation to proceed to the seat of the conference which meets on the 13th November.

I am, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

No. 369.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 636.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 31, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is substance of two notes, dated 29th October, handed simultaneously to High Commissioners this afternoon by Hamid Bey:—

First Note.—Government of Grand National Assembly, having received Allied note of 27th October, is ready to send plenipotentiaries to Peace Conference. It had proposed Smyrna as place of meeting in the hope that necessity of Turkish delegates being able to correspond quickly and securely with Angora would be appreciated.

Turkish Government draws attention to the advantage which Smyrna would present from the point of view of the celerity of negotiation. Anyhow, establishment beforehand of rapid and secure means of communication between Turkey and Lausanne would be "of very great interest for Turkey."

Second Note.—Referring to above, Hamid Bey is instructed to draw attention to the following considerations:—

Government of Grand National Assembly cannot consider simultaneous delivery of invitation to Izzet Pasha as [group undecypherable] of Turkey. Invitation as representatives of Turkey of delegates from Constantinople, which is merely administrative district in Allied occupation, might prevent Government of Grand National Assembly from assisting at conference, besides which the said invitation would appear to be in formal contradiction with the spirit and even the existence of Mudania Convention.

Texts follow by King's Messenger to-morrow.

No. 370.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 637.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, October 31, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Having had inkling this morning of intention of Angora to make acceptance of invitation conditional on exclusion of Constantinople Government, I have agreed with my colleagues to let Hamid Bey know that High Commissioners thought this would amount to a request that they should consider Constantinople Government as having been superseded. We could not accept this view, and I told him so plainly when he delivered note, and said that second note appeared to me to cancel the first. I trust my colleagues will have used similar language as agreed.

As note contained no mention of date, I asked him whether acceptance referred to meeting on 13th November as proposed by Allies. He said that he understood that to be the case. I told Hamid that argument used by Angora Government in connection with Mudania Agreement was very weak.

He gave me to understand that intention of Angora was to despatch delegates to Lausanne, but to refuse to enter into conference if Constantinople delegates were there also. I reminded him that similar situation had arisen in March last year, when the two separate delegations had gone to London and that it had then been found possible to combine forces.

Central Government is making great effort to come to an understanding with Angora for joint action on basis of recognition of great rôle which Angora had played, but without formally abdicating its own position. Refet Pasha visited Sultan on 29th October.

No. 371.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 638.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 31, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Constantinople Government telegraphed to Mustapha Kemal yesterday to say that it had been invited to Peace Conference.

Constantinople Government suggest that the two Governments should consult together with a view to unity of action. If this were not done prospect of peace might be endangered, and neither Government could afford to assume this responsibility. Constantinople Government was now awaiting reply. Mustapha Kemal might ignore telegram, in which case Constantinople Government would have to consider its position. It would let us have an answer in two or three days' time.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what had passed between Sultan and Refet Pasha. He said he had not got detailed information, but that he understood from Grand Vizier that Refet Pasha had asked Sultan to dismiss his Government in order to allow Angora Government to send a Governor-General here. Sultan is stated to have replied that he would consult his Ministers.

No. 372.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 639.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 1, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is summary of various press messages from Angora intercepted by telegraph censorship:—

A special meeting of Grand National Assembly on 30th October discussed Tewfik Pasha's telegram announcing his participation at Lausanne Conference. This was considered treasonable, and it was decided not to reply, but eventually to punish its authors.

Grand National Assembly decided that administration of Constantinople must be handed to it, and denied existence of any other power. Number of votes on motion that Grand National Assembly, being heir of Ottoman Empire, and sovereignty belonging to the nation, Sultanate should be suppressed was not judged sufficient and discussion was postponed.

Ismet Pasha stated that it was not legal for Constantinople Government, being under occupation, to be invited to conference; this would upset situation created by Mudania Conference, as "our official right is force throughout all Turkish territory."

No. 373.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 640.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 1, 1922.*

MY telegram No 624.

After waiting some days for permission to proceed to Angora, Dr. Nansen was asked to negotiate exchange of populations with Hamid Bey at Constantinople. Negotiations began yesterday, when Hamid Bey declared that basis on which he was empowered to negotiate was compulsory exchange of whole of Mussulman inhabitants now living in Greece, Macedonia and islands, &c., for total Greek population in Turkish dominions, including Constantinople. As this latter condition opens up serious economic considerations, Dr. Nansen is somewhat puzzled how to proceed. Matter will be discussed between Dr. Nansen and High Commissioners on Friday next. Turks either do not or will not realise that, as economic life of Constantinople depends mainly on commercial activities of Greeks, disappearance of latter will paralyse all industry and commerce.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 231.)

No. 374.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 1, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 142.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Government expressed thanks for invitation to Lausanne Conference, to which they will not fail to send delegates, whose names will be communicated later.

No. 375.

Mr. Peters to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 232.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, October 31, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 228.

Official press to-day points out that if Russia does not participate in Peace Conference she will be able to preserve freedom of action in regard to Europe. Turkey can obtain no satisfactory result from a conference which leaves Russia out.

These two facts might constitute inducement to conclude a Russo-Turkish offensive and defensive alliance.

Reports from usually well-informed quarters indicate that Soviet Government intends to return an "energetic" reply to invitation. This may account for change in tone of press, which has hitherto confined itself mainly to the development of points made by Chicherin, and reported in my telegram under reference. Soviet Government may possibly be preparing the way of retreat in case a request put forward for admission to Peace Conference is refused.

No. 376.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 532. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 1, 1922.*

ACCORDING to information reaching me from a reliable source, the Italians are engaged in starting a separate negotiation with Angora behind the backs of their allies. The plan appears to be to work for special concessions and privileges in favour of Italy in return for her abandoning the tripartite agreement. A special Italian envoy or agent is to proceed at once to Angora. Whilst seeking exclusive Italian advantages, he will probably endeavour to enlist your and your French colleague's sympathetic support by arguing that such mission will help to smoothe matters for the Allies generally at Angora. The agent is understood to be on his way to Constantinople now.

I am making an appeal to M. Mussolini through His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome to stop the proposed separate negotiations with Angora.

Meanwhile, should you be approached either by the Italian special agent or by your Italian colleague, you will no doubt be careful not to commit yourself nor take them unnecessarily into your confidence.

No. 377.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 1, 1922.*

I HAVE received from M. Mussolini a cordially-worded telegram, in which he expresses confidence that he may count on receiving my friendly co-operation in dealing with the problems confronting our two countries, linked as they are by bonds of traditional friendship. I have sent a reply conceived in the same spirit. A similar exchange of telegrams has taken place with Mr. Bonar Law.

I request your Excellency to take an early opportunity of seeing M. Mussolini for the purpose of confirming the satisfaction with which I have received the assurance that the new Italian Government relies on the solidarity of the Allied nations for the successful pursuit of their common interests. I welcome that assurance the more warmly in view of the difficult situation facing the Allies in the Near East. Like M. Mussolini, I am convinced that a satisfactory solution of the difficulties can only be found by proceeding on the basis of the most frank and single-minded co-operation, to the exclusion of all attempts on the part of the Allies to enter into separate negotiations or arrangements with the Turks. This is the line of policy which I myself have consistently advocated and strictly adhered to both in regard to the troubles in the Near East ever since they arose and generally in all questions of common concern.

It is therefore with a feeling of considerable uneasiness, which I do not think it right to conceal, that I learn from certain quarters in Constantinople, in whose reliability I am bound to repose confidence, that the Italian Government which has just resigned was at the very moment of its fall contemplating the reopening of separate negotiations with Angora for the conclusion of some special arrangement between Italy and Angora. Of the terms of the proposed agreement I am in ignorance, but the fact alone that such an agreement was being sought by M. Schanzer appears to me altogether incompatible with the spirit of loyal co-operation between the Allies which M. Mussolini proclaims to be the keynote of the Allied policy which he intends to pursue.

I therefore earnestly trust that the new Italian Government will refrain from pursuing the policy credibly attributed to their predecessors, and will give definite and early orders for putting a stop to any separate negotiations which may have been in contemplation with Angora. The announcement in England that any one of the Allies was engaged in concluding a separate agreement behind the backs of the others, on the very eve of the Lausanne Conference, would have a very deplorable effect.

I beg your Excellency to speak to M. Mussolini with the utmost frankness.

[E 11964/10102/44] No. 378.

Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received November 2.)

Sir, *Air Ministry, November 2, 1922.*

I AM commanded by the Air Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th October with regard to the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and to request that you will lay the following observations in reply before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. As regards the air clauses of the treaty and those relating to commissions of control (articles 191 to 205, both inclusive), the Air Council are of opinion that no purpose would be served by prohibiting the Turks from maintaining an air force, or by restricting its size, unless we are able and prepared to take the measures necessary to secure that these prohibitions or restrictions are observed. These measures would involve the establishment of a commission of control, which Turkey would presumably only accept under duress, and which would, in any event, be extremely difficult to operate in that country.

3. The Air Council, therefore, consider that no conditions as regards the maintenance of air forces should be imposed in the new peace terms, and that we can rely upon the technical and financial difficulties preventing the Turks from attaining any great developments of air power. The Council, moreover, feel that a recognition of the re-establishment of Turkish power must carry with it the right for Turkey to be able to defend herself against potential enemy neighbours.

The Council accordingly propose, for Lord Curzon's consideration, the deletion of articles 191 to 195, both inclusive, and of the references to aeronautical control in articles 196 to 205, both inclusive.

4. As regards the aerial navigation clauses (articles 318 to 327, both inclusive), the Air Council agree that, in view of the undertaking of the Principal Allied Powers to support Turkey's admission to the League of Nations, it is not necessary to retain these clauses. They desire, however, to point out that admission to the League of Nations does not of itself involve adherence to the International Air Convention, and they suggest that a new article should be inserted whereby Turkey would undertake to adhere to the International Air Convention.

5. The Air Council would prefer to leave the question of Part VI, section I, ("Prisoners of War"), mentioned in paragraph 2 of your letter, to be settled by the War Office.

6. The Council take this opportunity of remarking that in regard to any arrangements for maintaining the freedom of the Straits, they would be strongly opposed to any proposal involving the permanent retention of British air squadrons either on the peninsula or on the Asiatic shore. In their view a small unit would be insecure against any Turkish forces brought up against it, while a large force would be both costly and difficult to operate on either of those sites.

7. Copies of this letter are being sent to the War Office and Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

W. F. NICHOLSON.

No. 379.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 647.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 2, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 640.

I presume this means that Dr. Nansen's efforts to induce Turks to allow male relatives of Asia Minor refugees to join them has failed. From point of view of situation here, this was the only pressing question, and it would seem that matter of general exchange of populations had better be left to Peace Conference.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 11891/10102/44] No. 380.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 374 of 31st October: Discussion of Egyptian clauses of Turkish treaty with Yousry Pasha.

In original form effect of article 104 was to place Egypt on footing of an Allied Power, thus conferring on Egyptians in Turkey extra-territorial privileges. Persons enjoying protection of other Allied Powers would have enjoyed such privileges, and consequently it was considered undesirable specifically to exclude Egyptians who at the time of signature of Treaty of Sèvres were British-protected persons. As Egypt is now independent and is herself bound by Capitulations, Egyptians cannot logically claim extra-territorial privileges in Turkey, and modification of article suggested in my telegram No. 258 has therefore become necessary.

Further effect of article is to exclude Egypt from category of "territory detached from Turkey." Various provisions in the economic and financial sections of the treaty apply only to such territory; for instance, it is burdened with proportionate share of Ottoman Public Debt.

If, however, Egyptian Government insist on thesis that their liability for service of tribute loans terminated with disappearance of Turkish suzerainty, it will add strength to the contention originally put forward by the French that Egypt should shoulder her share of Ottoman liabilities.

Other points raised by you are dealt with in my immediately following telegrams.

[E 11929/10102/44] No. 381.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I appreciate difficulties of Egyptian Government in regard to articles 109 and 113, but compromise on the lines indicated in your telegram No. 376 of 31st October is unacceptable.

Such rights as are conferred on Turkey by Suez Canal Convention are from their nature unsuitable for transference to Egypt, who will in fact acquire full and unqualified responsibility for the protection of the Canal with the disappearance of those Turkish rights, subject only, as between Great Britain and Egypt, to limitations imposed by declaration of 28th February.

As regards the Soudan, Turkey has no rights to transfer. In Lord Cromer's words, "the shadowy claims of Turkish suzerainty were practically, though not nominally, swept away by a stroke of the pen," when the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899 was concluded.

Failing international recognition, in the manner provided by the original text of the Treaty of Sèvres, of British rights in regard to the Suez Canal and the Soudan, those rights are only safeguarded by the declaration of 28th February and the Boutros-Cromer Convention. The latter instrument, though not formally recognised by the Powers, has not in fact been seriously challenged, but the declaration of 28th February is at present merely unilateral, and though tacitly accepted by the present Egyptian Government, might be repudiated by their successors. If, however, Egyptian adherence to, or signature of, the Turkish Peace Treaty could be made to involve their recognition of the declaration, the latter would acquire the force of a bilateral Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, and in those circumstances I am inclined to think that we need not insist on the maintenance of articles 109 and 113.

Article 101 would, however, have to be revised, and my immediately following telegram contains the text which I suggest for your Lordship's consideration.

[E 11929/10102/44] No. 382.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 282.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram: Suggested revision of Egyptian clauses in Turkish treaty.

Following is revised text proposed for article 101:—

"Turkey takes note of the declaration of His Britannic Majesty's Government to His Majesty the King of Egypt on the 28th February, 1922, defining the status of Egypt, and renounces all rights and title in or over Egypt, including those derived from the convention signed at Constantinople on 29th October, 1888, relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal.

"This renunciation shall take effect as from 5th November, 1914."

[E 11988/11988/44] No. 383.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 380.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, November 2, 1922.*

PERSONS mentioned below left Egypt on 25th and 27th October for Rome, and eventually Lausanne. They are by way of being delegation of Old Nationalist party, and intend to do propaganda in view of Near East Conference, and particularly to establish contact with Turks. They are, of course, in touch with Aly Bey Kamel, 4, Rue Christophe Colomb, Paris, and doubtless with ex-Khedive.

Mohammed Bey Hafez Ramadan. Dr. Ismail Sidki. Mustafa-el-Shurbagi. Ahmed Bey Lutfi. Ahmed Wagdi. Said Bey Talamat.

No. 384.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 534.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November 2, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

French Government, in suggesting answer to second Angora note, proposed to add, as a further reason justifying Allied attitude, that the Mudania Convention precluded the Allied Powers from insisting that the Constantinople Government should be separately represented.

I have informed French Government that, for reasons which I explain, this argument should not, in my opinion, figure in the reply of the three High Commissioners to Hamid's note, and that I have therefore warned you not to include it.

Please act accordingly.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 402, and Rome, No. 348.)

[E 12000/27/44] No. 385.

Sir Eyre Crowe to Count de Saint-Aulaire.

My dear Ambassador, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1922.*

I SHOWED Lord Curzon at once the two notes which you kindly handed to me to-day containing your Government's suggestions for the replies to be made jointly by the three High Commissioners at Constantinople to the recent communications from Angora respecting the Lausanne Conference.

Lord Curzon has now sent telegraphic instructions to Sir Horace Rumbold to concert answer in the sense suggested with his French and Italian colleagues.

There is only one point which Lord Curzon thinks it better not to allude to in the proposed reply on the subject of the double representation at the conference of Constantinople and Angora, and that is the argument contained in the sentence in your note: "D'autre part, la Convention de Moudania ne permet pas aux Puissances alliées d'insister pour que le Gouvernement de Constantinople ait une délégation spéciale."

This argument does not appear to Lord Curzon to be strictly valid. There is nothing in the Mudania Convention precluding the Allies from inviting the Constantinople Government to be represented at the Peace Conference separately from Angora. It is true that the convention was concluded with Angora alone, and that it makes mention throughout of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as the party with which the Allies are treating. But this was the natural procedure in an arrangement entered into for the purpose of stopping the hostilities in which the Angora Government were actually engaged, but in which the Constantinople Government had no part.

Lord Curzon has for this reason not included the passage above quoted in the terms of the reply which Sir H. Rumbold is authorised to sign in concert with his colleagues, and he trusts the French Government will agree to its being omitted.

Believe me, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[E 12001/27/44] No. 386.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

LE Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée d'Angora a fait savoir aux représentants alliés à Constantinople que la présence d'un délégué de Constantinople à la conference pourrait l'empêcher de s'y rendre.

Le Gouvernement français estime que, les Gouvernements alliés s'étant bornés à suivre la procédure adoptée lors de la réunion de la Conférence d'Orient à Londres, il appartient aux Gouvernements d'Angora et de Constantinople de se mettre d'accord pour envoyer une seule délégation à Lausanne, ce qui doit être facile, puisqu'on considère à Angora que Constantinople n'est qu'une circonscription administrative de la Turquie. D'autre part, la Convention de Moudania ne permet pas aux Puissances alliées d'insister pour que le Gouvernement de Constantinople ait une délégation spéciale.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement français suggère que les trois Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople soient chargés de remettre d'urgence une note dans ce sens à Hamid Bey.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 2 novembre 1922.

[E 12000/27/44] No. 387.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

IL ressort de la réponse faite par le Gouvernement d'Angora à l'invitation des Puissances que celui-ci, tout en ne refusant pas de se rendre à Lausanne, dont il semble subordonner le choix à l'établissement de moyens de correspondance sûrs et rapides, insiste pour Smyrne et laisse ainsi ouverte la discussion sur le lieu de la conférence.

Le Gouvernement français est d'avis que cette réponse, si ambiguë qu'elle soit, peut être considérée comme une acceptation de Lausanne. Il pense donc qu'il y aurait lieu de prendre acte immédiatement et en commun de cette acceptation et de donner au Gouvernement d'Angora l'assurance que les mesures nécessaires seront prises pour faciliter les communications télégraphiques entre Lausanne et la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement français suggère donc que des instructions soient envoyées aux trois Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople pour qu'une note commune s'inspirant des considérations qui précèdent soit remise à Hamid Bey.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 2 novembre 1922.

No. 388.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 644.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 639.

Latest information shows that on 1st November Grand National Assembly adopted decision that under fundamental law Turkish people represented by Assembly is sole sovereignty of Turkey, and that people recognise no other Government, and that Constantinople form of government has ceased for ever as from 16th March, 1920. Caliphate remains vested in the house of Osman, but incumbent must be elected by Grand National Assembly. Turkish State is support on which Caliphate rests.

Preamble states even more explicitly that office of Sultan has ceased to exist.

No decision has yet come through as to maintenance or otherwise of present Sultan in office of Caliph.

Constantinople Government is anxiously considering its position. There are unconfirmed rumours of resignation. If it resigns it may be impossible to form new Government, in which case question of administration of Constantinople pending Allied evacuation will arise in acute form.

No. 389.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 645.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 621.

Press publishes manifesto issued on 31st October by Shakir Bey to officials of new Administration in Eastern Thrace. It lays down admirable general principles, but specifies clauses prescribing registration of outrages by Greeks, immediate arrest of persons accused on good grounds of treason, registration of any remaining non-Moslems, &c., show anything but tendency to forgive old scores.

Manifesto states that if gendarmerie is insufficient local inhabitants may be employed to supplement it.

Translation follows by despatch. Shakir Bey has never publicly contradicted statement mentioned in my telegram under reference. He seems to be assuming rôle originally intended for Refet Pasha.

No. 390.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 646.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 530.

I have consulted General Harington.

Secret organisation, referred to in General Harington's telegram No. 2875, controlled by Essad, who though chief of police here has long been suspected by us of active Kemalist sympathies amounting almost to his being a Kemalist agent, is possibly what French Ambassador had in mind.

General Harington knows nothing of any definite opening of Nationalist recruiting bureaux in Thrace which would warrant any protest being made to Nationalist Government on lines suggested by French Ambassador.

Both General Harington and I consider nothing would be gained by making such protest at present.

Situation will be very carefully watched.

Discouragement of recruiting in Syria would be a distinct breach of convention. The numbers proceeding to Thrace are being checked. There is practically no transport left in Thrace, and Nationalists certainly have no guns.

General Harington does not look upon matters as serious yet, but they may become so later. French High Commissioner, who has been informed by French Government of *démarche* made by French Ambassador in London, has telegraphed that his Government must have acted under a misapprehension. All he did was to

sound note of warning as to likelihood of Kemalist Turks starting to recruit an army after Allied troops have left Eastern Thrace. This warning seems to be justified by that passage of Shakir Bey's manifesto to the effect that if gendarmerie is insufficient local inhabitants may be employed to supplement it (see my telegram No. 645). French High Commissioner does not consider a protest called for, at present

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No. 391.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 647.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

ALLIED High Commissioners and generals met this morning to discuss view of Nationalist Government that Mudania Convention merely contemplated respect of zones under Allied occupation in so far as military troops were concerned, but not in respect of civil administration. If this view were accepted Nationalists could introduce their administration into Gallipoli and Ismid zones and ultimately into Constantinople. In Chanak to all intents and purposes they have already done so. View of Allied generals is that while Nationalist administration might be admitted without military objection into Gallipoli provided it be subordinate to Allied control, as a concession to practical order, it cannot under convention be yielded as of right. Since admission even as a concession is of nature to prejudice future arrangements as regards Constantinople, General Harington requests views of Allied Governments on political aspect of the question.

High Commissioners undertook to ascertain views of their Governments, but in the meantime as Refet Pasha has asked General Harington for reply by to-morrow they decided that it was duty of generals to interpret Mudania Agreement, that High Commissioners did not desire to interfere in questions between Nationalist and Central Governments, but that whatever be form of administration in zones of Allied military occupation Allies must insist on Allied military control of that administration.

Refet Pasha refuses to admit such control, and I understand that if it is insisted upon and if right of establishing Nationalist gendarmerie in Gallipoli is denied to Angora Government he proposes to report to his Government that Allies are deliberately breaking terms of Mudania Convention.

While General Harington will naturally resist this view and inform Refet that Allied Governments are being consulted by telegraph, matter is urgent, since it is more than likely that Constantinople Government will resign within the next few days, thus bringing us face to face with *fait accompli* in Constantinople. While High Commissioners would find it difficult in that case for practical reasons to refuse to allow Nationalist Administration to function here, it would be intolerable that administration should be less under Allied control than is present Constantinople Administration.

Insistence on this point is likely to lead to number of delicate and difficult situations. It is therefore highly important that three Governments should concert at once with a view to decision on united attitude to be adopted.

Every concession made to Turks leads to a demand for a further concession, and however conciliatory we may be, Nationalists will always find an excuse for denouncing Mudania Agreement whenever it suits them to do so.

[E 12014/10102/44] No. 392.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 341.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 269 to Cairo, last paragraph.

There has been no indication in press of probable attitude of Italian Government, nor has question ever been mentioned to me.

It is one which I had better not raise.

(Repeated to Cairo.)

No. 393.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 649.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 3, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs left last night for Belgrade. Before leaving he informed me that object of his journey was to discuss whole situation with M. Nincic before latter left for Lausanne. King Alexander, whom he knew well, had expressed desire to see him, probably to discuss internal situation of Greece.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was pessimistic as to prospects of peace. He was convinced that Turks and Bulgarians were contemplating joint action. Turks were already forming troops out of the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace, and this was an understanding with Bulgarian komitajis. Fascisti Government filled him with anxiety, and Italians seemed determined to be as disagreeable as possible to Greece.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will only remain at Belgrade Sunday.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

No. 394.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 650.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 647.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that he had telegraphed to Dr. Nansen to say that he could not accept principle of exchange of populations of Constantinople against Mussulman inhabitants of Greece. Instructions given to Dr. Nansen were to endeavour to exchange males retained in Asia Minor against these inhabitants, since it was most important to have some shelter before the winter in which to place refugees, and Mussulman villages would have afforded it. Minister for Foreign Affairs could not contemplate taking into Greece enormous Greek population of Constantinople nor admit principle that Turks should expel them.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 395.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 435.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, November 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 322.

My telegram No 433 was written on Associated Press summary prepared to be issued after speech was delivered. It used words "cannot appropriately attend Lausanne Peace Conference," whereas actual text of speech runs: "We are not appropriately parties to peace negotiations which are about to take place."

This should not, in my opinion, be regarded as modifying the sense of text of *aide-mémoire* regarding United States participation in conference handed to you by United States Ambassador.

It is clear that Mr. Hughes was speaking guardedly to avoid possibility of clamour by irreconcilables. Anything said by Ambassador outside fair meaning of *aide-mémoire* should, I think, be regarded with caution until I have had an opportunity of speaking to the Secretary of State, who will be absent till the beginning of next week; but see my telegram No. 384, last paragraph.

[E 12063/10102/44] No. 396.

Memorandum by Mr. Ingram on Egypt and the Turkish Peace Conference.

THE principle has been accepted that Egyptian representatives should be present at the seat of the forthcoming conference, and the ground is now being explored by His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government in order to

ensure that where matters affecting Egypt at the conference come up for settlement both Governments may be agreed, not only as to the policy to be pursued, but as to the actual text of articles to be inserted in the treaty.

In arriving at this stage, His Majesty's Government have modified to some extent their views as to the form and substance of the Egypt chapter of the original Treaty of Sèvres. This has been necessitated by the change in the status of Egypt since the unilateral declaration to His Majesty the King of Egypt on the 28th February terminating the protectorate. The considerations which have led His Majesty's Government to adopt this attitude are—

1. The fact that Egypt is now an independent sovereign State and in international affairs can no longer be regarded as part of, or even as an appendage of, the British Empire.

2. The desire to establish such a spirit of friendly co-operation with Egypt as will facilitate future negotiations with her on the four reserved subjects, regarding which the *status quo* is at present being maintained pending such negotiations.

Assuming that preliminary agreement is reached between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government as to the attitude of both parties during the forthcoming conference—an end which will not have been attained without concessions on the part of His Majesty's Government (in respect of the Suez Canal and Soudan clauses)—it is important not to vitiate such goodwill as may have been acquired or nullify such sacrifices as may have been made in reaching such agreement by our subsequent treatment of Egypt in connection with this conference. For this reason, it may be useful to examine in advance what our attitude should be to the Egyptian representatives at the conference and the extent to which they should be allowed to participate in the discussion and determination of those portions of the treaty which affect them.

In the first place, I venture to think that, if practicable, the invitation to Egypt to be present at the conference should not emanate from His Majesty's Government alone. Such a procedure would be invidious and give rise in Egypt to the old cry that the present régime is merely a veiled protectorate.

In the second place, if Egyptian representatives appear at the seat of the conference, it would hardly seem consonant with our preliminary negotiations with them, did we not take the initiative in securing for them a hearing when matters affecting Egypt come up for discussion. The presence of Egyptian representatives at Lausanne will in any case be less helpful than embarrassing: the embarrassment, however, will be multiplied tenfold if they are there with a grievance.

I venture, therefore, to submit that, if and when we learn that Lord Allenby and Sarwat Pasha have come to an agreement at regards the form and substance of the Egypt clauses of the treaty, we should approach the French and Italian Governments, pointing out that, in view of the fact that Egypt is now an independent sovereign State, and that she is intimately affected by the matters dealt with in articles 101 to 114 of the former Treaty of Sèvres now under revision, we are anxious that an invitation should be extended to her to send duly accredited representatives to the seat of the forthcoming conference; that we consider that these representatives should be heard when the matters dealt with in these articles are under discussion, and that, though she is in no sense to be regarded as a signatory to the treaty itself, we are of opinion that, once the treaty is signed, she should, in order to validate them, sign a protocol signifying her accession to the above portions of the treaty.

The actual form and wording of such a protocol could be gone into at a later date with the legal adviser.

E. M. B. INGRAM

Foreign Office, November 3, 1922.

No. 397.

Sir G. Grahame to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Brussels, November 4, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, having received provisional but satisfactory replies from your Lordship, the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and French Government to his request that Belgium should attend Lausanne Conference in order

to take part in discussion when her economic or other [group omitted] were affected, has now learned from Paris that a British proposal has been made to effect that Belgium should only be shown treaty when ready for signature without having participated in earlier stages of negotiations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is greatly perturbed and has telegraphed to Belgian Ambassador to represent strongly reasons why Belgium should have the opportunity of making her voice heard during negotiation of treaty. He observes as regards Capitulations and other matters he believes Belgian interests are identical with those of Great Britain and earnestly asks for your support.

No. 398.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 648. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 532, Secret.

M. Maissa, whom I knew formerly in Persia and who was Italian High Commissioner here over two years ago, called to-day. He turned out to be special Italian envoy mentioned in your telegram under reference, as he stated that he was leaving for Angora on Monday. During interview, which was brief, he endeavoured to enlist my sympathetic support in manner foreshadowed by you and gave a somewhat confused account of object of his mission. He added that from all he had heard of present temper of people at Angora he did not expect to accomplish much.

I merely observed that his journey might in present circumstances be misinterpreted by Angora Government, which would probably exploit it.

M. Maissa is an old man, and has reputation of being crafty and pro-Kemalist.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 3.)

No. 399.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 649.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 569.

At a meeting to-day Dr. Nansen informed Allied High Commissioners that Angora Government definitely intended to evacuate compulsorily all Russian refugees from Turkey within two or possibly three months of installation of new régime.

As the majority of refugees are without identification papers or passports, he has prepared a form of certificate to enable these persons to proceed to such countries as will receive them when evacuated.

In view of the fact that signature of such certificates by himself as League of Nations representative would have no legal value, my Allied colleagues and I decided to request authority from our respective Governments to counter-sign them ourselves.

League of Nations Bureau will be responsible for their issue, and will guarantee that they are not granted to Bolsheviks or other undesirables.

Certificates are identical in form with those decided upon at conference of 3rd July to 5th July in Geneva.

French and Italian High Commissioners are addressing a similar telegram to their Governments.

Text of certificate and despatch follow by bag.

No. 400.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 651.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 3, 1922.*

VICE-CONSUL at Smyrna reports that on 1st November Minister of Finance instructed representatives of various banks to give him lists of private safe deposits

of Armenians and Greeks and details of their accounts. If banks refused he would use force. Allied consuls are instructing banks to yield under protest to force, and are themselves presenting joint protest stating that High Commissioners are in communication with Angora on this subject (see my despatch No. 935), and inviting Minister not to enforce proposed measure.

No. 401.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 562.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 4, 1922.*

NEWS of deposition of Sultan and publication yesterday of letter from Ferid Bey to French President of the Council announcing repudiation by Angora Assembly of all acts of Constantinople Government since March 1920 has produced a sensible *revirement* in French public opinion—at all events, as expressed in the press.

Arguments developed by M. Gauvain (see my despatch No. 2563) are generally used this morning, and "Pertinax," in "Echo de Paris," goes so far as to suggest advisability of preliminary meeting of experts to draw up programme of future judicial, financial and economic status of foreigners in Turkey.

No. 402.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 345.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 3, 1922.*

PRESIDENT of the Council called on me this morning to return my visit, and I spoke to him in the sense of your Lordship's telegrams unnumbered of 1st November, adding that such separate negotiations with Turks must inevitably destroy any prospect of that frank and loyal co-operation which we had hoped to establish.

His Excellency said that he knew nothing of alleged negotiations, and refused to believe his predecessor could have contemplated them. At any rate, in so far as he was concerned, I could assure your Lordship that any such separate action would be in absolute contradiction with policy he intended to follow. According to his information, Turks had now accepted Lausanne, but he enquired whether date of conference was likely to be retarded by difference between Governments of Angora and Constantinople. He was perturbed at growing arrogance and intransigence of Turks and their extreme pretensions, which now include the whole of Western Thrace. He thought it very desirable that Allies should decide on a correct policy *vis-à-vis* Turks [? before our] meeting them at Lausanne, otherwise conference would be the scene of complete confusion; he was ready to come to immediate understanding with His Majesty's Government on the subject if he could be informed of their views. He was also prepared to negotiate an immediate agreement to embrace Dodecanese and Jubaland.

My impression is that Signor Mussolini, who seems eminently a man of practical ideas and quick decisions, has lost no time in arriving at conclusion that friendship and co-operation with Great Britain rather than with France are likely to be of most value to Italy and is anxious to work in with us. Your Lordship will agree that this trend should be encouraged.

At the end of very friendly conversation, his Excellency begged me to reassure His Majesty's Government and public opinion in England as to his policy, which would not be one of aggressive adventure or surprises, but of steady and sustained effort to further [? practical] interests of Italy. He expressed pleasure at tone of British press in its references to new Government.

No. 403.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 352.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 345 of 3rd November.

Please see Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 648 of same date.

You should at once inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that our High Commissioner reports the intended departure for Angora on (Monday), 6th November, of Signor Maissa, clearly in pursuit of the very mission respecting which it would appear that Signor Mussolini has been left in ignorance.

Please urge his Excellency, in pursuit of the line of policy which he indicated to you, and of which I have taken note with the utmost satisfaction (intending to recur to the subject more fully later on), to take immediate steps to stop Signor Maissa's departure for Angora.

No. 404.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).**

(No. 406.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November 4, 1922.*

DIFFICULT situation has arisen at Constantinople out of Nationalist claim, formulated by Refet Pasha, to install Kemalist civil administration and gendarmerie in Allied occupied zones under the terms of the Mudania Convention. Question has been referred to their Governments by the Allied High Commissioners.

Now that the authority of the Constantinople Government is crumbling it seems difficult to resist Nationalist claim to take over the civil administration in Constantinople, Ismid, Chanak and Gallipoli. In the case of Gallipoli, the Mudania Convention actually provides for the replacement of Greek administration and gendarmerie by Turkish throughout Eastern Thrace, which undoubtedly adds weight to the Kemalist claim.

In the view of His Majesty's Government, it is, however, essential that in all four areas the civil administration, with or without gendarmerie, must remain subject to the control of the Allied military authorities in occupation of those areas, without which the military occupation specifically recognised in clause 12 of the Mudania Convention would cease to have any meaning.

Please, therefore, suggest to the Government to which you are accredited that they agree to the following as the attitude to be maintained by the Allies on this question, and should instruct their civil and military representatives at Constantinople accordingly:—

Gallipoli.—The installation of Turkish Nationalist administration and of a limited gendarmerie is admitted as a concession, or may, if judged necessary, be allowed as a right derived from the provision of the Mudania Convention, which covers the replacement of Greek by Turkish administration in Eastern Thrace, and from the fact of the recent withdrawal of the Greek administration, which implies to some extent the assimilation of Gallipoli to the rest of Eastern Thrace.

Chanak.—Turkish administration is admitted as a right and an existing fact, and a limited gendarmerie is allowed as a concession.

Constantinople and Ismid.—The Allied Powers claim no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Turkey not affecting any treaty rights. They consequently have no intention of opposing the replacement of the authority of the Central Government by that of Angora, but the latter cannot be allowed to install any new gendarmerie, since the transfer of authority would cover the already existing police and gendarmerie in these districts.

In all four areas, however, Turkish civil administration, with or without gendarmerie, must remain subject to the control of the Allied military authorities, who are in occupation of the territory in question and are responsible therefor; this occupation is based upon article 7 of the armistice, and has been admitted, *de facto* and *de jure*, by the Angora Government by their signature of the Mudania Convention.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 538, and Athens, No. 345.)

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* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 353.

No. 405.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 656.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 5, 1922.*

DR. NANSEN reports that Armenians will shortly leave Turkey under pressure of the Turks and that Western Thrace is only possible destination for them. He accordingly asks his representative here to request Greek Government to allow them to enter provided they are supported by voluntary charitable organisations.

I regard this proviso as illusory, since charitable organisations cannot possibly support all refugees already here, and if they undertake to support Armenians it simply means fewer other refugees will be supported. There are already many thousands of Armenian refugees being fed by Greek Government, who are under no obligation to afford this relief. I submit most respectfully, but strongly, that if Greece is asked to accept more Armenians they should be supported by Governments who have pledged themselves over and over again to protect Armenians.

Dr. Nansen adds a confidential sentence to his representative that, if Greek Government refuse, British and American charitable organisations might be requested to withdraw help they are now giving to refugees. As regards Americans, this threat has no importance, since they are certain to turn down any suggestion of Dr. Nansen's, whose interference they will resent. I trust same applies to British organisations.

Americans here, who are organising relief on vast and well-considered scale, have made it quite clear that they will have nothing to do with Dr. Nansen.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 412.)

No. 406.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 5, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 80.

Attention of this Government and of public has been concentrated on developments in Italy, and nothing has been said in regard to Near East. M. Nincic's confidences to Sir E. Drummond, who left here Friday, on the subject of outlet of Bulgaria on Ægean Sea, which will doubtless be discussed with Bulgarian Prime Minister on Wednesday, and of outlet for Serbia at Salonica, which is possibly being discussed with Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, are reported in my despatch No. 468 of 2nd November, which should reach London to-night.

Only addition I have to make is that M. Nincic, in his conversation with Sir E. Drummond, was very insistent that Great Powers in eventual settlement of Straits question should keep actual detachments of troops at Straits and not rely wholly on a mere paper guarantee by League of Nations. I should myself regard this insistence as being more in connection with restriction to Asiatic side of Turkish army, which is an important point for Serbia, than with freedom of Straits, in which Serbia cannot be much interested. Nor can she be much concerned with Capitulations, of which I think she did not enjoy privileges and of which, anyhow, she will not in practice stand in much need. Serbia is likely to leave main question in hands of Powers, centre of her interest gravitating round orientation of Bulgaria. Great importance may be attributed to sudden willingness of this Government to receive Bulgarian Prime Minister, a visit which seems to meet with no opposition in the press, and I do not propose to sound M. Nincic with regard to attitude this country is likely to adopt at conference until that visit is over.

No. 407.

Mr. Peters to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 235.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Moscow, November 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 228.

Along with text of Soviet reply to invitation to Lausanne to-day, press publishes a message sent by Chicherin to Angora on 3rd November congratulating National Assembly on overthrowing "despotic monarchical autocracy" which had acted against interests of people and had reduced country to subjection to Western Powers. Chicherin expresses confidence that, having made an end of internal treachery, Turkish people will realise its aims and right to self-determination and will rehabilitate in their entirety its sovereign rights on land and in its own waters, fully securing defence of Straits and of Turkish capital against all attempt on the part of foreign enemies and counter-revolution.

No. 408.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 4, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 345.

I thought it well, especially in view of Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 648, to have assurances of President of the Council confirmed by secretary-general, who is naturally more *au courant*.

Secretary-general assures me that there was no idea of separate negotiations, but Italian Government had been attacked in press for having no agent in Angora to give them independent news of what was happening there, and for Government being entirely dependent on French sources for their information. If they had contemplated negotiations they would have sent some agent very different from Signor Maissa. The latter is well known to me as also to Lord Hardinge. He is father-in-law to Sir H. Lamb, and particularly Anglophil. I do not agree in estimate of him given in last paragraph of Sir H. Rumbold's telegram.

Secretary-general declared that new President of the Council was particularly anxious to pursue straight and open policy. He gave me a message from his Excellency to the effect that he desired to press again for an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government before conference with a view to adopting united front. He did not know if ideas in London on all questions at issue were fixed, but in Rome they were still fluid. Might it not at least be possible for delegates to meet in Lausanne some days before conference opened for the purpose of previous discussion?

His Excellency further wished to say he would, if necessary, adhere to date of 13th November for opening as he had promised. But in view of meeting of Chamber on [group undecypherable] date in question it was extraordinarily inconvenient and precluded any possibility of his attending himself. If short imprisonment were possible he would be extremely grateful. I [? suggested that] similar enquiry should be addressed to Paris. Italian answer to your Lordship's note on [? Dodecanese] leaves by special messenger to-night. I gather that it admits our right to be consulted in the matter and proposes general discussion of Near East question.

No. 409.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 652.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 4, 1922.*

GRAND VIZIER called this morning to speak of situation created for Constantinople Government by recent decisions of Grand National Assembly at Angora as reported in my telegram No. 644.

Grand Vizier, after recapitulating rôle of his Government during last two years and telegraphic correspondence which he had had with Mustapha Kemal Pasha, asked for my advice on following two points:—

1. Whether Constantinople Government should now resign, and
2. Whether Constantinople Government should send a delegation to Lausanne.

In reply to first question, I said I could not take on myself the responsibility of advising his Highness as to his action. His Majesty's Government did not interfere with internal affairs of other States.

As regards the second question, I explained reasons for which invitations to conference had been addressed both to Constantinople Government as Government of Sultan with which Allied Governments had been in relations since armistice and to Angora Government which was *de facto* Government of greater portion of Turkey. There, again, I could not advise Grand Vizier one way or the other, and I reminded him of procedure followed last year when delegation from Sultan's Government and Angora Government were present at conference in London. Grand Vizier said that he was under the impression that Angora Government would not take over Government at Constantinople whilst the latter was in Allied occupation. Supposing Constantinople Government resigned, would Allies be prepared to step into breach? I replied that resignation of Constantinople Government would produce a situation which I would have to discuss with my Allied colleagues. All I could tell him was that as long as inter-Allied occupation of Constantinople lasted, whatever Administration was set up here would have to work under the same conditions as those under which Constantinople Government had worked, *i.e.*, would in last resort be under the control of Allies. Grand Vizier begged me to consult my colleagues, and I am doing so this evening.

Grand Vizier then commented in scathing terms on wild proceedings of Grand National Assembly. It was not within the province of such an irregularly-constituted assembly to decree the abolition of Sultanate or to make changes in Caliphate. Caliphate was a question which was of profound interest to the whole Mussulman world.

Grand Vizier foresaw that proceedings at the conference would be most difficult. In their present frame of mind, Kemalists would ask for the impossible.

No. 410.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 653.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 4, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 568.

Following is summary of Dr. Nansen's note to Hamid Bey of 2nd November:—

"Dr. Nansen has been endeavouring for five [? weeks] to open direct negotiations with Angora Government. After he had offered to go to Brussa and Angora it was finally decided that he should negotiate in Constantinople with Hamid Bey, who was authorised to treat with him for exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. Negotiations were begun on 31st October, Hamid insisting on total compulsory exchange of populations, including that of Constantinople, as the only basis of discussion. Dr. Nansen protesting against this arbitrary ruling, Hamid replied that he was leaving immediately for Lausanne, and that consequently all discussion on any basis whatever was useless, and that he would be replaced in a few days.

"Dr. Nansen has received assurances from Kemal, Ismet and Recuf Pashas that Angora Government is in principle agreeable to an exchange of population, and he imagined in consequence that the latter were prepared to make an immediate treaty. He is most anxious to find a solution for a question of such importance. In view, however, of attitude adopted by Angora Government he asks that he may be informed before Sunday, 5th November, whether they are prepared—

"(*a.*) To agree to an immediate treaty on basis of a voluntary emigration.

"(*b.*) Whether they will appoint plenipotentiaries with powers to draw up such a treaty subject only to ratification.

"(*c.*) Whether they are prepared to include deported male refugees in populations to be exchanged.

"Dr. Nansen intimates that he will leave Constantinople unless he receives a reply by Sunday. Unless, however, Turkish reply is a definite refusal he will not break off discussion, but will endeavour to take up matter in some other way.

"He has also asked for a separate reply as to whether Angora Government are willing to negotiate for an immediate exchange of prisoners of war and civilian hostages."

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 411.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 654.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 4, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram, and Athens telegram No. 647.

My colleagues and I agree with Mr. Lindley's view.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 412.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 655.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No 652.

Grand Vizier, who saw French High Commissioner this afternoon, informed the latter that he had sent a telegram to Angora expressing his readiness to resign, and asking to whom Constantinople Government should hand over. A reply may not come for three or four days. Grand Vizier also stated that Sultan saw no reason for abdicating.

My colleagues and I are agreed that we have neither material means nor can we assume responsibility of administration of Constantinople.

Whilst it is unsafe to predict from day to day what is likely to happen in this place, it may be assumed with some certainty that Kemalists will put in their own administration and appoint a Governor or High Commissioner.

But they are certain to resist any form of inter-Allied control, in which case a serious and difficult situation will immediately arise.

My colleagues agreed that we must be guided by events.

No. 413.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 656.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 5, 1922.*

UNITED STATES High Commissioner states that Angora Government is insisting upon immediate removal of Christian children, together with Greek and Armenian employees, in Near East religious orphanages in Anatolia. Number of orphans is about 12,000.

United States High Commissioner has also received report from Samsoun that all Greeks and Armenians must leave within thirty days or be deported.

As these reports indicate intention of Nationalists to evacuate entire Christian population of Eastern Anatolia, United States High Commissioner has asked Allied High Commissioners to join in protest to Angora Government, requesting that evacuation be suspended and matter discussed at peace conference.

French High Commissioner's information is to effect that order for evacuation of Christian population in Black Sea coastal area has already been issued, males between 18 and 45 being deported to interior and remainder expelled.

My colleagues and I agreed to make proposed representation to Angora Government, though favourable result can scarcely be anticipated.

It is estimated that there are over 1,000,000 Christians in Eastern Anatolia. If to this figure be added that of about 500,000 persons from Constantinople who

may very possibly also sooner or later become refugees, problem of their transport, destination and maintenance, particularly at this season, becomes one of almost insoluble difficulty. [? Many] will be Armenians, and Greece is scarcely in a position to provide for refugees already transported there.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 240.)

No. 414.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 658.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 655.

In view of reports current since yesterday evening of resignation of Cabinet and assumption of authority by Refet Pasha, I sent Mr. Ryan this morning to ask the Grand Vizier for account of situation.

Grand Vizier said that question of resignation had been discussed at the Palace on 3rd November. Sultan had pointed out impossibility of constituting new Government. Cabinet nevertheless decided yesterday afternoon to resign. Sultan directed Ministers to carry on current business. Grand Vizier had officially communicated this order to Ministers, but in these circumstances Government could take no action regarding conference, and Ministers would not hold councils.

Grand Vizier said that Refet had taken no action at Porte. He had gone to prefecture of city and told prefecture that he must be re-elected by Municipal Council, and that relations with Ministry of Interior should cease. This was accepted, and prefecture was formally re-elected. Refet had told Acting Vali of Constantinople that he could carry on, but only as subordinate of Angora Government. Officials generally had been given the option of remaining or taking leave, and had been told that Angora Government would see to payment of salaries.

He said Sultan had authorised him to contradict all reports of his abdication, as he had no intention of deserting his post. Sultan had asked that I should go and see him to-morrow, Monday, afternoon. He was willing to receive my French colleague and my Italian colleague also, but had not so far decided to invite them.

I am accepting Sultan's invitation, and will inform my colleagues this evening.

Grand Vizier made no mention of telegram which French High Commissioner understood him to have sent to Angora.

Refet has stated to press that, as only authorised representative of Angora Government on the spot, he has on his own responsibility taken over administration of Constantinople as from midday on 4th November in order to ensure continuity in working of public services. According to this statement, he maintains staff of municipality and vilayet of Constantinople, but places all other officials *en disponibilité*, without prejudice to their salary rights.

No. 415.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 660.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 5, 1922.*

ANGORA representative here has communicated to three High Commissioners, under instructions from his Government, note of which following is summary:—

"As result of abolition of personal sovereignty and of spontaneous desire of the population of Constantinople to place itself under the orders of Grand National Assembly, the latter has given necessary instructions for maintenance of order and transaction of public business in Vilayet of Constantinople.

"Though Nationalist troops will not cross the frontiers laid down at Mudania, it is the duty of the Government of Grand National Assembly, now virtually established in Constantinople, to maintain order and to introduce therein, as in Eastern Thrace, its officials and detachments necessary for safety of the town.

"Grand National Assembly, in view of situation arising out of recent events, sincerely hope that the Powers will recognise uselessness or even impossibility of further maintenance of Allied troops in Constantinople zone."

Note concludes with observation that Turkish peace delegation has already started for Lausanne viâ Constantinople, and that Grand National Assembly trusts conference will lead to positive results.

In communicating note, Hamid Bey stated that Ismet Pasha was due to arrive here to-morrow.

My Allied colleagues were as indignant as myself at this communication. We have this evening addressed reply to Hamid Bey to the effect that we cannot admit standpoint adopted by Grand National Assembly, which is contrary to terms of Paris note of 23rd September and of Mudania Convention.

Allied armies will consequently continue to be responsible for maintenance of order in territories which they occupy in virtue of Mudros armistice of 1918, limits of which were fixed in last resort [*sic*] at Mudania.

Our reply also takes note of Nationalist declaration that Turkish troops will not cross the frontiers of these zones.

My colleagues are telegraphing in similar sense to their Governments.

No. 416.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 661.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 5, 1922.*

HAMID BEY to-day presented joint note to Allied High Commissioners describing naval regulations which were to be considered in force in Turkish ports by the Powers with whom armistice conditions exist. Following is summary thereof :—

1. Name, class, number of crew and similar details are to be notified before foreign ships of war enter Turkish ports.

2. Foreign ships of war must enter by daylight and not more than one can enter same harbour at a time.

3. Cruising by foreign men-of-war by night in territorial waters presents dangers and inconvenience.

4. Crews of foreign ships are only to be landed when senior Turkish officer ashore has given permission, provided number of men concerned does not exceed that authorised.

After consultation, Allied High Commissioners have replied by joint note that as conditions of Mudros armistice are still in force they are unable to agree to any such restrictions on Allied men-of-war, and they request Hamid Bey to notify Grand National Assembly accordingly.

No. 417.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 662.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 530, last paragraph.

As Nationalist authorities are showing unjustifiable disposition to accuse Allies of breaches of faith in respect of Mudania Agreement, Allied High Commissioners, with a view to carrying war into enemy's camp, have suggested to General Harington desirability of vigorous protest being addressed by Allied generals to Refet Pasha against Shakir Bey's manifesto as evident violation of text and spirit of article 7 and article 13 of that convention.

No. 418.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 663.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 6, 1922.*

TURKISH authorities arrested here yesterday afternoon Kemal Bey, former Minister of the Interior, and editor of an anti-Nationalist paper, " Peyam Sabah," which ceased to appear some time ago.

Allied High Commissioners agreed yesterday that no political persecutions could be tolerated as long as Allied occupation endures. This is the first, and therefore test, case, on which it is essential to take strong line. All High Commissioners were unanimous in this respect.

High Commissioners have accordingly requested generals to take whatever measures, even force, they considered necessary to procure his immediate release. In agreeing to force if necessary, French High Commissioner said that he was prepared to pledge his own responsibility.

No. 419.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 665.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 6, 1922.*

MY telegrams Nos. 660 and 661.

Allied High Commissioners sent for Hamid this morning, and told him quite plainly that, whilst their Governments had neither wish nor intention to interfere in any way with Turkish internal affairs, by which we specified change of régime at Constantinople, it must clearly be understood that so long as inter-Allied occupation of this town lasted Turkish administration must be subject to Allied surveillance. This was necessary for security of Allied forces of occupation.

We told Hamid that inter-Allied force of occupation was in last resort responsible for order, and that this consequently involved maintenance of certain measures, such as control of police, sanitary services, &c. We could not admit that there should be any change in this system. These declarations were very categorical and firm.

Hamid, who had in the meanwhile received our replies to two notes mentioned in my telegrams under reference, said that he would at once communicate our statement to him to Angora Foreign Minister, under whose instructions he had handed us notes in question yesterday.

I wish to emphasise fact that my colleagues are working in complete harmony. We take so grave a view of situation that we consider that a united and firm stand at present moment is only way of avoiding one of two alternatives, *i.e.*, an ignominious capitulation to all Turkish demands or a rupture with Turkey, which means war. We think that the two notes delivered to us yesterday were largely in nature of bluff, but measures taken to-day by Kemalist Administration, and which are described in my immediately following telegram, show an insolent defiance of Allied authorities here.

We are confident that Allied Governments will give us most complete support during this critical period, and will show that they are as united as their representatives on the spot.

My colleagues are telegraphing in a similar sense to their Governments.

No. 420.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 666.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 6, 1922.*

NATIONALIST authorities here have ordered application of specific customs tariff multiplied by five to fifteen times as at Angora in place of 11 per cent. In case of bread alone this will double price.

Director of Customs has been instructed no longer to pay 3 per cent. share of customs to Public Debt, to withhold payment to Debt of sum due at Customs for dues already collected, and to pay in future all customs duties to Angora financial representative here instead of to Ottoman Bank for account of Provisional Financial Commission. All Debt officials at Customs have been requested to withdraw. These measures are equivalent to abolition of Financial Commission, and first step in abolishing Public Debt also.

British Judicial Mixed Court has been notified by Turkish president that court is closed by order of Angora Government. Allied delegates of International Sanitary Commission of Control have similarly been notified that Angora Government have taken over that sanitary control.

Nationalist authorities have also given instructions that no passports are to be issued to Ottoman subjects without final visa of Turkish police. As director-general of latter is now under the orders of Angora Government this means that no Ottoman subjects will be allowed to leave Constantinople.

Other measures of this nature will doubtless follow. It is question of a trial of strength.

No. 421.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 657. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 656.

I feel it my duty to report that Dr. Nansen's intervention here regarding refugees has been far from happy. The Americans and other charitable organisations all consider him unpractical and anxious to obtain credit for work for which they supply money. He has no organisation or advisers who understand anything about refugees. Colonel Corfe, his representative here, is so dissatisfied that he is going to refuse to represent him any longer.

It is to be regretted that money granted by [? omitted: His Majesty's Government] for relief of refugees was given to League of Nations instead of to British Red Cross, who could have sent out properly-qualified unit. If any more is granted I trust this will be done.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 413.)

[E 12133/10102/44] No. 422.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(Nos. 384 and 385.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 281 and 282.

I concur in your Lordship's view that recognition by Egypt, either by adherence to or signature of Peace Treaty, of declaration of 28th February makes insistence on our part upon maintenance of articles Nos. 109 and 113 unnecessary. I do not anticipate any difficulty in securing such recognition in some form from Sarwat, but it is clear from series of conversations I have had with him during past week that there is little hope of inducing him to consent to omission of a specific article dealing with Suez Canal.

In regard to article No. 101, I find that Sarwat sets much store by mention of declaration of independence and assumption of monarchy by King of Egypt on 15th March. I do not think we should gain anything by resisting this, provided it is inserted in innocuous form. We arrived at following formula, to which I see no objection:—

"(*a.*) Turkey renounces all rights and title in and over Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect from 5th November, 1914. Turkey takes note of declaration of 28th February by which Great Britain terminated her protectorate and recognised independence of Egypt. Turkey recognises this independence and establishment of Egyptian monarchy proclaimed by King of Egypt on 15th March, 1922."

In regard to Suez Canal, he has suggested following formula, which he represents as being furthest point to which his Government could go to meet wishes of His Majesty's Government. The notion of merger (fusion) in this formula was suggested by me as preferable from our point of view to that of succession to Turkey's rights which Sarwat at first somewhat inconsistently proposed.

"(*b.*) As result of renunciation by Turkey of rights and title in and on Egypt and of recognition by her of Egyptian Government's independence, the rights and obligations falling to Turkey under convention of 29th October, 1888, relative to

neutrality of Suez Canal are and remain merged with rights and obligations falling to Egypt under same convention.

"If Egypt lacks means to secure observance of said convention Great Britain shall, in case of appeal by Egypt, take necessary measures to respond to this appeal."

In support of this, he argues that, in point of fact, rights conferred by article No. 10 must logically lapse with suzerainty, and that definite statement of this proposition, while desirable as a protection for him against Egyptian criticism for failure to procure cession of these rights to Egypt, is equally valuable as security in our common interest against a possible embarrassing offer by Kemalists.

I am disposed to concur in view that it is in our interest to procure declaration such as this to the effect that, while these rights have ceased to be possible subject of discussion by any third party, Egypt recognises Great Britain's special position as protecting canal. To this end, both above citations, or provisions to a similar effect, seem necessary.

In regard to article No. 118, I gather that Sarwat would consent to omission of any mention of Soudan in a special article, but he urged that words "and Soudan" should be inserted in article No. 101, between words "over Egypt" and "this renunciation," in his formula for that article.

Should your Lordship agree to these formulæ, I shall endeavour to have them embodied in an exchange of notes with some suitable references to articles concerned with tribute and nationality, which are still under discussion.

[E 12134/10102/44] No. 423.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 6, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

In the course of conversations from which these formulæ emerged Sarwat more than once spoke as if he took it for granted that Egyptian delegation would be admitted to deliberations of conference.

I reminded him, therefore, that His Majesty's Government had never been in a position to encourage this belief, and that it would probably not be until after arrival of delegation at seat of conference that question of its admission as participant would be decided by Allies. I added that while probably he could count on support of His Majesty's Government it was by no means sure that France and Italy would assent.

He replied that he had discussed this aspect of the question with his colleagues, and that they had decided that it would not be consonant with dignity of Egypt as an independent country to play any part in conference other than that of a participant, and that delegation would not therefore proceed to Lausanne until it was invited to do so in that capacity.

He pointed out that he had acted with complete correctness in asking for invitation through medium of His Majesty's Government and in doing his best to bring Egypt's programme into line with your Lordship's, and that he hoped your Lordship would not think that he had departed from this attitude if he addressed to His Majesty's Government, France and Italy a formal request to be admitted, as he now proposed to do, as a participant in discussion affecting Egyptian clauses.

Such a procedure on his part was, he said, essential in order to meet criticism to which he was exposed here to the effect that in confining himself to communicating with His Majesty's Government on this subject he is failing to vindicate Egypt's new liberties. I did not attempt to dissuade his Excellency from this course, which, in my judgment, will have double advantage of illustrating in a conspicuous manner the good faith of His Majesty's Government and of compelling French to show their hand. I do not conceive as matters now stand that His Majesty's Government has ground for serious disquietude whatever decision is given. I trust that my silence has your Lordship's approval.

I may add, for your Lordship's information, that I learn that fears are entertained, in quarters here favourable to Ministry, that Kemalists may seek to recognise non-official Nationalist delegation which has already left for Lausanne. Any recognition which Allies can properly give to official mission will tend to checkmate such an attempt.

No. 424.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 348.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 5, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 352.

I understood yesterday from Secretary-General that Maissa had already left for Angora. But President of the Council has at once agreed to stop him, and has telegraphed to Constantinople instructing him to remain there pending further orders. His Excellency assured me that no separate negotiations had been contemplated, but quite appreciated false impression which Maissa's mission might create.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 425.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 564.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 5, 1922.*

AS I entered M. Poincaré's room at the Quai d'Orsay this morning a lady left. M. Poincaré told me that she was a Mme. Gaules, a writer of repute and a Turcophil lady with diplomatic connections, who had just returned from a journey to Angora, Smyrna and Constantinople. She had had long conversations with Mustapha Kemal and was absolutely convinced that if the Turks did not obtain what they claimed at the Near Eastern Conference they would renew the war, and, moreover, that they counted with confidence on the assistance of the Bolsheviks, who would attack Roumania and Poland. She further told him that there was a pan-Turanian movement by which the Turks would obtain assistance from all the Powers of Central Asia as well as from Afghanistan. I at once interposed that I thought she was mistaken about Afghanistan, since, although there was a definite treaty between Turkey and Afghanistan, the Afghans were not likely to associate themselves with any movement in union with the Bolsheviks, and that our latest information was to the effect that the Afghans were determined to keep quiet and to pursue their own internal development.

M. Poincaré replied that that might be so, but that the Kemalists were under the impression that they might receive support from Afghanistan in the form of an attack upon the north-western frontier of India with the idea of crippling the military resources of Great Britain. He added that an attack of the Bolsheviks on Poland would immediately provoke an attack by Germany on German Poland, since M. Wirth had made it quite clear that if the Bolsheviks captured what was formerly Russian Poland the Germans would intervene to prevent the capture by them of what formerly was part of the German Empire. M. Poincaré added that he contemplated the Near Eastern Conference with the utmost apprehension, and that it was absolutely essential for His Majesty's Government and the French Government to preserve a united front on all questions that might arise, and he expected the difficulties to be very great owing to the demands and attitude of the Turks, which had become quite insupportable.

I impressed upon M. Poincaré that this renders it all the more necessary that there should be harmony between the two Governments on questions such as the Tangier port concession, which was not one of world-wide importance. I added that I would not fail to bring to your Lordship's knowledge all that he had told me.

No. 426.

Copy of Note received from M. Berzin, Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain.

M. BERZIN, Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain, presents his compliments to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, and begs to enclose a copy of a note received from his Government regarding the forthcoming conference on the question of the Near East :—

"*Le 2 novembre* 1922.

"Le Gouvernement russe a reçu la communication des Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, France et Italie du 27 octobre, avec invitation d'envoyer des délégués à la Conférence du Proche-Orient à Lausanne, afin d'y participer à l'examen de la question des Détroits. Il considère comme absolument inadmissible et injustifiable de fermer à la Russie l'accès de la conférence au moment de la solution de toutes les autres questions. Il constate, en premier lieu, que la composition de la conférence prévue par les Puissances est tout autre que celle des signataires du Traité de Sèvres, ce qui prouve que l'examen des affaires du Proche-Orient qui aura lieu à Lausanne ne peut aucunement être considéré comme une liquidation tardive de la participation ancienne à la grande guerre européenne, liquidation rendue en elle-même impossible après les brillantes victoires du peuple turc, mais que le but de la nouvelle conférence sera un arrangement général de toutes les affaires du Proche-Orient. Ces vues sur le véritable caractère de la Conférence de Lausanne sont aussi corroborées par le fait que quelques-uns de ces participants ont conclu avec la Turquie des accords séparés. Cette dernière circonstance ne permet, d'autre part, au Gouvernement russe de voir en cette conférence une réunion de belligérants actuels dont le but serait de mettre fin aux hostilités présentes. La majorité des Puissances invitées à Lausanne ne sont point de ce nombre.

"Attendu que l'objet de la Conférence de Lausanne est évidemment un arrangement général de toutes les affaires du Proche-Orient dans leur ensemble, le Gouvernement russe ne peut en aucun cas admettre que la Russie ne soit conviée à participer qu'à la discussion de la question des Détroits et non aux travaux de la conférence en son entier. Il trouve incompréhensible l'absence non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi de la Bulgarie, voisine de la Turquie, avec la présence simultanée non seulement de la Yougo-Slavie et de la Roumanie, mais aussi du Japon lointain. Ce choix artificiel des participants de la conférence apparaît aux yeux du Gouvernement russe comme une tentative des Puissances invitantes de régler arbitrairement les droits et la mesure de participation de chaque État à l'arrangement oriental. Les Puissances invitantes y admettent certains États et en écartent d'autres, ne s'appuyant sur aucune base légitime. Cette ligne de conduite des Puissances invitantes doit nécessairement apparaître comme l'expression d'une politique qui implique la violation par les États forts des droits légitimes des États faibles et la tentative de disposer arbitrairement de leur sort et de leurs intérêts. Cette ligne de conduite des Puissances invitantes peut inspirer la crainte sérieuse que l'intention de restaurer intégralement les droits du peuple turc et sa souveraineté sur son territoire et dans ses eaux leur est étrangère.

"La composition arbitraire de la Conférence de Lausanne et le refus opiniâtre des Puissances invitantes d'admettre la Russie à la conférence dans son ensemble y créent des conditions qui constituent un risque pour la possibilité d'une satisfaction complète des intérêts vitaux du peuple turc et de l'application du principe de ses droits souverains. A l'époque où toutes les Puissances de l'Entente étaient unies dans la lutte contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie et en dernier lieu contre son existence, même comme État indépendant, la Russie soviétiste seule entra dans la voie de l'amitié et de la fraternité avec le peuple turc, qui combattait en héros, et conclut avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale un traité qui établit définitivement les relations amicales entre eux. La décision d'écarter justement la Russie du nombre des participants du traité général avec la Turquie démontre que les Puissances de l'Entente ont résolu de frustrer à la table de la conférence le peuple turc du fruit de ses victoires et de ses efforts héroïques.

"La Russie soviétiste, qui est l'ami de tous les peuples opprimés et qui proclame le droit de toutes les nations de disposer de leur sort, a établi au cours de son existence des liens d'amitié avec les peuples orientaux qui ont amené à la création d'un ordre de choses stable en Orient et elle considère de son devoir de continuer à la Conférence de Lausanne l'application de ces mêmes principes. Le Gouvernement russe est non seulement étranger à toute intention de ressusciter les méthodes du ci-devant Gouvernement tsariste et des autres Gouvernements qui voulaient tenir la Turquie en tutelle, mais, tout au contraire, il croit devoir être présent à la conférence avec le but spécial de s'efforcer d'obtenir la réalisation de la plénitude des droits souverains du peuple turc, condition nécessaire d'un ordre des choses stable dans le Proche-Orient, ce qui constitue un but auquel la Russie est directement intéressée.

"La réalisation de ce principe dans le domaine militaire et naval est aussi une garantie nécessaire de la paix dans la mer Noire et de la sécurité des côtes de la Russie, Ukraine et Géorgie. Tout au contraire, la ligne de conduite des Puissances

invitantes représente une expression de leur tendance de placer les peuples orientaux en une situation d'infériorité. Leur refus d'inviter la Russie à participer à la conférence en dehors de la discussion sur les Détroits constitue pareillement un essai de violation des droits et des intérêts de la République russe dans le domaine de la politique et une tentative de porter dommage à sa situation internationale. Le Gouvernement russe est de l'avis, ainsi qu'il l'a indiqué dans sa communication du 18 octobre, qu'une tentative de résoudre la question des Détroits en dehors de toutes les autres questions pendantes dans le Proche-Orient ne produirait point les résultats attendus et ne mènerait aucunement à une solution pratique et durable de la question des Détroits ainsi que satisfaisante pour tous les participants. Selon lui, l'établissement d'un certain régime dans les Détroits est inséparable de l'ordre des choses général qui sera créé dans le Proche-Orient. Il lui apparaît clairement que telle ou telle solution de toute question inscrite à l'ordre du jour de la conférence ne peut éviter d'avoir une répercussion directe sur la situation dans les Détroits.

"Le Gouvernement russe considère comme indubitable que, si les Puissances de l'Entente avaient réellement en vue l'établissement véritable d'une paix durable, elles ne tenteraient point de laisser la Russie en dehors des accords internationaux au moment de la solution des problèmes du Proche-Orient. Ayant pour but les intérêts de la paix générale et la réalisation du droit de tous les peuples de disposer de leur sort et accomplissant son devoir de veiller sur les droits légitimes, la dignité et les intérêts vitaux de la République soviétiste, le Gouvernement russe se voit obligé d'insister catégoriquement sur sa participation pleine et entière ainsi que celle de l'Ukraine et de la Géorgie à la Conférence du Proche-Orient tout entière, sans aucune restriction, avec les mêmes droits que les autres participants.

"Le Gouvernement russe prie les Puissances invitantes de la Conférence de Lausanne de lui communiquer leur réponse au plus vite, afin que la délégation russe puisse arriver à la conférence à son début.

"CHICHERIN."

London, November 6, 1922.

No. 427.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 409.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 6, 1922.

THERE appear to be great and almost insuperable difficulties in the way of Lausanne Conference meeting as proposed on 13th November.

Although the situation at Constantinople has become clearer owing to disappearance of separate Government there, position must remain anxious and critical until questions of instalment of Angora civil administration in four zones of Allied occupation and of precise relation of new administration to the Allied military and civil authorities, especially as regards ultimate control over police and gendarmerie, have been satisfactorily decided. For the moment it is not clear if Angora are going to observe the Mudania Convention, and it seems essential that Peace Conference should not assemble until this and above-mentioned points are settled.

Secondly, I learn from Rome that Signor Mussolini, on his part, would welcome a postponement.

Thirdly, we are placed in some difficulty ourselves owing to the fact that the general elections are fixed for 15th November, and the opening of Parliament by the King for 23rd November. If the present Government are returned to power, I shall have to speak in the debate on the address on 23rd November, and if I am to represent His Majesty's Government at Lausanne, as seems inevitable, I can hardly leave England until the end of the month.

Fourthly, I have received with satisfaction the clear expression of the views of both M. Poincaré and Signor Mussolini, which I heartily reciprocate, as to the necessity of a united Allied front at Lausanne. But if this is to be secured, some preliminary exchange of views in writing, if not personally, seems essential, and 13th November would give us no time for this.

Lastly, in the face of these elements of uncertainty, it is impossible to make definite arrangements for hotel accommodation at Lausanne. Indeed, we have not yet heard from the Swiss Government as to the building in which the meetings of the conference are to be held, and this decision must, to some extent, affect the choice of hotel accommodation.

I shall be glad if you will explain these difficulties to M. Poincaré at once, and ask him to agree to a joint notification by the three Governments to all the Governments who received the original invitation, requesting them to accept a postponement of the date of meeting at Lausanne until the end of the month, say, 27th November.

You should add that I am meanwhile instructing His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople to warn Hamid Bey of this representation in order that Ismet Pasha, who is understood to be leaving for Lausanne to-morrow, may be informed of the possibility of postponement.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 539.)

No. 428.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 545.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 6, 1922.

ARCHBISHOP of Canterbury and others fear that Patriarch Meletios will meet violent death at hands of returning Turks, as did Archbishop of Smyrna, and that this may produce far-reaching consequences. Do you consider that he should be urged to leave?

[E 12159/10524/44] No. 429.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 605.)
My Lord, *Athens, October* 26, 1922.

WITH reference to previous despatches and telegrams on the subject of refugees in Greece, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the following documents,* which may be of interest both to your Lordship and to the "Save the Children Fund":—

1. A full report by Lieutenant-Colonel Jarvis, of the Imperial War Graves Commission at Salonica, addressed to Dr. Nansen's representative in Athens, on the work of the local Anglo-American Committee at Salonica.
2. A despatch from the acting British consul-general at Salonica on the same subject.
3. An appeal sent to England by the local British Committee at Patras.

The situation described at Salonica by Colonel Jarvis is practically identical with that which exists at Piræus and, I gather, also in other parts of Greece. There are greater numbers at Salonica, and presumably there will be more malaria there, but, thanks to the sheds built by the British during the war, the refugees are better sheltered there than here, so Dr. Nansen's representative said after recently visiting both places. According to the Minister of Relief, however, there are at present about 150,000 refugees in Greece without a roof over their heads (100,000 of them are in New Greece and 50,000 in Old Greece). Certainly in Piræus great numbers may be seen lying about the pavement, in the public squares and along the quays, with such of their children and clothing as they may have succeeded in rescuing. Others may be seen huddled together in unused railway trucks, inside and outside railway stations and under every sort of thing which may be called a shelter. The Minister of Relief is fully aware of all this, the passage leading to his own office in Athens being blocked thick with refugees, who appear to have made their home there. Theatres, factories, private houses, &c., are being requisitioned everywhere. The weather has, on the whole, remained warm and generally fine, so that the most urgent need has been food, as the refugees arrive in a starving condition. The great problem now confronting the Minister is to rescue as many refugees as possible, with their cereals and other possessions, from Eastern Thrace before the departure of the British troops.

Colonel Jarvis speaks of the lack of medicines, shortage of water and bread. This is not confined to Salonica, as your Lordship will already have realised from my telegraphic appeals for assistance. Fortunately the sea is close to the British camp at Phalerum, and little boys are bribed with biscuits and running races to take a dip.

* Not printed.

This pastime is, I am told, becoming popular. The absence of able-bodied men, too, is a very serious problem, and will render it difficult to plant the refugees on the land in the future.

Childbirth and death are almost of daily occurrence in the British camp at Phalerum, but medical men have wondered that, so far, at Piræus (and Phalerum), as at Salonica, no general epidemic has been signalled as yet. One solitary case of smallpox was recently discovered in the British camp here, and there was, I was told, one case of plague at Piræus several weeks ago. As soon as the rains begin, however, pneumonia and typhoid, to say the least, would seem to be inevitable, unless housing accommodation with sanitary arrangements and clothing can be provided in time, which seems hardly possible.

I can only end by endorsing what Colonel Jarvis says about immediate relief. Whilst Dr. Nansen and the Americans are organising (and the latter are going to help on a magnificent scale), thousands would doubtless have starved had not British volunteers at Athens, Salonica, Volo, Patras and Canea, and others, stepped into the breach at once, unorganised, to save what could be saved.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 12141/10524/44] No. 430.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 938.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora, respecting Greek atrocities.

Constantinople, October 27, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 430.

Yussuf Kemal Pasha to Sir H. Rumbold.

Angora, le 21 octobre 1922.

LE Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie reçoit de toutes parts des informations concordantes d'après lesquelles les populations musulmanes de la Grèce, de la Macédoine, de la Crète et des îles de la mer Égée sont en butte à des agressions de toute sorte, que des massacres sont organisées contre elles et qu'on les chasse en masse de leurs demeures.

Je tiens à attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur le fait que ces actes se passent dans des régions éloignées du théâtre des récentes opérations et n'ayant aucune relation avec la guerre. En outre, malgré toutes les promesses faites et les assurances données par les représentants des Puissances à Constantinople, les atrocités grecques continuent sans répit en Thrace, et les civils, y compris les femmes et les enfants, d'Asie Mineure transférés en Grèce ne sont toujours pas rendus.

L'officier turc qui, sur l'invitation expresse du Général Harington, commandant en chef des troupes interalliées, et suivant un itinéraire fixé par lui, a survolé en aéroplane la région voisine de la voie ferrée entre San Stefano et Lulé Bourgas, a constaté que le village de Sulmanli et la ferme de Beyatli, près de Tchorlou, étaient en train de brûler. Il a vu de grandes quantités de récoltes incendiées et de nombreux troupeaux de bœufs et de moutons que l'on poussait vers l'ouest.

Sur 148 Turcs arrêtés dernièrement à Kéchan pour être transférés en Grèce, 100 ont été assassinés en route au village Kouridji, à deux heures de Kéchan. Les villages de Adil Han, Mursilly, Oulaman, Boulgeur, Chanli Kavak, Teké Ogli, Zerdi, Kidjik, Karabissar, Docar, Tchakmé Turkman, Boz-Tépé, Akdjé Islam ont, entre autres, subi, ces derniers jours, les attaques des bandes grecques et ont été pillés et dévastés; ceux de leurs habitants qui n'ont pas réussi à s'enfuir ont été mis à la torture.

Le soussigné croit être en droit de se plaindre avec juste raison de l'indifférence témoignée par les grandes Puissances pour toutes les souffrances endurées par les populations musulmanes, indifférence qui contraste singulièrement avec l'intérêt marqué qu'elles portent pour tout ce qui touche aux chrétiens d'Orient. Cependant, les

musulmans sur le sort desquels nous venons d'attirer plus haut l'attention de votre Excellence sont complètement innocents et se trouvent être tout simplement les victimes de la fureur que la défaite a mise dans le cœur des Grecs. Une partie de ces musulmans, notamment ceux de la Thrace et ceux qui se trouvent déportés en Grèce, ont même droit, d'après les engagements des grandes Puissances, à leur protection effective. Par contre, les chrétiens en faveur desquels s'exerce d'une façon inlassable la constante sollicitude des Alliés sont presque toujours, comme ce fut dernièrement le cas pour les sujets turcs ayant porté les armes contre leur propre pays, de simple criminels que les lois de tous les pays punissent avec la dernière rigueur.

Le soussigné proteste, au nom de son Gouvernement, de la façon la plus formelle contre tous ces faits, et déclare que la ligne de conduite si évidemment partiale adoptée envers les différents peuples orientaux unit énormément à l'œuvre de pacification que l'on proclame vouloir poursuivre en Orient.

Le soussigné se croit, en outre, en droit de prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir demander à votre Gouvernement d'intervenir énergiquement afin d'obliger le Gouvernement hellénique à arrêter les atrocités commises en Grèce et dans les îles, ainsi qu'à relâcher les civils turcs emmenés d'Asie Mineure.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement
de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie,
YOUSSOUF KEMAL.

[E 12144/10524/44] No. 431.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 943.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 30, 1922.*

IN the last paragraph of my telegram No. 621 of the 26th October relative to the future prospects of Christians remaining in Eastern Thrace, I mentioned the outcry caused in Angora by the Allies' intervention in favour of Ottoman Greeks who had served in the Greek army in Anatolia.

2. I forwarded in my despatch No. 894 of the 16th October a copy of the High Commissioners' telegram to the Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs on the latter subject. Your Lordship will have observed the moderation of its language and the almost excessive regard shown in it for Turkish susceptibilities.

3. This did not prevent the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" from publishing a leading article, in which the Allies are accused of gratuitous intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. I enclose a summary of this article as telegraphed from Angora.

4. The matter was also raised in the Grand National Assembly on the 18th October. Yussuf Kemal Bey was first questioned as to whether there was any ground for the suggestion made in Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Manchester that Turkey had agreed to the Mudania Convention under pressure. He replied that this was not the case, and that, in agreeing to the Mudania Convention, Turkey had been animated simply and solely by love of peace. He was then asked what reply could be returned to the Allied note regarding those who had committed treason by taking sides with the enemy in occupied territory. In his reply he asked for discretion as to the nature of the answer to be returned to the Allied note, but before doing so he affirmed that Turkey was entirely independent, as independent as France, Great Britain or the United States of America, and that no Government had shown itself more humane than that of the Grand National Assembly. He intimated that what he asked for was discretion to return an answer consonant with these principles.

5. As a matter of fact Yussuf Kemal Bey has not deigned to reply to the High Commissioners' telegram at all. He has contented himself with an incidental allusion to it in the note enclosed in my despatch No. 938 of the 27th October, where he says that "les chrétiens en faveur desquels s'exerce d'une façon inlassable la constante sollicitude des Alliés sont presque toujours, comme ce fut dernièrement le cas pour les sujets turcs ayant porté les armes contre leur propre pays, de simples criminels que les lois de tous les pays punissent avec la dernière rigueur."

6. My object in dwelling on this subject is to show how intolerable will be the lot of large numbers of native Christians in this country under a purely Kemalist régime unless something can be done at the Peace Conference to secure a general amnesty, and unless some permanent safeguards of real value can be provided for the minorities. Both questions bristle with difficulties. Any demand for an amnesty will be contested on the ground that it is a violation of Turkey's sovereign rights. The difficulties in the

way of now providing safeguards for minorities are too obvious to need restatement, but I may perhaps once more draw attention to the fact that, if conscription is allowed, it will inevitably be used in the case of Christians as a means of persecution.

7. An amnesty is no less necessary for a large section of the Moslem population than for the Christians. Apart from Circassians and Kurds, there are a great many Turks who have made no secret of their hostility to the Kemalists, and who have leant to the side of the Allies, more especially Great Britain. All of these Turks are apprehensive of vengeance in one form or another. Their leaders will probably have no alternative but to leave the country, for even an amnesty would not afford them real protection. The majority, however, have neither the means to get away nor to maintain themselves abroad, and an amnesty would be of some real value to them.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 431.

Summary of Article in the "Hakimiet-Millié."

THE "Hakimiet-Millié," in its leading article on the Allies' note asking for the clemency of our Government towards the traitors who committed such outrages against the Moslem population and bore arms against our forces, says: "In spite of the fine and delicate language of the note and in spite of the passage saying that these steps are being taken solely in the name of humanity, this collective note is really an intervention in our interior affairs and constitutes a clear proof that the diplomats of Europe have in no way modified their considerations or their attitude towards us, and this happens on the first day that we reopen relations with the European Powers.

"The object of the fight which we maintained for nearly four years was to assure the independence of this country and nation both materially and morally in its interior affairs, and it is astonishing that the statesmen of Europe have not been able to understand this point, which is the principle on which our National Pact is founded."

The "Hakimiet-Millié" notes Lloyd George's severe criticisms on the statements of an American Senator about Ireland, the measures taken by Lloyd George since the Great War against the insurgents in Ireland, and also the fatal issue of the French partisans for the conclusion of peace with Germany, and asks if these Governments would permit foreign intervention on this subject.

After insisting on the necessity of the Powers leaving us free in our interior affairs, the "Hakimiet-Millié" says: "As to the sentiments of humanity and clemency, the best thing that the Powers could do would be, cease to protect any race within our territories, as it is shown by publications on the Pontus question that the differences existing between races within our territories and of different religions are only the results of the Great Powers' intervention into our interior affairs and the pretended protection which they have extended to certain races. Up till the time of this intervention and protection all these races lived peacefully, thanks to Turkish justice and clemency; these races know better than others what Turkish justice and clemency is and they have no need to be reminded.

"We think that the Government of the Grand National Assembly should consider this note as null and void, and the only reply which the nation can make is to return it unread to the writers."

The "Hakimiet-Millié" hopes that the Government will act in accordance with law and justice, saying that clemency towards those who attacked the nation from the rear or in co-operating with the enemy have plotted against the lives and possessions of the Turks would be an offence against the Turkish nation.

[E 12145/120/44] No. 432.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 947.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October 31, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 623 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter from Hamid Bey to the Vali of Smyrna relative to the restoration of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway to the company. The original given in an open letter to General de Candolle for presentation to the vali.

2. General de Candolle had already received from the directors of the company in London an intimation that he was to return to London, and that he would be replaced locally by Major Money Shewan, as stated in your Lordship's telegram to me of the 25th October. He nevertheless considered it advisable, in view of the decision of the Angora Government, to proceed to Smyrna, pending Major Money Shewan's arrival, in order to take delivery of the railway. I agreed, so far as I was concerned, that this was desirable, in order that no time should be lost in taking advantage of the more favourable disposition displayed by the Angora Government, and also because General de Candolle, who had, under my auspices, been in direct communication with Hamid Bey, is personally mentioned in the latter's letter to the vali.

3. General de Candolle left for Smyrna on the 28th October.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 432.

Hamid Bey to the Vali of Smyrna.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Constantinople, October 26, 1922.*

IN a telegram sent by the Commissariat of Public Works, under date of the 21st October, 1922, it is stated that, as the chief officials of the Aidin Railway Company withdrew at the time of the reoccupation of Smyrna, the Commissariat, in the sincere desire to assure the protection of the fixed material and rolling-stock of the above-mentioned railway, which remained ownerless, and of its industrial establishments, as well as to protect the rights and the interests of the company, gave orders to the direction of the Aidin Railway, the central office of which is at Eguerdir, to extend its administration as far as Smyrna; that the provisional action taken by the Commissariat, which is ever respectful of the rights and concessions of the company, in order to assure the rights of the company, was not in the nature of occupation; and that it is desirable that the company should take possession of the line as soon as possible; that it is, however, absolutely inadmissible that Greeks and Armenians, whose crimes both before and during the military operations have been proved, should be employed on the railway, and that it is necessary that Turkish officials must be exclusively employed on the line; but that, nevertheless, it is proper that use should be made of foreign specialists. As Major-General R. de Candolle, director-general of the above-mentioned railways, who is well known in the vilayet of Smyrna, is now about to proceed to Smyrna in order to assure and apply the above-mentioned points, it is requested that your Excellency will be good enough to allow the necessary facilities to be afforded to him by the vilayet authorities.

HAMID.

[E 12149/10524/44] No. 433.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 953.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from Dr. Nansen dated the 28th October, 1922, respecting the League of Nations' enquiry into Turkish and Greek atrocities.

Constantinople, October 31, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 433.

Dr. Nansen to Sir H. Rumbold.

My dear Sir Horace, *Constantinople, October 28, 1922.*

I WRITE to thank you for your letter of the 25th October concerning the proposals made by Mr. Lindley and Colonel Corfe, and also for the communication from the Moslems of Crete which you forwarded to me yesterday.

With regard to Mr. Lindley's suggestion that the Greek and Turkish Governments should be asked by the League of Nations to allow it to make enquiries into atrocities alleged by the Greeks and the Turks respectively I must confess that I feel somewhat reluctant to act in the way which he proposes. I always feel extremely doubtful as to the utility of enquiries into atrocities, and on this particular occasion I think that any such suggestion made by me would only endanger the whole of the negotiations which I have in hand. As you know, the Turks are extremely sensitive on this point, perhaps with good reason.

2. I am equally doubtful whether it would be wise for the League of Nations to endeavour to do anything of this sort through another channel than myself. I am sure it would only produce the same result.

3. With regard to Colonel Corfe's proposal that I should tell the Turkish Government that the Greeks have agreed to receive a representative of the Red Crescent accompanied by a representative of the League, to enquire into the treatment of Turkish prisoners in Greece, I am again not clear that I could usefully act in this way at the present moment. As a matter of fact I have a written statement from the Dutch Minister in Athens which I can hand to the Turkish Government and which will assure them that their prisoners are really being well treated.

Moreover, I do not think it would be wise to suggest an enquiry to the Turks when my real purpose is to endeavour to secure an immediate exchange of prisoners. It may prove, however, very useful in the course of my negotiations to be able to tell the Turks that the Greek Government has agreed to Colonel Corfe's proposal, and I am most grateful to you for having been good enough to transmit it to me.

Believe me, &c.

F. NANSEN,

High Commissioner for the League of Nations for Refugees.

[E 12152/27/44] No. 434.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 957.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 31, 1922.

BOTH my Allied colleagues spoke to me last night in terms of evident anxiety with regard to the present attitude of the Kemalist Government towards foreigners and foreign enterprise generally. They had both received information from a Frenchman and an Italian, who had just come from Smyrna, of the intolerable régime at present in force there. The old Turkish officials had been ejected by young Kemalists from Angora who were imbued with chauvinistic feelings. Customs duties had been enormously increased and the importation of articles of luxury absolutely forbidden. Further than this, although firms which had imported articles of luxury were not allowed to clear these from the customs, they were equally prohibited from re-exporting them. Measures had been threatened against the foreign banks, and foreign subjects were liable at any hour of the night and day to domiciliary visits by the Nationalist police. It was a fact that the officers and men of the Kemalist force at Smyrna had taken part in the pillage of that town. In these circumstances trade was impossible, and the French High Commissioner had even been advised that it would be useless for French subjects to remain there.

2. The French High Commissioner also informed me that he had received reports from Colonel Mougin, the French agent at Angora, to the effect that the extremists in the National Assembly appeared to have the upper hand for the moment. General Pellé had also heard that at Zungouldak, and probably elsewhere on the littoral of the Black Sea, the Kemalists were applying the measures which they had applied in Ionia, namely, that they were retaining men between 18 and 45 and giving the women, children and old men the choice between expulsion and deportation. These unfortunate persons preferred expulsion, and it was to be foreseen that a fresh mass of refugees might be expected from the regions in question.

3. The French High Commissioner said that, as a result of this state of things and of the general attitude of the Kemalists, he meant again to urge on M. Poincaré the absolute necessity of preliminary conversations between the three Allied Governments,

so as to enable the latter to decide, before the conference, to what extent they were prepared to accept the probable Kemalist demands, and at what point they would make a stand. He told me that he had already suggested this course at least twice to M. Poincaré, but that the latter, under the influence of the irritation produced on him by Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Manchester, had rejected the idea. General Pellé added very frankly that M. Poincaré was not always an easy man to deal with, and that the tone of his correspondence was often disagreeable. I told General Pellé that, in my opinion, absolute solidarity between the Allies was the only chance there was of resisting Kemalist pretensions at the forthcoming conference.

4. Admiral Dumesnil, who spent a considerable time at Smyrna both before and after the destruction of that place by fire, has also in conversation with me dwelt on the intractability and arrogance of the Kemalists. He expressed the view that Mustapha Kemal would endeavour to hold fresh elections for a National Assembly at as early a date as possible. As at present constituted the National Assembly was not sufficiently under his influence. In the course of a recent tour Mustapha Kemal had openly said to a gathering of notables that the people must not send any more hodjas to the Assembly. These men had been the curse of Turkey in the past, and if any more were elected he would throw them into the sea.

5. Meanwhile, Refet Pasha has continued to make speeches and to indulge in all manner of activities at Constantinople. His speeches have produced a bad impression on the Constantinople Turks, and it may be said with truth that he has outstayed his welcome. In one of his earlier speeches Refet Pasha spoke slightingly of Western republics, which, he implied, no longer corresponded to present-day conditions. He claimed that the Nationalist Government had discovered a far more up-to-date system of government, in that sovereignty was vested directly in the Grand National Assembly. He seems, however, to have forgotten the covention at the time of the French revolution. His allusions to the abolition of the Sultanate but to the maintenance of a Caliph, who would have no power of any sort, has puzzled even if it has not shocked moderate opinion here. Refet Pasha seems to have had in mind some such system as prevailed in Japan before the Restoration, i.e., an Emperor who was a mere figure-head, with a shogun, in this case possibly Mustapha Kemal, exercising sovereign powers.

6. It is probable that, with the knowledge of what has happened at Smyrna, the official classes of Constantinople are not looking forward with any enthusiasm to the installation of the Kemalist régime here. It may mean the dismissal of many of them in favour of office-seekers from Angora. The extreme doctrines proclaimed by Refet Pasha must also be a shock to the more conservative Turk. A few days ago one of the associations arranged a procession of Refet Pasha's escort through the town. This procession consisted of thirty-two motor-cars with three of Refet Pasha's men in each, but as far as I could see it evoked no enthusiasm whatever. In speaking to me of the first detachments of gendarmerie which have gone into Thrace, the Italian High Commissioner informed me yesterday that he had reliable information to the effect that the men were carefully-selected officers and non-commissioned officers, but that they were *des fripons*.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 12154/10524/44] No. 435.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 959.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, British forces in Turkey, to the President, Inter-Allied Commission, Rodosto, dated the 26th October, 1922, respecting the retention by Greeks in Thrace of archives and money.

Constantinople, October 31, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 435.

General Headquarters, the British Forces in Turkey, to the President, Inter-Allied Commission, Rodosto.

Constantinople, October 26, 1922.

WITH reference to your letters of the 23rd and 24th October, the points raised were considered by the Allied commanders on the 26th October, and it was decided that—

(*a.*) No action should be taken to prevent the removal by the Greeks of Greek archives. The originals of all Greek archives relating to the ownership of property, &c., should be taken away and copies left if possible.

(*b.*) The Governor-General of Thrace is justified practically in not handing over the money received from taxes, &c., since it is certain that the value of the property which the Christian refugees abandon will be greater than any sum of money the Greek Administration will be able to remove.

(*c.*) No special instructions regarding the change in currency will be required.

2. You should arrange that as far as possible inventories are made of all abandoned property in your area. Property, such as houses, stores, &c., should be sealed. These inventories should be made out in triplicate, one copy being handed to the Greek Civil Administration on departure, another to the Turkish Civil Administration on taking over, and the third retained by your mission. Similar action is being taken in the French and Italian areas.

(For Major-General, General Staff),
W. H. GRIBBON,
Colonel on the Staff.

[E 12155/27/44] No. 436.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 960.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 31, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 631 of the 28th October relative to the election of Ismet Pasha to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora, I have the honour to state that it is now definitely announced that Ismet Pasha will preside over the Angora delegation at the Peace Conference. Various reports are current as to the other members of the delegation, but up to yesterday Hamid Bey professed to have no definite information on the subject. He said he had himself begged to be excused from attending the conference. The names of Riza Nour Bey and Fethi Bey are mentioned for the post of second plenipotentiary. Private telegrams from Angora state categorically that Riza Nour Bey has already been appointed. He is a doctor by profession, but has been for many years an active politician. He has for some time been a member of the Angora Government. He was sent some months ago to Kharkoff to exchange the ratifications of the Angora-Ukraine Treaty, and went on to Moscow on a special mission. His political past since 1908 has been varied. Izzet Pasha calls him a weathercock.

2. Mustapha Kemal and Ismet Pashas left Broussa for Angora on the 28th October. The "Terdjuman-i-Hakikat" publishes a short interview with Mustapha Kemal just before he left. He confirmed the fact that Ismet Pasha would be principal delegate at the Peace Conference, and said that there would be no other soldier on the delegation. Asked whether he himself might be expected in Constantinople, he said, "Certainly." To a further question as to the date, he replied that, anyhow, it would be very shortly.

3. The "Aksham," a very strong, and sometimes well informed Nationalist paper, published on the 28th October a summary of certain of the Angora peace proposals. I enclose a translation. It will be observed that the writer adheres closely to the National Pact, that specific mention is made of the recovery of Mosul, and that, while it is stated that Turkey must have military and naval forces sufficient to secure her against attack, the gloss "without limitation" is expressly inserted.

4. The Constantinople Government appear to be very anxious to arrange a composition with Angora preparatory to the Peace Conference. They do not wish to be

eliminated altogether, but they are clearly prepared to go very far in the direction of leaving the effective representation of Turkey to the Angora Government, subject to some safeguards for their own technical position and that of the Sultan. Much attention has been attracted by the fact that Refet Pasha visited the Sultan on the 29th October. He had already had two or three conversations with Izzet Pasha and at least one with the Grand Vizier. It is, however, significant of his attitude and that of Angora that he did not apply for the audience through these statesmen. I believe he approached His Majesty through the prefect of the city. I have no information as to what passed, but the Sultan sent for the Grand Vizier immediately afterwards, and on the following day (30th October) the Grand Vizier addressed to Mustapha Kemal a telegram, a translation of which I enclose.*

5. It is, in my opinion, eminently desirable that some arrangement should be made by which the Sultan and the Constantinople Government should now yield to the logic of facts and recognise the claim of the Grand National Assembly to represent Turkey effectively, without formally abdicating. I fear that great difficulty may be encountered, but Refet Pasha's visit to the Sultan is perhaps a hopeful sign.

6. I see no reason to alter the forecast given in my despatch No. 903 of the 17th instant of the probable attitude of the Angora delegates at the Peace Conference. I am reporting in a separate despatch the views of my French and Italian colleagues, from which your Lordship will see that the French High Commissioner more particularly takes a gloomy view. At the same time, there are some signs that Angora is anxious to create a more favourable atmosphere and to avoid giving offence beforehand to His Majesty's Government. The promise to return the Smyrna-Aidin railway to the concessionary company, which took me by surprise, is an indication of this kind. I attribute this slight relaxation not to any intention of weakening at the conference, but to a realisation that, in spite of their recent successes, the Angora Government have many dangers to face. They are mistrustful of, and mistrusted by, the Bolshevika. They are apprehensive of a combination of the Balkan countries to resist possible Turkish expansion in Europe. They are indisposed by the Bulgarian Premier's reiterated pronouncements in favour of autonomy for a portion of Thrace. They cannot fail to see signs of a revulsion in French feeling, and they probably apprehend that this revulsion, combined with the resignation of Mr. Lloyd George, may bring the Allies to the conference with a more united front than has existed for some time.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 436.

Extract from the "Aksham" of October 28, 1922.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to information which we have received, views are already being formulated regarding certain things which will be asked for by our delegation at the Peace Conference. Of these, the points which have been settled are these:—

Territorial Question.—As regards territory, the whole of territories included in the National Pact will be demanded, namely, Eastern Thrace with the 1914 frontiers, a frontier including Mosul and a plebiscite for Western Thrace.

Military Question.—Turkey must possess an army and fleet without limitation, on a scale sufficient to protect her from all attack.

Internal Questions.—Exactly the same treatment will be applied to the minorities remaining in our country as that to which other Powers are bound.

Gendarmerie.—If necessary, some foreign officers will be employed to reorganise our gendarmerie.

Financial Questions.—The Powers will make the necessary concessions in financial questions. It is expected that there will be difficulties in solving certain points of detail under this heading.

Judicial Question.—It is expected that the most important differences with the Powers will arise in connection with the Judicial Capitulations.

As, however, these differences are already known, the replies to be given are being prepared.

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* Not printed.

[E 12182/9024/44] No. 437.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 1009.)

My Lord, *Rome, November 2, 1922.*

A FEW days ago the "Morning Post" correspondent here introduced to me the Rev. Charles Dobson, a young clergyman from New Zealand, who has been, until recent events, sub-chaplain of the English church at Smyrna, in order that he should give me an account of his late experiences in that town. I was impressed by Mr. Dobson's moderation and evident good faith. He carried a testimonial signed by 100 British subjects in Smyrna extolling the great services which he had rendered to them at the risk of his own life. The account he gave me was full and interesting, and appeared to me to throw further light on the Smyrna tragedy. He consented, at my request, to dictate a report on the subject, which I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure in No 437.

Report by the Rev. Charles Dobson on Smyrna.

IT has been questioned in some quarters whether the Turks were responsible for the fire in Smyrna. During my stay at the lazzaretto in Malta we were visited by the Bishop of Gibraltar, who desired to have a complete account of all that had happened in Smyrna. With five prominent citizens of Smyrna I met him at the Lieutenant-Governor's house. We discussed the matter dispassionately and with full information, and the conclusions that we came to, and which we believe were shared by the whole of the British community, are that there is no question but that the Turks were responsible for the outbreak of fire. I personally believe this, because I had seen for the previous three days the gradual weakening of the discipline of the Nationalist troops. Also, as was pointed out during our interview with the bishop, it is a most significant fact that until within two hours before the outbreak of fire, the wind was in such a quarter that any fire would have endangered the Turkish portion of the city.

It has also been questioned whether the massacres were of such a nature and extent as has been commonly reported One deprecates the careless use of large numbers, such as 120,000, which have appeared in some newspapers, but from personal experience and from the reports of reliable eye-witnesses, whose testimony can be taken at Malta, the massacres were on a scale unprecedented in modern history. I only saw two men actually killed, but saw many bodies and know of people whose relatives were killed before their eyes. The entry of the Kemalist troops was orderly. Apparently strong discipline was in force in order that they might effectively seize the strategic parts of the city. There was great tension amongst the inhabitants, and I believe in many quarters bombs were thrown at the entering soldiery by terror-stricken Armenians. The roads were congested by about 100,000 refugees, who had been pouring into the city during the previous days. The Turkish troops, on entry, had men preceding some of their forces telling the people to have no fear. Any account that I give must necessarily be from my own point of view, which is individual, and consequently limited. On the Sunday after the entry, in company with an Orthodox priest, I set out to bury the dead around the Point. We found only five bodies, which is evidence of the comparatively orderly nature of the entry; but during the Sunday night there was sporadic firing and screaming, and I believe much killing in the Armenian quarter near Caravan Bridge. On Monday the firing and screaming continued throughout the day. On Tuesday morning, whilst speaking with Captain Hole, vice-consul, in the consulate gardens, we were interrupted by a body crashing from the roof of the adjoining house, followed immediately by the appearance of Turkish soldiers pointing their rifles into the garden. It was an Armenian escaping from the hunt, which, I believe, was then general. With much difficulty and expostulation we prevented the soldiers shooting the man in the consulate gardens. I believe that the hunting of a man even in the consulate gardens is evidence of the massacres that were taking place in more secluded quarters. Colonel Murphy, who was reported to have been the only British subject killed, met his fate while trying to save his servants from violation. He was an old man of nearly

80 years. The Turks humiliated him by stripping him. They jumped on him, stunned his wife by breaking a vase over her head, and then shot him against the wall. He was left wounded for some days and then was brought to the English nursing home by the personal effort of Sir Harry Lamb, but died at midnight on the night of the fire, and his family were forced to leave his body in the abandoned house in order to escape to the ships. On Wednesday morning Sir Harry Lamb personally notified us at the maternity home that the situation was such that all British subjects, including the Maltese, must now leave the city. It was my task to give warning of this notice to people about the Point and down Halepi Street. While doing this it became evident to me that the Turkish soldiery were thoroughly out of hand. Down the side streets there were much shooting and terrified screaming, and some of the narrower streets were choked by running masses of people carrying their children in their arms. In one of the streets a man was dragging himself across the road on his elbows. He was shot through both thighs, one of which was fractured. The panic was so great that nobody answered his appeals. I could do nothing for him myself. Most of the people escaped only with their clothes and such valuables as they were able to carry. Many on their way to the ships were robbed even of their boots. In the harbour were floating the bodies of people who had been killed or had been drowned in desperate attempts to reach the ships. The fire broke out in half-a-dozen places almost simultaneously, and in a short time the whole city, with the exception of one quarter beside the Turkish part, was enveloped in flames. With 800 refugees I went on board the "Bavarian." Throughout the night boatloads of exhausted and terror-stricken people were being taken off. Nothing—no words—can describe the awful effect of the city, one appalling mass of flames, the water front covered with dark masses of despairing humanity, from whom we in the ships could hear dull cries of anguished despair. There was constantly rattle of small-arm firing, mingled with heavy detonations, which may have been the explosion of spirit stores. On the "Bavarian" escaped also the Archbishop of Ephesus, from whom I learned the true account of the martyrdom of Chrysostonos, the Metropolitan. Next to my family, in the hold of the "Bavarian," was a woman and her daughter, each of whom had been ravished by fifteen Turkish soldiers. The soldiers then wished to kill them, but spared their lives on the mother asking them to spare them for the Sultan's honour. I had this girl placed under the care of the doctor of H.M.S. "Iron Duke." This case is typical of many. In the earlier stages of the flight of the British colony it had been impossible to take one's Greek servants with one. Many have subsequently learned of the awful fate of these girls. In the lazzaretto at Malta and, I believe, also in Cyprus are many people who can personally vouch for the truth of most appalling massacres in the outlying villages.

Four days before the entry of the Kemalist troops I called on Chrysostonos at the Metropolite and found him in a state bordering on despair concerning the fate of his people. He gave me a telegram, which he wished sent to the Archbishop of Canterbury. This telegram was signed by Chrysostonos, the archbishops, including Ephesus, and the Armenian Archbishop, who, I believe, escaped. This telegram I left concealed in a bureau in Smyrna, because in the last stages it was too incriminating to be caught with. The last clause of the telegram was: "For Christ's sake, hasten to avert the calamity which we feel is approaching." After leaving the Metropolitan I felt that I could not send this telegram until I had consulted Sir Harry Lamb and Admiral Brock. Sir Harry Lamb was out when I called. I met the admiral, and he agreed with me that it was late to send such a telegram, but he said that if I sent it I should also mention to the archbishop that I had shown the telegram to him, and that he was prepared to do all in his power to afford protection to all sections of the community. I do not believe that the admiral, any more than the rest of us, foresaw how utterly the fears of Chrysostonos were to be justified by subsequent events. I asked the admiral for his permission to publish a message which would allay the terror of the people and help to tranquillise them and avoid provocative incidents in the event of a Kemalist entry. The admiral said that he believed (as we all did) that if Kemal entered the city the entry and occupation would be orderly, and that he advised the community to avoid provocation. After leaving the admiral I met prominent members of the Microasiatic Defence League at their headquarters. It was disturbing to see at these headquarters that arms were being issued to civilians. I told a small committee the gist of what the admiral had said to me, and, to make sure that there should be no distortion, wrote carefully what he had given me authority to say in his name. In company with a member of the league, I then went to see the Metropolitan. On the way I learned, as rumour has already told us, that a remnant of

the army desired to fight in order to hold the city and its environments until such time as the Allies could intervene to induce Kemal to treat without entry. My informant gave me the impression that this defence was only half-hearted. It was to have been supported by civilian recruits and, I believe, by the Greek fleet then in the roadstead. At the Metropolite the mention of the probability of Kemal making an entry was received with consternation. There had been vague rumours of a likely intervention of British troops, and the population had built their hopes on this. The tragedy of my message was this: The press thoroughly distorted it, and the message read that the British admiral had said that there was no cause for fear and advised the people to avoid provocation; while in a subsequent clause, appearing to be part of the admiral's message, it reported that British troops were on their way from Gibraltar and that five powerful naval units were coming from Malta. I can only believe that this distortion of the truth and the suppression of all mention of the likelihood of Kemal entering the city were done by the Micronsiatic League in order to encourage the contemplated defence of the city and its environments. By the next day at midday, however, all thought of resistance was past. In the meantime the Greek population was pathetically awaiting the coming of British help.

Chrysostonos was martyred on the day of the entry. Rumour had it that he was killed by the rabble outside Konak. This is unlikely. The Archbishop of Ephesus told me on the "Bavarian" what he believed to be the true story of his end. The archbishop was in closest touch with him and is likely to know the truth. It appears that Noureddine Pasha sent for him to report to the Konak. An open carriage, accompanied by one soldier, was sent for him. He wished to travel in his own car, which was closed. His wish was overridden by the soldier. On reporting to Noureddine Pasha, he was insulted, his beard was cut, and he was summarily executed. Chrysostonos was truly a martyr, because he had no false optimism and knew what his fate would be at the hands of the Turk. He had many opportunities of escaping, but to do so would have been to deprive his people of what encouragement and moral strength they drew from his presence with them. This he refused to do.

Just previous to leaving, a message came to my home from the Church of Saint-John (not the church near the Italian quarter) asking if I could come and spend the night with them, as the night before soldiery had broken into another church and had cut the throats of men and violated women there. I was unable to do anything. On Monday night some women took me to show me carts in which were the bodies of women and babies and also of young girls who had patently been violated before being killed.

This is only a brief and personal account of a few of the incidents that remain permanently in one's memory; but in the course of a month's ministering to the British community in the lazzaretto at Malta I have heard from people whose word cannot be doubted such accounts of murder, pillage and rape that, stripped of all exaggeration and discounting all tendency to hysteria, the accumulative facts are such as to make a truly damning indictment against the Kemalist troops, who preserved discipline until their own occupation was effectively accomplished, and then, apparently, deliberately neglected those military precautions which would have ensured the Christian population against the fanatical cruelty and lust of the Anatolian soldiery.

CHARLES DOBSON,
Sub-Chaplain, Smyrna.

[E 12211/27/44] No. 438.

M. Berzin, Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain, to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

M. BERZIN, Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain, presents his compliments to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, and begs to enclose a copy of a note received from his Government regarding the forthcoming conference on the question of the Near East.

November 6, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 438.

Note by M. Chicherin.

LE Gouvernement russe a reçu la communication des Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, France et Italie du 27 octobre avec invitation d'envoyer des délégués à la Conférence du Proche-Orient à Lausanne afin d'y participer à l'examen de la question des Détroits. Il considère comme absolument inadmissible et injustifiable de fermer à la Russie l'accès de la conférence au moment de la solution de toutes les autres questions. Il constate, en premier lieu, que la composition de la conférence prévue par les Puissances est tout autre que celle des signataires du Traité de Sèvres, ce qui prouve que l'examen des affaires du Proche-Orient qui aura lieu à Lausanne ne peut aucunement être considéré comme une liquidation tardive de la participation ancienne à la grande guerre européenne – liquidation rendue en elle-même impossible après les brillantes victoires du peuple turc—mais que le but de la nouvelle conférence sera un arrangement général de toutes les affaires du Proche-Orient. Ces vues sur le véritable caractère de la Conférence de Lausanne sont aussi corroborées par le fait que quelques-uns de ces participants ont conclu avec la Turquie des accords séparés. Cette dernière circonstance ne permet, d'autre part, au Gouvernement russe de voir en cette conférence une réunion de belligérants actuels dont le but serait de mettre fin aux hostilités présentes. La majorité des Puissances invitées à Lausanne ne sont point de ce nombre. Attendu que l'objet de la Conférence de Lausanne est évidemment un arrangement général de toutes les affaires du Proche-Orient dans leur ensemble, le Gouvernement russe ne peut en aucun cas admettre que la Russie ne soit conviée à participer qu'à la discussion de la question des Détroits et non aux travaux de la conférence en son entier. Il trouve incompréhensible l'absence non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi de la Bulgarie, voisine de la Turquie, avec la présence simultanée, non seulement de la Yougoslavie et de la Roumanie, mais aussi du Japon lointain. Ce choix artificiel des participants de la conférence apparaît aux yeux du Gouvernement russe comme une tentative des Puissances invitantes de régler arbitrairement les droits et la mesure de participation de chaque État à l'arrangement oriental. Les Puissances invitantes y admettent certains États et en écartent d'autres, ne s'appuyant sur aucune base légitime. Cette ligne de conduite des Puissances invitantes doit nécessairement apparaître comme l'expression d'une politique qui implique la violation par les États forts des droits légitimes des États faibles et la tentative de disposer arbitrairement de leur sort et de leurs intérêts. Cette ligne de conduite des Puissances invitantes peut inspirer la crainte sérieuse que l'intention de restaurer intégralement les droits du peuple turc et sa souveraineté sur son territoire et dans ses eaux leur est étrangère. La composition arbitraire de la Conférence de Lausanne et le refus opiniâtre des Puissances invitantes d'admettre la Russie à la conférence dans son ensemble y créent des conditions qui constituent un risque pour la possibilité d'une satisfaction complète des intérêts vitaux du peuple turc et de l'application du principe de ses droits souverains. A l'époque où toutes les Puissances de l'Entente étaient unies dans la lutte contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie et, en dernier lieu, contre son existence, même comme État indépendant, la Russie soviétiste seule entra dans la voie de l'amitié et de la fraternité avec le peuple turc, qui combattait en héros, et conclut avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale un traité qui établit définitivement les relations amicales entre eux. La décision d'écarter justement la Russie du nombre des participants du traité général avec la Turquie démontre que les Puissances de l'Entente ont résolu de frustrer à la table de la conférence le peuple turc du fruit de ses victoires et de ses efforts héroïques.

La Russie soviétiste, qui est l'amie de tous les peuples opprimés et qui proclame le droit de toutes les nations de disposer de leur sort, a établi au cours de son existence des liens d'amitié avec les peuples orientaux qui ont amené à la création d'un ordre de choses stable en Orient et elle considère de son devoir de continuer à la Conférence de Lausanne l'application de ces mêmes principes. Le Gouvernement russe est non seulement étranger à toute intention de ressusciter les méthodes du ci-devant Gouvernement tsariste et des autres Gouvernements qui voulaient tenir la Turquie en tutelle, mais, tout au contraire, il croit devoir être présent à la conférence avec le but spécial de s'efforcer d'obtenir la réalisation de la plénitude des droits souverains du peuple turc—condition nécessaire d'un ordre de choses stable dans le Proche-Orient, ce qui constitue un but auquel la Russie est directement intéressée.

La réalisation de ce principe dans le domaine militaire et naval est aussi une garantie nécessaire de la paix dans la mer Noire et de la sécurité des côtes de la

Russie, Ukraine et Géorgie. Tout au contraire, la ligne de conduite des Puissances invitantes représente une expression de leur tendance de placer les peuples orientaux en une situation d'infériorité. Leur refus d'inviter la Russie à participer à la conférence en dehors de la discussion sur les Détroits constitue pareillement un essai de violation des droits et des intérêts de la République russe dans le domaine de la politique et une tentative de porter dommage à sa situation internationale. Le Gouvernement russe est de l'avis, ainsi qu'il l'a indiqué dans sa communication du 18 octobre, qu'une tentative de résoudre la question des Détroits en dehors de toutes les autres questions pendantes dans le Proche-Orient ne produirait point les résultats attendus et ne mènerait aucunement à une solution pratique et durable de la question des Détroits, ainsi que satisfaisante pour tous les participants. Selon lui, l'établissement d'un certain régime dans les Détroits est inséparable de l'ordre de choses général qui sera créé dans le Proche-Orient. Il lui apparait clairement que telle ou telle solution de toute question inscrite à l'ordre du jour de la conférence ne peut éviter d'avoir une répercussion directe sur la situation dans les Détroits. Le Gouvernement russe considère comme indubitable que, si les Puissances de l'Entente avaient réellement en vue l'établissement véritable d'une paix durable, elle ne tenteraient point de laisser la Russie en dehors des accords internationaux au moment de la solution des problèmes du Proche-Orient. Ayant pour but les intérêts de la paix générale et la réalisation du droit de tous les peuples de disposer de leur sort et accomplissant son devoir de veiller sur les droits légitimes, la dignité et les intérêts vitaux de la République soviétiste, le Gouvernement russe se voit obligé d'insister catégoriquement sur sa participation pleine et entière, ainsi que celle de l'Ukraine et de la Géorgie, à la conférence du Proche-Orient tout entière, sans aucune restriction, avec les mêmes droits que les autres participants. Le Gouvernement russe prie les Puissances invitantes de la Conférence de Lausanne de lui communiquer leur réponse au plus vite, afin que la délégation russe puisse arriver à la conférence à son début.

Moscou, le 2 novembre 1922.

[E 12198/10102/44] No. 439.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, November 6, 1922.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury your letter of the 31st ultimo, on the subject of the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute.

In reply, I am to request you to inform the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston that their Lordships fully appreciate the desire of the Egyptian Government to make it clear that the payments made by Egypt for the service of these loans no longer partake in any way of the nature of a tribute.

The question may be regarded either from a strictly legal point of view on the analogy of the obligations which would fall upon a private individual under British or other municipal law in a parallel case, or from the point of view of policy and equity.

From the legal point of view the obligation upon Egypt to pay the sums in question may be held technically to rest upon the decrees of the Khedive, dated the 20th March, 1891, and the 30th May, 1894, by which he bound himself and his successors irrevocably to make the payments required for the service of the loans of 1891 and 1894, and section 4 of the agreement dated the 17th September, 1877, between the Porte and the bondholders, and the undertaking by the Khedive to carry out this agreement, dated the 22nd November, 1877, which documents recognise (though they do not explicitly affirm) the irrevocable liability of the Khedive and his successors to contribute 72,000*l.* a year towards the service of the loan of 1855.

As regards the further question whether Egypt has from a "legal" point of view the right to recover these payments from Turkey on the analogy of a mortgage or cession on guarantee, I am to state that it is, in their Lordships' opinion, unprofitable to endeavour to settle a question of this kind on the analogy of transactions between individuals under municipal law. The circumstances are so different that the results of arguments upon such lines are bound to be inconclusive.

Accordingly my Lords now turn to the political aspect of the matter as opposed to the quasi-legal aspect. The principle that States in whose favour territory is detached from Turkey should assume responsibility for a proportion of Turkish debt has

been recognised in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1911, and was accepted by all the signatories of the unratified Treaty of Sèvres. The principle adopted in the Treaty of Sèvres for apportioning the liability for the Ottoman Debt was that the amount of the annuity to be paid should bear the same ratio to the total required for the service of the Ottoman pre-war debt as the average revenue of the transferred territory bore to the average revenue of the whole of Turkey over the financial years 1909–10, 1910–11 and 1911–12. The strict application of this principle in the case of Egypt would have imposed a very heavy burden upon the Egyptian Exchequer, since the increase in the wealth of Egypt during the last eighty years would have been taken into account in fixing Egypt's liability to contribute to the Ottoman Debt.

Accordingly, His Majesty's Government, in order to minimise the charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer, have insisted throughout the negotiations in regard to the allocation of liability for the Ottoman Debt (both during the discussions of 1913 and those leading up to the Treaty of Sèvres) that the loans secured upon the Egyptian tribute should be excluded from the general settlement, and should for this purpose be regarded as being a part of the public debt of Egypt. These loans have, in practice, long been regarded as Egyptian rather than Turkish debt, and it may be pointed out in this connection that the advantageous terms on which the loans of 1891 and 1894 were raised, and the high price which they commanded before the war, as compared with other Turkish loans, is a clear indication of the credit enjoyed by the Egyptian Government in recent years, and that the Government would be ill-advised to jeopardise this advantage by seeking to question its liability to continue the payments heretofore made for the service of these loans.

It follows, in their Lordships' opinion, from the acceptance of the principle that States in whose favour territory is detached from Turkey should assume responsibility for a portion of Turkish debt, that there is no justification for Egypt's proposal to reclaim from Turkey the payments made for the service of the loans in question since the termination of Turkey's suzerainty over Egypt. But if it is desired, on political grounds, to acquiesce in this proposal being put forward (without its being endorsed by His Majesty's Government), my Lords would see no insuperable objection from their point of view.

Finally, I am to suggest that in defending an agreement to continue these payments the Egyptian Government might be well advised to rely mainly on the precedent of the Treaty of Lausanne, under which Italy, a Great Power, which had victoriously terminated a war with Turkey, agreed to pay, and duly paid, a large sum as a contribution towards the Ottoman Debt.

I am, &c.
B. P. BLACKETT.

No. 440.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, November 6, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me Bulgarian Prime Minister, who is here, endeavoured to obtain Roumanian support at Lausanne for plan of autonomy and Bulgarian outlet to Ægean Sea.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was not prepared to adopt any attitude which might be contrary to policy of Great Powers as regards Thrace. Outlet to Ægean Sea could probably be solved in due course. Bulgarian Prime Minister said he was opposed to joint frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria, and Ægean Sea could probably be solved in due course.

Minister for Foreign Affairs does not, however, entirely believe sincerity of this declaration, though it coincides with his own view.

(Sent to Sofia, [ ] figures by post.)

[E 12221/10102/44] No. 441.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 389. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 7, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 386.

I understand that Prime Minister is sending unofficially to Lausanne Seifullah Pasha Yousry, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to get into touch with Turkish delegates and create atmosphere favourable to Sarwat Ministry.

Yousry is well known in Turkish political circles. Since he returned to Egypt last year his behaviour has been unexceptionable and he has rendered to me very valuable services.

No. 442.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 668.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 6, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 665 and my telegram No. 666.

After having examined situation this evening with generals, Allied High Commissioners decided to address following identic telegram to their Governments:—

"Initial measures taken by new Administration of Constantinople constitute not only serious blow to interests and prestige of Allies, but also threaten to stop economic life of town. As result of application of new customs tariff, price of bread and of articles of primary necessity has already doubled. Certain articles indispensable to foreigners are prohibited. Justice between Europeans and Ottomans is suspended. Assumption of control by Turkish authorities over Ottoman police, gendarmes and troops here is a grave danger to safety of Allied troops and foreign colony.

"Strong representations will be made to-morrow to Nationalist agent here in name of Allied Powers. But contingency that these remonstrances will have as little effect as previous ones must be considered. I fear that a series of those measures which are already in force in Anatolia will follow: expulsion or deportation of Ottoman Christians, sequestration of their property, perquisitions in banks, prohibition for foreigners to come here or leave without authorisation, arrests, arbitrary executions, &c.

"Allied Governments cannot allow a situation of this nature to develop in a zone occupied by their troops and hitherto administered by their representatives without betraying confidence of population and without suffering an irremediable loss of prestige. Moreover, normal operations of different services and Allied controls can no longer be re-established except under surveillance and immediate protection of Allied forces of occupation.

"Armed conflict with police, gendarmerie and 2,000 Turkish garrison troops here may ensue. The necessity for disarming latter must be contemplated.

"In agreement with Allied generals, High Commissioners are unanimously of opinion that establishment of a state of siege here is necessary if above measures are to be put into execution. Nevertheless, operation is a delicate one, and may provoke conflict. Available Allied forces here consist only of about eight battalions, two squadrons, an artillery group, tanks, armoured cars, and flying machines. Assistance of fleet can also be counted upon.

"High Commissioners were unwilling to accept responsibility for such a decision without reference to Allied Governments. They would be grateful for an immediate reply, since every day lost aggravates situation and renders a peaceful solution less probable.

"If their suggestion be not approved, High Commissioners consider they are no longer in a position to carry on task assigned to them, and request fresh instructions."

No. 443.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 7, 1922.)

(No. 570.)
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR Lordship's telephone message of this evening.

I have seen M. Poincaré, who told me that he had this morning approved General Pellé's action for co-operation with his colleagues at Constantinople, and had authorised the proclamation of a state of siege if he and his colleagues consider such a step necessary.

As regards the last sentence in the message which I have received, M. Poincaré reserves his view on the ground that it is premature to consider measures to be taken if the state of siege should prove insufficient to establish and maintain order.

M. Poincaré wished me to tell your Lordship that he considers any delay in the meeting of the conference most dangerous, and he is so apprehensive of the result that may ensue that he refuses to assume in any way the responsibility. He told me that he has written me a note, which I shall receive shortly, explaining his reasons. I shall not fail to forward it by telephone or telegram as soon as possible. He says that any delay would produce a catastrophe.

No. 444.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 7, 1922.)

(No. 571.)
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 399.

A note just received gives the following as the views of the French Government on the identic telegram of the three High Commissioners:—

Owing to the dissolution of the Constantinople Government, which has just taken place, the first question, namely, the help to be furnished to that Government, no longer arises. Henceforward it will be for the Government of the Grand Assembly to provide for the functioning of the public services of Constantinople. The assistance which the Angora Government may have to ask for this purpose from the Allied Powers will have to be conditioned on recognition by the former of the undertaking and measures previously taken in order to assure the operation of the public services and the economic existence of a region which has never ceased to be a part of the Ottoman State

On the second point referred to in the High Commissioners' telegram, which in fact relates to the recognition by the Angora Government of the treaty, convention and acts concluded and put into force by the Constantinople Government, French Government agree with His Majesty's Government on the necessity of inserting in the future treaty a clause providing for the formal recognition by Turkey of these treaties, acts and conventions. They consider, however, that it would be inadvisable to put forward previously to the opening of the Lausanne Conference the insertion of this clause as a condition of the opening of the negotiations.

The three Governments would be justified in renewing in a formal manner the protest already made by their High Commissioners and insisting on the impossibility of agreeing to the repudiation of engagements and acts based on the necessity of maintaining order and of assuring public services and the economic existence of the capital and of an important part of the Ottoman State.

Finally, as regards the guarantees to be given by the three Governments for the execution of engagements previously taken by the late Government of Constantinople towards institutions, establishments or private persons, the French Government is of opinion that, owing to the financial responsibility to which it would expose them, the three Governments cannot give this guarantee, but that, as pointed out above, they ought after having immediately renewed their protest against the decision of Government of Angora to act in agreement and in the most energetic manner during the negotiations in order to obtain recognition of these engagements.

French Government would be glad to learn the form which your Lordship considers this new protest should take and also what answer your Lordship proposes to send to the letter from the Angora representative on this subject, which the French Government assume you have equally received.

No. 445.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 7, 1922.)

(No. 572.)
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 570, last paragraph.

Note just received from M. Poincaré states that he was on the point of instructing French Ambassador in London to urge on your Lordship the cardinal importance of accelerating to the utmost possible extent the step to be taken by the Allies for the re-establishment of peace. The uncertainty, as to the actual conditions of peace, which exists at the present moment in Turkish army and amongst Turkish people is causing an excitement which Government of Angora seems unable to control, and which is likely to develop, in spite of the Mudania Convention, into a resumption of hostilities, or, at any rate, into the taking of steps by the Turks which will result in Allied Governments being faced by a *fait accompli*.

M. Poincaré goes on to recall that as long ago as last March he urged His Majesty's Government to agree to a conference being held without delay at Constantinople. If his advice had been followed the last phase of the Turco-Greek conflict might have been avoided, and the Allies would at all events have secured better peace terms than they will now ever be able to get. He is convinced that every day's delay increases difficulties in way of concluding peace, and he fears that the illusions to which their rapid victory has given rise in Turkish mind are accompanied by a feeling of mistrust, and they are coming to believe that they will only obtain by force of arms the advantages which they feel now to be within their grasp.

Poincaré does not believe by postponing date of meeting of conference that satisfactory relations between Allied authorities and Turkish civil authorities in Constantinople will be facilitated, nor does he think that question of accommodation at Lausanne can really be regarded as a justifiable reason for further delay; if, however, His Majesty's Government and Italian Government, for reasons special to themselves, feel that they are absolutely unable to send their delegates to Lausanne on 13th, Poincaré urged with the utmost insistence that the postponement should be as short as possible, and under no circumstances later than 20th. In any case, he declined to take any responsibility for effect which news of this postponement may have on Angora Government and Turkish public opinion.

Poincaré considers that the best method of calming excitement which this news will produce at Angora would be to sign with as little delay as possible the preliminaries of peace, which should include, in a small number of articles, the essential terms of treaty. We should thus obtain an immediate acknowledgment by Turkish Government of certain general principles; this would produce a calming effect on Angora Government and would enable the elaboration of the definite treaty to proceed at leisure. This procedure, to which Mustapha Kemal is believed to have been favourable a short time ago, might yet be accepted by him. Poincaré is not blind to difficulties of settling such a preliminary treaty, but he is certain of its great advantage, and that the earlier sessions of the Peace Conference should be devoted thereto. Poincaré is anxious to know whether your Lordship approves, and, if so, what are questions which, in your Lordship's opinion, should properly form basis of such a preliminary treaty?

Discussion of these questions would, in Poincaré's opinion, correspond with proposal originally made by your Lordship for an exchange of views between our two Governments prior to opening of conference.

In a postscript Poincaré adds that he has further considered question since my interview with him this evening (reported in my telegram No. 570), and that he must now insist on maintenance of the date of 13th November, and that he cannot admit any postponement even until 20th. The dangerous thing, and thing which may well lead to a resumption of hostilities, is announcement made to Turks of any delay whatsoever. If date of 13th November is not changed Turks will have no pretext for not coming to Lausanne, and once there on the spot it might be possible, if necessary, to postpone effective opening of discussion. First essential is to meet Turks in a conference with peace as its objective ("réunion pacifique").

No. 446.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 7, 1922.*

SEE my telephone message No. 570 this evening.

Poincaré mentioned to me to-night that in no case would he embark in a war, which he considered it would be very easy to provoke.

No. 447.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 351.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 7, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 354.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs say that Italian Ambassador, London, has been instructed to inform your Lordship that Italian Government could be ready for meeting of conference on 13th November, but they agree to postponement till 27th November if your Lordship is satisfied that success of conference will not be prejudiced thereby; they are, however, disposed to consider an earlier date, say, 24th or 25th November, preferable if feasible.

No. 448.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 352.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 7, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I have feeling that French pressure is being exercised in favour of earliest possible date, as Italian Government seem less anxious for postponement.

No. 449.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sofia, November 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 53.

Views of M. Stamboliisky regarding Thrace and Bulgarian outlet were reported in my despatch No. 279 and my despatch No. 281. Autonomy of Western Thrace is solution which finds most favour here, doubtless because it would leave door open to future annexation by Bulgaria, but M. Stamboliisky would, I think, be satisfied with neutral zone to Dedeagatch. His attitude at conference may, however, depend on result of his conversations at Bucharest and Belgrade.

Bulgarian Government are not interested in question of Capitulations in Turkey, but if abolished there they will no doubt expect their abolition here also. As regards the Straits, I believe their only concern is that they should remain open to merchant ships in all circumstances.

If Stamboliisky returns here before proceeding to Lausanne I will endeavour to elicit his latest views. Otherwise I do not expect to obtain much information of value. [? Omitted : His] colleagues, being half-educated peasants or village schoolmasters, are incapable of thinking out problems of foreign policy and take no interest in them. Educated opinion counts for nothing with the present Government, and, in any case, opposition parties are inarticulate, all their leaders being in prison. In general, public opinion appears apathetic in regard to conference, and is entirely engrossed with internal policy.

(Repeated to Belgrade and Bucharest.)

No. 450.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 546.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 668.

We are gratified to learn that Allied High Commissioners and generals are absolutely united in presenting firm front to impossible demands of Angora representatives and in recommendations reported in above telegram and explained in fuller detail by Harington.

We have telegraphed to Paris and Rome to enquire how far we may rely on support of French and Italian Governments in carrying out those measures, and hope to let you have reply to-morrow.

No. 451.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 414.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1922.*

SUCCESSIVE demands made by Angora Government or by Kemalist representative at Constantinople for evacuation of Allied military and naval forces, Turkish control of police and gendarmerie in capital, closing of Mixed Court and assumption of complete fiscal and financial independence have produced a state of affairs in which Allies have to decide whether to resist these pretensions, which are in direct violation both of Mudros Armistice and of Mudania Convention, or to abdicate their position. The former alternative may lead to crisis in Constantinople, which, if firmly dealt with, would probably subside. The latter would involve final destruction of Allied prestige and early withdrawal of Allied forces under conditions of no small humiliation.

The High Commissioners and the Allied generals appear to be acting in closest co-operation, and have addressed identical appeal for support to their respective Governments. It seems to His Majesty's Government that this should now be given. We have been willing to make every possible concession to the Angora demands, including the return of their civil administration and gendarmerie to Chanak, Gallipoli and Ismid areas, subject to Allied supervision and control in those areas. We were about to enter Lausanne Conference with warmest desire for a fair and reasonable satisfaction of Turkish claims. It is also possible that their larger demands may contain a considerable element of bluff and may mask a design to drive wedge between Allies or to test the measure of Allied unity.

In any event, it seems to us that the case has now arisen to demonstrate that unity, and, in M. Poincaré's own words, quoted in your telegram No. 564, that it is absolutely essential for His Majesty's Government and the French Government to preserve a united front on all questions that may arise out of the insupportable demands and attitude of the Turks.

The immediate crisis is at Constantinople, where withdrawal of Allied troops would produce a grave panic and might lead to a repetition of deplorable scenes at Smyrna. The High Commissioners are unanimously of opinion that establishment of a state of siege in city is necessary, and have reported to their Governments that, if this suggestion be not approved, they are no longer in a position to carry on task assigned to them.

I shall be glad if you will see M. Poincaré at once, and ask if we may expect support of French Government for action of Allied representatives at Constantinople. If once it is realised that Allies are absolutely united, and that there is no question of division between them or of isolated action by any one of their number, and further that present Turkish attitude may render Peace Conference impossible, situation may still be saved. The case is one of extreme urgency.

We have received a telegram from General Harington, in which he requests immediate sanction for measures to be taken in accordance with advice of Allied generals and High Commissioners.

We cannot give this authority until we know to what extent we may rely upon the co-operation of French Government.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 357, in "R.")

No. 452.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1922.*

MY despatches Nos. 3303 and 3277 of 3rd November and 31st October: Belgian participation at Lausanne.

The Belgian Ambassador states that his Government have learned through the French Government the nature of the proposal made by His Majesty's Government for Belgian participation in the drafting of treaty with Turkey at Lausanne, and that they are not satisfied with adequacy of proposal. Belgian Ambassador has therefore proposed, on behalf of his Government, the following formula:—

"In view of the importance of the economic and financial interests of Belgium in the East, proposals should be made to the Belgian Government to send to Lausanne two delegates, who would be summoned by the president of the conference at their request to take part in the discussions when financial and economic questions of special interest to Belgium are being studied."

Please inform M. Poincaré that I am prepared to agree to this formula if he is, and suggest that joint instructions to make a communication to the Belgian Government in this sense should be sent to Allied representatives at Brussels.

Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 358.

(Repeated to Brussels, No. 44.)

[E 12331/10102/44] No. 453.

Minute by Sir C. Hurst on Egyptian Tribute Loans.

THE memorandum originally transmitted in 1916 by Lord Edward Cecil, and the subsequent reports on Ottoman finance, including the Egyptian tribute loans, by Mr. Armitage-Smith and the committee which dealt with the financial aspects of the Franco-British negotiations for the Egypt-Morocco Convention have always assumed that the effect of the announcement made in 1914 by His Majesty's Government that the suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt was terminated, necessarily entailed a cessation of the obligation on the part of Egypt to pay tribute to Turkey. Any such admission at the present moment would weaken the position of His Majesty's Government in claiming that Egypt must continue to pay the sums which have now been paid for many years by the Egyptian Government to certain financial houses in London in accordance with the hypothecation of the Egyptian tribute for the service of certain Turkish loans. If Egypt was freed in 1914 from the obligation to pay tribute, the security held by the bondholders for these loans would be gone, and the loans would fall into the class of unsecured claim upon the Turkish Treasury.

I am not satisfied that His Majesty's Government need necessarily accept the view that the events of 1914 put an end to Egypt's liability to pay the tribute. The history of the Egyptian tribute is that up till 1840 Egypt was a Turkish province, and, therefore, the Porte was in a position to squeeze all the money which it could out of Egypt. In 1840 came the rebellion of Mehemet Ali and the intervention of the Powers, under which Egypt was converted into an hereditary pashalic in the family of Mehemet Ali, and one of the terms was that a fixed tribute of 80,000 purses was to be paid to the Ottoman Treasury. In 1866 these provisions were varied as the result of an understanding arrived at between Ismail and the Sultan. Ismail succeeded in obtaining from the Porte certain modifications in the order of succession to the Khediviate, and also certain other privileges, and in return for them the tribute was raised of 80,000 to 150,000 purses, that is to say, was raised to £ T. 750,000 per annum. It is true that this agreement was embodied in a firman issued by the Sultan, and that this firman is in form a unilateral act on the part of the Sovereign of Turkey, but, nevertheless, it was in fact an agreement to which Egypt was a party, and there is no reason why it should be taken for granted that Egypt by herself, or Great Britain on Egypt's behalf, was entitled to modify this agreement. Egypt was never at war with Turkey. If there had been a war, it might well be that the agreement was one of a class which would be terminated by the outbreak of hostilities,

but technically Egypt has always been at peace with Turkey. Egypt was attacked by the Turks because Turkey was at war with the British in Egypt.

If Great Britain had annexed Egypt, there would equally be a good ground for regarding any payment in the nature of tribute as terminated, as the annexation of the country would have freed it from servitude of this kind.

For the purposes of argument, therefore, I can see no reason why the British authorities in Egypt should discuss this question of Egypt's obligation to continue the service of the tribute loans upon the footing that any liability on the part of Egypt to continue the payment of the 150,000 purses a year fixed in the firman of 1866 had come to an end in 1914 by reason of the British proclamation of the termination of the Turkish suzerainty.

The library have supplied two memoranda (annexed) on the subject of the cessation of the Eastern Roumelian and Bulgarian tributes in 1908 when Bulgaria severed its connection with Turkey and proclaimed itself an independent kingdom. The events of 1908 throw singularly little light on the legal point as to whether the tribute automatically ended on the proclamation of the Bulgarian Kingdom or not. In the case of the Eastern Roumelian tribute, its cessation was due to a deal between Turkey and Russia, under which Turkey renounced her right to it in future. The Bulgarian tribute, provided for in the Congress Treaty of Berlin of 1878, was never paid, and the Porte likewise renounced any claim to it in future, but the fact that Turkey was made to renounce it affords, from the legal point of view, an argument for maintaining that without such renunciation the tribute would have continued.

Under the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey was made to renounce any right to the tribute (see article 112). Need this language be continued if it would strengthen our claim for maintaining that without Turkish renunciation Egypt would remain liable to continue the payment? Might not the clause be reworded so as to provide that Turkey renounced merely such right as she had to the tribute over and above those which she had already hypothecated on behalf of the bondholders of the tribute loan?

CECIL J. B. HURST.

November 7, 1922.

ANNEX I.

Memorandum on Eastern Roumelian Tribute.

Article 18 of the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th July, 1878, stipulated that immediately after the exchange of ratifications an European Commission should arrange for the organisation of Eastern Roumelia. The commission sat from the 30th September, 1878, till the 3rd June, 1879, and produced the Organic Statute of the 26th April, 1879, Annex 9 to Chapter VII, of which fixed the tribute of £ T. 240,000, representing three-tenths of the estimated revenue of the province. In addition, Eastern Roumelia was called upon to pay to the Imperial Government the equivalent of the net annual produce of the customs, valued at £ T. 5,000, and to participate in the general charges of the Ottoman Empire.

2. On the 20th December, 1882, the Provincial Assembly passed a law reducing the tribute to £ T. 180,000—on the ground that the annual revenues were estimated to amount to only £ T. 600,000 for a period of five years from the 1st March, 1883—plus the £ T. 5,000 on account of the customs revenue.

3. The Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt took exception to this law as being likely seriously to affect the payment by Turkey of interest upon her debt; and neither the Treaty Powers nor the Porte gave their sanction to it.

4. On the 3rd November, 1887, the Bulgarian Government declared that three-tenths of the revenue of Eastern Roumelia amounted only to £ T. 130,000, plus £ T. 5,000 on account of the customs revenue, which sum the Porte agreed to accept provided that the payment of the tribute began at once. The Bulgarian Government answered, however, that they were not in a position to make any immediate payment. As from the date of the union of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria in 1885, down to January 1888 no payments were made, the arrears at the last-named date amounted to 436,408*l*. By a series of annual payments of 20,000*l*., this amount had, on the 5th October, 1908 (the date of the proclamation of Bulgarian independence) been reduced to 29,960*l*. Other arrears that had accumulated between 1888 and 1902 had been paid off on the 16th October, 1902, in a lump sum of 311,600*l*., obtained from the proceeds of a loan.

5. From 1888 the sum of £ T. 130,000 seems to have been recognised by both sides as the amount of the tribute. This sum, however, was not actually paid, as, when the Varna–Rustchuk Railway Company sold their line to the Bulgarian Government in 1888, they made over at the same time a debt of 420,000*l*. due to them by Turkey. In 1897 a convention was signed between the Bulgarian Government and a representative of the Ottoman Public Debt, by which the former was empowered to retain from the annual payment due on account of the Eastern Roumelian tribute the sum of 34,520*l*. until the complete extinction of the debt. In 1908 there remained the sum of 28,886*l*. still to be paid off, but the Bulgarian Government claimed that the capitalised value of the compound interest, due since the 1st January, 1885, amounted to 1,142,530*l*. Thus after deducting the sum of 29,960*l*. (see paragraph 4 above) which they still owed as arrears of the Eastern Roumelian tribute, it was estimated by Bulgaria that Turkey was in her debt to the extent of 1,112,570*l*.

6. It was arranged by the Turco-Bulgarian Protocol of the 19th April, 1909 ("State Papers," vol. cii, p. 375) and by the Russo-Turkish Protocol of the 20th April, 1909, which was confirmed by the Russo-Turkish Declaration of the 21st December, 1909 ("State Papers," vol. cii, p. 384), that the Ottoman Government would renounce all claims to the Eastern Roumelian tribute, as well as to the assumption by Bulgaria of a share of the Turkish debt. The Bulgarian Government, on the other hand, undertook to pay 40,000,000 fr. as interest at 5 per cent. on the amount of the Roumelian tribute due from the date of the declaration of independence (5th October, 1908) to the date of the ratification of the agreement (19th May, 1909), and she also renounced her claims on account of the Varna–Rustchuk Railway.

JOHN W. FIELD.

Foreign Office, November 3, 1922.

ANNEX II.

Memorandum on Bulgarian Tribute.

By article 9 of the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th July, 1878, the amount of the annual tribute which Bulgaria was to pay to Turkey was to be fixed by an agreement between the Powers signatory of the treaty at the close of the first year of the working of the new organisation in Bulgaria. The tribute was to be calculated on the mean revenue of the principality. When fixing the tribute the Powers were to consider what portion of the Public Debt of the Turkish Empire could also be assigned to Bulgaria.

2. The amount of the tribute was never fixed, and by paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Turco-Bulgarian Protocol of the 19th April, 1909 ("State Papers," vol. cii, p. 375), the Ottoman Government renounced all claims to the tribute due up to the 5th October, 1908 (the date of the proclamation of Bulgarian independence), as well as to the assumption by Bulgaria of a share of the Turkish debt.

JOHN W. FIELD.

Foreign Office, November 3, 1922.

No. 454.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 661.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November* 7, 1922.

NANSEN asks me to telegraph following to your Lordship:—

"I feel it my duty to draw your attention to following facts:—

"Before I left Constantinople on 4th November I had received much evidence that Angora authorities had begun to expel from Asia Minor all remaining Christians. Nearly 350,000 had already arrived at Constantinople, saying that Turkish soldiers had given them the choice of being deported into the interior or proceeding immediately to the coast to leave Asia Minor as refugees. They say that whole Christian population is receiving the same orders.

"According to most reliable information I have, this will mean 350,000 more refugees from Asia Minor who must be brought away within next few weeks, fed,

and settled in employment subsequently. New refugees are arriving, like previous ones, without any luggage or possessions.

"It is most probable that if this exodus from Asia Minor continues panic will start in Constantinople and the whole Christian population of that city, roughly [? 5]50,000, will also endeavour to leave. This would mean total of between 900,000 and 1,000,000 more refugees, who as a result of their fear of Turkish authorities will be thrown upon Europe for support.

"Evidence upon which above is based is not conclusive, but after our experience of what happened in Eastern Thrace, it is necessary to foresee and prepare for the worst. It is certain that Greek nation cannot support any further great numbers of refugees beyond those already in the country without immediate large scale support from the rest of Europe. If such support is not forthcoming, most serious position for the whole of Europe will, in my opinion, inevitably result."

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 226.)

No. 455.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 8, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs also said that feeling of irritation was growing here against the Turks in view of reported arrogance of their demands, and also of fact that intrigues with Macedonian Committee had been discovered. He had recently intimated at Paris these sentiments of dissatisfaction.

He had grave doubts whether conference might not break down, and he had understood that in that event Great Britain would take action in co-operation with Greece. It was most essential that armament of Serb-Croat-Slovene army should be rapidly completed. He was hoping to acquire at once the German rifles (see my despatch No. 436). I thereupon told him about the Lee-Enfield rifles available in England. He said he had heard nothing about them; but he did not want rifles which were discarded by another army as not being good enough. He also alluded to request made in my telegram No. 130 for a credit.

I mentioned to him that press here showed little interest in Turkish question. He admitted that that was so, but he was always glad when press refrained from taking up grave matters of foreign politics.

No. 456.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 7, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 95.

Following is summary of attitude of Roumanian Government to be adopted at Lausanne Conference, defined last night by Minister for Foreign Affairs. Despatches on this subject by bag Thursday :—

1. *Straits.*—Freedom should be absolute, not in principle only, but effective and secure as such. Control in the hands of a commission, preferably of all interested nations. Liberty of passage secured by stationnaires, and even by international contingents stationed at both the Bosphorus and Gallipoli ends. Minister for Foreign Affairs is not entirely favourable to idea that League of Nations should be amongst those responsible for freedom of the Straits, as it has no organ of execution. He appears to prefer commission of all interested nations rather than that of Great Powers only, but would not press point.

2. *Capitulations.*—If Allies decide to abolish these, Roumanian Government would not oppose. If maintenance is preferred, Minister for Foreign Affairs would press that smaller nations should be placed on precisely similar footing to Great Powers.

3. *Eastern Thrace.*—Minister for Foreign Affairs does not approve Bulgarian desire for autonomy either of Eastern or of Western Thrace. He considers future of

Eastern Thrace settled by decision of Great Powers to return it to Turkey. In view, however, of danger to Roumania of encirclement by former enemies, namely, Hungary, Germany, Russia, Angora and Turkey, and, finally, Bulgaria, he advocates demilitarised zone between Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria, though recognising that zone would probably only last a few years. It would nevertheless be of great utility.

4. *Western Thrace.*—He suggests that it might also be well to separate Turkey in Eastern Thrace from Greece in Western Thrace by prolonging demilitarised zone along the Maritza to include Dedeagatch, whereby Bulgaria's exit to Ægean Sea might be assured. He thinks that entire zone from Black Sea to Ægean Sea might be entrusted to the same Powers controlling the freedom of the Straits. He opposes Bulgarian desire for autonomy of Western Thrace because it would only lead to intrigues and to possible later attempts by Bulgaria to regain possession.

5. *General Eastern Question.*—Roumania desires above all peace and harmony of Allies. Her chief danger is from Russia, but Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs to make personal suggestion at Warsaw Conference of 30th November that Roumania would not improbably be ready to negotiate with Russia and abandon her claim to restitution of gold deposited at Moscow, provided that Russia recognises definitely Roumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and agrees to restore archives and State papers sent to Russia during the war. He hopes that this will show conciliatory attitude of Roumania and improve situation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has no reason to think that Jugoslav [? Government] will adopt different attitude, but has not yet heard their views. I informed him that I should report all the above for the information of His Majesty's Government.

[E 12348/10102/44] No. 457.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, November 8, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 380.

My immediately following telegram contains names of persons (*a*) who have recently left or are about to leave Egypt; (*b*) who are now in England or France and may join the others forming a delegation of Zaghlulist party to visit seat of Peace Conference. Those who have left expect to reach Lausanne to-morrow.

I am aware of what tactics they intend to adopt. They are not so well equipped for establishing contact with Turks as Watanist delegation, but they will presumably endeavour to canvass French and Italians.

Reasons for sudden accession of first on the list to this party are not clear. He possibly represents an intrusion of influence of Mohamed Said, whose connection, however, seems to be chiefly with Watanist delegation.

Attempt is being made to induce Ahmed Mazloum Pasha to join Zaghlulist delegation.

[E 12349/10102/44] No. 458

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 392.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 8, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

(*a.*) Hassan Hassib Pasha, Salama Mikhail, Abdel Halim-el-Bialy, Ata Afifi and Hussein Hilal, with Georges Dumani and Mahmud Hassan Abu Gazia, secretaries.

(*b.*) Aly Shamsy, Hamed Mahmud and Sadek Henein.

[E 12319/10102/44] No. 459.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, November* 8, 1922.

MY telegram No. 386, paragraph 4.

Egyptian Government have addressed similar communication to Japanese Government.

[E 12320/10102/44] No. 460.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November* 8, 1922.

MY telegram No. 389.

Yousry Pasha would like to be put into touch with a member of British delegation. Would you give me name of someone to whom he could be referred?

No. 461.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(No. 671.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 8, 1922.

IDENTIC telegram from Allied High Commissioners of to-day's date.

I have just seen Ismet, who is prepared to leave for Lausanne to-morrow. I explained to him difficulties in the way of Lausanne Conference meeting as proposed on 13th November, although I had already done this through Hamid yesterday. He was obviously greatly put out at proposed adjournment of conference, and said that every day's delay increased local difficulties here and internal difficulties of Angora Government. I told him I did not think that conference could possibly meet before 20th November, but I appeal to you most earnestly to arrange for its meeting on that date, although I quite recognise personal inconvenience to yourself. Could you not open conference and then return to England? It is extremely necessary that official proposal for postponement of meeting of conference should be made as soon as possible. Unfortunately Eastern Telegraph Company's line is interrupted, and telegrams expected by my colleagues are not coming through.

No. 462.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(*Received November* 8, 1922.)

(No. P. 561.)
(Telegraphic.)

SITUATION is becoming critical owing to the attitude taken by the Nationalists towards the Administration of Constantinople. If the Nationalists do not agree to Allied control being maintained in town it is the Allied intention to declare a state of siege, and take stringent measures, both military and naval. The situation was discussed at a meeting of the Allied generals and admirals this afternoon, Tuesday, at which the prospect of Allied support was much more in evidence than has been hitherto the case. It was agreed that if it became necessary to proclaim a state of siege it would precipitate matters one way or the other, that is, that Nationalists would either moderate their attitude or deliberately violate the Mudania Convention by crossing the neutral lines.

No. 463.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(*Received November* 8, 1922.)

(No. 565.)
(Telegraphic.)

FOR Foreign Office from British High Commissioner:—

"Following is identic telegram from three High Commissioners to their Governments:—

"'Three Allied High Commissioners are profoundly convinced of necessity of holding conference at earliest possible date and not in any case later than 20th November. From impression gained from first contact with Ismet Pasha it is clear that any delay may result in pressure from extreme elements on Angora Government which latter will not be [? able to] resist, and which may destroy last chance of peaceful solution. Point of capital importance is to open conference.'"

No. 464.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 567.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 7, 1922.

MY telegram No. 562.

Reaction in French press against exaggerated Turkish demands is even more marked this morning.

Impression is becoming general that Allies have now to deal, not with the signatories of the Mudania Agreement, who had some claim to be called statesmen, but with a so-called National Assembly, which have got completely out of hand, and are convinced of their imaginary success over impotent Western Powers.

If the Turkish delegates are to arrive in this state of mind at Lausanne it may become necessary for France to reconsider her policy of support for Turkey.

No. 465.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 568.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 7, 1922.

MARSHAL FOCH sent for member of my military staff this morning to say that he considered it advisable that the British and French military authorities should, if possible, come to an understanding now about the military questions which will arise at the Lausanne Conference. He suggested that War Office should either inform military attaché, who is in England for a few days, of their views, or should send out a qualified officer to discuss matter here.

I understand that a message to this effect has been sent to War Office direct.

No. 466.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 573.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 8, 1922.

M. POINCARÉ asks me to communicate to your Lordship the following telegrams, which he has just received (Colonel Mougin's from Angora has been delayed in transmission) from General Pellé, Constantinople:—

Telegram No. 1:—

"Le Colonel Mougin me télégraphie d'Angora qu'Ismet Pacha insiste vivement pour que la conférence ne soit par retardée.

"'La nation attend,' dit Ismet. 'Je ne sais pas ce qui peut arriver demain. Pensez à toute une armée immobilisée devant un ennemi implacable, qui retarde toujours le moment de la paix; songez à tout un peuple enthousiaste. Que pouvons-nous faire? Nous serons débordé. Aucun ajournement ne semble possible.'"

Telegram No. 2:—

"Avec Ismet Pacha, le Colonel Mougin vient d'arriver à Constantinople. Il est tout à fait pessimiste. Il me dit que les éléments modérés et Moustapha Kémal Pacha lui-même sont débordés; on leur reproche, à Angora, d'avoir arrêté l'armée avant la victoire complète. Les instructions données pour la conférence à Ismet Pacha lui prescrivent de ne rien céder sur les points suivants: les territoires fixés par le Pacte national, comprenant Mossoul; plébiscite en Thrace occidentale; rectification de la frontière de la Syrie; autonomie des îles; indemnité pour réparation, 6 milliards de francs-or; indépendance ratifiée; aucune Capitulation. Les éléments les plus modérés accepteraient peut-être un régime provisoire pour les tribunaux.

"En ce qui concerne Constantinople, on veut appliquer immédiatement les lois d'Angora. Moustapha Kémal Pacha suggère la transaction suivante: les Alliés évacueraient la ville de Constantinople et se retireraient à Scutari, Tchanak, Gallipoli et Tchataldja. A cette condition, il a promis que pas un soldat ne franchirait la ligne de démarcation.

"La situation est très grave.

"Le Colonel Mougin redoute même que l'ajournement de la conférence entraîne des résolutions extrêmes. Il dit que l'armée, bien approvisionnée en matériel et munitions, est prête à marcher. Si nous ne voulons pas abandonner nos intérêts à Constantinople à la domination du régime kémaliste, il est indispensable que les Gouvernements alliés prennent d'un commun accord des mesures pour la protection de ces intérêts.

"La présence d'Ismet Pacha va permettre de voir si notre volonté de conciliation, que je ne me lasserai pas d'affirmer, peut attendre un résultat pratique.

"Dans la journée d'hier, Hamid Bey et Réfat Pacha ont été visiblement impressionnés par les efforts que j'ai faits en vue d'obtenir un régime acceptable à Constantinople jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix."

No. 467.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 577.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 8, 1922.*

M. POINCARÉ has just sent me an urgent letter to say that he has heard from General Pellé that Sir H. Rumbold has informed Ismet Pasha of proposal for adjournment of conference. This news has, as M. Poincaré expected, produced the worst effect, and General Pellé fears it may even lead the Turks to refuse to take part in the conference. General Pellé adds that the proclamation of state of siege runs the risk of having the gravest consequences owing to the adjournment of the conference, as the Turks will regard it as being connected therewith. It may precipitate an immediate conflict.

In these circumstances, M. Poincaré insists in the most energetic fashion on the date of the 13th being adhered to.

No. 468.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 354.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 8, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 356.

President of Council has sent instructions to Italian High Commissioner to the effect that only representatives on the spot can judge whether state of siege will accomplish desired results and has given him full discretion in the matter.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 469.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sofia, November 7, 1922.*

I HAVE received to-day note from Bulgarian Government, of which following is summary:—

After thanking for invitation to attend conference, Bulgarian Government expressed regret that they are only invited to participate in discussions on Straits, and not to those having for object termination of war between Turkey and Greece, fixing frontier between those States and solution of question of Thrace, Turkish victory having created new situation and important problems in which fate of Bulgaria is bound up.

Note then refers to promise under Treaty of Neuilly of outlet to sea which still remains unfulfilled, although Bulgarian Government have on their side executed all their engagements, and which is closely connected with question of frontier between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. This, and question of return to their homes in Eastern and Western Thrace of over 200,000 refugees now in Bulgaria and involving her in heavy expenditure, are matters which must necessarily be considered at conference; in these circumstances Bulgarian Government hope that their point of view cannot but have some interest for Powers, the more so seeing that they have invited to conference Serbia and Roumania, who are interested in questions in a much lesser degree.

Bulgarian Government therefore beg that they may also be heard in regard to the frontier to be established between Turkey and Greece and outlet to Ægean Sea, and they beg His Majesty's Government to put forward this request to French and Italian Governments.

Text follows by bag to-morrow.

No. 470.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November 8, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 572 of 7th November.

M. Poincaré's recollection of what happened at Paris in March last is at fault. It was I who on last day of meeting suggested conference at Constantinople, which was rejected by M. Poincaré on ground that Angora Turks would decline to attend. I continued to press for meeting at Therapia, Beicos or any suitable place in neighbourhood. M. Poincaré's suggestions were first Brusa, which, being still in Greek occupation, was impossible, and afterwards a French ship at Ismid, which we could not accept.

His Majesty's Government have no desire to urge postponement of Lausanne Conference on other grounds than those of public necessity. But information which M. Poincaré has himself now sent to us concerning intended demands amounting to an ultimatum of Turkish delegate to conference, as reported by Colonel Mougin, sufficiently demonstrate that it will be useless to enter into such a conference unless Allies are agreed beforehand as to the line that they mean to adopt in respect of some at any rate of these demands.

For instance, the demand for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, for an indemnity, for the islands, and for the complete abolition of Capitulations, which concern all the Allies, are questions upon which we have hitherto believed that the latter were united, and about which they would absolutely refuse to give way. Should this impression be ill-founded, and should a disagreement between the Allies on any of these points arise at the meeting, upon which the Turks are probably counting, the result would be a breakdown of the conference and the bankruptcy of the alliance.

It seems, therefore, indispensable to His Majesty's Government that there should be a preliminary interchange of views and a clear understanding on these and kindred points between the Allied Ministers before the opening of the Lausanne Conference, as was proposed by me in my telegram No. 409 of 6th November. Whether M. Poincaré would prefer to communicate his views in writing, or whether it would be possible to arrange for a meeting between M. Poincaré, Signor Mussolini and myself in Paris on

the way to Lausanne is open to consideration. But that the conference should not begin without such an understanding seems to His Majesty's Government to be indisputable.

M. Poincaré's suggestion of a preliminary treaty of peace to which the earlier sessions of the Lausanne Conference should be devoted does not appear to meet this or the other difficulties involved. For, firstly, such a treaty must deal in general terms with the question of frontiers, the freedom of the Straits, minorities, Capitulations and the debt, the discussions of which would occupy almost as much time as the negotiation of the final treaty itself; and, secondly, there would be no guarantee that in such a discussion conducted under the conditions proposed the Allies would be found in unison. His Majesty's Government therefore press most earnestly that an opportunity may be found for this preliminary interchange of views, in the manner most convenient to their allies.

On this understanding the date of meeting of conference might be definitely fixed for 20th November.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 362, and Constantinople, No. 551.)

[E 11886/27/44] No. 471.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Harvey.

Foreign Office, November 8, 1922.

Your Excellency,

IN reply to your note of the 30th ultimo enclosing a memorandum relative to the participation of the United States Government in the forthcoming Peace Conference at Lausanne, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government will welcome the presence of one or more United States representatives at Lausanne, for the purposes indicated in the memorandum enclosed in your note.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 12321/27/44] No. 472.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 2605.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 7th November, 1922, respecting the proposed postponement of the Lausanne Conference.

Paris, November 8, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 472.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris, le 7 novembre 1922.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE reçois à l'instant la lettre de ce jour par laquelle votre Excellence, après m'avoir exposé les difficultés que soulève, à l'avis du Gouvernement britannique, la réunion de la Conférence de Lausanne le 13 de ce mois, me fait part du désir de Lord Curzon de voir reculer cette réunion jusqu'au 27. Cette lettre me parvient au moment où j'allais prescrire à l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres d'attirer l'attention du Foreign Office sur l'intérêt pressant qu'il y avait à accélérer le plus possible l'action des Alliés pour le rétablissement de la paix, que tout retard risquerait, à mon sens, de compromettre sérieusement. L'incertitude qui règne dans l'opinion et dans l'armée turques sur les conditions générales de la paix est la cause d'une effervescence que le Gouvernement d'Angora paraît incapable de contenir et qui risque de se traduire, en dépit de l'Accord de Moudania, par une reprise d'hostilités ou tout au moins par un ensemble de mesures tendant à placer les Gouvernements alliés devant le fait accompli.

Je ne peux pas oublier qu'à la suite de la Conférence de Paris, au mois de mars dernier, j'ai insisté vivement, à plusieurs reprises, auprès du Gouvernement britannique pour qu'une conférence se réunisse sans retard à Constantinople. Si cette conférence

s'était réunie, même dans des conditions légèrement différentes de celles qui avaient été arrêtées à Paris, la dernière phase de la guerre gréco-turque aurait été évitée et la paix aurait pu, dès le printemps dernier, être conclue dans des conditions bien plus satisfaisantes qu'elles ne pourra plus jamais l'être. Il est à craindre que l'excitation et les illusions qu'ont fait naître chez les Turcs leurs rapides victoires ne soient accompagnées d'un sentiment de méfiance et qu'ils ne soient portés à croire qu'ils n'obtiendront que par la force la confirmation des avantages sur lesquels ils croient déjà pouvoir compter. Je suis persuadé que chaque jour de retard augmente les difficultés qu'il y aura à conclure la paix.

Je ne pense pas qu'en reculant la date de la réunion de la conférence on facilite l'établissement des rapports entre les autorités alliées et les autorités civiles turques de Constantinople.

Je ne pense pas non plus que les mesures à prendre en vue de l'installation des délégations à Lausanne puissent être considérées comme une raison sérieuse justifiant un nouveau délai.

En conséquence, si le Gouvernement britannique, pour des raisons qui lui sont particulières et que fait valoir Lord Curzon, ne peut absolument pas envoyer ses délégués à Lausanne pour le 13, et si le Gouvernement italien, pour des raisons analogues, se trouve dans la même difficulté, j'insiste d'une façon toute spéciale auprès de votre Excellence pour que le nouveau délai soit réduit au strict minimum, et que la conférence puisse se réunir le 20 novembre. Je décline d'ailleurs toute responsabilité sur les effets que l'annonce de ce retard pourra produire sur le Gouvernement d'Angora et sur l'opinion turque.

Il me paraît qu'un moyen de calmer l'émotion que cette nouvelle produira à Angora et de mettre un terme à un état d'incertitude qui comporte de réels dangers serait de signer dans le plus bref délai des préliminaires de paix comprenant en quelques articles les conditions essentielles du traité. On obtiendrait ainsi immédiatement une reconnaissance par le Gouvernement turc de principes généraux, et on lui donnerait, d'autre part, des apaisements qui faciliteraient considérablement dans la suite la discussion des clauses du traité, à laquelle il pourrait être procédé à loisir. Cette procédure, que j'avais recommandée dès le printemps dernier, et à laquelle Mustapha Kémal semble s'être autrefois montré favorable, rencontrerait peut-être encore son adhésion. Je ne me dissimule pas les difficultés que pourra présenter l'établissement de ces préliminaires, mais l'avantage certain qui en résulterait me fait penser que les premières séances de la Conférence de Lausanne, surtout si elle est reportée à une date ultérieure, ne sauraient être consacrées à une tâche plus utile ni plus urgente.

Je serais obligé à votre Excellence de faire part immédiatement de mon sentiment et de cette proposition au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, et de le prier, au cas où il estimerait cette procédure opportune, de me faire connaître les questions qui, à son avis, devraient faire l'objet de ces préliminaires de paix. Cette procédure répondrait d'ailleurs au désir que m'a fait exprimer le principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté d'échanger nos vues avant la réunion de la conférence sur les principaux points qui devront y être traités.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ.

P.S.—Comme je vous l'ai dit tout à l'heure, j'insiste pour que la date du 13 soit maintenue, et pour qu'il n'y ait aucun renvoi, même au 20. Ce qui est dangereux et ce qui peut amener la reprise des hostilités, c'est l'annonce, faite aux Turcs, d'un retard quelconque. Si la date du 13 n'est pas changée, ils n'auront aucun prétexte pour ne pas venir à Lausanne, et là, sur place, on pourra, s'il le faut, ajourner de quelques jours le commencement effectif des discussions. Mais l'essentiel est, d'abord, de se rencontrer avec eux dans une réunion pacifique.

R. P.

[E 12322/27/44] No. 473.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 2606.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 7, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the reply of the French Government to the note which I addressed to them on receipt of your

Lordship's telegram No. 400 of the 31st October regarding the objections raised by the Soviet Government in answer to the invitation to take part in the discussion of the question of the Straits at the Lausanne Conference.

As regards the first point raised by M. Chicherin, your Lordship will observe that M. Poincaré does not consider it sufficient justification of the choice by the three Allies of the Powers to be represented to say that the Powers "most immediately interested" have been invited. He is of opinion that it should be explained that those Powers have been invited who are not yet at peace with Turkey, and that the answer to this point should be so drafted as to refute the statement of M. Chicherin contained in his radiotelegram to the French Government (a copy of which is enclosed in M. Poincaré's note) to the effect that the conference, since it does not include all signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres, cannot be regarded as "une liquidation tardive de la participation ancienne à la grande guerre européenne," but as "un arrangement général des affaires du Proche-Orient."

M. Poincaré concurs in your Lordship's views on M. Chicherin's second point, but proposes an alternative text for the reply, designed to meet the statement in M. Chicherin's above-mentioned radiotelegram to the effect that the discussion of the Straits question cannot be isolated from that of the other questions, and that therefore the Governments of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia must be admitted to full participation in the conference.

With regard to the third point, M. Poincaré considers that it should be made clear that the invitation is not addressed to the Ukraine and Soviet Georgia, but that the Russian Soviet Government is free to include in their delegation Ukrainian and Georgian delegates.

M. Poincaré also encloses a draft radiotelegram which he proposes to send to M. Chicherin at the same time as an identic answer is handed to the Soviet Government by the British and Italian agents in Moscow, and enquires whether your Lordship agrees with his proposals regarding the answer to be made to the first question of M. Chicherin as well as with the terms of draft radiotelegram.

I should be grateful for instructions as to the answer I should return to M. Poincaré.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
R. S. HUDSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 473.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 8 novembre 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR une lettre du 1er de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des objections élevées par le Gouvernement soviétique de Russie en réponse à l'invitation qui lui a été adressée de participer à la discussion de la question des Détroits à la Conférence de Lausanne.

J'ai reçu du Commissaire aux Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement des Soviets un radiotélégramme,* dont j'ai l'honneur d'envoyer ci-joint la copie à votre Excellence, et qui reproduit dans leur ensemble les mêmes objections.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer les réponses que le principal Secrétaire d'État de sa Majesté estimerait pouvoir être faites aux objections de M. Tchitcherine et qui seraient les suivantes:

1. Le Gouvernement des Soviets demande à connaître les principes dont les Gouvernements français, britannique et italien se sont inspirés dans le choix des Puissances auxquelles a été adressée une invitation à négocier un Traité de Paix avec la Turquie. Il demande pour quelle raison la Belgique n'a pas été invitée, si les Puissances invitées sont les Puissances "alliées," ou pour quelle raison le Japon a été invité et la Bulgarie ne l'a pas été, si les Puissances invitées sont les Puissances "intéressées."

Son Excellence le Marquis Curzon proposerait de répondre que les Puissances invitées sont celles des Puissances alliées et signataires du Traité de Sèvres qui sont les plus intéressées aux questions qui paraissent devoir être soulevées par le Traité de Paix.

* See No. 438.

Le Gouvernement français croit nécessaire de faire observer que le choix qui a été fait ne lui paraîtrait pas suffisamment justifié s'il était répondu que les trois Gouvernements ont entendu inviter parmi les Puissances celles qui paraissent les plus intéressées dans les questions à régler dans le Traité de Paix. Il serait difficile en effet de soutenir que non seulement la Bulgarie, mais surtout la Russie ne sont pas parmi les États les plus intéressés et, d'autre part, que le Japon a plus d'intérêt dans ces questions que ces dernières Puissances.

Le Gouvernement français considère que l'objet du traité à conclure étant de rétablir la paix en Orient par un traité général avec la Turquie, les Puissances appelées à participer à sa conclusion sont celles entre lesquelles actuellement un état de paix définitif n'a pas été rétabli. Ces Puissances sont la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, le Japon, la Serbie, la Grèce, la Roumanie, d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part. La Russie a, il est vrai, été en état de guerre avec la Turquie. Mais, sans qu'il y ait à faire état du Traité de Moscou, le Gouvernement soviétique ne saurait contester qu'il soit actuellement en état de paix avec cette Puissance. Quant à la Bulgarie, elle n'a pas été en état de guerre avec la Turquie depuis le Traité de Paix de 1913.

D'autre part, la Roumanie ne saurait être considérée, malgré le Traité de Brest-Litovsk, comme en état de paix définitif avec la Turquie, son intention contraire s'étant nettement manifestée par sa déclaration du 9 novembre 1918.

Enfin, le Japon s'étant, par sa coopération navale avec la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie dans les opérations de guerre en Méditerranée orientale, rangé parmi les Puissances en guerre avec la Turquie, et ayant adhéré au Pacte de Londres du 5 septembre 1914, on ne saurait contester sa participation à la Conférence de la Paix dont il s'agit.

La réponse à la première question posée par M. Tchitcherine devrait en outre être formulée de manière à répliquer indirectement à l'assertion du Gouvernement soviétique contenue dans le radio ci-joint, suivant laquelle la conférence, ne comprenant pas tous les signataires du Traité de Sèvres, ne peut être considérée comme "une liquidation tardive de la participation ancienne à la grande guerre européenne," mais comme "un arrangement général des affaires du Proche-Orient."

Le Gouvernement français propose donc la formule suivante:

> "Les trois Gouvernements tiennent à faire connaître qu'à la conférence qui doit se réunir à Lausanne pour mettre fin à l'état de guerre en Orient par la conclusion d'un traité de paix avec la Turquie, ils ont convié les États qui, actuellement encore, ne sont pas en état de paix définitif avec cette Puissance."

2. Le Gouvernement des Soviets demande, en second lieu, d'après le Gouvernement britannique, si ses représentants qu'il est invité à envoyer pour l'examen des Détroits sont appelés à discuter cette question elle-même ou seulement les questions qui seraient soulevées à cette occasion. Ces représentants auraient-ils effectivement voix aux décisions en cette matière ou seraient-ils simplement invités à faire connaître les vues de leur Gouvernement?

Son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État propose de répondre que ces représentants ont été invités à la discussion de la question même des Détroits et qu'ils auront voix aux décisions.

Lord Curzon fait observer que l'expression "avoir voix aux décisions" ne confère pas au Gouvernement des Soviets d'autre droit que celui de prendre pleinement part aux discussions et de voir prendre ses vues en considération comme celles de tout autre participant avant d'en venir à la décision, ce droit n'impliquant pas celui d'opposer un veto aux décisions qu'adopterait la conférence.

Je partage entièrement le sentiment de Lord Curzon à cet égard. Les représentants des Soviets auront dans la discussion et dans la décision les droits habituellement reconnus à toute Puissance participant à des négociations et à des décisions internationales, y compris celui de refuser leur adhésion, mais sans que ce refus puisse empêcher les autres participants de prendre entre eux telles décisions sur lesquelles ils seraient d'accord. J'estime, d'ailleurs, avec Lord Curzon que les Gouvernements alliés devront éviter autant que possible un pareil refus, qui fournirait à la Russie un prétexte, qu'elle paraît désirer, de proclamer que les Alliés ont l'intention de régler sans elle la question des Détroits.

Toutefois, dans le radio adressé au Gouvernement français, M. Tchitcherine ne vise la discussion relative aux Détroits que pour déclarer qu'elle ne peut être isolée de

celle des autres questions et réclame pour la Russie, l'Ukraine et la Géorgie une participation complète aux travaux de la conférence.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement français propose de rédiger comme suit la réponse à faire à ce sujet au Gouvernement de Moscou : " Les représentants des Soviets auront, dans la discussion relative aux Détroits, le droit de participer aux négociations et aux décisions, et seront ainsi en mesure de faire connaître leur point de vue sur les différents aspects de cette question."

3. En dernier lieu, le Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires étrangères demande si l'invitation adressée à la Russie s'étend à l'Ukraine et à la Géorgie.

Pour éviter toute interprétation tendancieuse, j'estime qu'il y a lieu de répondre à cette question que l'invitation n'est pas adressée à l'Ukraine et à la Géorgie, mais que le Gouvernement soviétique de Russie est libre de comprendre dans sa délégation des délégués ukrainiens et géorgiens.

Je serais obligé à votre Excellence de bien vouloir me faire savoir si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté donne son adhésion aux propositions formulées en ce qui concerne la réponse à donner à la première des questions de M. Tchitcherine et au projet de radiotélégramme ci-joint qui serait adressé par le Gouvernement français au Gouvernement des Soviets au même temps qu'une réponse identique lui serait remise par les agents britanniques et italiens dans les conditions où l'a été leur invitation.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 473.

Draft Reply to M. Chicherin.

Paris, le novembre 1922.

(Télégraphique.)

LES Gouvernements français, britannique et italien ont examiné avec attention les observations formulées par le Gouvernement des Soviets de Russie au sujet de l'invitation qu'ils lui ont adressée le 26 octobre à se faire représenter dans la discussion de la question des Détroits.

Les trois Gouvernements tiennent à faire connaître qu'à la conférence qui doit se réunir à Lausanne pour mettre fin à l'état de guerre en Orient par la conclusion d'un Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, ils ont convié les États qui actuellement ne sont pas en état de paix définitif avec cette Puissance.

Ils tiennent également à préciser que les représentants que le Gouvernement des Soviets a été invité à envoyer, le moment venu, à Lausanne auront dans la discussion de la question des Détroits le droit de participer aux négociations et aux décisions, et seront ainsi en mesure de faire connaître leur point de vue sur les différents aspects de cette question.

Les trois Gouvernements ajoutent que le Gouvernement soviétique de Russie a toute liberté de comprendre dans sa propre délégation des délégués ukrainiens et géorgiens comme ont déjà été compris des représentants de ces républiques dans la délégation soviétique russe à la Conférence de Gênes.

No. 474.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November* 8, 1922.

MY telegram No. 144 and my telegram No. 145.

I had an interview with M. Nincic this morning. He said that until it was known what demands Turks would bring forward at conference it was difficult to define what the attitude of Serb-Croat-Slovene Government would be. As regards Western Thrace, he was in favour of placing a slip of territory down to Dedeagatch under an international commission like that of the Danube, which would afford to Bulgaria her economic outlet to sea. This would at any rate provide an internationalised barrier between Turkey and Greece. He let me suppose that Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed agreement to above, though it does not quite correspond with what I learnt at Greek Legation. According to M. Todorov, M. Stambolilisky's best friend, such an arrangement is about all latter expects to obtain.

With Greece's present position in Western Thrace confirmed, M. Nincic regards question of Eastern Thrace as already settled by note of Powers of 23rd September. He is, of course, in favour of no Turkish military force, save what is necessary to maintain order, being admitted into Europe.

As regards freedom of Straits, this Government has little knowledge of question, and will leave it to Great Powers to provide their scheme for securing it. Serb-Croat-Slovene Government are not much interested in Capitulations, which Serbia had not hitherto enjoyed except as regards her former Austrian subjects, but he would co-operate with Greece in demanding a more efficacious protection of Christian minorities than that afforded by recent treaties of peace.

M. Stambolilisky is to arrive to-morrow, but I do not now expect that his visit will result in any noteworthy modification in views.

No. 475.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(No. 669.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November* 7, 1922.

TELEGRAMS which I have sent you during last two days [? group omitted] that Kemalists aim at asserting their complete and immediate independence here by their alteration of customs tariff, abolition of international sanitary administration, &c. In fact, they evidently mean to apply same régime here as they have done at Smyrna, which means abolition of Capitulations.

Their plan is to present Powers at Lausanne Conference with a *fait accompli*, and when questions of Capitulations and customs régime, &c., are raised at conference, to reply that there is no need for discussion of these questions, as they have been settled already.

No. 476.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(No. 670.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 7, 1922.

MY telegrams Nos. 645, 649, 650, 651, 656.

I trust that English press will give widest publicity to proceedings of Kemalist Government as indicated in above-mentioned telegrams.

It seems essential that public opinion should be enlightened as to character of Turks with whom we are now dealing in unfortunate event of a rupture.

If United States Government could be induced to come out at this moment with a strong pronouncement both with regard to measures which Kemalist Government are contemplating or actually taking to get rid of minorities, as well as with regard to proceedings of Kemalist Government in arbitrarily altering customs tariff here, &c. (see my telegram No. 668), it would greatly help situation.

No. 477.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(No. 673. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 7, 1922.

MY telegram No. 658.

Sultan gave me an audience yesterday exceeding three and a half hours. He insisted on illegal character of Angora Government, [? especially] now that lawful Government was in state of suspended animation, and questioned me as to attitude of Powers. I parried his enquiries by pointing out necessity for us of facing fact

that only Angora could send representatives to conference and leaving question of legality until later.

He urged importance of Allies taking [group omitted] line in Constantinople pending conclusion of peace. I explained present position.

He said that Caliphate was matter of spiritual concern to whole Moslem world, and Grand National Assembly could not usurp rights of all Moslems.

He believed attitude of Angora Government to be that they dare not depose him, but wanted to make him abdicate. He would not do this unless situation became such as to absolve him from obligation, under which he at present felt himself, to guard his trust.

He said his decision must depend largely on attitude of Allies in Constantinople. I observed that our principles were clear, but that actual course of events could not be foreseen. He accepted this answer, and asked whether we could get him away if he decided to leave. He referred to promise given in 1920 to protect his person in the event of imminent personal danger. I said that promise held subject to our ability to carry it out. As regards immediate future, I said I had no doubt we could enable him to leave if necessity arose, but I was dubious as to whether we could do so in all conceivable circumstances, even if occupation lasted.

Sultan was composed, and did not seem to despair absolutely of reaction in his favour.

Details follow by bag.

No. 478.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

[Viâ Horsea Wireless.]

(No. 674.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 7, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Sultan was very strong on argument that Angora was claiming right as regards Caliphate over [? Indian] Moslem world, large part of which was under temporal sovereignty of His Majesty's Government.

It would be useful if I could have summary of any reports from Viceroy on effect produced in India by Angora decision.

No. 479.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

[Viâ Horsea Wireless.]

(No. 675.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 7, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 663.

All attempts to discover whereabouts of Ali Mustapha Kemal have failed. Both Refet and Nationalist agent deny all knowledge of arrest. There is good reason to believe, however, that, having been arrested by unofficial agents of Angora Government, he was smuggled across to Asiatic side, where, if he has not already been murdered, he will certainly be executed.

Arrest has caused great consternation here, and 150 Turks, fearing similar fate, took "bast" in Embassy garden yesterday. They were taken under military escort to Tashkishla Barracks last night, and are temporarily accommodated there. But it is probable that others will follow their example. Their disposal is matter requiring urgent settlement, and it may be necessary to incur financial charges on their behalf. Would Cyprus be willing to receive a certain number of Turks of this category? Apart from Greeks and Armenians, many hundreds, if not thousands, of Turks will wish to leave Constantinople rather than remain once Allied, and particularly British, troops are withdrawn.

If Allies adopt strong line here, Turks at present under military protection will return to their homes, and question of ultimate disposal of compromised Ottomans will, of course, lapse, temporarily at any rate.

No. 480.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 682.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 8, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 545.

I should deprecate departure of Patriarch at present, as it would produce serious panic amongst Greek population. He could not remain here after cessation of Allied occupation. Even while it lasts, I fear he is in some danger, but I do think no one should or would induce him to abandon his flock.

In case of Allied evacuation, I would propose to offer him any possible facilities for departure.

No. 481.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9, 1922.)

[Number undecypherable.]
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople (viâ Horsea W/T).*

MY telegram No. 677.

My colleagues and I are much impressed with danger that adjournment of conference, if only by a week, coupled with probable proclamation of a state of siege, will make Turks think that we harbour some sinister design. They may look upon it as last straw.

Above is one of the main reasons for which we must press for meeting of conference on 20th November. As a consequence, no doubt, of interruption of Eastern Telegraph Company's line, neither my French nor my Italian colleague has received instructions from his Government with reference to proclamation of a state of siege. Meanwhile, generals will, on their side, do all that is possible to get Refet Pasha to accept a sufficient measure of inter-Allied control of police and gendarmerie, whilst Allied High Commissioners, on their side, have demanded in writing that measures taken with regard to customs, debt, &c., should be revoked, and are endeavouring to arrange a collective interview with Ismet for that purpose.

No. 482.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 574.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 8, 1922.*

PRESS this morning shows remarkable unanimity in approving—

1. Choice of French plenipotentiaries at Lausanne (see my telegram No. 569).

2. Arguments used by M. Poincaré in refusing to agree to postponement of conference (see my telegram No. 572).

3. Action of Allied Governments in authorising High Commissioners to declare state of siege at Constantinople. Papers agree in regarding this as essential in order to prevent Allies being faced at Lausanne by *fait accompli*.

No. 483.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 10, 1922.)

(No. 582.)
(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE this moment received note from M. Poincaré in reply to letter I sent him yesterday embodying your Lordship's telegram No. 417.

M. Poincaré begins by maintaining his views that no adjournment should take place, but he realises your Lordship's desire to meet an Italian representative and M. Poincaré himself before the opening of the conference. Although as a result of previous meeting agreement has been reached between the Allies on general principle,

recent events render it necessary to modify those agreements in certain respects M. Poincaré therefore welcomes proposal for a conversation in Paris, which must not, however, assume the character of an official meeting before the conference restricted to certain only of the Allies.

To give time for this conversation, the first meeting of the conference should still be on the 13th, but should be clearly of a formal nature, and attended by one plenipotentiary of each Power. The secretariat should meanwhile proceed to Lausanne to make the necessary arrangements.

The effective work of the conference would, according to M. Poincaré's views, begin only on the 17th or 20th.

No. 484.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 360.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 9, 1922.*

PRESS comments on Eastern situation are not numerous so far, but those which have appeared are very satisfactory in tone. It seems to be [group omitted] that Turkish challenge must be firmly met, and prospect of renewed solidarity between *Entente* Powers is welcomed.

Signs of a reaction in attitude of press towards Turkish question had already been noticeable, and behaviour of Turks has now made it easy even for pro-Turkish press to support strong line which it is understood the Government has decided to take.

While criticisms of French and British policy in the past, and particularly of British policy, continue to be published here and there, there is no hint of any opposition to firm and united action in present crisis.

Reports of your speech in the city, which have appeared in all papers, have produced an excellent effect.

No. 485.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva).

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 9, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Sir Eric Drummond :—

" (Confidential.)

" His Majesty's Minister at Athens reports confidentially that Dr. Nansen's position *vis-à-vis* other relief organisations in Greece is most unsatisfactory, that no one will work with him, and that Colonel Corfe, hitherto his representative in Athens, who had proved most capable, is about to resign.

" Sir H. Rumbold also reports that Dr. Nansen has failed in negotiations with the Turks for the release of deportees or exchange of minorities.

" This is deplorable, as it is essential, if vast disaster is to be averted, that all relief organisations should co-operate with each other and with League, which alone can take initiative in various political issues involved in refugee problem, and that League representative, who ought to centralise all activities, should command the confidence of the powerful organisations already at work.

" It is most desirable that Council should consider with least possible delay the question of finding more suitable representative."

No. 486.

Telegram (by Telephone) to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 419.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 9, 1922.*

YOUR telephone message of this morning.

The arguments fully set out in my telegram No. 417 of last night retain all their force. Moreover, Sir H. Rumbold has already explained to Ismet Pasha that conference could not in any case meet before 20th November, and has appealed to me most earnestly to accept that date in preference to 27th November. This accordingly I have done.

I have notified this not only to Italian Government, but to all Governments to whom original invitation was sent.

In these circumstances, it is important that you should make communication, in accordance with my telegram No. 417, with as little delay as possible. M. Poincaré must be got to understand that this is no question of convenience, or even of practicability. I am not going into the conference in order to find myself let down very likely on the first day by the French or the Italians. I must know where I am, and whether in face of the Turkish attitude Allied solidarity, to which everyone pays lip-service, is a reality or a sham.

No. 487.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 9, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 656 of 5th November: Expulsion of Christians from Anatolia.

Turkish Government are also preparing to expel entire Christian population of Constantinople, and Armenians and Greeks are already being forced to leave in vast numbers, while all Christian men between 15 and 45 are being retained in Anatolia and deported to interior, where they cannot survive long.

Please ascertain confidentially probable attitude of United States Government towards violent xenophobia of Kemalists, as shown in above acts, which will seriously affect both commercial and humanitarian activities of United States in Near East.

No. 488.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 10.)

[By Wireless.]

(No. 679.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 8, 1922.*

FRENCH agent at Angora arrived here with Ismet Pasha yesterday.

French High Commissioner has given me a summary of French agent's impressions.

French agent says that, as regards territorial question, Ismet Pasha's instructions are to demand Mosul, a rectification of Syrian frontier, a plebiscite in Western Thrace and liberty of [? islands]. He says that extremists have [? got] upper hand at Angora and for the moment have swamped moderate party, which includes [? Kemal], Ismet and Fethi.

A large section of National Assembly is greatly opposed to Mudania Agreement, which is considered to have deprived Turkey of a victory. Turkish army is quite willing and prepared to advance. It is well supplied with artillery and motor transport captured from Greeks.

French agent views situation with pessimism. Measures taken by Refet since he arrived here bear out view that extremists are in power and mean to show it. We must therefore be prepared for any excuse for breaking Mudania Agreement and of setting Turkish troops in motion.

No. 489.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 682A.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 9, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 677.

Ismet Pasha left this morning for Lausanne with Turkish delegation, although I told him quite clearly yesterday that he would probably not find anybody when he

got there. His attitude is that, as Angora Government has received no official notification of adjournment of conference, he ought to be at Lausanne on date originally indicated. He may then enter a protest against non-attendance of Allied delegates on 13th November. This action would be designed to [? omitted: place] Allies in the wrong.

No. 490.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 684.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 9, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 675.

On learning that Ali Kemal had been taken to Ismid, where he had been lynched, then hanged, by crowd, Allied High Commissioners addressed a strong written protest to Hamid against this "political murder," which they would report to their respective Governments. Although both Refet and Hamid denied all knowledge of kidnapping of Ali Kemal, Allied High Commissioners are satisfied that it was carried out with knowledge and connivance of Kemalist authorities.

No. 491.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 10.)

[Viâ Horsea W/T.]

(No. 686.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 9, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 648.

Italian High Commissioner informs me that M. Maissa has been recalled to Rome.

Please repeat to Rome.

No. 492.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 10.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(No. 687.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 9, 1922.*

SITUATION is as follows:—

Allied military experts in respect of gendarmerie, police, sanitary, telegraphic and censorship matters are to hold meeting to-day with Turkish experts to see whether it is possible to reach working arrangement ensuring Allied control in manner satisfactory to Allied prestige and safety of Allied troops. Allied generals will consider proposals to-morrow morning.

Allied High Commissioners had hoped to have a collective interview with Ismet yesterday with reference to violation of Capitulations. It was evident from the first that Ismet shrank from this interview, and he managed to get out of it. There is therefore no progress to report under this heading, especially as neither French nor Italian High Commissioner has received any telegrams for three days, owing to break in the line, and is not yet in receipt of instructions from his Government regarding proclamation of a state of siege if necessary; I have proposed to my colleagues that when they receive these instructions we should tackle Nationalist authorities on the subject of breach of Capitulations.

No. 493.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 10.)

[Viâ Wireless.]

(No. 688.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 9, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 679.

French agent likewise stated that Turks would demand an indemnity from Greece. Italian High Commissioner learns that Turks will ask for 6 milliards of francs gold.

Another intention [? of] Turks is to pass on Turkish debt to Greece and thereby get rid of Ottoman Debt Administration.

Please repeat to Athens.

No. 494.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Peters (Moscow).

(No. 256.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 228 of 27th October: Russia and Lausanne Conference.

My immediately following telegram, while incidentally answering the first three questions, is the identic reply of the French, British and Italian Governments to the answer of 2nd November from the Russian Government to the invitation to Lausanne contained in my telegram No. 250 of 26th October. Please communicate text to Russian Government. Russian telegram was communicated to us through M. Berzin on 6th November. French Government will presumably telegraph direct to M. Chicherin, and Italian Government through their representative at Moscow.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 372.)

No. 495.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Peters (Moscow).

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 10, 1922.*

THE French, British and Italian Governments have carefully examined the observations formulated by the Russian Soviet Government on the subject of the invitation which they addressed to that Government on 26th October to be represented in the discussion on the question of the Straits.

The three Governments desire to make it clear that they have invited to the conference, which is to assemble at Lausanne to conclude the state of war in the East by the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Turkey, the States which are actually not in a state of definite peace with the latter Power.

They also wish to explain that the representatives which the Government of the Soviets has been invited to send in due course to Lausanne will have in the discussion of the question of the Straits the right to participate in the negotiations and in the decisions, and will thus be in a position to make known their point of view on the different aspects of this question.

The three Governments would add that the Russian Soviet Government has complete liberty to include in its own delegation the Ukrainian and Georgian delegates in the same manner that representatives of these republics were included in the Russian Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 373.)

No. 496.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 582.

M. Poincaré's latest suggestion is quite impracticable.

Neither Rumbold nor I can possibly be at Lausanne on 13th November; nor have I any intention of despatching British secretariat to twiddle their thumbs in Switzerland for a week.

An opening meeting with half the nations absent and Great Britain unrepresented followed by an adjournment for a week would be ridiculous, and is clearly only intended to save M. Poincaré's face. If he dislikes idea of joint preliminary conference at Paris for reasons given by him, I am quite willing that you should put forward suggestion, which on whole seems preferable, that Barrère should come here after seeing Mussolini, but only on condition that he is in a position to speak for both Italian and French Governments, and to come to a clear understanding with me as to the points on which the three Allies intend to stand firm. It will be of no use to talk with him in a tentative way and then to find that he is repudiated by his Government. I shall want to know exactly where the Allies mean to stand on each of the main issues, and whether they will or will not see the matter through. Otherwise we shall have a humiliating fiasco.

[E 12475/10524/44] No. 497.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 11.)

Admiralty, November 9, 1922.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a report which has been received from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the evacuation of refugees from Smyrna and district, 14th–30th September.

I am, &c.
CHARLES WALKER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 497.

Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Light Cruiser Squadron, to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

THE attached report from the commanding officer of "Curaçoa" on the evacuation of refugees from Smyrna is submitted.

2. At the commencement of the evacuation a limit of time was set for the refugees being permitted to depart, and therefore speed of embarkation was essential.

3. In my opinion, Commander Halsey Powell, U.S.N., of the United States ship "Edsall," is deserving of the greatest commendation. The ships working for the American Relief Committee were under his supervision, and American sailors under his orders provided barrier and gate guards, as stated in the report. He was in personal touch and tactful in his dealings with the Turkish authorities. I am of opinion that the successful evacuation of so large a number of refugees is largely due to his own personal efforts, and also to the officers and men serving under his command.

The United States destroyers under his orders made all arrangements for the evacuation of outlying districts, with the exception of Chesmeh, where the French destroyer "Hova" assisted the British steamship "Pavia."

My personal relations with Commander Powell have been most cordial, and his assistance has been of the greatest value.

The American Red Cross also worked indefatigably in relieving, as much as lay in their power, the misery of the destitute refugees.

4. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men of "Curaçoa." The conditions under which the work was carried out are described in Captain Buckle's report. The physical strain was severe and the heat and general conditions most trying. That their efforts were appreciated by the refugees was very evident, as ships who passed near "Curaçoa" all cheered or attempted to cheer when leaving.

5. While concurring in the remarks of Captain Buckle as to the particular officers he mentions, I would specially bring to your notice the services of Captain Buckle himself, who personally arranged all details in conjunction with Commander Powell, U.S.N., and spent most of the day on the jetties.

6. The following table gives a complete estimate of the number of refugees evacuated to the 5th October, 1922:—

Estimated Total Numbers Evacuated in Steamships from all Sources (except Aivali).

Date	Method.	Number.
September 14	United States torpedo-boat destroyers	1,800
,, 14	Steamship "Winona" (American Relief Commission)	1,600
,, 14	,, "Constantinople" (American Relief Commission)	2,000
,, 14	,, "Elpiniki" (British charter)	59
,, 15	H.M.S. "King George V"	130
,, 20	Steamship "City of Versailles" (British control)	3,282
,, 20	,, "Worsley Hall" (British control)	3,153
,, 22	,, "City of Versailles" (British control)	4,407
,, 23	,, "Worsley Hall" (British control)	5,053
,, 24	Greek ships under American Relief Commission control	15,000
,, 25		Nil
,, 26		40,000
,, 27		30,000
,, 28	From Smyrna and Cordelio in British and Greek ships	36,000
,, 29		35,000
,, 30		5,000
,, 29	From Chesmeh by French torpedo-boat destroyer "Hova" and British steamship "Pavia"	5,700
,, 30	From Chesmeh by United States ship "McLeish" and Greek ships	1,000
,, 30	From Vourlah Scala by United States ship "McLeish" and Greek ships	10,000
	French evacuation of nationals and protégés given as	9,000*
	Italian evacuation of nationals and protégés given as	11,000*
	Total	219,384

* These figures are up to the 28th September inclusive. Other refugees left afterwards in small numbers.

NOTE.—Evacuation of Aivali still continues. No figures are included.

WILMOT NICHOLSON, *Rear-Admiral.*

H.M.S. "Curaçoa,"
Smyrna, October 7, 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 497.

Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Curaçoa," to Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Light Cruiser Squadron.

THE following report of the evacuation of refugees from Smyrna is submitted.

2. At 11·30 on Saturday, the 23rd September, "Curaçoa" took over from "Cardiff" the embarkation in steamship "Worsley Hall," she being the only ship available. At 13·15 she was full, and sailed at 14·15 with 5,053 refugees on board. The arrangements at this time were that "Curaçoa" provided all parties who were disposed as shown in the enclosure. At 18·30 "Curaçoa" sailed for Chanak, and returned to Smyrna at 9·15 on Monday, the 25th September.

3. At daylight on Tuesday, the 26th September, numbers of Greek steamers, mostly small, arrived, and the assistance of "Curaçoa" was offered to Commander Powell of the United States ship "Edsall," who gratefully accepted it. In view of the strained situation it was decided that the Americans should man the gates and approaches thereto and regulate traffic as far as and including the police barrier. From there to the head of the pier was manned by "Curaçoa," who also provided hands for loading; all "Curaçoa's" were unarmed. On this day we endeavoured to

load five ships at a time, but found that it was too many, and from A.M. on the 27th September four only were loaded at one time. This was found to answer well, as, unless the vessels were all small, not more than five ships could be alongside at a time, thus leaving a spare ship to which traffic could be directed immediately a vessel was loaded and ready to sail. The numbers embarked on the several days were :—

Day.	Numbers embarked.	Hours worked.
Saturday, September 23	5,053	11·30 to 14·00
Tuesday, September 26	40,000	12·00 „ 21·00
Wednesday, September 27	30,000	08·30 „ 20·30
Thursday, September 28	32,000	08·30 „ 19·30
Friday, September 29	29,500	08·30 „ 21·30
Saturday, September 30	6,000	08·30 „ 19·00

4. The ships varied a great deal in their capacity and individual arrangements. Large ships in ballast, such as the "Andreas," of 5,167 gross tons, presented great difficulty owing to the height of freeboard and shortness of brows, causing the latter to lie at a very steep angle, most unsuitable for the aged or heavily laden. The between-deck spaces were stowed first, then the parts furthest from the brows, finally filling up the last inch of space. The only way to ensure their following directions was to carry their packs to the desired position. In nearly every case the officers and men of the ships lent every help, especially in the case of the "Maid of Chios" and the "Pavia." On the other hand, the captain and officers of the "City of Oxford" did nothing to help, raised objections and, as I ultimately discovered, ignored my personal request to organise their hands to supply water to the refugees embarked.

5. The condition of the refugees was pitiable in the extreme. All men of military age were made prisoners and placed under guard at the gates or the police barrier, leaving a crowd of panic-stricken women and old men, with hordes of children, to struggle along, carrying all their worldly possessions. Their physical condition was bad, and cases of collapse were frequent. Water was in great demand; every available barricoe was landed and distributed by the watering party at each halting place. Most of the refugees carried some receptacle, which was filled either on the dock by the watering party or on board by the ships' crews and Greek boys. The majority of them had been under guard since the fire on the 20th and 21st September, exposed to robbery, outrage and violence at the hands of the Turkish soldiers. During the evacuation robbery was continuous and increased, despite the protests of British and American officers. It was seldom that any but subordinate Turkish officers were seen, and they were as bad as—or worse than—their men. On one occasion a more senior Turkish officer, appealed to by Commander Powell, D.S.O., U.S.N., unmercifully thrashed a soldier who was pointed out as an offender, but such isolated incidents had no general effect. On the 29th September, when the Americans were short-handed owing to the evacuation of Cordalio being undertaken, the situation was very bad, and I saw many cases myself. More were reported, as were also offences against women and even the carrying off of girls—and this in broad daylight. Commander Powell landed another ten men, and "Curaçoa" took over the traffic up to and including the barrier marked "B," so that the American parties at the gates could be re-established and the actions of the Turkish soldiers supervised as far as possible. Further American reinforcements were landed later and our parties returned to their original stations.

6. It was found extremely difficult to avoid cases in which members of the same family were embarked in different ships, but every endeavour was made to rectify the matter when discovered. Engineer-Lieutenant McLennan was of the greatest possible help with his knowledge of colloquial Greek, the language question being a great and enduring difficulty.

7. The conduct of the police officer at the police barrier was very restrained, and he was on the whole most generous in his manner of fulfilling the proclamation that all Greeks between the ages of 16 and 45 were to be made prisoners of war. On the other hand, his subordinates and the soldiers were brutal, and, unless supervised, would go to any length. The contradictory nature of the Turk's character is exemplified by the numerous cases I and my officers heard of, from American officers, of Turkish police and soldiers throwing themselves on the ground outside the gates to save a child that had fallen and was being trodden underfoot; five minutes later the same man would quite likely kick a cripple in the stomach. I myself saw an exceptionally brutal

policeman carry a lost child up and down the jetty until he found the parents. The Greeks did not help matters by producing passports with the most palpable alterations in ages, dates, photographs, &c.; many of these were shown me by the police officer, and were obvious frauds. Two young men tried to pass disguised as women, but were at once detected and made prisoners.

8. Surgeon-Commander Haydon established a first-aid depot near the police barrier and had a stretcher party under his order. He himself remained by the barrier, and very quickly established confidence and good relations with the police officer. This enabled him to get many sick or injured Greeks of military age released. His prompt diagnosis of lead-poisoning in the case of a man with "wrist-drop," who, on interrogation, turned out to be a lead-worker, inspired further confidence.

9. The physical condition of the refugees steadily deteriorated as the days passed; each evening the "sweep" of the compound and jetty produced an increasing number of cases of collapse amongst the aged, which culminated on Saturday, when the stretchers, English and American, were in constant demand, and cases were brought down the jetty in loads on trollies. There were several births and also several deaths, the bodies being consigned to the water. It is feared that more deaths will be reported after the disembarkation of those evacuated on Saturday, the 30th September. On that day the evacuation was completed.

10. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men, who all worked at least twelve hours daily in most distressing and insanitary conditions, in an atmosphere of heat, dust, filth, stink and vermin. They showed great sympathy and kindness to the Greeks, coupled with a very necessary firmness, and also great tact and firmness with the Turks. There were several incidents which might have developed into trouble, such as the pursuit down the dock of an escaped prisoner by a Turkish soldier; the latter appeared to trip over a rope across the gate in the barrier through which the prisoner had dashed, and, on being told by an ordinary seaman to "—— off out of it," protestingly obeyed.

11. All officers of each branch willingly assisted, and the excellent organisation and inspiring example of Commander Maltby on shore, shown in detail in enclosure, and of Commander Miles on board, kept everything going smoothly by day or night.

12. Dinner and tea were landed and eaten as opportunity arose. On returning on board all hands stripped and shook out their clothes, followed by a disinfectant bath—a most necessary precaution. The men were warned not to drink shore water or eat the grapes which were distributed by the American Relief Committee, but some undoubtedly succumbed to the temptation and are suffering from stomach-ache and diarrhœa in consequence. There were no cases of drunkenness or misbehaviour.

13. I wish to bring to your notice the excellent work done by the officers and men of the American destroyers. Of Commander Powell, D.S.O., you have had opportunity of forming your own estimate; his officers and men worked magnificently and in the most cordial relationship with my officers and men, and, but for the co-operation mrintained throughout by them, the speed of embarkation would have been much reduced.

H. C. BUCKLE, *Captain.*

Smyrna, October 2, 1922.

[E 12470/27/44] No. 498.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.— (*Received November 11.*)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 9 novembre 1922.

M le Marquis,

EN réponse à l'invitation qui lui avait été remise par l'Ambassadeur de France en même temps que par les représentants de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie en vue des négociations destinées à ramener la paix générale en Orient, le Gouvernement des États-Unis a fait remettre au Gouvernement français, par l'intermédiaire de son Ambassade à Paris, un aide-mémoire daté du 30 octobre dernier.

Conformément à mes instructions, j'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-oint à votre. Seigneurie, copie de la réponse que M. Poincaré a aussitôt adressée à Mr. Mjyron Herrick

Veuillez agréer, &c.

SAINT-AULAIRE.

Enclosure in No. 498.

Note du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à l'Ambassade des États-Unis d'Amérique à Paris.

LE Gouvernement de la République a reçu avec satisfaction la nouvelle que le Gouvernement fédéral enverrait des observateurs à la conférence qui va se réunir pour rétablir la paix en Orient.

Il comprend que les États-Unis n'ayant pas été en guerre avec la Turquie et n'ayant point signé l'armistice de 1918, n'aient pas le désir de prendre part à la négociation qui mettra fin à la guerre entre les Alliés et la Grèce d'une part, et la Turquie de l'autre, et qu'ils préfèrent ne pas assumer de responsabilités dans les résultats politiques et territoriaux auxquels aboutira cette négociation.

Mais le Gouvernement fédéral ne veut pas laisser l'impression que les intérêts américains ont moins de titres à être respectés que ceux d'aucune autre Puissance, ni qu'il soit disposé à abandonner les droits dont les États-Unis jouissent à l'égal des autres Puissances dans un certain nombre de matières dont il donne l'énumération.

Il se trouve que sur tous ces sujets les Puissances alliées, et en particulier la France, ont des intérêts analogues à ceux des États-Unis. Le Gouvernement français, en ce qui le concerne, fera donc tous ses efforts pour que ces intérêts soient sauvegardés. Mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler que cette tâche ne sera pas facilitée par les circonstances. D'après les renseignements que le Gouvernement français a déjà reçus de toutes parts, les Turcs, après avoir victorieusement repoussé les attaques des armées grecques en Asie Mineure, se refuseront à accorder aux étrangers la plupart des avantages qu'ils leur avaient reconnus autrefois. Si l'on veut obtenir les concessions que souhaite le Gouvernement fédéral, il est certain que le concours effectif des États-Unis ne sera pas inutile.

Quant à conclure des arrangements secrets ou à maintenir dans des accords déjà signalés des clauses que les États-Unis jugeraient préjudiciables, le Gouvernement de la République peut donner dès maintenant au Gouvernement fédéral l'assurance qu'il n'en a jamais eu l'intention.

Paris, le 31 octobre 1922.

[E 12445/27/44] No. 499.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 2633.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré respecting the Lausanne Conference.

Paris, November 10, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 499.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Paris, le 10 novembre 1922.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE reçois votre lettre d'hier soir, par laquelle vous me faites savoir que Lord Curzon demande que l'ouverture de la Conférence de Lausanne soit fixée définitivement au 20 novembre, et qu'il désire s'entretenir au préalable avec M. Mussolini et avec moi sur les principaux points qui y seront traités.

Je persiste à penser, comme je l'ai déjà dit à votre Excellence, qu'il y aurait les plus graves inconvénients à retarder la date primitivement fixée. Je viens, d'ailleurs, d'apprendre ce matin que la délégation turque a quitté Constantinople pour Lausanne, où elle arrivera, par l'Orient-Express, dimanche soir. Ce départ indique bien que les Turcs tiennent à marquer que, si quelque retard est apporté à la réunion de la conférence, ce ne sera pas de leur fait.

Toutefois, je comprends les raisons qui font désirer au principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté de me voir ainsi qu'un représentant de l'Italie, avant l'ouverture de la conférence. Bien qu'au cours de réunions précédentes l'Entente se soit établie entre

les Alliés sur les principaux généraux, les derniers événements rendent indispensable, en effet, d'apporter à ces accords certaines modifications. Je ne demande donc pas mieux que de voir Lord Curzon à son passage par Paris, lorsqu'il se rendra à Lausanne. Cette entrevue, à laquelle un représentant de l'Italie serait naturellement appelé à assister, ne devrait toutefois pas prendre le caractère d'une réunion officielle de certains des Alliés avant la conférence.

Pour faciliter cette conversation préliminaire, je suggère qu'on décide que la première séance restant fixée au 13, les travaux de la conférence ne commencent effectivement que le 17 ou le 20 novembre. La première séance ne serait que de pure forme et il suffirait que chaque Puissance y fût représentée par un seul plénipotentiaire. En attendant, chaque délégation pourrait envoyer à Lausanne des délégués de son secrétariat, pour prendre toutes les dispositions matérielles indispensables. Le Gouvernement suisse aurait ainsi le temps nécessaire qu'il désire pour préparer les locaux où devra se tenir la conférence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ.

No. 500.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

[By Wireless.]

(No. 693.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 10, 1922.

AS I am uneasy about safety of Sultan, having regard especially to murder of Ali Mustapha Kemal, I informed General Harington officially yesterday that my Allied colleagues and I would deplore any violence to Sultan whilst Allies were in occupation of this town. I added that I did not think it fair that responsibility of Sultan's safety should devolve especially on British military authorities, and I suggested that he should consult Allied generals with a view to provision, if necessary, of an inter-Allied guard.

This matter was brought before a meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals this evening. The latter pointed out difficulties in the way of ensuring absolute safety of the Sultan's life, and Italian general dwelt on the size of force which would be required to protect him. I was not at all impressed by his arguments, and derived impression that he was not at all willing to share responsibility for protection of Sultan.

No. 501.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

[By Wireless.]

(No. 694.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 10, 1922.

AT a meeting held this afternoon Allied generals informed High Commissioners that, in their opinion, it was very undesirable to proclaim a state of siege [? here] unless Allied Governments fully realise that this would in all probability lead to an immediate advance of Kemalist forces across the line of demarcation, to meet which forces considerably in excess of those at present available would be urgently necessary.

I understand that forces at present at Constantinople would, in the opinion of Allied generals, only suffice to declare and maintain a state of siege for a limited period, and would be quite inadequate to deal with any other military [? duty]. Pending definite [? assurances] from Allied Governments that they are prepared to undertake active hostilities [? and] provide necessary means to facilitate, generals recommend a temporising policy.

Generals also point out that the whole administration here might collapse with the introduction of a state of siege, and Italian High Commissioner, and [group undecypherable] general in particular, considered we might be faced by a strike of necessary services of the town, as it would be impossible to find functionaries or labour without a guarantee [group undecypherable] would be protected after return

of Nationalists to Constantinople. I believe this point of view to be greatly exaggerated, as it would undoubtedly be possible to find Greek labour. The attitude of Italians was markedly timid and in keeping with small contribution of two battalions which they make towards Allied force of occupation.

I was unable to extract from generals an authoritative expression of opinion as to length of time during which they could maintain a state of siege, pending arrival of reinforcements. There was a suggestion that we could hold out for a fortnight. I understand that despatch of reinforcements to European shore of Bosphorus and Sea of Marmora is not excluded by Mudania Agreement. If Kemalists violate that agreement Greeks would presumably be at liberty to re-enter Eastern Thrace and two Greek army corps could be here in a fortnight. The seven Allied battalions now in Eastern Thrace could also be recalled.

In my view, the declaration of a state of siege can alone prevent situation from getting worse here, and from our having to submit to successive demands of Kemalists, who will soon have completely undermined our position. But I see difficulties of generals. Kemalists have now twice suggested that we should evacuate Constantinople. When infiltration of Kemalist forces is considered sufficient by them, Kemalists may be expected to summon us to leave.

A suggestion was [? made] during the meeting that Allies might fix a date by which they would evacuate this town. I refused to endorse this suggestion as being for one thing a violation of Allied note of 23rd September. Further reasons against it are that Constantinople is a useful pledge to hold during conference, and that a premature evacuation would certainly be followed by wholesale atrocities on Christian population and on Turks suspected of hostility to Kemalists.

If French and Italian Governments are prepared to purchase peace at any price there is nothing more to be said. But if they are ready to make a stand with us on questions such as Capitulations, Western Thrace, the islands and Straits we must face possibility of conference breaking down and war ensuing. From that point of view Allied Governments would do well to consider advisability of strengthening their military position here as rapidly as possible. The present situation is deplorable and humiliating to the three Great Powers.

French High Commissioner tells me he has recommended despatch of reinforcements by his Government if a state of siege is proclaimed. He deplores the fact that French press seems unable or unwilling to grasp situation here, and he supposes that it is under the influence of financiers.

No. 502.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 585.) By Bag.
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 10, 1922.*

M. POINCARÉ has just made a long speech in Chamber. First half was devoted to internal politics, second half to external affairs, in which he made elaborate apologia for France's action at Chanak, and quoted documents from his military experts in support of policy he had pursued.

He spoke in the warmest terms of Mr. Bonar Law and your Lordship, mention of whose names was received with applause. His speech was, I am told, otherwise coldly received. He ended by saying he was anxious to go to Lausanne in complete accord with his allies, but that accord did not mean subordination.

The change of tone between his speeches yesterday and to-day is most noticeable, and is probably largely due to criticisms referred to in my despatch No. 2634.

No. 503.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 11 1922.)

(No. 588.)
(Telegraphic.)

UPON receipt this morning of your Lordship's telegram No. 421, I addressed a note to Poincaré proposing suggestion that M. Barrère should go to London in order to come to a preliminary understanding with you. He had not received this note when I met him in the train going to Compiègne to attend an official ceremony in connection with the memorial to commemorate signing armistice.

In President's train I had a discussion for more than an hour with the President of the Republic, M. Poincaré and Count Sforza upon the Near Eastern affairs and the forthcoming conference. I insisted upon absolute necessity of an agreement with the French and Italian Governments in order that you might be quite certain of the support which you would get from them on certain questions likely to be raised in the conference to which the Turks will probably be in opposition and how far those Governments would be ready to go. I pointed out difficulties of your own position owing to elections not taking place until 15th, and stated my belief that you will not be absolutely sure that the present Government is definitely in office until at least the evening of 16th. Consequently it would be materially impossible for either you or Sir H. Rumbold to be at Lausanne on 13th, or for you to have an interview with M. Poincaré in Paris on your way to Lausanne before the 18th, at the very earliest. These views provoked a long discussion, in which both President of the Republic and M. Poincaré pressed very hard that the conference should be opened on 13th by a secondary member of the Government as your representative, and that conference should then be adjourned for a week. In the event of its being impossible to send a member of the Government, His Majesty's Minister at Berne might be instructed by you to act as your representative at opening meeting, when practically no business would be performed except to adjourn to the following week. I pointed out that it was hardly possible to find time to send any member of Government from England, but I would put forward their suggestion as I was pressed very much to do so by the President of the Republic. I may add that Bompard, second French delegate, has been ordered to be in Lausanne on morning of 13th, and the Roumanian and Greek Governments, to my knowledge, and probably other Governments, have been asked by Poincaré to send representatives also by that date. M. Poincaré made a great point of fact that Turkish delegation, arriving from the wilds of Asia, would consider it almost an affront that the Western Powers would not come up to time, while they, having travelled more than 1,000 miles, would be there at date which had been fixed.

As regards my proposal for Barrère's mission to London, Poincaré objected to it on ground that he could not represent both French and Italian views and that he himself was particularly anxious to discuss the matter with you. He considered that 18th, if you could manage to come on your way to Lausanne, would be a very convenient date for a discussion, and Count Sforza added that he was almost certain M. Mussolini would gladly come and meet you and M. Poincaré in Paris on that day.

M. Poincaré remarked to me that, having seen views of War Office, which had been communicated to Marshal Foch, he believed that there would be very little disagreement between himself and you, although he fully realised that views of War Office did not represent entirely views of His Majesty's Government. As far as I am able to judge, 19th would be equally convenient to M. Poincaré, and it is only a night's journey from Paris to Lausanne. Count Sforza emphasised fact that M. Mussolini would, he thought, be willing to come to Paris as a halfway house, but not to come as far as London. Since my return from Compiègne I have received your telegram No. 425, which I think has been fairly covered by my conversation this afternoon, as I think I made it clear that a conference would be useless without a prior understanding between us and French Government. If M. Poincaré's last proposal is inacceptable I will put forward your suggestion that he should go to London.

No. 504.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 11, 1922.)

(No. 589.)
(Telegraphic.)

DURING course of conversation held in President's railway carriage this afternoon, the Italian Ambassador made a proposal, under instructions from his Government, which, I understand, has been probably made to you too. It was to effect that, in order to avoid possibility, which seems not unlikely, of the Turks exercising pressure upon Allies during conference which might necessitate their withdrawal owing to the impossibility, recognised by the generals, of holding Constantinople

against a Turkish advance, the conference should be suspended and the troops withdrawn in order to avoid humiliation of having to withdraw under pressure of the Turks and during the conference.

Both President of the Republic and M. Poincaré replied that such a suggestion was quite inacceptable, since it would expose all Europeans and Christians in Constantinople to immediate and serious risk, besides leaving at the mercy of the Turks European property of very great value. I added that it was my conviction that such a proposal would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government, since it would be likely to entail a repetition of massacre at Smyrna followed by destruction of the Christian quarters of Constantinople. I also remarked that to hand over Constantinople to the Turks after the conclusion of the conference and ratification of the treaty was a very different thing from handing over Constantinople immediately after evacuation by our troops under pressure.

Count Sforza then made a proposal that the question of the evacuation of Constantinople by the Allied troops should be left to the discretion of the generals on the spot. M. Poincaré seemed not indisposed to agree to this suggestion, but I remarked that I was confident that no Government would oppose the generals if they informed their Governments that in their opinion the evacuation was necessary, and that I did not see question need arise for the present. I promised, however, to telegraph to you what had passed.

No. 505.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 363.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 345.

Note from Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that Italian Government would have agreed to participate in warning to Angora to put an end to economic blockade of Constantinople Government if fall of latter had not rendered such a warning unnecessary.

As regards insertion in Peace Treaty of clause [? recognising] validity of all financial and administrative acts of Constantinople Government, Italian Government have no objection to co-operating with Allies to obtain insertion of such a clause from Ottoman delegates, but they consider it would not be prudent to give any guarantee of the kind to interested parties. Such a guarantee is all the less necessary now that idea of allowing Constantinople Government to negotiate new [? credit]s and collect certain dues under cover of guarantee has come to an end with Constantinople Government itself.

No. 506.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, November 11, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 364.

I have repeatedly pressed for immediate reply. Cabinet met twice yesterday to consider matter, and last night President of the Council sent a secretary to tell me that answer had been despatched through Ambassadors in London and Paris. Italian Government considered it would be better to evacuate Constantinople rather than risk expulsion, but that in all other respects a firm line should be adopted.

President of the Council did not see how he could possibly leave Rome before the meeting of the Chamber on 16th November, but is most anxious to meet your Lordship for preliminary discussion.

No. 507.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 366.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, November 11, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 371.

Italian Government repeated their instructions to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople to consent to state of siege two days ago. They have now received telegram from him saying that High Commissioners and Allied generals are agreed that it would no longer be practicable to establish state of siege.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 508.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 448.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, November 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 335.

I have seen Secretary of State and discussed situation very fully with him. He appears confident that United States High Commissioner will be able to prevent deportations, &c., through exercise of strong diplomatic pressure. He has, however, promised to discuss with the President over the week-end situation which would arise should diplomatic pressure fail, and I am to see him again on 13th November.

No. 509.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 560.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 11, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 604 of 11th November: Imposition of state of siege in Constantinople.

View of His Majesty's Government of the situation is as follows: On 7th November Allied High Commissioners and generals unanimously agreed to recommend immediate proclamation of a state of siege in Constantinople, and sought approval of their Governments, even threatening resignation of High Commissioners if their advice was not accepted. The three Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy at once gave the desired authority; upon which we presumed that action would be taken without delay on the spot. We think that fullest advantage should be taken of this authority, and of Allied accord so happily established. The question of what supplementary action may be required must depend mainly upon what occurs after state of siege has been declared. If the Allies are in agreement as to the first step, they will find difficulty in repudiating the responsibilites that it may entail; and the breaking away of any member of the alliance will be less easy than it was at Chanak or Ismid. Should either of our allies, however, decline to act with us in carrying out the measures demanded by this preliminary accord, then we shall have to decide whether to act independently or to follow their example.

In the meantime, we entirely deprecate the fixing of any date for the evacuation of Constantinople. This is a matter for the Lausanne Conference, not for the Allied representatives at Constantinople.

As regards the military position, British reinforcements cannot be sent from England without mobilisation, which we should be unwilling to undertake unless France and Italy consent to send corresponding number of troops—nor even, did we decide upon it, could troops arrive from England in time to influence the local situation that may immediately arise.

Our view is in general accord with yours. His Majesty's Government thinks that certain risks must be run, and that Kemalists will, in all probability, hesitate to force an issue at Constantinople either before Lausanne Conference meets or while it is sitting. If they do Mundania Convention will have been torn up by them, and either the conference will break down or Allied Powers will be driven to take joint

military action. But we are far more likely to induce Allies to act with us if we allow situation to develop and do not press at this moment for military reinforcements, which are almost certainly to be refused. If I meet French and Italian Ministers or consult personally with their Governments before proceeding to Lausanne as I have proposed, I can raise the question of local danger which may have arisen in consequence of state of siege, and shall have better chance of being successful then than if I act prematurely now.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 426, and Rome, No. 379.)

No. 510.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva).

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1922.

MY telegram No. 80 of 9th November: Dr. Nansen's position, second paragraph. Following for Sir E. Drummond:—

"There could, of course, be no question of replacing Nansen while he was negotiating with Kemalists. Breakdown of negotiations was quoted in my telegram of 9th November, as showing that this obstacle no longer exists. There was no desire to criticise Nansen's conduct of negotiations, which could hardly have succeeded in any circumstances."

No. 511.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 425.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1922.

WHAT I fear is that, whether I go to Paris on way to Lausanne, or Barrère is instructed to come here, Poincaré will so arrange that the conversation is delayed till the last moment, with a view of throwing upon me the responsibility, should we fail to come to an agreement, of again postponing or even breaking down the Lausanne Conference. Is it not worth while putting the case to Poincaré quite plainly and stating that, unless France, Italy and ourselves have a prior understanding, it is, in my opinion, useless to hold the conference at all? Information reached me yesterday evening from what was alleged to be a good source that Poincaré might be willing to come over here for preliminary conversation.

This would appear to be best solution, and, in view of my four successive visits to Paris, a not unreasonable plan to adopt.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 425; repeated to Rome, No. 375.)

No. 512.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 382.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1922.

MY telegram No. 560 of to-day to Sir H. Rumbold.

Italian Ambassador here has just made a communication to the effect that, since in the opinion of the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople it is now impossible to give effect to the measures at first proposed by them and approved by their respective Governments, the Italian Government considers the only means of escaping without loss of dignity from the untenable position in which the Allies are placed is to withdraw their troops as rapidly as possible. For the troops could not remain inactive witnesses of the arbitrary acts and methods of the new Turkish Administration after the latter had shaken off Allied control. Nor could the Lausanne Conference very well be assembled whilst the Allied troops remained exposed to Turkish pressure, which would in such circumstances be continuously exercised throughout the negotiations.

M. Mussolini therefore proposes to suspend the Lausanne Conference pending a meeting to be held between the Allies at the earliest possible date in order to consider the changed situation. Meanwhile he advises that a note should be addressed

to the Angora Government, of which he submits a draft, protesting against, and throwing upon the Angora Government the responsibility for, their departure from the Mudania Convention involved in the demand for the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Constantinople, and announcing that in these circumstances the Allies have decided to withdraw their troops from Constantinople.

I am replying that our most recent news from Constantinople does not bear out M. Mussolini's account of the advice of the High Commissioners. Your Excellency will see from my telegram above referred to what in our view is the situation and how we consider that it should be met.

His Majesty's Government sincerely trust that the Italian Government will not now withdraw the authority which they have already given to the commander of the Italian forces at Constantinople to act in accord with his Allied colleagues in proclaiming martial law (state of siege), which the three High Commissioners only four days ago unanimously and most categorically recommended as the one way of avoiding a greater danger. In our view, were the Lausanne Conference to meet either now or later, the position would be intolerable if the Turks had meanwhile, in direct violation of the Mudania Convention, constrained the Allied forces to retire from Constantinople. In such a case it would seem better to abandon the conference altogether. A united Allied front in the face of Turkish encroachment can alone, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, now save the situation at Constantinople from becoming one of supreme humiliation for the three Allied Powers. They are disposed to believe that resolute and united action on the part of the Allies will make the Turks hesitate before openly attacking their forces in the districts which the latter occupy in virtue of the armistice of Mudros and clause 12 of the Mudania Convention.

Please speak at once in above sense to M. Mussolini.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 427, and Constantinople, No. 564.)

[E 12514/27/44] No. 513.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 3391.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1922.

THE French Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon with regard to the Eastern question and the approaching conference. He had in his hands a letter from M. Poincaré which had been rendered somewhat out of date by the proceedings of the past few days, and I therefore asked him to allow me to deal with the situation as it now stood.

There was, I said, no longer any question that the conference should meet on the 13th November. For some time past, a meeting on that date had evidently been impossible. Few, if any, of the delegations, including the French, were prepared to be in Lausanne in two days' time. The Turks had gone there knowing perfectly well that there would not be anyone to meet them, and having, as I knew, intimated privately that they were quite prepared to spend the ensuing week before the 20th in Paris or elsewhere. The date of the 20th had now been definitely fixed and notified to all the States concerned, who were taking measures accordingly. The really important thing was, not the date of the conference, but what was to be done by France and ourselves before it met. I could not, I told the Ambassador, exaggerate the importance, and even the indispensability, of reaching a prior understanding between France and Great Britain, and if possible Italy also, in that interval. Without such an understanding, I was not prepared to enter the conference at all. I could not submit my Government and my country to the humiliation of open disagreement with our principal Allies at the conference table, in the eyes of the Turks and before the face of Europe. I was not prepared, once again, as I had had to do on at least three previous occasions, to fight a battle against the French and Italians in combination, and to make concessions, in order to arrive at an Allied agreement which was forgotten or broken as soon as it had been concluded. When we reached Lausanne, either we should have to yield to Turkey all along the field, or there must be a definite understanding under which France, Italy, and ourselves undertook to side together and even to break up the conference sooner than yield. Such an understanding could not be secured, as M. Poincaré had suggested, by my calling at the Quai d'Orsay for a conversation of an hour or two with him on my way to Lausanne. Supposing that, in such a case, we failed to come to an agreement: was I to be vested with the sole

responsibility of breaking up the conference by returning to England, or was I to proceed to Lausanne with the certainty that on all important points I was going to be deserted by my Allies? No, the conversation and the understanding must both take place under conditions that were free from any such danger. I had myself proposed three alternatives to M. Poincaré. The first was that Signor Mussolini should go to Paris, see M. Poincaré, and then come to London. This might be difficult, owing to the possible inability of the Italian Prime Minister to leave Italy at present. The second alternative was that M. Poincaré should empower M. Barrère, after conversations with the Italian Government, to come to London and make an agreement with me. But as to this there was uncertainty whether M. Poincaré would be willing to invest M. Barrère with the requisite powers. The third, and much the best, solution would be that M. Poincaré should do me the honour of coming to London in the middle of next week and having a conversation here. During the last year and a half, I had gone, as British Foreign Minister, four times to Paris for similar discussions; and I thought that the time had arrived when the compliment might be returned. I could not myself leave London in the course of next week, and I thought that public opinion here would resent these repeated rushes of the British Foreign Minister to the Quai d'Orsay. It was for the French Prime Minister to say what he considered the best manner of dealing with the case; but, unless an opportunity were created and unless a definite understanding were arrived at, I did not myself see any advantage in proceeding with the Lausanne Conference at all. There would be less humiliation in retiring before the conference met than in beating a retreat after its sittings had begun. In any case the course would be difficult enough, and my plan was the only means of removing the main obstacles from the path.

In reply to a question from the Ambassador whether I had a clear idea as to the points on which an agreement between the French and ourselves was in my view essential, and whether I could formulate them for M. Poincaré's consideration, I said that I was a little tired of always being asked to put forward proposals for M. Poincaré to dissect or oppose, but that I had a pretty clear idea in my own mind of the points upon which an Allied agreement was essential and which, therefore, I should be prepared to discuss with M. Poincaré.

A conversation ensued upon the position in Constantinople, which was, in my opinion, of more perilous a description than the Count de Saint-Aulaire believed it to be.

Upon his remarking that the French Government did not propose to send reinforcements to the Turkish capital, I observed that I deprecated more than I could say these constant asseverations on the part of M. Poincaré that, whatever the circumstances might be, nothing would induce him to fire a shot or to send a man. They served only to aggravate the insolence of the Turks and to demonstrate the futility of the Alliance. Circumstances might arise in Constantinople, even during the ensuing week, in which, in a local riot or disturbance, or in the event of a serious attack by the Kemalists upon the Allied forces, the blood of French soldiers might be shed. Was it the French intention that, even in such a case, not a man should be moved or a shot be fired? I was unable myself to believe that it was. There was one thing that I hoped Mr. Bonar Law and myself had made absolutely clear: we were doing our best, in the face of considerable risk, to see the matter through together with our Allies in Constantinople; but if, in the event of serious trouble arising, our Allies were not going to stand by us, we should not hesitate to withdraw. We had the ships, and we had the means, and to Gallipoli our troops would go. The discredit, and even the shame, of the evacuation would be considerable, but it would not rest with those who had been compelled to withdraw because they were called upon by their Allies to bear the burden and to face the peril alone.

The Ambassador, who seemed to be imperfectly acquainted with the situation in Constantinople, appeared to regard the alternative of evacuation as not to be dreamed of, and he argued that the French declarations related only to a situation which might be changed from day to day.

After protesting many times that he did not think a clear agreement with France on the most important points ought to be difficult to reach, he hinted, as he stood at the door before leaving the room that the situation would be much easier if French public opinion had reason to believe that, in return for a solid front in Constantinople and Lausanne, the French would have a chance of obtaining better terms as regards reparations and the European situation. He knew perfectly well that the French interest in the East was of equal importance with our own, and that the matter ought to be settled on its own merits and apart from any other question; but French public

opinion did not take that view. It believed that a settlement was of much greater moment to us than to France, and it was disposed, in return for a complaisant attitude in the East, to demand some compensation in the West.

In reply to this suggestion, I earnestly deprecated the idea of making any bargain about the matter. This was a line of diplomatic approach with which I had been rendered only too familiar in my intercourse in recent times with Italian representatives. But the Count de Saint-Aulaire was neither Signor de Martino nor Signor Schanzer, and I hoped that he would not now adopt the tactics with which those statesmen had made me only too frequently acquainted.

His Excellency assured me that nothing was further from his thoughts than a bargain of that description. Nevertheless, I am convinced that no auditor of our conversation could possibly have doubted that such was his actual suggestion.

In parting, I impressed upon the Ambassador that the present moment was one, as it seemed to me, of extreme importance in the relations of France and Great Britain. The spokesmen of the two Governments had exchanged the warmest words of mutual sympathy and respect in the past fortnight, and I was more than grateful for the kind language in which M. Poincaré had spoken of me in the French Chamber on the preceding day. But if we now fell asunder over this Eastern question, the effect would extend to a much wider area, and the situation would be wholly changed.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 12522/27/44] No. 514.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, November* 10, 1922.

I HAVE been instructed by my Government to bring the following communication to your Lordship's notice:—

"The Greek Government is greatly perturbed by the actual situation at Constantinople in regard to the position of Greek and Greek Ottoman subjects who served during the European War either in the Greek or an Allied army, and who, it is almost certain, will be tried and condemned to death by the Kemalist authorities once they have control of the administration in Constantinople.

"The Greek Government makes an urgent appeal to the Great Allied Powers in favour of these Greeks, and begs them to send adequate instructions to their High Commissioners and generals in Constantinople.

"In the event of such protection not being guaranteed to the above-mentioned Greeks, the Greek Government would be extremely grateful to the Governments of the Great Allied Powers if they could see their way to provide them with the means for leaving Constantinople.

"The Greek Government also seeks the same protection for Greek Ottoman subjects under military age, for whom the greatest fear is entertained that they will be arrested and deported to the interior, as was the case of the Greeks of the same category in Asia Minor by the Nationalist authorities."

The Greek Government, in making this appeal to His Britannic Majesty's Government, earnestly hopes that they will be kind enough to examine in a spirit of sympathy and generosity the cases submitted to their kind consideration.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

No. 515.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November* 11, 1922.

MY telegram No. 148.

M. Stamboliisky considers his visit to Belgrade has produced results quite satisfactory to him. I think that neutralised or internationalised corridor to Dedeagatch is agreed upon by all parties. As regards matters not connected with conference, two

countries will appoint mixed commission to liquidate outstanding questions in dispute.

After having been received by President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Stamboliisky had an audience with King of one hour's duration, which is considered as a significant mark of cordiality.

M. Stamboliisky has good press this morning, and Government organs anticipate good progress in relations between the two States.

They take occasion to warn Turkey that it is only Greeks whom she has defeated, and that her demands must be moderated accordingly.

M. Stamboliisky left for Lausanne last night.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 7.)

No. 516.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 696.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 11, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 689.

Chinese refugees from Black Sea ports are beginning to arrive at Constantinople. On recommendation of principal naval transport officer, I have authorised him on my own responsibility to charter "Charnwood" for one further trip. At the same time, I understand there is now considerable number of Greek vessels at Piræus which could be used for refugee work here.

General Headquarters are at present giving refuge to and feeding some 200 Turks who for political reasons fear same fate as Ali Kemal (see my telegram No. 684). If British troops evacuate Ismid Peninsula several hundred Christian employees of Anatolian Railway will similarly claim protection.

General Headquarters are naturally anxious to get rid of refugees on their charge as soon as possible, and, though this High Commission cannot be held responsible for them, it is difficult in present conditions to authorise their being turned adrift in the town again.

Whole question of refugees, Greeks, Armenians, Turks and Russians, to some of whom British authorities are under certain obligations, needs urgent consideration on broad basis. It is most desirable that His Majesty's Government should lay down general lines of policy in respect of different categories mentioned. If such policy could be indicated, committee consisting of representatives of General Headquarters, British High Commission, principal naval transport officer, and, if possible, League of Nations, could be formed here with discretion to take immediate decisions in accordance with general lines.

I had hoped that whole question of evacuation of Christian minorities would be discussed in early stages of Lausanne Conference. But events might move so rapidly that certain latitude might be given to above-mentioned commission, though financial obligations on His Majesty's Government would be avoided as far as possible.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 517.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 698.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 12, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from vice-consul, Smyrna, 11th November:—

"Something approaching reign of terror exists here. Evictions of tenants from Greek and Armenian-owned houses take place. Aggressive behaviour of military causing extreme apprehension. We have planned surreptitious evacuation of British subjects, which could [group undecypherable] be effected if necessary, provided sufficient notice of declaration of state of siege or some such action is given. [? Reprisals] here consequent on such action at Constantinople will certainly prevent free evacuation. Even now British subjects are virtually prisoners."

No. 518.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 700. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 12, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 560.

It is necessary that I should give you a fuller account of meeting between Allied High Commissioners and generals on 10th November, as a result of which I sent you my telegram No. 694. Owing to break in cable, I made telegram No. 694 as short as possible, as it had to be transmitted by wireless, and as soon as I realised at meeting that Allied generals had apparently shifted their position with regard to expediency and feasibility of proclaiming a state of siege, I protested and said that it would be difficult for me to explain this to your Lordship. I added that it was essential for me to know exactly where we stood. I reminded the meeting of tenor of identic telegram No. 668 from High Commissioners. This telegram clearly showed that Allied generals were in agreement with proposal for a declaration of a state of siege. The telegram had warned Allied Governments that such a declaration might produce a conflict and it enumerated forces at disposal of Allies here. I reproached the generals vehemently for receding from attitude they had taken up on 7th November. The generals warmly defended themselves, and discussion became very heated. During this time my Allied colleagues remained silent.

It transpired further that whereas your Lordship's assent to our proposal to proclaim a state of siege had been as prompt as it had been unqualified, my colleagues had only received their instructions three days later. Although they did not produce text of their instructions as I had done, I gathered that assent of French and Italian Governments was somewhat grudging in the sense that High Commissioners were only to proceed to declare a state of siege if it were absolutely necessary.

My Allied colleagues were visibly impressed by arguments adduced by generals against advisability of declaring a state of siege at this juncture, and acquiesced in recommending that we should temporise. They were also influenced, as I admit I was myself, by argument that it seemed advisable to avoid [group omitted]s of precipitate rupture on eve of conference. In these circumstances I had no alternative but to send my telegram No. 694, much as I regretted impression which I knew would be produced on His Majesty's Government by this change of front.

Your Lordship will, I am sure, recognise that Allied High Commissioners are bound to rely on advice of their military advisers here. I myself am convinced that in view of present situation at Angora the proclamation of a state of siege, which in effect means tightening up of martial law, which is at present in force, and taking over by generals of administration of this town, would produce an immediate rupture with Kemalists. We know that Kemalist troops at present on Ismid Peninsula are short of food and only too ready to come here.

I understand from General Harington that a rupture means that Kemalists would attack both at Chanak and on Ismid front, and that they could bring heavy guns to the Bosphorus in eight days. Once Kemalists were established on Bosphorus, Allied troops could no longer hold Constantinople and would indeed have to embark at a moment's notice. This, amongst other things, would leave Christian population at mercy of Kemalists. My colleagues, whilst admitting that we have already lost face, feel that an enforced evacuation of Constantinople in above conditions would entail a further great loss of prestige. Before meeting ended, however, I warned my colleagues and Allied generals that we were descending a slippery slope. I considered that as Kemalists' position at Constantinople got stronger Allies' position would get weaker, and I expressed belief that it was at least an even chance that we should be driven into war with Turkey. I said policy of concessions did not pay with Turks.

I freely admit that these considerations should have been present to minds of Allied High Commissioners and generals when they concurred in recommending on 7th November that a state of siege should be declared. The subsequent examination of the matter led the generals to conclusions submitted to us on 10th November.

I am sure that your Lordship will make allowances for the very difficult situation in which Allied High Commissioners and generals find themselves. Throughout this long-drawn-out crisis, which seems to us on the spot never ending, the Allied High Commissioners have been skating on the thinnest ice. I can only express my

personal gratitude to His Majesty's Government for the splendid and ungrudging support which it has given me through you during the whole of this crisis. Finally, I would point out, with reference to second paragraph of your telegram under reply, that it was not intention of High Commissioners to offer their resignations if their advice was not accepted, but to suggest that they could not usefully fill the rôle assigned to them and must have fresh instructions.

No. 519.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 701.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 12, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 560 and my immediately preceding telegram.

Allied High Commissioners and generals met this morning to consider situation. I read them first part of your above-mentioned telegram down to words "after a state of siege has been declared."

French High Commissioner read telegram he had sent after our meeting on 10th November. This telegram was much on the lines of my telegram No. 694. He also read a telegram from French President of the Council stating that French Government could not send reinforcements and that we could only count upon French troops actually on the spot. I then made it clear that His Majesty's Government could not undertake to send reinforcements unless France and Italy consented to send a corresponding number of troops. As no mention was made of Italian reinforcements, which presumably will not be forthcoming, Allied High Commissioners and generals had to make up their minds to the fact that they were thrown on their present resources. Just prior to meeting I had received a telegram from Smyrna which is being repeated in my telegram No. 698. I read this to meeting. It is clear from this telegram that if we proclaim a state of siege immediately British and probably all other Allied subjects will be hostages in the hands of Turks.

In view of above-mentioned telegram, coupled with military considerations contained in latter part of my immediately preceding telegram and which were developed at length by General Harington, Allied High Commissioners and generals decided that they could not afford to precipitate matters by declaring a state of siege and that this measure must be reserved for last extremity.

No. 520.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

(No 590.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 12, 1922.

M. POINCARÉ informs me that he has just sent following telegram to French Ambassador in London in answer to one giving account of M. Saint-Aulaire's interview with your Lordship :—

"J'irais volontiers à Londres voir Lord Curzon, si l'Assemblée française ne se trouvait pas en pleine discussion du budget et si un voyage à ce moment ne devait me forcer à demander le renvoi de la suite d'un discours commencé au Parlement. Je passerais même outre de grand cœur à ces difficultés, si Lord Curzon n'était pas dans l'obligation matérielle de passer par Paris pour aller à Lausanne. Le plus simple me paraît être qu'il s'arrête ici quelques heures pour déjeuner ou dîner avec moi, suivant ses convenances. Nous pourrions ainsi avoir dans l'intimité une conversation qui nous permettrait d'assurer l'accord de la politique de nos deux pays à la conférence. Le Comte Sforza nous avait dit hier à Lord Hardinge et à moi qu'il pensait que M. Mussolini pourrait venir à Paris avant d'aller lui-même à Lausanne. Je reçois ce matin de M. Barrère un télégramme où il me dit que M. Mussolini serait gêné par ses obligations parlementaires pour pousser jusqu'à Paris, mais qu'il serait heureux de nous rencontrer, Lord Curzon et moi, à Lausanne. Si Lord Curzon pouvait venir samedi, nous passerions la journée ensemble et nous partirions tous deux pour Lausanne dimanche, de manière à y rencontrer M. Mussolini lundi matin. Cette combinaison semble de nature à concilier toutes les convenances."

No. 521.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 566.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 673 and 674 of 7th November : Sultan.

Your language approved.

Indian view will be communicated to you.

No. 522.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 567.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 675 of 7th November : Incriminated Turks.

Though we should wish to save the lives of these Turks, it is useless to ask for Treasury authority for expenditure when there are so many equally justifiable claims.

Meanwhile we are consulting Colonial Office as to accommodation at Cyprus for such as can pay their own way.

No. 523.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 590 of 12th November : Allied meeting before Lausanne.

I am very grateful to M. Poincaré for his kind suggestions. They seem, however, to involve certain drawbacks, affecting both of us, though in different ways.

In the first place, my conversation with M. Poincaré at Paris would not take place till Saturday, and, supposing that we could not arrive at an agreement, I should nevertheless find it very difficult to decline to accompany him on Sunday to Lausanne.

Once arrived there, on the very night before the meeting of the conference, it would be additionally difficult for me to withdraw, in the event of a disagreement still being found unhappily to exist between M. Poincaré, Signor Mussolini and myself.

As regards M. Poincaré, this plan has the further drawback of compelling him to make a journey to and from Lausanne, unless, indeed, he proposes to remain there as chief French plenipotentiary, an idea which I have hitherto understood him not to entertain.

I spoke yesterday with utmost frankness to the French Ambassador here, as my record of the conversation, which is being sent to you to-day, will show. But I am not sure whether M. Poincaré as yet fully understands how crucial is the position, and how determined are His Majesty's Government that I shall not go to the conference at all until I know that France and ourselves have decided to show a common front on all the main issues. If we do so, Italy will doubtless follow suit.

M. Poincaré's plan does not render this position sufficiently secure. It was for this reason that, of my three alternatives, I urgently pressed upon Comte de Saint-Aulaire the suggestion that, even at the cost of a Parliamentary absence of two or three days, M. Poincaré should be willing to come here on Wednesday, or the latest Thursday. We could then devote one or more days to our conversations, and at the end I should know whether our accord was sufficient to justify me in proceeding to Lausanne. In the latter case, I would suggest that Signor Mussolini, who has let me know that he could get away from Rome after the 16th, might be invited to Paris, where M. Poincaré and I might converse with him on Sunday. I could then proceed alone to Lausanne on Sunday night. M. Poincaré would escape his journey to Switzerland and Signor Mussolini could return to Rome.

I may add that I am also apprehensive that the discussion *à trois* which M. Poincaré recommends at Lausanne would not be pursued in the most favourable of atmospheres and might give rise to local interpretations, which would not facilitate our subsequent labours.

Please make an immediate representation to M. Poincaré in this sense.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 428; repeated to Rome, No. 383, and Constantinople, No. 565.)

[E 12574/27/44] No. 524.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 595.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, November* 6, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 527 of the 6th ultimo respecting the situation at Constantinople, I have the honour to state that I saw M. Duca this evening and enquired if he would outline to me the attitude he proposed to adopt at Lausanne.

With respect to the Eastern question generally, he declared that above all Roumania desired peace and to act in harmony with her allies, great and small. For his country the chief danger was from Russia, with whom, however, he was quite ready to enter into negotiations on condition that the Roumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia is definitely recognised by the Soviet Government. As he had already informed me (see my despatch No. 591 of the 3rd instant), he had taken steps to have the suggestion put forward at the Moscow Disarmament Conference, to meet on the 30th November, through the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Roumania would not improbably be ready to abandon her claim to the restitution of her gold in return for the recognition of Roumanian ownership of Bessarabia provided her archives and papers were returned to her from Moscow. This would demonstrate the conciliatory attitude of Roumania, and might solve a difficult situation.

He pointed out again (see my despatch No. 527) his earnest desire for a demilitarised (as he now termed it) zone, however narrow, between Bulgaria and Turkey in Eastern Thrace. Without this, Roumania might find herself encircled once more by her former enemies, with Russia in addition. The circle would begin with Hungary, after which, proceeding north, Germany and Russia, with contact for the latter with the Angora Government, and finally Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria. The more barriers that could be created to break this circle the better for Roumania. He drew a diagram to illustrate his meaning. As the Great Powers had agreed that Eastern Thrace was to be restored to Turkey, he considered its future settled. He recognised that the demilitarised zone would probably not last, but said that it would at least be advantageous for several years.

He had also thought that, in order to provide an outlet for Bulgaria at Dedeagatch, which was near the mouth of the Maritza, it might possibly be profitable to arrange the extension of the demilitarised zone to continue between Eastern and Western Thrace, and to include in that zone the Bulgarian outlet. Such extension would have the advantage of separating Turkey and Greece in the two Thraces. It would also assist in avoiding further friction between Greece and Bulgaria.

He made it clear that he was opposed to M. Stamboliiski's suggestion for Thracian autonomy, though he had not categorically replied to him in this sense, in order not to render their general conversation unpleasant. Autonomy for Eastern Thrace was out of the question, while to grant autonomy for Western Thrace would, according to his view, only lead to intrigues by Bulgaria to recover it, and even possibly to future attempts to seize it by force.

To my enquiry as to whom he thought the custody of the demilitarised zone might be entrusted, he replied that he thought to the same Powers responsible for the freedom of the Straits.

This brought the conversation to the question of the Straits. I will reserve M. Duca's observations thereon for a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING.

[E 12578/27/44] No. 525.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 323.)

My Lord, *Sofia, November* 8, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 67 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the note from the Bulgarian Government referred to therein expressing their thanks for the invitation from the Allied Governments to attend the conference at Lausanne for the purpose of participating in the discussion on the Straits and putting forward a formal request for permission also to state their views at the conference on the questions of the Bulgarian outlet to the Ægean and on the settlement of the frontiers between Turkey and Greece.

The note also encloses a list of the members of the Bulgarian delegation.

In view of the last sentence of the note, my first impression was that, encouraged by the message regarding the question of the outlet to the sea, which I had been instructed by your Lordship's telegram No. 50 of the 30th ultimo to convey to M. Stamboliisky, the Bulgarian Government wished His Majesty's Government to put forward this request to the French and Italian Governments on their behalf, but on comparing notes with my French and Italian colleagues I ascertained that they had received notes couched in identic language including the sentence in question, each being requested to ask his Government to recommend the Bulgarian claim to the other two Governments.

Your Lordship will observe that the Bulgarian Government consider that they have a better claim to be heard than the Serb-Croat-Slovene and the Roumanian Governments, ignoring the fact that the latter were the allies of the Powers in the war against Turkey and were signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres, whereas they themselves were fighting on the opposite side.

It will also be observed that as a reason for claiming the fulfilment of article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly they state that they on their side have fulfilled all their obligations under the treaty. As the Bulgarian Government lose no opportunity of making this statement, which, having regard to their attitude on the reparation question, is, to say the least of it, inaccurate, I venture to suggest that, in any reply which may be returned to their note, this assertion should not be left unnoticed.

As I expect to see the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow, I shall call his attention to both these points.

As regards the Bulgarian delegation to the conference, your Lordship will see that, as reported in my telegram No. 69 of to-day's date, it includes, besides M. Stamboliisky, two full delegates, two assistant delegates, five technical counsellors and two secretaries. The numbers appear to be excessive, even if Bulgaria is admitted to the discussion on other questions besides that of the Straits, and some at least of its members appear to have been selected for reasons not strictly connected with the matters to be discussed at the conference.

M. Todorof, Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade, who fought during the war in the French army on the Salonica front, is doubtless known to your Lordship from Sir Alban Young's reports.

M. Simon Radef was Minister at The Hague until he was removed by M. Stamboliisky for various malpractices. He is said to be thoroughly disreputable, but able.

Of the assistant delegates, Professor Milef, an ardent Macedonian, is editor of the Opposition newspaper "Slovo," while M. Mouravief is a relation and satellite of M. Stamboliisky of no particular merit.

Of the technical counsellors, the only one who can be taken seriously is M. Morfof, who enjoys a high reputation as a railway expert and was formerly Director of the State Railways. His advice regarding the outlet to the Ægean will doubtless be of great value to the Bulgarian delegation.

Mgr. Stefan, a prelate of urbane manners, who is reputed to hold somewhat broad views on questions of religion and morality, attended a pan-Christian conference at Stockholm early in the year. I understand that the Bulgarian Government hope that he may be of service to their cause by getting into touch at Lausanne with some of the friends he made on that occasion. I can only attribute the appointment of M. Noikof, an army expert who recently paid a visit to London, to the hope that he may be able to do some propaganda among the foreign delegates in favour of a return to obligatory service for the Bulgarian army.

M. Groskof is the Deputy whose alleged mission to Angora was the subject of Allied representations to the Bulgarian Government last year and is a friend of Kemal Pasha, while Mustapha Riza Bey is the head of the Turkish Agrarian Party in this country.

The selection of these two persons would appear to have been made with the object of establishing good relations with the Kemalist delegation and possibly discussing the question of the return of Bulgarian refugees to Eastern Thrace.

Much satisfaction is expressed in the Bulgarian press at the appointment of M. Rakitch, Serbian Minister here, as one of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegates to the conference. He is described as a man of tact, who has on frequent occasions shown his desire for good relations between the two countries.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

Enclosure in No. 525.

M. Vanef to Mr. Erskine.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Cultes,
Sofia, le 6 novembre 1922.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de remercier beaucoup votre Excellence et de lui accuser réception de sa lettre du 28 octobre 1922, par laquelle elle a bien voulu transmettre au Gouvernement bulgare l'invitation des Gouvernements britannique, français et italien de prendre part à la Conférence de Paix pour l'Orient (relativement à la discussion de la question des Détroits), qui doit se réunir le 13 novembre prochain à Lausanne.

Le Gouvernement bulgare accepte bien volontiers cette invitation, et il a déjà désigné les personnes dont la liste est ci-jointe qui doivent le représenter à cette conférence.

Le Gouvernement bulgare m'a chargé, toutefois, de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence et du Gouvernement de Grande-Bretagne qu'il ne peut ne pas constater avec regrets que, d'après les termes de la lettre de votre Excellence, il appert que le Gouvernement bulgare est invité de prendre part à la conférence seulement en ce qui concerne la question des Détroits et non relativement aux discussions qui doivent mettre fin à la guerre en Orient entre la Turquie et la Grèce et fixer les frontières de ces deux États en donnant une solution à la question de la Thrace.

Les victoires turques et la caducité du Traité de Sèvres, de même que le retour de la Turquie en Europe, ont créé une situation nouvelle et ont posé des problèmes importants, auxquels est lié étroitement le sort du Royaume de Bulgarie. La question des frontières à fixer et de la Thrace touchent grandement les intérêts bulgares.

Par l'article 48 du Traité de Paix de Neuilly, les Puissances alliées et associées ont reconnu le droit de la Bulgarie à un débouché sur la mer Égée, qui jusqu'à présent attend toujours sa réalisation, malgré que de son côté le Gouvernement bulgare a exécuté tous ses engagements. C'est un engagement solennel d'ordre international, qui est en rapport étroit avec la détermination des frontières des États voisins de la Bulgarie—la Grèce et la Turquie—et qui ne peut ne pas être examinée à la prochaine Conférence de la Paix pour l'Orient.

Cette question est d'un intérêt vital pour la Bulgarie, dont dépend non seulement son développement et son commerce, ses relations avec les Puissances occidentales et les pays voisins, mais tout son avenir politique et économique.

D'un autre côté, plus de 200,000 réfugiés des deux Thraces se sont sauvés en Bulgarie, où ils mènent une existence de misère. Le Gouvernement bulgare est obligé de leur donner des secours, qui causent des dépenses bien sensibles au Trésor public du royaume. La question de leur rapatriement se pose aussi bien dans l'intérêt du bon ordre et de la tranquillité de ces régions, que ces malheureux peuvent compromettre. C'est une question d'équité, qui ne peut ne pas être examinée par la future conférence.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement bulgare aime à espérer que le point de vue bulgare ne peut ne pas avoir une certaine importance pour les Puissances qui doivent résoudre la difficile question du Proche-Orient et qu'il ne sera pas oublié, d'autant plus que les principales Puissances alliées ont invité à ladite conférence les États voisins de la Bulgarie—le Royaume serbe-croate-slovène et la Roumanie—qui sont intéressés dans la question dans une mesure bien moindre.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Excellence, j'ai l'honneur de la prier de vouloir bien transmettre au Gouvernement de Grande-Bretagne la demande du Gouvernement bulgare d'être entendu de même par les Puissances qui doivent élaborer le Traité de Paix entre la Turquie et la Grèce, relativement à la question des frontières à fixer entre la Turquie et la Grèce et l'issue de la Bulgarie sur la mer Égée. Le Gouvernement bulgare a l'honneur de prier de même le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne de vouloir bien être l'interprète de cette demande auprès des Gouvernements français et italien.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
P. VANEF.

Délégation bulgare à la Conférence de Lausanne.

1. Président de la délégation :
   M. Al. Stamboliisky, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

2. Délégués :
   M. C. Todorof, Ministre plénipotentiaire de Bulgarie à Belgrade ; et
   M. S. Radef, ancien Ministre plénipotentiaire, délégué bulgare à la Société des Nations.

3. Délégués suppléants :
   (1.) M. Milef, professeur à l'Université de Sofia ;
   (2.) M. C. Mouravief, Chargé d'Affaires de Bulgarie à Constantinople.

4. Conseillers techniques :
   Mgr. Stephan, Évêque Métropolitain de Sofia ;
   M. le Colonel Noikof ;
   M. Anghel Groskof, Député ;
   M. Morfof, ingénieur ;
   M. Moustapha Riza Bey, Député au Sobranié bulgare.

5. Secrétaires :
   Mlle. N. Stanciof, 1re Secrétaire de la Légation de Bulgarie à Washington ;
   M. Iv. Altinof, Secrétaire de la Légation de Bulgarie à Constantinople.

[E 12550/27/44] No. 526.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

(No 1034. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Rome, November* 8, 1922.

THE new President of the Council is so overwhelmed with public affairs that it is not easy to obtain access to him, but I took the first possible opportunity of acting upon your Lordship's telegram unnumbered of the 1st November with regard to the report from Constantinople of separate negotiations being initiated by the Italian Government with the Government of Angora. This was when Signor Mussolini called upon me on the morning of the 3rd November. I drew his serious attention to the report, and said that I could scarcely believe that the Government which had preceded that of his Excellency could seriously have contemplated separate negotiations with the Angora Turks at such a moment. Anything of the kind could not but be absolutely fatal to those relations of friendship and co-operation between Italy and Great Britain to which his Excellency had so recently assured me he attached the highest importance.

It was evident that Signor Mussolini knew nothing whatever about the negotiations and he refused to believe that his predecessor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs could have contemplated them. In any case he authorised me to assure your Lordship that such separate action of the nature indicated would be in absolute contradiction to the policy which he intended to follow.

It was not until the following day that I learnt from Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 648 of the 3rd November that a special Italian envoy had actually reached Constantinople and that that envoy was Signor Maissa. Secrecy had evidently been

observed in the matter, as Signor Schanzer had never mentioned it to me, nor had Signor Maissa himself, whom I had met on several occasions during the past weeks.

On receiving this supplementary information I at once called on the Secretary-General to the Italian Foreign Office in order to obtain confirmation of the assurances that Signor Mussolini had given me on the previous day. Signor Contarini admitted that Signor Maissa had been sent to Angora, but denied that any negotiations were in contemplation. He said that the Italian Government had been hotly attacked for their want of contact with Angora and for being entirely dependent on French sources for their information. There was strong feeling on the question in the Chamber and the press. It was pointed out that M. Franklin-Bouillon travelled backwards and forwards through Anatolia, carrying and obtaining news, while Italy had no similar agent. Had the Italian Government contemplated negotiations they would have chosen a very different type of delegate to Signor Maissa, who was an old man of high reputation, but without initiative or energy. Signor Maissa was first known to me when he was Minister in Persia, and he was always on particularly friendly terms with His Majesty's Legation in that capital and with Lord Hardinge, who was then in charge of it. He is the father-in-law of Sir H. Lamb, and I know him to be particularly Anglophil. I cannot therefore altogether agree in the estimate of his character formed by Sir H. Rumbold.

I understood from Signor Contarini that Signor Maissa had already left Constantinople for Angora. I therefore confined my comments to saying that I thought it peculiarly unfortunate that he should have been sent at such a moment and that the sooner he was recalled the better. So far as I was aware, neither Great Britain nor France had an agent—or at any rate an agent of such standing as Signor Maissa—at Angora, and it was bound to create a false impression as to the attitude of Italy.

On the 5th November I received your Lordship's telegram No. 352, and I at once called on the President of the Council. I was unable to see his Excellency at the time, and therefore left a message for him through Signor Contarini, pointing out that Signor Maissa's mission was in complete contradiction with the assurances that his Excellency had given me, that even if no separate negotiations were contemplated it must create an entirely false impression and seriously weaken the unity of the Allied front. I therefore begged that orders should be at once sent for Signor Maissa's recall. In the afternoon his Excellency answered me by telephone to the effect that he had immediately telegraphed to Signor Maissa at Constantinople instructing him to remain there pending further orders. He again assured me that no separate negotiations had been intended, but he appreciated the force of the reasons which I had given him for stopping Signor Maissa. I thanked his Excellency in suitable terms.

On the 6th instant Signor Schanzer called upon me at the Embassy in order, as he was good enough to say, to express his regret at the severing of our official relations and his appreciation of their pleasant nature. As his Excellency was no longer in office, it did not seem much good attacking him on the subject of the Maissa mission, but it was worth while to endeavour to draw some information from him. I therefore asked him chaffingly whether Signor Maissa was enjoying a pleasant trip and why he had not told me something about it, as both in London and Constantinople it was liable to be misconstrued and to create an unfortunate impression. Signor Schanzer replied that the mission had no significance, and repeated the same reasons that had already been given me by Signor Contarini to account for it, but he added, rather naively, that Signor Maissa, besides establishing contact with, and remitting news from, Angora, would endeavour to ascertain what the Kemalist Government thought of the terms of the Italian treaty with the Constantinople Government concluded in April last, and whether they would be likely to favour concessions to Italy on the lines of that treaty. I pointed out at once that this was in reality a negotiation. But Signor Schanzer entirely refused to admit it. I was careful not to inform him that Signor Mussolini had stopped Signor Maissa. Signor Schanzer is, not unnaturally, somewhat bitter over the way in which the Facta Government was unceremoniously turned out by the Fascisti and he himself was obliged to quit office so hastily. He has been attacked for his alleged subserviency towards Great Britain, and would, no doubt, not be sorry to make a similar attack upon his successor. It is essential that there should be no grounds, however flimsy, for such an accusation against an Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as it seriously prejudices his position.

In conversation with the Secretary-General at the Consulta this morning I recurred to the whole matter. I recounted to him my conversation with Signor Schanzer, and said that his Excellency seemed to me to show a lamentable want of perception when he did not regard the Maissa mission in the light of a separate negotiation, Signor

Contarini, after a moment of hesitation, let himself go, and said that he had never had to serve under a more unsatisfactory Minister than was his late chief. I was already aware that this was the general feeling in the Consulta. Signor Contarini said that he had been in complete disagreement with the Minister's policy in regard to the Maissa Mission, the Dodecanese, the treaty with Constantinople and, most of all, as regards Austria, and his feelings on the subject were such that he had prepared his resignation to submit to Signor Schanzer, when the latter fell from office. He described Signor Schanzer as weak, undecided and distressingly short in his views. His Excellency was ready to compromise really important interests for imaginary successes without any substantial value. Signor Contarini ended by expressing warm appreciation of his new chief. He had expected to find Signor Mussolini strong and decided, but he was struck by the reasonable attitude which his Excellency seemed prepared to adopt on every question and his readiness to hear all sides of it. He believed that the Allied Governments would find Signor Mussolini a most satisfactory statesman to deal with, and that the result would be a great improvement in relations. I felt able to share Signor Contarini's disappointment with Signor Schanzer, who has, in my opinion, not lived up to the record he had established at Washington and Genoa. It is yet too early days to say whether his enthusiasm for his new chief can safely be shared, but there is a general consensus of opinion that Signor Mussolini is making an excellent beginning.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 12537/769/44] No. 527.

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received November 13.)

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a paper, prepared by the General Staff, on Turkish organisations in Thrace.

War Office, November 11, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 527.

Turkish Organisations in Thrace.

(A.)—*History.*

WHATEVER may be the conflicting aims and ambitions of Bulgars and Turks with respect to Eastern and Western Thrace, it is safe to say that both races have at least one object in common, viz., the abolition of Greek rule in all Thracian territory.

For the achievement of this object, a number of local organisations have been in existence for the last three years, and these may be conveniently considered under two main heads:—

(*a.*) The Bulgarian Thracian Committees.
(*b.*) The Turkish Thracian Committee; also known as the Central Committee for Thrace.

2. Of the Bulgarian Thracian Committees little need be said. They consist of a number of bodies who all favour autonomy for both Eastern and Western Thrace. As a general rule they do not employ militant or secret methods, but seek to achieve their ends by constitutional means.

3. The Turkish Thracian Committee was remodelled, towards the close of 1920, from remnants of an earlier organisation. Like the Bulgarian Thracian Committee, it originally favoured an autonomous Thracian State, and, with a view to furthering this object, it not only formed armed bands in Eastern Thrace, but also cultivated independent relations with its Bulgarian sympathisers.

4. *Kemalist Influence.*—The Kemalists obtained complete control of the Turkish Thracian Committee, thanks to the activities of two persons: (*a*) Shakir Bey, and (*b*) Dramali Fouad Bey.

(*a.*) Shakir Bey. Originally the Deputy for Gallipoli in the Constantinople Parliament, this individual joined the "Salvation of the Country" Party under

Mustapha Kemal on its inception in 1919. In June 1920 this party sent Shakir Bey, now a leading member of the Turkish Thracian Committee, to Sofia to negotiate for Bulgarian help in securing autonomy for Thrace. Shakir Bey achieved no very tangible results, but by propaganda he considerably assisted Bulgarian band activities in Thracian territory. He also completely changed the policy of the Turkish Thracian Committee from "Autonomy for Thrace" to "Eastern Thrace for Turkey and a plebiscite for Western Thrace," thus converting the Turkish Thracian Committee for all practical purposes into a Kemalist organisation, although Shakir Bey was not a professed Kemalist.

(*b.*) In June 1921 the Kemalists sent one Dramali Fouad Bey to Sofia, ostensibly to counter Shakir Bey's activities, and to gain direct touch between the Kemalists and the Thracian committees in Bulgaria. Fouad's *métier* was militant action as opposed to Shakir's political propaganda. He, Fouad, organised bands, sabotaged the railway, endeavoured to bring about concerted action on the part of both Thracian and Bulgarian bands, and generally stirred up trouble.

Shakir Bey outwardly deprecated Fouad's activities, but secretly he corresponded with him.

In December 1921 the Kemalists appointed Shakir Bey their actual, but secret, political agent at Sofia, although their nominal agent was one Djevad Abbas.

In January 1922 Shakir became president of the Thracian Committee.

In the same month Fouad, having to some extent organised the bands and drawn a red herring across Shakir's trail, was driven from Bulgaria by the Bulgarian Government under strong pressure from the Allies.

After the Mudania Conference, on the 19th October, 1922, the Kemalist Rafet Pasha entered Constantinople as Military Governor of Eastern Thrace. Shortly afterwards Shakir Bey proceeded to Adrianople and issued a manifesto to officials of the new Administration in Eastern Thrace, apparently as Civil Governor.

5. To recapitulate: The history of Kemalist intrigue in Thrace, and its result, is as follows:—

1919: Shakir Bey, member of Mustapha Kemal's party in the Constantinople Parliament, was also a member of the Turkish Thracian Committee.

1920: Shakir, now a leading member of the Turkish Thracian Committee, brought its policy into line with that of the Kemalists, although outwardly not a Kemalist himself.

1921: The Kemalist Fouad Bey organises militant activity in Thrace and draws a red herring across Shakir's trail, whilst Shakir organises political propaganda and becomes the secret political agent for the Kemalists in Bulgaria.

1922: Shakir becomes president of the Turkish Thracian Committee, and thus controls its organisations. Fouad is driven out of Bulgaria, but leaves a militant organisation in Bulgaria and Thrace. This is at the disposal of Rafet Pasha, the Kemalist Military Governor of Eastern Thrace. The political organisations are also at the disposal of the Kemalists, and their head, Shakir Bey, becomes Civil Governor.

(B.)—*Recent Developments.*

1. *Kemalist Military Organisation of Eastern Thrace.*

The military organisations in Eastern Thrace have rapidly expanded during the last four months, and have extended through the Chatalja area to Constantinople itself.

At the time of the Greek threat to Constantinople, in July 1922, a considerable Turkish military organisation became apparent in Eastern Thrace, at which, according to General Harington, the French connived.

Fifteen thousand men were enrolled and gradually equipped by Essad Bey, the chief of police at Constantinople, who is known to be a Kemalist. Munitions were surreptitiously obtained from the dumps under Allied control in Constantinople.

At the same time, the Constantinople Government applied for permission to raise two divisions for the defence of Chatalja, and the Kemalist representative in Constantinople offered General Harington a division, which he said he could raise in seven days and the organisation of which was already in being. This could be expanded to 20,000 men if the Allies would provide arms, &c.

Since then it is known that at least 2,000 men have been added to the 15,000 enrolled by Essad Bey. In addition, there has been a small infiltration of Kemalists

into Thrace viâ the Black Sea. Eight thousand Kemalist gendarmes have also been allowed to proceed to Thrace under the terms of the Mudania Convention.

On the 17th October, 1922, it was reported that the Kemalists were organising an army of 30,000 men in Eastern Thrace with a view to attacking the Allies if the latter failed to comply with the terms of the Mudania Convention. The 8,000 gendarmerie in Thrace, a large percentage of whom are believed to be in reality officers and n.c.o.'s, are to form the nucleus of this army, which would be commanded by Rafet Pasha. It is thought that the organisation of this army is well advanced. Shakir Bey has already announced that, if the gendarmerie is insufficient to maintain order, local inhabitants may be employed to supplement it.

2. *Present Possible Kemalist Force in Eastern Thrace and Chatalja.*

It is therefore believed that the Kemalists could raise—

(*a.*) In Eastern Thrace, two army corps, each of three divisions, each of 3,000 rifles, or 18,000 rifles in all, with a ration strength of 5,000 per division, or 30,000 in all.

These would be composed of—

8,000 gendarmes.
17,000 Essad Bey's men.
5,000 local bands.

(*b.*) In Chatalja and Constantinople two more divisions of the same strength, or 6,000 rifles in all, composed of—

The Chatalja gendarmerie.
Central Government troops.
Local police, firemen, &c.
Local levies.

The Kemalists already have sufficient rifles for the above eight divisions, but at present they have no artillery in Europe.

General Staff, War Office,
November 7, 1922.

[E 12544/10524/44] No. 528.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

My Lord, *Greek Legation, London, November* 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, Lordship that my Government has entrusted me to bring the following facts to the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

The question of the refugees in Greece is daily assuming the aspect of an unprecedented tragedy. In addition to the refugees who have already arrived in Greece from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor—who amount to nearly 1,000,000—further large numbers are beginning to arrive from the Asiatic shores of the Black Sea and from Constantinople. The representative of the American Relief Fund for Orphans in the Near East informed the Greek Government that he has been warned by the Kemalist authorities that if the 20,000 orphan children now concentrated on the borders of the Black Sea were unable to leave they would be exposed to massacre.

Faced by such an appalling menace, the Greek Government has been compelled to declare that they are prepared to admit these orphans—of whom two-thirds belong to the Armenian community—into Greece.

On the same day Dr. Nansen impressed upon the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs the necessity for the immediate transport to Greece of tens of thousands of women and children who were likewise concentrated at ports on the shores of the Black Sea.

Upon the observation of M. Politis to Dr. Nansen that Greece would be absolutely unable to undertake the care and shelter of these new refugees, Dr. Nansen informed the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that he did not fail to raise this point before the Turkish authorities, who did not hesitate to retort that if these women and children

could not be enabled to depart they would contemplate their enforced deportation to the interior of Asia Minor.

As a striking illustration of the feelings now prevailing among Turkish authorities, the Greek Government has been informed by Dr. Nansen that, in his endeavours to stop the cruel persecution of the Christians by Turkish authorities, he suggested to the latter that Greece would probably be compelled to invite Mussulmans living in Greece to leave there in order to make room for Greek refugees, who continue to arrive in large numbers. The representative of the Angora Government then coolly declared that the Kemalist Government would not in such a case hesitate to order the wholesale massacre of all Greeks remaining in Turkey, including the inhabitants of Constantinople.

Such a situation places the Greek Government in a hopeless position on the possibility of an adequate solution of the problem created by the refugees in Greece. Even Dr. Nansen, strongly realising the whole situation, is completely discouraged, as he cannot see any possible means of exerting an effective pressure on Turkey except through the action of the Great Powers.

In view of such a situation, the Greek Government consider it their imperative duty to make the most earnest appeal to the humanitarian feelings of His Majesty's Government to ask them whether they could kindly see their way to enter into immediate communication with the other Great Powers in order to take any possible measures to cope with such a grave situation.

The enormous influx of hundreds of thousands of destitute refugees in Greece is creating great dangers, not only for the maintenance of these unfortunate victims of the Eastern crisis, but also from a sanitary point of view. As a matter of fact, the fear of great epidemics is daily becoming worse, and the Greek Government entertains the most serious apprehensions lest epidemics of all kinds should spread all over Greece, which will constitute a serious manace, not only to Greece proper, but also to a great part of Eastern Europe.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

[E 12854/10102/44] No. 529.

Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 396.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November* 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 384.

When I saw Prime Minister yesterday I found his attitude in regard to exchange of notes had changed. He said he had discussed this question with his colleagues, and that they had agreed that, while formulæ in their opinion could not be improved upon as a harmonious statement of our policies, they could not give any written undertaking to this effect before delegation left for Lausanne.

He explained that in Egypt it would be quite impossible to keep any such action secret. The King, indeed, in his desire to damage Ministry, would be the first to give them away. It was essential for sake of appearances for him to be able to give impression that he had at least entered conference with an unfettered programme. He could never face in Parliament attacks that would be directed against him for having gone to Lausanne, as it were, with his hands tied. He would prefer to abandon all idea of attending conference. In any case, he felt sure that Egypt's essential interests were safe in your Lordship's hands. His desire to see his country represented at Lausanne had been, and was still, only prompted by *amour-propre*. He begged me to believe and to assure your Lordship that if he were invited to conference he would loyally accept formulæ agreed upon. He could not, of course, put them forward himself, but he undertook to abide by them if and when they were put forward by His Majesty's Government.

I replied that I did not think your Lordship would be satisfied with anything short of exchange of notes, to which throughout our negotiations he had led me to hope that he would be willing to give effect.

After reiterating his objections to this course, he suggested, in proof of his good faith, that he should send confidentially to your Lordship, through myself, personal message in nature of guarantee. My immediately following telegram contains text of this message. I said that I would be willing to transmit this communication to your Lordship, but that I doubted whether it would change situation. I added that, while I should express hope that, if His Majesty's Government had to plead Egypt's

case at conference, your Lordship would bear formulæ in mind, I must remind him that formulæ were in essence a compromise, and that your Lordship had made considerable concessions in order to reach common ground. I must therefore warn him that his failure to exchange notes would leave your Lordship in a position of complete diplomatic liberty.

He said that he fully appreciated this, and assured me again that, due allowance being made for necessities both of his own and of Egypt's political position, he would regard texts already formulated as satisfactory and magnanimous. He added that report had reached him to the effect that your Lordship was shortly going to Paris for a preliminary discussion with French and Italian Governments, and that he hoped to be able to send Yousry Pasha to meet your Lordship there to explain his point of view more fully, and trusted your Lordship would be willing to give him hearing.

[E 12590/27/44] No. 530.

Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 397.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, November* 13, 1922.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Prime Minister authorises me to send following message on his behalf to your Lordship:—

He wishes to confirm to your Lordship assurances already given to myself that exchange of views resulting in formulæ already communicated to you constitute, in his opinion, friendly effort to review [group undecypherable] aspect of question concerning Egypt and to explore possible solutions in order to avoid disagreement in the matter of principle between representatives of the two countries at deliberations of conference.

In these circumstances, and having regard to natural susceptibilities of himself and his colleagues, he considers that it is preferable that prearranged formulæ should not be invoked ("que des textes arrêtés ne soient pas invoqués à l'avance"), certain text, such as that in regard to tribute, being susceptible of alternate or subsidiary solutions which may call for further discussion.

He begs particularly to assure your Lordship that Egypt would propose to adopt at conference most cordial attitude towards His Majesty's Government, and that Egypt's claims, being merely logical outcome of Egyptian independence and of lapse in her favour of Turkish suzerainty, are in no way incompatible with interests of Great Britain.

No. 531.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 702.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November* 12, 1922.

FOLLOWING is identic telegram of three High Commissioners to Governments:—

"Italian High Commissioner notified to his colleagues this morning Italian Government's suggestion for evacuation of Constantinople and adjournment of conference. High Commissioners agree to make following comments thereon to their Governments:—

"Judging by information at their disposal as to present attitude of Grand National Assembly and Turkish army, adjournment of conference might seriously endanger the maintenance of armistice; High Commissioners therefore urgently recommend that conference meet as soon as possible and that definite date be fixed immediately.

"As regards proposed withdrawal of troops prior to conference, there is reason to fear lest such evacuation be interpreted by Turks either as trap with a view to resumption of hostilities later under better conditions or as confession of weakness. This might induce them, in the first case, to refuse to evacuate and to resume hostilities, and in the second contingency to increase their demands."

No. 532.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 705.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 12, 1922.*

PROCEEDINGS of Kemalists at Constantinople and Smyrna have hit French harder than anybody. In fact, their present customs régime will completely ruin French trade with Turkey.

French High Commissioner read us to-day text of a strong protest against Kemalist proceedings which he had been instructed to address to Refet.

Allied High Commissioners have decided not to see Refet together about the violations of Capitulations, as such an interview would do no good, and might even subject us to humiliation. Instead, we propose to draw up a carefully-worded note in which we shall declare that we consider action of Kemalists in violating Capitulations as null and void, and that we reserve all rights to redress and compensation for injury done to Allied interests. We have also decided to have as few dealings as possible with Refet. The latter paid us visits two days ago, which we returned yesterday. We had previously agreed together not to discuss political question with Refet, but, as latter complains of pessimistic accounts given in Leafield press of situation here, I told him these accounts faithfully reflected impression in England, and that public opinion would be behind Government in any action it thought fit to take as regards the Near East.

No. 533.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

(No. 593.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 13, 1922.*

LATE last night I received your Lordship's telegram No. 428 of yesterday, and I called upon M. Poincaré at 9 o'clock this morning.

On my entering his room, he told me that he was absolutely stupefied at the attitude of the press in England, which seemed to be working up to a crisis between England and France, which, as far as he knew, had no foundation whatever, and that even posters were placarded in London announcing the existence of a crisis. Further, in two important journals yesterday the statement was made that the French Government were endeavouring to bargain over the Near Eastern question and making their attitude conditional on British concessions on the question of reparations. He said with some heat that he had never contemplated a bargain, and that he would be ashamed to propose one. All that he had said had been to express the pious hope that in coming to terms with us over the Near Eastern question, we would equally be able to come to terms with him later over the question of reparations, and he reminded me that, to show his goodwill towards the new Government in England, he had made a concession in the postponement of the adjudication for the port concession of Tangier. To him it was quite incomprehensible that there should be any question of a crisis, and he could see no valid reason for any divergence of views between the two Governments in their policy in the Near East, which for his part would be based on the agreement of March and 23rd September, with a few modifications in the former to suit the development which had since occurred in the situation and to be agreed upon between the two Governments.

In determining these, he could foresee no difficulty whatsoever. He considered it very desirable from the point of union between the Allies that the reports and rumours in the press of a crisis should cease, for from his point of view he could see none or even any danger of one arising. He was determined to come to an agreement with us, and there would be no going back. Everything between the two Governments would, either here or at Lausanne, be discussed between the representatives and a common front determined. He regarded this as elementary.

As for your suggestion that he should go to London this week, he regretted very much it was quite impossible for him to do so owing to budget debate, which commences to-morrow, and would be prolonged probably during the whole week. He said that he had no personal feeling in the matter, and would be very glad to come to London to meet you if it had been materially possible, but it was not so, nor did he think that a discussion in London would be desirable, since it would be resented in

Rome, while a conversation in Paris on your way to Lausanne would be quite natural and not open to misconstruction. Since yesterday he had received a telegram from Mussolini stating that owing to parliamentary exigencies he found he would not be able to come to Paris, and he had suggested that there should be a meeting between you and Poincaré and him at Nice. This Poincaré thought out of question, as Nice was not on the road to Lausanne and would make a long *détour*, and the alternative to it seemed to him to be a meeting at Lausanne, but, in view of your opinion that atmosphere at Lausanne might not be favourable, he was suggesting to Mussolini that the meeting might be at Geneva, where this objection would not exist and which would be close to Lausanne.

I read to Poincaré your telegram No. 428 of yesterday. He said he could not understand your fears of disagreement. He considered that, if you could be here on Saturday to lunch or dine with him and to discuss matters with him for as many hours in the day as you please, there would be no difficulty whatever in settling every point. If necessary, the discussion could be continued in the train and resumed with Mussolini at Geneva Sunday night or Monday morning. He has seen the War Office memorandum containing their views on the Near East which had been communicated to the French military authorities with the authority of the Secretary of State for War, and Marshal Foch has expressed to him his general agreement with the views contained therein. I emphasised the fact that it did not follow that the War Office views would be the views of His Majesty's Government. M. Poincaré replied that, in any case, they would form a basis which has already received the approval of the military authorities on both sides of the Channel.

In your interview with the French Ambassador you had mentioned the question of the Straits, frontiers, minorities agreement for Thrace, judicial, financial and other questions as those to which you attach importance.

As regards the Straits and frontiers, the French Government were ready to accept the War Office views if accepted by His Majesty's Government. The question of minorities might have to be settled on the basis of minorities in Hungary, Bulgaria and in other countries. He did not understand exactly what the views of the Foreign Office might be as to the régime to be applied in Thrace, but he supposed it might mean the demilitarisation of certain districts. This, just as the other judicial, financial and other questions, would be a matter of discussion between the two Governments, and he felt absolutely convinced that there would be no difficulty in arriving at a complete accord. He emphasised to me that he had his hands perfectly free. He asked me if I could explain your fears and anxiety. I told him quite frankly that what I believed you feared was that when an agreement had been come to between you and him and the Italian Government, as to the attitude to be adopted towards the Turks on some particular question, he might, under military pressure from the Turks, give way to them and leave us alone and in the lurch. To this he replied that he had already been asked what the attitude of the French troops at Constantinople would be in the event of a Turkish advance, and his reply had been that they would answer force by force. Even if it, in his opinion, was desirable that the Allies should yield to the Turks on any particular point rather than avoid hostilities, he would say so only to you and the Italians, but towards Turks the attitude of France would be solid with Allies. He reminded me of the agreement of September 1914 by which the Allies pledged themselves not to make a separate peace with the enemy. This was his own handiwork, which he, as President of Republic, had forced upon M. Doumer, who was Prime Minister at the time and who had not wished it, and he would adhere strictly to the terms. He was resolved to do his utmost to make a satisfactory peace between Allies and Turkey, and though the Turks would be displeased with the attitude of the French Government, he would act solidly with Great Britain and Italy.

These are the chief points, and the conversation lasted more than an hour. My feeling is that an end must be put to this situation of mistrust, which may have very serious consequences, and as it is quite evident that M. Poincaré, who, it must be remembered, is Prime Minister as well as Minister for Foreign Affairs, is detained here by the debate on the budget, which may last the whole week, I do hope it may be possible for you to put an end to this state of tension, and to be here on Saturday to discuss informally these questions with him, as I feel fairly certain that you will arrive at a satisfactory agreement, especially as it is in M. Poincaré's own personal interest to do so, for a failure would almost certainly bring about his fall. If on Saturday you failed to come to terms there would be nothing to prevent your returning to London on Sunday.

I should add that criticism in English press has so far done only good, and has produced an entire change of atmosphere to our advantage, but if pressed too far it will produce resentment and have the effect of strengthening Poincaré's position. There are already indications of this.

I have just received advanced copy of your despatch to me of 11th November, and I see no reason to change my opinion.

No. 534.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 369.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, November* 12, 1922.

I COMMUNICATED to President of the Council your reply. French Government have also refused to accept Italian proposal on the grounds of effect in Moslem world.

Signor Mussolini said that there had never been any question of withdrawing authority given to Italian High Commissioner and general to proclaim state of siege if they and their colleagues thought it desirable. Reason for Italian proposal for withdrawal was that Allied representatives, after being authorised to proclaim state of siege, had never done so, apparently because they felt unable to enforce it. If, as appeared from your telegram, situation in Constantinople had improved, or was not so serious as represented by Italian High Commissioner, his Excellency did not press for withdrawal. If, however, situation became so grave that there was danger of Allied forces being massacred, it would be better to withdraw them before such a thing could happen. Proposal for withdrawal had not signified any weakening in Italy's attitude, which remains perfectly solid with that of her allies.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 535.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

(No. [? 372].)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, November* 13, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 383.

At the risk of repeating myself, may I again impress on your Lordship that, if any value is attached to Italian co-operation, there should be no preliminary meeting between yourself and M. Poincaré at which Italy is not represented? If such a meeting is held and Signor Mussolini is invited to later meeting, he will consider that he is being placed before a *fait accompli* and either refuse to attend or give a lot of trouble. At present moment I believe attitude of Italian Government on the whole question to be satisfactory—far more so than that of France. You might receive useful support from [? his Excellency], but if alienated he could prove awkward opponent. Please bear in mind that the idea of Italy "following suit" to decisions taken by France and Great Britain is exactly what he is pledged to resist.

No. 536.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November* 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 372.

President of the Council has just telephoned to me that he sees from Havas Agency there is to be meeting in London between you and French Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is unable to be present himself, but is despatching Marquis della Torretta to-night to arrive at London Wednesday evening in order to attend meeting on his behalf. He earnestly begs that it may be postponed until after Marquis della Torretta's arrival. Otherwise effect throughout Italy, and especially on his own position, will be deplorable.

(Sent to Paris.)

No. 537.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 420.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1922.

THE "Times," in their Paris letter of yesterday, and several other newspapers, refer to probability of Ismet Pasha taking advantage of postponement of conference to go to Paris, where he would have an interview with M. Poincaré.

I earnestly trust that this report is unfounded. It would surely be altogether improper for the Turkish representative to enter upon further separate discussions with French Prime Minister on the eve of the conference, and at the very moment when we on our part are using every effort to establish definite agreement with French Government for presenting a united front to Turkish pretensions.

We cannot without profound misgiving contemplate a fresh manifestation of French tendency to parley with the Turks alone, and, instead of unmistakably marking their complete solidarity with their allies, assume the ostensible rôle of mediating between us and the Turks.

Please express to M. Poincaré my confident hope that, if Ismet does come to Paris, he will not be received by anyone in authority, but given to understand that separate discussion with him before the Lausanne Conference cannot be sanctioned.

In view of repeated asseverations by Prime Minister and myself of our desire and intentions to act in absolute accord with our allies, appearance of French hesitancy is producing unfortunate impression, which would be greatly aggravated by any symptoms of independent action.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 386, and Constantinople, No. 568.)

No. 538.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1922.

YOUR despatch No. 2604 of 8th November: Armenians and Lausanne Conference.

Please inform M. Poincaré that I am sending reply to Armenian note regarding representation at Lausanne in the sense agreed upon, but that I have kept the words "which is understood to include" in the last paragraph of the text of my draft, which I prefer to the words "qui aurait à comprendre" in the French translation. I did not think it necessary to await further for a reply from the Italian Government, who will doubtless be willing to accept the note upon which we are both agreed, and I am so explaining to Signor Mussolini.

You should point out to M. Poincaré that the case of Georgia is quite different. We are only admitting the possibility of hearing Armenian representatives at Lausanne should we desire information regarding Armenian minorities in Turkey during the course of the proceedings. The Armenian representatives who may thus be summoned to Lausanne will not be the representatives of the pre-Soviet Armenian Government of the Caucasus, but Armenian national representatives, including particularly Turkish Armenians. There is no similar question of Georgian minorities in Turkey at issue.

As regards the Georgian Government, my view remains that we recognised Georgia's independence *de jure* in January 1921, and, of course, the then existing Government of Georgia as a *de jure* Government. This did not, however, imply that our recognition of that Government, as distinct from the independence of the Georgian State, would last longer than the term of that Government's power. There seems no reason to suppose that the men who composed it will now ever return to office in Georgia, and it is absurd to deal with them now as either the *de facto* or *de jure* representatives of that country.

No. 539.

Telegram (by Telephone) to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 431.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 13, 1922.*

YOUR No. 593.

The press here merely reflects the opinion which is universal in England, that, unless there is a definite agreement between the three Great Allied Powers before entering the conference at Lausanne that they will stand together in resisting the extreme Turkish pretensions, which increase daily and are already intolerable, there will be no advantage in holding the conference at all. It cannot be denied that there is much force in this plea, since on every occasion when I have been to Paris, whether in March, September or October of this year, the press has seen a widely advertised agreement which has subsequently either been flouted by the Turks or not adhered to by the Allies, with the result of shaking all confidence in the sincerity or power of the alliance, and stimulating the Turks to present fresh and more extravagant demands. The latest illustration of this lack of concord may be seen at Constantinople, where the High Commissioners and the Allied generals have had to abandon the decision to declare a state of siege because the Allied Powers have not sufficient forces to control the situation that might arise, while the French and Italian generals announce that their Governments refuse to send any more troops. I recall also the repeated declarations of M. Poincaré at Paris that in no case would the French consent to fire a shot. If the Powers, then, are unable to act together at Constantinople to resist the flagrant breaches of the Mudania Convention of which the Turks have already been guilty, why, asks the press, should there be any greater unity or resolution when some fresh action is threatened or taken by the Turks at Lausanne? Perhaps the above remarks may help to explain the attitude which so deeply surprises M. Poincaré.

As regards the substance of his reply, I greatly regret that the parliamentary situation in Paris will prevent M. Poincaré from coming here, since that would have been from every point of view the best solution. On the other hand, I welcome his assurance, more than once repeated, that in his opinion there is no divergence between the views of the two Governments, and that there will be no difficulty in arriving at a complete accord. Further, I note with extreme satisfaction his statement that in the event of a Turkish advance at Constantinople the French will answer force by force, and I earnestly trust that Generals Pellé and Charpy may not only be acquainted with these instructions, but may be supplied with the forces with which to render them effective. I also hail with satisfaction the assurance that towards the Turks, in the event of trouble, the attitude of France will be solid with the Allies.

These assurances relieve His Majesty's Government of a great anxiety, and lead them to think that the unity which they have so long and consistently preached may at last be realised and maintained.

The French Ambassador has just called to make the suggestion that I should acquaint M. Poincaré in advance with the points upon which it seems to us that agreement is essential before I proceed to the conference.

Acting upon this suggestion, which had already occurred to me, I propose to send to you to-morrow, for communication to M. Poincaré, a list of these points, with the views of His Majesty's Government upon them. They will have reference to the agreements already concluded between the Allies, to the published demands of the Turks and to the facts of the existing situation.

If M. Poincaré, after consideration of these points, finds it as easy to agree with us upon them as he contemplates, and as I most earnestly hope, I will then come over to Paris on Friday, in order to pursue the discussion with him on Saturday. Should an agreement have been found impossible, I could, as you point out, abstain. In the opposite and, I hope, more probable case, since it appears that Signor Mussolini cannot now come to Paris, I would then be ready to proceed to Lausanne on Sunday in order that we might have the suggested discussion *à trois* that night. Though M. Poincaré has been good enough to suggest Geneva to meet my views, I do not think the diversion would be worth undertaking in view of the delay involved, and I should be content to proceed direct to Lausanne.

The main conference could then be opened on Monday morning or afternoon.

In the above proposals I have sought to meet M. Poincaré in every possible way while reserving the freedom of action which His Majesty's Government have been bound to claim.

[E 12324/27/44] No. 540.

Foreign Office to M. Aharonian.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 13, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th October regarding the question of Armenian representation at the Peace Conference at Lausanne.

2. The three principal Allied Governments regret that, owing to the adoption by the Republic of Armenia, whose *de jure* independence has been recognised, of the Soviet form of Government, they cannot see their way to admit the participation of Armenia in the approaching Peace Conference or her signature of the new treaty. The case of Armenia was carefully considered at the Paris Conference of March last, not only on its own merits, but also in connection with the protection of minorities in general. The Allied Governments are not aware that anything has occurred to invalidate the broad conclusions which were then arrived at and which will doubtless form the basis of discussions when the question is reached in the preparation of the new treaty.

3. Should the conference consider it desirable to consult Armenian opinion on any of these points in the course of its proceedings, the necessary invitation will be sent by the conference to the Armenian National Delegation in Paris, which is understood to include representatives of both Russian and Turkish Armenians.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 12618/10102/44] No. 541.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 976.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to a letter dated the 6th October addressed by the Board of Trade to your Lordship's Department regarding the proposed revision of the economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey which appeared in the print of the 7th October, and to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum by Mr. Consul-General Waugh offering some comments on certain articles in the proposed draft.

2. It is doubtful, however, whether it will be possible for His Majesty's Government to base their programme at the Peace Conference on the Treaty of Sèvres. It would be useful, therefore, if the Allied Powers could agree beforehand on a programme containing the essential points.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 541.

Memorandum by Mr. Waugh.

Article 1.—Adopts Juridical Commission's proposal to debar new States (Serbia, Czechoslovakia, Poland) from a voice in modification of Capitulations, which they did not enjoy pre-war, but leaves a voice to Greece and Roumania. I do not see how this can be avoided.

Greece had a treaty giving her most-favoured-nation treatment, the application of which since her defeat in 1897 has been in dispute. The dispute must be settled at the Peace Conference. Roumania had no treaty, but was admitted by the Treaty of Berlin to the benefits of the Capitulations until a treaty should be made between her and Turkey.

The article does not embody Juridical Commission's recommendation regarding the non-applicability to Allied subjects of Turkish laws unless expressly accepted by the Allied Governments.

We have always maintained this in principle; the Turks refused to admit it. It is a knotty point, and must lead to endless disputes unless settled at the Peace Conference.

Article 2.—The reorganisation of the Turkish Post Office must be recognised to be satisfactory before we can consider the suppression of our post offices.

Article 4.—For safeguard of Allied subjects against abuses in taxation, see end of my despatch of the 14th October, 1922.

Articles 21–26.—Juridical Commission recommends insertion of provision in the treaty that all actions for violation of trade-marks, patents, and industrial, literary and artistic property should be tried by mixed courts contemplated in article 136 of Sèvres Treaty. Until this jurisdiction is set up, the Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission should continue to sit.

Article 29.—It should be made clear that this is governed by the principle laid down in article 123 of the Sèvres Treaty that only those *habitually resident* acquire Allied nationality. Mesopotamians, Palestinians, Syrians, Albanians, &c., living in Turkey must be treated as Turkish subjects.

Article 36.—The extension proposed by Juridical Commission of this indemnity (article 300 of Sèvres Treaty) to cover the period of the armistice has not been adopted by Board of Trade, which suggests that a general provision should be inserted elsewhere in the treaty.

It is essential that a full indemnity should be inserted to cover all persons who may be prosecuted criminally or sued civilly for acts committed during the armistice on behalf of or under the direction of any Allied authority.

Article 37.—The revised text gives satisfaction to British merchants resident in Turkey in allowing them the benefit of payment of debts due to them at the pre-war rate of exchange. No doubt the French and Italians will oppose this in the interest of their banks. Their objection could be met by making the article apply only to debts due to Allied subjects, and not to debts due by them.

Article 42.—Substitutes the Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission, as recommended by Juridical Commission. It should be made clear that the provision for revision applies to all judgments given during the armistice, which the Allied High Commissioners refused to recognise as valid.

[E 12838/10524/44] No. 542.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 979.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the proclamation of the 31st October issued by Shakir Bey to the officials of the new Turkish Administration in Eastern Thrace.

Constantinople, November 7, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 542.

Proclamation issued by Shakir Bey to the Officials of the new Turkish Administration in Eastern Thrace, published in the Constantinople Press on November 1 *and* 2, 1922.

(Translation.)

THANKS to the grace of God, the effective deliverance of our beloved Thrace commences to-day. I give praise to Almighty God, and, while congratulating all my collaborators on this historic national day, I earnestly beg them to act with a deep feeling of sacrifice in face of the great and holy duty which we have undertaken. Our principal aim will be to make the benefits of an orderly and strong administration felt as soon as possible in this beloved country, which, after groaning for years under enemy oppression and slavery, has once again had its vital foundations shaken on the occasion of its evacuation, and to work for the well-being and happiness of the much tried population by showing the great and just works of the Government of the Great National Assembly.

2. The first task to be undertaken in the liberated territories is the establishment of the national power and the guarantee and protection of local security. If the existing gendarmerie are not sufficient to assure this at once, sufficient men, possessing the qualities of mountain guardians and of good conduct, can for the present be employed from among the peasants.

3. Measures will be taken to prevent the loss of abandoned property left ownerless, and to find goods which have been transferred to others. Property thus found will be taken under protection.

4. Until elections have again taken place there will be formed provisionally an administrative and a municipal council consisting of a fixed number of persons possessing the qualities necessary for membership of administrative and municipal councils.

5. A start will be made at once with the collection of information regarding atrocities committed by the enemy before and during the evacuation in each village, the act and the persons being registered in each case.

6. As it is known that the enemy took away many persons from the liberated territories, enquiries will be made as to where each one was taken, and registers will be prepared and forwarded containing the name, family name and places.

7. It is also necessary to make enquiries and investigations concerning houses and forests burnt, devastations made, and animals, effects and provisions carried off by the enemy, and the collected information must be sent as soon as possible.

8. As it is probable that charges will be made against certain persons of high treason, of serving the enemy, and of harming the Moslem population, great caution and moderation should be shown in this connection. In the case of those known to be really guilty of the charges laid against them, they will be immediately arrested, the necessary enquiries will be carried out and the result communicated to the vilayet within a week.

9. If any of the non-Moslem population have remained, enquiries will at once be made and reported regarding their numbers and their place of residence. Protection must be given them, and as from the time of our taking over the administration no injustice must be done to them.

10. The exportation of animals and provisions from the vilayet is forbidden. As regards the exportation of other merchandise, the establishment of the customs administration in each place must be awaited.

11. As, in conformity with a special law accepted by the Great National Assembly of Turkey, the making, the importation and the use of all spirituous liquors are forbidden, existing stocks will be collected within a given time and their quantities will be declared before the end of November. If, in certain Greek villages and shops, there are spirituous liquors in fixed receptacles which cannot be transported, they will be guarded in the same way as the abandoned properties.

12. Telegraphic and postal communications between the kazas must for the present be assured by the gendarmes or by other special means.

13. Should the Greeks have left behind official documents in official departments, these must not be lost but must be put for protection in sealed sacks.

I pray for the success of my colleagues in the duties which they have undertaken.

SHAKIR,
Vali of Adrianople.

October 31, 1922.

[E 12842/9024/44] No. 543.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 983.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Smyrna, dated the 2nd November, enclosing a copy of a "Law on abandoned Property at Smyrna."

Constantinople, November 7, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 543.

Vice-Consul Urquhart to Sir H. Rumbold.

Sir, *Smyrna, November* 2, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, the attached copy of the "Loi concernant l'Administration des Biens meubles et immeubles des Personnes qui se sont enfuies ou absentées des Régions libérées."

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

Enclosure 2 in No. 543.

Loi concernant l'Administration des Biens meubles et immeubles des Personnes qui se sont enfuies ou absentées des Régions libérées.

ARTICLE 1er. Les biens meubles se trouvant dans les régions libérées de l'occupation ennemie et qui sont restés sans propriétaires par suite de la fuite ou de l'absence de ceux-ci seront vendus aux enchères publiques par les soins du Gouvernement et dans les formes usuelles.

Les biens immeubles ainsi que les cultures seront aussi administrés par le Gouvernement et leur prix, leur bail ou autres revenus après déduction des frais encourus seront versés aux caisses du fisc pour être passés en compte dépôt. Pourtant les biens immeubles ainsi que les sommes ainsi versées en compte dépôt aux caisses du fisc seront ristournées à ceux des propriétaires qui rentreront.

Art. 2. Les actes conclus dans les formes usuelles et basés sur des procurations exécutées avant l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi sont valables. A partir de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, tous les droits découlant desdits actes ainsi que tous les devoirs mandataires passeront au Gouvernement.

Art. 3. Toute personne qui aurait pris possession arbitrairement des biens et des cultures et des choses abandonnées qui sont restées sans propriétaire devra dans un délai d'une semaine à partir de la publication de la présente loi en faire remise au Gouvernement. Ceux qui refuseront de ce faire seront empêchés administrativement de la jouissance de ces biens et seront traduits par-devant les tribunaux.

Art. 4. Ceux qui dénoncent des biens abandonnés et cachés seront rémunérés dans la proportion du 10 pour cent des biens précités.

Art. 5. Les dispositions de la présente loi seront aussi applicables aux biens meubles et immeubles et aux cultures de ces personnes dont la fuite ou l'absence ailleurs pour des raisons d'ordre politique ou militaire serait établie par voie de présomption.

Art. 6. Cette loi entrera en vigueur à partir de la date de sa publication.

Art. 7. Les Commissaires aux Finances à l'Intérieur et à la Justice sont chargés de l'application de la présente loi.

[E 12643/27/44] No. 544.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 984.)

Constantinople, November 7, 1922.

My Lord,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 652 of the 4th instant, the Grand Vizier called on me by appointment at 11 A.M. on that day. Speculation had been rife as to how long the Constantinople Government would be able to maintain itself in view of the measures taken against it by the Angora Government. I knew that there had been frequent consultations at the Palace amongst the Ministers, which all pointed to the discussion of some decision of importance. Matters were brought to a head by the attitude taken up by the Grand National Assembly at Angora when the Grand Vizier's telegram suggesting united action at the Lausanne Conference was read out. The manner in which this telegram was received must have convinced the Central Government, even if it did not realise the fact before, that any understanding or accommodation with the Angora Government was hopeless.

2. I was consequently not surprised when the Grand Vizier, after some preliminary remarks about his son, who has been ill, alluded to the telegram he had sent to Mustapha Kemal about the Peace Conference and the manner in which it had been received. In this connection he alluded to a statement made by Mustapha Kemal in the Grand National Assembly to the effect that a reply had been sent to the telegram. If this was true, he could only say that he had never received the reply and he suspected Hamid Bey of having suppressed it. He spoke of Hamid Bey in terms of profound distrust and dislike. His Highness declared that the Nationalists had continually reproached him and his colleagues with maintaining themselves in power illegally. They had even gone so far as to accuse the Central Government of treason. He did not admit that his tenure of power had been illegal. His was a properly constituted Government functioning under the Sultan and in close relations with the Allies. In that capacity the Central Government had been invited to the Peace Conference. He wished, therefore, to ask me in the first place whether the invitation should be accepted, and, if so, whether a delegation from Constantinople should go to Lausanne, even under the threat that the Kemalist delegation would abstain from attending a conference at which representatives of the Central Government were present.

3. I replied that I greatly regretted that I could not offer his Highness any advice on this matter. I reminded him of what had happened in February of last year in London. Delegations had gone both from Constantinople and Angora and had managed to get along perfectly well together. It was true that the respective positions of the two Governments had changed owing to the complete defeat of the Greeks by the Nationalists I could only put the matter to his Highness in the following way: If invitations to an official dinner had had to be sent out to two personages who were known to be on bad terms with each other, it seemed to me to be a matter for the decision of one or other of those personages whether or not to abstain from attending the dinner.

4. The Grand Vizier then alluded to the larger question of the position of the Central Government. Again he enquired, with an anxiety which was pathetic and unusual for a man who is generally so self-possessed, whether his Government should resign. In point of fact, I only learnt afterwards that his mind was already made up on that subject, as he had offered the resignation of the Cabinet to the Sultan the previous afternoon. I could only reply that there again I could not offer him any advice as it was contrary to the principles of His Majesty's Government to mix itself up in the internal affairs of foreign States. I expressed regret, however, to his Highness for not being able to be more helpful.

5. The Grand Vizier did not seem surprised at my reply. He enquired whether, if his Government resigned, the Allied High Commissioners would be prepared to carry on the administration of Constantinople. I said that we could not undertake such a task, for which, for one thing, we had not the material means. His Highness nevertheless begged me to consult my colleagues with regard to the position in the event of the resignation of the Government. I made no allusion during this interview to the Sultan. The Grand Vizier then took his leave, and I felt that I had seen the last, officially, of a courteous old Turkish gentleman of the old school. His dignified bearing in the midst of his difficulties and humiliations could not but make a strong appeal to my sympathy.

6. I saw my colleagues in the afternoon, when the French High Commissioner informed me that the Grand Vizier had told him, about two hours after he had left me, that he had telegraphed to Mustapha Kemal to say that he was ready to resign and asking to whom he should hand over the conduct of affairs. It is therefore evident to me that after he left me at noon the Grand Vizier, with the consent of his colleagues, took the final step. The Grand Vizier also told the French High Commissioner that the Sultan had no intention of abdicating at present. My colleagues approved the line I had taken with the Grand Vizier, and agreed that we must face the prospect of a Kemalist Administration. Indeed, it was evident to us that Refet Pasha's real purpose in prolonging his stay at Constantinople had been to prepare the *coup d'État* which would get rid of the Constantinople Government.

7. Thus have disappeared a régime and an institution which have existed for many centuries. The office of Grand Vizier is nearly as old as the Turkish Empire itself, and it precedes or follows the deposition of the last representative of a dynasty which has reigned for fully 600 years.

8. The observer here lives too close to these remarkable events to be able properly to appraise their full significance. Time alone will show whether the disappearance of this historic régime will make for the prosperity of Turkey, but present indications seem to show that those in power in Turkey to-day are steering the country to ultimate disaster.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

High Commissioner.

[E 12645/27/44] No. 545.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No 987.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of two joint Allied notes to the Angora Government respecting the conference at Lausanne.

Constantinople, November 7, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 545.

Allied High Commissioners to Hamid Bey.

LES soussignés Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence Hamid Bey qu'ils ont reçu l'ordre de leurs Gouvernements respectifs de déclarer que ces Gouvernements prennent acte du contenu de la note verbale du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale, en date du 29 octobre 1922, par laquelle il se déclare prêt à envoyer des délégués plénipotentiaires pour assister à la conférence qui doit se réunir à Lausanne le 13 novembre 1922.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont reçu également l'ordre de déclarer que les Gouvernements français, britannique et italien prendront toutes les mesures qui dépendront d'eux pour faciliter dans toute la mesure du possible l'échange de correspondances entre Lausanne et la Turquie pendant la durée de la conférence.

PELLÉ.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 4 novembre 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 545.

Allied High Commissioners to Hamid Bey.

SE référant à leur note collective en date d'aujourd'hui au sujet de la conférence qui doit se réunir à Lausanne le 13 novembre 1922, les soussignés Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'informer son Excellence Hamid Bey qu'ils ont porté à la connaissance de leurs Gouvernements respectifs le contenu de la note verbale qu'il a bien voulu leur adresser le 29 octobre au sujet de l'invitation qui avait été transmise au Gouvernement de Constantinople en vue de se faire représenter à la conférence.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'ordre de faire remarquer à son Excellence Hamid Bey qu'en adressant leur invitation aux deux Gouvernements de Constantinople et d'Angora, les Gouvernements alliés se sont conformés strictement à la procédure suivie jusqu'ici. Sans s'immiscer dans des questions qui sont du ressort de la politique intérieure, ils seraient heureux de voir la Turquie représentée à Lausanne par une délégation unique.

PELLÉ.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 4 novembre 1922.

[E 12646/27/44] No. 546.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 989.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 7, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 660 of the 5th November, copy of an identic note communicated to the three High Commissioners by Hamid Bey to the effect that, the Grand National Assembly having assumed control on the same lines as in Eastern Thrace over the administration of Constantinople, it trusted that the Allied Powers would appreciate the uselessness or even impossibility of maintaining here any longer the Allied forces of occupation.

2. This communication was considered at a meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals held at the British High Commission yesterday evening. Both my Allied colleagues expressed their strong indignation at this insolent request for the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Constantinople. Marquis Garroni, to whom alone this note had been personally delivered, stated that he had reminded Hamid Bey that the Allied occupation was the result of the war, which had terminated with the armistice at Mudros in 1918, and had warned him that the attitude which the Grand National Assembly was adopting was calculated to lead to the abandonment of the Peace Conference. We unanimously decided that not a moment should be lost in declining even to consider the proposal of the Angora Government. That proposal was contrary, not only to the Mudros armistice, but also to the Paris note of the 23rd September, which stated that the Allied occupation would only terminate on the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace, as well as to the terms of the Mudania Convention, by which the Angora Government undertook to respect the zones in Allied occupation.

3. My colleagues and I decided to base our refusal to entertain the Nationalist proposals on the above grounds. The reply, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, was drafted and signed at the meeting, and sent to Hamid Bey's office the same evening, together with our reply to the second note communicated by Hamid Bey, as described in my telegram No. 661 dated the 5th November in regard to the restrictions on the movements of Allied warships in Nationalist ports. Copies of the note and of the reply thereto are also enclosed.

4. General Harington at the commencement of the meeting described the conversation which he had had with Refet Pasha the preceding day, and in the course of which he had communicated to Refet in writing the decisions taken at the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and generals on the 3rd instant, as reported in my telegram No. 647 of that date.

5. As will be recollected, the main point of those decisions was to the effect that whatever administration was set up in Constantinople, the Allies must insist on exercising over all essential services the same control as they had hitherto exercised over the administration of the Central Government. Refet Pasha had stated to General Harington that the Angora Government being independent could not accept such control, but had asked for General Harington's support in maintaining order in the city. General Harington had replied that the maintenance of order depended on the relations to be set up between the generals and the Nationalist Governor-General here, that an occupying army possessed an inherent right to protect itself, and that the Allied army of occupation had been repeatedly recognised not only by Refet himself, but in the Mudania Convention. Refet Pasha had stated his intention of reporting what General Harington had said to him to the Government of Angora in the form of a proposal for co-operation (the word "control" was obviously distasteful to him) with the Allied troops.

6. I then read to the meeting a summary of my telegram No. 658, giving an account of the visit paid to the Grand Vizier by Mr. Ryan that morning. It was perfectly obvious that the Nationalists considered themselves to be, and were going to act as, the *de facto* Government of this city.

7. Both General Pellé and the Marquis Garroni agreed that, unless we made our position absolutely clear at once to the Angora Government and unless we were prepared to take a firm stand from the beginning, we would shortly find ourselves obliged to leave Constantinople altogether and under humiliating conditions. As a preliminary step, General Pellé proposed that it would be desirable to issue a public proclamation stating the intention of the Allies to maintain the *status quo* here and to hold themselves responsible for the maintenance of order in the town.

8. I agreed to this, and a notice has already been given to the press to that effect. I urged, however, that the first measure to be taken was for the General Officer Commanding-in-chief to prohibit all further demonstrations in the town such as had occurred on the preceding night, when a crowd of armed hooligans had not been prevented from parading the streets and firing revolvers to celebrate the Nationalist assumption of the administration of the city. General Harington undertook to endeavour to arrange this direct with Refet Pasha. I have since learnt from General Harington that Refet has undertaken that no more demonstrations of this nature shall take place.

9. It was recognised at the meeting that the situation in Constantinople was even more dangerous than at the time of the Mudania crisis. The Turkish police and gendarmerie here were no longer at the disposal of the Allied army of occupation. They had now given their allegiance to the Angora Government, and could not be trusted to act as auxiliaries and might even have to be considered as active enemies. The Nationalists were applying to Constantinople the same procedure of gradual infiltration as they had employed in the neutral zones prior to the Mudania Convention. Thrace was in process of being nationalised. The Allied forces of occupation, in fact, were in the position of having nothing but fronts to defend. In these circumstances nothing could avail us except a bold and united action.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 546.

Note verbale communicated by Hamid Bey to High Commissioners.

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, A. Hamid Bey a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique qu'à la suite de l'abolition de la souveraineté personnelle en Turquie, la population de Constantinople, en communion enthousiaste avec l'âme et les aspirations nationales, ayant spontanément décidé de se placer sous l'autorité directe du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, celui-ci a transmis, d'ores et déjà, les ordres et les instructions nécessaires aux départements compétents, en vue d'assurer le maintien de la tranquillité et la gestion des affaires publiques dans le Vilayet de Constantinople.

Bien qu'il demeure entendu que nos armées ne franchiront pas les lignes de démarcation provisoires arrêtées par la Convention de Moudania, la garantie de l'ordre devant désormais incomber exclusivement au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie par le fait de l'établissement virtuel dudit Gouvernement à Constantinople, il est évident que la nécessité s'impose pour nous d'y envoyer, à l'instar de ce qui a été pratiqué en Thrace orientale, les fonctionnaires et les contingents qu'exigent les besoins de sécurité locale.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale a le ferme espoir qu'en présence de cette situation résultant des événements, les Puissances reconnaîtront la non-utilité, voire l'impossibilité, de la continuation du maintien des troupes interalliées dans la zone de Constantinople.

A cette occasion, A. Hamid Bey a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique que la délégation turque pour la Conférence de la Paix s'est déjà mise en route pour se rendre à Lausanne par voie de Constantinople, et que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie espère sincèrement que cette conférence donnera des résultats positifs.

Constantinople, le 5 novembre 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 546.

Note verbale communicated by Hamid Bey to High Commissioners.

HAMID BEY a l'honneur de communiquer au Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique, pour les fins requises, les mesures suivantes qui ont été prises par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale au sujet des conditions d'entrée et de

séjour dans ses ports des navires de guerre des Puissances avec lesquelles la Turquie se trouve en état d'armistice :

1. Pour que les navires de guerre des Puissances étrangères puissent entrer et ancrer dans l'un des ports de l'État de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, il est nécessaire de faire connaître préalablement le nom, la classe, l'armement, le nombre de l'équipage, le but de la visite et la durée de séjour des navires en question ;
2. Les navires de guerre étrangers ne peuvent pénétrer dans les ports turcs qu'après le lever et avant le coucher du soleil. Il ne peut entrer plus d'un seul navire à la fois dans un même port ;
3. Les croisières des navires de guerre étrangers dans les eaux territoriales pendant la nuit, et particulièrement pendant les nuits brumeuses ou trop obscures, présentent toujours des dangers et des inconvénients ;
4. Les équipages desdits navires ne peuvent débarquer par détachement. Les équipages qui désirent débarquer dans un but de visite doivent préalablement s'adresser au commandant turc du grade le plus élevé se trouvant dans le port et ne descendre à terre qu'à condition que leur nombre ne dépasse pas celui qui aura été autorisé par ledit commandant.

Constantinople, le 5 novembre 1922.

Enclosure 3 in No. 546.

Allied High Commissioners to Hamid Bey.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note que son Excellence Hamid Bey a bien voulu leur transmettre en date du 5 novembre relative aux mesures prises par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale au sujet des conditions d'entrée et de séjour dans ses ports des navires de guerre des Puissances avec lesquelles la Turquie se trouve en état d'armistice.

Les conditions de l'armistice signé à Mudros en 1918 restant toujours en vigueur, les Hauts-Commissaires ne se voient pas à même de se conformer aux restrictions ainsi imposées aux mouvements des bateaux de guerre alliés.

Ils ont donc l'honneur de prier son Excellence Hamid Bey de bien vouloir porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale.

Constantinople, le 5 novembre 1922.

Enclosure 4 in No. 546.

Allied High Commissioners to Hamid Bey.

PAR une note en date du 5 de ce mois, son Excellence Hamid Bey a bien voulu faire savoir aux Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie qu'à la suite de l'abolition de la souveraineté personnelle en Turquie, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale, estimant qu'il lui incombe exclusivement d'assurer l'ordre dans le Vilayet de Constantinople, avait envisagé l'éventualité d'y envoyer les fonctionnaires et les contingents qu'exigeraient les besoins de la sécurité locale, conformément à ce qui a été fait en Thrace orientale, et étant bien entendu que les armées turques ne franchiraient pas les lignes de démarcation provisoires arrêtées par la Convention de Moudania. Par suite, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale propose que les Gouvernements alliés examinent l'opportunité du retrait de leurs troupes de la zone de Constantinople.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence Hamid Bey qu'ils ne peuvent accepter cette manière de voir, contraire à la note des Gouvernements alliés en date du 23 septembre et aux termes de la Convention de Moudania du 11 octobre dernier. Les armées d'occupation alliées continueront, en conséquence, à assumer la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre dans les territoires qu'elles occupent en vertu de l'armistice du 30 octobre 1918 et dont les limites ont été fixées en dernier lieu par la Convention de Moudania.

Les Hauts-Commissaires prennent acte de l'affirmation par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale que les troupes turques ne franchiront pas les lignes de démarcation de ces zones.

Constantinople, le 5 novembre 1922.

[E 12647/27/44] No. 547.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 990.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 7*, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 673 of to-day, I have the honour to report the following details of my conversation with the Sultan on the 6th November:—

His Majesty received me in a kiosk adjoining that in which he usually gives audience to foreign representatives. He pleaded a cold as the reason for this, but I suspect it was partly due to a desire to make the most of a reduced retinue in a smaller vestibule. I was met on arrival in the usual kiosk, but there were only one chamberlain and one minor official of the Court on duty. The masters of ceremonies, who technically belong to the Porte and not to the Palace, failed to attend, although they had been notified.

The Sultan saw me alone with Mr. Ryan, as usual. He was perfectly composed, less vehement in his language than he sometimes is, but also less nervous in his manner, and not too dejected to indulge in an occasional humorous sally. He kept me three and a half hours. I think he was sincerely gratified to find that I was willing to see him.

Your Lordship will forgive me if, in the present stress of business, I confine myself to the bare outlines of what passed in a very long conversation, an exact record of which would be all the more difficult as the Sultan showed all the idiosyncracies which I have mentioned in reporting on previous audiences.

After preliminary courtesies, the Sultan reviewed the circumstances in which the Kemalists, whom he described as Bolshevik, had overthrown his Government by a sort of unarmed *coup d'État*, and asked how the new situation was regarded by the Allied Powers. I said that it was only on the previous day that the Kemalists had flouted the Allies. He asked to what I referred. I gave him a summary of the two notes from Hamid Bey asking for the evacuation of Constantinople and imposing restrictions on the movements of our ships. I said that the Allied High Commissioners had drafted negative replies within two hours of receiving these notes and that we were in correspondence with our Governments on the whole situation. In reply to further questions, I explained that, while not mixing up in internal questions, our view was that any Kemalist Administration set up here must function in the same way as the previous Constantinople Government, and that the right of the Allied Powers, as occupants, to exercise such control as was necessary to secure the safety of their forces and to assure law and order remained unimpaired.

The Sultan spoke of the plight of his subjects who had opposed the Kemalists and of his non-Moslem subjects. He said that as Constantinople was held in pledge by the Allies, and as he had been deprived of all power, he must leave the protection of all those people to us. He waived this responsibility on to me with a gesture, and then proceeded to speak at length of the recent decision of Angora in regard to the Caliphate. The people there had not merely assailed his temporal authority at home, but had ridden roughshod over the rights of all Moslems outside Turkey, who were subject to the purely spiritual authority of the Caliph, and were entitled to a voice in this matter. He declared that he and His Majesty's Government were cointerested in the question, having regard to the vast number of Moslems who were subject to the temporal sovereignty of Great Britain and to his own spiritual authority. Angora had not, so far, ventured to deprive him of the Caliphate, probably because of the storm which might be raised; but the people there were seeking in every way to bring about his abdication. There had been times when he had thought of such a step, but in present circumstances he could not contemplate, except in the last resort, such a dereliction of duty. Imminent danger might justify him in abdicating, but otherwise he could not abandon his trust without handing it on to a competent successor. He could not resign his functions in favour of an Assembly.

In this connection he mentioned his conversation with Refet Pasha on the 29th October. Refet Pasha had not at first sought an audience, nor had the Sultan any

reason for inviting him. Eventually Refet Pasha had asked for an audience. He came ostensibly to rectify false impressions caused by his speeches. His rectifications amounted to a repetition of what he had said publicly. He had then suggested that he, the Sultan, should create a *fait accompli* of the same kind as he, Refet Pasha, had actually brought off a week later. He put this forward as a personal suggestion. The Sultan had replied that it was well to sleep over even small matters, and that this was a great one. At parting he had spoken of the possibility of a further meeting, but Refet Pasha had refused to consider this, saying that he had already gone to a length which his enemies in Angora would make a ground of attack against him.

I said that His Majesty's Government could not fail to be alive to the implications of the Angora decision about the Caliphate, and had doubtless had reports on the effect produced in India. These reports had not yet been communicated to me, but I would enquire by telegraph.

The Sultan then descanted lengthily on the question of the attitude of the Allies. The Kemalist *coup*, he said, had the appearance of an internal affair, but in reality it greatly affected the Allies. He urged the importance of their taking a firm grip of the situation here. He ultimately reduced his observations to two definite questions, viz., were the Allies going to recognise the legitimacy of the Angora Government, and were they going to admit, pending the conclusion of peace, the pretentions of the Angora Government in regard to Constantinople? In leading up to these questions His Majesty emphasised the fact that the Kemalists were a minority enforcing their views on a majority, who, unless the Allies took hold of the situation, would be incapable of making themselves felt.

In reply to the Sultan's first question, I said that the Constantinople Government had disappeared, that we must treat with some one at the conference, and that there was only the Angora Government left to treat with. His Majesty demurred to the suggestion that the Constantinople Government had ceased to exist. It was in his view in a state of suspended animation. I did not pursue a sterile discussion on this subject, and contented myself with suggesting that ultimately some lawful Government must be evolved, deriving either from the present National Assembly or from some new body.

As for the second question, I reaffirmed the principle by which the Allies were guided, namely, that any Administration in Constantinople must be conditioned by the Allied occupation so long as it lasted, but I said that the practical evolution of the situation must depend on events which could not be foreseen. His Majesty, who had pressed me very hard, at last expressed himself satisfied with my answer, and turned to the question of his personal position, to which, as he more than once intimated, he had all the time been leading up.

The Sultan repeated that the Kemalists showed no inclination, for the present at any rate, to dispossess him of the Caliphate, but that they were seeking to bring about his abdication by circulating rumours of it in every sort of shape. They were drawing a net around him. As an example of their conduct, he mentioned that they had replaced by creatures of their own his guards and custodians at the Old Seraglio Palace, though it belonged to the Imperial Family, and though the contents of it belonged partly to the family and partly to the Caliphate. He adverted to the promise made to him by my predecessor in 1920 to the effect that the British authorities would do their utmost to protect his person in case he was threatened with imminent danger. He explained that he might find himself in such a position that the only thing to do would be to leave Constantinople. If he were driven to do this he might either abdicate or simply retire to a place of safety without abdicating. In any case he would not abdicate beforehand as he would thereby increase the danger to his personal liberty.

His Majesty asked whether, in the contingency he had in mind, we could enable him to leave. I said that the promise made in 1920 still held good. If it were a question of his leaving in the immediate future, I was confident that it would be in our power to help him. I could not speak with absolute confidence of the whole period between this and the eventual evacuation of Constantinople, as many unforeseen contingencies might arise. His Majesty said he would not leave until grave danger was actually in sight, and he realised that in certain extraordinary conditions it might not be possible to arrange for his departure. He then raised the question of where he could go to, and asked whether he could be given asylum in a British dependency, like Egypt or Cyprus. I said I feared that Egypt would be impossible, and added that I did not think the question of destination was an immediate one, as he could go somewhere temporarily before settling on his eventual place of residence. After some further

discussion as to the number of people who should accompany him, which he put at ten to fifteen, or at most twenty, all told, the conversation ended. Before giving me leave to go, he asked whether I would see him again. I said I would do so, but begged him not to send for me too soon.

The Sultan seemed to have in mind the possibility of a reaction in his favour, especially if the Allies took hold of the situation here and the majority of the population were thus enabled to give free play to their feeling of loyalty. Towards the end of the audience he hinted at the possibility of his cajoling the Kemalists with the object of confronting them with a *fait accompli*. It was by no means clear whether he meant simply that this might be his unmolested departure from Constantinople or whether he was speaking of the possibility of his bringing about a reaction in his favour. For obvious reasons I forbore to question him on this point, and I was careful throughout not to say anything which might be taken as encouragement to the Sultan to embark on adventurous projects.

I have omitted to state that in the course of the conversation I told His Majesty that the Allied High Commissioners had recorded a strong protest against arrests for political reasons while the Allied Powers were in occupation of Constantinople.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 12657/27/44] No. 548.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 991.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 7, 1922.

I RECEIVED a visit a few days ago from M. des Closières, the French commissioner on the debt and president of the Provisional Financial Commission of Control, who had just come from Paris and to which he was returning in a day or two.

2. M. des Closières informed me that he had done his best to impress on his compatriots the real character of the Nationalists and the danger which their assumption of power would mean for the persons and interests of foreign subjects. He expressed the opinion that at Mudania the Nationalists had been largely bluffing and might be expected to continue to bluff. A united front was the only way of meeting this, and M. des Closières deplored the fact that the suggestion for a preliminary conference had broken down. He attributed this to the misplaced *amour-propre* of the British and French Prime Ministers, neither of whom had been willing to hold this preliminary conference in the capital of the other. The result was that the Turks would go to the conference knowing what they wanted, whereas the Allies would not have had the opportunity of agreeing on the points on which they must make a stand. He hoped that it might nevertheless be possible, even at the last hour, to hold preliminary conversations.

3. M. des Closières went on to talk of the plenipotentiaries who would represent Nationalist Turkey at the conference. He described these as "deux brutes," with whom discussion would be difficult, if not impossible. In these circumstances the prospects were not very propitious.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 12658/303/44] No. 549.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 992.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the minutes of a special meeting of Allied High Commissioners and Allied generals held at the British Embassy on the 6th November, 1922.

Constantinople, November 7, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 549.

Réunion spéciale des Hauts-Commissaires et des Généraux alliés à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre le 6 Novembre 1922.

Président: Sir H. Rumbold.

Général Pellé.	Mr. Henderson.	Marquis Garroni.
M. Jessé Curély.	Colonel Baird.	M. Quaroni.
Commandant de Courson.	Mr. Greenway.	Colonel Vitelli.
Général Charpy.	Général Sir C. Harington.	Général Mombelli.
Colonel Chatel.	Colonel Gribbon.	Colonel Vitale.
	Colonel Heywood.	

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD prie le Général Harington de renseigner les Hauts-Commissaires au sujet de l'entretien qu'ont eu les généraux alliés avec Réfet Pacha le même matin.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON rapporte que les généraux s'étaient entendus préalablement pour adopter une attitude unanime et définitive vis-à-vis des prétentions de Réfet. Ce dernier leur avait déclaré le matin qu'il ne savait peu ou rien au sujet des notes présentées le 5 courant aux Hauts-Commissaires par Hamid Bey—notes qu'il caractérisait comme essentiellement "diplomatiques." Il n'était que trop clair que l'intention de Réfet était de s'arroger le maintien de l'ordre, aussi bien que le contrôle de la police, des troupes turques et de la gendarmerie. Il avait ajouté qu'il était préparé à respecter la présence des troupes alliées en vue de la Convention de Moudania.

Les généraux avaient répondu qu'ils ne pouvaient point prendre en considération ces prétentions. Ils étaient chargés par leurs Gouvernements en vue de l'armistice de Mudros du maintien de l'ordre jusqu'à la ratification de paix. Ils n'avaient donc ni l'intention ni le pouvoir de se dévêtir de cette responsabilité. Ils étaient préparés à travailler en collaboration avec lui, mais ils ne voudraient point se soumettre à son contrôle. Pendant la réunion, les généraux avaient été informés des désordres qui s'étaient produits de l'autre côté du Bosphore. Le commandant anglais de la place avait demandé permission au Général Harington de prendre certaines mesures afin de faire cesser toute démonstration de cette nature. Ayant appris les ordres donnés par ledit commandant anglais, il fut invité à s'abstenir de se mêler de la sorte. A cette demande Général Harington avait répondu que c'était son affaire à lui.

Les généraux déclarèrent que Réfet ferait mieux de s'occuper de la Thrace—question pour laquelle il était venu à Constantinople—que, dans tous les cas, ils n'avaient aucune intention de lui remettre le contrôle sans des ordres préalables de leurs Gouvernements; et que, vu tous les efforts de conciliation qu'ils avaient faits, son attitude semblait étrange.

Réfet déclara que l'armistice de Mudros était annulée par la Convention de Moudania.

Général Harington observe, en parenthèses, que la situation est maintenant des plus graves, non moins grave que celle de l'avant-dernier soir de la Conférence de Moudania.

Réfet avait terminé par dire qu'il allait s'entendre le lendemain avec Ismet Pacha pour arriver à une conclusion définitive.

Général Harington ajoute que Réfet avait déclaré qu'il allait lui-même communiquer toute décision des autorités compétentes turques au sujet du vilayet de Constantinople directement aux généraux, et que toute question extérieure serait communiquée par Hamid Bey aux Hauts-Commissaires. De plus, il avait insisté que la censure soit abolie; il avait même chargé le commandant de la gendarmerie, Ali Kémal, de ne plus maintenir liaison avec le Général Fillonneau; en même temps, il avait informé ce dernier qu'il ne commanderait dorénavant que la gendarmerie du vilayet de Constantinople. Quant à Ali Kémal du Peyam Sabah, Réfet prétendait ignorer son sort: peut-être se cachait-il, ou bien des personnes privées l'avaient enlevé.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD observe qu'il est évident que la mission de Réfet avait pour but de monter ce coup, et qu'il l'avait soigneusement étudiée avant de venir

à Constantinople. Les derniers événements étaient en pleine contravention avec l'esprit de l'article 12 de la Convention de Moudania.

La remise en vigueur du tarif spécifique multipliée quinze fois amènerait sans doute une crise des plus graves.

MARQUIS GARRONI demande quelles sont les conclusions des généraux.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON remarque qu'il faudra attendre l'entretien de Réfet avec Ismet Pacha. Les deux parties se maintiennent actuellement sur leurs lignes. Réfet sait bien que les généraux ne céderont pas.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD estime que si les Hauts-Commissaires ne pourront pas maintenir leur autorité jusqu'à la ratification de paix, ils devraient passer la main aux militaires et cesser de fonctionner. L'armée serait donc responsable pour toutes les mesures nécessaires à maintenir l'ordre publique et la sécurité générale. S'ils acceptaient que le nouveau régime abolit toutes les Administrations interalliées, la situation deviendrait absurde.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ observe que les mesures qu'envisagent les Kémalistes léseront les intérêts étrangers et qu'elles supprimeront la plus grande partie du commerce de la ville. Réfet a donné des ordres pour la suppression du Tribunal mixte et de la Commission sanitaire interalliée ; on attend aussi l'arrivée à Constantinople du Commissaire général de la Dette à Angora, qui va remplacer le personnel actuel de l'Administration par des employés kémalistes. Il est donc nécessaire de faire face à ces prétentions avec tous les moyens possibles.

LE MARQUIS GARRONI observe que les Turcs vont se présenter à la conférence comme des vainqueurs qui vont traiter avec les vaincus. Le Général Pellé ajoute que les Alliés n'auront aucune d'espèce de gage entre les mains. Il estime qu'il faut annoncer immédiatement, de la façon la plus formelle, que les Alliés ne toléreront pas de tels agissements. Il faudra non moins prendre des mesures urgentes pour assurer la sécurité. Les autorités militaires ne peuvent plus compter sur une bonne moitié des forces disponibles, c'est-à-dire la police et la gendarmerie.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ propose de faire proclamer sans délai l'état de siège et de remettre les pouvoirs aux généraux. Il faudra aussi occuper la douane et proclamer le rétablissement du tarif 11 pour cent *ad valorem*. De même, les Administrations que Réfet a voulu supprimer devront recommencer à fonctionner sous le contrôle militaire.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON observe que la seule arme que possèdent les autorités alliées, c'est la menace d'arrêter l'installation du nouveau régime en Thrace. Il désire avoir une liste des méfaits de Réfet. Si ce dernier a tenté de contrôler les troupes turques de la capitale, il a agi contre la Convention de Moudania. Il faudra donc désarmer ces troupes. Jusqu'ici, la police a obéi à ses ordres. Il se peut, toutefois, que le jour viendra où elle ne le fera plus. Heureusement, Réfet n'a pas eu le temps d'organiser de tels incidents en Thrace.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ demande si les Alliés disposent des moyens pour assurer leur attitude.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON répond qu'il n'a à Constantinople que trois bataillons anglais. Il y a quatre bataillons français et un italien. Il ne faut pas oublier qu'il a aussi les fronts de Chanak et de Scutari. Il y a pourtant la marine et soixante-six avions. Il est d'avis qu'il y aurait lieu de faire dresser une liste des agissements de Réfet et de lancer une proclamation les annulant.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ donne lecture d'une liste récapitulant les agissements de Réfet. Cette liste comprend la saisie des recettes des douanes et de la surtaxe douanière, l'invitation à la Dette de retirer leur argent qui se trouvait à la douane, l'application du tarif spécifique multiplié quinze fois et la prohibition entière de certains articles dits de luxe, tels que le savon, les souliers et les vins. Général Pellé résume les déclarations du Comité consultatif de Commerce réuni d'urgence le même jour. Le prix du pain serait doublé ; des importateurs avaient déjà détourné leurs cargaisons. Il n'y aurait plus ni vêtements ni chaussures ni meubles ni vins. Les stocks existant ne pourraient être retirés.

Général Pellé observe que les juges ottomans du Tribunal mixte ont été avisés sous menace de ne pas siéger ; de même, la Commission sanitaire avait été avisée de

remettre ses archives et ses recettes à un organ purement ottomane. Pour comble de tout, la Bourse avait été fermée.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON est d'avis qu'il y aura lieu de rédiger une proclamation qui dénoncerait les actes de Réfet comme illégaux et qui les annulerait. On devrait aussi proclamer l'état de siège, le couvre-feu et toutes les restrictions qu'on jugerait nécessaires. Général Harington croit que Réfet hésiterait à s'opposer à ces mesures.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ demande si les Hauts-Commissaires peuvent prendre des mesures semblables sans avoir demandé l'autorisation préalable de leurs Gouvernements.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON rappelle la nécessité de prendre des mesures immédiates. Il pourra, toutefois, tenir avec les forces à sa disposition jusqu'à ce que les Gouvernements auront décidé un plan d'action

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD observe que les Hauts-Commissaires ont déjà envoyé un télégramme pour exposer la situation et pour demander l'appui le plus complet de leurs Gouvernements.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ démande si l'application de l'état de siège ne comportera pas un certain délai.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON répond qu'il va rédiger un document le soir même d'accord avec son expert légal, et qu'il l'examinera le lendemain matin avec ses collègues.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ observe que cette mesure est de la nature d'un coup d'État, et qu'il faut la préparer très soigneusement.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD demande si les Hauts-Commissaires ont le temps d'en informer leurs Gouvernements.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON dit que oui.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD propose donc d'adresser un télégramme identique aux Gouvernements pour faire suite à celui que les Hauts-Commissaires ont envoyé pendant la journée, et, en même temps, une note à Hamid Bey, rédigée d'une manière plutôt générale, pour l'informer que les Hauts-Commissaires ne reconnaissent point les événements de la journée, et qu'ils en ont informé leurs Gouvernements.

GÉNÉRAL CHARPY estime que cela pourrait entrainer un conflit, auquel nous ne pourrions pas faire face. Lui-même ne disposait que de quatre bataillons, car il ne pourrait faire rentrer les bataillons de la Thrace. Il y a quelque temps, quand il était question d'organiser une résistance, les généraux pouvaient compter sur la gendarmerie ; cela n'existait plus du point de vue de renfort ou d'appui. Lui-même ne pouvait garantir que la défense de Stamboul, et cela pas même entièrement. Il suffirait peut-être d'en référer aux Gouvernements, mais il faudrait en même temps donner un avertissement formel à Hamid et à Réfet ; cela n'empêcherait pas, d'ailleurs, qu'on prenne toutes les mesures préparatoires.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ demande quelle sera l'attitude à adopter si nous arrivons à un conflit.

GÉNÉRAL HARINGTON observe que cette question sera discutée le lendemain ; si les généraux ont la libre disposition de leurs troupes, ils seront assez forts pour faire face à la situation. Il désire savoir sur quels renforts les généraux peuvent compter.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD est d'avis que l'opinion publique anglaise ne sera satisfaite que si les Hauts-Commissaires et les généraux auront fait tout le possible pour éviter un conflit. Il propose donc d'envoyer de suite le télégramme dont il a été question dès que le soit, et en même temps de donner un avertissement formel à Hamid Bey et à Réfet Bey par acquis de conscience, comme l'a proposé le Général Charpy.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ observe que l'opinion publique française est même plus forte que celle de l'Angleterre au sujet d'un conflit possible.

GÉNÉRAL MOMBELLI soulève la question des troupes grecques. Si l'on arrive à un conflit à Constantinople, les troupes grecques ne tarderont pas à franchir la ligne de la Maritza.

MARQUIS GARRONI déclare qu'une compagnie de navigation italienne a été prié de transporter 3,000 troupes turques de Panderma, de Guemlik et d'Ismid jusqu'aux côtes de la mer Noire.

Sur la proposition de SIR HORACE RUMBOLD, les Hauts-Commissaires décident qu'ils ne recevront Réfet qu' *in corpore*.

GÉNÉRAL PELLÉ se charge de la rédaction du télégramme identique.

[E 12623/27/44] No. 550.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 2648.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 12, 1922.*

M. POINCARÉ, after defending the internal policy which he had pursued since his advent to power in January last (see my despatch No. 2647 of yesterday's date), went on to discuss the foreign policy of his Government.

This, according to M. Poincaré, mainly concerned itself with two questions: (1) the Near Eastern crisis, and (2) reparations.

Taking the former first, M. Poincaré gave a long account of events since the beginning of the year, and described in considerable detail the successive attempts, beginning with the Paris Conference of March, to obtain a settlement. His main pre-occupation was to bring out the fact that during the whole of this period his one effort had been to reach peace, and to avoid all possibility of France being dragged into a new war. In support of his contention he quoted at length the successive instructions which he had sent to French representatives abroad and the reports which those representatives had sent to him, from which it appeared that France's policy was peace at any price. He claimed that this policy had been eminently successful, inasmuch as, without French intervention, the Turks would never have sent any representative to Mudania, English troops would have been in hostile contact with the Kemalists and war would have broken out.

I will not trouble your Lordship with details of M. Poincaré's speech, as they add almost nothing to what was known of his actions already.

He concluded by stating that the urgent question was an immediate opening of the Lausanne Conference, to deal with the definite fixing of the terms of peace; it would have to determine the exact frontier of Thrace, including the question of Karagatch; the guarantees to be obtained in place of the régime of Capitulations; the maintenance of French schools and charitable works in Turkey; the protection of ethnical and religious minorities; the settlement of the Ottoman debt; &c. His chief object during the conference would be to remain in the closest possible contact with his Allies and to endeavour in all sincerity to make France's policy accord with theirs. Such accord would not, however, mean subordination; for French interests in the Near East were so great that she had every right to speak to her Allies on terms of equality. Such co-operation with His Majesty's Government would be especially easy owing to the high opinion which he held of your Lordship and the fact that you were Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in a Cabinet headed by Mr. Bonar Law, who had always been a sincere friend of France. This statement of M. Poincaré's aroused enthusiasm in the Chamber.

M. Herriot, who, as your Lordship is aware, has just returned from Russia, made an important intervention in the debate and urged, amid considerable interruption from members of the Extreme Right, that Russia should be fully consulted during the conference, in particular on those questions which concerned the régime of the Straits. Owing to the loss of Latvia, Esthonia and Bessarabia, Russia was now dependent upon her remaining ports in the Black Sea; the country therefore which supported her just claims at the conference would gain for the future an enormous moral influence in Russia. It was therefore in the interests of France, and not merely those of Russia, that he advocated the policy of giving due weight to any representations which the Soviet Government, even though not yet recognised, might make at Lausanne.

I am told that the first portion of M. Poincaré's speech, which dealt with internal problems, was coldly received and was the subject of much inattention on the part of his hearers. The second portion, which I have summarised above, received very much the same fate; and his speech as a whole is regarded as having weakened his position. If, however, M. Poincaré can bring himself, before the Lausanne Conference, to give His Majesty's Government assurances which will enable a united front to be presented there against the extreme Turkish pretensions, M. Poincaré's position in the Chamber will be sensibly strengthened, and I doubt whether the opposition aroused by his internal policy will suffice of itself to cause his fall.

The debate will be continued next week, when M. Poincaré will deal with the question of reparations.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 12675/27/44] No. 551.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
Cher Lord Curzon, *le 12 novembre 1922.*

M. POINCARÉ, à qui j'ai résumé notre entretien d'hier, me fait savoir qu'il serait venu très volontiers à Londres si la Chambre française ne se trouvait en pleine discussion du budget. Il devrait donc demander au Parlement de suspendre ses travaux. Cependant, il eût passé outre de grand cœur à ces difficultés si vous n'en eussiez pas moins été dans l'obligation matérielle de passer par Paris pour vous rendre à Lausanne.

Le plus simple lui paraît donc que vous vous arrêtiez quelques heures à Paris pour déjeuner ou dîner avec lui, suivant vos convenances, et avoir dans l'intimité une conversation permettant d'assurer l'accord de la politique de nos deux pays à la conférence.

M. Poincaré suggère donc que vous veniez à Paris samedi prochain. Dans la journée, vous auriez tout le temps de vous entretenir avec M. Poincaré et vous partiriez avec lui pour Lausanne dimanche de manière à y rencontrer M. Mussolini lundi matin.

Celui-ci avait d'abord espéré pouvoir se rendre à Paris; mais, d'après un télégramme de M. Barrère, arrivé ce matin même au Quai d'Orsay, M. Mussolini serait gêné par ses obligations parlementaires pour pousser jusqu'à Paris et serait heureux de vous rencontrer à Lausanne en même temps que M. Poincaré.

La combinaison esquissée ci-dessus semble de nature à concilier toutes les convenances, et M. Poincaré désirerait savoir le plus tôt possible si elle vous agrée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
SAINT-AULAIRE.

P.S.—N'ayant aucune explication supplémentaire à vous donner et désirant respecter votre dimanche, je ne veux pas vous déranger. C'est pourquoi je confie cette lettre à une secrétaire, pour le cas où vous pourriez lui remettre votre réponse.

S.-A.

[E 12868/27/44] No. 552.

Mr. Lyon to Mr. Vansittart.—(Received November 14.)

My dear Vansittart, *War Office, November 13, 1922.*

ENCLOSED is a summary of Major-General Burnett-Stuart's interview with Marshal Foch, which your Secretary of State will wish to have.

Yours sincerely,
KENNETH LYON.

Enclosure in No. 552.

Note by Major-General Burnett-Stuart on a Visit to Marshal Foch, November 9, 1922.

I ARRIVED in Paris late on the night of the 8th, and sent over the memorandum giving the General Staff views regarding the proposed treaty with Turkey to General Weygand by the hand of Lieutenant-Colonel Segrave as early as possible next morning, but it was 10 A.M. before the translation was completed.

I went to Marshal Foch's office at 10·30, had half an hour's preliminary discussion with General Weygand, and then went into Marshal Foch's room, where we went through the memorandum and discussed it thoroughly till after 1 P.M. Both Marshal Foch and General Weygand were most friendly and cordial, and our conference was quite open and informal.

I found the Marshal in general agreement with our views, especially on the fundamental question as to the limits of our ability to enforce terms on Turkey, and the necessity of avoiding any commitment on land which might lead us again into such an unsatisfactory tangle as that in which we now are.

I attach a summary of notes taken at the interview by Lieutenant Warburton, who accompanied me. Lieutenant-Colonel Segrave was also present as interpreter if required. I was a little puzzled at first by the Marshal's use of the word "contrôle," till I realised that what he really meant by it was "surveillance," and that the mission of control for the Straits was really no more than a patrol.

The Marshal agreed to our preamble and to the suggestions as to the Turkish frontier in Europe. But he struck out for the "freedom of the Straits" (though he, no more than anyone else, could give me no satisfactory definition of that vague term), and for a mixed mission of "contrôle" or "surveillance" or "guarantee" to oversee the maintenance of the demilitarised zone. By demilitarisation he meant no more than the destruction of all coastal batteries and permanent coast defence installations. To this I said that we would agree to such a demand and probably to a share of the patrol to oversee its execution, but we would have no commitment on shore. To this he absolutely subscribed. The League of Nations he dismissed with a snap of the fingers.

The Marshal agreed with our view that it was useless to try and impose limitations as to the strength of or terms of service in the Turkish army or gendarmerie. But he wants to limit the strength of the Turkish forces in Thrace. This, he said, we owed to Bulgaria in her weak state, and also to the reduction of our own anxieties for the future. His point was that though we could not control the carrying out of this arrangement (supposing the Turks accepted it), we could at least keep an eye on troop movements and concentrations, and would always hear of any transfer of forces across the Straits, and could then either protest or take action. At least we should get warning of any Turkish aggression in Europe.

In brief, I gathered that the Marshal wanted to ask for a little more than we suggest, but that there is no question of the French undertaking the slightest military commitment to enforce such demands. We therefore found no point of real disagreement. Deliberate comments on our memorandum are being prepared by General Weygand and will be sent over by bag.

I received the impression (I may be wrong) that the Marshal had not deeply studied the Near Eastern situation, and that his real heart and brain were busy elsewhere, *i.e.*, on the German front. Also his few comments on the existing Constantinople crisis showed a want of precise information, especially as to the real Allied strength there, the topographical conditions, and the tactical problems involved. I suggest that it would be inadvisable to attach much importance to any epigrammatic pronouncements of his on this situation. I gathered, however, that there was no question at all of the French fighting against the Turks in any circumstances.

The Marshal was most appreciative of my visit and of the promptitude with which you responded to his request by sending me over.

J. BURNETT-STUART,
Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.

November 10, 1922.

Notes on an Interview between Major-General Burnett-Stuart and Marshal Foch and General Weygand at Paris, November 9, 1922.

(NOTE.—Passages in inverted commas do not purport to be literal renderings of the remarks made, but very close paraphrases.)

GENERAL WEYGAND read the French translation of the General Staff memorandum on the terms to be offered to Turkey (with the covering note), which he and Lieutenant-Colonel Segrave had made.

MARSHAL FOCH expressed general agreement on matters of principle as General Weygand had done before the Marshal's arrival. In the discussion which ensued, the following were the chief points of interest:—

MARSHAL FOCH and GENERAL WEYGAND agreed that no limit be set to the strength of the Turkish army and that voluntary service be not insisted on, provided that the Turkish forces in Europe were limited to a definite strength. In support of this they pointed out that, under present conditions, the chief dangers threatening Turkey were (*a*) Russia in the Caucasus and (*b*) internal disorders in their huge territories in Asia Minor. The neighbouring States in the Balkans were not in a position seriously to threaten Turkey in Europe. Hence the justification for an increase in the Turkish army lay in Asia Minor, not in Europe. Secondly, if the Turkish forces in Europe are strictly limited, the threat to the rear of such organ of control as may be set up in the Straits will be eliminated. Thirdly, this limitation will provide the Allies with an answer to the protest, which is to be expected from Bulgaria, when the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres are annulled, while their counterpart in the Treaty of Neuilly remains in force.

The Enforcement of this Limitation.

The Allies would take steps to keep themselves informed as to military events in Thrace. As soon as they ascertained that the stipulated numbers had been exceeded, the Allies would bring the fact to the notice of the Turkish Government and announce that they were about to take precautions accordingly.

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART. "If the Turks mean serious trouble, their main army being in Asia Minor only puts it a little further from the scene of action."

MARSHAL FOCH. "Yes, but the limitation of the force in Thrace will make us feel easier."

This, with the agreement of the French Government, would be the view put forward by the French General Staff at the approaching conference.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that, at the moment, the Turks were to receive back Thrace, which had been taken from them, and were to be allowed national service; they should, therefore, be prepared to agree to such a limitation of their forces in Europe.

The general suggested that the new treaty should stipulate for a certain minimum of gendarmerie (he would not specify its composition) specially designed for the protection of the non-Turk minorities. The cost of this gendarmerie would militate against the maintenance of a large army.

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART said that this suggestion would be noted for the conference. He then asked whether the Marshal agreed that it was hopeless to demilitarise the Bosphorus, and whether he was prepared to abandon all control there.

MARSHAL FOCH. "The freedom of the Bosphorus should be insisted on equally with that of the Dardanelles. It is not only Russia which wishes for an exit from the Black Sea, but friendly States such as Roumania. But this was a question of degree and practicability. All coastal batteries should be suppressed. This would not put Constantinople at the mercy of the Russians, for an army would be necessary for its capture; nor would the Russian fleet be very formidable for some time. He said that it would be useless to forbid Turkish occupation of the coastal zones. (However, later he appeared to contemplate such a veto.)

"In principle, he would recommend régime for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles analogous to that already in force on the Danube. In addition to the suppression of the coastal batteries, we should impose a surveillance.

"We cannot produce the troops for a strong occupation.

"Are we to take to ourselves a treaty right to an occupation?"

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART. "How are we going to enforce disarmament?"

MARSHAL FOCH. "A commission of control would be appointed, similar to the Danubian Commission, composed of all those interested (England, France, Italy, Roumania, Serbia, &c.)."

The reorganisation of coastal batteries requires time and this will give us time to act. The entry of Turkish troops into the coastal regions would not escape our observation.

The navy and the air force would be able to watch for any attempt to fortify the coast.

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART. "The employment of aeroplanes will involve the establishment of a base, as General Weygand has indicated. This is vulnerable and costs money. We are quite prepared to join in a commission of control of this sort, provided that we entirely avoid any appearance of being prepared to use force to support it. We do not want any commitments on shore which may involve us in war."

MARSHAL FOCH. "That is quite understood."

GENERAL WEYGAND read the composition and duties of the commission for the control of the Straits, as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that this contemplated the representation of all the interested States (Turkey was added later)—even of Russia eventually.

GENERAL WEYGAND. "The French General Staff completely agree with regard to the danger of commitments."

MARSHAL FOCH. "I am persuaded that the idea of a permanent occupation is impossible. That is why I am seeking another method of ensuring the freedom of the Straits at the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The method I suggest is the destruction of the coastal batteries and the establishment of surveillance."

He proceeded to ask: "Is Constantinople going to remain the capital of Turkey? If not, he remarked, the difficulties of the situation would be greatly reduced. Constantinople was a very exposed capital. If we had gone for it in 1914, following the "Goeben" and "Breslau," there would have been no difficulty in taking it. It would be better for the consolidation of the new Turkish Empire if their capital remained in Asia, but the Turks must suggest it, of course. The idea should not be talked about. Eski-Shehir or Angora had been suggested."

Marshal Foch then summed up his proposals as follows:—

1. Demand the freedom of the Straits.
2. Raze all coastal fortifications.
3. Institute a commission, composed of those interested, to "surveiller" the freedom of the Straits.
4. No Allied military occupation.
5. Turkish army in Thrace to be limited, but not total army.

The Marshal promised to send Lieutenant-Colonel Segrave a note, embodying the views of the French General Staff on the Turkish situation and on the British General Staff memorandum, on the evening of the 9th or the morning of the 10th.

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART. "Of course, these are our proposals which we are discussing, but the Turks may say 'No.'"

MARSHAL FOCH. "When we wish to impose conditions on Turkey we can do so, for the weight behind us is too great for Turkey to resist."

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART pointed out that the essential was that we should act in unison.

He then asked the Marshal's views on the present situation in Constantinople.

MARSHAL FOCH. "We can control it. We can proclaim a state of siege and prevent the Turks from crossing, if necessary. Our lines of communication are secure, so we can hold out."

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART. "If the Turk moves his army into the Ismid area, what do we do?"

MARSHAL FOCH. "We can always prevent the Turks from crossing." The fleet, he said, could easily prevent boats from crossing. The Turks could do little more than bombard Constantinople. He continued: "If the Turks reason intelligently they will come to the conference in a very accommodating frame of mind—although at the moment they are very much above themselves." He pointed out that the Turks would have everything to gain by being reasonable.

The Marshal said that the Allies had a total of 35,000 men at Constantinople and Gallipoli, and would hold the Turks at both places.

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART read out particulars of the Allied strength at both places, and said that the Allies had not more than 10,000 combatants on the

Bosphorus, and a total of 14,000 to 15,000 combatants at the two points (exclud troops supervising the handing over of Eastern Thrace).

MARSHAL FOCH. "They must be suitably disposed. You have strong naval forces?"

GENERAL BURNETT-STUART. "Yes, we have sufficient naval forces to do exactly what we like on the sea. I have not got the particulars."

MARSHAL FOCH. "I would not undertake to cross the Narrows with the British fleet in front of me!"

[E 12605/10102/44] No. 553.

Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 398.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November* 13, 1922.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

My recent conversations with Prime Minister have proceeded on the assumption that articles Nos. 101 to 114 of treaty will be replaced by four clauses, not including 104, if this is retained.

Texts of two of these four clauses, namely, those replacing articles 101 and 109, have been discussed in final form as approved subject to minor amendments in your telegram No. 289. Remaining two relate to nationality and tribute. Prime Minister has suggested a nationality article in following terms:—

"Conditions under which Ottomans resident in Egypt shall be deemed to have acquired Egyptian nationality shall be settled by Egyptian legislation. Such legislation shall be based upon principles which have hitherto governed admission of Ottomans to Egyptian indigenat; it shall not extend Egyptian nationality—*ipso jure*—to Ottomans who do not possess Egyptian indigenat without conferring upon them right to opt against such nationality. Turkey will not dispute right of Egyptian Government to admit Ottomans resident in Egypt to naturalisation. Ottomans and nationals of States detached from Turkey shall not be entitled to capitulary privileges in Egypt."

I have not found it possible to frame article relating to tribute which can usefully be discussed with Sarwat, in view of his desire (if only for form's sake) to put forward various alternatives. As it seems to me likely that you will think it desirable to have a draft available which would not imply Egyptian adherence I venture to suggest following:—

"In view of continuing obligation of Egypt to make payments heretofore made by her for service of Ottoman loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894, Egypt shall be discharged from any further or other liability in respect of Ottoman Public Debt, and from her obligation to pay tribute to Ottoman Empire."

[E 12655/10102/44] No. 554.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 399.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November* 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 396.

In my conversations with Sarwat, I have done my best not to give the impression that His Majesty's Government were over-anxious to secure Egyptian co-operation. I have tried rather to allow him to infer that we were indifferent as to his actual or possible attitude. It is, however, fair to assume that my concern to secure realisation of your Lordship's wishes in the form of exchange of notes has engendered in his mind belief that attitude of Egypt was of some importance to us. The examination of all potentialities of question, which my discussions with Sarwat has naturally involved, has brought me to the conclusion that except from point of view of local Egyptian politics, which, of course, have their own importance, which I need not elaborate again, the interest for us, one way or the other, in attitude of Egyptian Government in regard to treaty is diminishing rather than increasing.

It seems to me, therefore, that Sarwat has become conscious of our concern at a moment when that concern may be safely assumed to have ceased to exist.

As proposed four texts now stand I do not conceive that your Lordship would have serious grounds for apprehension, even in the improbable hypothesis of a sinister understanding being concluded between Turks and Egyptians.

I am, of course, assuming that (leaving Egyptians out of account) your Lordship is assured of reasonable support from the allies *vis-à-vis* Turks. Most corrupt conceivable bargain between Egyptians and Turks would contain following terms:—

(*a*.) Cession of Turkish rights in Soudan to Egypt.
(*b*.) Cession of Turkish rights in Canal to Egypt.
(*c*.) Omission of second paragraph in new text of article 101.
(*d*.) Unconditional release of Egyptian tribute.

Turkish proposal in the sense of (*a*) as an alternative to text now proposed would be plainly intended to be vexatious, and present no interest to Allies. A similar observation applies to (*b*), provided that the Allies concur in new paragraph 2 of 109, which, in view of their previous concurrence and published text, it may be presumed that they do.

(*c*.) Reference to declaration could presumably not be obtained save by adequate pressure supported by Allied good-will. Egyptian resistance (and I may repeat that I regard it as political impossibility) would create impression of pusillanimity.

(*d*.) Egyptian attitude and interest, so far from tendency to conspiracy with Turks to escape debt services, is rather directed to enlist Allied support against Turkey for recognition of right of recourse.

Were they to adopt the opposite attitude, which I regard as impossible, I apprehend your Lordship would have ample support in overruling them.

In these circumstances, I venture to think that your Lordship's support might well be given to secure from France and Italy admission of Egypt to participation in discussion of Egyptian clauses of treaty and to protocol of adhesion thereto.

I have strong belief that Sarwat's attitude would be one of loyalty, and I have already given my reasons for thinking that in any event risks are now negligible. I need not enlarge to your Lordship either upon good effect invitation would produce nor upon unfortunate impression which would, I fear, be created were it to be withheld. It seems to me inevitable that His Majesty's Government would incur all the odium of a refusal, and that that odium would not be inconsiderable.

I hope that I have explained Sarwat's attitude sufficiently clearly to indicate that when making your proposals to Allies in regard to Egyptian clauses, your Lordship would be justified in explaining that though no formal agreement has been reached with Egyptian Government, and while it is to be anticipated that that Government may desire to advocate some views of a somewhat academic bearing, you have reason to believe that in substance these formulæ will not be unacceptable to them.

I may add as a suggestion for your Lordship's consideration that, should you contemplate Egypt being heard at conference, you might leave paragraph 3 of article 101, last paragraph of the nationality article and first paragraph of article 109 to be proposed by them. Should your Lordship not contemplate their admission, I should urge your proposals should, if possible, in these respects remain unaffected by my failure to conclude arrangement with Sarwat.

No. 555.

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 7) to Acting Vice-Consul, Smyrna.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 14.)

(No. 706.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 13, 1922.

YOUR joint telegram No. 2315/11.

Present position is that we are not for the moment proclaiming state of siege, which will only be enforced in last resort.

It is, however, most desirable that British subjects should not in any event be left as hostages in hands of Turks, and you should therefore use every endeavour to complete evacuation of all British subjects without delay.

No. 556.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 710. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 14, 1922.

FRENCH High Commissioner is doing his utmost to bring home to his Government true position of affairs here and issues involved. He notices that tone of French press has been much more satisfactory [? group omitted] Near East, but I gather French Embassy are convinced that Franklin-Bouillon is intriguing in the background. I have had one report to the effect that French suspect Franklin-Bouillon of still corresponding direct or through Ferid Bey with Mustapha Kemal. He is stated to have informed Mustapha Kemal that French will never fight.

French High Commissioner told me in confidence yesterday that he had some sharp passages of arms with French President of the Council at the time of Mudania Agreement, and he said quite frankly that latter was a most disagreeable person to serve under.

My Allied colleagues warmly approve your insistence on inter-Allied agreement on all main issues before going to the conference so that Allies may present a united front at conference.

No. 557.

Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Geneva, November* 14, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 81.
Following from Sir E. Drummond:—

"I have seen Nansen. Negotiations for exchange of populations not absolutely broken off, but no reply yet received to formal proposals made to Turks by Nansen for voluntary exchange. Nansen's view is that Turks intend to delay matters until peace is signed, after which they will forcibly expel all Christians without Allied interference.

"Expulsion of Christians from Asia Minor now beginning, and, if continued, refugee problem will become almost insoluble, since Greek Government is already swamped with present number. For instance, no country is willing to take expelled Armenians. We submit that, in view of urgency of problem, matter should be immediately considered at Lausanne and, if possible, arrangements made for negotiations as to prisoners, population released, detained male hostages, Christian population at Constantinople, particularly Russian refugees, at least to run concurrently with main negotiations. Nansen could be present at early period of conference. He is preparing report for council, of which main points will be summarised and sent unofficially to Allies' plenipotentiaries on arrival at Lausanne. As regards relief work in Greece, of which main burden is being borne by American relief organisation, Nansen is most willing to appoint deputy for co-ordination purposes. As deputy will have also to act as chief adviser to Greek Government in refugee relief questions and will have very extensive power, he should be a man of position, authority and energetic initiative. Unfortunately League cannot afford any salary, though travelling expenses and incidental expenses will be borne from Nansen's funds. Nansen would welcome any proposals made by His Majesty's Government on this point, particularly as he must return to Norway after attending Lausanne Conference."

No. 558.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 14, 1922.)

(No. 594.)
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 593.

In conversation this evening with M. Peretti, he stated that, although the French forces in Constantinople would be ready to die at their post in defence of the city against the Turks, the French Government would and could in no case send a large force to make war against the Turks. They would send ships, but not troops.

No. 559.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 14, 1922.)

(No. 596.)
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 429 of yesterday.

Before I received your instructions, I warned M. Peretti yesterday that a bad effect might be produced in England if Ismet Pasha came to Paris, as I have seen suggested in the press. Such a move could not fail to produce unfavourable interpretation in England, although his visit might be of a perfectly innocent character.

Having, in the meantime, received your telegram, I spoke in its sense to M. Poincaré this morning. He expressed astonishment, since the news of Ismet Pasha's intention to come to Paris had been communicated to him by M. de Saint-Aulaire, whom he understood to have received it from your Lordship and without comment. He sent for and showed me a telegram which he had sent in reply to M. de Saint-Aulaire on 12th November couched in the following terms:—

"I have not been informed that the Angora Government have accepted the date of the 20th, nor that the Angora delegation intend to await that date in Paris, but if Ismet Pasha in fact comes to spend a few days in France before the opening of the conference you can give to the British Government the assurance that, while receiving him with courtesy, I shall not discuss with him, in the absence of the Allies, any of the questions that the conference will have to deal with at Lausanne."

M. Poincaré presumes that M. de Saint-Aulaire carried out these instructions.

He further added that, the Allies having, in effect, treated the Angora delegation with a striking lack of courtesy in their absence from Lausanne on the 13th, to which they had invited Ismet Pasha for that date, he felt that he could not possibly do otherwise than treat the delegation with courtesy, but he could assure me that although he would receive them, it would be only a question of an interview of a few minutes, in which, as he had already promised, no question would be discussed with which the conference would have to deal. He further added that he would do his utmost to induce Ismet Pasha to call also on the Italian Ambassador and me, so as to avoid the imputation of any collusion between him and the French Government.

No. 560.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—Received November 14, 1922.)

(No. 597.)
(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE communicated to M. Poincaré the substance of your Lordship's telegram No. 431 of yesterday, which reached me early this morning. Although M. Poincaré considers a memorandum unnecessary, he will gladly consider it when it reaches him (I presume I shall be in a position to forward it to him to-morrow), but he said that he had no doubt whatever as to his being able to agree to the views contained in it, which presumably will be based upon the agreements of March and

September. He could see no cause for any serious divergence of opinion. He fully counts on your being in Paris on Friday and going on to Lausanne on Sunday with him. As I left he laughingly said he was going to order luncheon for you on Saturday.

There is one point in your telegram to which I would draw attention. You refer to the inadequacy of the French and Italian contingents and to the announcements by the French and Italian generals that their Governments refuse to send any more troops; and, in referring to the possibility of a Turkish advance on Constantinople, you expressed the hope that the French general may be supplied with the forces with which to render resistance effective. The latter hope presumably implies the reinforcement of the French contingent.

According to paragraph 11 of article 3 of Mudania Convention, the Allied generals undertake not to increase the number of their troops.

In giving to M. Poincaré the substance of that portion of your telegram, he at once fixed upon this point and remarked that to send reinforcements was a violation of the convention and that this was therefore out of the question. He added that the French generals knew that, in the event of an attack, they were to defend themselves and act in co-operation with their allies, and if the evacuation should unfortunately become necessary they were to evacuate together. What further step should then be taken would have to be decided later.

Another French warship is already on its way to Turkish waters. He felt, however, absolutely convinced that there would be no Turkish advance against coast, so long as the three Allied flags were flown together. The Angora agent in Paris had assured him in that sense.

No. 561.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) *Washington, November 13, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 448.

I have again seen Secretary of State. He expressed himself a little less optimistic about effect of diplomatic representations, but is by no means hopeless that United States High Commissioner will persuade Turks to abandon their intentions with regard to deportations.

Mr. Hughes tells me with great frankness that, both in President's view and in his, American public opinion is at present hostile to any idea of United States using armed force in the Near East. He repeated several times that President and he were both determined to make no gesture and to take up no position in which public would not support them. He is wholly unwilling to appear to threaten Turks or even to take a strong stand until he feels himself in a position to employ all the force of United States if Turks refuse to listen to what he has to say. It is quite clear that as a result of discussion Administration does not exclude idea of going to war with Turkey, provided Congress and the country will support them.

In the meantime, Mr. Hughes tells me that following my conversation with him on Friday he telegraphed instructions to Admiral Bristol solemnly to warn Turks of possible results of outraging popular sentiment of United States. He is now awaiting a reply. Personally, I do not expect the country as a whole will easily be prepared to support use of armed force, unless it is shocked by some startling occurrence such as massacre in Constantinople. Now that election here is over and excitement has subsided, messages from American press correspondents in Europe dealing with Near East situation will receive front page positions and heavy type headings. Accurate and reliable information might, I think, be advantageously given to American correspondents in London, but I wish to warn most seriously against there being any exaggeration or pro-British bias in information given out. If there were suspicion of this it would go far to defeat its purpose.

In the meantime conscience of churches is profoundly stirred, and they will spare no effort to bring pressure on Government.

Congress assembles on the 20th instant and nothing will be done by Administration until they have been able to consult leaders in both Houses. I shall see Secretary of State again, and no doubt his opinion has moved since Friday, but we must expect some retrogression when Congress first meets.

No. 562.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva).

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 62 and 63 of 11th November: Dr. Nansen's position.

My telegram No. 80 was actuated solely by the fact that, according to our information, the co-ordination of the various societies under the ægis of the League of Nations, which appears to us essential for the carrying out of any effective relief, had not been achieved.

We are quite unable to suggest any person to take Dr. Nansen's place, but we think it most important that the principal representative of the League of Nations in the Near East should be a neutral, should command the confidence of all other organisations already in the field, and should be able to centralise and co-ordinate their efforts.

If you are satisfied that Dr. Nansen has carried out his task in a satisfactory manner, or if you are unable to suggest anyone to take his place, we should prefer to let the matter drop.

No. 563.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 571 and despatch No. 2607 of the 7th and 8th November respectively: Insertion of clause in new treaty recognising acts of Constantinople Government.

You should inform the French Government that we agree with their views regarding questions 1 and 3 in the identic telegram of the three High Commissioners of 26th October. The Constantinople Government has disappeared, and there is therefore no budget to provide for.

2. Question remains of the insertion in the new treaty of a clause recognising the validity of all acts, contracts and financial operations concluded between the Constantinople Government and Allied nationals, companies, banks and concession holders since the date of the armistice, and His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that the French Government are also in agreement with them on this point.

3. You should point out, however, that neither His Majesty's Government nor the three High Commissioners have suggested that the recognition of the acts of the Constantinople Government should be made a condition precedent to the meeting of the conference at Lausanne, and state that if M. Poincaré wishes to support the protest of the three High Commissioners of the 26th October by a further protest from the French Government addressed to the Angora representative at Paris His Majesty's Government would welcome such a step, although they have no means of communicating with Angora except through Hamid Bey, which has already been done by the three High Commissioners.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 432; repeated to Rome, No. 391, and Constantinople, No. 570.)

No. 564.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1922.

YOUR No. 597.

I am sending over by bag to-night the points which I desire to submit to M. Poincaré, upon which it appears to me, in some cases essential, in other cases most desirable, that an agreement should be arrived at between the Principal Allied Powers before we proceed to Lausanne. The former can be briefly stated and scarcely call for explanation, being based upon agreements already arrived at by the Allies, and

embodied in documents signed by them. In case M. Poincaré should desire any explanation upon the items in the second category which will call for closer examination, I am sending over Forbes Adam to-night to supply it.

Any discussion on these points, unless they be accepted without discussion by M. Poincaré, should be reserved for my conversation with him on Saturday; and my proposal is merely that Forbes Adam should attend at the Quai d'Orsay for the limited proposal above described. I shall hope to receive from you by to-morrow night sufficient assurances on the points in both categories, and particularly in the first, to justify me in asking the Cabinet on Thursday morning to authorise my departure for Paris on Friday afternoon.

M. Poincaré is mistaken in his reference to paragraph 11 of article 3 of Mudania Convention. This only precludes Allies from sending reinforcements to Chanak and Ismid, and there is nothing in the convention to prevent such reinforcements from being sent to Gallipoli and Constantinople, either for local defence or to cross Straits, if Turks violate Mudania Convention lines in Asia.

M. Poincaré therefore can claim no justification in terms of Mudania Convention for his refusal to send more troops to Constantinople. Moreover, Turks have themselves already been guilty of gross violation of that convention in demanding Allied evacuation of Constantinople and Straits, and in steady infiltration of officers and men into European areas, either as gendarmerie or in disguise.

My fear as regards Constantinople position is that threat of military action there may be used by Turks at any moment in conference as a lever to secure compliance with their demands; and that presence of adequate Allied forces is sole effective protection against this menace.

No. 565.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 434.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 588.

Although M. Poincaré admitted in conversation with you on 11th November that views of General Staff as communicated to Marshal Foch need not be identical with those of His Majesty's Government, I should like it to be made quite clear to him that His Majesty's Government are in no sense responsible for the paper referred to, it having never been discussed by Cabinet or approved by me. Nor did I know that War Office had sent over a general to discuss the paper with French military authorities until I read his report.

No. 566.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 390.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1922.

I HAD hoped that it might have been possible for Signor Mussolini to come either to London or to Paris to take part in a conversation with M. Poincaré and myself before we proceed to Lausanne. There are several points upon which, in the view of His Majesty's Government, it is absolutely essential that the three principal Allies should be in agreement before meeting Turks, and this I know to be the view of Signor Mussolini himself. In the inability of M. Poincaré, owing to Parliamentary engagements, to come to London, and of Signor Mussolini, for similar reasons, to go to Paris, I have agreed to draw up a list of the points upon which agreement seems to me indispensable, with the views of His Majesty's Government in brief upon them. I propose to telegraph this to-morrow both to Paris and to you. Should I learn, as I hope to do, that both the French and Italian Governments agree with His Majesty's Government upon them, I then propose to go to Paris at the end of the week, and to accompany M. Poincaré to Lausanne on Sunday, arriving there in the evening in time for the suggested conversation with Signor Mussolini.

Should we find ourselves in accord, the Lausanne Conference can then begin on the following day.

No. 567.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 14, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 372.

My No. 390 of yesterday will have shown that there is no ground for Signor Mussolini's suspicions. No one is more anxious than myself to consult and honour Signor Mussolini in every possible way. But if an Italian Minister is unable, though invited, to proceed either to London or to Paris, he really cannot make his absence a ground for preventing any conversation between the Foreign Ministers of his allies. If no conversation is ever to take place between the Foreign Ministers of France and England except in the presence of the Italian Foreign Minister, diplomacy will soon become an extinct art. I might equally claim that if the French Foreign Minister visited Rome he should not be allowed to converse with Signor Mussolini unless I were specially summoned from London. The next step will be that I may not see the French Ambassador here except in the presence of the Italian Ambassador. Nearly every conversation now is made the subject of protest or misrepresentation by the Italian Government, and I may not even go to Paris without Italy regarding herself as insulted unless she is there also. This is an entirely new departure in diplomacy. If only Signor Mussolini would realise that everyone, and not least myself, is most anxious to pay all due respect to his country and himself, things would be much easier. This is for your general guidance in your conversations. When I have the pleasure of meeting Signor Mussolini at Lausanne I am confident that these unreasonable suspicions will be dissipated.

No. 568.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 14, 1922.*

I AM communicating to French Government the following document regarding revised treaty with Turks. It is in two parts, of which (A) represents the points of cardinal importance on which His Majesty's Government must have an absolute assurance of their allies' support, without which assurance I shall not feel justified in entering the conference.

(B) represents various points on which agreement is most desirable, but which nevertheless admit of discussion.

Points alluded to in Lord Curzon's Telegram No. 433 of November 14 to Lord Hardinge.

CATEGORY (A).—("ESSENTIAL.")

I. *Western Thrace.*—Adherence to the understanding arrived at in the March discussions that the position in Western Thrace shall not be altered, and that the Turkish demands for a plebiscite shall be refused.

II. *Frontier of Western Thrace* to be the frontier ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria under the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of September 1915.

(This agreement may be subject to possible creation of a neutral zone to provide railway access for Bulgaria to the Ægean.)

III. *Freedom of the Straits.*—This principle is accepted by all the Allies (*vide* note of the 23rd September). The actual manner in which it is to be applied remains for discussion. The Allied Governments should maintain a firm accord as to the demilitarisation of certain zones on the Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus, and as to the inspection of these areas under conditions to be determined.

IV. *Capitulations.*—Adherence to the March resolutions with certain modifications which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to suggest to their allies.

V. *The Islands in the Ægean.*—To be ceded by Turkey to the Allies, to be disposed of in the manner agreed to by the latter.

VI. *Frontiers of Syria and Irak.*—To be maintained except in so far as the mandatory Powers may be disposed to consider or to propose local rectification.

VII. *Mandated Territories in Syria, Irak and Palestine.*—No change to be admitted.

VIII. *Allied Graves.*—The Allies to insist upon a transfer of the ownership of the soil to them.

IX. *Indemnities.*—A Turkish indemnity to be demanded as proposed in the March resolutions. The exact figure to be determined by agreement between the Allies.

The Turkish demand for an indemnity from Greece to be refused.

X. *The Mudania Convention.*—To be strictly enforced, and all Turkish violations of it to be firmly resisted.

XI. *Constantinople Position.*—No withdrawal of Allied troops until ratification of the new treaty with Turkey (September note).

CATEGORY (B).—("MOST DESIRABLE.")

I. *Protection of Minorities.*—As regards minorities in Asia, adherence so far as is still possible to resolutions of March, and as regards minorities in Europe strict adherence to terms of September agreement.

II. *Turkish Military Forces.*—General adherence to terms of March resolutions. If a relaxation of these is conceded, this should not apply to the Turkish army in Europe, which should be strictly limited in numbers.

III. *Financial Clauses.*—These should remain for discussion between the Allied experts.

IV. *Economic Clauses.*—Insistence upon recognition by Turkish Government of Allied pre-war concessions, and annulment of Turkish repudiation of contracts since the armistice. The methods to be discussed by the Allied experts.

[E 13042/27/44] No. 569.

Memorandum communicated by the Netherlands Minister, November 15, 1922.

DEPUIS des siècles le Gouvernement néerlandais a des intérêts, solidaires avec toutes les autres Puissances occidentales, en ce qui concerne la protection de leurs sujets en Turquie, tant au point de vue économique qu'au point de vue de leur situation en matière de droit. Les garanties existantes sont incorporées dans le droit coutumier et dans les Capitulations, dont la suppression n'a pas été reconnue par le Gouvernement de la Reine.

Ces intérêts communs ont été également prévus par le Traité de Sèvres. Dans le cas où le régime des Capitulations en matière judiciaire aurait été remplacé, on aurait demandé la coopération des Puissances non signataires.

Il est à prévoir que la question des Capitulations sera posée à la Conférence de Lausanne. Le Gouvernement néerlandais se permet pour cette raison de rappeler la grande importance que cette question a pour les Pays-Bas, et il a confiance que dans le cas où la position juridique des étrangers en Turquie sera discutée à cette conférence, celle-ci ne sera pas réglée sans que les autres Puissances intéressées, telles que les Pays-Bas, aient été consultées et aient été mises à même d'y coopérer.

Légation des Pays-Bas, Londres,
le 15 novembre 1922.

No. 570.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (Paris).—(Received November 15, 1922.)

(No. 599.)
(Telegraphic.)

I SENT M. Poincaré at 9 o'clock this morning your memorandum containing views of His Majesty's Government on the points to be discussed at Near East Conference. I have just seen him on his leaving a sitting of the Chamber at noon.

He has carefully studied this memorandum, and he asked me to say that he sees no grounds for any serious divergence anywhere, and that, although he will have

observations to make to you on some of the points, he can assure you that he will be able to maintain with you a united front before the Turks. If he has views on certain points as to the force of which he is unable to convince you, he will nevertheless give way and be with you in front of the Turks. He is determined that there shall be complete accord, and he anticipates no difficulty whatever in arriving at it in discussion with you. He asks me to say that he invites you to luncheon on Saturday and will devote the whole afternoon to discussion with you and will start on Sunday with you to Lausanne.

I have told M. Poincaré that it is most important that there should be no leakage in connection with the points under discussion. He agreed, and assured me he would take every precaution on his side, but he remarked that in the account telegraphed over to him from London of the contents of this morning's papers there were indications that the press had obtained information somewhere of the contents of the memorandum.

No. 571.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 382.) *Rome, November 15, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 393.

I am well aware how childish and irritating [? is] attitude of Italians, but task of persuading them not to be hypersensitive is no easy one. It is not assisted by telegrams from your Lordship in an open cypher to the effect that "If France and ourselves have decided [? to act] Italy will doubtless follow suit."

I have made situation quite clear to Signor Mussolini, and he understands it perfectly. But he is mainly preoccupied with his own political position in face of very impressionable Italian public opinion. One of the main planks in his platform is that the previous Government allowed Italy to be humiliated and dragged in the wake of Great Britain and France, whereas with his own advent to power new era has dawned. He fears that his numerous enemies will be only too glad to assert that Italy is still placed in secondary position. Nor are these fears unreasonable in view of recent press articles and intensive French propaganda through Havas Agency and Paris correspondents to show that Italy has only been saved from humiliation at our hands by attitude of French President of the Council.

If I have passed on his Excellency's often unreasonable protests without attenuation it is in hope of avoiding repetition of Sforza incident, &c., which seriously damaged Anglo-Italian relations and still rankles.

Mussolini is at present dictator of Italy. His foreign policy appears likely to be more satisfactory than that of previous Government or than that of France. He seems to be inclined to lean towards us rather than French. His support might be useful to your Lordship, but he could certainly prove very obstructive. In the circumstances an exaggerated regard for his susceptibilities might not be altogether wasted.

No. 572.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 574.) *Foreign Office, November 15, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 396 of 11th November: Evacuation of civilians from Constantinople.

There is no objection to any feasible measures of organisation for eventual evacuation of Christian population and other refugees, but there is no possibility of further financial contributions from His Majesty's Government.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 574; repeated to Athens, No. 354.)

No. 573.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 436.) *Foreign Office, November 15, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 599 of 15th November: Conversation with M. Poincaré.

It has given me much pleasure to receive the assurances from M. Poincaré contained in the above telegram, confirmed as they have been by a very cordial personal message which has arrived simultaneously from him. I rely confidently upon the complete accord which he promises, and I anticipate from it the happiest results at Lausanne. As to press disclosures here, my memorandum, which was written by myself, was not completed and handed to Forbes Adam until 7·30 P.M., and no press correspondent was seen at the Foreign Office after that hour. I have, however, enjoined on the office the utmost reticence about matters which I concur with M. Poincaré in thinking should be treated with special reserve.

[E 13027/27/44] No. 574.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A BRITISH POLICY.

I.—*Previous History of the Question.*

THE problem of the Straits has, during the last 150 years, been subjected to so much confusion of thought, and obscured by so many side issues, that it is to-day difficult to represent the question in its essential features. As an appendix to this paper will be found an historical summary prepared by the Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, which is of great value in establishing the more permanent elements of the problem and as indicating the aspects from which it has at different times been approached. The following are the main points which emerge from the historical consideration of the Straits question:—

(*a.*) The problem of the Straits was from the first regarded, and in its essence remained, an Anglo-Russian rather than an Anglo-Turkish problem. Until 1915 Turkey was considered in this country to be quite subsidiary to the two main protagonists, and Russian ambitions to secure Constantinople (ambitions which were partly imperialistic, partly economic and partly religious), were opposed in this country primarily because their realisation would have implied an outlet for the Russian Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean. It was thus that the term "the Straits" was invariably taken to cover not only the Dardanelles but also the Bosphorus. In the present paper it is in this sense that the expression "the Straits" is employed.

(*b.*) Up till 1915 the policy of His Majesty's Government was directed towards keeping the Russian Black Sea fleet out of the Mediterranean ("the Closing of the Straits") rather than to enabling the British Mediterranean fleet to enter the Black Sea ("the Freedom of the Straits"). It is important, however, to recollect that these two policies were in their essence little more than two alternative forms of an identic defensive policy against Russia, and that British statesmen, even in the nineteenth century, sometimes hesitated whether their ultimate policy could best be secured by the closing or by the opening of the Straits to ships of war. Lord Palmerston is known to have consulted the Duke of Wellington on the subject, and the latter, after careful consideration, expressed the decided opinion that, as the Straits were nearer to the Russian naval bases than to our own, it would be preferable for them to be closed to the Russian fleet rather than that they should be open to the British fleet.

(*c.*) This continual tendency throughout the nineteenth century to press for the closing rather than for the opening of the Straits is explained by a further important consideration. So long as Russia coveted the

Straits, and Great Britain, was opposed to the realisation of this ambition, it was inevitable that Turkey should look to us and France for protection in the event of a Russian attack. Under the Convention of 1841 the Sultan retained the right, if Turkey was at war, to allow foreign men-of-war to pass the Straits. It thus became almost an axiom during the nineteenth century that the Sultan would open the Dardanelles, and even the Bosphorus, to the British fleet in the event of any serious Russian menace. Thus, whereas the policy of the "Closing of the Straits" (as Lord Salisbury indicated in 1878), was inspired by the assumption that in the last resort Turkey, as in the Crimean War, would let us in; "the Freedom of the Straits" is based on the realisation that now, as in 1915, she very probably will not.

(*d.*) The Straits Convention of 1841, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Treaty of London of 1871, all embodied in different forms the principle that foreign men-of-war should *not* have freedom of transit through the Straits; and His Majesty's Government were always careful to enforce, or rather to maintain, this principle as against Russia. Thus, when during the Russo-Japanese War two vessels belonging to the Russian volunteer fleet passed through the Straits in the guise of merchant-men and proceeded to commit belligerent acts in the Red Sea, His Majesty's Government protested strongly, with the result that the commissions of these two vessels were revoked and reparation for their belligerent action was eventually made.

(*e.*) With the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, an entirely new situation was created. Turkey, for her part, realising that she could no longer count upon Great Britain to protect her against Russia, drew towards Germany; while Russia, as early as 1908, opened negotiations with Great Britain in the hope of securing some arrangement as to egress from the Black Sea more in accordance with Russian desires. These conversations led to no definite result at the time, although Russia endeavoured during the years that followed to use her influence with her two partners in the Triple *Entente* to obtain an outlet into the Mediterranean. Her attempts to secure this object broke down against our determination that, if the Straits were to be opened, this freedom should be reciprocal, and that Russia should not be allowed into the Mediterranean unless we were also allowed into the Black Sea. By 1912 we find M. Isvolsky, at that time Russian Ambassador in Paris, trying to persuade M. Poincaré that it was in the interest of the two Western partners of the *Entente* to allow the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean. M. Poincaré appears to have agreed to this proposal and to have promised M. Isvolsky to "support him with all his efforts." It was some one-sided solution of this nature which Russia had in mind in concluding in 1912 a naval agreement with France, and in proposing such an agreement two years later to ourselves.

Although His Majesty's Government had thus adopted a cautious attitude towards Russia so long as she was no more than a co-partner in the *Entente*, yet we showed ourselves prepared generously to meet her wishes so soon as she became our ally in the European War. In March 1915 Notes were exchanged between the British and the Russian Governments, under which Russia was promised Constantinople, together with zones of surrounding territory on both sides both of the Bosphorous and of the Dardanelles corresponding roughly to the zones with which we are now so familiar. This agreement, in its turn, may be said to have lapsed owing to the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and Germany, and Russia and Turkey.

(*f.*) The position as regards Turkey was also fundamentally altered by the circumstances of the present war. On the one hand Turkey, in the spirit at least if not in the letter, flagrantly violated the Straits Convention when on the 12th August, 1914, she allowed the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" to pass up the Dardanelles and to take refuge in the Golden Horn. The subsequent closing of the Straits, even to commerce, and the Gallipoli campaign convinced His Majesty's Government that the geographical position of Turkey placed in her hands an immense opportunity for obstruction, and induced them to

decide that one of the objects of the war should be to remove this vital corridor from the control of so unreliable a Power.

(*g.*) The doctrine of the "Freedom of the Straits," as thus evolved, became, with the complete defeat of Turkey, a determination on the part of His Majesty's Government to secure that never again should the Sultan be able to bar the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea. The occasion was singularly propitious for the realisation of this determination. Turkey was powerless; Russia was unable to make herself heard or felt; while the Allies were for the moment united. The Treaty of Sèvres, while establishing the principle of free transit for warships both in peace and war, contained provisions which were calculated effectively to guarantee that this freedom of transit could not be interfered with. In the first place, the Dardanelles were, in practice, internationalised by Greece being left on one coast and Turkey on the other; in the second place, Turkey was demilitarised, both generally and locally, and the military control of the Bosphorus rested with the Allies. In the third place, elaborate provisions were enacted both for inspection and control; and in the last place, the Allied Powers, under the second paragraph of Article 36, reserved for themselves the right, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the Treaty, to recede from their promise to leave Constantinople under Ottoman sovereignty.

II.—*The present Position.*

Since the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres the circumstances under which that Treaty was drafted have been radically altered. Turkey has recovered: Russia has again become a serious menace; and the Allied Powers have failed, on several important occasions, to maintain a united front. It will thus not only be almost impossible to obtain at the forthcoming Conference an agreement embodying our former solution of the Straits problem, but it would prove physically difficult to maintain or guarantee such a solution even if it could on paper be secured. Our difficulties in this respect are both diplomatic and military.

(A.)—*Diplomatic Difficulties.*

Although Turkey, Russia and France have all pronounced themselves ready to accept in some form the "Freedom of the Straits," yet the different interpretations given to this elastic formula by the several groups of Powers indicate that considerable divergence exists between our own interpretation and that of the other Powers.

It may be well, at this stage, to outline the interpretations given by the several Governments to the formula of "The Freedom of the Straits" and to indicate the different reasons of policy which inspire these interpretations:-

1. *British Interpretation.*

The interpretation which His Majesty's Government placed on the phrase at the moment when they were drafting the Treaty of Sèvres was undoubtedly that, whether Turkey was at peace or at war, there should be freedom of passage through the Straits not only for commercial vessels, but also for ships of war; in other words, our purpose was to secure by the terms of the Treaty that in no circumstances should Turkey obstruct the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea.

Our reasons for this were that in the event of a general war, Russia would either be on our side or against us. If she were our ally free communication with her would, as the last war showed, be essential. If, on the other hand, she were our enemy, the closing of the Straits would render her almost invulnerable, and would leave her free to treat the Black Sea as a Russian lake, to isolate Roumania and Bulgaria, and to use the valuable communications between Odessa and Batoum for the transport of troops to the Middle East.

Apart from these primary considerations, the conflict appeared, and still remains, one between the continental, or military system, and the oceanic, or naval system. Put in another way, the issue was whether the Straits were to form a territorial bridge between Europe and Asia, or whether they were to constitute a blue water line separating those two continents. At the present moment,

France hopes to construct, on the bases of the elaborate connexus of alliances and combinations which have arisen in Eastern and Central Europe, a dominant position founded, in the final resort, on her own military prestige. If such countries as Bulgaria and Roumania, to say nothing of Turkey, are rendered immune either to pressure or assistance arising from command of the sea by some other Power (*e.g.*, Great Britain), France will be able to exercise her influence with greater facility. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that if we are precluded from sending the British fleet into the Black Sea, if, that is, the mouths of the Danube flow into a permanent Russo-Turkish lake, the whole connexus of Danubian alliances and inter-dependencies which centre round the Little *Entente* will tend all the more to fall within the orbit either of France or Russia. The effect will be felt not only in Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania, but even in Poland, Czecho-slovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. If, however, we can obtain the right of sending our fleet to Varna, Constanza and Odessa, whatever France may do for these countries in the way of finance, propaganda and military support, British influence in the last resort will remain equal, if not predominant.

The French realise this perfectly, and for this reason they have at times been tempted to oppose, as far as they can, our interpretation of the Freedom of the Straits.

2. *Other Interpretations of the Formula.*

(a.) *Russia.*—It is notoriously difficult to forecast the attitude which the Soviet Government will in any given circumstances be likely to adopt. Their main object for the present is to keep Turkey dependent as far as possible upon themselves. They will thus oppose any scheme which is calculated to render Turkey susceptible to pressure from the Western Powers and they will wish to keep her in full military possession of the Straits, with power to fortify them. They are unlikely, since their navy will always be weaker than ours, to support free transit of warships: and will probably endeavour to interpret the commercial freedom of the Straits merely as limiting our opportunities of blockade. Finally they will oppose any intervention on the part of the League of Nations.

In any case they may be counted on to put the worst and the most public interpretation upon any formula in which we may try to embody on our desiderata.

(b.) *Turkey.*—Turkey has seldom found herself in so strong a position, both diplomatic and military, as she enjoys to-day. The Nationalist Government are extremely suspicious of the policy of His Majesty's Government, and are convinced that our intention is to secure some solution under which, in the ultimate resort, the British fleet can bombard Constantinople.

They have committed themselves in vague terms to the commercial freedom of the Straits. They will endeavour to interpret this in such a way as to throw upon Europe the expense of lighting and buoying the two waterways, while retaining for themselves complete military control both of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

They will be found intractable, suspicious and very arrogant. It may be doubted whether they will consent to sign any treaty which does not leave the military control of the Straits entirely within their own hands.

(c.) *France.*—The French were some time ago not wholly in favour of the free passage of warships. On the one hand, they disliked our command of the sea, and desire therefore to prevent our ingress; on the other hand, they felt that in the event of a future war between France and Russia, it would be very inconvenient for them if the Russian fleet had an analagous right of egress into the Mediterranean. How far the campaign now being conducted by the Turks against all foreign commercial interests, will cause the French to reconsider their attitude, and induce them to join us in retaining some physical hold over the new Turkish Government must for the moment remain a matter of conjecture. All that can be said is that the attitude of the French to-day is already very different from the whole-hearted Turcophil policy which was theirs six weeks ago.

(d.) *Italy.*—The former Italian Government tended generally to support France, to conciliate Turkey and to limit our opportunities of exercising naval power. It is possible that M. Mussolini may be prepared to adopt a more energetic and less subservient policy.

(e.) *Roumania*, who has a very direct interest in the Freedom of the Straits, will be anxious to agree with our point of view, but is within the orbit of France and at the mercy of Russia.

(f.) *Jugoslavia* is not wholly to be relied upon for any useful action; but might be willing to support our policy provided France were also in agreement.

(g.) *Greece*, provided she does not dissolve into anarchy, can be counted on.

(h.) *Bulgaria* will probably confine her efforts to obtaining an outlet to the Ægean and will not take any very active interest in the transit of war vessels through the Straits.

(B.)—*Military or Physical Difficulties.*

It will be seen from the above that we may be faced at the Conference with serious opposition, of which the nucleus would be formed by Turkey and Russia, on the one hand, and possibly by France and Italy on the other, who may in different ways and for different reasons oppose our desire to secure the free passage of men-of-war. The United States may possibly support our contention, but it is unlikely that, in their capacity of "observers" at the Conference, they wish to take any very active part in the controversy.

Even, however, if we obtain a general agreement to the effect that the principle of the free passage of warships should be reaffirmed in the new treaty, it will now be difficult to devise and maintain physical guarantees and safeguards for the maintenance of that principle. The free passage of warships both in peace and war could be *absolutely* guaranteed only by the presence on the spot of forces able effectively to resist not only the total forces of Turkey, but the total of such forces plus any potential Turkish ally. This could only be secured by clauses similar to those of the Treaty of Sèvres, and it is obvious that we are not to-day in a position, unless we again go to war, to impose such extensive servitudes upon Turkey. On the other hand, anything short of the full scheme of control as embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres might, when put to the test, be found to be illusory. All schemes for the control of the Straits by reduced Allied detachments, or by some military organisation under the League of Nations, would be likely, in practice, to prove irksome, expensive and, in the ultimate resort, ineffective.

Before examining the alternative lines of policy which are now open to us, it is important to indicate that the present disadvantage under which we labour, both diplomatic and military, is not likely to be very permanent. In other words the present moment is for us, of all historical moments, the most inopportune for an international conference on the Straits question; in a few weeks conditions may be more favourable; to-day they are very inauspicious indeed.

Inconvenient as is the present arrogance and power of Turkey, it must be realised that it is largely fortuitous and provisional. It is based on an unnatural alliance with Russia; it has maintained itself owing to the disunity and war-weariness of Europe. Both these phenomena will pass in time and Turkey, galvanised though she now is into unnatural energy, will sooner or later relax again into her hereditary weakness.

It must be remembered also that Turkey knows neither gratitude nor resentment; her only consistent political emotion is fear. For a century she was afraid of Russia and made friends with us and France; when we in our turn made friends with Russia, Turkey sought refuge with Germany; now that she is afraid of us she is espousing France and Russia. It is probable that in a few years she will be afraid again of Russia and will turn again to Great Britain. Thus before long some readjustment of the present unfavourable balance is probable, and as soon as this has taken place Turkey will be easier to deal with.

Moreover, Russia, dangerous as she now is, has become dangerous chiefly from her position of having everything to gain and nothing to lose. This condition in its turn can only be transitory, but while it lasts it renders it in practice impossible to negotiate on a basis of reasonable equality with the Soviet Government.

The Near Eastern question will not be permanently settled by any arrangements which may be made at this Conference. It will only be settled when Russia and Turkey have assumed their natural, and lost their present abnormal, proportions.

It is submitted therefore that our object should be to secure a settlement which, while enabling an early peace to be signed and ratified, will not unduly tie our hands in the future or leave us in regard to the Straits in a position less favourable than that which existed before the war? How can such a settlement be secured?

III.—*Alternative Lines of Policy.*

We are thus faced by the following proposition:—

1. Our policy at the time of the Treaty of Sèvres was to secure and guarantee the freedom of passage, whether Turkey was at war or peace, not only for commerce but also for ships of war.
2. This freedom of passage can only be absolutely secured by a system of physical guarantees which, to be effective, should not be less than those embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres.
3. Diplomatically it will be difficult to secure the acceptance of the principle of the passage of warships; militarily it will be difficult in present conditions to safeguard the principle even if it were accepted.
4. Some modification of our original policy may therefore be imposed upon us. What form should be given to such modification if found inevitable?

Only six weeks ago it appeared probable that His Majesty's Government would stand practically alone in contending that any real restriction should be imposed upon Turkey's full military control over the Straits. Our two major Allies did not seem disposed to agree to anything beyond vague paper guarantees under the League of Nations; and it was apprehended that, unless we were prepared to act alone against Turkey, we might be forced completely to abandon our maximum programme and to fall back on interpreting the "Freedom of the Straits" as applying to commerce only.

Since then certain developments have taken place, which indicate that our original pessimism may in some respects be relieved. The Turks have behaved in such a way as to alarm, and even to alienate, important sections of French public opinion. The Fascista revolution has placed the Government of Italy in the hands of a man who is certainly more energetic than his predecessors, and may prove more reliable. There are signs to-day that Allied unity may again become a deciding factor.

An important indication of this improvement in the general situation is furnished by the conversations which took place on the 9th November between Marshal Foch and General Burnett-Stuart, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. In these conversations, and in the memorandum which he subsequently prepared, the Marshal made it clear that he, at least, was not of the opinion that the Allies should leave the Turks in unfettered control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and that the "Freedom of the Straits" was a principle which it was "absolutely indispensable" that the Allies should maintain "under penalty of losing one of the principal fruits of the war."

This statement of Marshal Foch must, it is true, be qualified by certain reservations, namely:—

(*a.*) That the Marshal is supposed to be somewhat indifferent to the Near Eastern situation, and that his opinion on this question is likely to carry less weight with the French Government than would his views on the affairs of Central Europe;

(*b.*) That, as he himself confessed, he had no clear idea of what was meant by the "Freedom of the Straits." We have nothing definite to prove that he considers this phrase necessarily to imply the free passage of ships of war;

(*c.*) That the French Government may be unwilling to go so far as to make the acceptance by Turkey of the Freedom of the Straits, in the sense advocated by Marshal Foch, a condition *sine quâ non* of signing the Treaty of Peace.

It thus remains uncertain whether the French Government will adopt as their own the proposal which the French Marshal has expounded; whether the Marshal himself agrees with our own view regarding the passage of war-ships; or whether, if the Turks reject Marshal Foch's proposal, M. Poincaré will give us any very effective support in imposing the scheme upon them. All we can now say is that the Marshal has decisively expressed his view that the Turks should not be left in a position which will enable them systematically to fortify the Straits.

We may summarise as follows the three main alternatives which are open to us:—

1. *Marshal Foch's Proposal.*

The outlines of Marshal Foch's scheme are as follows:—

(*a.*) Demilitarisation of the Straits zones, with destruction of all military and naval works.
(*b.*) No Turkish armed forces, with the exception of the Constantinople garrison, to have access to these zones.
(*c.*) Inspection (or, in French, "contrôle") by a Commission, under the auspices of the League, and composed of interested Powers, to secure that this demilitarisation is being observed.
(*d.*) No Allied occupation or garrison at any point.
(*e.*) Limitation of the armed forces which Turkey may maintain in Eastern Thrace.

Assuming, as we are bound to assume, that we are to-day not in a position to impose such absolute guarantees upon Turkey as were envisaged in the Treaty of Sèvres, this modified proposal of Marshal Foch offers important advantages:—

1. Although it would not in the ultimate resort make it impossible for the Turks to attempt to close the Straits, yet it will render it difficult for them to erect any systematic fortifications.
2. In the event of war there would thus be more likelihood of our being able to rush the Straits than there would be if the Turks, in times of peace, had remained in unfettered and unwatched control.
3. Even, therefore, if we do not obtain specific recognition of the right of free navigation of the Straits by warships, we should, if Marshal Foch's proposal were accepted, place ourselves, under the new Treaty of Peace, in a more advantageous position than we were in 1914.

In the absence, so far, of any assurance that M. Poincaré, even if he agrees to accept the scheme as a joint Allied desideratum, he will be willing to impose it upon the Turks, we ought, unless we are prepared to deal with Turkey single-handed, to have ready certain alternatives to which, if need be, we can retreat:—

2. *Interposition of the League of Nations.*

If M. Poincaré hesitates to accept Marshal Foch's scheme, or if, as is more likely, he accepts it subject to the reservation that he will not pledge himself to enforce it, we may find it desirable to retire to our second line and invite the co-operation of the League of Nations.

If we contemplate reference to the League of Nations we must be prepared to face certain initial difficulties:—

(*a.*) In the first place, neither Russia nor Turkey are members of the League, and are therefore unlikely to bind themselves in advance to accept whatever measures the League may prescribe.
(*b.*) In the second place, the League itself may object to having imposed upon it any detailed programme such as might be included in a treaty to be adhered to both by Russia and by Turkey.

In other words, if we make the terms of reference too general, they will be objected to by Russia and Turkey; and if we make them too precise, they may not be well received by the League.

It should be possible to conceive some middle course which, while not alienating Russia and Turkey, would render possible the co-operation of the League. Such a course, as regards details, would doubtless base itself upon such established principles as the Danube and Suez Canal Conventions, and would meet the legitimate anxieties of the League by confining the activities and responsibilities of their representative to functions of inspection rather than to functions of control.

The idea would be to elaborate some "Statute of the Straits" which, while providing for such necessities as lighting, buoyage and sanitary control, would, at the same time, maintain the semblance of Turkish sovereignty.

The Department have prepared, in detailed form, alternative treaty articles by which this supervision of the League could be exercised. These articles are not annexed to this memorandum, but they, as well as several other draft alternatives, are immediately available if desired. Those articles which provide for the intervention of the League are based on the conviction that if the League has to be introduced, it should be represented in the person of an individual High Commissioner rather than in the form of a mixed Commission. If the Allies are unable themselves to establish physical force in the zone of the Straits, they must rely upon some other broad-based moral force working through an individual. The combination of the extremes of moral appeal and personal efficiency can only be achieved through the appointment of a League High Commissioner who should, if possible, be a citizen of the United States.

The powers and functions of such a High Commissioner would not extend very far beyond the inspection of the demilitarised zone envisaged by Marshal Foch. The disadvantage of the interposition of the League would be, however, that in the event of the Turks disregarding the warnings of the High Commissioner, the League would be unable to exert rapid physical pressure. The Turks, who have no regard for anything but physical force, might thus feel that they could continually defy the League with impunity.

If we are unable to secure either some inter-Allied organ of inspection as proposed by Marshal Foch, or the appointment of an American High Commissioner under the League of Nations, we may be obliged to fall back upon our last line of retreat, namely, the commercial freedom of the Straits :—

3. *The Commercial Freedom of the Straits.*

To the principle of the commercial freedom of the Straits France, Italy, Russia and Turkey are all committed; the discussion will arise, not on the principle, but on the interpretation to be given to it. Here again a maximum and minimum interpretation can be applied.

(1.) *Maximum Interpretation.*

(*a.*) So long as Turkey was at peace the Straits have always been free to commerce. What is required is some convention such as will secure unimpeded freedom of commercial navigation even when Turkey is at war.

(*b.*) During the Tripoli and Balkan wars the passage was blocked by Turkish mines for long periods and free navigation was seriously obstructed; during the European war the Straits were closed completely. Measures must now be taken to secure that this shall not happen again.

(*c.*) Events have shown that Turkey if left in complete physical control of the Straits cannot be trusted.

(*d.*) Some international convention must therefore be made such as will provide that in no circumstances shall Turkey be in a position to close the Straits to commerce.

This interpretation would thus imply the imposition upon Turkey of physical guarantees varying from a promise on paper that no military works would be established, to the institution of controls of the nature contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres. The difficulty of this is, not only the old difficulty of maintaining physical guarantees, but also the danger that the Turks will claim that if they are to be deprived of all physical defences they must be guaranteed against attack by the permanent neutralisation, on the Belgian analogy, of the Straits and adjoining territories. This contention would be difficult to counter, and, if accepted, would leave us in a position less favourable than that which existed before the war.

(2.) *Minimum Interpretation.*

The minimum interpretation would be to regard the Straits merely as an "international" water-way, and to prescribe measures for the freedom of navigation on the analogy of those embodied in the Danube Convention. Such measures would apply only to conservancy, quarantine, buoyage and lighting, and, so long as they and the Russians were represented, the Turks would have no objection to the execution and supervision of these functions being entrusted to

an international commission. To apply the Danube Convention to the Straits would, it must be admitted, in practice represent but a slight improvement of the pre-war situation, since it would merely regularise the details of navigation during peace. It would not in any effective way solve the problem of free navigation when Turkey is at war. The solution implied in the "commercial freedom of the Straits" is not therefore a solution at all. It should only be adopted if it is found that no other alternative can be secured.

Conclusions.

The following, therefore, are the conclusions arrived at :—

1. That we should in the first instance endeavour to secure the acceptance by France and Italy of Marshal Foch's proposal, to be interpreted, if possible, as covering the Freedom of the Straits to navigation by warships.
2. That if allied unity cannot be obtained on this proposal, or if, although agreed in principle, our Allies refuse to exert any real pressure to secure Turkish acceptance, we can fall back upon the interposition of the League of Nations.
3. If defeated on both of the two above propositions we must endeavour to secure the formulation in the eventual Treaty of Peace of the doctrine of the commercial Freedom of the Straits in such a form as, while in no way tying our hands for the future, would impose upon Turkey some measure, if not of international control, at least of international inspection.

HAROLD G. NICOLSON.

Foreign Office, November 15, 1922.

APPENDIX.

Introductory Note to the Memorandum on the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

THE following memorandum contains a succinct account of international action as to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It seems necessary to supplement the narrative by calling attention to certain general points which arise out of it.

1. We may begin with a question of terminology. In the past we find that the question which the Government had to consider was always that of "opening" or "closing" the Straits; quite recently, however, a practice has arisen of speaking of the "freedom of the Straits." The difference in language implies a fundamental difference in principle. The older usage was based on the recognition that as in fact the Straits are a narrow channel, both shores of which were within the territories of a single State, that State in law and fact, by universal agreement, exercises full and complete sovereignty over the waterway just in the same way as a country controls the mouth of a river which runs through its own territory. Other countries therefore had no "rights" of any kind except such privileges as the Porte chose by treaty to accord to them. This is the doctrine to which all European Governments, and in particular the British Government, have always given their adherence. The political problem was always to persuade the Porte, whether by amicable discussion, by bribery, intimidation or force, as to the manner in which it would exercise its undoubted rights of sovereignty.

2. As soon as we use the words "freedom of the Straits," we are, though perhaps not always with full consciousness and deliberation, committing ourselves to a different principle. Some writers on international law are inclined to approach the problem by laying down the general principle that the high seas are and must be freely open to the navigation of the ships of all nations, whether mercantile or naval; they then proceed to state dogmatically that not only the Black Sea, but also the Straits, are parts of the high seas, that therefore navigation in them should be unrestricted and that their waters are not and cannot be subject to the territorial sovereignty of Turkey or of any other State. The Government of Washington, which has never been a party to the Straits Conventions, seems to have been disposed to adopt this point of view, and has avoided full recognition of the Turkish claims to sovereignty (see § 28). If this point of view were adopted, then the work of the future would be, not as in the past, to influence the Porte as to the manner in which

it exercises its undoubted rights of sovereignty, but to devise guarantees to prevent it or any other Government attempting illegally to establish control over the waterway.

3. Those who advocate this newer view naturally lay stress on the analogy of the Baltic and argue that the Black Sea should be placed in the same category as the Baltic, to which there has always been free access. In some ways the conditions are very similar. Of the entrances to the Baltic, two, the Sound at one spot, and the Little Belt for a considerable distance, are less than 6 miles broad, so that according to the English doctrine referred to by Lord Palmerston (§ 21) they would both come within the territorial jurisdiction of the riverain States. And even if the Great Belt is in no place less than 10 miles broad, we have to remember that there has apparently never been a general agreement as to the 3-mile limit for territorial jurisdiction and the Danish Government have always claimed, and apparently still claim, that the waters both of the Sound, the Great and the Little Belt are within their territorial jurisdiction, and for some centuries used their authority to impose dues on all vessels passing the Sound. The real difference between the two is, however, not legal and theoretical, but historical. There has never been any attempt, except for very limited periods, to close the Sound and Great Belt, whether to merchant vessels or to ships of war. When a proposal has been made to declare the Baltic a "closed sea," it has always been defeated. However great the resemblance may be to the lawyer, the historian and the practical politician cannot ignore the fact that the two seas and the two Straits have been for 500 years treated on completely different principles.

4. The question then arises whether during recent years there has been such a general change as to justify or require the British Government to repudiate all its past declarations, and apply to the Straits some such general abstract principle. Here we come across an important distinction between ships of commerce and ships of war. As to the first, as far back as 1856, the general principle of free access to the Black Sea was, in fact, adopted in the Treaty of Paris; and also the rules governing international communications in times of peace have in recent years been greatly developed. These regulations have been applied to rivers such as the Danube, and means have been found by which they can be put in force without infringing the principle of territorial sovereignty. Everything that can be done for a river might also obviously be done for the Straits, which in many ways have the character rather of a river than a sea. In regard, therefore, to commercial navigation, we appear to have reached a stage at which the transit of the Straits by commercial vessels in time of peace can be formally placed under international regulations; and, if so, we can properly speak of the "freedom of the Straits."

5. For the application of such rules either to commercial traffic during time of war or to the passage of warships, both during peace and during war, the historical method gives no guidance. There is no experience in the past to help us. Many have suggested that the rules governing the navigation of the Suez Canal might be applied to the Straits. For the reasons given below (§ 43), to which others might be added, it seems very doubtful whether the analogy holds. Nor does it seem that much help can be got from the treatment of other Straits, as, for instance, those of Magellan, for whatever similarity there might be if we approached the problem from the point of view of a theoretical lawyer, the political and practical difficulties are such as to overpower the resemblance. It may, however, be worth while noting that supposing the principle that the Straits, being part of the seas, were and must remain open, the same principle would apparently have to be applied to the Sea of Azof.

6. All proposals for establishing the freedom of the Straits in this sense necessarily imply an international guarantee, to which, of course, this country would be a partner, for the security of Constantinople against an attack by sea, and also a general undertaking to be observed even in time of war to refrain from the military occupation and fortification of either bank of the Straits. The only experience which history affords of guarantees of this nature seems to be the neutrality of Switzerland and of Belgium; there are probably few countries who, even since the establishment of the League of Nations, would be willing to depend for their security on the certainty that such guarantees and engagements would not be violated or ignored. This was clearly the opinion of the Russian Government. From 1912 onwards it seems that vague suggestions in this direction were put forward, though I have not been able to find any positive and considered proposals, but Russia would not accept guarantees of this kind, and there are obvious objections to making promises which it would be very difficult to fulfil in the stress of war. If the case of the Suez Canal is quoted, it must be pointed out that, in fact, the convention has never been submitted to the real stress of warfare. A perusal of the confidential papers at the time when it was under negotiation supplies evidence that, even in this country, the military advisers of the Crown did not believe that any paper convention would be sufficient

to deter an interested party from using every means at their disposal to make navigation through the canal impossible; this doubt extended even to our own action. A guarantee to be effective requires armed force; in the case of a matter of such importance as the Straits, this must be not only adequate in size, but also ready for use at any time to meet an immediate emergency. This was foreseen in the Treaty of Sèvres; under that instrument the security for keeping the Straits open was the right given to Great Britain, France and Italy to maintain naval and military forces there. It may be assumed that neither Turkey nor Russia would be willing now to accept a system which would place access to Constantinople and the Black Sea in the hands of their late enemy.

What it seems to come to is that it would be extraordinarily difficult for the British Government to repudiate all its action in the past and adopt the principle of freedom and attempt to impose it upon other States. It would, of course, be easy enough for a completely new Government such as that which we now have in Russia to do so, and if they were (which does not seem probable) to press the principle, it would be much easier for the British Government to accept their suggestion than it would be to take the initiative.

7. The difficulty would also be removed if there had been a complete change in the political conditions; if, for instance, there had been such a modification of the frontiers that the Porte should cease to be the sovereign Power over both banks either of the Bosphorus, or of the Dardanelles, or of both, a change such as the Treaty of Sèvres, had it been ratified, would have brought about. Or, again, the difficulties would have been removed if Turkey, instead of becoming again, as it was in the past, a fully sovereign State, were in some form or another to be placed under some form of curatel or guardianship; if her territory were to be neutralised or guaranteed, or if she were placed under a mandate of a single Power, or became a protected State.

8. At the present moment it looks as though none of these conditions would be fulfilled; both shores of the Straits will apparently be restored to Turkey with full sovereignty. From this important practical results will follow. At this moment both shores of the Straits are, as they have always been in the past, legally part of the Turkish dominions. They happen at the moment still to be in the military occupation of enemy States, but this military occupation by itself no more affects the permanent legal position than did the military occupation of the North of France or of Belgium by the Germans. As soon as peace is made, this military occupation will presumably cease; full and complete Turkish sovereignty will be re-established, and will be subject only to such restrictions or to such new rules as the Turkish Government may agree to by treaties with one or more of the other States of Europe. If no such agreements are arrived at, either the existing treaties will once more come into operation (they can only be repealed by unanimous consent), or, alternatively, matters will revert to the condition which existed before the Straits Convention of 1841; the sovereignty of the Porte would be unrestricted and the Turkish Government would be free to open or close the Straits to the war vessels of other nations as they themselves wished.

9. In either case we should find ourselves back again in a diplomatic situation identical with that which existed before the war. The different nations, each pursuing the policy which seemed advantageous to itself, would try each to gain its ends by bringing pressure to bear upon the Turks. This being so, a study of the past history of the problem is not without its value. We see from this that the question is primarily and always must be Russian rather than English or French. It all turns on the constant efforts of the Russian Empire to gain secure access to the open sea by a channel completely under their own control. This continues, and must continue. The overthrow of the autocracy cannot change it; the policy of the new Government of Russia must eventually become a continuation of that of its predecessors, just in the same way as the policy of the French Republic continued that of the monarchy. Whatever the future may have in store, to the country which controls the northern shore of the Black Sea, the question of the Straits will always be of predominant importance. At this moment it is more important than ever in the past, for Russia has to a large extent lost the alternative openings through the independence of the Baltic States and the extension of Japanese influence in Eastern Siberia. For the British Government the political problem has always turned on the point, Which is more important, the defensive, *i.e.*, the exclusion of the Russians from the Mediterranean, or the offensive, the entrance of the British fleet into the Black Sea? The first seems to be almost purely one of naval strategy; in the second larger political problems are involved, as, for instance, the defence of India by a naval attack on Russia, as in the time of the Crimea, and the importance of being able to use the navy in order to support British interests in the countries bordering on the

Black Sea—on the one side Roumania, and indirectly the Danubian States and Poland, for to Poland, though it is not a riverain country, the exit by the Black Sea is of high importance: on the other side, the districts of the Caucasus, Batoum, Baku and the gate to the Caspian and Northern Persia.

J. W. H.-M.

The Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH.(1)

Unrestricted Turkish Sovereignty.

In order to understand the problem of the Straits, even in its most modern form, it is necessary to start from the condition of things which existed when the Turkish Empire was at the height of its power. During the 17th century, not only were the shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, with the Sea of Marmora, but also the whole coast of the Black Sea, within the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Both the waterway of the Straits and the Black Sea were therefore treated as part of the Ottoman Dominions; the Straits were regarded as fully and completely under the authority of the Porte, as if they had been not the sea but a river. The right of the Sultan to determine absolutely by his own will whether, and under what conditions, ships flying a foreign flag, whether mercantile or naval, should enter the Straits, was as full and unimpeached as at the present day is the right of the Dominion of Canada to control the waters of the St. Lawrence, or of England to control the mouth of the Thames or the Solent. This right has continued up to the present day, subject only to such changes in the exercise of it as the Government of Constantinople might agree to in treaties with one or more foreign States, and if the Turkish sovereignty were restored without conditions this right would revert to them, not indeed for the Black Sea, but for the Straits.

2. Down to the beginning of the 18th century the practice of the Porte was absolutely to deny entrance into the Black Sea to the ships of any nation whatsoever. "For 300 years—from 1476 to 1774—they alone navigated and traded in the Black Sea, and they used it as their own domain." Under the Capitulations by which the right of commerce in the Levant was regulated, the Porte granted to Venice, France, Great Britain and other States, permission for merchant vessels flying their flag to sail through the Dardanelles up to the port of Constantinople, but under no circumstances and no conditions were they ever allowed to proceed through the Bosphorus. From time to time permission was given to merchants to trade, but never for foreign ships to sail in these waters. Cargoes for Black Sea ports had to be transhipped to Turkish vessels, and in the same way ships navigating the lower waters of the Danube had to tranship their cargoes, and were not allowed themselves to navigate the Euxine. At this period there was no idea of anything such as a right of way through the Straits into the Black Sea.

Russia and the Black Sea.

3. A change came when the Russians began to establish themselves on the northern shores of the Black Sea. In the year 1696 the town of Azof on the Sea of Azof was captured by the Russian army, and in the year 1700 a Russian mission was sent to Constantinople to demand the opening of the Black Sea to Russian commerce. This mission arrived at Constantinople on a Russian ship of war. This fact created the greatest concern at the Porte. They believed, and acted on the belief, that if a Russian navy were established in the Black Sea, the security of Constantinople would be fatally compromised:

> "The Sultan considers the Black Sea as his own house to which strangers cannot penetrate: it is a virgin shut up in the harem, hidden from the view of strangers, and he would rather have war than permit other nations to navigate on this internal sea."

(1) The authorities which I have used are first the archives of the Foreign Office, and in particular a series of valuable memoranda prepared from time to time in the Library regarding the action of the British Government. It is from these memoranda that many of the quotations in the text are taken. Of published works the most important are "La Mer Noire: Essai d'Histoire diplomatique" (I do not know who the author is); "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles," by Gorianof; the only English monograph on the subject is "The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles," by Phillipson and Buxton, which is of very unequal merit.

In case the length of this memorandum may be the subject of criticism, I may be allowed to point out that the last full memorandum written in the Foreign Office by Sir Edward Hertslet extended to 120 printed folio pages, and this stops at 1877.

And again:—

> "When foreign ships obtain the right of sailing freely on this sea, the end of the Ottoman Empire will have sounded."

The request was refused, and for the next seventy years the relations between the two States were governed by this controversy, which was the cause of prolonged wars. During the reign of Catherine II (1762–1796), the Russians succeeded in establishing themselves along the whole northern shore of the Black Sea, eventually annexing the territory of the Crim Tartars, and by the Treaty of Kioutchouk-Kainardji (1774) the Porte conceded to them the right to the free and uninterrupted navigation of all the seas which water their States. Their commercial vessels were thereby permitted not only to use the Black Sea, but also to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This treaty was amplified and confirmed by further treaties, as in 1779 and 1783. But in all these treaties the authority of the Porte was maintained by strict regulations as to the size and nature of the vessels which might pass the Straits: in every case they were required to receive a special firman, and the Porte retained the right of search to assure itself that there were no Ottoman subjects on board.

Opening of the Straits and Black Sea to Commerce.

4. In this way the Russians had gained not only the sole right to navigate the Black Sea, but also other valuable privileges, for instance, their ships were exempted from the dues which English and French merchant vessels had to pay on passing the Dardanelles. Inevitably the Porte was, though slowly and with reluctance, compelled to grant similar privileges to other States, as to Austria in 1784, to Great Britain in 1799, to France in 1802, to Prussia in 1806.

The further history of merchant shipping need not detain us long. By the Treaty of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey in 1812, all previous treaties were renewed and confirmed. At this date the right of navigation was still a special privilege accorded to a few Powers:—

> "In 1822 the Ottoman Minister communicated to the Ministers of the Powers whose flags had the right of entrance to the Black Sea a firman of the Grand Seigneur from the date of which the passage of the Bosphorus is closed to the ships of nations to whom the Porte has never accorded the right of entry to that sea. These Powers are requested not to lend their flag to facilitate the passage. Many Sardinian and Spanish vessels, both laden and empty, have been seized in a port of this capital since this order."

It was extended to Sardinia in 1823, to Sweden and Spain in 1827. A great extension was given to the privilege by the Treaty of Adrianople, concluded between Russia and Turkey in 1829 at the conclusion of the war; by this Russian ships were to be free from any kind of visit whatever on the part of the Ottoman authorities, and it is particularly to be noted that the privileges granted to Russian ships were extended also to the ships of friendly nations trading with Russian ports:—

> "The Sublime Porte promises never to allow itself henceforth to stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast, whether Russian or belonging to nations with whom the Ottoman port should not be in a state of declared war, which vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles on their way from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Mediterranean into the Russian ports of the Black Sea."

It will be seen, then, that this treaty in reality throws open the Straits to the free navigation of all nations, and its provisions were reinforced by a series of treaties by which the different civilised States were in this matter placed on the most-favoured-nation footing. As an example of them we may refer to the treaty with the United States of 1830.(2)

5. From this time both the Straits and the Black Sea have in times of peace been in fact open to the commerce of all nations; and a clause in the Treaty of Paris (1856) establishes the principle for the Black Sea:—

> "Freed from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, customs and police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of commercial transactions."

(2) See Turkey No. 16 (1878), Cmd. 1953, which contains the text of the more important treaties.

No such general regulation has been made for the Straits, and down to 1914 the right even to commercial navigation through them seems to have depended solely on the individual treaties referred to above. Apart from the permission given by them, the full sovereignty of the Porte continued, and it has always maintained the formality of the separate firman for each vessel which had to be granted on passing the Dardanelles, and continued to make restrictions, as, for instance, that ships might not pass during the night. On these matters there has been frequent correspondence, but it does not appear that any general questions of principle were raised. The only matter concerning merchant shipping on which there still is difficulty is the procedure in the case of war. Difficult questions as to the right of blockade have arisen, and both in 1912 and 1913, though the Straits were not formally closed, serious actual impediments were put in the way of shipping, as, for instance, by mining the channel; they led to protests by the interested States, and at one time active intervention by Russia, who was acting in close agreement with Roumania, appeared imminent. The consideration of this point of navigation in war does not seem to belong to an historical memorandum, but rather is a question of current international law.

Constantinople and the Partition of Turkey.

6. Very different is it with the opening of the Straits to ships of war; this is a problem of a completely different order. In it were involved points such as the security of Constantinople, use of the Straits as the base for a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, which might become a danger equally to France and Great Britain, and the opening of the Black Sea to the maritime Powers for hostile operations against Russia. While essentially a question of naval strategy, it was for more than a hundred years to be one of the pivots on which the policy of the great Powers depended. More and more Turkey herself became merely a pawn in the game; the protagonists were Russia, Austria and the two maritime Powers, France and England, but always in order to understand it, we must accustom ourselves to look at it primarily from the Russian point of view.

7. The Russians, as we have seen, before the end of the 18th century, had attained free passage of the Straits for their own merchant shipping; they were well aware, however, that this privilege was a precarious one; it had been conceded under pressure and might at any time be revoked if the Porte came under the influence of other States. It could only be permanently secured if the Russians themselves exercised actual control over the Straits. The attainment of this control was therefore always the ultimate object of their policy. The simplest way of obtaining it would be by war, conquest and annexation, and Catherine II. throughout her reign, sedulously encouraged the national and religious aspiration of the Russian nation that it was their mission to be the liberator of the Orthodox Church, to rescue Constantinople from the infidels and to re-establish the Christian Empire of the East. But Turkey did not stand alone. They were well aware that the other nations of Europe, and especially Austria, France and Great Britain, would not permit so great an extension of Russian power. If Turkey was to be overthrown, then it would have to be dealt with like Poland; there must be a partition; and projects of the partition of Turkey were frequent. In 1780 we find the idea of a coalition between Russia, France and Austria, a coalition from which Great Britain was to be excluded. In this, as in every other similar project, Constantinople and the Straits were to be assigned to Russia, Egypt to France. In view of later events, we must never forget that Egypt and the Straits were always connected; the fate of the one was to depend on the fate of the other. The realisation of any of these projects implied an attempt to exclude the English altogether from the Mediterranean, for, after all, were they not interlopers there?

8. We can easily understand then how it came about that Pitt laid down the principle that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire was a British interest. He was thinking of the defence of India and the maintenance of British sea power in the Levant. This was threatened by the Russians, who at this time maintained a considerable fleet in the Mediterranean; obviously a most dangerous situation would arise if this fleet was able to use the Dardanelles as an impregnable base, all the more if there were to be an alliance between Russia and France. The activities of the Russians in the Levant were very disturbing; Catherine had made herself the protector of the Greeks, and in 1768 for the first time a Russian fleet had sailed from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. It did so with the consent and active assistance of the English, who supplied provisions and lent the services of British officers. In 1770,

under British officers, it actually entered, though it did not pass through, the Dardanelles. But this friendly feeling soon disappeared; the British Government became suspicious and jealous, and withdrew their active support.

Napoleonic Wars.

9. During the revolution and Napoleonic wars, the question of the Straits became involved in the great struggle which was taking place. It was a period during which Russian policy was marked by a series of extraordinarily rapid vacillations. But throughout it all we see running the one firm purpose of securing control over the Straits with the particular object of extending Russian influence and Russian naval power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, we have Napoleon, with restless energy, carrying out his great project, the destruction of British maritime supremacy and the overthrow of the British Empire in India. In this he saw that the Levant was one of the cardinal points, and he never ceased to work in order to secure the help, now of Turkey, now of Russia, in this great ambition.

10. The first stage comes in 1798, immediately after the accession of the Emperor Paul. The French, who had already occupied the Ionian Islands, sent out their fleet from Toulon; it seized Malta and went on to Egypt. The Russians had believed that Constantinople would be the objective, and, in fact, an attack on this city was in Napoleon's mind. The first result was an unwonted combination; an alliance was concluded between Russia and Turkey, which was joined by Great Britain; this is of great importance for the history of the Straits, for by it Russia undertook to send a fleet to defend the Turkish possessions, while Turkey, on her side, now for the first time granted to Russia, "for this occasion only," free passage for her ships of war through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. A Russian fleet availed itself of this permission; it appeared in the Mediterranean and took an active part in the operations against France as an ally of England and Turkey. It seemed to be the beginning of a new epoch. Not only did the fleet sail there once, but there was a constant coming and going; it seemed to be the object of the Russians that the presence of their ships of war in the Straits should become a habit. This fact produced grave apprehension in England, although for the moment the two countries were allied, and it was this jealousy which was one of the principal causes of the sudden change of policy by which in 1801 Paul joined Napoleon. The result of this was that the Russian fleet, which was in the Levant, became an ally of the French, ready to take its part in an attack on the road to India, and the whole Asiatic position of Great Britain.

Alexander I and Russian Policy.

11. The Emperor Paul was assassinated in 1801, and at the beginning of Alexander's reign an important discussion took place as to the policy which should be pursued by Russia with regard to the Straits. Among other contributions Count Kotchoubey presented a memorandum to the Emperor which had great influence on Russian policy for many years. There were, he said, two possible systems between which Russia could choose; the first was a partition of the Ottoman Empire in agreement with France and Austria; the second was to oppose any such policy of partition as dangerous to Russian interests. He strongly advocated the latter course. Russia had no need of further territories, and she could not hope to have a neighbour more inoffensive than Turkey. The preservation of the Ottoman Empire must, in the future, be the keystone of Russian policy. By working with Turkey Russia had gained greater advantages than in all her wars against Turkey; the treaty of 1799 gave free passage to Russian ships of war, and the creation of the Republic of the Ionian Islands was a pretext for demanding the continuation of this right. This conception was in fact adopted by the Russian Government, and, with few exceptions, they ceased from that time to appeal to the vague mystical conception of Russia's mission for driving the Mussulman out of Constantinople, which had played so large a part in the reign of Catherine. Their aim was not to destroy the Ottoman Empire, but to maintain it, but at the same time, to keep it in a state of subjection:—

> "It is, wrote the Emperor Alexander, one of the fundamental principles of my political system, to contribute in every way to preserve the Empire of Turkey, the weakness and bad internal administration of which constitute valuable guarantees of security."

It was, as a French writer notes, the practical application of the celebrated theory of Montesquieu, according to which nothing could be more advantageous to a State than to have very weak neighbours. The device of maintaining a weak State on the frontier instead of annexing it is one common to all great conquering countries; it was the attitude of Rome towards Armenia, of England towards Afghanistan, of Germany to the Baltic Provinces in 1918. The adoption of this principle did not of course mean that the Russian Government had once and for all dismissed from their minds the larger ambition; it was only postponed, postponed because they saw that any attempt to seize Constantinople itself would inevitably raise a European coalition against them. But difficulties were soon experienced in carrying out this policy. It was necessary that no other State should gain predominant influence over the Porte; it was necessary also that the Government of Turkey should not be transferred to younger and more vigorous hands. If either of these contingencies occurred, or threatened to occur, Russia at once was ready to intervene in arms, as in 1833, in 1912 or in 1914. Moreover, it was soon found that the attempt to exercise exclusive influence over the Porte brought about a coalition as surely as an attempt at actual conquest would have done.

12. To trace in detail the working of opposing policies at the Court of St. Petersburg during the next century would be a task of extraordinary interest, and in this way alone is it possible to explain the rapid and often almost incomprehensible changes of Russian policy, which were especially marked during the Napoleonic era and since. That which outside observers, particularly the British Government, saw was the steady purpose which, under different forms, was always present, of establishing exclusive Russian influence, and with this object, of bringing about an arrangement by which Russian warships alone should have the right of navigating the Bosphorus. In this country, whatever Government might be in power, there was always present the gravest suspicion of Russian actions and Russian motives, and a complete distrust of any offers of friendship. This attitude continued with very few and temporary exceptions (Fox and Gladstone) down to the year 1907. It would be impossible to maintain that it was unjustified, for however genuine the professions of friendship of a particular Tsar or Minister might be at the moment, no one could doubt that any concession made to Russia would, on some future occasion, be used as a step towards objects which could never be conceded.

13. To return to the narrative. The death of Paul and the accession of Alexander stopped the sudden friendship of France, and long negotiations took place between 1802 and 1805 concerning the formation of the new coalition against Napoleon. In these we find that, even after the death of Paul, the question of Malta takes a prominent position; the Russians were always demanding the island, or, at any rate, the right to have a garrison there; they had succeeded in getting, together with Turkey, the protectorate over the Ionian Islands. In constant pursuance of their object to extend their maritime power in the Levant by alliance with Turkey, in 1805 they negotiated a new treaty with Turkey which is of great importance, for in it we find the two essential points of Russian policy, the closing of the Black Sea to the warships of all other nations, and the opening of the Straits to the Russian fleet:—

> "The high contracting parties are agreed in regarding the Black Sea as closed, and in not permitting the appearance of any flag of war or armed vessel of any Power whatsoever, and in case anyone should attempt to appear there in arms, the two high contracting parties engage to regard such an attempt as *casus foderis*, and to oppose it with all their naval forces, this being the only method of assuring their reciprocal tranquillity; it being understood that a free passage by the Canal of Constantinople will continue for the ships of war and military transports of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, to which, on each occasion, the Sublime Porte will give, so far as it depends on it, all assistance, and will grant all facility."

14. Eventually Alexander joined the coalition; Napoleon therefore now aimed at using Turkey as a weapon against his enemies; they, notwithstanding their treaty, closed the Straits to the Russians. War between Russia and Turkey followed. We get then the situation of Russia and England working together to win over Turkey from French influence, and with this object, Admiral Duckworth (February 1807), with the English fleet, sailed up the Dardanelles and appeared before Constantinople with the apparent intention of dictating their course to the Turks, and if Turkey refused the conditions offered, of bombarding Constantinople and destroying the fleet. This is the first time that a fleet sailed through the Dardanelles, and demonstrated the

incapacity of the Turks properly to protect the position. But there was no Nelson at Constantinople; the English had come to threaten, but when their demands were refused, feared to strike. The Turks delayed and procrastinated, and the English fleet sailed away under the fire of the batteries of the Dardanelles, leaving untouched the main Turkish fleet, which they ought to have dealt with as the Danish fleet had been treated.

15. Another quick change took place. After Tilsit, 1808, Alexander became the ally of Napoleon. Napoleon's object was to secure Russian help against England in the Mediterranean, and for this purpose to force the Turks to open the Straits to the Russian fleet. He attempted to bring about an agreement between Russia and Turkey, but at the same time he started negotiations with Alexander about the partition of Turkey. These negotiations are, even at the present day, of great interest, for one feels how little the world has changed. They broke down on the question of the Straits. Two alternatives were put forward: (1) that Constantinople should be established as a free city; (2) that it should be held by Russia. Alexander chose the latter, but he required not only Constantinople and the surrounding territory, but the Dardanelles as well. This Napoleon refused. If Russia was to have Constantinople, the French must hold the Dardanelles; otherwise, as the French envoy said, the Russian fleet would soon be at Malta, Naples and Toulon.

16. As a guarantee against these proposals the English, who were now friendly to Turkey, made a treaty, which is of great importance as the first step towards what was to prove for fifty years the definite solution. The important clause runs as follows:—

> "As ships of war have at all times been prohibited from entering the Canal of Constantinople, namely, in the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea, and as this ancient regulation of the Ottoman Empire is in future to be observed by every Power in time of peace, the Court of Great Britain promises on its part to conform to this principle."

In this we get, for the first time in a treaty with a foreign State, the formal recognition of what is here called the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire. But, as has been pointed out, by the very fact that the recognition of this rule by Great Britain is made contingent upon the enforcement of the rule against all other States, the Porte in fact to a certain extent gave up its full freedom of action. Hitherto it had enjoyed and had exercised the right of permitting the passage of ships of war as it desired, in accordance purely with its own wish and interest; henceforth this full sovereignty was to this extent limited, that while the right to close the Straits remained unimpeached, it gave up the free right to open them. At this time the freedom was limited by agreement only with Great Britain.

The War of Greek Independence.

17. This treaty was the only permanent result of the Napoleonic struggle as regards Turkey. After all their efforts the Russians really had failed in their endeavours; the treaties of 1799 and 1805 were not prolonged by the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). Turkey remained intact and Great Britain had secured the closing of the Straits against the Russians. None the less during the next years Russian intrigues in the Mediterranean continued, and the British Government were more than once seriously concerned by the suggestion of the Tsar, now in connection with the Spanish troubles, now with the Barbary pirates, to send a Russian fleet into the Mediterranean. The outbreak of the war of Greek independence naturally led to a great increase of activity, but the Russian fleet, which took part in the Battle of Navarino, still had to make the long voyage from the Baltic. War between Russia and Turkey followed. When the time came to make peace, an interesting discussion on this matter again took place in the Russian Council of State. The main point discussed was whether it was better for Russia to press on to the dissolution of the Turkish Empire or to be content with maintaining Turkey as a weak Power under Russian influence. The decision was for the latter course; if Turkey was destroyed, Russia must then herself occupy Constantinople and the Straits, but she could not do this without a European war; other Powers would certainly use the opportunity to annex other portions of the Turkish Empire, and the relative strength of Russia might be weakened rather than strengthened. They determined, therefore, to aim at maintaining political control over Turkey, and in this way keep control over the Straits. In the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) nothing is said about the Straits except the article on the passage of Russian commercial vessels, to which reference has already been made.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skélessi

18. The opportunity for extending control over Turkey was given by the revolt of Mehemet Ali. When it appeared probable that the forces of Ibrahim Pasha might appear on the shores of the Bosphorus and seize Constantinople itself, the Russians, acting alone, sent a fleet to Constantinople and disembarked an army on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus. Fortunately we need not follow the very complicated negotiations which ensued; it is sufficient to say that this step was regarded with the gravest suspicion by France and England, who, although opposed to the ambitions of Mehemet Ali, did not wish that Turkey should fall entirely into the hands of Russia. Eventually peace was arranged between the Porte and the rebellious Pasha; the Russian fleet and army then withdrew, but the day before they did so there had been signed the celebrated Treaty of Unkiar-Skélessi (the 8th July, 1833), which gave to the Russians that which they had always aimed at securing—the sole and exclusive right of sending their ships of war through the Straits. The treaty takes the form of a defensive alliance between the two Empires, and the Tsar undertakes, if called upon, to furnish by land and sea as many troops and forces as may be deemed necessary. This, though it is not expressly stated, clearly implies that a Russian fleet might be summoned to pass through the Straits in order to defend the Mediterranean coasts of the Turkish Empire. The public articles are followed by a secret and separate article, by which the Turks bind themselves permanently to close the Dardanelles to the fleets of every other State :—

> "In virtue of one of the clauses of the first article of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance, concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, as His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessel of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.
>
> "The present separate and secret article shall have the same force and value as if it was inserted word for word in the Treaty of Alliance of this day."

The two parts of the treaty taken together establish a complete protectorate over Turkey by Russia.

19. France and England at once entered a formal and identical protest, both at Constantinople and St. Petersburg :—

> "The undersigned has been instructed to express to the Sublime Porte the deep concern with which the British Government has learnt the conclusion of the treaty of the 8th July between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan. That treaty appears to His Majesty's Government to produce a change in the relations between Turkey and Russia, to which other European States are entitled to object; and the undersigned is instructed to declare that if the stipulations of that treaty should hereafter lead to the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey the British Government will hold itself at liberty to act upon such an occasion, in any manner which the circumstances of the moment may appear to require, equally as if the treaty above mentioned were not in existence."(1)

The Russians soon found that they had gone too far; if they were to insist on their rights under this treaty they would be isolated. The Emperor Nicholas is said to have been much influenced by the opinion of the Duke of Wellington. The Duke, who continued the policy of Pitt, and was a confirmed advocate of the closure of the Straits, had been much disturbed even by the commercial clauses in the Treaty of Adrianople, and, as soon as he heard of them, had written :—

> "The navigation of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus and, of course, of the intervening sea has been considered as belonging to the Porte as the Thames is ours and as the Rhine belongs to the King of the Netherlands, excepting in as far as the possession of the latter river is limited by the Treaty of Congress (Vienna). These Straits and the intervening sea are, in fact, a *mare clausum* in the possession of the Porte over which that Power has always exercised, and must always exercise, dominion."

(1) This protest was avowedly directed only against the public treaty; it is not clear how soon the secret clause became known.

To the Russian Ambassador he said in 1834 :—

> "With all frankness I declare that, so long as this treaty remains in force, it will be impossible for us not to observe a reticence towards your Government, with which we should so much wish to have a good understanding on all points."

The Duke was Foreign Secretary during the short Tory Government, November 1834–April 1835, and we have from a French source an interesting account of advice which he gave to Lord Palmerston, who succeeded him, and who is reported as having said to the French Ambassador :—

> "Lorsqu'en 1835, nous revîmes au pouvoir, je me rendis chez le Duc de Wellington; mes rapports avec lui me permettaient une démarche de confiance, et je dis au duc que l'Orient étant appelé à jouer un grand rôle dans les affaires de l'Europe je tenais essentiellement à connaître son opinion sur les deux systèmes qui se présentaient à notre politique : travailler à ouvrir la mer de Marmara à nos flottes et conséquemment à celles des autres Puissances, ou la fermer à toutes, y compris les nôtres. Le duc me répondit sans hésitation : 'à la fermer; nous sommes, dans ces parages, très loin de nos ressources, et la Russie touche aux siens.' Ce mot, continue Lord Palmerston, m'a frappé comme plein de sens et de raison."(1)

Convention of the Straits 1841.

20. The treaty remained nominally in force for seven years, but never became effective. In 1834 the Russians came to an agreement at Munchengrätz with Austria, by which the two Emperors agreed to maintain the Ottoman Empire, and in case of its dissolution, to act together. The whole situation was reviewed in 1839 in connection with the further troubles about Mehemet Ali. The Tsar was now willing to retreat from the position he had secured and to accept the principle that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and the closing of the Straits should be made a common European matter. The Russian Ambassador himself suggested to Lord Palmerston that a general agreement should be made by which the Straits were closed to the warships of all Powers; in consequence, in the Quadruple Agreement of 1840 by which the Egyptian problem was settled, it was agreed that if Mehemet Ali refused to submit to the conditions imposed on him and were to attack Constantinople—

> "The high contracting parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression."

By this it will be seen that the Tsar gave up his position as sole protector of Turkey; what was meant was that if the occasion arose and the Russian fleet should pass the Bosphorus, the French and English fleets would sail up the Dardanelles in order to protect Constantinople.

A further article states that these stipulations—

> "shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above mentioned; but it is agreed that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus."

This latter principle was re-enacted in 1841 as a separate agreement, to which France, who had been excluded from the Quadruple Alliance, now became a party. The terms of this Convention of the Straits are as follows :—

(1) Dépêche du Baron de Bourqueney au Maréchal Soult du 12 juillet 1839. Guizot, "Mémoires," Vol. VI. (There seems to be no English record of this conversation.)

"Article 1. His Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at peace, his Highness will admit no foreign ship of war into the said Straits. And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.

"Article 2. It is understood that in recording the inviolability of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire mentioned in the preceding article, the Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed as is usual in the service of the missions of foreign Powers.

"Article 3. His Highness the Sultan reserves to himself to communicate the present Convention to all the Powers with whom the Sublime Porte is in relations of friendship, inviting them to accede thereto."

21. This convention, with certain modifications introduced in 1856 and 1871, has remained in force ever since, and it is by it, with these modifications, that if no fresh arrangement were made, the navigation of the Straits would presumably still be governed. It requires, therefore, careful examination. The form in which it was finally adopted was chiefly due to Lord Palmerston, and British diplomacy seems to have been very successful. The original Russian proposal had been that the closing of the Straits, both in peace and in war, should be declared a principle of the public law of Europe. Lord Palmerston, while accepting the policy of closing the Straits, insisted that this should be based on what is called "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," which had already been recognised in the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809. This was in accordance with the principle which the British Government had always maintained, that Turkey had complete sovereignty over the Straits. As he wrote in 1839:—

> "Every State was considered as having territorial jurisdiction over the sea which washed its shores as far as 3 miles from low-water mark, and consequently that any Strait which was bounded on both sides by the territory of the same sovereign, and which was not more than 6 miles wide, was within the territorial jurisdiction of that sovereignty."(*)

It will be noted, however, that to a certain extent Turkey, by agreeing to this treaty, surrendered the full rights of sovereignty which she had hitherto possessed, for, while entering into an agreement with other Powers to close the Straits, she thereby gave up the full right which she had hitherto enjoyed, of opening them at her own discretion.

22. Again, the Russians had desired that the Straits should be closed in time of war as well as in time of peace. There was much discussion on this point which the British, supported by the Austrians, refused to accept. The importance of this was to become apparent at the time of the Crimean war, and it was at the time fundamental for British policy. So long as Turkey and England were friendly or allied, the situation was extremely advantageous to us; during times of peace we were freed from the apprehension of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean; if there was war against Russia, then it could be assumed that we should have Turkey as an ally and thereby the Straits would be open to us to attack the Russians in the Black Sea. Thirdly, the treaty was one by which the signatory Powers bind themselves, not only as against Turkey, but also to one another; any change would therefore require the consent of all the signatories.(*)

(*) I believe, but have not been able to verify the fact, that this despatch was based on an opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown.

(*) The negotiations between 1839 and 1841, and again in 1855–56, were very prolonged and very complicated, and for reasons of space alone, it would be impossible to give any full account of them here. Moreover, especially for the first period, we have to depend almost entirely on French and Russian works; the British archives seem to have never been studied, and there has been no satisfactory account of the discussions written in English.

The Crimean War.

23. The next stage is the Crimean war. In September 1854, even before war was declared, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was instructed to send for the British fleet, which was already at Besika Bay, to come to Constantinople; this led to a protest from the Russians, who declared that we had been guilty of a violation of the treaty. There was a long correspondence on the matter; the justification we put forward was a double one, first the Russian invasion of the Danubian provinces, though not accompanied by a declaration of war, was, in fact, an act of a warlike nature; secondly, and this is that on which the greatest stress was laid, there was grave danger to the Christian inhabitants of Constantinople, and, as Lord Clarendon wrote—

> "When it appears that the lives and properties of British subjects are exposed to serious danger and that the Turkish Government declares itself unable to avert that danger, it is clear that the treaty has no longer a binding force upon us, and that urgent necessity supersedes its provisions."

24. The terms of peace imposed upon Russia at the conclusion of the war were in this matter very severe; the Allies, at the instance of France, demanded that the Black Sea should be neutralised and the naval forces both of Turkey and Russia strictly limited. The relevant clauses of the treaties are as follows:—

(*a.*) In the main Treaty of Paris:—

"Article 11.—The Black Sea is neutralised; its waters and its ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in articles 14 and 19 of the present treaty.

"Article 13.—The Black Sea, being neutralised according to the terms of article 11, the maintenance or establishment upon its coast of military-maritime arsenals becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that coast any military-maritime arsenal."

(*b.*) A separate convention re-enacts the Straits Convention of 1841;

(*c.*) A separate treaty between Russia and Turkey was signed:—

"Article 1.—The high contracting parties mutually engage not to have in the Black Sea any other vessels of war than those of which the number, the force and the dimensions are hereinafter stipulated.

"Article 2.—The high contracting parties reserve to themselves each to maintain in that sea six steam-vessels of 50 metres in length at the line of flotation, of a tonnage of 800 tons at the maximum, and four light steam or sailing vessels of a tonnage which shall not exceed 200 tons each."

This treaty was to have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part of the general treaty of peace. "It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the general treaty."

The exceptions referred to in article 11 are:—

(i.) Those specified in article 2 of the treaty between Russia and Turkey;
(ii.) The light vessels which the Sultan permits into the Straits for the service of the missions at Constantinople, and also two light vessels which each of the contracting Powers is authorised to station at the mouths of the Danube in order to secure the execution of the regulations relative to the liberty of that river.

To these treaties Sardinia was a party, and in consequence the Kingdom of Italy was from the time of its establishment associated with the four Great Powers in all negotiations concerning the Straits.

25. It has been contended with much force that in insisting on the neutralisation of the Black Sea and the limitation of the Russian fleet, the Allies had used their advantage more fully than was wise or generous. The British Government was undoubtedly influenced by the strong pressure of popular feeling which at the

conclusion of war was still very bitter to Russia. Everyone could foresee that the Russian Government would take the first opportunity to free itself from this very invidious restriction. On the other hand, it must be recognised that the situation between 1841 and 1855 had been very unsatisfactory. A large Russian fleet was maintained in the Black Sea from which it was not allowed to emerge. It could not be used to support Russian policy elsewhere; the building of this fleet could therefore only be interpreted as a weapon for the intimidation and control of Turkey. Its very existence, shut up in the Black Sea, with no other activity open to it, was by itself a menace and incentive to war.

Denentralisation of the Black Sea, 1871.

26. During the following years there is much official correspondence with regard to the Straits, but this deals almost exclusively with difficult cases as to whether individual ships which applied for permission to go through the Straits came within the terms of the treaties of 1856. The exercise by the Porte of its power to admit guard-ships for the Embassies of Constantinople was very carefully watched, and the British Government, to which every case seems to have been reported, always protested against the admission of any ship of war belonging to any nation which did not seem to be justified by the terms of the treaty. The general question of principle did not come up. The Russian Government were indeed determined to free themselves from what they not unnaturally held to be degrading restrictions on their own sovereign rights; suggestions came to them both from Austria and from France that they should do so, but they preferred to wait until the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, by which a very favourable opportunity was provided. They were secure in the support of Prussia; France was helpless; the defeat of France made it impossible for Austria to offer opposition to any proposal on which Prussia and Russia were agreed; England alone remained.

27. The procedure adopted by Prince Gortchakof was by a despatch of the 31st October, 1870, to inform the Powers who had signed the Treaty of the Straits (1) that the Tsar no longer considered himself bound by the obligations of the treaty of 1856 so far as they limited his rights of sovereignty in the Black Sea; (2) that he believed he was justified in denouncing to the Sultan the special additional convention fixing the number and size of the ships of war which the two riverain States should maintain in the Black Sea. The declaration, that is, applied only to the Black Sea and did not directly affect the passage of ships through the Straits themselves. As is well known, the British Government, insisting on the principle that a single Power could not free itself from its treaty obligations in this way, had the matter brought before a conference which met in London in February 1871. The result of the conference was a convention abrogating the previous treaties so far as they applied to the neutralisation of the Black Sea and the limitation of the ships of war in it. The principle of the closing of the Straits as it had been established by the separate convention of 1856 was maintained, but with the important exception that the Sultan should have the power "to open the Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of 1856."

Attitude of the United States of America.

28. At this stage we may note that from time to time difficulties arose about the recognition by the United States of the Sultan's right to close the Straits. The Government of Washington have never been parties to any of the treaties with Turkey about the passage of ships of war, and they seem deliberately to have refrained from anything which might be interpreted as giving their assent to the principle that Turkey had the right to close the Straits. The nearest approach to this was in 1868: in that year the American Legation at Constantinople applied for permission for Admiral Faragut to pass in his flagship through the Dardanelles to Constantinople, and in making the request observed that America had no princes of the royal blood, but that Admiral Faragut, on account of his high standing and rank in his country, might be considered as such. The request was supported by the Russian Ambassador, who "did all in his power to make it appear that the British Ambassador was the principal obstacle which prevented the Porte from granting an act of courtesy which would be highly appreciated by the American people." The request was refused by the Porte. In the course of conversation—

"The American Minister at first argued that as the United States Government was no party to the treaty of 1856 it was not bound by it, but, on the Turkish Minister maintaining that inasmuch as the treaty was officially communicated to the American Government and that it did not protest against it at the time it was equivalent to an acceptance of it, the American Minister recognised the principle of closing the Straits as established by treaty, and stated that his application in favour of Admiral Faragut was an entirely exceptional one."

It seems, however, doubtful whether the American Minister would have been supported by his Government in using this language. The position of the United States(1) was carefully to refrain from recognising the right, while acquiescing in it in fact. In 1868 a resolution of Congress urged the Government to procure "the perfect freedom of navigation through the Straits to all classes of vessels." No action was taken on this, but in 1871 the President explained that, while he was "not disposed prematurely to raise any question to disturb the existing control which Turkey claims over the Straits leading into the Euxine," he deemed it "important to avoid recognising it as a right under the Law of Nations."

"The Black Sea, like the Baltic, is a vast expanse of waters which wash the shores not only of Turkish territory but those of another Great Power, who may in times of peace at least expect visits from men-of-war of friendly States. It seems unfair that any such claim as that of Turkey should be set up as a bar to such an intercourse, or that the privilege should in any way be subject to her suffrance. There is no practical question making it necessary at present to discuss the subject, but should occasion arise when you are called upon to refer to it, you will bear in mind the distinction taken above, and be cautious to go no further than to recognise the exclusion of the vessels as a usage."

And again,

"The proper occasion may arise for us to dispute the applicability of the claim to United States men-of-war. Meanwhile, it is deemed expedient to acquiesce in the exclusion."

The Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin.

29. During the following years interest was directed rather to the land possessions of the Sultan, to the endeavours of the Bulgarians and Serbians to attain freedom and independence, and even at the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, comparatively little discussion took place on the more limited question of the Straits. While the Russian army advanced on Constantinople, no attempt seems to have been made by the navy to force the Bosphorus. During the period of profound tension at the end of the war, the British fleet was sent to Besika Bay, and notwithstanding the protest of the Porte, sailed through the Dardaneiles, and for six months was stationed in the Sea of Marmora. The Treaty of St. Stefano did not contain any clauses dealing with the passage of warships through the Straits, and the final Treaty of Berlin merely re-enacts the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of London.

30. It appears, however, that Lord Salisbury, who succeeded Lord Derby as Foreign Secretary in April 1878, was even at that time disposed to give up the traditional policy of closing the Straits. In a letter to Lord Beaconsfield of March 1878, he enumerates as one of the objects to be obtained, "effective securities for the free passage of the Straits at all times as if they were an open sea." He would be glad "if the Straits could be declared as open as the Sound," and suggested that they should either be neutralised and their fortification forbidden, or that the right to blockade them in time of war should be recognised and freed from international impediments. And again, in June, after referring to the objections which used to be urged against throwing open the Straits altogether, he says: "The exclusion of Russia from the Mediterranean is not so great a gain to us as the loss resulting from our exclusion from the Black Sea, because we are much the strongest as a naval Power."(2) We could not have a more complete repudiation of the view taken by the Duke of Wellington. The change of attitude is easily explicable by the altered circumstances. There was no longer cause to fear the effect of a Russian

(1) J. B. Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. I, pp. 664-668.
(2) "Life of Lord Salisbury," Vol. II, pp. 214, 291.

fleet appearing in the Mediterranean, and the experience gained during the Crimean war had shown how important it might be at any time to have free access to the Black Sea.

31. The fact that he held this view is the explanation of a well-known episode at the Congress of Berlin. Before signing the treaty, Lord Salisbury, on behalf of the British Government, handed in a protocol :—

> "Considering that the Treaty of Berlin will modify an important part of the arrangements sanctioned by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and that the interpretation of article 2 of the Treaty of London, which is dependent on the Treaty of Paris, may thus become a matter of dispute, I declare on behalf of England that the obligations of Her Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the Straits do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determinations in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties."

At the next meeting Count Shuvalof presented a counter protocol :—

> "The plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able exactly to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of the second plenipotentiary of Great Britain respecting the closing of the Straits, restrict themselves to demanding, on their part, the insertion in the protocol of the observation: that in their opinion the principle of the closing of the Straits is a European principle, and that the stipulations concluded in this respect in 1841, 1856 and 1871, confirmed at present by the Treaty of Berlin, are binding on the part of all the Powers, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the existing treaties, not only as regards the Sultan but also as regards all the Powers signatory to these transactions."

An explanation of the action which he then took was given by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, when in 1885 war seemed imminent between Great Britain and Russia :—

> "The object of the declaration which I had to make on behalf of her Majesty's Government, I understood to be to establish the principle that our engagements in respect of the Dardanelles were not engagements of a general European or international character, but were engagements towards the Sultan only; the practical bearing of that reservation being that if, in any circumstances, the Sultan should not be acting independently, but under pressure from some other Power, there would be no international obligation on our part to abstain from passing through the Dardanelles."

Whatever importance may be given to these practical reasons, it seems very difficult to justify the legal interpretation given to our engagements. It is perhaps the less necessary to do so because at a later date, as we shall see, the British and Russian Governments each took up a position precisely opposed to that which they had taken on this occasion.

1878–1908.

32. During the thirty years from 1878 to 1908 the position as defined by treaty remained unchanged, but the real situation was in many ways greatly altered. In the first place, we must note the establishment of Roumania, and later of Bulgaria, as fully sovereign States, on the shores of the Black Sea, so that navigation there could no longer be regarded, as it had been in the past, as a matter affecting only Russia and Turkey. Secondly, the opening of the Suez Canal, followed as it was by the occupation first of Cyprus and then of Egypt by British forces, changed the naval situation in the Levant. As we have seen, Egypt and the Straits must always be considered together, and from the Russian point of view these events constituted a serious change in the balance of power, for which they might well claim some compensation. Thirdly, the relations of Great Britain and Turkey were becoming less friendly, and this necessarily made the system established in 1841 much less favourable. Fourthly, so long as Bismarck remained in office it was the established principle of German policy that they would not oppose Russian ambitions in regard to the Straits, not even as to the possession of Constantinople.

33. The third point is illustrated by the events of 1885. When the Russian advance in Central Asia made war imminent between Russia and Great Britain, it was obvious that it would be to the English interest to use their maritime power in order to attack Russia in the Black Sea; it was here that India must be defended, but

if Turkey maintained neutrality, the Straits would be closed to the British fleet. It seems to have been anticipated in the Chancelleries of Europe, therefore, that in case of war, the British Government would disregard the treaties and violate Turkish neutrality: Bismarck at once set to work with great energy to arrange a European coalition for the protection of the neutrality of Turkey against England. In this he had the support, not only of Russia and Austria, but also of France. The Sultan went so far as to make the enquiry whether—

> "If English ships were to appear before the Dardanelles the neutral Powers would not also send ships there in order to support Turkey in the maintenance of its treaty right to close the Straits, and by their appearance, to stop the English attack."(9)

It is not apparent how far this action of his was known here; the important thing is that had war in fact broken out, we should have been placed in a most dangerous situation, and been confronted by something like a European coalition. It is from about this time that Turkey began to give more attention to the defences both of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which hitherto had been neglected.

34. Meanwhile new and serious difficulties arose as to the enforcement of the existing treaties. These were ultimately caused by the opening of the Suez Canal. As soon as this took place it obviously was most desirable for the Russian Government that it should be able to send out both ships of war, military and naval stores and reinforcements of troops to the Far East by this route. It appeared an intolerable situation that they should still have to depend entirely on the naval ports in the Baltic for this purpose. As the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople said in 1882 to Lord Dufferin :—

> "It was impossible that Russia should consent to be shut up in the Black Sea inasmuch as the opening of the Suez Canal had completely altered the aspect of the case and rendered it absolutely necessary for Russia to insist upon an immediate transit from the Black Sea to her Pacific possessions."

The Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which a few years before had been inferior to that of Turkey, was in consequence strengthened. That about which the Russians were immediately concerned was not so much the passage of ships of war, as of vessels belonging to the so-called volunteer fleet,(10) which they wished to use for conveying troops and stores from Odessa; they also claimed that transports carrying soldiers should not be prohibited. On this two points arose; first an interpretation of the treaties; did the exclusion of warships exclude ships which, while flying the merchant flag, were in fact being used as transports; arising out of this was the question how far Turkey should exercise the right of search in order to assure herself that the firman given to an avowedly merchant ship was not being misused.(11) Secondly, there was the point whether the right of interpreting the treaties rested with Turkey alone. These points were the subject of correspondence extending over many years, but it does not appear that a final settlement was arrived at on any of the matters at issue. The British Government seems on the whole to have adopted a waiting attitude; cases where the passage of either a warship or a transport were admitted were constantly reported to them, but on the whole they seem to have confined their action to warning the Porte that equality of treatment must be granted to all Powers alike.

35. From time to time there were rather desultory conversations with other Powers about the general question, but no clear determination was arrived at. In 1896, Lord Salisbury wrote to Sir F. Lascelles :—

(9) The correspondence which has been published in Germany, "Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinetto, 1871–1914," Vol. IV, pp. 111, &c., is of great interest.

(10) "The Russian Volunteer Navy was established during the Russo-Turkish war, 1877–1878, at the instance of a patriotic association, when hostilities with Great Britain seemed imminent. The ships of this fleet carry the mercantile flag in time of peace and may engage in commerce, though they are usually employed in the public service as transports between the Black Sea and the Russian possessions in the Far East. Their crews are subject to naval discipline and training, and the two principal officers of each vessel are commissioned by the Government. In 1900 they took part in the Chinese expedition despatched by the Powers as a result of the revolt of the Boxers." (Phillipson and Buxton—"The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles," p. 170.)

(11) It may be convenient to note a difference as to the procedure observed with regard to the passage of merchant ships on the one hand, and ships of war and vessels belonging to the Volunteer Fleet on the other. The latter had in each case to receive an *iradé*, which is in the nature of a personal expression of the sovereign will of the Sultan; merchant vessels required only a firman which could be issued by subordinate officials who were merely carrying out general regulations contained in an *iradé* which had already been issued.

"Our view is and has been for some time past in favour of opening the Straits to all nations. The opening of the Dardanelles alone would be a less complete and satisfactory arrangement, but it would be acceptable to His Majesty's Government"

But the next year, when he was consulted by the Austrian Ambassador as to the policy to be pursued for the protection of the Straits against any enterprise on the part of Russia, he answered:

"Owing to the change which had taken place in British public opinion towards Turkey, the altered attitude of the Porte and the increased fortification of the Dardanelles, His Majesty's Government were unable to pledge themselves to any specific course of action, and their policy must depend upon the course which events might take and the circumstances in which the question might present itself."

In 1897 when difficulties arose about Armenia, the closing of the Straits became very inconvenient, for it prevented the British Government using the fleet to support its policy in the Black Sea. On this occasion, however, the Porte permitted the strengthening of the guard-ships at Constantinople to all the signatory Powers, in order that they might protect the Christians of that city against the disturbances which were anticipated.

The Russo-Japanese War.

36. With the outbreak of war in Russia and Japan in 1904, these problems suddenly assumed the most urgent importance and in consequence of her alliance with Japan, Great Britain was especially interested. It was necessary to face the question what should be done if, contrary to expectation, the Black Sea fleet actually sailed through the Straits in order to join the Baltic fleet on its adventurous journey to the Yellow Sea. Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne agreed that if they did so we were under a moral obligation not to allow the fleet to sail through the Suez Canal, and that for this purpose it would be necessary to have a superior British naval force in the Levant. The question was discussed in what way the necessary warning could be sent to the Russians, but in fact the Russian Government no doubt well understood the situation, and there is no evidence that they ever proposed to send out the Black Sea fleet. A difficult case arose when two vessels belonging to the Russian Volunteer fleet sailed out through the Straits and the Suez Canal disguised as merchantmen. After entering the Red Sea, however, they assumed the character of ships of war and seized several vessels, including a British steamer, on the charge that they were carrying contraband:

"The British Government protested against the act and declared that if the capturing vessels were commissioned warships, Russia had violated the treaties relative to the Straits in failing to obtain the necessary authorisation for the passage, but if they were merchantmen, she had infringed a fundamental principle of international law which restricts belligerent operations to lawfully-commissioned warships. Thereupon the commissions of the two vessels were revoked and reparation was eventually made."

The conditions attached by the Porte to the transit of transports was of such a nature that the Russian Government was not able to comply with them.

37. It is not proposed here to discuss the legal problem of what for the purposes of the Straits Convention constituted a "ship of war," but no one can read the correspondence which took place without realising how intolerable the situation must have been to the Russians. They were engaged in a great war, on the result of which their whole position in the Far East depended; they had a considerable fleet in the Black Sea, and in addition, the Port of Odessa was their largest and most convenient depot from which stores and reinforcements could be despatched. They found themselves, however, in the position, that they could not freely use these resources and had to depend chiefly on their Baltic establishments, the use of which involved not only a long additional sea voyage, but also the transport of goods and men from the south to the north of Russia. We cannot, therefore, be surprised if, after peace had been made, the efforts of Russian diplomacy were once more concentrated on solving the question of the Straits in a sense favourable to themselves.

The Entente.

38. The signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907 naturally had a great effect on Russian policy in the Near East, all the more that it was immediately followed by the outbreak of the Turkish revolution, which, among its consequences, involved a reopening of the Eastern question, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, the war between Turkey and Tripoli, and the Balkan war of 1912. The fact that Russia was in alliance with France, and now for the first time in close friendship with Great Britain, inevitably raised hopes that the maritime Powers would withdraw the opposition which had for so long impeded the attainment of Russian ambitions. These ambitions were, in the first place, the opening of the Straits to Russian ships of war (and they hoped to secure this without at the same time giving access to the Black Sea to the ships of other nations); secondly, supposing, as became year by year more probable, the Turks were to be expelled from Europe, the acquisition in some form or another of Constantinople, the zone of the Bosphorus, and of the Dardanelles.

39. In the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 no reference was made to the question of the Straits, and it does not appear to have been discussed in the Reval interview of 1908. The British Government had, however, been warned that Russia would use the favourable opportunity to ask for some modification of restrictions which recent events had shown were extremely inconvenient to them. The question, therefore, arose and was considered, what attitude His Majesty's Government should take if any such request were made. There were two points for consideration: (1) a naval question; (2) the interpretation of the existing treaties.

(1.) The naval question was referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the question was asked "what difference would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia were to obtain, through possession of Constantinople, free egress from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, this remaining closed, as at present, against other Powers? The answer unanimously accepted was that "while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean." It will be observed that the answer is very carefully restricted and only deals with the naval position as it was in the unusual collocation of the time, and naturally does not imply that the opening of the Straits would not have serious strategical importance in the future. So far as it goes, however, this clearly gave freedom to the political handling of the question.

(2.) A second point necessarily arose as to the diplomatic procedure which should be adopted if His Majesty's Government were disposed to withdraw their opposition to the egress of the Russian fleet. In this connection, the statement made by Lord Salisbury at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 became important. According to the doctrine which he there laid down, "the obligations of His Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the Straits did not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determinations in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties." This appears to mean that on this matter there were no treaty engagements to the other European States and, therefore, it would be open to His Majesty's Government, if the Sultan of his own free will declared his intention to permit the Russian fleet to pass through, simply to express their approval of this course; no alteration in existing treaties would be required. If, then, the other States of Europe took up the same view, all that would be necessary would be that the Russian Government should persuade the Sultan to take this course, agree with each State signatory to the Treaty of 1878, not to raise any objections, and the thing would be done.

40. Curiously enough, however, the statement made by Count Shuvalof might appear definitely to have debarred the Russian Government from accepting this view. They had declared that in their view "the stipulations concluded in 1841, 1856, 1871, confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, are binding on the part of all the Powers . . . . ., not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers signatory to these restrictions." This means that the signatory Powers were bound not only to the Sultan, but also to one another, and they could not free themselves from these mutual obligations except by a joint protocol or treaty, the framing of which would obviously require a special conference for the purpose.

41. From subsequent negotiations it appears that Sir Edward Grey and the Cabinet were not prepared to act in accordance with the opinion given above; while the Russian Government, ignoring their previous declaration, contended that they

could settle the matter by separate negotiations with Turkey, Sir Edward Grey was generally inclined to oppose this view, to maintain that it was a European question and that, though the British Government was prepared to alter its attitude with regard to the material question, it still must come before the Powers as a whole. The whole transaction is a curious illustration of the manner in which the views taken by States of their treaty obligations may change with circumstances.

M. Isvolsky and the Annexation Crisis.

42. Immediately after the outbreak of the revolution in Turkey in July 1908 we find M. Isvolsky, who was then Foreign Minister, taking up the matter with great energy. This was the chief object of the journey which he took round Europe in the autumn. He seems to have prepared the way by an *aide-mémoire* of the 2nd July, which was laid before the Cabinet of Vienna, in which he intimated that while both the annexation (of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and also the question of Constantinople, the adjoining territory of the Straits, was a European matter, he was prepared to enter into conversations on it with the Austrian Government. Count Aehrenthal, while expressing general agreement, put forward two conditions: first, that the other riverain States of the Black Sea—Roumania and Bulgaria—should have the same right for their vessels of war as Russia; secondly, he required guarantees for the security of Constantinople against an attack by a Russian fleet entering the Bosphorus. He suggested as the natural model of the new arrangement the international treaties on the Suez Canal, but would add a provision that only one ship of each nation might pass through the Straits each twenty-four hours.

43. During all the subsequent negotiations we find constant reference to the Suez Canal Convention; it was suggested that the regulations contained in it for the passage of ships of war would be a convenient model for a new Straits Convention. But language is often used which seems to imply that there was some restriction on the number of warships belonging to any one Power that could pass through the canal at the same time. This seems to be a misapprehension; there is no such provision. In time of peace the canal is open to ships of all nations, whether of commerce or of war, without restriction. The only special regulations as to warships refer to ships of belligerents during the time of war; this article reads as follows:—

"Article 4.—The maritime canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of article 1 of the present treaty, the high contracting parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the canal, shall be committed in the canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

"Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

"Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power."

In truth there is little analogy between the Suez Canal and the Straits. The great difficulty about the Straits is that they give access to Constantinople, and in consequence it would be possible, if there were free and unrestricted use of them by ships of war, for any nation in time of peace to accumulate a fleet in the Sea of Marmora and then make a sudden attack on the city. The canal is far removed from all the vital parts of Egypt, so that this point naturally does not arise. We may also note that, so far as this country is concerned, circumstances are completely different, for the obvious reason that the British navy controls access to both ends of the Suez Canal, while, in case of war with Russia, a British fleet passing through the Straits into the Black Sea would, on emerging, find itself in what we may call enemy country.

44. On the 5th September, Isvolsky had a conversation with Tittoni, and immediately afterwards, with Herr von Schoen, the German Foreign Secretary, who in a general way was informed of what was going on and expressed his approval. On the 15th September he met Aehrenthal at Buchlau. No formal written note of

the conversation was made, but there was a general agreement that Russia should support the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina while Austria would give Isvolsky a free hand in the Dardanelles. Austria-Hungary did not accept the offer of the Sanjak which Isvolsky made, but, on the other hand, Isvolsky undertook not to seize Constantinople or any territory in its neighbourhood. Russian ships of war were to have the permission to pass the Dardanelles singly, but not in squadrons. The whole matter was eventually to be regulated by a European Conference.

45. It was Isvolsky's belief that matters would not be hurried, and that he would have an opportunity of discussing his projects with France and England, and with this object he pursued his journey to Paris. As is well known, Aehrenthal, proceeded to immediate action, and the annexation of the two provinces was announced on the 6th October. This was extremely inconvenient to Isvolsky, who had hoped that, having come to an understanding with Austria (and through Austria with Germany), he would then assure himself of French support, and, finally, be able to put his request before the British Government under such conditions that it would be very difficult for them to refuse. The hasty action of Aehrenthal upset the whole plan; his hopes were disappointed; he was compelled to give an explanation of his activities, which caused Sir F. Bertie to say: "I have the impression, I may say the conviction, that he did not quite tell me the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

46. At the beginning of October he came to London and raised the question in conversation with Sir Edward Grey. The procedure he put forward was now altered; he did not propose to bring the Straits before the European Conference, which, at the time, was in contemplation. He wished it to be the subject of separate conversations between Russia and Turkey; what he asked was that, if he came to an agreement with Turkey, the British Government would not raise any opposition. In doing so he used language which was clearly meant to indicate that the future of the *Entente* would depend upon the answer which he received. The following is Sir Edward Grey's account of a conversation of the 10th October:—

"M. Isvolsky urged very strongly that, if Russia could satisfy Turkey that an arrangement about the Straits was safe for Turkish interests, England should not oppose it. He told me that there had been great opposition in Russia to the Anglo-Russian Convention. He had had to spend great energy in getting it accepted in Russia. All the Liberal and advanced elements in Russia were in favour of an understanding with England; but the reactionary elements were against it and would like to upset the convention. The Emperor was by training and education not on the Liberal side. It was possible to keep him reconciled to reforms in Russia only by proving to him that things were going better; for instance, whereas two years ago there was a state of active revolution, the state of affairs was now much improved. In the same way it would be fatal to a good understanding with England if, when the question of the Straits was raised, it was found that England blocked the way, and that no improvement followed from good relations with England.

"His proposal to Turkey would be that ships of war belonging to the riverain Powers on the Black Sea should have a right of way through the Straits. They would not be allowed to remain in the Straits. There might be regulations that not more than three vessels should go through at a time, and that no other vessels should go through for twenty-four hours after the first. Such regulations would, of course, only apply in times when Turkey was at peace. In time of war, Turkey would be able to do as she pleased.

"In other words, the closing of the Straits would be maintained, subject to a limited servitude of this kind in favour of Russia and the riverain States.

"M. Isvolsky went on to say that the present was a most critical moment. It might either consolidate and strengthen the good relations between England and Russia or it might upset them altogether. His own position was at stake, for he was entirely bound up with the policy of a good understanding with England, which he had advocated against all opposition.

"I asked him to give me a draft of what he proposed with regard to the conference, so that I might have something definite to put before the Cabinet; this he promised to do.

"I said I realised how critical the moment was. We were most anxious to work with Russia. We were in favour of the new régime in Turkey, not in order that we might support Turkey against Russia, but because we regarded an independent and well-governed Turkey as the only alternative to anarchy and confusion.

"M. Isvolsky said the Russian desire now was to be friendly with Turkey. They did not wish to have Constantinople for themselves; it was not a place which could be held like Gibraltar, it had to be made a capital, they could not make it their own capital, and they would not wish to see it in any hands but those of Turkey. Therefore, they wished to have a peaceful and well-governed Turkey, with whom they could be friendly.

"I told him I recognised the Russian feeling about the Straits; but the proposal he had now put before me was not the same as that which Count Benckendorff had discussed with me at the time of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The proposal then had been that, while Russia should have egress from the Black Sea through the Straits, other Powers should have liberty to send their vessels of war into the Straits without going into the Black Sea.

"M. Isvolsky pointed out that, as Russia would not ask for any right to stay in the Straits, it would be useless to grant a right of access to the Straits without staying there and without going on into the Black Sea. But he was not putting the proposal before me now on the ground that I had made any promise previously. He was putting it forward from the point of view of good relations.

"If Russia did not make the proposal now, it might be blocked by Germany or Austria at some future time; and he hoped that if Russia could get the consent of Turkey voluntarily to an arrangement such as he had suggested we would not oppose it.

"I told M. Isvolsky I must have time to consult the Prime Minister and my colleagues, who had seen the proposal made some time ago, but to whom this would be quite new."

47. In a further conversation of the 12th October M. Isvolsky professed to be surprised when Sir Edward Grey made the point that the one-sided opening of the Straits presented objections :—

"The point I had put to him as to Russian cruisers being able to come out from the Straits into the Mediterranean in time of war, and being able to return again into the Straits free from pursuit, had not occurred to him. He thought it might be met by a provision that in time of war when Turkey was neutral, she should observe her neutrality by giving equal facilities for passage through the Straits to all belligerents."

48. The final answer of Sir Edward Grey to these proposals, given on the 14th October after consideration by the Cabinet, was that the opening of the Straits was a reasonable demand which should not be opposed, but that it must be on terms of equality to all States, and that it would not be possible to accept a one-sided agreement by which they would be open to Russian ships alone. With regard to the procedure it was necessary first of all to secure the consent of Turkey, and he informed the Turkish Ambassador that "we should make the voluntary acceptance by Turkey on terms considered by her to be satisfactory, a condition of our agreement to any such proposal." The present moment was inopportune, as clearly the Turkish Government did not desire to have the question raised now, but when the time came, if Russia was able to come to a satisfactory arrangement with Turkey, His Majesty's Government would not oppose it. The papers dealing with this very important decision are printed in the annex.

49. In the end nothing was done; the discussions passed off to the Serbian question, and the matter for the time was allowed to drop. M. Isvolsky himself left office a few months later and became Russian Ambassador at Paris.

1911 *to* 1914.

50. Though the matter dropped for the time, it continued to be the subject of correspondence between the Russian Foreign Office and Russian representatives abroad, and naturally came up again in consequence of the war between Turkey and Italy (1911) and the Balkan War (1912–13). It would take too long to give any connected account of the discussions, and there are many points which still remain obscure.(13) We note that M Isvolsky constantly pressed the importance of the matter on the French Government. In October 1911, he wrote pointing out that "if we now

(13) Our chief authority for these events, in addition to the archives of the Foreign Office, are the recent publications from the Russian archives: "Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre," by R. von Siebert; "Un Livre noir—Diplomatie d'avant-guerre d'après les Documents des Archives russes. Novembre 1910-Juillet 1914." I have not been able to get access to Hoschiller's "L'Europe devant Constantinople," which appears to contain important Russian documents.

decide definitely to raise the question of the Straits, it is very important to secure a good press here." For this purpose he must have more money. And a month later he explains to M. Louis, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Russia desires to maintain as long as possible the existence of the Turkish Empire, but "on condition that we are freed from old restrictions incompatible with our interests and our dignity." And if an understanding with Turkey proves impossible, or there is a liquidation of Turkish dominion in Europe, "naturally our point of view as to the Straits would change. Just as France has declared that she could not admit the establishment of any foreign Power whatsoever in Morocco, we are obliged on our side to warn France that Russia cannot admit the passage of the Straits in any but Russian hands." They expected French support on this matter as a return for Russian support on Morocco.

51. At this time (November 1911), M. Tcharykof, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, was bringing strong pressure to bear upon Turkey to come to a separate agreement with Russia. The great difficulty, however, was to get England to advance beyond the memorandum of 1908, which was not regarded as satisfactory. On the 2nd November, M. Sazonof wrote to Count Benckendorff :—

"It appears desirable to us to use the present political situation in order to cause the French and English Governments to declare in a quite concrete and indeed in written form, their point of view on the question of the Straits, and to do this exclusively towards us, independently of the arrangements which we might eventually make with Turkey. As regards England especially, it is to be observed from your reports, we believe that we can conclude that Grey will make his consent depend on a previous agreement with Turkey. To us a condition of that kind is not quite comprehensible, for apart from the fact that it gives England a new guarantee as regards an arrangement which might perhaps be inconvenient to England, this implies for Turkey a new ground for objections. We do not unconditionally wish to solve the question of the Straits immediately, but to determine the conditions under which this question can be solved. We hope, therefore, that England within these limits, will be able to give her point of view in quite definitely written form, and if you believe that this would form an advance on the memorandum of 1908, we would ask you to discuss the matter with the English Ministers."

And Count Benckendorff answered :—

"I will try to get a result which is an advance on the memorandum of 1908, although it is always difficult to move the English Government to general obligations which refer to future eventualities."

And again :—

"Our object is free transport in both directions; so far as this goes I see no serious difficulty, but to change the Black Sea in time of war into a great harbour of refuge for the Russian fleet, is another question; on this point difficulties would arise."

52. The Turkish Government, which was being pressed by M. Tcharykof, naturally turned for advice to this country, and on the 5th December the following *aide-mémoire* was communicated by the Embassy here :

"Russia has proposed to the Imperal Government an understanding to ensure, the one to the other, the free passage of the Straits, to the exclusion, of course, of the warships of all other Powers.

"Russia would engage to defend the Straits in conjunction with Turkey in the event of their being attacked by a force of a foreign Power, to assure Turkey of her co-operation in the execution of railway projects in Asia Minor, and to act as an intermediary for the realisation of an *entente* with the Balkan States.

"The Imperial Government would naturally take as a basis of negotiation the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1878, regulating the position of the Straits; but in view of Sir E. Grey's statement in the House of Commons intimating the decision of His Majesty's Government to abstain from all intervention as long as English interests are not threatened, they would wish to know clearly and precisely whether the Foreign Office consider that those interests are threatened by the advantages which Russia desires to secure to herself by the conclusion of a new arrangement as to the position of the Straits."

The answer, which was given verbally, was—

"that the free passage of commercial ships through the Dardanelles was a thing in which we were all interested, and which we all desired to see preserved; we therefore could not have any objection to an arrangement with Russia that would secure this free passage. As to opening the Straits to ships of war, I had promised M. Isvolsky in 1908 that we would not oppose the raising of this question, if Russia wished to raise it. But, in so far as this opening would require an alteration of treaties, it was a question which must be discussed with the Powers who were parties to the treaties."

This was, in effect, a refusal to accept the Russian proposals for settling the matter by separate conversations with Turkey. The negotiations were, therefore, for the time broken off.

53. The Russians, however, during the following years brought another motive to bear. They represented the value which it would be to the *Entente* if they could depend in case of war on the support of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. In June 1912, M Poincaré is represented by M. Isvolsky as saying that—

"he considers as altogether desirable from the point of view of general policy, and in view of the new situation in the Mediterranean, that France and England should open the exit of the Black Sea to the Russian naval forces, and that he is ready, when the occasion presents itself, to support us with all his efforts for the solution of this question."

This was clearly in the minds of the Russian Government when they concluded in 1912 a naval agreement with France; and in 1914 proposed one with Great Britain.

54. Meanwhile, serious events were happening in the Balkans. When, in consequence of the Balkan Alliance, it appeared that danger might eventually arise as to the safety of Constantinople itself, the Russians put forward the suggestion that they should give a guarantee of the safety of the city against the Balkan allies; when the Bulgarian army was actually threatening Constantinople, the Russian Government said that if Bulgarian troops entered the city, the Russian fleet would at once be sent into the Bosphorus; they would not object to the presence of the ships of other nations there, but the Russian fleet would remain until all the others had been withdrawn. The check of the Bulgarian army on the Chatalja lines removed the immediate danger to Constantinople, and for the moment European discussion was again concentrated on the Serbian question.

55. A letter from M. Sazonof to M. Isvolsky of the 28th November, 1912, (13) gives a valuable indication as to Russian policy. They had had to observe "a certain reserve towards English proposals to discuss the question on an eventual internationalisation of Constantinople and new guarantees for the régime of the Straits." The reason for this is important. "In our view the fundamental interests of Russia in the Straits cannot be protected by any treaty guarantees and clauses, for these can always be circumvented, but we must always consider what actual power is really in a condition to secure a given régime of the Straits from attack from any source." This means that they would not accept neutralisation or internationalisation, but, if any change was to be made, would be satisfied with nothing less than the actual physical control in their own hands. Again, he would not deal with Austria from the point of view of an arrangement or compensation; he rejected the suggestion (which Isvolsky had adopted in 1908) of making a bargain by which "Russia should declare herself disinterested with regard to the western part of the Balkan peninsula, while Austria should give us complete freedom of action in Constantinople." "This would be injurious to the interests of the Balkan States." Short of any more satisfactory final solution, "the most practical course seems to us to be to deal with this question of the Straits as in 1908, that is, to empower the riverain States of the Black Sea, under certain conditions which would guarantee the security of Constantinople, to allow their ships of war to pass in and out in time of peace." And in another letter of the 1st May, he rejects suggestions for financial proposals, the practical result of which would be that Turkish armaments would be limited and thereby the defence of Constantinople and the Straits imperilled. The Russian Government at this time showed great anxiety when they heard of any proposal for the increase of the Turkish fleet of such a kind that it would imperil Russian predominance in the Black Sea.

56. In truth, by the end of 1913 the situation as regards the Straits had completely changed and the Russian Government was rapidly becoming convinced that they must give up the passive and expectant attitude which, with few exceptions,

(13) "Siebert," p. 687

they had observed for a hundred years; the time seemed to be approaching when, if they were not to lose the reversion of Constantinople, they must act, and act quickly. In the past they had had to do with a Turkey, decrepit, irresolute, influenced only by fear, a Turkey which would at any time be an easy prey. This was gone. If Turkey were to survive, it would be a new Turkey, animated by positive ambitions, national, racial, religious—a Turkey which under Enver Bey was adopting the Western conception of Turkish nationalism, was already conceiving the idea of the solidarity of the Turanian race, and at the same time making itself the champion of the Mussulman revival. If, on the other hand—and this was perhaps more probable—Turkey were to fall for ever, there were now rival claimants in the field—Bulgaria and Greece. But this was not all. A new and more formidable competitor had appeared; Germany was once more strengthening her control over Constantinople which had for a short time after the revolution been shaken, but a German protectorate over Turkey, combined with commercial and political activities in Asia Minor, threatened to present a permanent barrier to the achievement of the national aspirations of Russia. These apprehensions were brought to a head when in the winter of 1913, General Liman von Sandars was appointed to command the first Turkish army corps in Constantinople itself. A very serious crisis followed; it was for the moment overcome, but it was not forgotten, and we cannot be surprised that the Russian Government began to take active measures in order to be ready, when the moment came, to possess themselves of Constantinople and the Straits.

57. In November 1913, a memorandum concerning the Straits was drawn up by Basili, Vice-Director of the Chancery of the Minister for Foreign Affairs; it was laid before the Tsar by M. Sazonof, received his approval and at the beginning of March 1914, considered by a special conference at which were present many of the chief political military and naval advisers. This memorandum and the records of the conference which have been published by the present Russian Government, afford valuable indications as to the conceptions by which the Russian Government was being influenced. The main consideration was that, as Sazonof said, "if by force of events the Straits should be withdrawn from the dominion of Turkey, Russia could not allow any other Power to establish itself on their shores, and, therefore, perhaps, might be compelled to take possession of the Straits and to determine the arrangements for the control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. . . . . Our historical task in reference to the Straits consists in the extension of our dominion over them." Control over the Bosphorus alone would not be sufficient. Simple neutralisation would not be satisfactory, for there would be no security against its violation, and therefore it would neither guarantee the exit of the Russian fleet from the Black Sea, nor the closing of the entrance against a hostile Power. It was agreed that the main object would not be secured except as the result of a general European war. In such an event the fleet of the Triple Alliance would be held in check by the English and French navies; no support could be expected from Greece: "the dream of Constantinople will probably be a hindrance to a closer approach between us and Greece," but Greece and Bulgaria would probably take opposite sides; Serbia would be fully occupied with Austria. The conference therefore proceeded to a discussion of the military and naval preparations which would be necessary in order, in the event of a general war, to seize Constantinople. Among other measures it was recommended that the Black Sea fleet be strengthened as soon as possible by a strong brigade of modern dreadnoughts.

58. If we are to understand the situation just before the outbreak of war, we must always recollect that for Russia the question of the Straits was predominant; to this the interest in Serbia, though it occupied a much larger part in public controversy, was subordinate. In the past the main opposition had always come from France and England; Germany had been favourable. Now the situation was changed and it was becoming more and more clear that the road to Constantinople lay through Berlin If we keep this in mind we shall not be surprised to find that from the very moment that war broke out the Russians began to show extreme anxiety as to the future of Constantinople; when the Gallipoli expedition was proposed, they at once came forward with the demand that the zones of both Straits should be assigned to Russia, and at the beginning of 1915 secured from Great Britain and France a formal acknowledgment of their claim.(14)

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY.
Historical Adviser.

November 7, 1922.

(14) These events have been dealt with in a separate memorandum "on the Russo-British Agreement of 1915 as to the future of Constantinople and the Straits" (E 10696/27/44)

ANNEX.

(I.)

Memorandum by Sir E. Grey.

(Secret.)

I GAVE M. Isvolsky to read a setting forth of what the Cabinet had authorised me to say to him about the Straits.

After reading it, he said he looked upon it as a carefully considered decision, and, although it did not give all he had hoped for, he would accept it.

I told him that the Turkish Government were most anxious not to have the question raised now. The Turkish Ambassador had of himself quite spontaneously developed the same arguments as to inopportuneness which I had used.

I had impressed upon the Turks that some opening of the Straits was essential, in the long run, to good relations between Turkey and Russia, and that I believed Russia desired good relations.

It would be possible for me, at a suitable moment later on, to advise that the Turks should consider an agreement with Russia on the lines which had been indicated. But I could not do this now, when the Turks themselves had pleaded that, though they might be willing to consider the opening of the Straits later on, they ought not to be pressed at the present time.

I assured M. Isvolsky of my own personal desire to get the question settled, because I felt it was essential to the maintenance of good relations between Russia and Turkey and between Russia and us. But the time for a settlement must be chosen carefully.

E. G.

October 14, 1908.

(II.)

Enclosure in Foreign Office despatch No. 319 Secret.

Memorandum.

(Secret.)

His Majesty's Government agree that the opening of the Straits is fair and reasonable, and in principle they will not oppose it.

If the proposal made was that the Straits should be open on terms of perfect equality to all, the proposal would be one to which no exception could be taken.

The difficulty arises from the proposal to give Russia and the riverain Powers an exclusive, though limited, right. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that the time is very inopportune for securing general assent to such an arrangement.

Feeling in England has very much resented the action of Austria; it would be greatly disappointed if Russia, after protesting against Austrian action, apparently used the occasion to secure an advantage for herself which had any appearance of prejudice to the position of Turkey or altered the *status quo* to the disadvantage of others.

If, on the other hand, there is cordial co-operation between Russia and England to overcome present difficulties on disinterested lines, the good effect on public opinion here would be very marked and would predispose it to a change about the Straits in a sense favourable to Russia.

His Majesty's Government, however, agreeing in principle that some opening of the Straits is reasonable, cannot refuse to discuss the question.

They feel that a purely one-sided arrangement, which would give the Black Sea Powers in time of war the advantage of having the whole of the Black Sea as an inviolable harbour from which cruisers and commerce destroyers could issue and retire at will, free from pursuit by a belligerent, is not one for which public opinion in England is prepared or which it would be induced to accept.

Any arrangement, therefore, must be one which, while giving Russia and the riverain Powers egress at all times under some such limited conditions as M. Isvolsky has indicated, and securing them from menace or the establishment of foreign naval Power in the Black Sea in time of Peace, would yet contain such an element of reciprocity as would in the eventuality of war, place belligerents on an equal footing with regard to the passage of the Straits.

His Majesty's Government would further observe that the consent of Turkey would be a necessary preliminary to any proposal. To put pressure upon Turkey at this moment to make an arrangement which she might regard, however unreasonably, as a menace to her interests would defeat what we believe is the joint object of England and Russia, viz., to prevent the overthrow of the present Turkish Government, and the confusion and anarchy which would probably result.

(III.)

Sir E. Grey to M. Isvolsky.

(Private. Confidential.)

Dear M. Isvolsky, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1908.

My own personal opinion cannot increase or diminish the force of the official statement which I have made. But, as in the course of our conversations I have dwelt much upon the difficulty of settling the question of the Straits at the present moment, I should like before you leave to repeat that my motive in doing so has not been a desire to keep the Straits closed. On the contrary, I positively desire to see an arrangement made which will open the Straits on terms which would be acceptable to Russia and to the riverain States of the Black Sea, while not placing Turkey or outside Powers at an unfair disadvantage. Some such arrangement seems to me essential to the permanent establishment of good-will between Russia and ourselves.

I also attach much importance to what you have said to me to the effect that Russia desires now to be on friendly terms with Turkey, and that the opening of the Straits would remove a bar to cordial relations between the two countries. I believe that the course of events will make the truth of this felt. At a favourable time I should be ready to support this view at Constantinople; for the moment, however, Turkey, who is beset by sudden troubles, has asked that no pressure should be applied to her to do now reluctantly what she might do willingly later on. And I believe that feeling both at Constantinople and in England will be so favourably affected by a disinterested co-operation between Russia and England to pull Turkey through the present crisis that this will do more than anything else to prepare the way for dealing with the question of the Straits later on, a state of feeling which I shall welcome.

Yours sincerely,
E. GREY.

[**E 12762/10102/44**] No. 575.

Sir E. Drummond to Mr. Tufton.—(Received November 16.)

My dear Charles, *League of Nations, Geneva, November* 8, 1922.

I ENCLOSE a short memorandum about the sanitary questions which will have to be considered in any peace treaty which is drawn up between Turkey and the Allied Powers.

You will see that the suggestion is that the small sub-committee of experts which has been considering the question of the revision of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912 might be placed at the disposal of the conference in order to give expert advice with regard to the drafting of the necessary clauses.

Sir G. Buchanan is a member of this sub-committee, and if the Foreign Office consider—as I hope they will—that the question is worth serious consideration, he could give any further explanations that may be required.

I understand that a similar suggestion may also be made to the French Government.

Yours ever,
ERIC DRUMMOND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 575.

Memorandum.

THE Peace Conference at Lausanne will have to consider the establishment of an international sanitary authority which would be entrusted with the sanitary control of the Black Sea and the Straits. This body when constituted might further exercise its

functions over all the ports belonging to Turkey, including the Turkish ports in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It will be necessary also to make provision in the peace treaty for protective sanitary measures in connection with pilgrimages, and particularly on the Hedjaz Railway at a point as near as possible to the Holy Places.

These questions have been the subject of a study by the Health Organisation of the League of Nations, which, with the approval of the council, despatched an expert commission this year to the Near East to enquire into international arrangements regarding epidemic disease prevention in certain areas of the Near East and in connection with the Mecca pilgrimages

This commission has drafted proposals of modification of the second, third and fourth parts of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912. The draft proposals have been submitted to the examination of the Office international d'Hygiène publique, and have obtained their approval.

The understanding arrived at between the Near Eastern Commission of the Health Organisation of the League and the Office international has allowed the annexed memorandum to be drafted by a special sub-committee of the Health Organisation of the League, in which the main recommendations are summarised. The memorandum is signed by Professor Th. Madsen and Sir George Buchanan, chairman and vice-chairman of the Health Committee of the League, and by M O. Velghe, president of the Office international d'Hygiène publique of Paris, as members of a special sub-committee appointed for the purpose.

This expert sub-committee, to which could be added experts of other nationalities, such as, for instance, Italian and Turkish technical representatives, might be placed by the Council of the League at the disposal of the Peace Conference if their advice were desired on questions connected with the matters dealt with in the annexed memorandum. The Inter-Allied Sanitary Commissioners of Constantinople might perhaps place their views before this sub-committee, which would thus possess all the technical information which would enable it to submit a draft of the relevant clauses of the peace treaty, should it be considered desirable to act in the sense outlined in this memorandum.

Enclosure 2 in No. 575.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Memorandum on the Expert Opinion which has been submitted to the League on the Measures of Public Health and Quarantine in the Near East which require to be considered in connection with the Terms of the New Treaty of Peace with Turkey

THE above question has recently been the subject of special investigation and report by an international commission nominated by the Provisional Health Committee of the League of Nations in consultation with the Office international d'Hygiène publique. This commission consisted of five members from the Public Health Services of Denmark, France, Great Britain, Netherlands and Portugal respectively, together with the president of the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt. Its report is contained in the League of Nations document C. 342, M. 193, 1922, III, dated the 10th April, 1922, and was submitted to the Council of the League and distributed Since then the report was discussed and approved by the Office international d'Hygiène publique of Paris.

I.—*Sanitary Control of the Straits*

The Near East Commission reported that, by the establishment of an efficient sanitary organisation, "possessing an international character," steps should be taken to put in force the following measures, which should be embodied in the next International Sanitary Convention :—

(*a.*) This authority should make sanitary regulations for the Straits similar to those which have been authorised for the Suez Canal in the International Sanitary Convention 1912 (see also revised text now proposed by Office international d'Hygiène publique, 1922.. These regulations, in accord with the convention, should specify the measures which are required in regard to ships which arrive in the Straits from Black Sea ports or other infected areas, according as they are "healthy," "suspected," or "infected," and so on. That is to say, they would define the quarantine mooring places, the system of medical examination and the general procedure; they would also regulate

the use of the quarantine stations, specify the conditions in which "surveillance" or "observation" is required, and like matters.

(*b.*) This authority should take special measures, consistent with the International Sanitary Convention, to deal with ships from infected Black Sea ports passing through the Straits "in quarantine," *i.e.*, they should determine the conditions under which transit is permitted, arrange for notification of infection to ports of destination, &c.

(*c.*) This authority should provide and maintain a well-equipped sanitary station at the northern end of the Bosphorus for the above purposes, in substitution for the present unsatisfactory station at Kavak.

(*d.*) If Constantinople is infected by plague or cholera, outgoing vessels should be dealt with in the same way as outgoing vessels from Bombay or other Eastern ports, *i.e.*, the passengers and crew must be individually examined medically at the time of embarkation.

The grounds on which the Near East Commission advocated the above measures were, in brief :—

1. The special and continual danger of ship-borne infection being conveyed to Europe and other ports as a consequence of the Black Sea traffic and the epidemics of Russia and the Near East, and the importance to other countries of protecting Constantinople from invasions of plague and cholera.

2. The exceptional means of sanitary control afforded by the geography of the Straits, comparable to that which is afforded by the Suez Canal and exercised in the Canal to prevent the conveyance of infectious diseases to Europe by vessels arriving from the south.

3. The importance of the shipping traffic concerned, its large volume, and many nationalities concerned with it (the Turkish and Russian-owned vessels being only a small fraction of the whole), and the necessity, therefore, of good sanitary and quarantine organisation and equipment. Good and impartial administration is required, which, together with the proposed regulations, should be based on the international sanitary code and on modern practices of preventive medicine.

4. The Constantinople Superior Board of Health, which, before the war, exercised sanitary control in the Straits, as also in the other ports of the Turkish Empire, ceased to direct quarantine measures in the Straits during the war. The present directing authority is only of a temporary character consisting of the Inter-Allied Sanitary Commission at Constantinople.

The Near East Commission considered that it was beyond its province to make proposals regarding the nature of the future sanitary authority for the Straits to direct the measures (*a*) to (*d*) above. The commission, however, assumed that the body in question would be an efficient organisation possessing an international character, the functions of which need not necessarily be limited to the Straits. The commission, writing in April 1922, pointed out that from the point of view of practical hygiene there might be advantages in the same body, when established, exercising its functions over all the ports belonging to Turkey, including the Turkish ports in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

II.—*Sanitary Control at Ports in Syria and Palestine.*

The Near East Commission, after visiting the principal ports in Syria and Palestine and studying the satisfactory sanitary organisation which is being completed in each of these countries under the respective direction of France and Great Britain, concluded that there is no reason to recommend that exceptional measures should be taken in these ports for the prevention of the introduction or spread of infectious disease by shipping, provided that action is taken in accordance with the provisions of the International Sanitary Conventions in force.

III.—*Sanitary Control in the Suez Canal and Ports, the Sanitary Service of which is controlled by the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt.*

The Near East Commission details reasons for the conclusion that special measures in addition to those general measures which are authorised by the sanitary conventions remain necessary in the Suez Canal, and should be continued on the same broad principles which were adopted in the 1912 and previous international conventions. The commission consider, that for this purpose the countries of the world would do well to continue to rely on administration by the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine

Board of Egypt, a body with special international representation possessing experience obtained from many years' work. This body derives authority for its measures from the International Sanitary Convention of 1912 and antecedent conventions, and the Near East Commission recommended that certain modifications should be introduced into Part II of that convention in order to increase the efficiency of the work of the board. The modifications thus recommended have now been endorsed by the committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique, and embodied by them in the new revision of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912, which that body has now prepared.

IV.—*Sanitary Measures in connection with Mecca Pilgrimage and in the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.*

The Near East Commission considers that in present circumstances it is essential to maintain the system of quarantine stations by means of which the infections of cholera, plague and other diseases among pilgrims going to the Hedjaz are detected and the importation of infection by pilgrims to Arabia is prevented. The commission considers it equally necessary to continue special measures to prevent the dispersal of pilgrims in an infectious condition on their return to their homes after completing the pilgrimage. Before the war all these measures were practically in the hands of two authorities, the Superior Board of Health of Constantinople and the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt. In present circumstances a portion of the control, at El Tor in the Gulf of Suez, remains with the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt. The quarantine station on the island of Kameran at the south end of the Red Sea is no longer administered by the Constantinople Board but by British India, and the land quarantine station on the Mecca Railway at Tebuk (which also was formerly administered by the Constantinople Board) no longer exists. The Near East Commission emphasises the importance of maintaining an efficient system of quarantine for the pilgrims of Kameran and of re-establishing as soon as possible an effective quarantine station on the Hedjaz Railway at a point which, though outside the kingdom of the Hedjaz, is as close to that kingdom as practical considerations permit. The neighbourhood of Maan in Transjordania is indicated by the commission as probably suitable for this purpose. It is considered that separate quarantine stations which are established on the frontiers traversed by the railway, for example, at Derna on the Syrian-Transjordanian frontier, or on the frontier between Syria and Turkey, should be worked in co-ordination with the primary railway quarantine station to the south. In other words, the commission considers that in-coming and out-going pilgrims by the railway route should be examined and dealt with medically on their entrance to or on their departure from the Hedjaz Kingdom, as the case may be, in a similar way to pilgrims coming by sea viâ the quarantine station of Kameran on the south or that of El Tor on the north.

The commission does not recommend that reliance should be placed in the present circumstances on sanitary measures taken within the Hedjaz Kingdom itself or at Jeddah or other ports of the Hedjaz.

The Near East Commission recognises further that the administrative authorities of the main quarantine stations concerned with the pilgrimage (*e.g.*, El Tor, Kameran and the future railway quarantine station) should co-ordinate their action, and for this purpose should each be represented on a co-ordinating sanitary committee.

On consideration of the large number of nationalities which are properly interested in the protective measures taken, the commission recognises that this committee should be made responsible to the League of Nations, in the sense that it should report to the Council of the League and deal with matters submitted to it for opinion or advice either by the Council or Health Committee of the League, or by individual countries interested in the pilgrimage. It should be understood that the commission, in making these recommendations, does not exclude the provision of other quarantine stations for dealing with pilgrims in countries more remote from Arabia.

V.—*Draft Clauses giving effect to the above Proposals.*

The Near East Commission, in an annex of its report, sets out a series of draft articles which might be incorporated in the revised International Sanitary Convention, so as to give effect to the above recommendations.

These draft articles, together with other recommendations of the Near East Commission, have just been considered by the Permanent Committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique at its session in Paris last October. The committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique was then engaged, in accordance with its

statutes, in preparing for the Powers interested expert proposals for the modifications needed in the International Sanitary Convention of 1912, in order to take account of recent developments of medical knowledge and existing administrative conditions.

The committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique considered that until the immediate future of administration in the Near East has been settled, it might be undesirable to propose to the Powers detailed articles to be embodied in the next convention which relate to countries in the Near East. The committee, however, discussed fully the recommendations which had been made by the Near East Commission of the League of Nations, and from the expert point of view approved these recommendations on their broad lines. The following resolutions were adopted by the committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique on the 27th October :—

1. *Measures in the Straits and in the Black Sea Ports.*

Special measures should be prescribed by an international sanitary authority for arrivals from the Black Sea, analogous to those contemplated in Part II of the International Sanitary Convention.

2. *Measures for Pilgrims travelling by the Hedjaz Railway.*

Sanitary stations should be established on the main lines of railway used by pilgrims, and particularly on the Hedjaz Railway at a point as near as possible to the Holy Places.

3. *Sanitary Co-ordination for the Pilgrimage.*

A co-ordinating body of an international character should be formed, with the duty of co-ordinating the work of the several sanitary authorities executing the measures prescribed in Part III of the International Sanitary Convention.

Note.—The reference in these resolutions to the International Sanitary Convention are to the text of the convention of 1912, as revised in 1921–22 by the Committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique.

The members of the Special Sub-Committee of the Health Committee :—

PROFESSOR THOMAS MADSEN,
Chairman of the Health Committee of the League of Nations.
SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN,
Vice-Chairman of the Health Committee of the League of Nations.
O. VELGHE,
Chairman of the Office international d'Hygiène publique.

November 4, 1922.

[E 12761/10524/44] No. 576.

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received November 16.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward copy of a paper, dated the 8th November, 1922, from General Headquarters, Constantinople, on Greek and Turkish atrocities subsequent to the burning of Smyrna.

Major-General J. T. Burnett-Stuart hopes that this information will be of interest to Sir Eyre Crowe.

War Office, November 14, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 576.

Note on Greek and Turkish Atrocities subsequent to the Burning of Smyrna.

(Secret.)

Table I.—Greek.

THE following cases of persecution, murder, incendiarism and looting have been investigated by the various inter-Allied missions in Thrace, and established as authentic :—

(*a.*) Burning of Sarlar (on railway between Muradli and Chorlu).

Investigated by Lule Burgas Mission the 26th October. Some hayricks observed burning on the 17th October.

(*b.*) Burning of Chakmak (east of Kuleli Burgas).

Investigated by Uzun Keupru Mission the 25th October. Looted and nearly all burnt by villagers from Saloufkeui, helped by demobilised Greek soldiers.

(*c.*) Burning of Chefli Keui (village near Kutchuk).

Investigated by Chorlu Mission the 18th October. 17th October: Village burnt out—inhabitants state it was set on fire by twelve mounted Greeks.

(*d.*) Burning of Katanja (16 kilom. south of Baba Eski).

Investigated by Lule Burgas Mission the 2nd October. 27th October: French patrol saw Greek soldiers setting fire to village (five outbreaks seen); failed to arrest incendiaries. Officer Commanding Greek company said Turks had attacked, but no rifles seen by patrol. Two Greeks shot.

(*e.*) Persecution and murder at, and burning of, Karish Diren.

Investigated by Lule Burgas Mission. Visited the 25th October. Two or three houses only burnt. One old man, 70 years, unable to escape, burnt.

(*f.*) Murder at Chorlu.

Investigated by Chorlu Mission the 21st October. Verified.

(*g.*) Murder of Turk Bey (north-east of Lule Burgas).

Investigated by Lule Burgas Mission. Verified.

(*h.*) Murders at Uzun Keupru.

Investigated by Uzun Keupru Mission the 25th October. Verified murders of eleven Turks and one Greek in the district up to date the 25th October.

(*i.*) Deportation and looting at Mandra (on railway South Baba Eski).

Investigated by Lule Burgas Mission the 2nd November. Seventeen men taken away as hostages. Up to the 28th October none of these returned. During evacuation on the 14th October Greek soldiers took away 40 buffaloes, 3 horses, 108 cows, 183 oxen, 29 carts, valued £T. 32,000. In addition, Greeks raised subscriptions of 15,000 drachmas by threatening to burn village. Names of gendarmes implicated: Vasil, Mitcho and Balta Edocia.

(*j.*) Destruction of mosque at Samokov.

Investigated by Kirk Kilisse Mission the 30th October. Mosque partially demolished.

(*k.*) Murders at Kouridji (Rodosto area).

Investigated by Rodosto mission. About the 5th October nine Turks brought by Circassians and Greeks from Tifke to neighbourhood of Kouridji. Four killed and others beaten; five subsequently escaped.

Remarks.—1st November: Mufti of Keshan reported all Turks deported from that area have returned, with exception of fifteen missing and eighteen said to be murdered at Kouridjikeui.

(*l.*) Murders and looting at Oulaman (Rodosta area).

Investigated by Rodosto Mission. 23rd to 27th October: Oulaman—Greek soldiers and refugees systematically pillaged this place. About the 13th October three Greeks robbed a house and murdered a women. One of the robbers captured on the 17th October.

(*m.*) Murders and looting at Kara Hissar (Rodosto area).

Investigated by Rodosto Mission. 24th October: fifty-two cows were taken. Greek refugees from Era Punar and Sighli Beyendik stole all Turkish belongings from Kara Hissar.

(*n.*) Murders and looting at Turkman (? Chiftlik).

Investigated by Rodosto Mission. On the 18th all men shut in mosque—beaten and robbed. 15th October: Greeks murdered one man and one woman.

(*o.*) Deportations and looting at Boztepe (east of Keshan).

8th October: twenty men, of whom eighteen have now returned, were deported by Greeks. All of them were shut up in the mosque and robbed. 18th October: ninety-three vehicles and 180 oxen taken by the Greeks.

Remarks.—1st November: Mufti of Keshan reports that all Turks deported from that area have returned, with exception of fifteen missing and eighteen said to be murdered near Kurujkeui

Table II.—Turkish.

The following cases of persecution and murder have been verified by various sources which are reliable :—

(*a.*) Massacre at Bigha (Chanak area).

Investigated by 28th Division. On withdrawal of Greek troops from Bigha, Turkish Irregulars entered the village and killed about eighty Greeks. Others were tortured with hot oil to disclose their wealth. A number of women were raped and carried off.

About the 24th September 1,631 refugees from Bigha were evacuated by Officer Commanding 1st Battalion The Loyal Regiment. There were there then, eight Greeks (men, women and children) who had been mutilated.

(*b.*) Persecution at Shile (Ismid Peninsula).

Information from refugees interrogated by 84th Brigade. On the 7th October the first Nationalist troops entered Shile; general looting of Christian shops occurred. On the 8th October the troops started raiding the houses of the rich Christians, beating the men and violating the women. On the 20th October all Christians were taken to the beach, and the women separated from the men and put into boats. The men were shut up in the church, and it was rumoured they would be sent to Ismid as a labour unit. (Report from source believed to be reliable that these men have all been massacred. This is being investigated by the League of Nations).

Two Greeks (including Lieutenant Katsaros, a Greek demobilised officer) were murdered, and various houses and two churches were pillaged.

(*c.*) Murder and persecution near Rodosto (Thrace).

Investigated by Officer Commanding Thracian Brigade. On the 23rd October Officer Commanding Thracian Brigade reported that four Greek gendarmes had been shot at Ortajakeui, and that Turks had been attacking convoys and looting Greek houses at Kimbaghi.

(*d.*) Murder at Chorlu (Thrace).

Investigated by Chorlu Mission. One Greek soldier was shot by Turks at close quarters on the 19th October.

(*e.*) Murder at Katanja (16 miles south of Baba Eski) (Thrace).

Investigated by French patrol. Reported on the 27th October that two Greek soldiers were shot by Turkish villagers.

(*f.*) Murder at Tash Farm (6 miles north of Pera) (Constantinople area).

Investigated by 1st Guards Brigade. On the 11th October one Greek killed at Tase by twelve Turks, and Tase ransacked.

(*g.*) Persecution at Alemdar (15 miles east of Scutari) (Constantinople area).

Investigated by 84th Brigade. Warrant for arrest of three Armenians issued about the 28th October, on a charge, now two years' old, that they had reclaimed an Armenian girl from a Turk who had kept her as a slave.

(*h.*) Murder in Pera (Constantinople area).

Investigated by G.S. "I." On the 27th October an Armenian was stabbed to death for refusing to loan his car, free of charge, for procession of Nationalists' gendarmes in the town.

[E 12764/27/44] No. 577.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 2669.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 15, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the reply which I have received to the note which I addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 406 of the 4th November regarding the claim formulated by Refet Pasha to instal Kemalist gendarmerie in the Allied occupied zones under the terms of the Mudania Convention.

Your Lordship will observe that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs entirely shares the views of His Majesty's Government on this question.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 577.

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR sa note en date du 5 novembre, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu exposer les vues du Gouvernement anglais en ce qui concerne l'attitude à adopter par les Alliés dans les zones de Constantinople, d'Ismid, de Chanak et de Gallipoli. Il paraît difficile au Gouvernement britannique que les Alliés s'opposent à ce que le Gouvernement nationaliste turc pourvoie à l'administration civile de ces territoires par ses propres fonctionnaires.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté admet même, à titre de concession, que lesdits fonctionnaires soient accompagnés à Ismid et Gallipoli d'une gendarmerie strictement restreinte.

En ce qui concerne Constantinople et Ismid, sans aucune intention de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie en tant qu'elles ne touchent pas aux droits résultant des traités, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne s'oppose pas à la substitution de l'administration du Gouvernement d'Angora à celle du Gouvernement précédent, mais une augmentation quelconque des forces de gendarmerie ne saurait, selon lui, être admise.

D'ailleurs, aussi bien à Gallipoli et à Chanak qu'à Constantinople et Ismid, l'administration civile turque, quel que soit l'effectif de la gendarmerie, doit rester sous le contrôle des autorités occupantes alliées.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir qu'il partage entièrement la manière de voir de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre dans cette question.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 14 novembre 1922.

No. 578.

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 158.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 16, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 153.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will leave for Lausanne to-night. I had conversation with him this morning and one with Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. I have not, however, elicited anything beyond what has been communicated to you, and I think you have already in your possession gist of results of visits of Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs and Bulgarian Prime Minister which, after all, in so far as regards Turkish question, are limited, as far as I can ascertain, to

Bulgarian economic access to sea under international guarantee and maintenance of Greek sovereignty in Western Thrace. There would seem to have been no explicit talk of re-establishing Balkan alliance against Turks. For the rest, this Government is interested in arrangements by which Turkish military power in Eastern Thrace is reduced to an absolute minimum.

[?His] Excellency seemed to admit that where French showed indulgence and British severity towards Turks, Serbs would support British, but Nincic was not willing to be explicit and could not say more until Allies' programme and that of Turks were disclosed. He appeared to be somewhat displeased with preliminary conversation which your Lordship desired to hold with France. Italy thinks these ought to be held at Lausanne itself with [group undecypherable] of Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and Roumania.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have taken considerable offence at [group undecypherable] which Kemalists and Ismet Pasha have taken with Macedonian and Mussulman malcontents of this country. M. Nincic is more than ever convinced of the close relations between Soviet and Angora Governments, and I cannot say that Bulgaria is free of suspicion of Soviet tendencies.

Public opinion is not much aroused in regard to Near East and it is somewhat mystified at English action towards date of opening of conference.

French and Italian representatives have received instructions to inform this Government that delegations of some Powers were not able to be at Lausanne by 13th November and that meeting is consequently postponed until 20th November.

No. 579.

Sir M. Findlay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Christiania, November 16, 1922.*

I LEARN from Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as question of Capitulations will probably come before conference at Lausanne, Norwegian representative in London has been instructed to draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that in 1914 Norway informed Turkish Government that she could not recognise any abolition of Capitulations by unilateral action on the part of Ottoman Government. He is to emphasise the important interests which Norway has in this connection, and to add that if judicial position of foreigners in Turkey is dealt with at the conference, Norwegian Government trusts that no agreements will be made without co-operation with the other interested Governments.

Similar instructions have been sent to the Norwegian Ministers at Paris and Rome.

In commenting on the above decision this morning, "Tidens Tegn" states that Norwegian interests are not confined to Capitulations, and urges that most-favoured-nation treatment, which her shipping had hitherto enjoyed, must be safeguarded.

No. 580.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 712. Private and Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 16, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 693.

Sultan has requested General Harington in writing to arrange for his immediate flight from Constantinople. Arrangements are being made for His Majesty, accompanied by his son [? Er]togrul and eight members of the suite, to be taken to Grenadier Guards barracks early to-morrow morning, 17th November. They will be conveyed thence to H.M.S. "Malaya," which will leave for Malta, where presumably other arrangements will be made for His Majesty's disposal and destination.

I gather that Sultan has no fixed idea as to where he wishes to go, and his determination to fly appears to have been taken suddenly and for reasons of which I am unaware. They may be purely panic or based on [groups omitted].

No. 581.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 713.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 16, 1922.*

REFET PASHA has handed to me answer of Angora Government to the two Allied joint replies respecting withdrawal of Allied forces (see Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 989) and arbitrary changes effected by Nationalists in administration of Constantinople.

Answer reaffirms intention of Government of Grand National Assembly to respect Mudania Convention, and expresses hope that contracting parties, who are agreed on broad principles, will also agree on detailed interpretation of that convention.

Note explains that Grand National Assembly, while ready to admit presence of Allied troops within limits fixed at Mudania and to discuss measures affecting safety of Allied troops, had requested withdrawal of those troops in order that responsibility for maintenance of law and order in Constantinople having been assumed by Grand National Assembly, control exercised by Allied troops over internal administration should cease. In this connection Angora answer takes note of statement made in the communication addressed by Allied generals to Refet Pasha, that High Commissioners had no objection to form of administration set up by Grand National Assembly in Constantinople.

Note concludes by statement that Grand National Assembly is only applying its own laws to Constantinople; that it regrets to be unable to admit interference in its internal affairs; and that in this respect it has confidence in conciliatory spirit of the Allied Powers.

No. 582.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received November 16.)

(No. 714.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 16, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Note of Angora Government, while civilly worded and no longer suggesting withdrawal of troops, leaves matters where they were in so far as it insists on complete liberty of action in respect of all civil administration, and only admits discussion on points affecting safety of Allied troops.

Situation is therefore as follows:—

Allied High Commissioners have formally protested against measures already introduced, as reported in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 666, which modify civil administration as exercised by Allies until fall of Central Government. These measures have not been withdrawn, and it is certain that further measures of same category will be introduced. It is almost equally certain that French and Italian Governments will not be prepared to resort to forcible action to prevent these further encroachments, at any rate, provided they do not endanger safety of troops.

Issue at present is therefore military, *i.e.*, whether or not Allied control of services such as police and gendarmerie, which are essential to safety of Allied forces, is to be maintained. Decisions of Allied generals in respect of police were communicated yesterday to Refet Pasha, who has declared his intention of rediscussing question with the generals.

If *modus vivendi* acceptable to generals can be reached, situation here will drag on until conference meets and has had time to discuss it. But in the meantime, if force be excluded in non-military issues, undermining of forces will continue, and Nationalists will gradually acquire absolute control of civil administration. Ultimate result of this in [group undecypherable] may be to render military position untenable. If, however, process be really gradual, situation here can possibly be prolonged until conference has had time to fix date for evacuation of Constantinople.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 248.)

No. 583.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 716.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 16, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 714.

Amongst more immediate modifications of former inter-Allied administration which Angora will attempt to introduce here are:—

1. Suppression of press censorship;
2. Suppression of Allied control of enemy banks; and
3. Reversion to pre-war system in regard to operation of Eastern Telegraph Company.

In view of fact that Foreign Office had long ago favoured suppression of press censorship (please see correspondence ending with your despatch No. 810 of 5th August), I do not feel justified, unless my colleagues take strong line, in refusing to agree to this provided that Refet guarantees that no incendiary articles are allowed to be published in the Turkish press.

Request for suppression of enemy bank control, if put forward, will be of interest as indicating German collusion somewhere. I do not feel inclined to take strong line as regards this point either, which seems to me one of comparative unimportance to our prestige here.

I shall, however, endeavour to resist (3) as far as and as long as possible.

No. 584.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 600.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 15, 1922.*

IN accordance with your instructions, I arranged with M. Poincaré that Mr. Forbes Adam should attend at the Quai d'Orsay to furnish any explanations which M. Poincaré might desire regarding your memorandum. Mr. Forbes Adam saw M. Peretti this afternoon. Following points seem worth recording:—

CATEGORY (A).

1. *Western Thrace.*

M. Peretti said that if the Turks raised this question the Allies should definitely refuse to discuss it.

2. *Frontier of Western Thrace.*

M. Peretti, who seemed unfamiliar with the terms of the Bulgaro-Turkish Agreement of 1915, said that M. Poincaré only felt doubt as to whether the question of Karagatch and of the forts of Adrianople on the right bank of the Maritza was of sufficient importance to warrant Allied intransigence if the Turks pressed for them as a necessary defence for Adrianople and Eastern Thrace. He asked what was the precise frontier of the 1915 convention and whether M. Poincaré was right in supposing that you only proposed a neutral zone for the Turkish side of the Maritza. Mr. Forbes Adam explained the detailed *tracé* of the convention, by which Turkey had voluntarily surrendered Karagatch, and that your proposal related to the possible creation of a neutral zone comprising a strip of territory on both the Greek and Turkish sides of the Maritza, and perhaps up the Tungja to the Bulgarian frontier, thus meeting any Turkish argument as to the defence of Adrianople. M. Peretti said that he would explain this to M. Poincaré.

3. *Straits.*

Accepted without comment.

4. *Capitulations.*

M. Peretti asked whether he could be given some idea of the modifications which we might suggest. Mr. Forbes Adam gave him informally a copy of the text of

the first five articles in the draft revise of the economic clauses of 3rd November, explaining that this had been worked out by the experts as a basis for Allied discussion but not formally approved by you. M. Peretti said that this seemed to be more or less what the French Foreign Office and Ministry of Commerce had in mind. Opinion in France was very strong on this point, and whatever concessions might be made to the Turks *in form* as regards abolishing the judicial and fiscal capitulations, in substance they must be maintained at any rate for some time to come. As regards the future eventual mixed or unified system, M. Peretti volunteered that the French were thinking of the possibility of a majority of foreign judges sitting as nominally Turkish judges to try mixed civil and criminal cases.

5. *Islands of the Ægean.*

M. Peretti said that M. Poincaré was uncertain to which islands you referred. Mr. Forbes Adam explained that they were those dealt with in articles 84 and 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres. M. Peretti said that their cession by Turkey was, of course, essential on the ground of their ethnical character, if for no other.

6, 7 and 8. *Frontier of Syria and Irak. Mandated Territory in Syria, Irak and Palestine. Allied Graves.*

Accepted without comment.

I may here add that M. Poincaré mentioned incidentally this morning that as to the question of Mosul, he regarded it as a point of honour to support His Majesty's Government.

9. *Indemnities.*

M. Peretti asked if this meant a demand for the payment of the costs of occupation or for reparations for war damages to civilians and their property. Mr. Forbes Adam explained that this was a matter which you would discuss, but that what you mainly had in mind was the latter. M. Peretti explained that, if so, the French Government were entirely at one with His Majesty's Government. The French unsifted claims amounted to over a milliard francs, and there was a strong group in the Chamber who wanted payment by the Turks. The amount of the reparations which could now be obtained and the modalities were matters, of course, for discussion.

As regards the Turkish demand for reparations by Greece, the French Government thought that it would be difficult to refuse to allow the Turks to put forward a claim for the damage done by the Greeks since they began fighting on their own responsibility, say, March 1921, but that the Greeks would have a legitimate counter-claim for the previous years which might cancel out the Turkish claim. Even if there were a paper balance against Greece, it could be cancelled by such part of the Allies' claims against Turkey as they would perforce have now to forgo owing to the impossibility of obtaining large payments from Turkey.

M. Peretti added that France might have to press the claim of some French nationals against Greece for damage to their property by the Greeks since March 1921 in the Smyrna area.

10. *Mudania Convention.*

Accepted without comment, except that M. Peretti volunteered that M. Poincaré had recently misinterpreted article 3, paragraph xi, of the convention. M. Peretti had at once pointed out to him that the convention did not prevent Allied reinforcements going to Gallipoli and Constantinople.

11. *Constantinople Position.*

Accepted without comment.

CATEGORY (B).

1. *Protection of Minorities.*

Accepted without comment, except that M. Peretti said that the French Government were still hopeful as to the possibilities of an exchange of population under the treaty, since their information was that Nansen had not been tactful in conducting his now abortive negotiations with Angora, and that he was much disliked by the Turks.

2. *Turkish Military Forces.*

M. Peretti remarked that the French Foreign Office thought that it might be a good thing to try and demilitarise the whole of Eastern Thrace. Otherwise no comment.

3 and 4. *Financial and Economic Clauses.*

No comment, except that M. Peretti emphasised that the interest of France in obtaining economic safeguards from Turkey as regards existing concessions, &c., was even greater than Great Britain's.

M. Peretti remarked incidentally that the French Foreign Office were very sceptical as to the genuineness of the seven Turkish claims recently reported by Colonel Mougin. Apparently he was merely reporting rumours picked up in conversation and from the Angora press.

No. 585.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 15, 1922.*

YOUSRY PASHA called on me this evening. He has been in constant touch since he arrived here with Jelaleddin Rustem and other prominent Turks. First of these has already gone to Lausanne. He is most pessimistic as to result of conference. He found spirit of intractability and unreasonableness that astonished him. Ismet Pasha will arrive at Lausanne so tied up with instructions as not to be able to accept any compromise, and has declared he comes to dictate, and not to be dictated to. Yousry says that Turks will be reasonable about Straits and frontiers, but will be adamant on all questions which in their opinion affect their independence, such as Capitulations. Government of Angora is now completely under the influence of younger and hot-headed elements, who are prepared and almost anxious to fight. They say that there is no prospect of Allies being able to dispose force which can deal with Turks. Yousry conceived strong impression that Turks had some arrangement with France, on which they count to upset Allied front, but this was, of course, merely an impression. In his private opinion, formed after discussion with Turks here, and knowledge of their correspondence with Angora, conference is bound to break down. I give above with all reserve, but Yousry, whom I knew well in old days, was evidently sincere in his opinion.

No. 586.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 15, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 394.

I communicated list of points to Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning. Signor Mussolini has been all day in Cabinet Council held to discuss questions connected with opening of Chamber to-morrow. He has only seen points this evening, and said at once that they raised questions of such gravity that he could not possibly arrive at decision without previous discussion with your Lordship and French President of the Council.

I pointed out that your Lordship did not intend to proceed to Lausanne unless assured of united Allied front on points in category (A). His Excellency said that he could not leave here before Saturday, but would be ready after that to go anywhere to meet your Lordship, and would prefer preliminary meeting at some other spot than Lausanne.

He promised to examine list of points to-night, and I may have further information as to his attitude thereon to-morrow.

No. 587.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 437.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1922.

MILITARY situation in Constantinople as reported by General Harington is extremely serious, and Allied unity of action is as essential there as it is at Lausanne. Otherwise Allies may be confronted with disastrous panic, if not worse, and may be compelled to evacuate under conditions of extreme humiliation, which would not only prejudice, but might entirely wreck, Peace Conference in its opening stages. I propose, therefore, to bring over General Burnett-Stuart with me to-morrow, and shall be glad if you can arrange a conversation with M. Poincaré and Marshal Foch on Saturday morning in order that we may arrive at a decision on this subject before we proceed to discuss the points raised in my memorandum on Saturday afternoon.

No. 588.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Erskine (Sofia).

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1922.

GREEK Government have information of increased Bulgarian komitaji activity, supported by Kemalist agents. Turkish komitajis in Bulgaria are said to have received instructions from Constantinople to concentrate round Adrianople. Other concentrations are reported at Nevrokop, Kirchali, &c. Bulgarian army is said to be playing a prominent part, object being to force hands of Lausanne Conference in regard to autonomy of Western Thrace.

Please enquire and report.

[E 12655/10102/44] No. 589.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 3426.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1922.

I REQUEST your Excellency to make the following communication to the French Government:—

"His Majesty's Government have learnt that the Egyptian Government desire to participate in the conference at Lausanne, whilst the revision of articles 101 to 114 of the Treaty of Sèvres is under consideration. Though no formal agreement has been concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government in regard to the nature of such revision, which is rendered necessary by the fact that Egypt is now an independent sovereign State, His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that the Egyptian Government are willing to agree to provisions acceptable to the Allies and less cumbrous than the original articles, and to sign a protocol of accession to the Peace Treaty on its conclusion.

"In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government trust that the French Government will join with them in addressing a formal invitation to the Egyptian Government to send to Lausanne duly accredited representatives who will participate in the proceedings of the conference when matters dealt with in the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres affecting Egypt are under discussion.

"A similar communication is being addressed to the Italian Government by His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome."

2. For your private information, I may say that negotiations have been proceeding between His Majesty's High Commissioner and the Egyptian Government during the last four weeks in regard to the revision of the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres referred to in the above communication.

3. As a result of these negotiations, a general measure of agreement has been arrived at, and I transmit herewith the provisional text of the clauses which it is

* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 1386, *mutatis mutandis*.

now suggested should be substituted for articles 101 to 114 of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Egyptian Government have signified their acceptance of the text of articles A, B and D. Article C, being designed to exclude Egypt from the category of territory detached from Turkey which is burdened with a proportional share of the Ottoman public debt, is unlikely to meet with Egyptian opposition.

4. As regards article E, the Egyptian Government have shown no disposition to repudiate their obligation to continue meeting the service of the loans secured on the Egyptian tribute, but they are anxious to make it clear that henceforth such payments are no longer in the nature of a tribute payable by a vassal State. The text, therefore, of this article is entirely provisional, and is liable to considerable modification.

5. As regards article F, the Egyptian Government are understood to accept the principle of accession to the Turkish Peace Treaty by a protocol, and this article provides the machinery whereby this accession may be achieved.

6. You should take a very early opportunity of making the communication referred to above to the French Government. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 589.

Suggested Revision of Articles in Treaty of Sèvres relating to Egypt (as agreed with Sarwat Pasha).

TEXT OF ARTICLES AS AMENDED.

(Corresponding Articles in Treaty of Sèvres.)

(A.)—(101 and 113.) Turkey renounces all rights and title in and over Egypt and the Soudan. This renunciation shall take effect from the 5th November, 1914.

Turkey takes note of the declaration of 28th February, 1922, by which Great Britain terminated her protectorate and recognised the independence of Egypt.

Turkey recognises the independence of Egypt and the establishment of an Egyptian monarchy proclaimed by the King of Egypt on 15th March, 1922.

(B.)—(109.) As a result of the renunciation by Turkey of her rights and title in and over Egypt, and of the recognition by her of the independence of Egypt, the rights and obligations falling to Turkey under the convention of 29th October, 1888, relative to the neutrality of the Suez Canal are, and remain, merged with the rights and obligations falling to Egypt under the same convention.

If Egypt lacks the means to secure the observance of the said convention Great Britain shall, in the case of an appeal by Egypt, take the necessary measures to respond to this appeal.

(C.) (104.) For all purposes connected with the present Treaty, apart from article 261, Egypt and Egyptian nationals, their goods and vessels, shall be treated on the same footing, as from 1st August, 1914, as the Allied Powers, their nationals, goods and vessels, and provisions in respect of territory under Turkish sovereignty, or of territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present treaty shall not apply to Egypt.

(D.) (102, 103 and 105.) Conditions under which Ottomans resident in Egypt shall be deemed to have acquired Egyptian nationality shall be settled by Egyptian legislation. Such legislation shall be based upon principles which have hitherto governed admission of Ottomans to Egyptian indigenat; it shall not extend Egyptian nationality—*ipso jure*—to Ottomans who do not possess Egyptian indigenat, without conferring upon them right to opt against such nationality. Turkey will not dispute right of Egyptian Government to admit Ottomans resident in Egypt to naturalisation. Ottomans and nationals of States detached from Turkey shall not be entitled to capitulary privileges in Egypt.

(E.)—(112.) In view of continuing obligation of Egypt to make payments heretofore made by her for service of Ottoman loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894, Egypt shall be discharged from any further or other liability in respect of Ottoman public debt and from her obligation to pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire.

(F.)—(New.) Egypt may accede to the provisions of articles of the present treaty by a notice of accession deposited with (the Government with whom the original

treaty is deposited). Such notice may be deposited at any time after the signature of the present treaty, and, if deposited before the coming into force of the treaty, will take effect *ipso facto* (" de plein droit ") as from the date of such coming into force.

Articles 106, 107, 108, 110, 111 and 114 of the Treaty of Sèvres drop out.

[E 12833/27/44] No. 590.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

UN certain nombre de Puissances ayant manifesté au Gouvernement français le désir de participer à la prochaine Conférence orientale, M. Poincaré a chargé l'Ambassadeur de France de faire connaître à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires étrangères ses vues sur l'admission de ces Puissances à Lausanne :

Le Gouvernement français estime, d'une manière générale, que les Puissances n'ayant pas pris part à la guerre européenne à nos côtés devraient être admises à faire connaître leurs vues, soit oralement soit par écrit, sur les questions mettant directement en cause leurs intérêts, mais exclusivement sur ceux-ci. Elles devraient être seulement entendues, mais non participer aux débats.

En ce qui concerne les autres États, considérés comme alliés, il paraît difficile de leur refuser le bénéfice de la décision prise en faveur de la Belgique s'ils le demandent formellement. Ils seraient donc admis à participer aux discussions quand on examinerait les questions financières et économiques de nature à les intéresser spécialement. Tel serait, en particulier, le cas de la Pologne.

D'autre part, le Gouvernement français estime nécessaire que le Gouvernement albanais, en dehors des conditions dans lesquelles il pourra se faire entendre, comme les autres tierces Puissances, participe à la conférence pour le règlement de la répartition des charges incombant aux territoires de l'Empire ottoman (liquidation de la guerre balkanique de 1913 restée jusqu'ici en suspens).

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a été chargé de demander à sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon de Kedleston de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le plus tôt possible son sentiment à cet égard, et il saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 16 novembre 1922.

No. 591.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 717.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 16, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 714 : Contemplated possibility of conference at Lausanne coming in its early stages to agreement as to date of evacuation of Constantinople.

I have raised this point because I consider that unless forcible action is to be taken soon, and jointly with our Allies, situation here will be such that, instead of holding Constantinople as a pledge, we shall ourselves be in the position of hostages.

No. 592.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 718.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 17, 1922.*

AT the suggestion of French High Commissioner, meeting of High Commissioners was held yesterday evening with Refet Pasha to discuss Allied press censorship.

After considerable discussion, it was agreed that Allied censorship should cease to function. Refet Pasha undertook to prevent articles of incendiary nature or contrary to Allied prestige from being published in Turkish press, but would only accept responsibility if he himself exercised censorship over it. I consented with the greatest reluctance and only on condition that Allied officers attached to Refet's staff co-operated.

I fear that co-operation will be more apparent than real, but was unwilling on a non-essential point to risk deadlock, which might have led to open disregard of Allied censorship, which would have been still more humiliating.

No. 593.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 719.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 17, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 712.

Arrangements which had been made by General Harington for the departure of the Sultan were carried out this morning without hitch.

His Imperial Majesty left the Palace at 8 o'clock by side entrance to Yildiz barracks, where Grenadier Guards received him and where he was met by acting first dragoman and General Harington's aide-de-camp.

Sultan was met at naval base by General Harington and myself, who accompanied him on board H.M.S. " Malaya," where he was received by Commander-in-chief of Mediterranean. H.M.S. " Malaya " left for Malta shortly after.

Once on board the ship I conveyed suitable message to Sultan from the King and His Majesty's Government. His Imperial Majesty begged me to convey to His Majesty and British nation his thanks for protection they were affording him.

Sultan laid much emphasis on fact that he had not abdicated. He begged that suitable person with knowledge of Turkish might be placed at his disposal at Malta. Communiqué will be published in press this afternoon to the effect that Sultan, fearing his liberty and life to be in danger, had appealed, as Caliph of all Moslems, for British protection and transportation from Constantinople and announcing his departure.

King informed.

No. 594.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 388.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 17, 1922.*

I HAD satisfactory conversation this morning with President of the Council, who is looking forward to meeting your Lordship at Territet on Sunday evening. He had had time to consider points in your telegram No. 395, and said that I might assure you that in principle he was in agreement with you on all of them, both (A) and (B), though some required further elucidation and discussion.

Secretary-General had given me to understand that there might be difficulties about (A) I, but Signor Mussolini declared himself strongly against a plebiscite. As regards No. 4, he thought that full substance of Capitulations should be retained, but possibly under some other name. In regard to No. 5, he required some explanations. With reference to No. 7, he enquired whether Conservative victory at election might mean that His Majesty's Government were no longer so anxious to maintain mandate. I replied that I had no information to show that we desired to divest ourselves of serious obligations. In regard to No. 11, he was still of opinion that it might be advisable to withdraw Allied forces rather than risk their expulsion, but was quite open to argument on the subject.

His Excellency expressed the hope that I had considered his reference to the Turks in his speech yesterday as satisfactory. It is regarded here as a strong warning to the Turks. He was optimistic in regard to the conference, declaring that if only Allies were united, and this ought to be achieved without great difficulty, Turks would accept our terms.

Finally, his Excellency said that his general foreign policy would be as follows : Condition of whole world was unstable and disturbed. There was great danger of combination of Germany and Russia, and possibly Turks, to disturb it still further. Only hope of continued stability lay in closest understanding and co-operation between Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium during the next ten or twenty years. These Powers if really united would present a solid block against which disturbing elements would beat in vain.

[E 12845/10524/44] No. 595.

Memorandum on the Present Situation as regards Refugees in Greece.

THE present situation as regards the refugees in Greece is as follows:—

During September and October at least 500,000 Ottoman Greek refugees reached Greek territory from Asia Minor. This figure, originally reported by His Majesty's Minister at Athens, has been confirmed by detailed reports from the Save the Children Fund, the British naval authorities, the captains of the refugee ships, and information in the possession of the various relief societies. These refugees are for the most part destitute, and include no men of military age, all men between 15 and 45 having been retained by the Turks for service in labour gangs in the interior of Anatolia. All reports are agreed on this point. The naval reports on the embarkation of the refugees all emphasise the fact that the refugees were passed through two lines of Turkish soldiers before being allowed to embark, and that not a single able-bodied man of less than 45 was allowed to leave. The director of the British School of Archæology in Athens, who is a member of the British Relief Committee, and who arrived yesterday direct from Greece, states that among the refugees in the Athens district he did not see a single able-bodied male between 15 and 50.

The absence of these men greatly complicates the whole problem of relief, since it means that the refugees cannot support themselves, and cannot be settled on the land. Mr. Lindley, Dr. Nansen and Sir H. Rumbold all agree that it is of the first importance to attempt to obtain the immediate release of these men from the Turks. In view of the number of refugees which is known to have arrived in Greece, it seems clear that the men detained and deported by the Turks must amount to not less than 100,000. We know from other sources that if they remain in labour gangs through the winter few of them can survive.

The Turks have also detained a great number of young women from among the refugees. This fact was particularly emphasised in the reports of His Majesty's consular officers from Smyrna. It will, however, be a matter of great difficulty to obtain the release of these women, who are probably already distributed in Moslem houses all through Anatolia.

In addition to the 500,000 refugees from Asia Minor, the entire Greek population of Eastern Thrace has migrated to Greek territory. According to the latest reports from the inter-Allied commissions in Eastern Thrace, hardly a single Greek remains in that province. According to the Turkish figures for 1914, the Greek population of Eastern Thrace in that year amounted to 235,000. This is probably an underestimate, more especially as the Greek Government had already settled a large number of Greek refugees from Anatolia and Pontus in that district. It therefore seems probable that the exodus from Eastern Thrace has brought another 300,000 refugees to Greece. These, however, include able-bodied men, and a large proportion of them were able to bring their carts and cattle and a proportion of their possessions. Recent reports from Western Thrace and Macedonia, however, show that the condition of these refugees is hardly less appalling than that of the Asia Minor refugees in Old Greece.

In addition to these 800,000 refugees, large numbers of Ottoman Greeks are daily reaching Greek territory from Constantinople and elsewhere. Sir H. Rumbold recently reported that the Greeks were leaving Constantinople at the rate of 3,000 a day. He also reported on the 5th instant that the surviving Greek population of the north coast of Anatolia, with the usual exception of the able-bodied men, was being expelled by the Turks, and the Greek Government have informed us that they are trying to make arrangements to evacuate these people to Greece.

It may, therefore, safely be assumed that the number of refugees in Greece is already in the neighbourhood of 1,000,000, or one-fifth of the total normal population of the territory in which they have taken refuge.

One of the most urgent questions is the liberation of the men retained in Anatolia. Their absence has vastly complicated the problem and greatly increased the hardships to which the refugees are exposed.

An equally urgent problem is that of relief. The food supply is totally inadequate and the local population of Greece is already being severely rationed. There is no doubt that a serious famine is imminent. Shelter is also most urgently required, as a large proportion of the refugees are sleeping in the open and winter conditions have already begun.

The sanitary problem is equally serious, and epidemics have already broken out in several camps. When these conditions develop, it will probably be necessary to draw a sanitary cordon round Greece. On the 14th November Mr. Lindley reported that the Central Co-ordination Committee for refugees in Athens had decided to telegraph to the League of Nations recommending that the action of the latter in Greece should be confined to fighting the epidemics in the hope that the sanitary situation may thus be got under control.

G. W. RENDEL.

Foreign Office, November 17, 1922.

[C 15766/419/7] No. 596.

M. Caclamanos to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 18.)

Greek Legation, London,
November 16, 1922.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my letter of the 11th instant, I have the honour to bring the following information to your Lordship's notice, acting upon instructions from my Government:—

The following movements of troops took place on the night of the 8th November, upon orders from the Bulgarian War Office: Two companies of the 9th battalion, fully equipped, numbering 300 men, 8 officers and 6 machine guns; two companies of the 21st battalion, 280 men strong, 7 officers and 6 machine guns; and a company of the 2nd Engineers, numbering 90 men, with 4 officers, all left Philippopoli for Pashmakli.

Two squadrons of cavalry belonging to the 3rd regiment were also under orders to leave for the same destination within two days.

All these movements of troops are justified as being necessary for the maintenance of order and the suppression of any so-called autonomist attempt in the region of Nevrokop, on Bulgarian territory.

Concerning the military concentrations around Nevrokop, the French colonel, head of the Inter-Allied Mission of Control, informed the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia that the troops already in that area numbered three battalions, totalling about 4,000 men. He added that he had demanded explanations from the Bulgarian staff, but has as yet received no reply.

It has been further reported that, on the 3rd instant, two field guns of the Philippopoli Regiment were sent to Nevrokop, and on the 4th another field battery left Philippopoli for Cepelare.

On the 9th November a section of the 8th group of artillery, of six field guns, was ordered from Stara-Zagora to Tyrnovo-Siemen and from there to Pashmakli.

At the same time the following equipment has been sent from Sofia to the Commissariat of Philippopoli: 25,000 overcoats, 20,000 uniforms and 30,000 puttees.

According to other reliable information, komitajis have been arriving by railway in the region of Mustapha Pasha. They are there armed and equipped and formed into bands, which are landed on the eastern bank of the Maritza. A village of that region was attacked by a band 200 strong. They murdered and pillaged and then made for Eastern Thrace.

According to further information from Philippopoli and Sofia, the Bulgarian autonomist organisation has decided that Bulgarian bands should invade Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace one of these days, with an object on Porcia, Serres, Drama, Xanthi and Gumuldjina, in view to impressing the forthcoming Peace Conference by creating trouble in this province, which they would attempt to present as a local movement. These bands are to be reinforced through a local enrolment by the autonomist agents in the frontier region, under army officers and non-commissioned officers. They are provided with numerous machine guns.

The whole garrison of Philippopoli, with the exception of a battalion of gendarmerie, has been directed towards the frontier of Pashmakli.

The Bulgarian Minister of the Interior has apparently gone to Nevrokop in order to acquaint himself with the situation there. He was met at Mahomia by members of the executive of the komitaji organisation. He is said to have declared to them that not only did the Bulgarian Government not oppose the fomentation of a movement in Greek territory, but that such a movement would also have their support in the form of a supply of arms.

On the other hand, he is reported to have requested that no such action should be taken in Serbian Macedonia.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

[E 12885/27/44] No. 597.

Mr. Harvey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 18.)

United States Embassy, London,
November 17, 1922.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the following reply to the invitation to the Near Eastern Conference at Lausanne, which was extended to the United States Government through the British, French and Italian representatives at Washington, was sent, *mutatis mutandis*, to those same representatives on the 14th November, 1922:—

"The Department of State has received the communication of the French Chargé d'Affaires, dated the 27th October, stating that the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy are inviting the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugo-slavia, Greece and Turkey to send representatives to Lausanne to conclude a Treaty of Peace to end the war in the East, and that they would welcome the presence of United States representatives at Lausanne in a capacity similar to that of the representative of the United States Government who was present at San Remo in 1920, or in a more active capacity.

"Previous to the receipt of the French Chargé d'Affaires' communication, instructions had been sent to the American Ambassadors in Paris, London and Rome to communicate to the respective Governments on the 30th October an *aide-mémoire* briefly outlining this Government's attitude toward the proposed conference at Lausanne and indicating that American representatives would be present for the purposes stated in the *aide-mémoire*, if this were agreeable.

"To supplement this Government's communication of the 30th October, and in reply to the memorandum of the 27th October, the Secretary of State takes pleasure in advising the French Chargé d'Affaires that the President will be pleased to designate as such representatives the American Ambassador to Italy and the American Minister to Switzerland. The High Commissioner at Constantinople will be associated with Ambassador Child and Minister Grew during such time as his present duties may permit."

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
OLIVER B. HARRIMAN,
First Secretary of Embassy.

No. 598.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 721.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 18, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 719.

I am informed that Refet Pasha was furiously angry on learning of Sultan's departure yesterday, and that he has telegraphed to Angora suggesting new Caliph be immediately nominated and that Angora Government should demand extradition of Sultan.

Angora will have some difficulty in nominating new Caliph in manner which will appear satisfactory to Moslem world. It is also believed that all princes of house of Osman have unanimously decided to refuse Caliphate. It is possible, however, that Angora might induce Prince Selim, son of late Abdul Hamid, and who is half-witted, to accept.

Turkish press, which published official communication only this morning, endeavours to belittle affair. It describes flight of Sultan as act of treachery and cowardice, and of no interest either to Turkey or Moslems. Public opinion here has not yet definitely been formed or realised importance of event.

Persian Ambassador informed me to-day, however, that some, even of Sultan's well-wishers, were dissatisfied with action he had taken.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 37, for Lord Curzon.)

No. 599.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 18.)

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 18, 1922.*

I HAVE just returned from very friendly interview with President, in which he said that there were two questions of supreme importance, on both of which there existed misunderstanding on one side or the other. The English seemed [? groups omitted] absolutely firm intention of [? French] to stand with them at Constantinople in all circumstances. On the other hand, we were suspected in some quarters of desiring to acquire an exceptional position in Constantinople in the future, and flight of Sultan under British protection was thought to lend some countenance to this view. On the first point I cordially welcomed President's assurance, of which, I added, test might arise at any time during the next few weeks, and manner of executing which I proposed to discuss with President of the Council this afternoon. On the second point I warmly repudiated any such British ambition, and added that flight of Sultan, so far from being prearranged, had taken us completely by surprise, and I had first read of it in the newspapers. We were as much puzzled as anyone to know what to do with him.

Regarding approaching work at Lausanne, President declared that it was essential that, while doing our best to create a self-respecting Turkish State, we should abate none of the safeguards which were necessary for the protection of our interests. On my observing that there seemed to me a very marked change in French public opinion [? as to] necessity for resisting impossible claims, President admitted that this was the case, and declared emphatically that only by an unbroken front at Lausanne should we win through.

No. 600.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 685.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 18, 1922.*

MINISTRY for Foreign Affairs inform me that French consul at Kirk Kilisse has been ordered to leave by Turks, and that Italian mining company in neighbourhood have also been ordered away.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 601.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 726.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 19, 1922.*

AFTER prolonged secret session, in which apparently only 162 Deputies participated, telegrams from Angora state that Grand National Assembly elected Crown Prince Abdul Mejid as Caliph by 148 votes, Prince Selim getting three and Abdul Rahman two.

French High Commissioner told me last night that his reports from Syria indicate that first impression of Moslems there was that election of Caliph at Angora could not be recognised.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 1.)

No. 602.

Lord Hardinge to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 610.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 18, 1922*

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon:—

"Discussion this afternoon lasted nearly five hours, and covered all points raised in my memorandum. New Italian Ambassador, although not yet accredited,

took advantage of his presence at preceding official breakfast at Quai d'Orsay to insist upon attending meeting; and the certainty that responsibility for refusal would be thrown upon me alone compelled me to acquiese, even though I shall have to go through the entire business again with Signor Mussolini to-morrow. The conference was also joined by the two French delegates for Lausanne, to the co-operation of one of whom I look forward with dismay. Although it left us in general but rather indeterminate agreement on principal points, and would not justify me in refusing to proceed to Lausanne, it nevertheless left upon my mind a somewhat discouraging impression. For there was the familiar disputation on rather narrow and technical points. M. Poincaré seemed a somewhat reluctant convert to the doctrine of complete harmony; and the edifice which we succeeded in erecting was one for which no one seemed to predict any sure success and which in many respects is a facade rather than a structure. That the Turks will accept it seems very unlikely. That if accepted it will provide any permanent solution of the problem is improbable.

"Discussion began with examination of military situation at Constantinople. To explicit questions from me, M. Poincaré replied: (1) that France would send no reinforcements; (2) that if attacked French troops would resist force by force; (3) that if ordered by the Turks to evacuate they would refuse to go; (4) but that if compelled by situation to withdraw they would retire with us to Gallipoli and hold it. If we were to be confronted at Lausanne by menace of military action by Turks, we must, he said, wait for situation to arise and deal with it as best we could.

"Marshal Foch proposed that the High Commissioners should hand over their powers, in absence of Rumbold and Garroni, to the generals, which I declined to accept; and further that the generals should be instructed to draw up an immediate plan for the military defence of Constantinople. This also I resisted on the ground that without further troops, which the French had declined to send, the city is militarily indefensible. Poincaré, quoting a recent telegram from General Pellé, described the local situation as much more favourable, and did not think that any of my contemplated dangers would arise.

"We then passed to the memorandum

"*Western Thrace.*—There was general agreement that Turkish demand for plebiscite must be absolutely refused. When I proposed neutral zone to west of Maritza, including triangle ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915, and extending southwards to the sea so as to provide exit for Bulgaria to Ægean, and a corresponding, but narrower, demilitarised zone in Eastern Thrace to east of Maritza, to include Adrianople, Poincaré accepted in principle, but argued strongly in favour of giving forts and station of Karagatch to the Turks. It was finally agreed to discuss this at Lausanne. If both Adrianople and Karagatch are demilitarised, the point, which is not of essential value, may ultimately have to be conceded, subject to running rights over railway, though, as I pointed out, Turkey had voluntarily made the surrender in 1915, and other States may have views on the subject.

"*Freedom of the Straits.*—Upon this I interrogated the French as to what exactly they understand by the phrase. Poincaré produced a formula drawn up by Fromageot, which provides (1) for the complete commercial freedom of the Straits, subject to Turkey, if she is a belligerent, retaining the right to visit and search; (2) as regards ships of war, free passage in peace for ships of all flags, subject to a limit of numbers and tonnage and duration of stay. In time of war, if Turkey is neutral, a corresponding freedom of passage, subject to Hague Convention restrictions as regards belligerent action. If, on the other hand, Turkey is a belligerent, complete freedom for neutral vessels only. As the French are prepared to put forward this formula, which is in excess of our proposals, I agree to their suggesting it at the conference.

"*Demilitarised Zones of both Straits.*—French are prepared to demand the demilitarisation of Gallipoli Peninsula on European shore of Dardanelles, and Chanak Sanjak on Asiatic shore; and also demilitarisation of existing neutral zones on the two shores of the Bosphorus; and their idea is to place these zones under the League of Nations. When I pointed out the difficulties, namely, that the League might be unwilling, that probably Turkey, and certainly Russia, would object, and that there would be no guarantees for the execution of these servitudes, if accepted, the criticism was frankly admitted, but it was contended by Marshal Foch that though the protection thus afforded would be largely illusory, it might avail to give a breathing space of a week on the outbreak of hostilities, when the Straits could be forced before the Turks had had time to block or defend them.

"The inspecting body under the League of Nations would be the International

Straits Commission created by the Treaty of Sèvres, whose functions would be extended to include this duty. Here, again, I was prepared to leave the responsibility of the suggestion to the French.

"*Turkish Armed Forces.*—As regards conscription, I pointed out the danger of conceding to Turkey what has been refused to Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary and Germany, and proposed, in accordance with March formula, that date of introducing voluntary system might be indefinitely postponed.

"Concerning Turkish forces in Europe, a limitation of these to 15,000, gendarmerie and garrison of Constantinople included, was proposed by Foch. As regards gendarmerie, I insisted that if Turkey accepted foreign officers, these should be taken in equal proportions from the three Great Powers. I also protested against any French monopoly of gendarmerie instructors or otherwise, as foreshadowed in Angora Treaty of Franklin-Bouillon, concerning which Poincaré inadvertently admitted that text of incriminating letter supplied to us was a Quai d'Orsay version of more than one letter exchanged between Franklin-Bouillon and Kemal. As to the limitation of Turkish forces in Asia, I suggested that it might be well to fix some limit, however illusory in practice, to maintain the principle adopted in treaties with other enemy Powers. The whole subject was left in a vague and unsatisfactory position, and I doubt the French standing firm on any points except Turkish army in Thrace.

"*Capitulations.*—Upon this point it was agreed to invite the various States possessing capitulary treaties with Turkey to send a single representative, each to be heard at the conference, in order to broaden the base of strong attitude taken up by the Great Powers. As to the latter, it was agreed to drop all mention of the 'name' Capitulations, and to put forward draft articles, drawn up by the Allied experts, on the lines of the British draft.

"*Islands in the Ægean.*—British formula accepted, though France exhibited a tentative desire to propose restoration of Tenedos and Imbros, after demilitarisation, to Turkey—a proposal which I shall certainly resist. The Italian Ambassador made a rather unintelligible protest about Italian claims.

"*Frontiers of Syria and Irak: Future of Mandated Territories and Allied Graves.*—Proposals in my memorandum accepted.

"*Indemnities.*—A discussion ensued on this point ending in the remark from me that while everybody would put forward claims, very likely quite defensible, for damages inflicted, it would be difficult to extract anything substantial, and the various demands would for the most part be written off, the one against the other.

"*Pre-war Debt.*—It was agreed to maintain the principle of March resolutions

"*Minorities.*—It was agreed to proceed as far as possible in the direction of March resolutions.

"The bulk of these agreements will, I suppose, have to be thrashed again with Signor Mussolini, whom we meet, at the end of an exhausting journey, on the Lake of Geneva to-morrow night."

No. 603.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 2. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 10, 1922.*

PRIME MINISTER, much impressed by apparently still continuing French suspicions of designs on our part to establish special position for ourselves at Constantinople or in Dardanelles, asks me to suggest for your consideration whether we should not propose that French Government should confer command in Turkey on Marshal Foch, in which case we should offer to place the British troops there under his orders. If French Government were to accept such arrangement, it would present obvious advantage (1) of convincing them that designs attributed to us have no existence in fact, (2) of impressing Turks with reality of Allied unity in face of possible military encroachments, and (3) of France becoming more definitely committed to making determined stand against such encroachments in co-operation with Great Britain and Italy.

It would be necessary to lay stress on our readiness to confide supreme command over Allied forces to Marshal Foch on account of his great military position and the confidence reposed in him personally by His Majesty's Government. There is, of course, a risk that French Government, whilst unwilling or unable to send Marshal

Foch, might be eager to interpret our suggestion as implying readiness to accept French supreme command in the person of any French general, such, for instance, as Weygand, or even Charpy. This, of course, would not be acceptable. It is only the predominant personality of the marshal to which we could without serious loss of prestige subordinate command of British forces. If this be made clear, no harm could come of our proposal, even if French Government did not accept it, whilst fact of our making it might help to dissipate French uneasiness as to our policy.

In placing above considerations before you, Prime Minister leaves it entirely to your judgment whether you will moot the suggestion with M. Poincaré. I understand that it is sympathetically viewed by Lord Derby.

[E 12930/12891/44] No. 604.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 1005.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 14, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 644 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an "Agence d'Anatolie" telegram of the 1st November, giving the full text of the resolution of the Grand National Assembly regarding the abolition of the office of Sultan.

2. It will be observed that the resolution does not purport to be a legislative act, but merely to define a situation already created by the promulgation of the text of the Angora "Fundamental Law." It is, however, an undoubted fact that such a definition of the effect of that law is far in advance of the ideas of many members of the Grand National Assembly. The resignation of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs (the Angora equivalent of the Sheikh-ul-Islam), which occurred soon after the adoption of the resolution, is interpreted as a sign of disapproval on the part of some of the Ulema.

3. It is also noteworthy that the resolution is described as having been passed "unanimously and by acclamation." As it is certain that the Assembly were not unanimous, this suggests that the promoters of the resolution preferred acclamation to a division.

4. The Angora Government are still holding their hand as regards the Sultan's position as Caliph. He was prayed for by name with the title of Caliph in the Constantinople mosques last Friday, the 10th November, and he was not prevented from going in state as usual to the midday prayer. Only his own guards, however, took part in the ceremony, so that the military display, already much reduced since Abdul Hamid's day, when the "selamlik" was a really imposing function, was on the smallest possible scale.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 604.

Text of Resolution adopted by the Grand National Assembly.

(*Extract from the "Agence d'Anatolie" of November* 1, 1922.)

(Translation.)

IN the last session of the historical meeting held to-day, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey unanimously adopted the following decision:—

"The Ottoman Empire having at last passed into history after having been violently shaken for centuries by great calamities due to the ignorance and debauchery of the Palace and the Sublime Porte, the Turkish nation, the founder and true owner of that Empire, rose up in Anatolia against its foreign enemies and also threw itself into the fight against the Palace and the Sublime Porte, who allied themselves with these enemies and worked against the nation. After constituting the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, its Government and its armies, and in the midst of the great difficulties and sorrowful privations which are known, it commenced the struggle by acts and by arms against the foreign enemy, the Palace and the Sublime Porte, and has to-day obtained its deliverance.

"When the Turkish nation saw the treason of the Palace and of the Sublime Porte, it promulgated the law of fundamental organisation, which, by its first article, took the sovereignty from the Sultan and invested it in the nation itself, and by its second placed the executive and legislative powers in its own strong hand. By its seventh article it assembled in the person of the nation all the rights of sovereignty such as the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. As from that time, therefore, the old Ottoman Empire was overthrown and its place taken by a new and National Turkish Government, the Sultanate abolished and the Grand National Assembly put in its place. That is to say, that the Council which exists to-day in Constantinople possesses no lawful and non-foreign force or national assistance regularly to protect its existence and is as a shadow which has disappeared.

"The nation has established the administration of a popular Government protecting the rights and guaranteeing the happiness of the peasants and of the mass of the people in place of the Government founded on personal sovereignty and on the debauchery of the people of the Palace and of its surroundings. In view of this state of affairs, we are astonished to see that in Constantinople people who have been collaborating with the enemy are talking of the rights of the Caliphate and Sultanate and of the rights of the dynasty. It is rare in history that a document is seen so strange, so astonishing and so contrary to fact as the telegram of Tewfik Pasha. The Grand National Assembly has therefore decided to promulgate the following articles:—

"'1. By the fundamental law the people of Turkey decided to invest with representative rights and to use effectively the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which is the true representative of its sovereign rights and sovereignty, in a manner admitting of no abandonment, divisibility or renunciation, and not to recognise any power or body not founded on the national will. It therefore does not recognise any form of government other than the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, within the limits of the National Pact (or "within the National Pact frontiers"). Consequently the people of Turkey consider as having passed into history as from the 16th March, 1336, and for ever the form of government in Constantinople which is founded on personal sovereignty.

"'2. The Caliphate is vested in the House of Osman, and the member of this House most qualified and suitable in respect of learning and moral character is elected to the office of Caliph by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Turkish State is the support of the Caliphate.'

"*November* 1, 1922."

After this decision had been accepted unanimously and by acclamation by the Grand National Assembly, Reouf Bey mounted the tribune and proposed that to-night and to-morrow, the 2nd November, be considered as a Bairam festival. The Assembly accepted this proposal with cheers and the sitting ended with an eloquent prayer. These historic decisions of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey were announced by a salute of 101 guns, and the troops have begun to celebrate them by torchlight processions and music. The manifestations continue. Everybody is joyful and congratulates everybody else. The "Agence d'Anatolie," on the occasion of this national Bairam, which coincides with the birthday of the Prophet, congratulates the great Turkish nation, the worker of miracles, and the Great National Assembly, its sole representative.

[E 12931/10524/44] No. 605.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 1006.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram No. 656 of the 5th instant relative to the expulsion of the Christians from Anatolia, and to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a joint note addressed to Hamid Bey by my Allied colleagues and myself.

2. The United States High Commissioner also addressed a similar note to Hamid Bey.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 605.

Joint Allied Note to Hamid Bey.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie apprennent que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale insiste sur le départ immédiat des enfants, d'origine grecque ou arménienne, qui sont à présent maintenus dans les orphelinats du Near East Relief en Anatolie.

Ils apprennent également qu'il est l'intention du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale d'évacuer, dans une période de quinze à trente jours, toute la population grecque ou arménienne de l'Anatolie occidentale. Cette décision aura déjà été notifiée aux habitants grecs et arméniens de tout le littoral de la mer Noire. Il serait même l'intention du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale d'appliquer une pareille mesure éventuellement à la population de Constantinople.

Les conséquences, si ce n'est que du point de vue de l'humanité, d'un pareil procédé se rapportant à une population d'entre un et deux millions de personnes ne sauront être méconnues par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale. Son application serait d'autant plus regrettable à la veille d'une conférence où le monde espère que les bases seront posées pour une paix juste et durable dans le Proche-Orient.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont donc l'honneur de prier son Excellence Hamid Bey de bien vouloir porter ce qui précède d'urgence au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale à Angora en exprimant l'espoir des soussignés que cette mesure, si en effet elle est envisagée, sera rapportée ou, au moins que les délais indiqués seront prolongés afin que la question de l'avenir de ces populations soit soumise pour discussion à la Conférence de la Paix.

PELLÉ.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 6 novembre 1922.

[E 12935/12929/44] No. 606.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 1010.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report on Consul Matthews's visit to Adrianople.

Constantinople, November 14, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 606.

Consul Matthews to Sir H. Rumbold.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in conformity with your Excellency's instructions, I proceeded to Adrianople on the 23rd ultimo. I was met at the railway station by the secretary of the Greek Civil Governor and by the Chief of Police, who bade me welcome on behalf of the Greek Administration. On the 24th ultimo I called on General Katchaki, the Civil Governor, who is said to be an ardent Veniselist and was for some time head of the Greek Military Mission in Constantinople; on Major Bamford, British member of the Inter-Allied Military Mission; on M. Pérétier, French consul; and on M. Badetti, acting Italian vice-consul. M. Pérétier and M. Badetti returned my call in the course of the afternoon of the 24th October, and General Katchaki returned my call the following day. M. Dimitriades, Mayor of Karagatch, called on me on the 25th ultimo, and the Greek Archbishop and the vicar of the Armenian Archbishop a few days later.

2. General Katchaki told me that the evacuation was proceeding in an orderly manner, and would be completed within the time laid down by the Mudania Convention.

He was experiencing difficulty in obtaining rolling-stock, particularly locomotives, and would be grateful if I could induce the company to meet him in this matter (my telegram of the 24th October). I subsequently had many conversations on this subject with the station-master and other railway officials, who assured me that everything possible was being done to provide more rolling-stock. However, I formed the opinion, which was shared by Major W. J. Ross, R.E., president of the Mixed Railway Commission, that the Oriental Railway Company was pursuing a policy of obstruction, in which it had the support of French officials on the spot. As a result, parties of refugees were held up for days at the Adrianople (Karagatch) railway station, and large quantities of grain, estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 tons, have had to be abandoned by the owners.

3. In a conversation which I had with him on the 25th ultimo, the French consul referred to the necessity of drawing the new frontier line so as to include Karagatch with Adrianople, although Karagatch was on the right bank of the Maritza. I told M. Pérétier that I did not agree with him, and pointed out that Bulgaria had obtained Karagatch from Turkey in 1915, when the Maritza had been fixed as the frontier line between the two countries. I added that I understood that, from a military point of view, the Maritza formed the best frontier line. The branch railway line from Karagatch to Adrianople, which was constructed during the Great War, gave Adrianople railway communication, and was a sufficient guarantee that the town would not suffer commercially. This branch line, which does not appear to be marked on any map, runs east from Karagatch for about 1 kilom., and then north or north-west for about 2 kilom. to the bridge over the Maritza at Adrianople. I walked over the line on the 8th instant with Major Ross, who stated that it was in good working order. From this conversation with M. Pérétier and from conversations which I had with French military officers, I came to the conclusion that French opinion in Adrianople was in favour of Karagatch being restored to Turkey.

4. I had several long conversations with M. Badetti, the acting Italian vice-consul, who is also honorary Belgian consul. M. Badetti is a member of an old Levantine family, and owns considerable property in Adrianople. He is 60 years of age, and has had experience of Turkish, Bulgarian and Greek rule in Adrianople. His solution of the problem of Thrace is to form an autonomous province, with Adrianople as capital, under the supervision of some Power, such as Great Britain or France, able and willing to spend money on the development of the country, which is agriculturally rich. I was interested to find that M. Doulas, a local landowner of Ottoman Greek origin and honorary dragoman of the French consulate, whom I first met in 1909, was also in favour of forming an autonomous province in Thrace, under the guarantee of one or of several of the Great Powers. While such a solution could scarcely be a definite or permanent one, it is one which the Greeks and the Bulgars, and even the Turks and the Great Powers, might find it convenient to adopt in the absence of a better.

5. By my telegram of the 6th instant I reported to your Excellency a statement of the French member of the Mixed Railway Commission that he anticipated that 150,000 Bulgars, who had been expelled from Eastern Thrace, would return to their former homes when the Mixed Railway Commission had assumed control of the railway on the right bank of the Maritza, in accordance with article 4 of the Convention of Mudania. The figure of 150,000 Bulgars seems to me to be exaggerated, and I was unable to obtain confirmation of it in Adrianople. The Greek Archbishop, Mgr. Polycarp, who has been in Adrianople since 1910, indeed assured me that there were never at any time since that year more than 40,000 Bulgars, including Moslem Bulgars like the Pomaks, in Eastern Thrace. The Turks and Greeks between them appear to have eliminated the Bulgar element from Adrianople and Eastern Thrace, and the only Bulgar of whom I heard in Adrianople was the priest in charge of the Bulgarian episcopal diocese. His duties appear to consist in viséing the passports of persons desiring to proceed to Bulgaria. It may be doubted whether the Turks would receive Christian Bulgars, even if the latter were willing to return to Eastern Thrace.

6. I was favourably impressed, during my stay in Adrianople, by the behaviour of the Greek troops. I witnessed no disorder, nor were any cases of disorder on the part of the troops brought to my notice. I made careful enquiries, and heard no complaints of acts of indiscipline, such as looting and drunkenness, which might have been expected in the circumstances. The only signs of relaxed discipline apparent were that soldiers seldom saluted officers and that troops departing by train usually fired their rifles into the air as the train left the station.

7. With regard to the refugees, much hardship was suffered, especially by the refugees who had to encamp in the open in inclement weather while waiting for trains

to convey them elsewhere. Everything possible was done to alleviate their lot by the Greek Administration and by relief societies, and there was not, at least at Adrianople, any shortage of food.

8. A disquieting feature of the evacuation was the appearance of armed bands of Turkish marauders. Their activities have no doubt been reported by the Inter-Allied Military Commission, and I merely venture to draw attention to the following outrages, which were reported to me as having occurred between the 23rd and 28th ultimo.

9.—(1.) Armed Turkish peasants attacked a party of refugees at the village of Viza (Kirk Killisseh), and drove off four head of cattle.

(2.) A band of 100 armed Turks attacked a Greek shepherd near the village of Murghitas, and captured his flock of 300 sheep.

(3.) A band of eighty armed Turks attacked twenty Greek shepherds near Malgara, killing one of the shepherds and capturing twenty-five cows.

(4.) A band of Turks attacked five Greek shepherds near Chorlu, killing two shepherds.

10. I reported, under date of the 8th instant, that forty Greek gendarmes had been attacked on the 6th *idem* at the village of Yenijeh, on the road from Kirk Kilisseh to Havsa, by a Turkish band, which brought a machine gun into action. The Greek gendarmes were reported to have been all either killed or captured, and a force of 150 Greek gendarmes was despatched from Adrianople to endeavour to capture the band. I have reported separately on the derailing of a train between Kirk Kilisseh and Pavli-keui.

11. The evacuation of Eastern Thrace by the Greek army was carried out by the 30th ultimo, and the evacuation of the civilian population was almost completed when I left Adrianople on the 8th instant. I understand that General Nider, who commanded the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, has established his headquarters at Dimotika, and that arrangements are being made for General Katehaki, the Civil Governor, to take up his quarters at Gulmuljina. I was informed that the Greeks were keeping a force of three divisions on the right bank of the Maritza.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[E 12936/27/44] No. 607.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 1011.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 14, 1922.

I RECEIVED a visit a few days ago from Izzet Pasha, late Minister for Foreign Affairs. He came to thank me for helping him during his tenure of office.

2. I gathered from Izzet Pasha that he had been opposed to the resignation of the late Government, and, although he was too loyal to say so, I inferred that he blamed the Grand Vizier for this step. He stated that on the 4th November, the day on which the Grand Vizier resigned, he, Izzet Pasha, had gone to his office in the afternoon in ignorance of that fact, and had found that four Ministries were already vacant and that there was only a rump of a Cabinet left. In these circumstances there was nothing for him to do but to retire with the Cabinet.

3. I asked Izzet Pasha whether he knew personally Dr. Riza Nour, the second Turkish plenipotentiary. He replied in the affirmative and described Riza Nour as "une canaille." It appears that this personage has belonged at one time or another to most of the parties in the State and is a regular turn-coat.

4. Before he got up to leave Izzet Pasha said that as a Turk he ought naturally to rejoice in the Turkish victories over the Greeks, but he was now almost tempted to regret them.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 12937/27/44] No. 608.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 1012.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 14, 1922.

REFET PASHA paid me a visit on the 10th instant. I had previously arranged with my colleagues that we would not discuss political matters separately with Refet Pasha, with whom at that time we contemplated having a collective interview. I had therefore taken the precaution of informing Refet Pasha beforehand that I should look upon his visit merely as one of courtesy.

2. I returned the visit on the following day, the 11th instant, and found Refet Pasha installed in the part of the building of the Sublime Porte formerly occupied by the Grand Vizier. I purposely avoided all allusion to political matters and to the breaches of the Capitulations made by the Kemalists since they have taken over the administration of Constantinople; but when Refet Pasha complained of the criticisms in the Leafield press of the recent actions of the Kemalists at Constantinople, I said that this press faithfully reflected public opinion in England and that he would find that the electorate would be solidly behind the British Government in any measures it had to take in the Near East.

3. Refet Pasha then gave an entirely unconvincing explanation of the two notes delivered to the High Commissioners on the 5th instant suggesting the evacuation of Constantinople and announcing restrictions on the movements of Allied warships.

4. My Allied colleagues and I have agreed to see as little as possible of Refet Pasha.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 12946/27/44] No. 609.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 1057.)
My Lord, *Rome, November* 15, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 12th instant, upon hearing that the French Ambassador was to be received by Signor Mussolini, I telephoned to the latter to remind his Excellency that it was he who had at our first interview suggested and pressed for a preliminary inter-Allied exchange of views before the Lausanne Conference. I expressed my hope that he would in no case depart from this attitude. I gather that he did in fact maintain it in his conversation with M. Barrère.

In the afternoon I saw M. Barrère and discussed the situation with him. He said that he could not believe there would be the slightest chance that the Italian Government would authorise him to speak for them at any meeting, as had been suggested in your Lordship's telegram to Lord Hardinge No. 421 of the 10th November. In the evening the Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs confirmed this view, and said that such a solution was out of the question. It would in no sense satisfy Italian public opinion, which was especially sensitive on the question of participation in inter-Allied conversations of this nature.

Your Lordship's telegram to Lord Hardinge No. 428 indicated that you contemplated a separate conversation with M. Poincaré with a view to deciding a common front with France on all the main issues, and assumed that Italy would doubtless follow suit. In my telegram No. 372 I ventured to warn your Lordship that such a meeting might be misconstrued here, and that Italian feeling on the subject was extremely susceptible. A little later in the day Signor Mussolini telephoned to me that he had seen the news of the proposed meeting in a Havas telegram. He was himself unfortunately unable to attend, and if it took place without Italian participation, the effect throughout the country, and more especially on his own political position, would be deplorable. He was therefore sending the Marquis della Torretta that night post haste to London, and hoped that he would arrive in time to be present and to represent the Italian point of view.

In the meantime news and comment on the subject began to accumulate in the Italian press. I have the honour to transmit extracts from the "Messaggero" of

yesterday in the shape of a message from their Paris correspondent, and a bitter leading article. Moreover, the press was flooded with Havas messages and telegrams from the Paris correspondents of the Italian newspapers, all of which endeavoured to show that your Lordship had wished to have a separate conversation *à deux* with the French President of the Council, and that this humiliation to Italy had only been averted by the attitude of M. Poincaré.

The absurd Sforza incident in September last will have shown your Lordship how easily the Italian public will swallow misrepresentations. It produced a painful impression here, which no subsequent explanations have been able to dissipate, and it was extremely desirable to avoid a repetition of any similar misunderstanding on the present occasion.

I called at once at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the misleading and unfair impression which the "Messaggero" and other similar articles were calculated to convey to the Italian public. Your Lordship had repeatedly invited Signor Mussolini to meet you in London or Paris or elsewhere, and had shown a special desire that this meeting should take place. If Signor Mussolini had, owing to his parliamentary obligations, been prevented from accepting, this was no fault of ours. Moreover, if there had ever been any reluctance to a meeting of the three Ministers it had come from the French side. Signor Contarini entirely agreed and promised that he would have a communiqué inserted in the evening's papers. A paragraph then appeared in the "Tribuna" to explain the reasons for the sudden departure of the Marquis della Torretta for London, but it was couched in ambiguous terms. It concluded by saying that there had been a tendency to think that your Lordship's invitation to M. Poincaré signified a desire to leave Italy aside. "This is perhaps a mistaken interpretation," since only a few days previously you had invited his Excellency to proceed to London to discuss the Near Eastern problem. It was in any case well that the Marquis della Torretta had left for London at once.

In a telephonic conversation with the Secretary-General yesterday evening I said that this explanation appeared to me insufficient. He undertook to do better, and this morning a perfectly satisfactory communiqué from the Stefani Agency has appeared in all the papers disposing once and for all of the tendencious and malicious rumours hitherto current. The "Messaggero" published a correction and expressed regret at having been misled.

I can well understand the annoyance which must be caused to your Lordship by my reports of unreasonable protests from the Italian Government and ridiculous statements in the press. But I have been faced during this past week with what amounts to a regular campaign of French propaganda in order to indispose Italian feeling towards Great Britain and to bring Italy into line with France on the question of the Near East. As a further instance of this tendency, Havas Agency yesterday reported that your Lordship's memorandum proposing the points for agreement between the Allied Governments was only being communicated in Paris and not in Rome. The Secretary-General asked my permission to correct this message, as he had already received the intimation from me that identical communications were being made in Rome and Paris. I at once authorised him to do so. I am calling your Lordship's attention in a separate despatch to the serious inconvenience of having Reuter messages distributed throughout Europe by the Havas Agency. The Italian Ministers with whom I have to deal, not even excepting Signor Mussolini, are extremely sensitive to all manifestations of Italian feeling and attach an altogether exaggerated importance to them. I have endeavoured to explain their point of view in my recent telegrams to your Lordship and the reasons which have prompted me in addressing you so persistently on the subject. Italy is at this moment hesitating as to her Near Eastern policy and, although I believe Signor Mussolini to be inclined to follow your Lordship's lead and to adopt a firm line towards excessive Turkish pretensions, there is also a strong current here in favour of the policy of the late Government, which was that in no circumstances whatever would Italy be drawn into any action against the Turks or despatch a single soldier to the Near East. The margin of governmental and public feeling between the two policies is so narrow that I have felt that no effort ought to be spared in order to maintain the Italian Government in line with ourselves at this crucial moment, and that if this can only be accomplished by observing a somewhat exaggerated regard towards their susceptibilities, it is still worth while.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 609.

Extract from the "Messaggero" of November 14, 1922.

THE following extract is taken from a telegram, dated from Paris the 13th November, which appeared in the "Messaggero" on the 14th November :—

(Translation.)

"At 9 A.M. Lord Hardinge, the British Ambassador, proceeded to Quai d'Orsay on behalf of his Government to ask the French President of the Council to go to London to examine with Lord Curzon the attitude to be adopted at the Peace Conference with Turkey, and to exchange views on the various problems of foreign policy actually at issue regarding reparations, Tangier, Egypt and Tunis. An Italian representative could participate in these conversations—according to the Foreign Office proposal—in the examination of those questions in which Italy was interested.

"It is to be noted that the Sforza incident at the time of the Curzon–Poincaré conversation which preceded Mudania, when our Ambassador imposed his presence on the French and English Prime Ministers, has created a precedent. Indeed, Poincaré observed to Lord Hardinge that Italian susceptibility, not without reason, might be shocked at a conversation *à deux* and that for his part he preferred a meeting *à trois*. 'If all three of us can meet,' said the French President of the Council, 'I will be at your disposal when and where you wish, although I am obliged to continue a debate already begun in the Chamber.'"

Enclosure 2 in No. 609.

Extract from the "Giornale di Roma" of November 14, 1922.

THE following passage occurs in a telegram, dated Paris the 13th November, which appeared in the "Giornale di Roma" on the 14th November :—

(Translation.)

"Meanwhile officially inspired reports confirm what we have already said regarding the increased authority gained by Italy with the advent to power of the new Government, an authority which demonstrates the necessity of not treating her any longer as a nation under age, but as one always to be regarded as an equal in all Allied conflicts. The press reports in fact that among the objections communicated to London regarding a meeting between Poincaré and Lord Curzon, the French President of the Council had also made a point of not accepting a meeting *à deux* in order not to hurt Italy's feelings, but had announced his readiness to meet a British delegate at any moment and at any place if he were sure that the Italian President of the Council could also attend the meeting.

"It was precisely to save Mussolini the long journey from Rome to London that Poincaré proposed a preliminary inter-Allied meeting at Lausanne."

Enclosure 3 in No. 609.

Extract from the "Messaggero" of November 14, 1922.

(Translation.)

ITALY AT THE SIDE OF THE ALLIES.

THE Marquis della Torretta, the new Italian Ambassador in London, left Rome yesterday evening for the British capital. The reasons for hastening his departure, which was to have taken place some days later, are to be found in the news that Lord Curzon has asked M. Poincaré to go to England for a preliminary conversation *à deux* in regard to the Eastern question.

The answer of M. Poincaré to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the conversation must not and cannot take place without the participation of Italy's

representative, has put things right. But we are bound to regret the fact that at this moment—when it is of the highest importance that all the nations of the *Entente* should really unite to follow a single line of conduct, in an agreement between the Allies that should be not merely apparent but substantial and harmonious—Lord Curzon should have chosen to consider Italy as occupying a secondary position in regard to a question in which, as a Mediterranean Power, she is necessarily a principal actor.

Lord Curzon is preparing a real and hearty welcome to the Marquis della Torretta as representative of the King of Italy in the British capital and at the Court of King George V. He, himself, has announced this welcome in a cordial telegram sent to the successor of Commendatore de Martino immediately after the official announcement of his nomination. We note this with pleasure. But we think that the best proof of British good intentions, not only towards the new Ambassador, but towards Italy, ought to have consisted, on the part of the British Foreign Minister, in a just estimate of the position of Italy and of the rights and duties which are hers in regard to an international problem which touches her interests at least as nearly as those of England and France.

We should be glad to think that the answer of the Chief of the French Government has made Lord Curzon understand the inopportune nature of his proposal, which appeared to forget our country. But we think in particular that the order given by the Italian Premier, Signor Mussolini, to the new Ambassador, to reach his post by the speediest possible means, will have given to the Foreign Office the sensation that there is a Government in Italy which—while being sincerely and loyally in favour of the *Entente*—intends to maintain Italy's position among the Allies as that of an equal among equals, and will not consent to any infringement of her dignity and her interests. If frank words and frank attitudes are the essential basis of good friendships, the explicit frankness of language held by Signor Mussolini in his recent conversations with Lord [*sic*] Graham, the British Ambassador in Rome, has furnished this basis. It will be the duty of the Marquis della Torretta to complete the work.

In this task, we are certain, there will not be lacking the hearty and active co-operation of England, persuaded as she is, more than ever, of the value of Italian friendship.

No. 610.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 727.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 20, 1922.

ATHENS telegram No. 685.

French High Commissioner informs me that Turks have ordered all Ottoman Greeks to leave Kirk Kilisse; French consular agent there, being an Ottoman Greek, is included. French High Commissioner is protesting to Refet Pasha against this order.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 254.)

No. 611.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November* 19, 1922.

UPON arriving with M. Poincaré at Lausanne this evening; we found we were expected to proceed to Territet to meet Signor Mussolini. The latter had declared his inability to come to Lausanne for personal reasons, but when we found later that he had arranged to return with us at night, and is, indeed, now installed in the same hotel, we realised our progress to Territet was required for spectacular effect. This was successfully accomplished, and M. Poincaré and I were escorted by Mussolini through large crowds to his hotel. There we sat down at once to a conference, which was attended by French and British delegates and secretaries. Mussolini, however, asked that room should be cleared and left to M. Poincaré,

himself and me. He produced a paper and declared that he must decline to proceed until M. Poincaré and I, on behalf of our Governments, had signed a formula declaring the perfect equality of Italy with France and Great Britain in respect both of interests, duties and rights in the East. This we both declined to do on double ground that equality did not in fact exist, and that any declaration of common interests should follow, and not precede, agreement on points we had met to discuss.

M. Poincaré eventually drew up a harmless formula to be issued after we had come to an agreement. The company having been readmitted, we then took points in my memorandum one by one, with an interval for dinner, at which we were guests of Mussolini. Everything was devised for effect, and Italian Premier is evidently a finished actor. He speaks French well, and conducts himself with a certain rather histrionic dignity. But it was obvious that he knew next to nothing of the subjects, and his agreement was procured with little difficulty to all points by President of the Council and myself, former showing considerable ingenuity in meeting arguments or flattering the vanity of our host. The unexpected spectacle was thus offered of France and England presenting a firm front to the somewhat feeble assaults of our ill-informed ally. A few subjects were reserved for discussion to-morrow morning, and we then all returned by train to Lausanne, having to wait three-quarters of an hour for Mussolini's railway carriage to be retrieved and attached. He will return to Italy to-morrow, and the general impression left upon me is that Italians will not give much trouble provided they can get some advantage which they can parade to their countrymen.

No. 612.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November* 20, 1922.

MEETING of Allied delegates and experts, together with French and Italian Président du Conseil, was resumed this morning, when Italians raised question of Dodecanese and mandates. I replied as to former that we were only now concerned to discuss terms with Turks, and that future of islands was to be determined as part of entire peace settlement by friendly discussion between Allies. With this Signor Mussolini appeared to be satisfied. Marquis Garroni then made a long and futile protest against French and British mandates on the ground that Italy had obtained no corresponding advantage, but he did not seem to welcome suggestion of M. Poincaré and myself that they should share mandate with ourselves on condition of sharing cost. Performance, which augured ill for future activities of my chief Italian colleague in conference, finally subsided, and we continued in a smaller meeting to discuss procedure of main conference. Chief point was Turkish demand to be admitted to share in presidency of principal commissions. This we decided to refuse on the ground that, just as it would have rested with inviting Power if place of meeting had been France, England or Italy, so it must be shared between inviting Powers in a neutral country. Plenary session of conference will be held at 3·30 P.M. this afternoon confined to speech of welcome by Swiss President. To-morrow morning we hold second meeting to accept proposals as to procedure, and first session for formal business will begin in the afternoon, when we shall probably start upon frontier and territorial questions, myself in the chair.

No. 613.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November* 20, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 1.

I have very carefully considered with Sir H. Rumbold suggestion contained in above, which Lord Derby had made to me before leaving London. I do not think suspicions mentioned to me by the French President are entertained by French Government. They have never been alluded to by M. Poincaré. Question should

therefore be decided in the main by local considerations as affecting Constantinople itself. Even if French did not take advantage of offer to suggest some other commander than Marshal Foch, and even if they refused it for Marshal Foch himself, as I think they would probably do, knowledge that it had been made, which they would take care to disseminate, would certainly weaken both General Harington and British position in Constantinople. Further, Turks would profit by it to spread report that we had abdicated in favour of the French and were unable to cope with situation ourselves. Lastly, I am apprehensive that French would regard it as a stratagem devised by us to throw discredit of a possible disaster at Constantinople on to them. For all of these reasons, in which Sir H. Rumbold concurs, I would prefer not to make the suggestion.

No. 614.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November* 20, 1922.

FIRST plenary meeting of conference took place this afternoon in a large hall open to public and press. Swiss President presided and read an appropriate and well-worded speech of welcome. It had been agreed that I should respond on behalf of delegations in a few words of a complimentary character. This I did, and proceedings would have terminated had not Ismet Pasha advanced to the platform, pulled out a paper and read speech containing some very partisan and rather truculent remarks. French President of the Council told me that but for his influence speech would have been much worse.

French and Turks are staying in same hotel and contact between them constant and close. Ismet Pasha is coming to call upon me presently.

His attitude to-day was [? example of] spirit in which Turkish delegation are approaching conference and foreshadows trouble at every turn.

No. 615.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 20.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 613.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 19, 1922.

PRESS comment on communiqué, issued after yesterday's meeting at Quai d'Orsay, follows a *mot d'ordre* alleged to have been given by M. Poincaré to effect that an *entente élastique* had been reached.

"Echo de Paris" and "Petit Parisien" are notable exceptions, and insist that in last resort France must stand by her allies and resist extreme Turkish pretensions by force if necessary.

No. 616.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 459.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, November* 19, 1922.

MY telegram No 448.

In confidential memorandum received to-day, State Department inform me of communications addressed to Hamid Bey by United States High Commissioner on 4th and 8th November. In the first he makes representations in regard to deportation orders, and in the second he associates himself with Allied High Commissioners' note of 6th November.

In reply to communication of 4th November, Angora Government denied that any expulsion orders had been issued, but added that permission had now been granted for Christians who so wish to leave within a month.

In subsequent conversation Refet Pasha informed United States High Commissioner that there was no necessity for expulsion order as Christians had long wished to leave. High Commissioner replied that permission to leave was apparently being misconstrued as an order, and urged that Angora Government should correct this impression, which may lead to panic amongst thousands of Christians.

Text by bag.

[L 3866/3866/405] No. 617.

Memorandum by the Institute of Historical Research (London University) on the Capitulations.

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I.—*Origins.*

THE Capitulations, being a system of personal, and not territorial, law, are an anomaly when regarded from the point of view of the modern territorially sovereign Western State. It is because the Turks are at present adapting themselves to Western political ideas and attempting to adopt Western political forms, that they are finding the Capitulations increasingly irksome and are becoming correspondingly anxious to get rid of them. The Capitulations were not, however, in their origin something extraneous, forced upon the Ottoman Empire by foreign Powers and incompatible with its institutions. They were "capitula" or "articles" voluntarily granted by the Ottoman Government to foreign communities resident in its territories, and were in harmony with the similar personal rights granted to the non-Moslem native communities of the Empire (who were obviously not in a position to bring any kind of pressure to bear upon their conquerors). Both the Capitulations and the "Millet" system were natural products of Islamic political ideas, before Islamic institutions in Turkey were first overlaid and then partially supplanted by the comparatively recent invasion of Western influences.

Indeed, the principle of personal, as opposed to territorial, law was not only indigenous to Islamic society. It is historically a more usual conception than that of territorial law, and even in Western Europe, where the modern territorially sovereign State originated, the personal conception of law was paramount until the close of the Middle Ages, and has left its trace in such phrases as "benefit of clergy."

The office of "consul" and the system of consular jurisdiction were evolved in Western Europe under these earlier conditions. "Consul" was simply the ordinary title of the local executive magistrates in the mediæval Italian communes, which were the first communities in Western Europe to develop an extensive foreign commerce. When trade brought foreign merchants to settle in these cities, the city

governments set apart one or more member of the college of consuls to be "Consuls of Merchants" or "Consuls of the Sea," in order to exercise jurisdiction over these resident aliens, and the functions of these specialised consuls were extended to embrace jurisdiction over their own citizens on ship-board or in foreign parts, in which latter function they became known as "Consules Ultramarini."

The Pisan, Genoese or Venetian merchants abroad carried their own law with them wherever they went, and therefore the Pisan, Genoese or Venetian Government sent out consuls after them to administer that law for them in places where they gathered themselves together in permanent settlements.

The earliest known examples of extra-territorial consular jurisdiction exercised over citizens of Italian communes by their own magistrates in foreign countries are to be found not in the Levant, but in Western Europe itself; for example, in 13th century Castile and Savoy. Similarly, the Hanseatic merchants enjoyed extra-territorial rights in the Scandinavian countries and in England, and in 1302 Edward I anticipated the modern device of a "Mixed Court" in order to meet conditions created by the conflict between Hanseatic extra-territoriality and his own sovereignty. In the West, however, the idea of territorial sovereignty steadily asserted itself, and extra-territorial consular jurisdiction was circumscribed and eliminated in its infancy. From the Renaissance onwards it became incompatible with the fundamental principles of Western politics. Its future lay in the Levant, where there was no corresponding development of the purely territorial principle of sovereignty until its quite recent introduction from the West, and where the marked difference in religion and social customs between the native populations and the Western residents made it far more difficult to bring the latter under local jurisdiction than it was to bring Pisans under Castilian or Germans under English law.

II.—*Developments in the Byzantine Empire, Crusader Principalities and Mediæval Moslem Egypt.*

From the latter part of the 11th century onwards, when Western Europe expanded into the Levant, the system of consular jurisdiction underwent further developments in these new Western colonies overseas, and the present Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire are descended in a direct line from the mediæval Capitulations in this area.

The Byzantine Empire was weakening, and the Frankish princes in Syria depended on the sea power of the Italian States in order to maintain their precarious footing on the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Italian city States could bargain for more extensive extra-territorial rights in these Levantine countries than they had ever secured in Western communities nearer home. Under the Capitulations granted by the Byzantine Empire to Venice in 1199, the Venetian consular authorities in Byzantine territory not only had entire jurisdiction in cases arising between Venetian residents, but were even granted jurisdiction in cases between a Venetian and a Greek, if the Venetian were the defendant—the principle that jurisdiction should lie with the court of the defendant's nationality being thus applied to the subjects of the local sovereign, even in cases in which it would bring them under foreign jurisdiction in their home territory. The Genoese Capitulations of 1261 gave the Genoese consular authorities even fuller rights, including guarantees in cases in which the defendant was a Greek and the suit therefore lay in a Greek court.

In the Crusader principalities, consuls of the Italian States actually acquired territorial jurisdiction over all residents (of whatever nationality) in those quarters of maritime cities which had been assigned to one or other Italian community, and in Galata, as well as in the Genoese settlements in the Crimea, consular jurisdiction developed into virtual territorial sovereignty. In Moslem Egypt, on the other hand, the authority of the foreign consuls, even over their own nationals, was restricted, simply, no doubt, because the mediæval Egyptian Government was stronger than the Byzantine Empire. For example, in the Capitulation granted by Egypt to Venice in 1302, all cases involving the death penalty were excepted from the Venetian consul's competence. Again, in the Capitulation granted by the Ottoman Government to France in 1528, in order to confirm the status enjoyed in Egypt by French residents before the Ottoman conquest, consular jurisdiction in suits between French residents was confirmed, but with the exception of cases involving blood.

It is interesting to note that in 1391, more than half a century before the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Government forced the Byzantine

Government to allow an Ottoman Kadi to exercise jurisdiction over Ottoman residents in Constantinople, obviously on the model of the Capitulations already enjoyed there by the Western communities. At Salonica, again, there was an Ottoman consul during the five years (1426–30) before the Ottoman conquest, when the city was a Venetian possession. In this case, however, consular jurisdiction seems to have been limited to civil cases between Ottoman residents, on the same footing as the Venetian and French consular jurisdiction in Egypt.

III.—*The Transition from the Mediæval to the Modern Phase.*

Thus systems of Capitulations developed in nearly all the Moslem and Christian States round the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and these Capitulations differed considerably in detail, although the fundamental principles on which they were based were the same. A new chapter opened, however, in the latter part of the 15th and the early part of the 16th century. In the course of this period, all the local Levantine States, with the exception of Morocco, were swallowed up by the Ottoman Empire, so that the Capitulations granted by the Ottoman Government to Western Powers superseded the local Capitulations in theory, if not altogether in practice; and, on the other hand, the Italian republics, which had hitherto taken the lead in the Levant trade, fell into the background, and their place was taken by the new big-scale Western National States like France and England, who were strong enough, or at any rate sufficiently remote from the centre of Turkish power, to be able to deal with the Turk on more or less equal terms.

In obtaining new Capitulations from the now paramount Oriental Power, France took the leading part, and it is not too much to say that the present Capitulations in Turkey are a French achievement. Until 1783, all other Western Powers were content to secure "most-favoured-nation treatment" on the French standard, and to get their status assimilated to that which France had already obtained; nor has the actual working of the Capitulations been greatly influenced by the additional rights secured by Russia in 1783 and at various later dates, or by the United States of America in 1830.

IV.—*Special Subsequent Arrangements with the Barbary States.*

(See Lippmann, pp. 72–74, and Rey, pp. 160–174, in list of books referred to in Appendix II.)

The Capitulations granted by Morocco to Western Powers have a history independent of the Ottoman Capitulations, since Ottoman suzerainty has never been asserted, still less accepted in Morocco. The most important are those given to France on the 30th September, 1630, and the 28th May, 1767, to Spain in 1767 and on the 1st March, 1799, and to England on the 9th December, 1856. Special features in these Capitulations no doubt go back to the charters granted by Moroccan Governments to the Italian States in the Middle Ages. As for Algeria, Tunis and Tripoli, these provinces were always nominally under the suzerainty of Turkey from the early 16th century onwards until the conquest of Algeria by France in 1830 and the cession of Tripoli to Italy in 1912, while the relations of Tunis to France and Turkey respectively seem never to have been precisely determined. At the same time, Turkish sovereignty in these North African provinces has seldom been a reality, and the Ottoman Capitulations were therefore more often than not inoperative in this region.

All the early Capitulations between Western Powers and Turkey contain special articles providing for their enforcement in the Barbary States, and decreeing penalties against the Barbary pirates for the infraction of them, but it is evident that the North African Moslems paid scant attention to the wishes of their Turkish over-lord. Indeed, the Western Powers found it necessary to conclude separate treaties with the local North African authorities, in which the application of the Ottoman Capitulations, at any rate in part, was provided for, though doubtless the arrangement was precarious so long as the Barbary pirates remained strong. The tables were turned, however, towards the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, and in Tripoli, during this period, the semi-independent local rulers allowed all cases in which foreigners were concerned to be tried in the Consular

Courts, even if one party were a subject of the Tripolitan Government. This was an important encroachment on the Ottoman Capitulations, which, in contrast to the Byzantine, had always ensured that any case in which a local subject was involved should be tried in the courts of the local sovereign. Accordingly, when Turkey re-established her effective sovereignty over Tripoli in the course of the 19th century, she insisted that the modification of the Capitulations which had become established there should be done away with, and the system brought back into line with the normal Ottoman model. The Powers gave their consent to this in 1873.

The applicability of the Ottoman Capitulations to all North Africa except Morocco was expressly asserted in the commercial treaty signed by Turkey and Great Britain on the 17th August, 1838. The first article of the treaty confirmed the previous Capitulations except as previously modified or abrogated in the treaty itself. The sixth article provided that the treaty should apply to all Ottoman possessions, specifically including Egypt and North Africa.

It would thus appear that (always excepting for Morocco) the Ottoman Capitulations are the legal basis of the Capitulatory rights at present enjoyed by Western Powers in North Africa (if disputes regarding these rights are to be settled on their legal merits), and that modifications established by special local arrangements or by local use and wont have comparatively little legal validity, however important they may be in practice.

V.—*Principal Treaties.*

(For brevity, treaties are referred to hereafter simply by the name of the country concluding them with Turkey and by the year in which they were made, *e.g.*, France, 1535, means the Capitulation of that year between Turkey and France.)

The history of the Ottoman Capitulations may be divided into four periods :—

(i.) 1535–1782, in which the lead was taken by France.
(ii.) 1783–1837, in which the lead was taken by Russia.
(iii.) 1838–1860, in which the lead was taken by England.
(iv.) 1861 to the present time, in which the lead has been taken by France again.

The principal treaties are the following :—

(1.) 1535–1782.

(i.) *France, February* 1535. (Noradounghian, No.1. See Appendix II.)

A bilateral treaty between two Powers, not a mere unilateral charter on the part of Turkey. This treaty is the most important of the whole series and the foundation of all that have followed.

(ii.) *France, October* 18, 1569. (Noradounghian, No. 2.)

Unilateral. Supplementary to (i).

(iii.) *France, May* 12, 1604. (Noradounghian, No. 3.)

Unilateral. Goes into greater detail than (i) and (ii).

(iv.) *France, April* 20, 1607. (Noradounghian, No. 5.)

Unilateral. Supplementary to 1604, dealing exclusively with the French protectorate over Western nations not diplomatically represented in Turkey.

(v.) *France, June* 5, 1673. (Noradounghian, No. 13.)

Unilateral. Contains important new articles regarding the Ottoman customs tariff.

(vi.) *England, September* 1675. (Noradounghian, No. 14.)

Unilateral. Reincorporates all the previous English Capitulations, giving the articles in chronological order by groups under the dates at which they were granted. Brings English privileges into line with those acquired by France up to 1673. This Capitulation remains the basis of present English privileges, its provisions being merely reaffirmed in subsequent treaties.

(vii.) *Austria, July* 27, 1718. (Noradounghian, No. 20.)

Bilateral. Brings Austrian privileges into line with French and English.

(viii.) *France, May* 1740. (Noradounghian, No. .)

Unilateral. Incorporates and amplifies all previous French Capitulations, and remains the basis of present French privileges, being merely reaffirmed in subsequent treaties.

(ix.) *Russia, July* 10–21, 1774. (Noradounghian, No. 36.)

Bilateral Treaty of Peace. Article 11 stipulates that Russia shall have M.F.N.T.* in Turkey of the French and English standard, just as if the French and English Capitulations were incorporated verbally in the treaty. The provisions of the French and English Capitulations in regard to the Ottoman tariff are expressly referred to in this connection.

(2.) 1783–1837.

(x.) *Russia, June* 10–21, 1783. (Noradounghian.)

Bilateral Treaty of Commerce. Important because it contains an increase of privileges over and above England, 1675, and France, 1740, an increase which accrued to the advantage of other capitulatory Powers on the M.F.N.T. principle.

(xi.) *Great Britain, January* 6, 1809. (Noradounghian, Vol. II, No. 27.)

Bilateral Treaty of Peace. Important as limiting the extension of British protection to Ottoman subjects and as making capitulatory privileges reciprocal

(xii.) *United States, May* 7, 1830. (Noradounghian, Vol. II, No. 61.)

Bilateral Treaty of Commerce. Important on account of article 4, which, according to one version of the text, gives jurisdiction to the American consular authorities in all cases in which an American subject is concerned, even if the other party is an Ottoman subject.

(3.) 1838.

(xiii.) *Great Britain, August* 17, 1838. (Noradounghian, Vol. II, No. 82.)

Bilateral Commercial Treaty confirming previous Capitulations, except where expressly modified. Specially important in regard to the regulation of the Ottoman customs tariff. This treaty served as a model for similar treaties concluded by almost all other Powers during the years immediately following.

(4.) 1861.

(xiv.) *France, April* 29, 1861. (Noradounghian, No. .)

Bilateral Commercial Treaty which served as a model for various treaties concluded in the years immediately following by other Powers. The treaties of this series have all now expired, but the Powers have hitherto refused to sanction any departure on Turkey's part from the conditions which they embody.

VI.—*Analysis of the Principal Elements in the Capitulations.*

The preceding sketch of the history of the Capitulations leads on to an analysis of their contents, considered as a single corpus of rights. In such an analysis the various documents can properly be taken together and considered as a whole, since practically every capitulatory Power has at some stage secured M.F.N.T. for itself, and has thus become entitled to benefit by any additional privileges obtained by any one of its neighbours or rivals. In Egypt, for instance, France secured M.F.N.T. as early as 1447, and in her first Capitulation with Turkey in 1535 she stipulated that the Pope, England and Scotland might benefit by it on condition of announcing their adhesion to it within eight months (a step which they all omitted to take).

In France, 1673, article 14, it is stipulated that an English dragoman in Turkey should have the same privileges as a French dragoman. In England, 1675, article 18, M.F.N.T. is formally granted, having hitherto been enjoyed by favour only, and later on in the same document the principle is applied in detail. For instance, English merchants are not to pay any higher dues than French and Venetian merchants on silks exported from Aleppo (article 44, repeated in article 48).

* Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment.

In Austria, 1718, M.F.N.T. is stipulated for in general terms in the preamble. Austrian subjects in Turkey are to enjoy the same rights as other *Christianæ a tributo liberæ nationes, i.e.*, foreign Christian residents not subject to the taxes exacted from native Christian communities. This was repeated specifically in article 11 of the Austro-Turkish Peace Treaty of 1739. Prussia obtained M.F.N.T. in 1761; Russia, as previously mentioned, in 1774, and again in 1783, articles 17 and 77. French, English and Venetian privileges being specifically mentioned. France, too, in 1740 reconfirmed her right to the same privileges as the Venetians (article 29), and obtained general M.F.N.T. under article 83. The United States secured M.F.N.T. in 1830, article 1, and the application of the principle was put on record as a matter of course in the later commercial treaties with other Powers.

Thus, the Capitulations can properly be treated as a single corpus, in which any clause is applicable to any capitulatory Power. There remains, however, the question of form, for, while the original French Capitulations of 1535 was a bilateral treaty, all the subsequent French additions, as well as all the English Capitulations down to and including 1675, were unilateral only—that is, they were not treaties between the two Powers concerned, but merely charters granted, by grace for a limited period, by the Ottoman Government; this might appear to invalidate them, but it must be mentioned, on the other side, firstly, that the Ottoman Government has always treated them as equivalent to bilateral treaties, in spite of their defective form, and, secondly, that since 1774 they have all been incorporated, or, at any rate, specifically reaffirmed in new treaties of a bilateral character. The Capitulations as a whole may therefore be regarded as constituting a single corpus of rights valid for any State which is a party to any one of them.

This body of rights can be analysed conveniently under the following heads:—

(i.) Sovereign rights of foreign States in Ottoman territory.
(ii.) Extra-territorial privileges of foreign subjects in Ottoman territory.
(iii.) Treaty limitations on the Ottoman customs tariff.
(iv.) Exemption of individual foreign subjects from Ottoman taxes and corvées.
(v.) Reciprocal application of the Capitulations.

(i.) *Sovereign Rights of Foreign States in Ottoman Territory.*

(a.) *Jurisdiction of Foreign Consuls over their own Nationals resident in Turkey.*

This is the root of the capitulatory system, and appears in the mediæval texts preserved to us—for example, in the Pisa-Tunis Treaty of 1302. It is emphatically asserted in France, 1535, the French consular authorities being given exclusive jurisdiction as between French subjects in Turkey, who are expressly denied the right even of voluntarily referring their case to the Ottoman courts. The Ottoman executive authorities are required to assist in the execution of French consular judgments.

This is repeated in 1569, article 12, and 1604, articles 24 and 43; England, 1675, article 16; Austria, 1718, article 5; France, 1740, article 26; Russia, 1783, article 63—to quote merely a few examples.

(b.) *Consular Privileges.*

In the French Capitulations in Egypt, as renewed by the Ottoman Government in 1528, the French consul is actually to be paid by the local Ottoman *douane*, and is to be accountable for his actions to the Sublime Porte only, and not to the local Ottoman authorities. In France, 1604, article 22, French diplomatic and consular authorities in Turkey are to be immune from taxation; they are not to be imprisoned or to have their houses sealed by the Turkish authorities, and cases against them are to be heard by the Sublime Porte only (article 25). The same privileges are extended to English consuls in England, 1675, article 25, with the addition that if they are summoned to appear before the Porte their Ambassador will have the right to answer for them there. In France, 1740, it is stipulated that consuls shall not be imprisoned on account of actions brought against their nationals (article 16); that the French consuls at Alexandria and Tripoli are not to be subjected to arbitrary imprisonment (article 25, an indication that the Capitulations were comparatively ineffective in outlying provinces); and, finally, that no French consul should be forced to appear personally in a Turkish court of law (article 48).

Russia, 1783, secures the same privileges for Russian consuls as for English and French (article 52), and stipulates that Russian consuls shall not be arrested when suits are brought against them (article 57).

(c.) *Trial of Mixed Cases under the Ottoman Capitulations.*

Unlike the Byzantine Government, or the Governments of Egypt and certain of the Barbary States at times when they have been semi-independent of Turkey, the Ottoman Government has always insisted that, in cases where one of the parties is a foreigner and the other an Ottoman subject, the trial shall take place in an Ottoman court of law. At the same time, various provisions have invariably been added for the benefit of the foreign party; for instance, that the trial shall only be conducted in the presence of an official representative of the diplomatic and consular authorities of the foreigner's nation; and, again, that in certain cases the suit shall only be heard before the highest Ottoman court of law; but there has never been any departure on the Turkish side from the main principle that Ottoman courts shall have sole jurisdiction in mixed cases in which an Ottoman subject is concerned.

(d.) *Participation of Foreign Consular Representatives in Trials before Ottoman Courts.*

In France, 1535, it is already laid down that in mixed civil cases a French dragoman shall be present at the proceedings. This is repeated in France, 1569 (article 11), with the proviso that the trial shall not be postponed fraudulently on the part of the dragoman by deliberate failure to put in an appearance. It is repeated again in France, 1604 (article 42), and in England, 1675 (articles 15 and 24); while in article 42 of the same Capitulation the privilege is extended even to cases in which Englishmen are accused of murder and kindred crimes. The privilege is secured to Austrian subjects in Austria, 1718 (article 5), and is repeated in France, 1740 (article 26), and in the same treaty (article 65) in the case of a Frenchman prosecuted for murder. Again, it is extended to Russian subjects in Russia, 1783 (article 63).

(e.) *Direct Reference of Cases to the Sublime Porte.*

In France, 1528, confirming the previous French Capitulations in Egypt, there is provision for an appeal by French residents from the local courts to the Sublime Porte, and arrangements are even made for their safe-conduct in these circumstances. In France, 1673 (additional article 1), it is stipulated that cases against French ecclesiastics resident in Turkey are to be heard by the Sublime Porte only, and in additional article 12 the same privilege is extended to all Frenchmen involved in suits with Ottoman subjects in which 4,000 aspers value or upwards is involved. The latter article is extended to English residents by England, 1675 (articles 24 and 69). In the latter article the condition is added that, if the case arises in some provincial place, the local English consul must go surety for the English party, in which case the latter is to be free to travel to Constantinople and lay his case before the Porte, while the Ottoman party to the suit shall be bound to follow him thither. If, however, the consul does not go surety for his national, the case is to be left to the discretion of the local Ottoman authorities. The privilege is extended to Austrians by Austria, 1718 (article 5), except that the minimum value entitling the Austrian party to carry the case to the Sublime Porte is lowered to 3,000 aspers. The privilege is reaffirmed (with the old minimum of 4,000 aspers) in France, 1740 (articles 41 and 69), and is extended to Russian subjects by Russia, 1783 (article 64).

(f.) *Legal Formalities required from Ottoman Authorities.*

Owing to the difference of language and alphabet, as well as of law, foreign merchants in Turkey are specially liable to suffer from legal chicane, and therefore the Capitulations contain frequent provisions for the formal notarial execution and record not only of legal documents, but of private commercial transactions. In France, 1535 (article 5), it is stipulated that in mixed cases a French subject may only be summoned before the Ottoman court on a written warrant, in default of which the oral testimony of Ottoman subjects shall not be sufficient. The invalidity of oral testimony against French subjects is reconfirmed in France, 1569 (article 6), according to which only those sureties and recognisances which have been recorded and registered in legal form by the Ottoman local authorities are to hold good. In

France, 1604 (articles 36 and 37), this principle is specifically applied to French consuls. They must have all their acts and contracts recorded by the local Turkish legal authorities, and no case is to lie against them with Ottoman subjects except on the showing of such written records.

The local recording of ordinary sales and purchases is stipulated in France, 1528, regarding Egypt, and again in England, 1675 (article 9), according to which any English merchant is entitled to demand a notarial record of any business transaction into which he enters with an Ottoman subject, and cannot be prosecuted on any evidence brought against him by Ottoman subjects which does not rest on such record. In article 58 of the same Capitulation it is provided that English merchants who have gone surety for other Englishmen shall not be liable except on the production of a written bond. The principle established by England, 1675 (article 9), is extended to Austrian subjects by Austria, 1718 (article 5). France, 1740 (article 71), adds the further safeguard that when once a case between an Ottoman and a French subject has been decided on the basis of a notarial entry, that case shall not be reopened without previous reference to the French Ambassador. The gist of these provisions is extended to Russian subjects by Russia, 1783 (article 9).

(g.) *Departures from the General Principle in Favour of the Ottoman Government.*

It has already been mentioned that in the mediæval Egyptian Capitulations cases involving death, or even bloodshed short of death, are reserved for the Egyptian courts, even in cases in which the defendants or both parties are foreign subjects. In the same way, by article 6 of France, 1535, all mixed criminal cases are reserved for Ottoman jurisdiction, though they are to be heard by the Sublime Porte only.

(h.) *Departures from the General Principle in Favour of Foreign Consular Jurisdiction.*

The main encroachments, however, have been in the other direction. In France, 1740 (article 15), for example, it is stipulated that the French Ambassador or consul is to decide cases of murder or violence between Frenchmen according to French law. In Sweden, 1737, it is laid down that even mixed criminal cases in which one party is an Ottoman subject are to be tried by the Swedish consular authorities, if the Swedish party is the defendant. A vast encroachment is made in article 7 of the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty of 1829. It stipulates that "Russian subjects (in Turkey) shall remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and police of the Russian Minister and consuls," and that the Ottoman authorities shall have no right to search Russian ships even in Turkish waters.

The most celebrated and also the most disputed clause of this nature is article 4 of the United States Treaty of 1830, which is so important that it deserves quotation in full:

> "Leurs procès dépassant 500 piastres seront référés à Constantinople et jugés suivant l'équité et la justice. Les citoyens américains vaquant paisiblement aux affaires de leur commerce ne seront point molestés sans motif, tant qu'ils n'auront pas commis quelque délit ou quelque faute; même en cas de culpabilité, ils ne seront pas emprisonnés par les juges et les agents de la sûreté, mais ils seront punis par l'entremise de leurs Ministres et consuls, à l'instar de ce qui se pratique à l'égard des autres Francs."

The Ottoman Government has never in practice accepted the American interpretation of this article, though the American consular authorities have apparently proved that the text on which they base it occurs in one at least of the original versions of the treaty. There are stipulations of the same character, though less precise in form, in the commercial treaties concluded by Turkey with the Hansa States in 1839, Belgium in 1839, and Portugal in 1843.

(i.) *Limitation of Ottoman Court Fees.*

In England, 1675 (article 73), it is laid down that English suitors in an Ottoman court shall pay the regular Mehkeme court fees only, plus a 2 per cent. honorarium to the Turkish Chaush on debts recovered through his agency. There is a similar provision in France, 1740 (article 72).

(j.) *Cases arising between Subjects of Two Different Foreign Powers.*

This contingency is seldom provided for in treaties between the Ottoman Empire and single foreign Powers, and in theory such cases presumably ought to come under Ottoman jurisdiction. In practice, however, the foreign consular authorities have always arranged for the conduct of such cases among themselves. In 1228, for instance, Venice and Genoa made a treaty regulating the trial of suits between their respective nationals in the Levant. In France, 1740 (article 52), it is expressly laid down that disputes between French merchants and other foreigners may be heard by their respective Ambassadors, if the parties do not wish to appear before the Ottoman customs authorities, who would otherwise be competent in such cases. The foreign consular authorities have tried various methods of dealing with these mixed foreign cases. Sometimes they have set up special mixed courts for the purpose; at other times they have assigned them to the national consular courts of the defendant in any given case.

(k.) *Protection by the Capitulatory Powers of the Nationals of other Foreign Powers not enjoying Capitulations and not represented by Ambassadors or Consuls of their own.*

This was a privilege eagerly sought after, especially by the French Government. It brought with it not only prestige and political influence, but also fees, since the protecting Power could claim from protected foreign nationals the same dues for the upkeep of its Embassy and consulates as it levied from its own subjects trading in Turkish territories. This question was the subject of a controversy between France and Great Britain, which began in 1580 and dragged on for a century. The Ottoman Government had first of all allowed the French to exercise protection over all non-represented Western nationalities, but in 1580, when the English obtained Capitulations of their own, they laid claim to the same right, and the Turks seem to have involved themselves in conflicting engagements with both Powers. The question is dealt with in France, 1604 (articles 4 and 6), and in France, 1607—an addendum to France, 1604, which is exclusively concerned with this controversy.

(l.) *Protection of Ottoman Subjects.*

This is a characteristic example of the way in which by gradual encroachment and by use and wont the Capitulations have been extended from small beginnings until they have seriously undermined the sovereignty of the Ottoman Government in its own territories. In England, 1675 (article 28), it is merely provided that English Ambassadors and consuls may freely choose what Ottoman janissaries or interpreters they will employ in their service. In article 45 of the same Capitulation it is added that English dragomans are to be inviolable while acting under instructions from their Ambassador, while, if they are prosecuted in their private capacity, no action is to be taken against them without the Ambassador being notified beforehand. In article 59, it is stipulated that they shall be tax-free, and, further, free to bequeath their property to whom they will, and the English Ambassador is given the privilege of maintaining ten such tax-free protected servants of any nationality (article 60). In Austria, 1718 (article 5), it is stipulated that not only Austrian officials and merchants in Turkey but also their servants (presumably including native servants) are to be tax-free. In France, 1740 (article 13), French interpreters are exempted from certain dues. By article 43 of the same Capitulation French interpreters are to enjoy all the privileges of French nationals. Further, French Ambassadors and consuls are to employ what interpreters and janissaries they will (article 45); French interpreters are not to be punished or imprisoned for carrying out their duties, and are only to be subject to correction by their Ambassador (article 46); and the French Ambassador may maintain fifteen Ottoman subjects as his servants free from taxation (article 47). Finally, French consuls may employ such janissaries as they please for the protection of their houses (article 50). The right to maintain tax-free and otherwise privileged Ottoman servants was extended to Russian consuls by the treaty of 1783 (articles 50, 51, 54). By the end of the 18th century, however, this privilege had become so inconvenient to the Ottoman Government that they took steps to restrict its scope in the Peace Treaty of 1809 with Great Britain, by article 9 of which no Ottoman subject was to be made an English consul, and no certificate conferring the privileges of an English dragoman was to be given to any artisan, banker, shopkeeper, manufacturer or other person engaged

in business. In the treaty of 1830 with United States, American consular officials were prohibited from giving either secret or open protection to Ottoman subjects (article 5). The principal cause of this change in Turkish policy appears to have been the abuse of the privilege by the Russians.

(iii.) *Establishment of New Consulates.*

Even the older capitulatory Powers had at first only possessed consulates at less than half-a-dozen places in the Levant, and the maintenance even of these was so precarious that the right to reappoint or replace their consuls in provincial cities had to be guaranteed in special articles. Russia, 1774 (article 11), contained the important innovation that the Russian Government might establish new Russian consulates at any place in Ottoman territory, even if no French or English consulates had existed there previously. The Russians subsequently took full advantage of the provision, which of course very greatly increased the value of consular jurisdiction by making it potentially all-pervasive.

(ii.) *Extra-territorial Privileges of Foreign Subjects in Ottoman Territory.*

(a.) *Free Circulation of Foreign Subjects in Ottoman Territory.*

Almost the first article in the early Capitulations, from France, 1528 (Egypt), onwards, usually provides that foreign subjects shall be free to travel on their lawful business through all parts of the Ottoman Empire (*e.g.*, France, 1528, articles 1 to 3; France, 1535, article 2; France, 1569, article 3; France, 1604, article 31; England, 1675, articles 1 and 23; Austria, 1718, article 13; France, 1740, article 20; Russia, 1783, articles 1 and 2). This provision might seem sufficiently obvious to be taken for granted, but in practice large areas of the Ottoman Empire have at various times been inaccessible to foreigners. In Egypt, for instance, during the 18th century, foreign merchants were virtually confined to Alexandria, and the present situation in the interior of Anatolia gives sufficient point to the privilege to make it worth while to refer to the articles on which it rests.

(b.) *Friendly Treatment of Foreign Shipping.*

A whole series of articles provides for courtesies, instead of hostilities, between the warships and merchantships of the Ottoman Empire and the capitulatory Powers when they meet on the high seas, and further for the revictualling and refitting of foreign ships when they touch at Turkish ports, without molestation or oppressive fees. It is further provided that in case of shipwreck on Ottoman coasts, both the crews and the cargo of the wrecked vessel shall be salvaged so far as possible, and shall not be treated as booty. (France, 1528, article 6; France, 1535; France, 1569, article 2; France, 1604, article 31; England, 1675, article 6; Austria, 1718, article 8; France, 1740, article 77; Russia, 1783, articles 4 and 5; United States, 1830, article 9.)

(c.) *Exemption from Collective Responsibility.*

At the date when the early Capitulations were granted it seems to have been a common practice to distrain upon or imprison one member of a foreign colony on account of debts incurred or misdemeanours committed by another, and the consuls in particular seem to have been liable to suffer vicariously for the defaults of their nationals. This principle is expressly repudiated, and the individual foreign resident is assured that he shall be liable only for his own acts, except in cases where he has specifically gone surety for a fellow-countryman. This right is guaranteed several times over in separate articles by France, 1528, while another article adds that French merchants resident in Egypt shall not be liable to reprisals, even for outrages committed by Christian pirates. This is extended to all Ottoman territories by France, 1535, with application both to consuls and to private merchants, and is repeated in France, 1569, article 4, and in France, 1604, articles 34 and 39. Article 34 specially stipulates that, in case of debt, only the debtor or his sureties shall be liable, and this only on the evidence of a legally recorded contract. Article 39 exempts the French community from vicarious responsibility for French delinquents who have fled from Turkey to escape the arm of the law. France, 1673, additional article 13, provides that there shall be no collective responsibility even for murders committed in French quarters of Ottoman cities. England, 1675, article 8, extends all these

provisions to English merchants; and Austria, 1718, article 5, to Austrians. They reappear in a more elaborate form in France, 1740, articles 22 and 42; and in Russia, 1783, articles 8 and 73.

(d.) *Inviolability of the Property of Foreigners Deceased in Turkey.*

One of the principal sources of revenue of the early Ottoman Empire was a death duty—practically amounting to total confiscation—on any estate sufficiently large to attract the Government's attention. In the case of high officials, who at this time were technically the slaves of the Sultan, such confiscation was the Sultan's legal right, and anything which he might leave to their families was a matter of grace: but the principle was extended to wealthy persons of all classes, and it was found necessary to guard foreign merchants against its application to them. In France, 1528, it is provided that a French national dying in Egypt shall be free to dispose of his property as he wishes. This is repeated in France, 1535, with the addition that in the interim such property shall be held in safe keeping by the French consul, or by the local Ottoman Kadi in places where there is no consulate. In France, 1604, article 35, it is stipulated that there shall be no interference with the property of deceased Frenchmen on the part of Ottoman officials. The provisions under the same head in England, 1675, article 26, are especially elaborate, and they are repeated in article 46, being in this case extended to Ottoman subjects in the English consular service, if they have heirs, the Ottoman Treasury being entitled to claim their property only in cases where no heirs are forthcoming. This is repeated in France, 1740, article 22, arrangements being made for intestates, as well as for French residents who have left wills. These benefits were extended to Russians in 1783, article 8.

(e.) *Inviolability of Domicile.*

As early as France, 1528, restrictions are placed upon the right of the local sovereign to conduct searches in a foreign resident's house. In France, 1740, article 70, it is provided that Ottoman officials shall not enter the house of a French resident except in the presence of the French Ambassador or consul. This is extended to Russian subjects by Russia, 1783, article 67, and it is one of the rights upon which the present Western communities in Turkey set most store.

(f.) *Right to Possess Religious and Secular Buildings and Institutions.*

In the treaty of 1313 between Pisa and Tunis, it is provided that Pisan residents in various places in the Tunisian Dominions, which have been assigned to them for residence by well-known custom, may maintain for their own use a funduk (factory), a cemetery, a church and a bakery, and that the public baths shall be reserved for them one day in the week.

By France, 1328, French merchants in Egypt retained the right of maintaining churches and baths; and in France, 1535, in more general terms, they are guaranteed the practice of their religion. France, 1604, is more explicit. In article 3 the Ottoman Government guarantees protection to the Jesuits and Capuchins of Galata, and to the French Churches at Smyrna, Saida, Alexandria and elsewhere, with the express stipulation that no payment is to be demanded for the privilege of rebuilding the Capuchin Church at Galata. Article 4 permits the celebration of divine service according to the Catholic rite in the French hospital at Galata. Austria, 1718, article 5, secures free practice of the Catholic rite in the domiciles of Austrian consular officials and merchants, and provides that non-Austrian Catholics may participate in the celebration if they wish. The provisions of France, 1604, are reaffirmed in France, 1740, articles 35 and 36.

(iii.) *Restrictions upon Ottoman Tariff Autonomy.*

The development of the Capitulations under this head is typical of the way in which they have grown up insensibly from small beginnings, until they have affected the whole public economy of the Ottoman Empire.

(a.) *General Licence to Trade.*

This privilege is expressly guaranteed in most early Capitulations, generally in connection with the right of travel and free circulation (*e.g.*, France, 1528, article 2; France, 1535, article 3; England, 1675, articles 23 and 53—in both cases with the

reservation that the proper duties must be paid, and that specially prohibited articles are excluded. The licence is given in general terms in Austria, 1718, preamble, and Great Britain, 1838, article 2. The latter gives English merchants complete liberty to export from Turkey any goods they choose, and forbids local Ottoman officials to impose vetoes or to create monopolies).

(b.) *Exportation of Particular Classes of Goods.*

In the earlier phase, the above-mentioned general licence to trade seems to have been limited in practice to certain customary articles of commerce. At any rate, in France, 1604, article 8, French merchants and other foreigners trading under the French flag are expressly given licence to export certain classes of goods, *e.g.*, leather goods, wax, cottons, cotton threads and "cordueans," which were not among those prohibited, and reference is made to previous licences given for the same list of commodities in 1569 and 1597. This particular list reappears in France, 1740, article 56; and in Russia, 1783, articles 45 and 46, there are similar special provisions regarding the export by Russian subjects of silks and cottons. Even as late as Russia, 1846, article 12, the export of silk from Turkey by Russian merchants is only sanctioned at certain ports.

(c.) *Customary Restrictions on Ottoman Customs Duties.*

In France, 1535, article 3, it is provided that French merchants shall pay no higher duties than Ottoman subjects. In France, 1604, article 16, it is added that there shall be no increase in the traditional rates of duty; and in article 32 that no extra duties shall be imposed. Article 75 of England, 1675, confirms the customary exemption from export duty on silks bought by English merchants in Constantinople or Brusa, and on Persian and Georgian silks bought from Armenian merchants at Smyrna, provided that these exemptions do not prove prejudicial to the Ottoman Treasury.

(d.) *Fixing of Definite* ad valorem *Duties.*

The first document in which an *ad valorem* duty appears to be fixed by mutual agreement is Franco, 1673 (additional article 5), which lays down that import and export duties payable by French merchants are to be reduced from 5 per cent., at which they had previously stood, to 3 per cent. Instructions are to be sent to the local Ottoman customs officials not to demand more, and payment is to be made in the same currency as is required by the Ottoman Treasury. The 3 per cent. maximum duties are also established for English merchants in England, 1675, article 34. Later on in the same Capitulation it is mentioned that, in spite of the above provision, Turkish customs officials in Egypt, Aleppo and other outlying provinces are charging higher rates, on the ground that the goods, though carried in English ships, are not English property or do not originate in England. These exactions are to cease, article 57. Later, again, the 3 per cent. maximum is reaffirmed, article 67, and is stipulated in detail for camlets, mohairs and other goods exported by English merchants from Angora and Beybazar, article 72. By Austria, 1718, article 3, the 3 per cent. maximum was extended to Austrian merchants and at the same time made reciprocal for Turkish merchants trading in Austrian territory. The 3 per cent. maximum was reaffirmed in France, 1740, articles 37 and 57, and in Russia, 1783, articles 19 and 20, in the latter of which extracts from the French Capitulations are quoted, and most-favoured-nation treatment invoked for extending the privilege to Russian subjects. By Great Britain, 1838, article 4 and additional article 1, both the export duties and the import duties were raised in practice, while theoretically remaining the same. The 3 per cent. import duty was to be subject to a surcharge of 2 per cent. in lieu of all other extra charges, this surcharge only to be payable at the moment when goods were actually sold (additional article 1). The 3 per cent. export duty was to be supplemented by a 9 per cent. duty in lieu of all internal *octrois*, neither part of this combined export duty being payable till the goods to be exported had reached the port of embarkation (article 4).

(e.) *Translation of the* ad valorem *Duty into a Money Tariff.*

The establishment of a general *ad valorem* duty naturally involved the drawing up of a detailed tariff, translating the general percentage into terms of Ottoman currency for particular quantities of particular classes of goods, since such valuation

could not simply be left to the caprice of local Turkish customs officials on each occasion when a cargo of foreign goods came into port. England, 1675, articles 62 to 66 inclusive, lays down a tariff of this kind for specified quantities of imported English *toile, drap, peaux de lièvre, fer-blanc* and *plomb*, upon arrival at Alexandretta and again upon transport from Alexandretta to Aleppo; and conversely, in the case of exports to England, on the journey from Aleppo to Alexandretta and on shipment at that port. This tariff is to supersede all previous regulations. Further on, article 68, it is provided that all English cloth imported to Constantinople, or Galata, or Smyrna is to pay a fixed price by quantity, while other commodities are to pay the customary duty. France, 1740, article 8, lays down that French goods are to be valued as previously for customs purposes, while article 60 provides that the [?French] assessors of the tariff shall not be subject to molestation. Russia, 1783, article 21, refers to a schedule of money valuations on the 3 per cent. basis, which has been agreed upon by both Powers and is now confirmed, and later on, article 25, the revision of this schedule is contemplated, if necessary. The traditional method of valuation is revealed in Great Britain, 1838, article 7. Down to that date a mixed panel of British and Ottoman commissioners had been appointed at intervals of fourteen years to translate the 3 per cent. duty into terms of Ottoman money. At the date when the treaty was concluded, one of these terms had just expired and accordingly new commissioners were appointed to make a tariff on the new *ad valorem* basis—a valuation which was this time to hold good for seven years, and to continue in force thereafter for further periods of seven years unless and until denounced by either party. Similar provisions are made with greater precision in Russia, 1846, article 19.

(f.) *Control of Foreign Shipping traversing the Straits.*

In France, 1569, article 14, it is arranged that French ships leaving Turkey are to be controlled at Constantinople and the Dardanelles only, and not at Gallipoli, and this is repeated in France, 1604, article 44. England, 1675, article 40, lays down that ships which have paid all their dues are not to be hindered from clearing. By Austria, 1718, article 3, Austrian ships leaving Turkey are exempted from search at the Dardanelles, on the production of a satisfactory certificate given at Constantinople. This exemption is not, however, incorporated in France, 1740, article 27, which merely repeats the provisions of 1569 and 1604. Russia, 1783, articles 30 and 31, secures for Russian ships the freedom of passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean on the terms already enjoyed by English and French ships. Ships in transit are to pay no duty and are not to be molested or forced to unload their cargoes, nor are they to be delayed, article 32, nor searched unless there is a reasonable ground for suspicion, article 33. The same rights are secured for Russian ships returning from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, article 34. The detention of ships carrying food cargoes is especially prohibited, article 35. In return for the above concessions, Russia permits the unrestricted purchase of corn in Russian ports by Turkish nationals, article 36. The freedom of transit for merchant ships through the Straits, thus established, is reaffirmed in article 7 of Russia, 1829, article 7 of United States, 1830, and in other subsequent treaties with various Powers.

(g.) *Goods in Transit.*

Licence for transit trade with Russia and Persia across Ottoman territory is given to English merchants by England, 1675, article 36, with a maximum transit duty of 5 per cent.; and in Austria, 1718, article 19, a maximum of 5 per cent. is agreed upon in the case of Persian merchants travelling across Ottoman territory to or from Austria. In France, 1740, articles 9 and 10, it is stipulated that duty shall only be payable on goods imported into Turkey for sale there and not on goods in transit, the charge upon the latter being limited to 300 aspers. Great Britain, 1838, additional article 3, provides that no duty shall be payable on goods in transit through the Straits, even if they are transhipped in Turkish territorial waters, while goods in transit across Turkey by other routes are to pay no more than 3 per cent.

(h.) *Prohibition of Forcible Unloading of Cargoes.*

In England, 1675 (articles 39 and 41), it is stipulated that English ships are not to be forced to unload their cargoes in order that duty may be extracted from them.

(i.) *Harbour Dues.*

By France, 1604 (article 18), French ships are exempted from harbour dues except on their departure, and from paying more than 3 écus for *bon voyage*. Similarly, by England, 1675 (article 70), the anchorage dues payable by English ships are limited to 300 aspers.

(j.) *Duty known as "Mastaria" or "Mezeterie."*

England, 1675 (article 52), lays down that "mastaria" shall be payable at Constantinople and Galata on goods for which it is customary, but not on others. France, 1740, lays down in one place (article 39) that French goods are to pay the "mastaria" within the same limits as English goods, and in another (article 55) that they are to be exempted from this tax altogether. The complete abolition of the tax is further stipulated in Russia, 1783 (article 28), which provides that a single duty only shall be payable.

(iv.) *Exemption of Individual Foreign Subjects from Ottoman Taxes and Corvées.*

(a.) *Exemption from Personal Taxation.*

France, 1535, provides that no tax or *corvée* shall be levied on French subjects until they have resided there for ten full years, and the same privilege is given reciprocally to Ottoman subjects in France. France, 1569 (article 9), goes much further, providing that French subjects shall be exempt from tribute or "harach," without mentioning any term of years. France, 1604 (article 18), stipulates that French residents shall be exempt from certain minor taxes (distinct from the "harach" or capitation tax of native Christians), such as "kassablyk," "reft" and "bach." France, 1673 (additional article 1), provides that French ecclesiastics in Turkey shall be exempt from taxation altogether. England, 1675 (article 13), exempts all English residents from "harach," and article 32 from "kassablyk." Austria, 1718 (article 5), exempts both Austrian consular authorities and merchants, as well as their servants, from Ottoman taxes, and adds that there shall be no forced gifts on their part to local Ottoman officials. In article 13 of the same Capitulation it is further provided that Austrians residing in Turkey shall not be molested by the collectors of harach. Exemption from harach is reaffirmed in France, 1740, article 67, and is extended from individual residents to ships calling at Turkish ports (article 74). Russian subjects are exempted from kassablyk under Russia, 1783, article 71.

(b.) *Security against Requisition.*

As the carrying trade of the Mediterranean passed more and more into the hands of Western Christian nations, their ships in Levantine ports became more liable to requisition by the local Governments for the transport of troops, or of grain and other taxes collected in kind, as native shipping of equivalent capacity and tonnage became rarer. Such requisition, which might be ruinous to foreign shipowners, is expressly forbidden in a number of Capitulations, beginning with France, 1528, regarding Egypt. It is repeated in France, 1535, being extended here from the ships to their crews. It recurs in Austria, 1718, article 11, and in France, 1740, article 80, with the concession to the Ottoman Government that French ships may be commandeered by the latter in case of necessity, but that, if this is done, the French Ambassador or consul must be informed. In United States, 1830, article 8, it is, however, forbidden under all circumstances, as in the earlier French Capitulations

(c.) *Prohibition of the Forced Sale of Foreign Merchandise.*

In the Levant, as in 16th and 17th century India, it was a common practice of local officials to force foreign merchants either to sell their commodities to them at arbitrary prices or, again, to buy native commodities (which were often Government monopolies) at prices fixed by the local authorities. Both these abuses are forbidden in France, 1528, regarding Egypt. France, 1604, article 17, goes into greater detail. There is to be no forced sale of French merchandise to Turkish tax collectors, but French merchants may sell or not when and where they like, without paying duty except upon goods actually sold. Article 33 of the same treaty forbids the forced purchase of native goods. England, 1675, article 38, forbids the forced sale at Caffa,

in the Crimea, of goods bought in the hinterland of the Black Sea by English merchants and consigned to Constantinople. France, 1740, article 21, reaffirms the prohibition upon forced purchases by French merchants. Russia, 1783, article 7, binds both parties reciprocally not to force their respective merchants in one another's territories to purchase from monopolists or other favoured bodies. Great Britain, 1838, article 2, forbids monopolies altogether.

(d.) *Right of Paying* ad valorem *Duties in Kind.*

In case of dispute between a foreign merchant and the local Turkish customs authorities regarding the amount of duty payable in money upon any particular consignment of goods, the foreign merchant was granted the right to pay an actual 3 per cent. of the goods in question in kind. This is provided for in France, 1673, additional article 8; in Austria, 1718, article 3; in Russia, 1783, article 21; and again in Russia, 1846, article 19.

(e.) *Exemption of Foreign Coinage Imported by Foreign Merchants from Confiscation or Payment of Duty.*

Under certain mediæval Capitulations (for instance, Tunis–Pisa, 1313) imported coins had been subjected to a duty like other merchandise (in the instance cited, of 5 per cent.). Worse still, the local mint used sometimes to confiscate foreign currency and insist on recoining it—a process which doubtless resulted in a fraction only of the original value being returned to the lawful owners. Both these practices are forbidden in France, 1604, article 9; England, 1675, articles 21 and 22; Austria, 1718, article 3; France, 1740, articles 3 and 64; and Russia, 1783, articles 26 and 27.

(f.) *Immunity from Acquiring Ottoman Citizenship.*

This privilege is placed here at the end of the list, since it is never specifically mentioned in the text of the Capitulations, presumably because it was taken for granted (see Pears, in list of books, Appendix II).

At the same time, this unwritten privilege is by far the most valuable of all. In virtue of it, foreign families have been able to live in Turkey from one generation to another without forfeiting their allegiance to the country of their ancestral origin. If Nationalist Turkey were to introduce nationalisation laws of the ordinary modern West European type, this would revolutionise the position of foreign residents in Turkey more than the loss of any single one of all those privileges which the Capitulations expressly secure to them.

(v.) *Reciprocal Application of the Capitulations.*

In origin, as has been explained above, the Capitulations were not bilateral treaties, but unilateral charters granted by the Ottoman Government to foreign States whose nationals wished to reside in the Ottoman dominions. Therefore, there could be no question of the conditions laid down by Turkey for the residence of these foreigners within her own borders being applied to Ottoman subjects in foreign countries. Indeed, at the time when the early Capitulations were granted, the only Ottoman subjects likely to reside abroad were Greeks and Armenians, or members of other non-Moslem native communities, and the Ottoman Government was not specially concerned to secure the interests of classes whom it treated at home as outside the pale of citizenship.

At the same time, France, 1535, which, as has been explained, is exceptional in being a bilateral treaty, does stipulate for reciprocity in regard both to free circulation and to temporary exemption from taxes and *corvées* (see above). Austria, 1718, is more explicit. In the preamble it lays down that licence to trade shall be reciprocal; in article 3, the maximum of 3 per cent. for import and export duties is to apply to the Austrian customs as well as the Ottoman; and, by article 6, Ottoman "shahbenders" (consuls) are to be established in Austria, though in this connection there is no mention of extra-territorial jurisdiction, but only of the consignment to these consuls of the property of Ottoman merchants deceased in Austrian territory. By the Austro-Turkish Peace Treaty of 1739, article 11, not only

are Austrian subjects secured M.F.N.T. in Turkey, but it is provided that Ottoman subjects in Austria "ne seront pas traités d'une manière différente."

Russia, 1774, article 11, gave reciprocal M.F.N.T. to Turks in Russian territory, and this was confirmed in Russia, 1783. In Spain, 1782, reciprocity for Ottoman subjects in Spanish territory was provided for, including the establishment of an Ottoman consulate in a Spanish port. By far the most interesting passage, however, in this connection, is article 8 of the Turco-British Peace Treaty of 1809, which deserves quotation in full:—

> "Il sera permis de nommer des 'schahbenders' (consuls) à Malte et dans les Etats de Sa Majesté britannique où il sera nécessaire pour gérer et inspecter les affaires et les intérêts des négociants de la Sublime Porte, et les mêmes traitements et immunités qui sont pratiqués envers les consuls d'Angleterre résidant dans les Etats ottomans, seront exactement observés envers les 'schahbanders' de la Sublime Porte."

This article not only grants the Ottoman Government the right to establish consuls at Malta and in other places in the British dominions, as has been granted in the Austrian dominions by Austria, 1718, article 6, but it further provides that these Ottoman consuls shall enjoy the privileges of the British consuls in Turkey, including, presumably, extra-territorial jurisdiction. The treaty of 1809 was concluded under conditions exceptionally unfavourable to Great Britain, who had to free her hands from the war with Turkey in order to concentrate her energies upon the war against Napoleon. Evidently the Ottoman negotiators made the most of their opportunity, and since the article in question does not seem ever to have been abrogated, presumably it holds good, theoretically, at the present moment. There is no indication, however, that it has ever been put into practical effect.

Possibly, however, the most-favoured-nation clause giving Great Britain the benefit of Russia, 1846, article 17, in which reciprocity is expressly ruled out in the following terms:—

> "Les droits et les dispositions stipulés par la présente convention à l'égard des sujets et négociants russes ne peuvent pas, d'après les lois commerciales observées en Russie, être entièrement appliquées dans l'Empire russe envers les sujets et négociants de l'Empire ottoman, c'est-à-dire une pleine réciprocité à cet égard ne pouvant pas avoir lieu, les sujets et les négociants de la Sublime Porte et ses navires de commerce qui fréquentent les Etats russes et qui y exercent le commerce, ainsi que les produits des Etats ottomans, seront traités dans les Etats russes conformément aux dispositions qui sont adoptées envers les sujets et les négociants, les navires et les produits des Puissances étrangères les plus favorisées."

Before the European war, this question of reciprocity in regard to the Capitulations might have seemed at best a historical curiosity, and at worst a bad joke. It now, however, possesses a certain importance, for two reasons. In the first place, the passion for equality of status is a dominant motive among the leaders of the present Turkish Nationalist movement, and their intransigence over the Capitulations arises at least as much from this as from concrete objections to particular provisions; and, in the second place, German diplomacy availed itself of this characteristic of contemporary Turkish psychology in order to restore the Capitulations in a nominally reciprocal form. Germany did, indeed, protest, like the *Entente* Powers, when Turkey denounced the Capitulations just before her intervention in the European war, but since Turkey became Germany's ally, Germany could not, of course, follow up her protest by exerting any kind of pressure. She therefore accepted the abolition of the Capitulations, but proceeded to negotiate with Turkey a series of elaborate bilateral treaties, in which what was virtually a rehabilitation of the old capitulatory system was assured reciprocally to German subjects resident in Turkey and to Turkish subjects resident in Germany. Since the Turkish residents in Germany consisted of a handful of students, while the German residents in Turkey were a numerous and wealthy commercial colony, each party got by this arrangement what it was seeking, that is, Germany the substance and Turkey the form. Conceivably, however, this may be one of those diplomatic devices that are incapable of repetition.

VII.—*Relation between the Text of the Capitulations and the actual Practice of the Present Time.*

The above memorandum has been exclusively concerned with the rights, explicit and implicit, which are secured to foreigners in the text of the Capitulations themselves. It has not touched upon the question how far this text coincides with actual practice. That question can only be answered by those familiar with the contemporary working of the system in Turkey itself, *i.e.*, by the members of His Majesty's Levant Consular Service, by the leaders of the Constantinople Consular Bar, and by local British merchants or commercial bodies such as the Constantinople Chamber of Commerce. It will probably be found that the written law and the established practice are widely divergent. In a few instances, like United States, 1830, article 4, the rights established by treaty have not become practically operative. In a far greater number of cases, on the other hand (of which the foreign post offices are a good example), actual practice has left the written basis far behind. This divergence may prove of very great importance if the future of the Capitulations is determined by negotiation and not by *force majeure*.

Appendix I.

Collections in which the Texts of the Principal Capitulations can be found.

Abbreviations.

Noradounghian	...	...	=	Norad.	Hertslet Treaties between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535–1855...	=	Hert. L.
Testa...	...	...	=	Testa			
Charrière	...	...	=	Char.	Hertslet Treaties, &c., regulating Trade between Great Britain and Turkey	=	Hert. E.
St.-Priest	...	...	=	Priest.			
B. and F. State Papers	...	...	=	S.P.			

1. France, 1535, February. Norad., tom. 1er, p. 83. Testa, vol. 1, p. 15. Char., vol. 1, pp. 285–294. Hert. L., p. 169. St.-Priest, p. 353.
2. France, 1604, May. Norad., tom. 1er, p. 93. Testa, vol. 1, p. 141. Hert. L., p. 185. St.-Priest, p. 415. Draft S., Priest, p. 446. Dumont, V, ii, 38.
3. France, 1607, April. Norad, tom. 1er, p. 108. Testa, vol. 1, p. 152.
4. France, 1673, June. Norad, tom. 1er, p. 136. Hert. L., p. 193. St.-Priest, p. 454. Dumont, VII, i, 231.
5. England, 1675, September. Norad., tom 1er, p. 146. Hert. L., p. 247. Hert. E., p. 5. S.P., vol. 1, p. 747. Dumont, VII, i, 297.
6. France, 1740, May. Norad, tom. 1er, p. 277. Testa, vol. 1, p. 186. Hert. L., p. 202. St.-Priest, p. 498. Wenck, I, 538.
7. Austria, July, 1718, Peace, Commerce. Norad., tom. 1er, pp. 208, 220. Testa, vol. 9, pp. 73, 82. Hert. L., pp. 67, 80. Dumont, VIII, i, 528.
8. Russia, 1774, July. Norad, tom. 1er, p. 319. Hert. L., p. 463. Martens, ser. i, vol. II, 283.
9. Russia, 1783, June. Norad, tom. 1er, p. 351. Hert. L., p. 486. S.P., vol. 8, p. 1248; vol. 13, p. 902. Martens, ser. i, vol. III, 615.
10. United States, 1830, May. Norad., tom. 2me, p. 192. Hert. L., p. 697. S.P., vol. 18, p. 1361.
11. England, 1838. Norad, tom. 2me, pp. 249, sqq. Hert. L., p. 276. S.P., vol 26, pp. 568, 693. Martens, XIV, 695.

Supplementary.

12. France, 1838, November. Norad., tom. 2me, p. 256. Testa, vol. II, p. 406. Martens, M.R., vol. XV, p. 761. Hert. L., p. 283, and tariff, p. 238. St.-Priest, p. 527.
13. France, 1861. Testa, vol. 6, p. 409.
14. Great Britain, 1861. Hert. E., p. 41, and tariff, p. 53.

Appendix II.

List of Books.

(The most convenient collection of texts is Noradounghian, the best short treatises are Lippmann and Brown. The more important books are marked with an asterisk.)

I.—*Collections of Documents.*

*Austrian Government (K.U.K. Handelsministerium). "Die Kapitulationen und Handelsvertrage der Türkei." Vienna, 1909.

*British Government (Librarian, Foreign Office). "Treaties, &c., between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535–1855." London, 1855. Harrison and Sons.

*Charrière, E. "Négociations de la France dans le Levant." Paris, 1848–60 (quatre volumes): "Documents inédits sur l'Histoire de France, 1e série."

France-Turkey, original Capitulations. "Texte des Traductions originales des Capitulations et des Traités conclus avec la Sublime Porte ottomane," in de St.-Priest, "Mémoires" (*q.v.*). Paris, 1877. Leroux.

France-Turkey, Capitulations of 1604. "Articles du Traité fait en l'Année 1604 entre Henri le Grand, Roi de France, et Sultan Amat, Empereur des Turcs." Paris, 1615 Paulin. (Imprimerie des Langues orientales.)

France-Turkey. "Capitulations renouvelées entre Louis XIV, Empereur de France, et Méhémet IV, Empereur des Turcs (1673)." Paris 1689, Léonard.

French Government. "Capitulations et Traités entre la France et la Porte ottomane." Paris, 1841. Imprimerie Royale.

*German and Ottoman Governments. "Series of ten Treaties in lieu of the previous Capitulations, signed on the 11th January, 1917." "Reichs-Gesetzblatt," Jahrgang 1918, Nr. 55. Berlin, 17th May, 1918. (See also "Neuer Orient" I 4/5 of 25th May, 1917, Sonderbeilage.)

Great Britain-Turkey. "Capitulations and Articles of Peace between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as . . . . confirmed by the Treaty of Peace concluded at the Dardanelles in 1809." London. Harrison.

*Hertslet, Sir E. "Treaties and Tariffs regulating Trade between Great Britain and foreign nations, and extracts of Treaties between foreign Powers containing most-favoured-nation clauses applicable to Great Britain." London, 1875.

*Mu' Ahede Mejmu' Asy. Constantinople (five volumes).

*Noradounghian, G. "Recueil d'Actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman, 1300–1902" (four volumes: I. 1300–1789; II, 1789–1856; III, 1856–78; IV, 1878–1902). Paris, 1897–1903, Cotillon, then Pichon. Leipzig, 1897–1903, Breitkoff and Haertel. Neuchâtel, 1897–1903, Attinger.

Ottoman Law. "Citizenship, Turkish, law regulating (3rd April, 1917)." "Deutsche Levante-Zeitung," VII, 22.

*Strupp, K. "Ausgewahlte diplomatische Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage." Gotha, 1916. Perthes ("Schriften zum Weltkrieg," 10).

*Testa, Ignaz Freiherr Von (and continuators). "Recueil de Traités de la Porte ottomane avec les Puissances étrangères depuis le premier traité conclu, en 1536, entre Suleyman I et François I, jusqu'à nos jours." Paris, 1864–1911. eleven volumes. Amyot, Muzard, Leroux, &c. (I-VIII, France 1536–1894: IX-XI, Austria 1606–1855: XI, Postal Conventions, 1857–1910).

II.—*Historical Development of the Capitulatory System.*

Antonopoulos, St. "Über die Extraterritorialität der Ausländer in der Türkei, mit Rücksicht auf die Gerichtsbarkeit in Civil- und Strafprozessen" (translated from Modern Greek, with additions, by Meyer, F.). Sonderabdruck "Jahrbuch internat. Vereinigung vergleich. Rechtswissenschaft u. Volkswirtschaftslehre," Jahrgang 1, pp. 95–196. Berlin, 1895.

Arminjon, P. "Etrangers et Protégés dans l'Empire ottoman." Paris, Chevalier Marescq. Volume I, 1903.

*Bein. "Kapitulationen beurteilt nach Völkerrecht u. türkischen Staatsrecht." Berlin, 1916. Putkammer u. Mühlbrecht ("Preussische Jahrbücher 1916," volume 164, Heft 1).

Belin, F. A. "Des Capitulations et des Traités de la France en Orient: Extrait du contemporain, 'Revue d'Economie chrétienne.'" Paris, 1870. Challamel.

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Dumreicher, Dr. Jur. Fr. von. "Wie soll sich das Deutsche Reich der von England in Aegypten geplanten Justizreform gegenüber verhalten?" "Deutsche Levante-Zeitung," VIII, 13 (July 1, 1918).

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*Féraud-Giraud, L. J. D. "De la Juridiction française dans les Echelles du Levant et de Barbarie; étude sur la Condition légale des Etrangers dans les pays hors chrétienté. . . . . (1.) . (2.) Paris, 1866. Thorin (two volumes).

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Lehmann, W. "Aufhebung der Kapitulationen in der Türkei und ihre rechtliche Bedeutung." Berlin, 1916 (Doktordissertation in Greifswald).

Lehmann, W. "Kapitulationen." 1917.

*Lippmann, K. "Konsularjurisdiktion im Orient, ihre historische Entwicklung von den frühesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart." Leipzig, 1898.

Mikonios, G. "Les Consuls en Orient et les Tribunaux mixtes." (Thesis—University of Geneva.) Geneva, 1881. Braun.

Overbeck, A. von. "Kapitulationen des osmanischen Reiches." Breslau, 1917. ("Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht," Beigabe, Bd. x, Heft 3.)

*Pears, Sir E. "The Capitulations." "Law Quarterly Review," October 1905 (volume XXI, No. 84).

*Pélissié du Ransas, G. "Régime des Capitulations dans l'Empire ottoman." Paris, 1902, 1911 (two volumes).

Rauchhaupt, Dr. von. "Hansеatische Rechtszeitung," January 1918 (Beiheft): "Aufhebung der Kapitulationen in ihrer rechtshistorischen Bedeutung und ihrer rechtlichen Folgen."

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1. 37th Congress, 3rd session, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 25—Cong. Docs. volume 1149 (1863, January 26).
2. 47th Congress, special session, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 3—Cong. Docs. volume 1943 (1881, April 7).
3. 47th Congress, 1st session, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 21—Cong. Docs. volume 1966 (1881, December 19).
4. 47th Congress, 1st session, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 87—Cong. Docs. volume 1989 (1882, February 2).

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*British Government. Parliamentary Paper. "Papers relative to the Jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant." London, 1845. Harrison.

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Appendix III.

"*Foreigners in Turkey.*"

(By Philip Marshall Brown, Princeton University Press, 1914. Pp. vii, 157.)

[Interesting as giving an American view of the important and disputable article 4 of the 1830 treaty.]

P. M. Brown, in his preface, explains that as an official in the American Embassy in Turkey, he found a great "need of a clearer understanding in regard to the exact rights of foreigners as distinguished from their privileges, and, in some cases, their undue pretensions," and the present volume sets forth the results of his investigations.

In discussing the origins of the rights of foreigners, Brown claims that although the usual view is that the immunities of jurisdiction are necessary for the protection of foreigners from the rigours and inequalities of Moslem law as applied to non-Moslems, and that the existence of these immunities is derogatory to the sovereign independent rights of Turkey, they may, on the other hand, probably be placed to the credit of the Turk "as evidence of a more enlightened and a more liberal interpretation of the law of nations than has yet been granted in Europe."

After showing that while the Prophet Mahommed apparently divided all mankind into two opposing camps—"believers" and "unbelievers"—he shows that he did not rigidly maintain the distinction, but subdivided the "unbelievers" again into two classes—"peoples of the Book," *i.e.*, Jews, Christians, &c., and genuine pagans. Brown goes on to discuss the origin and growth of Moslem law as it affects the foreigner, and comes to the conclusion that Moslem law and the law of nations as regards the rights of foreigners, are not irreconcilable, and that therefore it is necessary to look elsewhere for a satisfactory explanation of the origin of immunities of jurisdiction.

This Brown finds in the needs of merchants trading in foreign countries, and proceeds to cite cases dating from 1204–1244 B.C., when Phœnicians from Tyre settled in Memphis in Egypt and were permitted to have separate temples for worship; and 579–526 B.C., when King Amasis allowed Greek merchants to establish themselves at Naucratis and permitted them to be judged by their own magistrates according to their own laws and customs. Brown also quotes a couple of articles from the treaty of 945 A.D. between the Varangians of Russia and the Emperor of Byzantium, which is the earliest documentary evidence of the granting of immunities of jurisdiction to foreigners, and points out that while these earlier privileges were reciprocal in character, those which still exist in the Ottoman Empire are entirely one-sided concessions on the part of the Turks. Here is noted the "personal" stage in the development of law, when it is addressed not to the inhabitants of a country, but to the members of a tribe or the followers of a religious system, irrespective of the locality in which they may happen to be. After offering many more instances of the granting of concessions to foreigners in Turkey, and while admitting that the various circumstances of these allow of much discussion as to their necessity or otherwise, Brown contents himself with emphasising the fact that by the time of the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, "it had become the almost universal custom to grant to foreigners extensive immunities of jurisdiction."

Brown goes on to discuss the legal status of non-Moslem subjects after the conquest, and mentions various adjustments that have been made or attempted, recalling how the Young Turks, after the revolution in 1908, rather sacrificed the "national" position by dealing with the various "religious communities as distinct nations and by determining representation in Parliament on the basis of nationalities rather than on a strictly Ottoman basis." Brown finds the reason for the perpetuation of privileges of non-Moslem subjects in "the fact that the Moslem confounds race, religion and law as one and the same thing," and points out that "it is sufficient for determining the origin and nature of the extra-territorial privileges of foreigners in Turkey, simply to note that, without the aid of powerful armies and battleships, the Christian and other subjects of the Sultan received extensive immunities of jurisdiction resembling in certain respects those subsequently granted to foreigners."

In dealing with the various Capitulations; the Venetian Treaty of 1454, the French treaties of 1535 and 1740, many provisions of which are quoted and discussed, Brown insists on the fact that they afford confirmation of ancient privileges and are recognitions of universal practice by the Turks. "Through tenacious insistence," says Brown, "on the right to the same treatment accorded to the most favoured nation, the other nations have successively obtained from Turkey, for the benefit of their own nationals, the same privileges granted to France in the Capitulations of 1535 and 1740, as confirmed by subsequent treaties. England was the first in 1579, Holland also in the same year, Austria 1615, Russia 1711, Sweden 1737, Denmark 1756, Prussia 1761, Spain 1782, Sardinia 1825, United States of America 1830, Belgium 1838, Portugal 1843, Greece 1854, Brazil 1858, &c. Most of these treaties were later modified; by extension in some cases, by restrictions in others."

Very great modifications in the whole régime of Capitulations were made by the promulgation, in 1867, of the law granting to foreigners the right to hold property. Several extracts are given, both from the rescript itself and also from the protocol signed by the Powers in acceptance of it.

Brown next endeavours to "reduce to the compass of a simple code, these rights as recognised in practice or claimed in theory at the present time in Turkey. This he draws up under three main headings: (i) immunities of jurisdiction in cases involving foreigners of the same nationality, (ii) in cases of foreigners of different nationality, and (iii) in cases between foreigners and Ottoman subjects. Each of these he considers on four principal points: (*a*) the nature of the rights involved, (*b*) the kind of tribunals and judicial procedure employed, (*c*) the law to be applied. (*d*) the execution of the law. Brown covers this ground thoroughly, and though he deals with it from the standpoint of American law and procedure, he loses no opportunity to compare them with those of other nationalities. Under the third main heading—that concerning foreigners and Ottoman subjects—he raises the divergence of reading of article 4 of the American treaty of 1830, between the official French version and the English version officially maintained by the United States of America, and cites a test case that took place in 1905, when the United States did not altogether appear to advantage. Under this heading also is discussed the position of the consular dragoman between the Ottoman courts and the foreign consulates.

Inviolability of domicile and special immunities are briefly mentioned, and Brown finally comes to the conclusion that under the régime of the Capitulations a very abnormal state of affairs exists, which cannot endure indefinitely.

In his final chapter, Brown attempts to reconcile in some measure the point of view of the Powers with that of the Imperial Ottoman Government. After noting at some length the difference in view-point between continental writers on international law, who hold that the rights of aliens cannot "be determined solely by the varying legislation of each sovereign nation," and the Anglo-American authorities, he summarises the continental view-point under four headings:—

1. International, not national, jurisprudence must have sway.
2. Foreigners carry with them, wherever they go, such rights as accompany their nationality.
3. These rights are, in general terms, such as relate to civil status and capacity.
4. That it is most desirable that their rights should be definitely determined by international agreements. They should be made to depend, not on international comity, but on international law.

Applying these observations to the case of the future relations between the Powers and the Porte with regard to the protection of foreigners and the sovereign rights of Turkey, Brown arrives at the following conclusions:—

1. Turkey to have exclusive jurisdiction over foreigners, as well as natives, in all matters affecting law and order in the Empire. Turkish criminal and civil law should therefore be made to accord fully both in form and substance with the law generally accepted in all civilised lands. As a corollary, the Powers would renounce the supervision and control over Ottoman tribunals, in cases involving foreigners, exercised by the consular dragoman.
2. Differences between Moslem jurisprudence and other systems of law are too wide to be reconciled, so that questions of personal status and civil capacity would have to be retained for consular courts or for the religious communities.
3. An international tribunal functioning within a sovereign independent State would not be feasible or acceptable.
4. To leave to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Consular Courts all questions regarding foreigners which do not in any way affect the public law and order of the Empire.

Brown's final conclusion is that the Consular Courts should be perpetuated, but with considerably restricted powers of jurisdiction; and a clear delimitation of the respective spheres of these tribunals and the Ottoman courts.

N.B.—An excellent bibliography and index are included. As regards origin of rights and Capitulations, Brown quotes "Ancien Diplomate," Miltitz and du Rausas most frequently, while on the juridical rights of foreigners, du Rausas, Mandelstam, Moore and Young are the chief authorities referred to.

[E 13044/10524/44] No. 618.

Memorandum on the Proposed Exchange of Greek and Turkish Minorities.

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IT is now generally agreed that the best practical solution of the minorities problem as between Greece and Turkey lies in the conclusion of a definite arrangement for an interchange of Turkish and Greek minorities.

2. A useful precedent for such an exchange exists in the Græco-Bulgarian Intermigration Convention of the 27th November, 1919, which was one of the subsidiary treaties signed with the Treaty of Neuilly. When the Treaty of Sèvres was drawn up it was anticipated that a convention on more or less similar lines would be signed between Greece and Turkey, and provision for such a convention was made in article 143 of that treaty.

3. The conditions at that time, however, were radically different from those now obtaining. The Greek minorities in Turkey were assured under the Treaty of Sèvres of full protection, and there was no reason to anticipate that they would wish to leave their homes in Asia Minor, where they were likely to continue to enjoy their former commercial prosperity, in any considerable numbers. It was therefore anticipated that more Moslems would leave Greek, than Ottoman Greeks Turkish, territory, and a provision was accordingly inserted in article 143 of the Treaty of Sèvres, at the request of the Greeks, debarring Turkey from acceding to the Græco-Bulgarian Intermigration Convention of 1919, as she might have done under article 16 of that convention, since it was thought that such accession would be to the financial disadvantage of Greece.*

4. The position is now entirely altered. We are no longer able to obtain any effective protection for the Greek minorities in Turkey, and the Kemalists are adopting a policy of violent xenophobia which makes them eager to expel or otherwise eliminate all non-Turkish elements from Turkish territory. It is therefore an urgent matter to provide for the departure of the remaining Greek minorities from Anatolia in the most favourable conditions which can be obtained. Further, the number of Ottoman Greek refugees who have now reached Greece from Turkish territory in a state of complete destitution is so great that it is important from all points of view to make every effort to obtain the restitution of a portion at least of their abandoned property. The only hope of securing either of these results appears to lie in the conclusion of an intermigration arrangement.

5. Three proposals have recently been put forward for such an arrangement.

6. The first was the suggestion that a preliminary intermigration agreement should be negotiated by Dr. Nansen, as League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Near East, in anticipation of the final treaty.

7. The second was for the conclusion of an entirely separate treaty similar to the Græco-Bulgarian Treaty, to be merely referred to and allowed for in the main Treaty of Peace, in an article closely corresponding to article 143 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

8. The third proposal, which is now under discussion, is for the insertion in the general settlement, or main Peace Treaty between the Allies and Turkey, of the

* Similar objections will now no doubt be put forward by the Kemalists (*cf.* paragraph 17) and the fact that we yielded to Greek representations during the Sèvres negotiations may somewhat weaken our position in this respect at Lausanne.

principal outlines of a Græco-Turkish intermigration agreement, to be followed by the conclusion of a separate Græco-Turkish convention on points of detail and machinery alone.

9. It has now become clear that any preliminary arrangement on the lines contemplated by Dr. Nansen is out of the question. Dr. Nansen's negotiations may be regarded as having definitely failed, and the Turks are not at present disposed to make any agreement with Greece which the latter could accept.

10. This attitude of the Turks towards the defeated Greeks is likely to continue, and there is little hope that they will agree to any equitable intermigration arrangements with Greece, if Greece is left to negotiate with them alone, or with the sole assistance of the League of Nations, in the manner foreshadowed in article 143 of the Treaty of Sèvres, after a general settlement between the Allies and Turkey has been reached.

11. The only hope of reaching a fair settlement of this question would therefore seem to lie in embodying the main outlines of the agreement in the general settlement. The question would thus become part of the general negotiations, and it might prove possible to bring sufficient inter-Allied pressure to bear on the Turks to ensure their acceptance of such provisions on this subject as are absolutely essential.

12. It is of the first importance to reach a decision as to the exact nature of these provisions, which will constitute, so to speak, the irreducible minimum of international guarantee, without which any scheme of intermigration must inevitably fail.

13. The question is a far more complicated one than that dealt with in the Græco-Bulgarian Convention, which applied principally to populations of approximately similar character and numbers, actually resident in compact and closely similar territories, and in which the question of refugees played a comparatively unimportant part, being only briefly alluded to in article 12.

14. In the present case it will be necessary to deal with great expanses of territory, including districts as widely distant from each other as Epirus, Cilicia, Pontus and Crete, and with minorities between which the greatest disparity exists as regards both numbers and general conditions. As will be shown below, the majority of the Ottoman Greeks are now already refugees in Greek territory, and, of the remainder, whose numbers are being decreased rapidly by death and emigration, a large proportion, which the Turks will probably be unwilling to release, are forcibly detained in Anatolia. The Hellenic Moslems, on the other hand, who are in any case far less numerous than the Ottoman Greeks, are for the most part established in Greece in favourable conditions, enjoying, among other advantages, full parliamentary representation, and are unlikely to be very willing to leave.

15. It is essential in the first place that definite rulings should be included in the main treaty as to the various categories of persons to be included in the exchange. We may anticipate that the Turks will object to the inclusion on the one hand of Hellenic Moslems from Western Thrace, where they may still hope eventually to obtain some kind of plebiscite, or at least gradually to undermine Greek influence, and, on the other, of various classes of Ottoman Greeks, such as refugees who left Turkish territory prior to some very recent date, and of persons forcibly detained. We further know that the Greeks have already strongly objected to the inclusion in the proposed exchange of the Ottoman Greeks of Constantinople, since they state that Greece cannot possibly absorb so large a purely urban population. A date must also be laid down prior to which the agreement ceases to be retrospective as regards refugees.

16. Great difficulties may be anticipated in regard to property. The Turks have already disposed of a great part of the property of Ottoman Greek refugees by the Abandoned Property Laws of 1915 and 1922. An attempt was made to obtain the cancellation of the first of these laws in article 144 of the Treaty of Sèvres, but it is now agreed that we cannot hope to retain that article, and, the principal plank of the Kemalist platform being that Turkey cannot tolerate interference in her internal affairs, it is not easy to see how their modification can be secured. Without such modification, however, the problem of reaching any equitable arrangement regarding refugees' property will be almost insoluble.

17. An even more serious difficulty as regards the question of property is that the total amount of Ottoman Greek property in Turkish territory is greatly in excess of that of Hellenic Moslem property in Greece. Therefore the Greeks would benefit collectively, though probably not individually, by an exchange. But the Turks, so far from being prepared to enter into any agreement by which payments in money or

in kind would have to be made by them to Greece, are demanding an indemnity from their vanquished adversary. The most we can hope for, therefore, is an arrangement by which Turkey will release or restore a total amount of Ottoman Greek property in Turkish territory equivalent only to the total amount of the property of Hellenic Moslems who leave Greece. This may be better than nothing, but it will take much of the value out of the Intermigration Agreement, and will make the Greeks far less willing to compromise on other points, so that there is a serious danger of negotiations breaking down on this point alone.

18. It is now desirable to consider in greater detail the various aspects of the proposed agreement. It is proposed to examine these under three heads :—

(1.) The classes and approximate numbers of persons likely to be affected.
(2.) The question of the property of the minorities concerned.
(3.) The machinery necessary for carrying out effectively any intermigration agreement which may be reached.

I.—*Classes and Approximate Numbers of Persons Affected.*

19. Broadly speaking, the intention is to remove to, and establish in, Greek territory, all Greek-Ottoman subjects hitherto resident in territory remaining Turkish, and to remove to, and settle in, Turkish territory, all Moslems at present residing in territory remaining Greek. The Greeks of Turkey, even if Turkish-speaking (as in the case of the Karamanlis of Western Anatolia), can easily be identified by anyone possessing local knowledge. The Turks of Greece are somewhat more difficult to distinguish. Our statistics in fact only speak of Moslems, not of Turks, and the Turks themselves, in their proposals to Dr. Nansen of the 31st October, spoke of "the whole Moslem population" of Greece.* It is probably preferable therefore to refer to them simply as Moslems, thus including the Cretan Moslems (who are not of Turkish race), and possibly a certain number of Moslem Albanians and Pomaks, who are likely to be prepared to migrate at any rate to Eastern Thrace. For the purposes of the present discussion it may be assumed that the exchange would in practice be one of Ottoman Greeks against Hellenic Moslems, and that the test would in general be religious rather than racial.

20. The classes of persons to which an intermigration treaty should apply are the following :—

(*a.*) Persons of the race or religion concerned actually and voluntarily resident in the territory of the respective States, as defined by the final treaty, at the date when the intermigration treaty comes into force.
(*b.*) Persons of the race or religion concerned forcibly detained in such territory.
(*c.*) Persons of the race or religion concerned who have left such territory since a specified date (*i.e.*, refugees).

21.—(*a.*) The question of the exchange of the minorities included in this category need present no insurmountable difficulty, provided a certain parity of numbers can be established. The principal difficulties are likely to arise over the expulsion of the Moslems of Western Thrace and of the Greeks of Constantinople. If, however, the imperialistic ambitions of the Turks in regard to Western Thrace can be permanently extinguished at the Peace Conference, the first of these difficulties may be overcome. As regards the second, it will be shown below that the number of Ottoman Greeks in the rest of Turkey available for exchange should be as great as, or greater than, the total number of Moslems in Greek territory, without the inclusion of the Constantinople Greeks, so that it will probably be desirable in any case to make separate arrangements regarding the latter.

22.—(*b.*) The difficulty here is a serious one since a large proportion, if not an actual majority, of the Ottoman Greeks who will be resident in Turkish territory when the treaty comes into force, will undoubtedly fall within this category.

23. There will be few if any Hellenic Moslems to set off against them. The Greeks took a small number of hostages when they retreated from Eastern Thrace and Ionia, but these appear all to have been Ottoman subjects, so that they would not fall under the agreement, and it is believed that they have in any case already

* Excluding Western Thrace.

been released.* The Turks allege that the Greeks have illegally imprisoned a number of Hellenic Moslems in Macedonia, Western Thrace and elsewhere, but no confirmation of these allegations has been received. The number of such arrests and detentions would appear to be inconsiderable, and such cases could no doubt be dealt with by the commission entrusted with the carrying out of the treaty. The Greeks are most unlikely to make any difficulties on this point, as the release of the Ottoman Greeks detained in Anatolia is infinitely more important to them than the retention of a few Turkish hostages or civil prisoners.

24. The Ottoman Greeks forcibly detained in Turkey are on the other hand extremely numerous, and their release, though it will be most difficult to obtain, is a matter of the utmost urgency, not only from the humanitarian point of view, but from that of the success of the intermigration scheme as a whole, and from that of the solution of the refugee problem with which Greece, and to some extent the whole of Europe, is now faced.

25 They may be divided into the following categories :—

(i.) The deported men of military age, and probably a large number of the survivors of the early deportations. During the recent exodus, the Turks have forcibly detained and employed in labour gangs all able-bodied Ottoman Greek males between 15 and 45. All reliable reports confirm the fact that among the 500,000 refugees known to have reached Greece from Ionia, there are practically no men of those ages, and the same principle is being applied in the case of the expulsions of Ottoman Greeks now taking place along the north coast of Asia Minor. These men will therefore form a very large proportion of the Ottoman Greeks remaining in Anatolia. It is essential that special provisions should be included in the main treaty to ensure their release. A provision corresponding to article 3 of the Græco-Bulgarian Treaty, is hardly likely to prove sufficient.

(ii.) The Ottoman Greeks who served in the Greek army during the war. These are being treated as criminals by the Turks, notwithstanding our representations, and will probably all have been shot by the time the treaty comes into force, so that it is unnecessary to provide for them.

Neither (i) nor (ii) can, of course, be treated as prisoners of war, who must be dealt with quite separately.

(iii.) Islamised women and children. These were provided for in article 142 of the Treaty of Sèvres. In 1921 the League of Nations reported that although the release of about 90,000 had been obtained, there were still 80,000 such women and children in Turkish houses, of whom presumably about half were Armenians. Since 1921, and especially during the exodus of September–October 1922, further large numbers of Ottoman Greek young women have been seized by the Turks. We may perhaps therefore place their numbers now at between 50,000 and 60,000. The League of Nations are very anxious that we should continue to try to obtain their release—but this will probably prove impracticable. One might, however, attempt to insert some provision in the treaty, which could eventually be interpreted as covering them. A League commission on deported women and children, established in anticipation of the Treaty of Sèvres, is already in existence, and has done much good work.

26.—(c.) *Refugees.*—The first question to be decided is the date beyond which the agreement shall not be regarded as being retrospective in regard to refugees. As this agreement is to form part of a treaty bringing to an end the war between Turkey and the Allies, during the whole course of which forced migrations of minorities occurred, it seems clear that the date must not be later than October 1914. On the other hand it is important not to attempt to go back too far. In article 12 of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention, no retrospective date is specified, and the mixed commission appears to have been allowed discretion on this point. They fixed on the year 1900, and experienced great difficulty in establishing the necessary data over so long a period. In the present case it seems clear that the agreement, which will in any circumstances be more difficult to carry out than the Greco-Bulgarian Convention, would prove quite unworkable if it were to cover any period

* Since the above was written information has been received of the continued imprisonment by the Greeks at Salonica of 600 Turkish civilian hostages from Brusa (see No. 672, p. 550).

anterior to the territorial rearrangements which resulted from the Balkan wars. But the greater part of the emigrations of Hellenic Moslems from Greek territory which have occurred appear to have closely followed on those wars and to have preceded the outbreak of the European war. It is desirable to include in the agreement as many Moslem refugees as possible in order that our hands may be strengthened in dealing with the Turks in regard to the question of the Ottoman Greek refugees from Turkey. It therefore seems desirable that the date to be fixed should be that of the termination of the Græco-Turkish Balkan War, *i.e.*, the 14th November, 1913. If this date is accepted, the position would be that only refugees of the two minorities concerned who had left their native territory after the 14th November, 1913, would be entitled to benefit by the agreement. With this addition, and the necessary verbal alterations, article 12 of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention might perhaps be inserted bodily in the text of the general treaty.

27. The question of the nature of the provisions to be inserted in the treaty in regard to the exchange of actual populations must depend to a great extent on the relative numbers of the two minorities concerned. Statistics can be quoted in support of almost any cause, and it is fully recognised that, as a general rule, they are apt to be both inaccurate and misleading; but in the present case we are in possession of information from so large a number of independent sources that certain general statements may be put forward with some degree of confidence. The following paragraphs summarise our information regarding the numbers of—

(A.) Ottoman Greeks in Turkey.
(B.) Hellenic Moslems in Greece.
(C.) Refugees.

(A.)—*Ottoman Greeks in Turkey.*

28. The Ottoman Greeks actually in Turkey (whether normally resident or forcibly detained there) may, for statistical purposes, be divided into three territorial groups :—

(1.) Asia Minor.
(2.) Eastern Thrace.
(3.) Constantinople.

(1.) *Asia Minor.*

29. According to the American statistics of 1914, which seem to strike a mean between the Turkish and Greek figures, there were in 1914 just under 1,600,000 Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor.

30. We know that of these, some 500,000 were deported between 1914 and 1918, and, from the accounts of the deportations which we have since received from neutral eye-witnesses, it is clear that only a small percentage of the deportees can have survived. We may perhaps, therefore, safely regard these deportations as having accounted for between 300,000 and 400,000.

31. It is difficult to estimate the number of Greeks deported between the spring of 1919 and the summer of 1922, but from American and other accounts it appears unlikely to have been much less than 300,000 (70,000 passed through Sivas alone); and from the details in our possession it appears that the mortality among these deportees can have been no less severe. We should no doubt be safe in estimating the deaths from these deportations as amounting to a further 200,000 at least.

32. According to detailed statistics furnished by the Save the Children Fund and from other reports, it is clear that at least 500,000 Ottoman Greeks reached Greece from Ionia in September and October 1922.

33. It therefore seems probable that, of the 1,600,000 Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor in 1914, about 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 have been accounted for, and that about 500,000 to 600,000 remain, of whom the majority are probably forcibly detained. Sir H. Rumbold reported on the 5th November, however, that the Turks were at that date expelling the remaining Christian women and children from Northern Anatolia in large numbers, and this estimate may therefore soon have to be further reduced.

(2.) *Eastern Thrace.*

34. The whole Greek population of Eastern Thrace has now left. This is borne out by the reports of the inter-Allied military commissions which supervised the evacuation. They can therefore only be dealt with as refugees.

(3.) *Constantinople.*

35. The Greek population of Constantinople appears in 1914 to have amounted to about 300,000, but is spoken of in recent reports from Sir H. Rumbold as being about 400,000. The Greeks have, however, been leaving rapidly ever since the Mudania Agreement—at one time at the rate of 3,000 a day—and it is probable that the number available for exchange when the treaty comes into force will be comparatively small. They will probably, therefore, have to be treated as refugees. The Turks insisted to Dr. Nansen on the 31st October that the entire Greek population of Constantinople must be included in the proposed exchange, but the Greek Government stated on the 2nd November that they "could not contemplate taking into Greece the enormous Greek population of Constantinople or admit the principle that the Turks should expel it." The departure of the Greeks would, of course, seriously impair the commercial prosperity of Constantinople for a considerable time, and it would be most difficult to absorb them in Greece. There is, therefore, from many points of view, a strong case for excluding what remains of the Greek population of Constantinople from any intermigration treaty.

36. Whatever decision may be reached on this point, it seems clear that the total number of Ottoman Greeks in Turkey, including Constantinople, at the beginning of November 1922 did not exceed 900,000, and was then being rapidly reduced.

(B.)—*Hellenic Moslems in Greece.*

37. The Hellenic Moslems actually in Greece may also for statistical purposes be divided into three territorial groups:

(1.) Old Greece and old islands.
(2.) New Greece, "Asiatic" islands and Crete.
(3.) Western Thrace.

(1.) *Old Greece.*

38. According to the Admiralty handbook on Greece of 1918 (C.B. 837), the Moslem population of Old Greece in 1907 only amounted to 3,516. As the tendency of the Balkan Moslems, as Sir Valentine Chirol recently pointed out, is to leave Christian countries as a matter of religious principle, if for no other reason, we may take is that this number has not materially increased. It may perhaps be regarded as amounting to 4,000 at most.

(2.) *New Greece.*

39. According to the Foreign Office (published) handbook on Greece of 1920 (No. 18), the Moslems in New Greece (inclusive of Crete and the "Asiatic" islands, but exclusive of Thrace) amounted to 18 per cent. of the total population. The population of these provinces, according to the 1920 Greek census, amounted to 1,991,816—say, 2,000,000—so that the Moslem population may perhaps be estimated at approximately 360,000

(3.) *Western Thrace.*

40. According to the Greek figures of 1912, which are not likely to be pro-Turkish, the Turkish population of the Greek portion of Western Thrace amounted in that year to 124,500. A certain number of these Turks have undoubtedly become refugees in Turkey since 1919. As was pointed out above, the question whether the Turkish inhabitants of Western Thrace are to be included in any intermigration agreement may be somewhat complicated by the fact that the Turks are not likely readily to abandon their scheme for a plebiscite in that province, and, as long as they cherish any hope of being able to recover it by that or any other means, they will hardly agree to the emigration of the native Turkish population. In discussing the intermigration proposals with Dr. Nansen on the 31st October, Hamid Bey pointedly omitted all reference to the Turks of Western Thrace.

41. If we take the above figures as substantially correct, the total number of Moslems in Greek territory would amount to 488,500. On the other hand, M. Veniselos, in discussing the question of intermigration with Sir E. Crowe on the 12th October, stated that "there was the difficulty that the total number of Turks in the whole of Greece was probably a good deal less than 200,000." M. Veniselos may have been excluding the islands and Crete and making too great an allowance for

emigration. The real number is no doubt something between 300,000 and 400,000. Further information is being sought on this point.* But, whatever may be the exact figure, it is clear that it has never amounted to more than half a million at the most.

(C.)—*Refugees.*

42. As regards refugees, the disparity in numbers is even greater. As shown above, we know beyond doubt that at least 500,000 Ottoman Greek refugees had arrived in Greece from Asia Minor by the end of October 1922. We also know that the entire Ottoman Greek population of Eastern Thrace has fled to Greece. This, according to the 1912 Greek figures, was 325,000, and, according to the 1914 Turkish figures, was 235,000. We may perhaps place it at 300,000, more especially as Hamid Bey informed Dr. Nansen early in October that 320,000 "Greek peasants from Eastern Thrace could be exchanged against a similar number of Turkish peasants from Greece." Adding to these figures the Ottoman Greeks from Constantinople and the neutral zones, and the stragglers from Asia Minor, we may take it that at least 900,000 Ottoman Greek refugees have reached Greek territory within the last three months. This number does not include the numerous refugees who reached Greece from Turkish territory between 1913 and 1918, and between 1919 and the summer of 1922, nor the Ottoman Greeks who are continually arriving from Constantinople; but it includes a certain small number of Armenians, Circassians and others, who could not benefit by any intermigration arrangements. The total number will be considerably reduced in the near future by starvation and disease, but, even so, it is likely to amount to well over a million. The majority of these refugees are destitute and separated from their breadwinners. The latter are retained in the interior of Anatolia, where they cannot long survive, and their abandoned property has in most cases already been looted or seized.

43. In regard to the Hellenic Moslem refugees in Turkey, we have unfortunately no statistics, but we know, partly from the absence of all data on the subject, that their number is not very great. As most of the statistics quoted above regarding the Moslem inhabitants of Greece are based on pre-war information, we may safely assume that the total number of Moslem refugees from Greece, whatever it may be, must be deducted from the maximum estimate of 500,000 given in paragraph 41. It is probable that considerable emigration has taken place since 1919 from Western Thrace. A number of Cretan Moslems are also known to have settled in Smyrna, and an exodus of Moslems is believed to have occurred from Macedonia and Epirus after the Balkan wars. If the Turks could furnish statistics regarding these refugees, it would no doubt be possible for the commission entrusted with the carrying out of the agreement to verify them from local records and by cross-examination of the remaining Moslems. But, however much greater the number of Moslem refugees may prove to be than is anticipated, it is clear that it can never compare with the number of Ottoman-Greek refugees who have left Turkish territory even within the last few months.

II.—*Property.*

44. Colonel Corfe, the president of the Mixed Commission entrusted with the carrying out of the Græco-Bulgarian Intermigration Convention, has pointed out that since interchanges of this nature are usually of a more or less compulsory character, "the really important point is compensation for property left behind." He has emphasised the fact that the absence of any proper settlement of this question leaves a permanent bitterness on both sides, which frequently eventually leads to a renewal of war. Attention has already been drawn (see paragraphs 16 and 17) to the peculiar difficulties of the property and compensation question in the present case. Can these difficulties be overcome?

45. The only lever which the Greeks possess is the real property in Greek territory belonging to Hellenic Moslems. The latter are for the most part farmers, and, in Macedonia in particular, own numerous large tobacco plantatins. Unfortunately, a considerable amount of this property appears already to have been seized either by the Greek Government, or, more especially in Crete, by Ottoman-Greek refugees. Thus the Greeks, instead of gaining by the liquidation of this property, may find that they are merely committed to further disbursements.

* See now No. 719, p. 607.

46. It is clear that the Ottoman-Greek refugees, owing to their enormously greater numbers, have abandoned a far greater total amount of real property than the Hellenic Moslem refugees. But they have lost much more than this. Many, especially from the Pontic towns, and from Constantinople, were merchants with an established trade, and will have lost businesses and connections, the value of which cannot be assessed, and for which no compensation is possible. The Hellenic Moslems, not being traders, and proceeding to a rich and depopulated country, will not suffer any corresponding loss.

47. In spite of the extreme difficulty of assessing losses and of recovering more than a very small proportion of the private property involved, a strong commission with carefully safeguarded powers might be able to obtain some tangible result. It is to be noted, for instance, that the Turkish abandoned property law of the 22nd April, 1922, provides theoretically for the safe custody by the Government of refugees' property pending their return. It would be optimistic to anticipate that more than a small portion of such property has in fact been safeguarded by the Turkish authorities, but the Turkish Government might conceivably be induced to hand over such property to a Mixed Commission, even if the abrogation or repeal of the abandoned properties laws as a whole should prove to be out of the question. It may be noted, however, that the Græco-Bulgarian Mixed Commission has succeeded in obtaining the abrogation of Greek and Bulgarian confiscatory measures against the abandoned property of emigrants and refugees without in any way laying itself open to the charge of unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of the Sovereign States concerned. This precedent may prove of use, and it may perhaps be possible for a Mixed Commission, with Greek, Turkish and neutral members, to take action which would be resented and opposed if coming from the Allied Powers.

48. Apart from private property, there is a great deal of ecclesiastical or corporate property of various kinds regarding the amount of which it would no doubt be considerably less difficult to reach an agreement. Detailed statistics are obtainable not only through the Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities, but also through the Turkish civil authorities of the churches, schools, institutions, &c., hitherto belonging to the Greek communities in Turkey. Although the Turks are known to have destroyed many of these—it was, for instance, recently reported that they were actively demolishing all the Greek churches in Smyrna—the total number and value of those standing in 1913 or 1914 could hardly be open to serious dispute. Against this could be set the value of Moslem religious and joint property in Greece. The Moslem Wakfs in Greece were specially safeguarded by article 12 of the Græco-Turkish Peace Treaty of the 14th November, 1913, and although many of the Wakf properties have no doubt already been liquidated in the manner allowed for in that article, they must still be very considerable in Crete, Macedonia and Western Thrace.

49. So much Greek religious property has been seized or destroyed in Turkish territory that it seems equitable that compensation for it should be charged, in part at least, against the Moslem religious property in Greece. But there are few questions on which passions are more easily inflamed than those concerned with religious property, and, although the seizure of the Orthodox property in Turkey is already an accomplished fact, any hasty interference with the Wakfs in Greece would no doubt bitterly offend the highly sensitive opinion of the Moslem world. It is therefore submitted that this question should, in the first instance, be referred to a small committee, comprising both Moslem and Orthodox members, which could propose certain general principles to be laid down on this subject in the main treaty, and to be adopted for its general guidance by the Mixed Commission entrusted with the execution of any agreement reached.

III.—*Machinery.*

50. The execution of the Græco-Bulgarian Intermigration Convention was entrusted, by articles 8 to 11 of that convention, to a Mixed Commission "composed of one member nominated by each of the contracting States concerned, and of an equal number of members of a different nationality, from among whom the president shall be chosen, and who shall be nominated by the Council of the League of Nations."

51. This commission issued an interesting account of its work on the 30th August last. In the course of this work it has gained most valuable experience, and, in investigating questions of Bulgarian property in Greek territory, it has inevitably, owing to the frequency of cases of doubtful ownership of property

in Macedonia as between Greeks, Bulgarians and Turks, dealt with questions of Turkish property in Greece. It has also been obliged to concern itself to some extent with questions affected by Turkish legislation on abandoned Christian properties.

52. The commission is likely to have to continue a part at least of its work for some considerable time, and it has been suggested from several quarters that, if a commission is now required to deal with the question of Græco-Turkish intermigration, the present commission, with the substitution of a Turkish for the present Bulgarian member, should be entrusted with the task. It has been pointed out that to employ a commission already on the spot, already possessed of much of the necessary data, and fully experienced in the difficult and delicate work involved, might much facilitate the actual execution of any Græco-Turkish arrangement which may be reached, and would incidentally save much unnecessary duplication of labour and expense. Owing to the large extent of territory now involved, however, a larger commission may prove necessary.

53. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the internal constitution of the commission should to some extent be reorganised, so that the position of the League of Nations delegates *vis-à-vis* their two local colleagues might be strengthened. This is understood to be Dr. Nansen's view. It is urged in support of it that, although the two League delegates on the Græco-Bulgarian Commission have in practice been able to outvote the Greek and Bulgarian delegates owing to the latter's constant divergence of view, they have in numerous cases been unable to secure action "since they were only able to exercise moral persuasion with the two parties." It has been suggested, therefore, that either party in the commission should be given the right to appeal to the Council of the League. The decision here, however, will depend to a great extent on the attitude of Turkey towards the League. We may safely anticipate considerable difficulty in persuading Turkey to agree to the same or to a similar commission as that now functioning in the case of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention. There is little hope that Turkey, even if she becomes a member of the League, will agree to any increase of the League's powers in this particular matter, and the wisdom of putting such a suggestion forward, and thus possibly courting a rebuff, seems open to serious question.

General Conclusions.

54. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that a number of important provisions must be inserted in the main treaty between the Allies and Turkey if any successful and equitable exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities is to be carried out. It is submitted that these provisions should form a separate part of the new treaty to be entitled "Exchange of Greek and Turkish Minorities" or "Græco-Turkish Intermigration," and should not be included among the ordinary minorities provisions (Part IV of the Treaty of Sèvres), where they would be more likely to provoke the resentment and opposition of the Turks, as constituting an interference in Turkish internal affairs.

55. In drawing up these provisions it would be well that the League of Nations members of the present Græco-Bulgarian Intermigration Mixed Commission, Colonel Corfe, and Major de Roover, should be consulted, as their recent practical experience of these questions would render their advice extremely valuable.

56. It is submitted that the provisions of the new part of the treaty should, if possible, proceed on the following general lines:—

(i.) A general definition of the classes and categories of persons to whom the arrangement would apply.

(ii.) A special provision regarding refugees based on article 12 of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention, with the modifications suggested in paragraph 26 above.

(iii.) Special provisions regarding persons forcibly detained, based on article 3 of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention, but giving the commission powers of enquiry and decision in doubtful cases. (*Cf.* paragraph 25, section i.) It might perhaps here be possible to insert some general provision which would enable the commission to co-operate with the existing League of Nations Commission on deported women and children. But the greatest care would have to be taken to avoid rousing Turkish opposition on this point. (*Cf.* paragraph 25, section iii.)

(iv.) Provisions regarding the private property, both real and personal, of persons actually resident in the respective countries.

(v.) Analogous provisions regarding the real and personal property of refugees, giving the Mixed Commission the strongest powers to which the Turks and Greeks can be persuaded to agree.
(vi.) Provisions regarding the liquidation and exchange of religious and corporate property.
(vii.) Provisions corresponding to articles 8 to 11 inclusive of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention, setting up and defining the duties of the Mixed Commission. It is perhaps unnecessary to specify in the main treaty that the commission should actually be the same as the Græco-Bulgarian Commission. If article 8 of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention is retained as it stands it will still be open to the League to appoint the same delegates, and there would doubtless be no difficulty in inducing Greece to follow suit. The Turkish delegate would be new in any case.

57. Our position *vis-à-vis* the Turks on this whole question is, however, a very weak one, and it is necessary to consider whether any alternative courses of action are open, should it prove quite impossible to obtain the insertion in the main treaty of clauses in the above sense. Such alternatives would necessarily be unsatisfactory, but they might still provide some alleviation of the present deplorable situation.

58. If one should not be able to obtain a special intermigration arrangement between Greece and Turkey, it might still be possible to persuade Turkey to accede to the Græco-Bulgarian Convention under article 16 of that convention. Much of that convention, would, for the reasons explained above, prove quite unworkable as between Greece and Turkey, but more property might be recovered and more facilities obtained for the return of refugees, &c., by this means than would be the case if negotiations were allowed completely to break down. Should this course be adopted the provisions of article 143 of the Treaty of Sèvres would have to be reversed, and it would have to be stipulated that Turkey did definitely accede to the Græco-Bulgarian Convention under article 16 thereof, and accepted the existing Mixed Commission, with the substitution of a Turkish for a Bulgarian member.

59. A third alternative would be the conclusion of separate local agreements for separate groups of the populations concerned. Thus the Moslem population of Crete might be exchanged against the surviving Greeks from Pontus or the Moslem population of Western Thrace might be exchanged against the Ottoman-Greek men of military age now detained by the Turks. Such agreements would not meet the main requirements of the situation, but would nevertheless bring a certain measure of urgently needed relief.

G. W. RENDEL.

November 20, 1922

[E 12989/27/44] No. 619.

Memorandum communicated by Italian Ambassador.—(Received November 21.)

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to statements made by M. Barrère to Signor Mussolini the French Government consider—

1. That the Powers who did not take part in the war on the side of the Allies should be invited to state their views at Lausanne respecting questions in which they are interested, but to take no part at all in the deliberations of the conference;

2. That, on the other hand, the States which are regarded as Allies should be accorded the same treatment as has been decided upon for Belgium;

3. That the Albanian Government, in addition to being treated in the same manner as all the other non-Allied States, should take part in the conference as regards the questions connected with the determination of the charges on the territories detached from the Ottoman Empire (liquidation resulting from the Balkan settlement of 1913 which has been in suspense until the present time).

On the contrary the Italian Government consider for their part—

1. That it is not possible to make a distinction between States which did or did not participate in the war on the side of the Allies, inasmuch as when it comes to the final settlement of questions in which third States are directly or indirectly interested,

it would appear to be desirable that these States should discuss such settlement and should not merely be invited to state their views.

2. Accordingly, the Italian Government propose that the Albanian Government be invited to take part in the discussion of all the matters that concern Albania, and not merely those connected with the Balkan settlement of 1913.

3. Consequently, and in virtue of the same considerations, the Italian Government propose that the Bulgarian Government, who have material and important interests, be invited likewise to share in the discussions which directly concern Bulgaria, and that, therefore, the scope of the invitation already sent to the Sofia Government be extended.

The Italian Government desire to learn the views of the British Government regarding all the above questions; and the Italian Embassy will therefore be very grateful to the Foreign Office if they will furnish the information required.

Italian Embassy, London, November 19, 1922.

No. 620.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 728.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 20, 1922.

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING'S telegram No. 3027, repeated to Lausanne, No. 2.

Allied generals reached deadlock this morning with Refet on question of police. General Harington is reporting separately on the subject this evening. As all three generals were united in refusing to make further concessions to Turks in this matter, my impression is that Refet will give in on 22nd November, when he is to give final answer. This will not, however, arrest Refet's activities in other directions. Only method which I can suggest to put a stop to these encroachments without risk of conflict would be to [? group omitted] early opportunity at conference to come to definite arrangement whereby administration and military *status quo* at Constantinople be maintained unaltered in any further respect pending issue of conference.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 7.)

No. 621.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 729.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 20, 1922.

MY telegram No. 726.

Prince Abdul Medjid has accepted Caliphate and ceremonial enthronement is to take place on Friday.

French High Commissioner, who has been on fairly intimate terms with Abdul Medjid, is somewhat exercised in his mind as to what attitude to adopt towards him as Caliph. I gather that he certainly contemplates some form of recognition. He has, however, probably referred to his Government.

It seems very desirable that attitude of representatives at least of the three Powers should be in accord. I told French High Commissioner that I would personally avoid any act which might imply recognition in any form until instructed to the contrary by my Government.

Your telegram No. 566.
I should be grateful for some indication of Moslem opinion.

No. 622.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lausanne (No. 1) to Major Marshall (Jeddah).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 21.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 20, 1922.*

SOME days before leaving Constantinople, Sir H. Rumbold received telegraphic message in Arabic signed "Hussein-bin-Ali, Mecca," and addressed to Sultan.

It was impossible to deliver this message without risk to Sultan.

Text is corrupt, and for obvious reasons it could not be shown to any native translator in Constantinople. It is believed to be offer of hospitality in Hedjaz by Hussein.

Please explain above to King Hussein. If he wishes to confirm message, suggest that he should send it to Malta in Turkish or English. You should, however, express no opinion as to desirability of offering hospitality or probability of Sultan's accepting.

No. 623.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 21, 1922.*

FIRST business meeting of conference was held this morning with myself in the chair and a full attendance of every delegation with their staffs. Subject of discussion was a draft of the rules of procedure, raising such important questions as appointment and chairmanship of committees for dealing with main subjects of new treaty, creation and duties of secretariat, rules of business and announcements to press.

Upon great majority of these points Turks raised objections, often of a very trivial character, intended to establish their claim to complete equality or to satisfy their national pride. These protests were heard and answered with perfect courtesy, but received no other support.

Three principal committees were appointed to deal with—

1. Territorial and military questions. Chairman, myself.
2. Régime of foreigners and minorities in Turkey. Chairman, Signor Garroni.
3. Financial and economic questions, ports and railways, health arrangements. Chairman, M. Barrère.

This afternoon we meet again for a general preliminary discussion should anyone desire to raise it.

To-morrow first commission commences its labours.

No. 624.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received November 21.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sofia, November 20, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 57.

Greek Chargé d'Affaires informs me that Turkish and Bulgarian elements in Thracian Committee are now in agreement regarding common action with a view to autonomy of Western Thrace, and that arrangements for komitaji activity there, to coincide with Lausanne Conference, are complete. Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, in whom I have far more confidence, has information concerning this to some extent. I learn to-day on fairly good authority that some Bulgarian ex-officers have recently gone to Eastern Thrace in service of Kemal to lead bands into Western Thrace.

French representative on liquidation organ enquired yesterday of Bulgarian Chief of the General Staff as to certain concentrations of troops near southern frontier. Latter replied that there were about 3,000 men with six guns in neighbourhood of Nevrokop, explaining that, though order had been restored at Nevrokop itself, there was still trouble in outlying districts (see my despatch No. 331), and that about

2,000 had been sent to Kirjali district to maintain order on frontier and prevent passage of bands; that their presence was all the more necessary as all conscripts in frontier guard had been dismissed on 1st November, contrary decision by Conference of Ambassadors having only now been received. While these explanations appear reasonable, they do not exclude possible *arrière-pensée* in minds of military authorities, at least, that in certain eventualities, such as failure to obtain satisfactory solution of question of Ægean outlet, these troops might be used for less legitimate purposes. There is, however, no evidence at present of their collusion with komitajis.

No. 625.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 584.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 21, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 566 of 12th November, last paragraph: Khalifate.

Summary of Indian views now received and copy will be sent to you by bag as well as to Sir H. Rumbold.

They vary from enthusiastic and uncritical endorsement of Angora policy to cautious opposition, based on Islamic law, which apparently precludes divorcement of Khalifate from temporal power.

General probability is that Mahommedan opinion will find means of reconciling itself to acceptance of *fait accompli* resulting from action of Turkish Moslems.

No. 626.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 21, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 793 of 18th November and your telegram No. 459 of 19th November: Expulsions and deportations of native Christians by Turkish authorities in Asia Minor.

Intentions of Turkish authorities towards native Christians remaining after 30th November are obvious, but evacuation cannot possibly be effected in time. Please suggest to United States Government that for purely humanitarian reasons they should instruct their representative at Constantinople to make strong representations for extension of time limit. Such representations are less likely to prove ineffective if made independently.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 582.)

No. 627.

Consul Morgan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Aleppo, November 21, 1922.*

TRAVELLERS report having seen 15th November, near Diarbekir, eighty motor lorries, and in Diarbekir cavalry and infantry preparing for attack on Mosul.

Turks have now intensified campaign for driving Christians out of Turkey. Refugees arrive here continually. American and Italian colleagues have informed Constantinople by telegraph.

No. 628.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 730.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 21, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 729.

Refet Pasha sent member of his staff with note to High Commissioner this afternoon announcing deposition by Grand National Assembly of Vahid-ed-Din Effendi and election as Caliph of Moslems of His Majesty Abdul Medjid.

In my absence verbal message was given to member of High Commission staff to the effect that Caliph would hold reception for Diplomatic Body to-morrow, 22nd November. I was requested to telephone if I wished to attend or send a representative. Messenger added that if I desired at any time audience with "His Majesty the Caliph," Refet Pasha would be glad to make necessary arrangements.

My Allied colleagues had received similar communications. French High Commissioner showed considerable inclination in favour of acceptance. I expressed earnest hope that our attitude would be uniform, and that I personally could not under any circumstances attend without instructions.

It was finally agreed to send back verbal message declining invitation on the ground that circumstances were without precedent, and that we had not had time to consult our Governments.

I also agreed, in deference to French High Commissioner's insistence, and having regard to his concession to me on the main issue, to send simple acknowledgment, without comment, of written communication.

Is there any objection to this?

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 10.)

No. 629.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, November 21, 1922.*

SECOND meeting began at 4 P.M. to-day. Turks endeavoured to reopen principal question regarding our programme of procedure, which had been decided in the morning. Although this was entirely irregular, I allowed them to state their case, but declined to reconsider decisions already arrived at and placed on record. They acquiesced in this situation with unexpected equanimity. I then invited general discussion in the event of anyone desiring to raise it, but there being no response we adjourned in best of tempers. Discussion on Thrace begins to-morrow morning, and Allies have met in my room this evening to settle a common line of action.

In the course of this morning's discussion I appealed to conference to observe strict silence about our proceedings from day to day, an agreed press communiqué being issued after each session. This appeal was cordially supported by French and Italian delegates and was unanimously agreed to. How long it will be kept I refrain from prophesying.

No. 630.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 21, 1922.*

I HAD a long and friendly conversation with Signor Mussolini for over an hour this evening. He described his policy at home and abroad, pointing out that he was in a position of a director who could carry out his promises and translate every intention into action. Abroad he was strongly in favour of *Entente* on basis of equal rights, and friendship with England was a cardinal principle of his creed. Two questions particularly concerned him. One was that of Dodecanese, in which he was intensely anxious that Turkey should not be allowed a voice, but that it should be settled by an agreement between Allies. He was gratified by assurance that this was precise meaning of clause in my memorandum referring to this subject. He then spoke at great length upon question of mandate, of the history and character of which he appeared to have haziest notion. At the back of his mind is clearly the idea that Italy, having practically lost tripartite agreement, and being unlikely to retain greater part of Dodecanese, has nothing to show to the world as Eastern reward for her victory in the war, whereas her allies have acquired possession of valuable territories which are a source to them of wealth and power. I pointed out that such was far from being our own estimate of value of Mesopotamia and Palestine; that Italy, having been offered, and having at one time accepted, mandate for Caucasus, had then voluntarily backed out, and that while her military

contribution to defeat of the Turks did not entitle her to any considerable prize in the East, she had gained more than any other of the Allies in Europe. He wanted me to authorise a declaration that this country had equal rights in mandated territories with ourselves and sketched a vague programme of Italian participation in position there created, even going so far as to take a share in military and financial responsibilities of maintenance. I declined to give any assurance, and reminded him that mandates had been solemnly conferred after years of discussion by League of Nations, that Italian representative on council had enjoyed abundant opportunities of stating his views, but that never once in four years since the war had I received hint of Italian desire for participation. I urged Mussolini to study question very carefully before arriving at final opinion and promised to consider any views that he might submit through Italian Ambassador, but I warned him against any sanguine expectations. (End of R.)

It was clear to me that he knew little of the subject, and was merely impressed with the idea of making some startling revulsion of policy that would gratify his countrymen and perhaps of obtaining economic concessions which would make up for disappearance of tripartite agreement. I should add that in our numerous conversations during the last forty-eight hours Mussolini has struck me as a sincere and attractive, and certainly a remarkable, personality, though strangely immature and lacking in experience in some of his views. The theatricality of his demeanour wears off in private intercourse.

[E 13098/10524/44] No. 631.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Note by the Secretary-General respecting the Question of Exchange of Populations between Turkey and Greece.—(Received November 23.)

THE Secretary-General has the honour to circulate, for the consideration of the Council and the information of the members of the League, the first part of a report by Dr. Nansen, dealing with the question of the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.

The second part of the report, which deals with the situation as regards relief for refugees in Greece, will be circulated shortly.

Geneva, November 15, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 631.

Report by Dr. Nansen.

Part I.—*Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities between Greece and Turkey.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the question of a reciprocal exchange of racial minorities between Greece and Turkey :—

When I was entrusted by the Assembly of the League of Nations with the study of the problem of the refugees in the Near East, my first aim was to get into touch with all the Governments interested in this problem. The question seemed to me of extreme economic and social importance for the countries of the Near East, and also of great importance for the peace of the world. Before leaving Geneva I telegraphed, on the 27th September, to his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha, expressing to him my earnest desire to enter into relations with the authorities of the Angora Government. The Persian delegation of the Assembly of the League of Nations also telegraphed, at my request, drawing the attention of the Angora Government to the importance of the questions entrusted to me.

Immediately after the end of the Assembly, I went straight to Constantinople, because I considered it of primary importance to have an interview with the Angora authorities. A few days after my arrival I had the good fortune to meet, several times, his Excellency Hamid Bey, diplomatic representative at Constantinople of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. I discussed with him the various

problems which, in my opinion, were involved in the question of the refugees, and I asked him to point out once again to the Angora authorities my desire to enter into direct relations with them. In confirmation of our conversations I sent him on the 12th October a memorandum, and on the 14th October a letter, in which I set forth the various questions with which I wished to deal, particularly that of an exchange of population between Greece and Turkey.

On the 15th October the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan told me their reasons for giving me a formal invitation to take all possible steps to endeavour to reach an agreement with regard to an exchange of population between the Greek and Turkish Governments as soon as possible, independently of the peace negotiations. They sent me this invitation because they considered that this question was essentially connected with the question of refugees with which I had been entrusted by the League of Nations. Sharing these views, I accepted their invitation, and I drew his Excellency Hamid Bey's attention to the importance of having the earliest possible reply from Angora to the request, which I had already made several times, that I should be enabled to enter into personal relations with his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

While awaiting for this reply, I went to Sofia and to Athens on urgent business in connection with the refugees. In Athens, where I passed one day, the Greek Government told me of its desire that I should attempt to establish an agreement on the subject of the exchange of populations.

I returned to Constantinople on the 23rd October, and on the same date I received a telegraphic communication from his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha, dated Brousa, the 22nd October, 1922, and reading as follows: "The exchange proposed by Dr. Nansen is acceptable in principle. Nevertheless, the matter must be considered with the Government. As it is impossible for me, under present conditions, to wait in any one town, it is unfortunately not possible for me to fix a meeting place.—(Signed: MUSTAPHA KEMAL, *Commander-in-chief*."

This communication seemed to me to postpone indefinitely the consultation which I desired to have with the Angora authorities. Having received this reply, and wishing to enter into negotiations with the Angora authorities in the speediest possible manner, on the 24th October I called upon his Excellency Refet Pasha, Governor of Thrace, who had just arrived at Constantinople, in order to consider with him the method to be adopted. Refet Pasha considered it desirable that, in order to reach a speedy agreement, I should proceed without further delay to Angora. I at once stated that I was ready to undertake this journey, and Refet Pasha promised me that I should be informed by Hamid Bey as soon as the necessary arrangements for my journey had been made. He told me that I should have to provide myself with a document stating that the Greek Government gave me full powers to endeavour to obtain an agreement. I consequently procured this document by telegraph.

I waited until the 30th October for a reply from Angora to the proposal which I had made to proceed to that city. On that date his Excellency Refet Pasha informed me that he had just received a telegram from the President of the Council of Ministers at Angora making the following statement: "We agree in principle to the exchange of populations, excluding Western Thrace. Dr. Nansen need not, therefore, trouble to go to Angora. The details can be discussed by Hamid Bey." A copy of this telegram was sent me later by Hamid Bey, who at the same time gave me a copy of a telegram from his Excellency Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which read as follows: "There is no need for Dr. Nansen to go to Angora. We agree to the exchange of populations. On this principle you can discuss with Dr. Nansen."

On the 31st October I had my first and only conference with his Excellency Hamid Bey. The latter took note of the powers granted me by the Greek Government, and immediately informed me that his instructions only permitted him to negotiate on the basis of a total and enforced exchange of populations, from which the population of Constantinople would not be excepted.

When I stated that I could not agree to limit the discussion in this way, he replied that he was of opinion that it was useless to continue without further instructions from Angora. It was agreed that Hamid Bey should ask Angora for instructions, and that, at the same time, I should submit to the Greek Government the question whether it should accept, as the basis of discussions, a total and enforced exchange of populations, including the populations at Constantinople. I asked that the discussions might be continued while awaiting the replies from the two Governments, seeing that many provisions dealing with the execution of any future agreement would be almost

identical, whether in the case of either voluntary emigration or expulsion. Hamid Bey stated that he could not agree with this view, and he added that in his opinion it would be time and labour lost to continue any discussion before knowing whether the two Governments could agree on even the basis of any future agreement. I insisted on the necessity of avoiding any further delay, and I gave Hamid Bey a list of questions that would have to be discussed. I informed him of my intention to send him immediately a draft preliminary agreement, which might serve as a more detailed basis for discussion than the list of questions.

On the 1st November, my representatives, who had called upon his Excellency Hamid Bey to hand him certain documents, were informed by him that he himself could no longer deal with this matter, because he had to leave in three days for the peace conference at Lausanne. Hamid Bey added that he had asked at Angora for the appointment of a substitute and for the sending of experts, and that he hoped to have a reply to his request within three or four days.

I was again therefore in the position of being unable to negotiate with any representative of the Angora Government, and I had no means of knowing the date when such a representative would come. Under these circumstances I considered it necessary to send, on the 2nd November, a memorandum to the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly explaining my sincere desire to obtain the solution of the question which had kept me so long at Constantinople, and adding that it was impossible for me to remain an indefinite time waiting for a result. I referred in my memorandum to the fact that, apart from my duties as High Commissioner of the League, I was also entrusted with other very important tasks, particularly the question of relief to the starving populations of Russia, but I stated that I was prepared to remain for a limited time at Constantinople if the information given me by the Angora Government seemed to me to offer a possibility of reaching a solution. I asked the Angora Government to inform me—

1. If it was prepared to negotiate without delay, and independently of the peace negotiations, an agreement for the exchange of populations on the basis of a voluntary emigration of the racial minorities in Turkey and Greece including the question of civilians detained in Asia Minor; and
2. If it was prepared to appoint delegates with full powers to conclude with Greek representatives, and under my auspices, an agreement which would be submitted immediately for ratification by the two Governments.

I expressed the hope that I should receive the Angora Government's reply before the 6th November. Having been informed that there was no boat between the 4th and 8th November from Constantinople to Athens—where I had to deal with urgent questions relating to relief for the refugees—I decided to leave for Athens on the 4th November in the afternoon, in order not to lose time. On the morning of the 4th November I sent the following letter to his Excellency Hamid Bey:—

"Your Excellency, "*Constantinople, November* 4, 1922.

"With reference to our correspondence and our previous conversations on the subject of an exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece, and finally to my note with memorandum of the 2nd November, I have the honour to inform you that I find it necessary to consult the Greek authorities on various questions. I feel bound to take advantage of the departure of a boat for Athens this afternoon, otherwise I shall not have an opportunity of leaving until Wednesday next.

"In this way I shall be free to continue, without loss of time, the negotiations already begun between us.

"I beg you to be good enough to send me any communication from the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to my office here, addressed to: Osman Bey, Techvikie dj-dessi 62. I have given instructions at my office that any communication from you or from your substitute at Constantinople shall be telegraphed to me, or, if necessary, sent me by wireless in order that I may be informed without delay, and so be able to take the steps which such communication may require.

"I have, &c.
"FRIDTJOF NANSEN."

Up to to-day, the 9th November, I have not yet received any information from my office at Constantinople to the effect that my communication has reached it from the representative of the Angora Government. As I have said above, it had been agreed

between his Excellency Hamid Bey and myself at our conference on the 31st October that I was to submit the question of a total and enforced exchange of populations, including that of Constantinople, to the Greek Government. The reply of the Greek Government to my communication on this subject, a reply which was clearly unfavourable on the last point, reached me before my departure from Constantinople, but not having had a reply from Angora I considered it useless to communicate it to the Turkish Government.

I should add that I kept the High Commissioners of the Allied Powers at Constantinople informed of what passed between myself and the representative of the Angora Government. In particular, I communicated to them a copy of my memorandum of the 2nd November, and I explained to them that, personally, after mature reflection, I did not think that it would be possible to negotiate an agreement on the basis indicated by his Excellency Hamid Bey, even if, contrary to my expectation, the Greek Government accepted such a solution. The High Commissioners completely agreed with me on this point.

Quite apart from the humanitarian aspect, I venture to draw your attention to the great material importance of these questions which undoubtedly are most intimately bound up with the whole financial life and future possibilities of the Near East. It would be superfluous to stress what a complete commercial and financial suicide would result from the flight of the Greek and Armenian populations from Constantinople; in effect by such an event, which seems almost inevitable if no preventive measures are taken, Turkey will sacrifice her richest asset. I therefore think that it is vital that these questions should be settled either by special negotiations before the signature of the peace treaty or by the peace conference itself.

I have the honour to attach to this report copies of the following documents:—

1. List of questions to be discussed together with a covering letter.
2. Preliminary draft agreement.

This draft, which had not been previously submitted to the Greek Government, was sent by my representatives on the 2nd November to the secretary of his Excellency Hamid Bey with an indication that it was an entirely preliminary draft, designed solely as a more detailed basis for discussion than the list of questions already sent.

ANNEX (A).

Dr. Nansen to Hamid Bey.

DR. NANSEN has been entrusted by the Assembly of the League of Nations with the question of relief for the refugees from the Græco-Turkish war.

2. The High Commissioners of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan at Constantinople have asked Dr. Nansen to offer his services to the Greek and Turkish Governments for the purpose of endeavouring to arrange, at the earliest possible moment, by a conference between them and independently of the peace conference, for the reciprocal emigration of the racial minorities of the two countries.

3. On Dr. Nansen's proposal, the Greek Government has given him full power to prepare an agreement on this subject.

4. A great number of persons of the Greek race have already left their domicile in Asia Minor and Western Thrace, and taken refuge in Greek territory.

5. Other persons of Greek race domiciled in Turkey will very probably desire to transfer their domicile to Greek territory.

6. A great number of persons of Turkish race domiciled on Greek territory will very probably desire to transfer their domicile to Turkish territory.

7. A mass emigration of this kind, if it is not very carefully regulated by the Governments concerned, will involve them in grave economic and administrative difficulties.

8. This mass emigration has already caused, and unfortunately threatens to cause, further severe suffering to hundreds of thousands of persons.

9. The Turkish Government has stated in principle its adherence to the proposal of an exchange of populations.

10. It is of the highest urgency to reach final conclusions in the matter.

Dr. Nansen has therefore the honour to submit to his Excellency Hamid Bey, representative of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, as a preliminary draft, and reserving the right to change it in any manner, the following list of questions, which might suitably form the subject of discussions to take place between them.

List of Questions to be Discussed.

1. Recognition for the nationals of the two Governments belonging to racial minorities of the right to emigrate freely in their respective territories.

2. Facilities and also help to be given by the two Governments for the exercise of the right provided in No. 1 above, and an undertaking not to place obstacles or allow obstacles to be placed to the departure of a voluntary emigrant, except in case of a definite condemnation to a punishment inflicted for infraction of civil law.

3. The necessary formalities for the exercise of the right of emigration, drawn up so as to permit the immediate departure of the persons concerned, with due regard to their pecuniary rights.

4. Right for the emigrants to take their movable property away with them or to have it despatched without any export or import duties being imposed.

5. Transport facilities.

6. Change of nationality.

7. Liquidation of real property, rural or urban, belonging to the emigrants. Special rules to be applied in view of the actual situation created by the previous emigration of owners.

8. Establishment of a mixed commission for the question of the liquidation of real property.

9. Competence of the mixed commission mentioned in No. 8 to supervise and secure the execution of the other stipulations relating to the question of the exchange of populations in accordance with the agreement to be made. What will be, generally speaking, the powers of this commission? Is it necessary to provide for an appeal against the decisions of the mixed commission?

10. Financial questions arising out of the liquidation of the real property of the emigrants, and other steps to be taken in execution of the agreement.

11. Payment in equal shares by the two Governments of the administration and working expenses of the mixed commission, and of the other organisations necessary for the carrying out of the agreement.

12. The present situation of extreme distress of the greater part of the populations in question makes it urgently necessary that the agreement should be concluded within the shortest possible time. The question of future procedure must therefore be considered in order that the signature and ratification of the agreement by the two authorities should take place without any loss of time.

13. The agreement will not infringe upon the rights which will be granted to the persons concerned by the provisions of other agreements, treaties or conventions, concluded or to be concluded, particularly at the peace conference.

ANNEX (B).

Preliminary Draft of an Agreement to be concluded between the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Greek Government.

ARTICLE 1.

THE High Contracting Parties accord to their nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities the right to emigrate freely into their respective territories.

ARTICLE 2.

The High Contracting Parties agree to encourage and facilitate, by all means in their power, the emigration provided in article 1, and not to cause, directly or indirectly, any hindrance to the freedom of emigration, notwithstanding laws or regulations to the contrary, which in this respect shall be considered as non-operative.

In particular, emigration shall not prejudice the pecuniary rights of the emigrants.

ARTICLE 3.

No hindrance shall be made to the departure of a voluntary emigrant for any cause whatever except in the case of a person under definite sentence for an infraction of the civil law. In case of sentence not yet made final, or of criminal proceedings in civil law against an emigrant, the latter shall be handed over for trial to the authorities of the countries to which he is proceeding by the authorities of the country where the action has been instituted.

ARTICLE 4.

The right of voluntary emigration shall belong to all persons above the age of 15 years. It may be exercised in (time and form to be determined in the course of the negotiation of the present agreement, the formalities being arranged so as to permit of the immediate departure of the persons concerned, with due regard to their pecuniary rights). The declaration of emigration of a husband shall imply that of his wife. The declaration of parents or of guardians shall imply that of their children or wards aged less than 15 years.

ARTICLE 5.

Emigrants shall lose the nationality of the country they are leaving as soon as they have left it, and shall acquire from that moment the nationality of the country of destination.

ARTICLE 6.

Persons who emigrate in conformity with the above provisions shall be free to take away with them their movable property of every kind, or to have it transported without any tax being levied upon it, either on their exit or entry.

In the same way, in cases where all the members of any community (including mosques, churches, convents, schools, hospitals or institutions of any kind) emigrate, they shall be entitled to take away freely all movable property belonging to their community, or to have it transported.

The widest possible transport facilities (details of which will be established by further negotiations) shall be granted by the authorities of the two countries.

Emigrants unable to take away all or part of their movable property, shall be allowed to leave this property behind. In this case the local authorities shall be obliged to verify together with the emigrants the inventory and assess the value of the movable property left behind by the emigrants. The document thus drawn up in duplicate, of which one copy shall be kept by the local authorities and the other handed over to the emigrant, shall be used by the mixed commission for the liquidation of this movable property as provided by article 11.

ARTICLE 7.

Immovable property, rural and urban, belonging to emigrants or to communities referred to in article 6, shall be liquidated by the mixed commission referred to in article 9 in conformity with the provisions of articles 10 and 11 of the present agreement.

ARTICLE 8.

Persons who, before this present agreement has entered into force, shall have left the territory of one of the contracting States in order to take up their residence in the territory of a State to which they belong from an ethnic, religious or linguistic point of view, shall be entitled to the value of the immovable property left behind by them in the country which they have left, and which is their property in virtue of the ordinary laws of the country, without regard to the exceptional measures to which this property has been subjected since the 1st January, 1910, in particular on account of the departure of these persons. The liquidation of this property shall be carried out in conformity with article 11 by the mixed commission referred to in article 9.

The above-mentioned persons shall also have the right either to recover the movable property which they have left behind, provided it can be refound and identified, or to obtain its money-equivalent through the mixed commission. They shall also be entitled to the money-equivalent of the movable property which they have left behind and which cannot be refound, if it can be proved that this property has been utilised by the authorities of the country which they have left.

ARTICLE 9.

Within six days from the signature of the present agreement there shall be set up a mixed commission comprising one member nominated by each of the contracting States, and two members nominated by (to be decided in the course of subsequent negotiations).

The two members nominated by shall act in turn as the chairman of the mixed commission.

ARTICLE 10.

The duties of the mixed commission shall be to supervise and facilitate the emigration provided for by the present agreement, and to liquidate the property of the emigrants.

The mixed commission shall possess all necessary power to take the measures necessary to carry out the present agreement, and to decide all questions which may arise out of this agreement.

The decisions of the mixed commission shall be taken by a majority of votes, and the president shall possess the casting vote.

ARTICLE 11.

The mixed commission shall possess all necessary power to carry out a valuation of the movable and immovable property which the emigrant past or present are entitled to have liquidated in conformity with articles 6 (last paragraph), 7 and 8, after hearing the statements of the interested parties or after having duly summoned them to make their statements.

The basis for the valuation of property shall be the actual value of this property on the .

The Government of the country in which the liquidation takes place shall pay to the persons entitled, through the good offices of the mixed commission, the total money equivalent of the property liquidated. This property shall accrue to the Government in question.

ARTICLE 12.

In order to facilitate the regulation of the payments referred to in article 11, these may be made partly in cash, partly in bonds redeemable within a period not exceeding years, which can be cashed immediately, the two Governments acting mutually on each other's behalf in dealing with the claims of the two groups of emigrants, and for this purpose a joint compensation account shall be established by the two Governments.

In order to guarantee the payment of the balance of this account, there shall be set up, in each of the two countries, a guarantee fund which shall include all the immovable property liquidated by the mixed commission.

(Details concerning the method of making payment will be set out in an annex to the agreement.)

ARTICLE 13.

The States concerned shall advance funds for the use of the mixed commission, under conditions fixed by the latter, in order to allow its organisation to carry on its work and to facilitate emigration.

ARTICLE 14.

The establishment and working expenses of the mixed commission and its services shall be met in equal shares by the two Governments concerned.

ARTICLE 15.

* * * * *

(This article will contain the rules to be applied to persons leaving the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties for a destination other than the territory of the other High Contracting Party.)

ARTICLE 16.

The present agreement shall not in any way prejudice any rights which the interested parties shall be recognised to possess by the provisions of other treaties or agreements concluded or to be concluded, in particular at the peace conference.

ARTICLE 17.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to make such modifications in their respective legislation as shall be necessary to ensure the carrying out of the present agreement.

[E 13065/12891/44] No. 632.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 2732.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 22, 1922.*

THE news of the flight of the Sultan from Constantinople was received in the press here with astonishment, not unmixed with a certain satisfaction, that a personage who was regarded as a mere puppet in the hands of His Majesty's Government should thus have disappeared from the scene. Much prominence was next given to the warm feelings of sympathy towards France alleged to be entertained by the newly elected Caliph. Reflection, however, appears to have caused some doubts to arise in the minds of certain writers in the press as to the effect which is likely to be produced on their fellow-Mussulmans by the act of the Deputies at Angora, and attention is drawn to the fact that there are considerable sects of Mahommedans who do not recognise the Caliph as their spiritual head. The names of other candidates are therefore examined; King Hussein is negatived as being too much under British influence, the Ameer of Afghanistan is too far away and is relatively unknown; the conclusion therefore is drawn that, if the election of the new Caliph causes a schism to the Mussulman world, the inhabitants of French North Africa and of Morocco will naturally turn to the Sultan of Morocco as their sole spiritual head.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

No. 633.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 732.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 22, 1922.*

ALLIED generals failed to reach agreement to-day in regard to police with Refet Pasha, who declined to admit jurisdiction of Allied police over Hellenes and Russians. Please see General Harington's telegram on the subject. Refet also objected to presence here of Greek High Commissioner, and apparently threatened to arrest General Katchakis, who arrived here two days ago to take over from M. Canellopoulos and to close down Greek Legation.

If there is to be duality of control in police matters only logical division is Ottoman and non-Ottoman subjects. So long as Allies remain here it is inconceivable that Hellenes and Russians should be left at the mercy of Turkish police. Immediate result would be expulsion of Russian diplomatic mission and installation in Russian Embassy of Soviet mission. Generals told Refet to discuss question of Greek High Commissioner with Allied High Commissioners. My view is that we should tolerate no interference with Greek mission here.

In my opinion so many important questions depend on maintenance of Allied police control over non-Ottomans that this is probable reason why Turks are offering such opposition.

Refet, who will be occupied during next two days with arrangements for enthronement of Caliph, will not meet generals before 25th November. It would be well if French and Italian generals, who show signs of weakening to-day, should receive very categorical instructions to insist on Allied police protection for Russians and Greeks.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 11.)

No. 634.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 733.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 23, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 732.

Allied High Commissioners met to-day to discuss question of Allied police control. Both my colleagues agreed that no arrangement was possible that excluded Hellenes and Russians, and they will request their generals to remain absolutely firm on this point.

If generals are unable to arrive at solution on numerous [group omitted: ? points] when they next meet Refet Pasha they will inform latter that last word has been said here and that question is one for reference to Governments through High Commissioners.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 13.)

No. 635.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 7) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 23.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, November 22, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 10.

I approve your attitude.

As relations of High Commissioner with the Sultan have always been strictly confined to private audiences, there should be no question of visiting new Caliph on the same footing as members of Diplomatic Body proper, who represent States not at war with Turkey and who are accredited. If French Commissioner visits him, you should arrange to do likewise on clear understanding that audience is private, as in the case of the Sultan since August 1920.

I have explained above view to M. Barrère, who agrees. If French Commissioner acts otherwise on instructions from Paris, inform me by telegraph, but do not depart from above instructions.

You may send written acknowledgment as you propose

No. 636.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 22, 1922.*

FIRST meeting of Frontier Commission under my chairmanship was held this morning to discuss Thracian question. It opened with Turkish demand for reversion to entire pre-war frontier of Thrace, and, as regards Western Thrace, holding of plebiscite in an area of that territory the boundaries of which they had not even considered. I have the utmost difficulty in dealing with the Turkish delegation, who appear to think it sufficient to put forward a demand unsupported by any arguments or figures or facts, then to express utmost surprise if claim is not acquiesced in, and finally to ask for an adjournment in order to prepare reply, which when the moment arrives is found not yet to be ready. I can only conclude that this is part of deliberate plan to waste time of conference and to show their contempt for ordinary usage. Otherwise it is wholly inept. Turks having briefly stated above claim, M. Veniselos made a speech, first part of which, though quite irrelevant, was an emotional defence of Greek action since early days of the war. Second part consisted of effective reply to Turkish pretensions as regards Karagatch, triangle in which it is situated and Western Thrace. M. Nincic on behalf of Serbia and M. Duca on behalf of Roumania then made short, but very useful, speeches, in which they vigorously contested Turkish case and threw themselves whole-heartedly on side of the Allies, Nincic formulating suggestion of a demilitarised zone or strip on both sides of entire Turco-Bulgarian frontier from Black Sea to Ægean. We then adjourned till 4 P.M. in order to enable Turks to prepare their rejoinder. When we reassembled Bulgarian Premier was first heard on demand of his country for an outlet on the Ægean. Turks then took everyone's breath away by declining to give

their promised reply on the ground that case against them had not been sufficiently clearly defined. No appeals, protests or warnings could move them from this position, and accordingly I said that, while I regretted having to speak before I was in full possession of their arguments or counter-arguments, I was left with no alternative but to put before them reasoned opinion of the three principal Allies We had spent one and a half hours yesterday evening in discussing this in my room on basis of firm agreement already arrived at between M. Poincaré, M. Mussolini and myself, and I was therefore in a position to cover the whole ground. I said that Allies must decline to tear up or ignore treaties by which Thracian frontier had been determined. We must adhere to Maritza frontier, which was boundary consistently demanded by Turks themselves. As regards demilitarised zones, I thought idea ought to be examined by a sub-committee of military experts on which Turks would, of course, be represented. As to northern frontier, I could express no opinion. But on west I developed a scheme upon which we had agreed for creation of demilitarised zones 20 or 30 kilom. wide on both banks of Maritza River from north-west corner of Eastern Thrace to sea. This would provide both for military security of Thrace and for commercial access of Bulgaria to Ægean. I proposed an international control of this railway and of port. As regards Western Thrace. I said that the Powers must absolutely decline to reopen this question, which had been settled by Treaty of Neuilly, and could not consider suggestion of a plebiscite, which would only introduce further confusion in an area to which Turks had no claim whatever. On conclusion of my remarks I was loyally and warmly supported by principal French and Italian delegates, who expressed their agreement with everything that I had said, and declared that Allies were solidly united.

We then adjourned till to-morrow to enable Turks to deliver their reply. Exhibition of so firm an Allied front at this early stage and on so important an issue took Turks very much by surprise, and will probably exercise a decisive influence on our future proceedings.

No. 637.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November* 23, 1922.

PLEASE arrange for a very early meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider and advise me as soon as possible by telegraph upon French memorandum defining freedom of the Straits communicated to me by President of the Council at Paris meeting of 18th November; a copy was sent to Admiralty by Captain Pound on 20th November, and by bag on 22nd November by Mr. Forbes Adam to Mr. Oliphant, as second annex to uncorrected draft of minutes of above meeting. My attitude at Paris was one of general willingness to support French proposals, but to leave initiative in putting them forward to them.

No. 638.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November* 23, 1922.

AT meeting of Frontier Commission this morning the Turks, who had apparently realised the unwisdom of their proceedings yesterday, and who were alleged to have sat up till 3 A.M. preparing their reply, delivered full and [? amiable] rejoinder to the case that had been made against them by different speakers yesterday. They reiterated their previous demands for 1913 frontier and a plebiscite in Western Thrace, but without heat or discourtesy, and they concluded by accepting suggestion which I had thrown out yesterday, that the question of a demilitarised zone or zones on northern and western frontier of Eastern Thrace, as well as that of railway control in area between Maritza and the sea, and the creation of port facilities at Dedeagatch, should be referred to a sub-committee of military and economic experts. This proposal was carried unanimously, and the sub-committee was at once appointed and commenced its sittings this afternoon. General Weygand will be chairman, and British representatives are General Burnett-Stewart and

Mr. Nicolson assisted by other experts. M. Veniselos delivered an impassioned harangue in reply to the Turkish statement, but it was agreed to defer continuance of main discussion until sub-committee has reported, which we hope may be to-morrow afternoon. Tone at this morning's meeting was much more amicable, although broad difference on issues remains unabated. Protest was made by the Turks against an alleged violation of obligation about press secrecy, but as the case was not serious the matter was not pursued. Difficulty is, however, acute and growing; although we are making attempts to supervise such information as is given to the press, I doubt our ability either to satisfy or to control the immense number of press correspondents assembled here.

No. 639.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 590.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, November* 23, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 718 of 17th November: Abolition of censorship.
Your action approved.

[E 13148/27/44] No. 640.

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the Président du Conseil, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris at the Quai d'Orsay at 3 P.M. *on November* 18, 1922.

Present:

For France.	For Great Britain.	For Italy.
M. Poincaré.	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	Baron Avezzano.
M. Barrère.	Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.	
M. Bompard.	Sir William Tyrrell.	
Marshal Foch.		
M. Peretti della Rocca.		

Secretaries:

M. Laroche.	Mr. Forbes Adam.	
M. Massigli.		

The Hon. H. Nicolson and Mr. Leeper were also present for the latter part of the meeting.

Admiral Lacaze, General Weygand, Captain Parker, Major-General Burnett-Stuart and Major Macleod were also present throughout the meeting.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

M. POINCARÉ opened the discussion by referring to a telegram which he had received from General Charpy to the effect that the Turks were showing a more conciliatory spirit and that Constantinople was calm. His information was of a purely military nature, but General Charpy must have been in agreement with General Harington when he telegraphed. The relations between the Allied missions and the Allied troops were excellent. M. Poincaré understood that Lord Curzon wished Marshal Foch to explain the question of how an attack by the Turks on Constantinople could be met.

LORD CURZON explained that he did not wish to raise the local aspects of the military situation alone, nor only the question of defending Constantinople. There was a larger question which he would like to discuss, and he would certainly wish to hear Marshal Foch's views on this. M. Poincaré had just read a telegram which he had received from General Charpy showing that the military situation was easier. He (Lord Curzon) was very glad to hear this, because the British telegrams from General Harington gave a rather different impression. General Harington telegraphed that

in spite of the Mudania Convention the Turks at Constantinople under Refet Pasha were trying to assume the entire government of the town, that the Sultan had been practically deposed and had fled, that one Department after another was being taken over under the eyes of the Allies by the Kemalists, and that the Allied troops were, in short, exposed daily to the danger of considerable humiliation. He understood that the actual military forces at Constantinople were as follows: On the European side of the Bosphorus, 2,000 British infantry and 2,000 French infantry; on the Asiatic side there were 2,500 infantry and sixteen guns, all British. He need not refer at this stage to the Dardanelles or Thrace, and would confine his observations to Constantinople. Although the situation there was perhaps somewhat easier, he (Lord Curzon) felt apprehensive as to what might happen in the future while the conference was sitting at Lausanne. No doubt the Allied military administration and the Turkish civil administration might continue to sit side by side, but sight must not be lost of the large number of Turkish gendarmerie present in Thrace and in the neutral zones, and the continued infiltration of Turkish soldiers into the zones and into Thrace. In these circumstances, the Allied position might in time be rendered impossible. General Harington had asked more than once whether he could receive reinforcements. Already the British force was in the ascendant throughout the area; in fact, the British had contributed 11,000 troops out of a total of 16,000. It was therefore not for the British at this stage to send more troops. He (Lord Curzon) would, therefore, ask his colleagues whether they could possibly add to the number of their troops in this area. That was his first question. The second question was whether, if trouble occurred at Lausanne and the Turks were to continue resisting some Allied demand, we might not find ourselves faced with a Turkish request to retire immediately from Constantinople. The Turks had, in fact, already made such a demand when Refet Pasha asked both the naval and military forces of the Allies to leave Constantinople. The third question was what Allied action should be taken in the event of the Allied position in Constantinople becoming intolerable and the Allied forces having no alternative but to withdraw. He (Lord Curzon) had assumed from M. Poincaré's remarks that if one of the three Allies evacuated, the rest would go too. If so, there arose the question in what direction evacuation should take place. The British forces were well supplied with ships and were prepared to go to Gallipoli. He was not aware whether the French had material means at their disposal for evacuating their troops in the same way. He would like to know, however, from his colleagues whether they were prepared to go to Gallipoli with the British in the event of the eventuality which he had put. Once there, were the Allies going to remain at Gallipoli?

These questions, although they were mainly military, must be answered because neither M. Poincaré nor Signor Mussolini intended to stay at Lausanne, and, after their departure, the Allied plenipotentiaries must know what they were going to do if during the conference their forces were suddenly faced with a dangerous situation, and the Turks demanded that they should withdraw. In short, was the united Allied front at Lausanne to be coupled with an equally united front at Constantinople throughout the conference? It was all very well to state that this could be—and must be—done by diplomatic means. The Turks would laugh at diplomacy, for which they would care nothing if they really meant to attack. It was, therefore, essential to have military and naval opinions on these points.

M. POINCARÉ thought that he had already answered the essential points which Lord Curzon had put. In the long communications which had passed between himself and Lord Curzon during the past year he had made it quite clear that France could not send reinforcements to Constantinople. France was neither in the material nor the moral position to do so. Great Britain might be in a different position, but the French Chamber had determined once and for all not to send a man. As regards Lord Curzon's second question, M. Poincaré thought that if the Allies were attacked at Constantinople they would certainly have to meet force by force. It was not so much a question of "if the Allies are in danger," but rather "if the Allies are attacked." He disliked the formula "if they are in danger"; such a formula often meant that the person in danger, or who fancied he was in danger, thought it necessary to attack without waiting. If the Allies were attacked, however, it was quite possible that the French Chamber might agree to send troops, but M. Poincaré could not say for certain in advance. As to the military question of defending Constantinople and Gallipoli, he (M. Poincaré) thought that General Harington had changed his opinion during the last few months. At first he had been in favour of evacuating Constantinople and going to Chanak and Gallipoli; now, apparently, he wished to stay at Constantinople and Gallipoli and abandon Ismid and Chanak. On this point

he (M. Poincaré) was quite prepared to trust to the military opinion of General Harington and that of his Allied military colleagues. If, then, the Allies were attacked, the French troops would certainly stand with their Allies, and if compelled to retire they would withdraw with them to Gallipoli. As to a difficult situation arising while the conference was sitting at Lausanne, in his opinion the best solution was to let things develop. To his mind it was unlikely that the Turks would do more than threaten.

At LORD CURZON'S request, Marshal Foch then made a statement.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he would like to call the attention of the conference to one or two points, which were vital if the position at Constantinople was to be cleared up. Apparently, the British and Italian High Commissioners were going to Lausanne. Marshal Foch suggested that the French High Commissioner should also be summoned to the conference, and that the three generals should then be left in complete charge of the situation there. As it was, the presence of the High Commissioners and a certain conflict in their spheres of action made it very difficult for the Allied generals really to know who was in command. If the Allies really wanted to defend Constantinople as well as possible, the Allied generals there should be told so quite clearly, and instructed to make the best position there in the circumstances. When they examined the question in detail they might find that they had plenty of cavalry and infantry, and not enough artillery. They then might have to bring artillery from Gallipoli to Constantinople. At all costs, the generals should examine the whole situation and prepare a joint plan.

LORD CURZON said that he had listened with much respect to M. Poincaré's and Marshal Foch's observations. He understood that M. Poincaré, as at present advised, was not in a position, or perhaps did not wish, to send reinforcements to Constantinople. He would not know the Italian view until Signor Mussolini entered the conference. As regards his second question, he deduced from M. Poincaré's reply that the French and British were united in agreeing to resist force by force. They must act together, and carry out one Allied military operation, and, if necessary, retire to Gallipoli. M. Poincaré's answer to his last question appeared to him less satisfactory. Apparently, the Allies were to await events and see how the situation developed. He (Lord Curzon) feared that if that were their policy, the Allies might find themselves too late. As regards Marshal Foch's suggestion, he could not agree that the powers of the High Commissioners, even in the absence of Sir Horace Rumbold and M. Garroni, should be transferred to the generals. Sir Horace Rumbold had been replaced by Mr. Henderson, who had been well known in the Embassy in Paris, and was regarded as a man of good judgment with plenty of experience. The British Government had full confidence in him.

BARON AVEZZANO intervened to say that the Italian High Commissioner had been replaced by Signor Maissa, who was a very capable man.

LORD CURZON enquired whether General Pellé was to remain at Constantinople.

M. POINCARÉ said that the arrangement was that he should come to Lausanne when required or summoned.

LORD CURZON expressed the hope that he would remain, as he had much authority and ability, and would prove a great support to the conference. On the general question it had always seemed to Lord Curzon a good thing to have some check on the opinions of the generals, and a double point of view, namely, that of the High Commissioners and the generals. As regards Marshal Foch's second suggestion, he understood that the Allied generals on the spot had already attempted to draw up an Allied plan for the defence of Constantinople, but they had found that such defence was in fact impossible. It was not so much an attack from outside by armed forces that was feared, but rather an internal rising following upon a large infiltration of Kemalist soldiers in civilian guise. The rising might be accompanied by an ultimatum to the Allies to quit. No number of guns would enable them to remain, and the question was what were they going to do? General Harington himself was so convinced of the danger that he would like a date fixed at once for the evacuation of Constantinople, before the conclusion of the conference. Lord Curzon himself was entirely against any such step, both because it would be humiliating for the Allies, and because it was entirely a matter for the Lausanne Conference to decide. It was essential that the Allies should keep to the

date fixed in the March resolutions, in the Allied note of the 23rd September, and the Mudania Convention, namely, the ratification of the new treaty by Turkey. In these circumstances, the situation appeared to Lord Curzon rather more dangerous than might be inferred from the remarks of M. Poincaré and Marshal Foch. Apparently, the answers to his questions were, "Defend Constantinople if you can, and if you can't, then retire if you can." Lord Curzon was apprehensive if their examination of the question were to be left at this stage. That was why he had asked the conference thoroughly to study the whole situation.

BARON AVEZZANO intervened to say that he would like to state his opinion, while reserving generally the views of Signor Mussolini. The latter had gained the impression that, in the present situation, the despatch of further troops would not be accepted by Italian opinion, whereas, if the situation grew worse, or the Turks attacked, Italian public opinion might change and find itself quite ready to send reinforcements.

M. POINCARE said that the question put to him by Lord Curzon as to what the Allies should do in case of a menace seemed to him rather too vague. It all depended on what the menace really meant. If it were a question of an ultimatum, M. Poincaré would certainly not accept it in any conceivable event. It would be intolerable for the Allies to submit to it, and they must simply refuse to retire. Again, if General Harington were to advise that the Allied troops should retire because the situation was not tenable; it did not seem to him (M. Poincaré) that it was therefore necessary for France, Great Britain and Italy to decide to declare war on Turkey. Lausanne was close to Paris, and when the situation arose, it could be discussed by telegram or telephone between Paris and Lausanne. Generally speaking, he (M. Poincaré) was not prepared to accept either a threat or an ultimatum, but he feared that preventive measures would be interpreted as provocative, especially in the state of over-excitement in which the Turks were at present. His advice therefore was that the Allies should be firm and independent, but avoid indiscretions, both in Paris and at Lausanne. If it were a question of an ultimatum, then he would act at once, but if it were a question of a distant threat, he would ask time to reflect on the action which France was prepared to take.

LORD CURZON explained that he was only talking of an eventual threat. He was glad of M. Poincaré's assurance that if the Turks issued an ultimatum at Lausanne for the Allied troops to retire, M. Poincaré would regard it is an intolerable situation, and would agree to the Allies taking all measures possible to keep their positions. He had one further observation to make. If the generals at Constantinople were to say that the situation was too delicate, and that the Allied Powers ought to retire, Lord Curzon trusted that M. Poincaré would examine with him at once what was to be done. Meanwhile, he hoped that he might infer from M. Poincaré's remarks that generally the Allies should agree to stand by the September note, and stay at Constantinople until the conclusion of the new treaty with Turkey, even if they were forced by circumstances to deviate in particulars from the line of conduct which they had agreed upon. He felt that their conversations had not been without value, since it had been decided to reject vehemently any form of ultimatum by the Turks, and that the Allies should do their utmost to stay at Constantinople until the conclusion of peace.

M. POINCARE said that he had never thought the agreement of the 23rd September irrevocable, although he, for his part, was very anxious to fulfil it to the letter. If, however, the generals thought that the Allies could not stay at Constantinople as long as the note laid down, it would, of course, be necessary for them to discuss the matter. He would like to point out, however, that the idea of retiring from Constantinople came from General Harington. At first, the latter had thought that he could not hold the town, and now apparently he thought he might be able to. There was also apparently a question of using guns for the defence of Constantinople. On this M. Poincaré thought it necessary to make a reservation. He was doubtful if it was a good precedent to set in the East; that was, however, a military matter.

MARSHAL FOCH intervened at this stage to urge that the High Commissioners and generals should be clearly told that the Allies wished to stay at Constantinople "jusqu'au bout." Every place was defensible if there was really the will to defend. The Allies might stay at Galata and Pera and leave Stamboul, or they might stay round the town. In any case, it was essential to tell the generals

clearly that they would have to make plans and do their best on certain lines. If they replied that they could not stay at Constantinople they should make plans for a second line of defence or for a retirement. If they had their plans they would not be surprised.

LORD CURZON said that while he felt it impertinent to make observations on a military question in the presence of Marshal Foch, he understood that it was General Harington's opinion, and also that of his colleagues, that Constantinople was quite indefensible in spite of the plans which they had made and the guns and troops which were on the spot. If General Harington were asked what he required to defend Constantinople, he would certainly ask for two or three more divisions. It must be remembered that General Harington had been ordered, not only to hold the town and prevent massacres, but also to make preparations for withdrawal and evacuation in face of an excessive threat, should this be delivered. They must not ask General Harington to do too much with the limited forces at his disposal. It was, in fact, impossible for the Allies to stay there in the event of a sustained attack by the enemy.

M. POINCARE pointed out that if such a situation arose it would not only be a question of Constantinople. The Allies would have entered on another war with Turkey, and Syria and Irak would have to be defended. France had taken most of her troops from Syria, and he believed Great Britain had done the same as regards Irak. Then there was always the danger of Russia marching against Poland and Roumania. If Poland were to give assistance to Roumania, Germany would attack her, and the Allies would be faced with a general European war.

MARSHAL FOCH asked to be allowed to refer again to the question of defending Constantinople. He thought that General Harington had been told to concentrate his attention too much on the town itself. It was much better to take the larger view and try to hold the Bosphorus as long as possible. General Harington should receive clear instructions on this point and examine all possible plans with this object

LORD CURZON pointed out that the British Government had already contemplated the question in its fullest possible aspect. General Harington's orders were to hold Constantinople as long as possible. If the Ismid Peninsula were indefensible, General Harington was to withdraw from that peninsula. If Constantinople proved indefensible, he was to retire to Chanak or Gallipoli. In any case, General Harington had full authority already to retire in the manner or direction which seemed best to him.

MARSHAL FOCH said that at the risk of being thought importunate he would like again to point out that General Harington must not be limited too narrowly to the question of Constantinople and Ismid. He should be given the largest latitude possible to defend the European shore of the Bosphorus. If he were told "Constantinople or death" or "Ismid or death," he would certainly die.

M. POINCARE then suggested that a discussion should take place on Lord Curzon's memorandum (see Annex I) point by point.

Question of Western Thrace.

M. POINCARE read the Allied note of the 23rd September, and, in particular, the passage regarding "certain zones to be demilitarised." He enquired whether both the Greek and Turkish sides were to be demilitarised. If not, it would be necessary to modify the words in the memorandum, "the 1915 frontier was not to be altered."

LORD CURZON said that his proposal was to demilitarise both banks of the Maritza. His suggestion was that the angle of territory between the Maritza and the frontier ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915, as well as a strip of territory further south on both sides of the Maritza, including Adrianople, should be constituted as a demilitarised zone. He proposed this not only as a defence for Turkey, but also to facilitate Bulgaria's railway access to the sea. Bulgaria would really like Salonika or Cavalla as her port of exit, but the Powers were already bound by the Treaty of Neuilly to give Bulgaria access to Dedeagatch, and they would be killing two birds with one stone by forming this demilitarised zone. He suggested that the proper course for the Allies to take at Lausanne was to put the proposal which M. Poincaré had already made regarding the demilitarised zone on both banks

of the Maritza in the September discussions, and follow this up with the argument which he (Lord Curzon) had put forward regarding Dedeagatch.

M. POINCARE said that there was also the question of the limitation of the Turkish army in Europe. If such a limitation were effected, the Turks must be given guarantees. There was a general agreement in principle; the details would have to be settled by the experts at Lausanne.

MARSHAL FOCH then called attention to the difficulty of demilitarising Adrianople.

M. POINCARE said that he thought it best to continue taking Lord Curzon's memorandum point by point, and he read paragraph 2 regarding the frontier in Thrace. This raised the question of Karagatch. In September, M. Poincaré believed that the Allies had reached an agreement that a concession should be made if the Turks pressed for it, as they certainly would do.

LORD CURZON said that he had certain observations to make on this point. In the first place, why did the Turks give up Karagatch to the Bulgarians voluntarily in 1915 if it were so important for the defence of Adrianople? Secondly, under his own proposal, which was also that of M. Poincaré, all the forts were to be pulled down. He enquired whether M. Poincaré did not intend to include Karagatch in the demilitarised zone.

M. POINCARE pointed out that Lord Curzon's argument should be directed to his own War Office rather than to the French Government. The War Office themselves wished to give Adrianople to the Turks with certain forts, including Karagatch.

LORD CURZON suggested that they should not lose sight of the fact that by allowing Turkey to recover the station of Karagatch and thus obtain a footing on the railway line, they might be frustrating one of their objects which was to afford Bulgaria access to the sea.

M. POINCARE, in reply, referred Lord Curzon to the treaty relating to Western Thrace of 1920, and pointed out that by this treaty, or similar provisions in a new treaty, Bulgaria would, in any case, obtain economic access to the Ægean Sea, whether or not the Turks had Karagatch. The Allies should agree now to yield on this point in the last resort.

BARON AVEZZANO concurred.

LORD CURZON enquired what precisely the proposal was, and whether the Turks were to be given both Adrianople and Karagatch, in spite of both being demilitarised.

M. POINCARE said that this was so, although in fact it was doubtful, in French opinion, if it would be possible actually to demilitarise either of these places.

M. BOMPARD intervened to point out that Turkey would certainly want railway access to Adrianople in her own territory.

LORD CURZON suggested that M. Poincaré's last remarks really meant that we were to construct a sham neutral zone in which, at the end of five years, Turkish forts would be found both at Karagatch and Adrianople.

M. POINCARE hoped this would not be the case, and thought that the League of Nations might be able to do something in the matter.

LORD CURZON said that civilian League officials visiting this area every three years, or some such plan as this, would hardly suffice to check the Turks. In any case, they could not agree to settle the question there and then; it must be decided at Lausanne after the Turks had been heard.

M. POINCARE then took point 3 of the British memorandum regarding the freedom of the Straits.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to know precisely what M. Poincaré meant by the phrase. It might refer either to ships of war or ships of commerce. At the beginning of the war the Turks, by having fortifications on the Dardanelles, had been able effectively to close the Straits. They had thus cost the Allies many valuable lives and had prolonged the war. The British Empire particularly had suffered from the fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula. If Turkey is no longer to fortify the Straits or close them in time of war, how would such prescriptions of a

new treaty be observed. Would inspection by civilians belonging to the League of Nations suffice? It was essential that the Allies should know precisely what they meant to do and have an agreement as to whether the freedom of the Straits was to be freedom for warships as well as vessels of commerce.

M. POINCARE presumed that there would only be complete freedom for both ships of war and ships of commerce in time of peace. It would certainly be necessary, in any case, to limit the numbers and tonnage of the vessels and the duration of their stay in the case of ships of war.

LORD CURZON enquired whether in peace ships of commerce and a limited number of warships were to be allowed through the Straits, while in war the Straits were to be shut altogether to vessels of commerce and warships.

M. POINCARE said he did not think so. All future hypotheses as regards a war must be considered on their merits, and it must be seen what in practice the Allies might hope to effect. They should, however, begin to work on the question from the point of view of times of peace.

LORD CURZON said that he was in entire agreement, but this was probably not the way in which the question would be put to them at Lausanne. Turkey and Russia would probably both ask that in war the Straits should be closed to all ships of war.

M. BOMPARD intervened to suggest that the Turks would also probably ask that the Straits should be shut to vessels of war in time of both peace and war.

ADMIRAL LACAZE suggested that there were really two different questions—the passage of vessels through the Straits and the stationing of vessels in the Straits. As regards the former, there ought to be complete freedom for both kinds of vessels in time of peace and war.

Both M. BOMPARD and M. POINCARE pointed out that there would have to be a limitation of numbers.

M. POMPARD also pointed out that in 1912 and 1914 the Turks had, after war had broken out, shut the Straits to both warships and ships of commerce. The Allies had not been able to stop it, and it would be very difficult for them to do it in the future if Russia and Turkey were to co-operate.

LORD CURZON said that all he wanted was to see that they had a clear understanding as to what they actually meant to do at Lausanne. He was in agreement with M. Poincaré in so far as he understood the latter's proposals. He enquired whether at all times (both in peace and war) the Straits were to be open to ships of commerce.

M. POINCARE replied in the affirmative, provided Turkey were neutral.

LORD CURZON then enquired whether the Allies were to try also to enable the Powers to send warships through the Straits in time of peace, and, if so, what was the object of obtaining such a result.

M. POINCARE said that he was in favour of warships being allowed to go through without formalities in time of peace, provided there was agreement as to numbers. As regards the object of their passage, it might well be that in the future France and Great Britain might wish to go to the Crimea. Provided the Allies could settle in advance with Turkey the question of passage, they need not now consider hypothetical objects to justify passage.

LORD CURZON pointed out that before the war only a limited number of ships of war were allowed into the Straits, and that their admission depended upon the agreement of the Turkish Government.

M. POINCARE said that he must distinguish between stationing vessels in the Straits and obtaining permission for them to pass. There would be much more opposition to the former than to the latter. He had asked M. Fromageot to explain by a formula what precisely the Allies should seek as regards the freedom of the Straits. He then read this formula, which will be found as Annex II to this memorandum.

LORD CURZON said that he did not raise any objection to M. Fromageot's formula, which seemed very clear, but that he would like time to examine it after communicating with his Government.

LORD CURZON then raised the question of the demilitarised zone round the Straits. He recalled that by the March proposals, as modified by the proposals of Marshal Foch and the War Office, the Dardanelles (including the strip from Rodosto to the Gulf of Xeros), the Sanjak of Chanak, the Ismid Peninsula, and the Chatalja zone were to be demilitarised. How was this to be ensured? In the Treaty of Sèvres there was an Allied force in the whole zone and Greek sovereignty in the Gallipoli Peninsula and on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora. Now there was to be full Turkish sovereignty on both sides of both Straits. Even under the March proposals the Allied force was confined to the Gallipoli Peninsula and Allied officers were sent from there to inspect the zones. Were these arrangements to be continued, or were the Allies going to have inspectors under the League of Nations, as was foreshadowed in the note of 23rd September? As regards the Bosphorus, were the two demilitarised zones to be maintained in spite of the fact that Constantinople was to be handed back to the complete control of the Turks, with a Turkish force garrisoning it? Even if the Allied secured the destruction of the forts; it would be difficult to insist upon the coasts remaining unfortified. It was useless for the Allies to ask the Turks to agree to something which they knew they could not enforce.

M. POINCARÉ explained that he had had in mind an international commission working under the ægis of the League of Nations with sufficient moral and international authority to carry out the inspection of the demilitarised zone. Perhaps it might not prove necessary to have any material force to back up the commission. Marshal Foch himself thought that the important thing was to secure the destruction of the coast fortifications of all kinds. All they could hope to do was to secure this and to trust to inspection by the commission to prevent their being re-established.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with M. Poincaré's proposal, but under the Sèvres Treaty it must be remembered that the international commission had only had the duty of looking after the buoys, sanitation, shipping dues, &c. The commission was now to be given quite other duties. It was, in fact, to have the military and naval duties of keeping these waters open. Apparently M. Poincaré was quite frank as regards the nature of this authority, which was only moral. He (Lord Curzon) feared that this was only a euphemism for the absence of all authority in practice. It was true that a slight advantage might be gained at the beginning of hostilities if the Turks had been forced to carry out their part of the bargain as regards the destruction of fortifications, but he feared that it might be difficult to make them do this. Nevertheless, in his opinion, the Allies might have to have some such arrangement, although they should realise how little it really meant.

M. POINCARÉ had pointed out that the views which he had expressed were really those of the British War Office. If Lord Curzon could secure a better guarantee at Lausanne, he would be all the more pleased. It would always be possible for the three Allies to re-enter the Straits if Turkey violated the clauses referring to the question of coastal fortifications.

LORD CURZON said that he feared M. Poincaré was basing his arguments too largely on the memorandum by the British War Office. This memorandum contained the views of neither the Foreign Office nor the Cabinet, who had never even seen it.

ADMIRAL LACAZE said that he would like to point out that at the beginning of the war the difficulty had always been the presence of permanent works, torpedo tubes, &c. in the Dardanelles. The Allies would really have taken a valuable step if they obtained the suppression of these engines of war.

LORD CURZON said that he was much interested in what Admiral Lacaze had said. He enquired whether M. Poincaré wished to place the commission under the League of Nations.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that the Allies had said so in their note of 23rd September.

LORD CURZON feared that the League of Nations might not agree to assume the responsibility for a commission with such powers. He was also doubtful whether Turkey or Russia would accept the supervision of the League. In fact, he was quite sure that the latter would not. He was, however, fully prepared to press the solution advocated by M. Poincaré, although he would like to know at once whether M. Poincaré was agreed that the Allies should do this, and whether they were to hold out at Lausanne to the end for some such general solution, or whether, in certain circumstances, they were to contemplate modifications. The whole question was a very difficult one, and Lord Curzon doubted whether the conference had sufficiently explored it.

M. POINCARÉ observed that Lord Curzon himself had proposed to place the commission under the auspices of the League of Nations in September, but, of course, the Allied invitation to the Russian Soviet Government raised a new issue. For the rest, it seemed to him (M. Poincaré) better to wait and see how events developed, and to maintain a close alliance outside the conference. The Allies might have private talks every night, and they could then decide what their procedure the next day should be. In March they had talked of an Allied military occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula; they could think no more of that now.

ADMIRAL LACAZE suggested that even if the League were only a moral force, it was always material for the Allies to fall back upon. Moreover, once Turkey was in the League, the guarantee of that body for the freedom of the Straits would be, in practice, a more serious one

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to run briefly through the other points in the British memorandum, and it was agreed that they might all be passed except the Capitulations, the Ægean Islands and the indemnity, which were reserved for further discussion.

[At this point the meeting adjourned for tea.]

On resuming, M. POINCARÉ raised the question of Capitulations. The Allies must endeavour to secure the utmost guarantees, but they should have no illusions on that point. He had had a talk with Ismet Pasha on the subject. He was very deaf. From this talk he had inferred that it was absolutely essential, in any case, to suppress the main Capitulations, while aiming at obtaining substantial safeguards. For the present, the matter might be left over and discussed at Lausanne by the experts.

M. BARRERE pointed out that the neutrals were on the Allies' side.

M. POINCARÉ said that Ismet Pasha had insisted on Turkey being treated on a footing of equality, and had kept repeating this point. It was characteristic of the Kemalist attitude.

BARON AVEZZANO explained that the neutral Powers had demanded to participate in the Lausanne Conference for the question of the Capitulations, and he asked what were the views of the conference.

LORD CURZON replied that Sweden and Spain had applied to His Majesty's Government, and he had answered the Swedish Government that they would be kept informed and that the Allies would look after their interests.

M. POINCARÉ thought it most important not to lose their support. Neutral Powers with capitulatory treaties, such as Spain, Holland, Poland, Norway and Sweden, ought to be allowed to present their views to the conference.

M. BARRERE suggested that they might choose two delegates among themselves.

M. POINCARÉ said they would never decide in that case on the delegates. For the rest, it would be a good thing to let the whole world talk to the Turks. The United States would be there in any case.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Poland had no capitulatory treaty with Turkey, unlike Sweden and Norway.

M. POINCARÉ agreed, but Poland had a general interest in the settlement. There was the question of Russia and the Straits, for instance.

LORD CURZON said that he had explained to M. Skirmunt in London that the Allied Powers had decided who was to be invited, and it was too late to change their decision. They might agree, however, to neutral States with capitulatory treaties coming to Lausanne to present their views on the Capitulations.

M. BOMPARD agreed that this was an excellent idea. Turkey had tried to get rid of the Capitulations by unilateral acts. The treaties of these neutral Powers with Turkey were really still in force.

LORD CURZON agreed and referred to the five draft articles prepared by the British delegation, giving generally the British idea as to how the fiscal and

judicial Capitulations might be modified. He enquired whether M. Poincaré had examined them.

M. POINCARE said that he was in general agreement, but that the French Government wanted greater precision on certain points, and especially more safeguards for French schools.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the neutral Powers should only send one delegate each, and who precisely these Powers were.

M. POINCARE replied that they were Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland. The United States had already been asked to Lausanne.

LORD CURZON suggested that Portugal might also expect to be asked.

M. POINCARE proposed also Brazil.

It was agreed that Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland should each be invited to send one delegate to Lausanne, at a date to be fixed, to give their views on the Capitulations. (See Annex III for the French text of the invitation.)

M. BARRERE then raised the question of the sanitary administration in Turkey which was bound up with the Capitulations and was very important.

LORD CURZON suggested that this might be left to the Straits Commission so far as the Straits zone was concerned, as was done in the Treaty of Sèvres.

M. BARRERE said that this would not be enough, as the Turks could not execute any sanitary measures.

LORD CURZON said that he did not propose that; he suggested that the League or the commission should have this function of executing sanitary measures together with the other functions, given them in the Treaty of Sèvres. In any case, the matter was one for the experts to consider at Lausanne.

M. POINCARE then went on to the question of the Ægean Islands, and enquired which Lord Curzon had meant

LORD CURZON said that he had meant all the islands. Some were already in the hands of the Greeks; for instance, those round the mouth of the Dardanelles, which were to be demilitarised. Then there were the Dodecanese Islands, which had been ceded to Italy by Turkey in article 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and, except for Rhodes, by Italy to Greece in a treaty signed at the same time as the Treaty of Sèvres between Greece and Italy. All that he now proposed was that all these islands should be taken away from Turkey at Lausanne.

BARON AVEZZANO asked why, in these circumstances, the question of the Dodecanese should be raised with the Turks at all.

LORD CURZON referred him to article 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and enquired whether Italy did not wish to maintain it. The Allies must provide for the cession of these islands by Turkey in the new treaty.

BARON AVEZZANO agreed to this point.

M. BOMPARD suggested that the Allies need only deal at Lausanne with the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Castellorizo; all the rest were already non-Turkish.

LORD CURZON said that he feared the Turks would raise the question, even if the Allies did not. For the rest, the juridical position of these islands was not satisfactorily settled before the war. That was the point of articles 84 and 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres. All Lord Curzon wished to do was to keep these articles in the Treaty.

BARON AVEZZANO replied that he did not wish the question to be reopened to the extent that it appeared to be reopened in the British memorandum, namely, that all the islands were to be handed back to the Allies for disposal. The situation was already a delicate one as regards their fate.

M. POINCARE suggested that it might be possible, while taking all the islands in the first instance from the Turks, to give them back Imbros and Tenedos as a concession, while demilitarising them.

LORD CURZON said that he could not agree to this, as the islands were entirely Greek.

M. POINCARE then referred to the question of indemnities, and pointed out that France might wish to obtain reparation for the damage done to the properties of French nationals by the Greeks on Turkish territory.

LORD CURZON explained that his memorandum on this, as on other points, had been much compressed, but all he had meant to do was to refer to the 240 million pounds sterling indemnity which, in the press, the Turks were said to be claiming from the Greeks. In point of fact, we should find at Lausanne that everyone would have claims to put forward one against another. These could be balanced one against another, and, as there was actually very little money about in this part of the world, no claims would probably be satisfied. This question might, however, be left in the first instance to the experts at Lausanne, who could assess the claims and draw up the balance sheet.

M. POINCARE agreed. He then took the points in category (B), beginning with minorities.

LORD CURZON explained that there were still probably some Armenians in Asia Minor and a few Greeks, and the Allies must do what they could to safeguard them by provisions in the treaty.

M. POINCARE agreed. The Allies should retain the March resolutions so far as it was now possible to do so. It was no good trying to do more in Turkey than they had done elsewhere, *e.g.*, as in Greece. As regards the Turkish military forces, M. Poincaré wished again to refer to the memorandum of the British War Office. It would be impossible to retain the March resolutions, especially as regards Asia; they could agree so far as Europe was concerned.

LORD CURZON pointed out that he could not accept the views of the French and British War Offices on a point like this. They seemed to like the idea of a large Turkish army, and he was sure that there were English and perhaps French generals who longed to be sent to command them. But there was an important political aspect of this matter. Take, for instance, conscription. Logically, Germany, Austria, Holland and Bulgaria would ask for similar treatment if conscription were left in Turkey. It might be possible, therefore, to maintain the March proposal in principle, and in practice for the Allies to continue postponing the date at which the voluntary principle was to be established in Turkey. Very wide limits might also be fixed for the Turkish army. Thus, in principle, the Allies would be following the lines of the other treaties, while, in practice, offering Turkey really all she wanted. In Europe, on the other hand, he entirely agreed with Marshal Foch, and thought it essential to limit the Turkish forces. He enquired whether Marshal Foch had any views as to the figure at which this limitation should be put.

MARSHAL FOCH said that his experts had arrived at the figure of 15,000 gendarmerie and troops in Europe, including Constantinople, but it would be necessary first to decide whether the Allies were to try and fix a minimum or maximum number of gendarmerie inside the Turkish military forces as a whole.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Turkey might want European officers for the gendarmerie. If so, the Allies should decide that there should be complete equality between the three Powers.

M. POINCARE thought that the Turks would only agree to take Allied instructors in the schools, and not officers for the gendarmerie.

LORD CURZON said he wished to be quite clear on this point, as he was afraid that the Angora Agreement and the letters accompanying it threatened to provide for a French monopoly of French instructors or officers. He referred to the letter from Yussuf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon of the 20th October, 1921, and to the paragraph in it about French specialists. It was necessary to have a clear answer as to the suggested monopoly.

M. POINCARE said that his text of the letter which Lord Curzon had read was different, and he believed that the letter from which Lord Curzon had read was a version prepared at the Quai d'Orsay of several letters from Yussuf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon. In any case, whether there were any Allied officers at all either in the gendarmerie schools or the gendarmerie depended on the Turks.

LORD CURZON concluded the proceedings by emphasising the necessity of Allied unity throughout the conference at Lausanne, and thanked M. Poincaré for having agreed generally to his memorandum and for the full and frank explanations which he had offered.

After a communiqué to the press had been agreed upon, the meeting adjourned.

Annex I.

Memorandum to French Government of November 15, 1922.

Category (A). (Essential.)

1. *Western Thrace.*

Adherence to the understanding arrived at in the March discussion that the position in Western Thrace shall not be altered and that the Turkish demand for a plebiscite shall be refused.

2. Frontier of Western Thrace to be frontier ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria under the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of September 1915. (This agreement may be subject to the possible creation of a neutral zone to provide a railway access for Bulgaria to the Ægean.)

3. *Freedom of the Straits.*

This principle is accepted by all the Allies (*vide* note of the 23rd September). The actual manner in which it is to be applied remains for discussion. The Allied Governments should maintain a firm accord as to the demilitarisation of certain zones on the Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus, and as to the inspection of these areas under conditions to be determined.

4. *Capitulations.*

Adherence to the March resolution, with certain modifications which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to suggest to their Allies.

5. *Islands in the Ægean.*

To be ceded by Turkey to the Allies, to be disposed in the manner agreed to by the latter.

6. *Frontiers of Syria and Irak.*

To be maintained, except in so far as the mandatory Powers may be disposed to consider or propose local rectification.

7. *Mandated Territory in Syria, Irak and Palestine.*

No change to be admitted.

8. *Allied Graves.*

The Allies to insist upon a transfer of ownership of the soil to them.

9. *Indemnities.*

A Turkish indemnity to be demanded, as proposed in the March resolution. The exact figure to be determined by agreement between the Allies.

The Turkish demand for an indemnity from Greece to be refused.

10. *Mudania Convention.*

To be strictly enforced and all Turkish violation of it to be firmly resisted.

11. *Constantinople Position.*

No withdrawal of Allied troops until ratification of new treaty with Turkey (September note).

Category (B). (Most Desirable.)

1. *Protection of Minorities.*

As regards minorities in Asia, adherence so far as is still possible to the resolutions of March; and, as regards the minorities in Europe, strict adherence to the terms of the September agreement.

2. *Turkish Military Forces.*

General adherence to the terms of the March resolution. If a relaxation of these is conceded, this should not apply to the Turkish army in Europe, which should be strictly limited in numbers.

3. *Financial Clauses.*

These should remain for discussion between the Allied experts.

4. *Economic Clauses.*

Insistence upon recognition by the Turkish Government of Allied pre-war concessions, and annulment of Turkish repudiation of contracts since the armistice. The methods to be discussed by the Allied experts.

Annex II.

French Proposal regarding Freedom of the Straits.

UNE condition essentielle de l'établissement d'une paix durable en Orient est l'organisation d'un régime assurant la liberté des Détroits.

L'exercice de la souveraineté ottomane devra subir à cet effet certaines restrictions, qui ne sauront, toutefois, lui être utilement imposées que si elles sont maintenues dans les limites strictement nécessaires pour assurer la liberté de la navigation.

La question paraît donc pouvoir être posée dans les termes suivants :

I.—*Navires de Commerce et assimilés.*

(a.) *En temps de paix:* Liberté complète de navigation, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, sans aucune formalité, taxe ou charge quelconques.

(b.) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant neutre:* Liberté complète de navigation dans les mêmes conditions.

(c.) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante:* Liberté de navigation pour les navires neutres, si le navire ne se livre pas à un transport d'assistance hostile (transport de contrebande, transport de troupes ou de passagers hostiles).

II.—*Bâtiments de Guerre.*

(a.) *En temps de paix:* Liberté complète de passage, quel que soit le pavillon, sans aucune formalité, taxe ou charge quelconques, mais sous réserve d'une réglementation limitant le nombre et le tonnage des bâtiments d'un même pavillon, ainsi que la durée de leur séjour.

Il sera stipulé que les Puissances signataires qui avaient avant 1914 le droit de posséder des stationnaires continueront de jouir de ce droit dans les mêmes conditions.

(b.) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant neutre:* Liberté complète de passage dans les mêmes conditions. Interdiction aux bâtiments belligérants de tout acte de guerre, capture ou exercice du droit de visite; interdiction de séjourner plus de vingt-quatre heures au delà du temps de navigation, sauf force majeure; ravitaillement et réparations dans les termes de la Convention No. 3 de La Haye 1907 sur la neutralité maritime.

(c.) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante:* Liberté complète de passage pour les navires neutres.

ANNEX III.

M. Poincaré to French Representatives at The Hague, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Christiania and Madrid.

(Télégraphique.)

LES trois Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie sont d'accord pour accepter que les Etats ayant des traités capitulaires avec la Turquie soient écoutés, s'ils le désirent, à la Conférence de Lausanne sur le sujet des Capitulations à une date qui sera fixée ultérieurement.

Veuillez le faire savoir au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en ajoutant qu'il peut envoyer à cet effet un délégué à Lausanne.—POINCARÉ.

[E 13149/27/44] No. 641.

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting held at the Grand Hôtel des Alpes at Territet, at 7·30 P.M., on November 19, 1922, between the French Président du Conseil, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Président du Conseil.

Present:

FOR FRANCE.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN.	FOR ITALY.
M. Poincaré.	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	Signor Mussolini.
M. Barrère.	Sir Horace Rumbold.	Signor Contarini.
M. Bompard.	Sir William Tyrrell.	Signor Lago.
	Secretaries:	
M. Laroche.	Mr. Forbes Adam.	Signor Barone Russo.
M. Massigli.		Signor Guariglia.

Also present:

Admiral Lacaze.
General Weygand.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

M. POINCARÉ opened the discussion by explaining that Lord Curzon and he had had a conversation in Paris in the presence of Baron Avezzana on the various points enumerated in the British memorandum. (See Annex I to Minutes of Paris Meeting of the 18th November.) They had reached a fairly precise agreement on most points, and had realised generally that there should be no difficulty in maintaining a common attitude before the Turks.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he wished to ask a preliminary question, and that was whether it was really necessary for all the experts present to assist at their discussion.

M. POINCARÉ and LORD CURZON explained that they thought it desirable that the French and British plenipotentiaries for the Lausanne Conference should be present at this discussion on the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that it might be necessary later for all the experts and delegates to be present, but there were several other questions which he wished first to consider.

M. POINCARÉ and LORD CURZON agreed to have a private discussion first, if Signor Mussolini so desired.

At this stage all present withdrew except M. Poincaré, Lord Curzon, Signor Mussolini and M. Camerlynck.

The full conference resumed at 8·15 P.M.

M. POINCARÉ began by taking the points in the British memorandum one by one.

As regards *Western Thrace*, he explained that during their conversation in Paris the day before he had made it quite clear that France was agreed as to there being no plebiscite, but that he was anxious that both sides of the Maritza,

and not merely the Turkish, should be demilitarised. Otherwise the Turks might easily be attacked, and this might not be treating them quite fairly. Lord Curzon had told him, however, that he was in agreement with the French Government on this point.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI enquired what was the population which would have to vote in a plebiscite supposing one were agreed to.

M. POINCARÉ replied that it was difficult to state, as it had never been decided what was Western Thrace.

LORD CURZON pointed out that there could be no question of a plebiscite in any case. The matter no longer concerned Turkey, as, by the Treaty of Neuilly, Western Thrace, which was Bulgarian territory, had been surrendered to the Allies and had been provisionally disposed of by them in favour of Greece. The plebiscite could not therefore be admitted. The real point, which M. Poincaré had already raised, was the question of the demilitarised zones. He (Lord Curzon) had yesterday suggested two zones, one on either side of the Maritza. Such an arrangement would have the added advantage of facilitating Bulgaria's access to the sea along the railway to Dedeagatch. If only the Allies could come to an agreement regarding these zones, they would be carrying out in full their agreement of March last and at the same time satisfying Bulgarian legitimate claims.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the *western frontier of Eastern Thrace*. He explained that in his discussion with Lord Curzon the day before they had agreed that the 1915 frontier should be put forward, except possibly as regards Karagatch and the Adrianople forts on the right bank of the river. He believed that the Turks would be very intransigent on this point. Karagatch was the railway station of Adrianople. In Lord Curzon's view, however, no offer of Karagatch should be made to the Turks, at any rate at the beginning of their proceedings. Later on the Allies might consider among themselves whether a concession should not be made in return for Turkish concessions elsewhere. In any case he wished to emphasise that he entirely agreed with what Lord Curzon had said on the point of principle the day before, viz., that the Allies should never separate in the face of the Turks, but should compose any differences which they might have among themselves.

LORD CURZON explained that his view was that we ought to wait and see what the Turks had to say on this matter. There were three very good reasons for not giving them back Karagatch:—

1. It had been voluntarily ceded by Turkey in 1915 to Bulgaria, so it could not have been very important to her then;
2. If the Turks argued that Karagatch and the forts in other hands would be a threat to the safety of Adrianople, the Allied proposal for demilitarised zones would fully meet them;
3. If Turkish sovereignty were restored over this bit of the railway, the Allies might find difficulty in assuring Bulgarian access to the sea.

These, however, were matters for Allied discussion. They should first hear the Turks, and then consider among themselves, if the Turks expressed their case, how they (the Allies) should reply, while firmly maintaining throughout the principle to which M. Poincaré had referred as to the absolute necessity of a united front in the conference chamber.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he had no objection to offer.

M. POINCARÉ then read the *Straits* section of the British memorandum, and explained that Lord Curzon and he were in general agreement on the formula proposed therein.

LORD CURZON observed that M. Poincaré had the day before put before him an agreed formula prepared by M. Fromageot defining the freedom of the Straits. He suggested that M. Poincaré might perhaps hand a copy later to Signor Mussolini.

M. POINCARÉ agreed and suggested that for the present they should continue to examine the remaining points of the memorandum. He then read the *Capitulation* proposal, and explained that both France and Great Britain had

prepared formulæ on this point which might serve as a basis for discussion and as a proposal to be made to the Turks. Doubtless Italy had a draft also. There would be great difficulty with the Turks on this point, but the Allied interests were the same, and they must therefore remain united throughout the conference.

LORD CURZON suggested that the essential line for the Allies to follow was to avoid the use of the word "Capitulations," which acted as a goad to the Turks. The British, French and Italian experts should concert together as soon as possible and produce a common draft. In this draft, while avoiding the word which the Turks disliked, they should retain substantial safeguards. He entirely agreed with M. Poincaré that the Allies here had all the same interests. Fortunately, too, there were neutral States, and the United States of America, who would come to their assistance and help them to fight a stiff battle with the Turks. They must bear in mind that Allied nationals would not be able to continue to live at Constantinople unless the Capitulations in some form or other, however modified, were maintained.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said he entirely agreed that they must avoid the word and keep the substance, and that Europeans living in Turkey must be properly protected.

[The meeting then adjourned for dinner and resumed at 9·40 P.M.]

M. POINCARÉ took the next point in the memorandum, namely, the Ægean Islands.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to explain at once lest his formula might give rise to some misinterpretation. All he had wished to do was to make it quite clear that Turkish rights in all the islands in the Ægean were to be extinguished in the new treaty. He did not intend to refer at all in the formula to the question of the ultimate disposal of these islands. That was a matter for the Allies to discuss amongst themselves.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he quite understood, but that he must make a reservation regarding the Dodecanese. They were entirely independent of the Sèvres settlement, and their fate was decided by article 8 of the Treaty of London. He asked whether Lord Curzon had meant to exclude the Dodecanese from his formula.

LORD CURZON replied that the formula was meant to comprise all the islands in the Ægean which were dealt with in the Treaty of Sèvres, and, therefore, the Dodecanese. Signor Mussolini seemed to be not quite aware of the actual facts regarding the treatment of the Dodecanese in the Sèvres settlement. He did not, however, think it necessary to discuss this point now. All that they had to do was to meet the Turks. Italy would be free later to discuss the disposal of the Dodecanese with Greece and the Allies.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he was prepared to pass the point subject to the general reservation which he had already made.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the question of the *frontiers of Syria and Mesopotamia*. The French Government agreed with the British Government that there should be no change in these except the rectification which the mandatory Powers were prepared to agree to. There was a similar agreement between France and Great Britain as regards the principle of the *mandates* not being discussed. As regards *Allied graves* he and Lord Curzon were in agreement that there should be a transfer of the ownership of the soil to the Allied Governments concerned.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he was prepared to accept these points in the memorandum, but that he must make a reservation as regards the question of the mandates in Syria, Irak and Palestine, as between France, England and Italy.

M. POINCARÉ said that he assumed this reservation did not apply to Turkey.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed that it was only a question as between the Allies.

M. POINCARÉ then took the question of *indemnities* in the British memorandum. He pointed out that the general lines of the settlement in this matter had been agreed to by the Allies in March last. He had, however, yesterday

made certain reservations to Lord Curzon as regards French property destroyed by the Greeks in Asia Minor. Doubtless there was other Allied property in a similar position. Lord Curzon agreed with him that it might be necessary to calculate the various demands and set them off one against the other.

LORD CURZON intervened to explain that the mention in his draft of an indemnity demanded from the Greeks referred only to the reported Turkish claim for the payment of 240,000,000*l.* by Greece.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the *Mudania Convention* and explained that he entirely adhered to Lord Curzon's proposal on this point.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed.

M. POINCARÉ then explained that they had had a long discussion the day before on the next point, the question of the Allies remaining at Constantinople until the ratification of the new treaty with Turkey. Marshal Foch had explained his views at length. They had understood from General Harington that if Constantinople were attacked by the Turks, it might be very difficult for the Allies to keep their hold on the town, and that it would be better to withdraw and concentrate on Gallipoli. In the circumstances, he (M. Poincaré) had thought that it might be better for the Allies to retire in advance before they were forced out. Apparently Signor Mussolini shared this view. On the other hand, Lord Curzon disagreed and believed that it would be a great blow to Allied prestige. However, the most recent news from Constantinople received from both General Charpy and General Pellé was that there was a considerable *détente* in the situation and little chance of a Turkish attack for the present. If so, it would not be necessary for the Allies to consider "une retraite préventive." They had therefore decided that it was better that the question of withdrawal should be discussed by the conference when it actually arose again in a serious form. They must not forget, however, that the Turks had an army of 150,000 men in Asia Minor, and the Turkish forces in front of Chanak and Ismid had two army corps echelonned behind them.

LORD CURZON admitted that there were certain dangers in the situation, but his first point was that the Allies had reached an agreement both in March and September that they would maintain their hold on Constantinople until the ratification of the new treaty with Turkey. A premature retirement would otherwise deal a terrible blow to Allied prestige. He (Lord Curzon) did not believe that any serious difficulty was now likely to arise. It was therefore much better for the Allies to hold on as long as possible and not to evacuate Constantinople unless they were actually forced to until the new treaty came into force. The better news from Constantinople, to which M. Poincaré had referred, was welcome. For the present, therefore, there was no need to reopen the agreement of September last.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI confessed himself to be pessimistic as regards the situation in Constantinople. His own news was grave. The Allies could not dispute his contention that the number of troops at Constantinople was totally insufficient to defend the town.

LORD CURZON intervened to explain that there were in fact about 16,000 bayonets in the whole area, of which some 8,000 were in Constantinople and the Ismid Peninsula, and about a similar number in Gallipoli and Chanak. There were actually in Constantinople 4,000 men to maintain order. He admitted that from a purely military point of view these numbers might be insufficient, and he had therefore asked M. Poincaré the day before to send reinforcements, if possible. He had found himself unable to make any promise, but he (Lord Curzon) would be very glad if Italy could see her way to adopt a different attitude and send reinforcements. He had a special right to speak on this matter as the majority of troops in the area were British, 11,000 against 4,000 French troops and one battalion of Italian troops.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that if they were attacked by the Turks, it would not only be in the direction of the Straits. The Allies would also have to fight in Syria and Irak, and this at a time when French troops had already been transferred from Syria to Constantinople.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that they were agreed that in any case the troops at Constantinople were insufficient, and that it would be difficult to reinforce them in time. The real question was whether the presence of this insufficient number of troops in the town encouraged Turkish intransigence or the reverse. How were the Turks going, in fact, to continue if Constantinople were retained by the Allies?

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that the Mudania Convention had really settled the question as between the Allies and the Turks, and that the Allies were to remain there until the conclusion of peace. If the Allies now retired without being forced to do so their attitude would be interpreted by the Turks as one of weakness.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI admitted the difficulty of the position. The Allies, while being conciliatory, must be prepared to show extreme firmness at a certain point, and we were in the difficulty of finding ourselves weak when we wished to be firm.

M. BARRÈRE said that once the Turks really understood that the Allies were together they would not attack them.

SIR H. RUMBOLD pointed out that if the Allies retired they would leave not only their very important colonies in Constantinople in danger, but also the Christian minorities. It would be deplorable if the Allies retired before a retirement was really necessary.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI asked whether the Allies were really in a position to defend either the colonies or the minorities.

M. POINCARÉ said that he did not think the Turks would attack if the Allies were united in staying in Constantinople. For the rest, the French had an agreement with the Turks which the latter would violate if they attacked Constantinople. He believed the Italians also had an agreement.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that this was not so, and that he believed the Grand National Assembly had recently repudiated the French agreement.

M. POINCARÉ replied that the agreement was still in force, and he did not think the Turks would break it.

SIGNOR CONTARINI said it was important to decide whether, if the Turks *did* attack, the Allies would resist.

M. POINCARÉ explained that he and Lord Curzon had agreed the day before that if the Turks did attack, the French and British forces should meet them force by force. If they evacuated before they were forced to, Constantinople and its Greek population might meet the fate of Smyrna.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI asked if there were not already Kemalists in Constantinople.

SIR H. RUMBOLD replied that there was a steady infiltration which was producing a gradual increase in the effective total of Turkish forces in, or near, the own.

M. BOMPARD intervened to explain that, as far as he could ascertain from his own experience as Ambassador at Constantinople, not only was there a large French colony in Constantinople, but there was also a colony of some 15,000 Italians. There was danger of the most terrible massacres which the prestige of the Allies symbolised by their presence in the town alone prevented.

SIR H. RUMBOLD added that there were also some 500,000 Armenians and Greeks in the city to be protected.

SIGNOR CONTARINI said that he thought there was no disagreement between the Allies in principle, but there was only the question that they should arrive at some decision as to what they should do in the event of a serious Turkish threat.

LORD CURZON pointed out that there were really three alternatives before the Allies :—

1. The reinforcement of their troops at Constantinople. He would be glad if Italy would send them. M. Poincaré was apparently unwilling.
2. Immediate evacuation. This seemed to Lord Curzon deplorable.

3. The Allies should stay as they were and run a certain risk, meanwhile trying to reach the end of the Lausanne Conference without evacuation. He believed that as long as Ismet Pasha was at Lausanne talking to the Allies it was incredible that the Turks would attack them. Therefore let the Allies stay and run the risk rather than give the town over to massacre by retirement.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he would not insist.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the next point in the British memorandum, namely, *minorities*. The Allies were agreed that they should do what they could. Turkey was unlikely to accept any clauses as severe as those suggested in the March resolutions, but they might accept something similar to those in the European minority treaties.

LORD CURZON thought that the Allies might be able to attain rather more than this. Provision had been made for a League of Nations High Commissioner at Constantinople. It might be possible to confirm his position in the treaty and give him powers to visit certain areas and exercise a certain supervision over the execution of the minority clauses of the treaty. He (Lord Curzon) felt very strongly that, in virtue of the Allied proposals to the Greeks, the Allies must do all they could to protect such of these unfortunate people as remained in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. It was quite true that the minorities were diminishing, and might end by disappearing, and that the Allies might not be able to do very much; but the eyes of the world were upon them, and America, who was sending representatives to the conference, was also watching. For his part, he would insist upon the Allies making the best fight possible.

M. POINCARÉ said that, although Lord Curzon had talked of American assistance, the difficulty was that America might take no part in the minorities settlement if, as Lord Curzon proposed, the League of Nations were in any way brought into the arrangement.

LORD CURZON replied that he did not think America would object to the League of Nations in this connection. She had shown herself ready to assist in the establishment of the International Court of Justice under the League. All that America really wanted was not to be actually mixed up in European politics. He was hopeful, however, that the American observers at the Lausanne Conference would give the Allies real support. In any case, the Allies must try to do something for the minorities with or without such support.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the formula in the British memorandum regarding the *military forces of Turkey*. He explained that in the Allied conversations the day before he had pointed out the difficulty of retaining the March resolutions. The Allies could hardly now ask Turkey to suppress purely and simply conscription, at any rate at once. Lord Curzon had presumably seen this by referring to the impossibility of attempting to abolish conscription in Asia Minor at any rate. The best line for the Allies to pursue was to be conciliatory as regards Asia, but very strict about Europe. In any case, the details of the military clauses might be examined by other experts.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed.

M. POINCARÉ then raised the question of finance and economics. These were of a special interest to Italy and France. He proposed that the Allied experts should begin by preparing their joint draft. Perhaps, however, Signor Mussolini would have something to say on the question of economics.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI replied in the affirmative, and said that he would like to-morrow to discuss the question of the islands, the mandates and economic matters.

M. POINCARÉ and LORD CURZON pointed out that as regards the mandates they had not come prepared to discuss this question with Italy. They were there to make peace with the Turks, and it was agreed that there could be no discussion of the mandate question with the latter.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he was prepared to agree on this point, while maintaining a general reservation regarding mandates in the new treaty, and that he would like to-morrow to discuss the Ægean Islands and the economic clauses.

It was agreed to adjourn until 10 A.M. on the 20th November, when the meeting could be resumed at the Beau-Rivage Hôtel at Lausanne.

The following communiqué to the press was agreed upon by the three Allies at the end of the sitting:—

"M. Raymond Poincaré, M. Mussolini et Lord Curzon ont eu ce soir une première conversation dans laquelle s'est nettement affirmée leur commune résolution de régler dans l'esprit de la plus cordiale amitié, et sur la base d'une parfaite égalité entre Alliés, toutes les questions qui vont être traitées à la Conférence de Lausanne.

"Ils auront demain matin une seconde réunion."

[E 13135/10102/44] No. 642.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 401.

I communicated to Prime Minister substance of two relevant paragraphs of your telegram No. 299 and explained to him the position in regard to protocol of accession.

He stated that Egyptian delegation would have full powers, and that he appreciated fact the protocol would take effect from date of signature of treaty. He added, however, that, while Egyptian adhesion would be valid, he could, of course, give no assurance that action of Ministry would escape parliamentary comment.

I should be grateful if you could expedite replies of French and Italian Governments in regard to invitation to Egypt to attend the conference.

No. 643.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 23, 1922.*

THIS evening I invited Ismet Pasha to call upon me to meet French and Italian delegates and discuss military situation at Constantinople.

I pointed out to him how undesirable and indeed improper it is that, while we are seated round a table here trying to make peace, Angora representative at Constantinople should be acting in a manner that may at any time render our relations there impossible. I reminded him that Allied Governments had promised to evacuate city as soon as new peace treaty had come into operation—to which pledge we should faithfully adhere—and argued absolute necessity of preserving a friendly *status quo* in the interval. High Commissioner then gave a list of cases concerning Allied police and other matters in which there continues to be danger of friction at Constantinople, and promising him brief memorandum about these; I urged that replacement of Refet Pasha by another Governor as reported in press provided good opening for a more conciliatory policy. Ismet Pasha said that he had no authority to issue orders himself, but that he would at once telegraph to Angora on subjects mentioned in memorandum and would ask that instructions be sent in the sense desired.

After meeting I asked French and Italians to telegraph instructions to their High Commissioners vigorously to maintain claim that Allied police should protect Allied subjects, including Hellenes and Russians.

No. 644.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 11) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 24.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, November 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 723.

Following on interview between Allied plenipotentiaries and Ismet last night, former have sent him urgent joint memorandum asking for definite information as to

scope of Angora Government's decision regarding Christians in Asia Minor and position thereunder of men of military age.

It is not clear whether Angora Government contemplate expulsion of all Christians or have merely said that they are free to leave provided they do so before 30th November. What is your latest information? You might ask French Commissioner to obtain clear statement by telegraph from Colonel Mougin. On what evidence does estimate of 1,000,000 Christians still in Asia Minor rest? Greek minorities expert here puts Greeks at 300,000 at outside and Armenian delegation, Paris, recently gave 100,000 as approximate figure for Armenians.

No. 645.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 12) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 24.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 11. My telegram No. 24 to Foreign Office.

Record of action taken here. We understood from your telegram No. 9 that generals had consented to Turkish subjects arrested by Allies for offences against Allied forces being tried by Turkish courts. Penultimate sentence of first paragraph of General Harington's telegram No. 3061 to War Office seems to suggest that question of tribunal to try such cases is still open. Please clear this up as soon as possible, as we have cited general's readiness to allow Turkish subjects arrested by Allies to be tried by Turkish courts as fresh proof of moderate attitude of generals, and it seems impossible now to depart from this position.

No. 646.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 466.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, November 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 343: Turkish deportations.

Secretary of State telegraphed yesterday to United States representative to make strong representations to Turkish Government in the sense you suggested. He will follow this up with a further telegram to emphasise importance.

No. 647.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, November 23, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Secretary of State is seriously disturbed at thought of suffering with which Christian populations are now faced, and is contemplating placing before Congress proposals for relief of refugees on a large scale. At interview to-day he said it would be of considerable assistance if he might be informed in detail of relief work which would be undertaken by British relief organisations or through British Government agencies in regard to—

1. Transportation of refugees to temporary relief camps; and
2. Measures for their relief on arrival.

He would be glad to learn of any proposals which His Majesty's Government may have to make in regard to ultimate destinations of refugees and to receive any suggestion as to manner in which United States Government can assist. He especially emphasised his desire that relief work undertaken should be done "in co-operation."

[E 13134/10524/44] No. 648.

Memorandum respecting the Civil Population of Constantinople.

(Enclosure in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 1008 of November 14.—Received November 24.)

IT has been given out in the press that the British forces will be withdrawn from Constantinople as soon as the peace is signed. I think it is necessary to face this situation squarely and think what it means.

2. It is obvious that the "Central Government" will be swamped by the Angora Government, who will then have complete control in the city.

Whatever assurances the Angora Government give on paper at the conference may be genuine, and may satisfy the conference, but they will not satisfy the inhabitants of this town.

The question of the peace terms is, of course, one for higher authorities, but as the Allied police has been in very close touch with the civil population for nearly four years, I consider it my duty to put forward an official opinion on the future result of our evacuation of the town.

3. There is a Christian population which may be put down at 400,000. They consist of Greeks, Ottoman Greeks, Armenians and some smaller parties of Jugo-slavs, &c.

Under Allied protection they considered themselves quite safe, and were foolish enough in some cases to adopt a provocative attitude towards their old enemies the Turks; for instance, during the Greek advance towards Angora.

They have seen what happened at Smyrna; it is useless to argue who were the chief offenders there; the fact remains that there were Allied consuls in the town, Allied ships in the harbour, and yet deplorable panic took place.

They see what is happening in Thrace; Allied troops are there, but the people know that they will leave in a month or so, and the result is a panic-stricken flight.

Stories, true and untrue, are being circulated that the Greeks have burnt villages and houses sooner than leave them to the Turks.

4. Greece and the islands, which have been a place of refuge up to the present, are now full to overflowing. There will be no possible place for more refugees to go to.

5. As people begin to recognise this they will be in a state of panic, which may very easily result in another case of Smyrna. The blame will be laid on the Allies, and more especially on the British, for putting them in a temporary state of security and then abandoning them to their enemies. For four years the town has been wonderfully quiet considering the mixed population, political enmities and destitute refugees; but this is entirely due to the presence of Allied forces.

6. The intentions of the Turks may be quite good. There are a certain number of moderates who were strong Kemalists as long as there was war between Angora and Greece; they honestly desire the prosperity of their country, and want to avoid trouble in the town. But even the Turks are alarmed at the present prospect.

7. The tone of the Angora press and the speeches lately made by Kemalists are certainly aggressive. There are constant hints that the Turks want no Greeks or Armenians on Turkish territory. The impression they leave is that the Angora Government intends to abolish the Capitulations and to be free of any sort of control; that foreigners will be subject to Turkish courts; that the Angora Government will seize foreign property as compensation for damage suffered by Turks in Asia Minor. In fact, that a Bolshevik régime will be installed.

8. The actions of Angora support this view. They have "requisitioned" the Aidin Railway, a British concern. They have put forward proposals to abolish the Public Debt here by transferring it to Greece. They have already issued certain orders to the Treasury.

9. These points will no doubt be discussed and arranged by the Peace Conference. But I am only concerned in noting their present effect on the population, which hears these things go uncontradicted and views the future with alarm.

10. There exist a considerable number of persons of the lower classes who would benefit by a panic; these include Bolsheviks and other destitute Russians, who have nothing to lose, Turkish refugees from Asia Minor, Syria, &c.

11. It is regretted that no solution is apparent, but as British officials in this town may be held to account afterwards, I beg that this opinion may be forwarded to the highest authorities.

12. I repeat that whatever guarantees may be offered at the Peace Conference they will not satisfy the Christian population if Allied forces are withdrawn. There will be a panic on an appalling scale.

C. R. BALLARD, *Colonel*,
President, Allied Police Commission.

Constantinople, October 30, 1922.

[E 13158/12790/44] No. 649.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Communicated by Peace Delegation, Lausanne; Received November 25.)

(Secret.)

My Lord, *Hôtel Beau Rivage, Lausanne, November 20, 1922.*

IN view of the Sultan's departure from Constantinople on the 17th November, I consider it desirable to place on record the position in regard to His Majesty up to the moment when I myself left Constantinople for Lausanne on the 15th November.

2. Your Lordship will have learnt by the despatch in which I reported my conversation with the Sultan on the 6th November, that His Majesty was then already much preoccupied with the question of his personal safety, but manifested no immediate intention of abandoning his post. Having regard to what passed on that occasion, and to the desire which I knew to be entertained by His Majesty's Government that the Sultan should not be exposed to personal danger or indignity, I was most anxious, before leaving, to make all possible provision for his security.

3. Some little time before I left I took the question up with my French and Italian colleagues and the Allied generals. The French and Italians quite agreed that anything possible should be done, but it was evident that, when things came to a head, it would devolve on General Harington and myself to take action.

4. It was important that the British authorities should present no appearance of urging the Sultan to leave, but should be ready to arrange for his departure the moment he expressed a wish to do so. The main difficulty was to ensure that His Majesty should be able to communicate with General Harington or myself through a reliable channel when he considered himself in danger. This was no easy matter, as the Sultan had himself told me on the 6th November that there were only two persons in his entourage in whom he had confidence.

5. One of these two persons was a person intimately connected with the Palace, who had frequently served as a channel of communication between the Sultan and the High Commission, and who still had access to the Sultan, but who was by these very facts already so compromised as to be no longer available for the transmission of messages to me. The other was a high official of the Court, whose movements were certain to be watched by the Kemalist authorities. When I saw His Majesty on the 6th November he promised to seek some less conspicuous person whom he could use in case of need. Up to the eve of my departure, however, he had not indicated anyone for the purpose.

6. In these circumstances I authorised Mr. Ryan on the 14th November to send the Sultan a message to the effect that I was leaving for Lausanne the next day, and that it was essential that His Majesty should indicate some person who could bring word to General Harington, if at any later date he wished to leave or found himself exposed to danger. Mr. Ryan wrote out a short unsigned message in this sense, and found means to have it handed to the Sultan the same evening by the person who had previously served as a channel of communication. An answer was received the following morning, intimating that in the contingency which I had in view the Sultan would communicate with General Harington through a named minor official in his entourage, who had never been used for any such purpose.

7. I left Constantinople feeling that I had done everything possible to provide for the Sultan's personal security, and knowing that General Harington could be relied on to facilitate his departure in case of need. When passing through Italy, I learnt, without surprise and with some relief, that His Majesty had made up his mind to avail himself at once of the opportunity afforded to him. The report from Angora, which I have seen in the press, but of which I have not yet had confirmation, that the Grand National Assembly had decided to put him on trial doubtless precipitated his decision. I think he was also probably influenced by my own departure from Constantinople, as he was good enough to attach importance to my personal interest in him.

8. I leave it to Mr. Henderson to inform your Lordship of exactly what passed regarding the Sultan in the forty-eight hours following my departure from Constantinople and to appreciate the effect produced by his flight. I wish, however, to record my opinion that things had reached a point at which His Majesty was justified in consulting his personal safety, and at which it was no longer possible for him to serve his country in any way by remaining. It is improbable that he has any future in Turkey, as, apart from anything else, it will be argued that by taking refuge with a non-Moslem Power he has disqualified himself for the post of Caliph. This argument will carry great weight in the Moslem world, even among those who have no bias against the Sultan personally, and it will be exploited to the fullest extent by the Kemalists.

9. As for the position of His Majesty's Government in the matter, I think that, even though the Kemalist minority may find in the circumstances of the Sultan's flight a fresh ground of complaint against the British, Turks generally will feel that, in protecting the life and liberty of a Monarch who sought to work with us, we have been faithful to the best traditions of Great Britain in the East.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

No. 650.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 694.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 24, 1922.*

GREEK General Staff state that General Nider is coming to Athens in the next day or two to report and confer regarding army. In case of need Greece can now concentrate in the field here seven divisions, that is, the six divisions of 3rd and 4th Army Corps and one division from 2nd Army Corps, but pending Nider's report General Staff cannot give definite strengths.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No 651.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 735.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 25, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 733.

Refet requested meeting with High Commissioners yesterday evening to discuss Allied police question.

Refet insisted that Hellenes, as enemy subjects, could not benefit by any special treatment, and that their interests should be entrusted to neutral (Swedish) Government. He showed violent animosity against them. His attitude as regards Russians was quite different, and obviously influenced by effect which any concession to our point of view might have on Soviet Government.

After interminable discussion compromise was reached on following lines :—

Hellenes and Russians to be omitted from enumerated list of Allies enjoying Allied police protection as hitherto, but annex to generals' proposals to be attached to following effect :—

"Until such time as further arrangements shall be made, Hellenes and Russians, provided that latter do not claim to be citizens of Soviet Government, will continue to be treated in accordance with procedure laid down in clause concerning Allied subjects."

Omission of Hellenes from list of Allies will not commend itself to Greek Government, but substance is thereby obtained and question might otherwise have dragged on with daily risk of incidents. As it is, *status quo* for Hellenes and Russians is maintained, though Angora will probably take an early opportunity of pressing for further arrangements to be made in respect of Hellenes on lines of neutral protection.

Generals met Refet to-day, when I hope that proposals will be agreed to and signed.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 18.)

No. 652.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 24, 1922.*

SUB-COMMITTEE appointed, with General Weygand as chairman, to consider questions :—

(*a.*) Constructing demilitarised zones on both sides of frontier of Eastern Thrace, *i.e.*, northern frontiers facing Bulgaria and western frontiers facing Greece; and

(*b.*) Measures to be adopted for providing a free outlet for Bulgaria on the Ægean Sea;

reported this morning, after prolonged sittings, in which all parties concerned, including Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, lent a helping hand. Report recommended creation of such demilitarised zones 30 kilom. broad along the entire frontier of the Black Sea to the Ægean Sea. Reservations were made by the Turks and in less degree by Greece in favour of additional step neutralising these zones and placing them under the individual and collective guarantee of signatory Powers. Turks further reserved their claim for 1913 frontier to the west of Maritza as opposed to the frontier of Maritza River itself, which has been laid down by the Allies. Concerning maritime outlet for Bulgaria, sub-committee reported in favour of the creation of international commission to undertake construction of equipment and development of port at Dedeagatch and supervision and development of railway running thither from Bulgarian frontier. This alteration was agreed to by all the Powers represented on the sub-committee, though Bulgarians put in a note to the effect that only by direct possession of territory required for port and railway terminus at Dedeagatch, or by creating autonomous régime for such territory, would port be of any use to Bulgaria. This afternoon we met to discuss the above report. Turks explained their contentions about neutralisation as necessary for their security from possible attacks in the future. I pointed out that this demand was one raising issues of the greatest importance and requiring reference to all Governments concerned. Further, I argued that discussion of questions by our committee should be postponed until we came to consideration of other demilitarised zones on both sides of the Straits and the Bosphorus, when the question of neutralisation might more properly be examined. Turks further objected *in toto* to the inspection of demilitarised zones if created, but were told by me that the Powers would probably insist on it. As regards Dedeagatch and railway, a merry encounter took place between M. Venizelos and M. Stamboliisky, who belaboured each other with good-natured fury, to the great delight of the committee. I told Stamboliisky that he ought to be profoundly grateful to us for giving him all that he had asked for so long, and that his further demands could not be conceded. At bottom we all know his petition for Dedeagatch as an economic outlet is sham and will never materalise, and that what he wants is a jumping-off place for the recovery of Western Thrace. Discussion ended in a very amicable manner, and to-morrow we resume consideration of the main frontier problem. M. Barrère supports me with consistent loyalty, and display of undeviating Allied unity is making a great impression on the Turks, who become more amenable every day. To what extent, however, Turkish delegation represent the views of Angora, or will be supported, if they adopt a moderate attitude, by extremists of Grand National Assembly is still entirely doubtful.

No. 653.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 16) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 25.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 25, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 14 from Harington to War Office.

It would considerably assist task of Allies here at present stage if General Harington would assume existence at Constantinople of complete Allied unity now established at conference, and on this presumption now take, where essential, firm stand justified [? by this] unity. I feel that any further [? concession] at Constantinople must react on [? strong] attitude taken up by myself and other Allies at Lausanne. I cannot but think risk entailed by continued submission to Turkish

Governor's demands is greater than that entailed by threat, or, even in last resort, use of force in support of just Allied claims in Constantinople itself. A stand must be made somewhere, and now appears to be the time to make it. Attitude of Turks here indicates that effect of such a stand would be salutory rather than the reverse. No doubt some risk is involved, but with loyal Allied co-operation, which can hardly be refused, I think it should be taken, and that General Harington should feel assured that he will be officially absolved of responsibility for consequences that may conceivably ensue. It is considered that safeguarding of non-Moslem population would best be assured by assumption of a firmer Allied military stand, and consequent removal of all doubt as to Allies' intentions. Safety of Christians seems to me incidental to re-establishment of full Allied military prestige. Turkey should not, therefore, be allowed to become a preoccupation calculated to hamper complete freedom of military action.

Please show above to General Harington.

No. 654.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 25, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 23rd November.

Committee of Imperial Defence recommend that French memorandum of 18th November on freedom of Straits should be accepted, on the understanding that the proposals contained therein are read in conjunction with Marshal Foch's proposals for the demilitarisation of the Straits (Foreign Office memorandum of 15th November, p. 7) and subject to certain qualifications by the Admiralty set forth at the end of this telegram.

As regards Marshal Foch's proposals, the committee realise that as an Allied force cannot be provided to ensure demilitarisation, the Turks may succeed in rendering it ineffective. Nevertheless, they agree with the remarks by Marshal Foch in Lord Curzon's telegram of 18th November from Paris that, "though the protection thus afforded would be largely illusory, it might avail to give a breathing space of a week on the outbreak of hostilities, when the Straits could be forced before the Turks had had time to block or defend them."

The committee also suggest that there would be diplomatic advantages in the future in securing the adoption by the Lausanne Conference of Marshal Foch's proposals, even though later on the Turks succeed in evading them. On the whole, the committee consider that Marshal Foch's proposals for demilitarisation are the utmost we can hope to obtain in present circumstances

In view of the uncertainty as to whether Marshal Foch's proposals can be made permanently effective, the Committee do not feel justified in recommending that insistence on them should be carried to the point of wrecking the Lausanne Conference. The matter is one in which you will no doubt use the general discretion given you by the Cabinet.

The Committee of Imperial Defence recommend that you should ask the French delegation, before they submit their proposals to the conference, to make the following qualifications, on which the Admiralty lay stress, but the Prime Minister wishes it to be understood that the extent to which you press these views is left to your discretion :—

Paragraph 1 (*c*).—In order to prevent the Turks from laying mines and also possibly using nets, hawsers or booms, the following paragraph should be added :—

"The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as to intefere with the free passage of neutral ships."

Paragraph 2 (*a*).—We presume that the proposal in the French memorandum of 18th November does not mean that any limitation is to be placed on the total number of warships allowed in the Black Sea, but only on the number proceeding through the Straits at one time. Even so, the limitation of tonnage under 2 (*a*), if applied under 2 (*b*), might expose a fleet entering the Black Sea to the danger of being beaten in detail. They suggest, therefore, that reference to the limitation of tonnage should be omitted, or that such modification should be made as would avoid that danger.

A clause should be added to the following effect :

"Naval aircraft shall have the same rights as surface vessels in and over the Straits zone."

No. 655.

Mr. Henderson (No. 22) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 26.)

(No. 736.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 26, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 11.

French High Commissioner is telegraphing to Colonel Mongin in sense desired.

My latest information from various confimatory sources is as follows :—

All Christians have been informed that, with the exception of men between 16 and 50, who are retained to work on roads and repair devastated areas, they are free to leave provided that they do so before 30th November. In some cases I believe that permission has been extended to 15th December. Up to date fixed, Christians are allowed to sell their property to Moslems [? and] are promised facilities for departure. Christians are given to understand that after date fixed they will, if they have not left, be deported to internment camps in the interior. Nothing has been published to this effect except by mistake at Zungouldak, but regular Turkish methods of intimidation varying according to localities are employed. Panic methods appear to be fully successful, and my latest information is that roads to Ineboli and Samsoun are crowded with refugees. There were no men between 16 and 50 in a boat-load of refugees which arrived here yesterday.

Whether it is called expulsion or permission to depart, object of Turks and result is identic Dr. Nansen was officially informed that exchange of populations could only take place on basis of complete expulsion of Ottoman Greeks. In general, aim of Angora is to get rid of as many as possible before conclusion of peace.

In certain of coastal regions other foreigners have similarly been given permission, under menace, to leave before 30th November A certain number of Bulgarians were evacuated from Zungouldak in accordance with this order. It is interesting to note that Turks have been careful to avoid giving orders in writing.

My estimate of about 1,000,000, *i.e.*, 250,000 Armenian and 650,000 Greeks, including those at Harput, was based on Near East Relief figures. Admiral Bristol has doubtless with him at Lausanne full and more accurate information in this respect.

No. 656.

Mr. Henderson (No. 24) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 26.)

(No. 738.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 26, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 7.

French High Commissioner, who had received similar instructions to mine, has asked for audience with the Caliph and is to be received to-morrow.

I have accordingly also asked for audience, leaving no doubt as to its private character.

No. 657.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 618.)
(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1922.*

IN view of Turkish administration, including gendarmerie, being now installed in Gallipoli Peninsula and that Eastern Thrace has been occupied by Turks, I have modified orders restricting the passage of Turks across [? the] Dardanelles as shown in my immediately following message No. 619.

No. 658.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Senior Naval Officer, Dardanelles Force.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 619.)
(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1922.*

NO interference with ordinary traffic across Straits is necessary, but organised bodies of armed men should not be allowed to cross. It is unlikely that this will be attempted. It is [? group omitted] longer practicable [? group omitted] prevent infiltration Turks into peninsula. Ship is not required at Gallipoli, but modified patrol of Straits is to be maintained for this purpose. One destroyer is sufficient

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No. 659.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 17) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 26.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 25, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is summary of progress up to this evening, for the information of yourself and General Harington :—

This morning Frontier Commission resumed discussion of Thracian question. Ismet Pasha answered previous speech of M. Veniselos, and M. Veniselos then answered Ismet. Serbian delegate, M. Nincic, also made, as before, a very concise and [? serviceable] speech. I then summed up on behalf of the Allies after previously consulting with the Allies, and declared inflexible adherence to decision (*a*) to decline any Turkish interference in respect of plebiscite or otherwise with Western Thrace, and (*b*) to adhere to Maritza frontier of Eastern Thrace. On the other hand, I announced concessions which we were [? willing] to make to the susceptibilities of Turkish Government by restoring to them small enclave between the right bank of Maritza at Adrianople and boundary line drawn by Turkish Government when it ceded Karagatch and surrounding district to Bulgaria in 1915. This concession will give separate railway station and small branch railway starting from Maritza River to Turks, while keeping Karagatch, which is Greek town, in the hands of the Greeks.

I invited the Turkish delegation to reflect upon the entire situation before returning final reply, and pointed out to them the unwisdom of coming into collision not merely with inviting Powers, who were united, but, with the solid *bloc* of Balkan States, such a collision could only end in failure for themselves, and instead of leading to peace might revive war.

The chief American delegate intervened with a statement of American object in attending the conference on lines of the reply sent by his Government to invitation of Powers, but attaching special importance to policy of the open door.

This afternoon we took up question of Ægean Sea islands. Here Turks made a claim for—

1. Recognition of Turkish sovereignty over islands of Imbros and Tenedos and Samothrace, commanding entrance of Dardanelles, and for complete demilitarisation of those islands;

2. Similar demilitarisation of main group of islands now in the hands of Greeks lying between above group and Dodecanese; and

3. Abrogation of Greek sovereignty over this second group, and institution of a form of autonomy which Ismet made no attempt to describe; this was a try-on, which I dismissed without difficulty and which was not heard of again.

As regards question of demilitarisation, for which there was more to be said, I proposed to defer official decision, both as to demilitarisation of three most northerly islands and as to sovereignty of Imbros and Tenedos, until we take in hand question of Straits, with which it is intimately connected. I proposed then to appoint a sub-committee of military and naval experts to examine this question, and at the same time to advise whether any, and, if so, what, form of demilitarisation should be applied to more southerly group, which Veniselos declared his willingness to submit to this form of servitude. My suggestions were unanimously accepted by conference,

and sitting was adjourned to Monday, when we take up the question of frontier of Syria and Irak. Ismet has asked to see me privately about latter subject to-morrow.

Concurrently, third commission on financial and economic questions under M. Barrère will be set up, and will commence to sit on Monday or Tuesday.

First week of our labours has thus terminated, and I think we may, without exaggeration, claim to have made progress that would have been deemed impossible a week ago.

No. 660.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 19) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 26.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 26, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 16, please acquaint General Officer Commanding from me with following :—

Not feeling satisfied as to [group undecypherable] delay in arrival of Angora reply to representations concerning position in Constantinople made by Ismet Pasha at my request, or as to nature of reply when received, I spoke again to him on the matter this morning and obtained promise from him to telegraph privately to Selah-ed-Din enjoining a circumspect and friendly attitude in the city. This he undertook to do, promising that no incident should occur. I replied that they were occurring daily and that situation was becoming intolerable.

In the event of these protests and promises proving futile, I intend to raise the question in full conference next week, and to propose sending telegram from President to Angora direct insisting on a correct attitude at Constantinople and a maintenance of the *status quo* there, during the sittings of the conference, as a condition of continuance of latter.

No. 661.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sofia, November 25, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 77.

I find that numbers of troops given in paragraph 2 were estimated by Greek Chargé d'Affaires. Bulgarian Chief of General Staff only admits total of 2,035 with six guns for both districts.

French colonel and Major Neate think that true figure lies between the two.

Additional reason for despatch of troops may be information recently received that extreme section of Turkish Thracian Committee advocate annexation to Turkey of Kirjali district.

[E 13252/27/44] No. 662.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1023.)
Constantinople, November 20, 1922.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 713 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the note from the Angora Government which Refet Pasha handed me on that day, and in which the Angora Government, while not raising again the question of the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Constantinople, insist once more that it cannot agree to any Allied interference in the civil administration of this city.

2. I also enclose copy of a joint note of the 7th instant (and not the 8th as stated), to which reference is made in the communication from Angora, and copy of which has not been already forwarded to your Lordship, protesting against the alterations introduced by the Nationalist authorities into the administration as hitherto exercised by the Allies in this city.

3. Refet Pasha endeavoured to give the impression that the communication from the Angora Government had no real importance and had merely been addressed to the High Commissioners in order that their two notes of the 5th and 7th instant should not be left without reply. It appears to be a favourite habit of Refet Pasha to make out that nothing has any importance, and to imply that the determination of the Nationalists to re-acquire full and unlimited sovereignty in Constantinople is self-evident and irresistible.

4. Refet Pasha took the opportunity to indulge in a somewhat violent tirade against the Leafield press (please see Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 1012 of the 14th instant). I told him that I had noticed that he had gone so far as to post up a proclamation throughout Pera in French calling upon the public to pay no attention to the Leafield press, the statements of which were entirely inaccurate. In justification, Refet Pasha mentioned that he had read in the Leafield press that morning an entirely untrue account of the treatment of some French nuns at Broussa. I said that Sir Horace Rumbold at the station that morning had asked General Pellé whether there was any truth in this report, and that General Pellé had denied it, and that I had accordingly given orders to the Allied censors that the statement in question should not be permitted to appear in the local press. I repeated, however, what Sir Horace Rumbold had already said to him, namely, that the Leafield wireless, which consisted of extracts from all newspapers in England, faithfully represented the state of public opinion in England, and that if Refet Pasha desired the tone of the British press to modify, he had but to modify his own attitude here and to come to an arrangement which would be satisfactory to the Allied generals in regard to the control of the police and gendarmerie in Constantinople.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 662.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora, to Allied Representatives, Constantinople.

(Traduction non garantie.)

LE soussigné, Ministre intérimaire des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées que son Gouvernement a reçu la note responsive du 6 novembre remise à Hamid Bey par leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées, en réponse à sa note responsive du 5 novembre, ainsi que celle également remise à Hamid Bey, en date du 8 novembre relativement aux certains changements d'administration survenus à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie se fait un devoir d'affirmer, une fois de plus, qu'il respecte les clauses de la convention d'armistice qu'il a signé à Moudania. La conservation des stipulations de ladite convention étant désirable aussi par les Puissances signataires, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie attribue une grande importance au fait que les deux parties d'ailleurs d'accord sur les bases le soient aussi dans les appréciations des détails.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie prend acte des déclarations contenues dans la note remise à son Excellence le Général Réfet Pacha et signée par les généraux alliés disant que les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées ne formulent aucune objection à n'importe quel mode qui sera décidé par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie concernant l'administration intérieure.

Tout en étant prêt à accepter la présence des troupes alliées dans la ligne fixée et déterminée à la Convention de Moudania et à discuter les mesures concernant la sécurité desdites troupes, il avait été demandé, du fait que le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité de Constantinople se trouve assumé par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, de mettre fin à la forme ayant le caractère de contrôle exercée par les troupes alliées dans notre administration intérieure.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, qui ne fait qu'appliquer ses propres lois et ses décisions dans Constantinople dont l'administration lui est revenue, s'excuse à nouveau de ne pouvoir admettre des immixtions qui pourraient avoir lieu dans ses affaires intérieures et à cet effet le Gouvernement de la

grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'empresse de déclarer qu'il a confiance en les sentiments de conciliation des Puissances alliées.

HUSSEIN BEOUFF,
Ministre intérimaire des Affaires étrangères.

Angora, le 12 novembre 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 662.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont fait connaître hier à son Excellence Hamid Bey qu'étant responsables vis-à-vis de leurs Gouvernements de la sécurité des troupes alliées, ils ne pouvaient accepter que le fonctionnement des diverses administrations dans le territoire occupé fût soustrait à leur surveillance.

Ils ont appris cependant que dans la journée d'hier des changements importants ont été apportés soit dans le personnel, soit dans les règlements de ces administrations, sans qu'ils aient été consultés ni même avertis. Par exemple, les commandants de la gendarmerie et de la police de Constantinople ont été changés. Les recettes de la douane ont été saisies, ainsi que la surtaxe douanière appartenant, d'après les traités, à la Dette publique ottomane; les tarifs de douane de 11 pour cent *ad valorem* ont été remplacés par les tarifs spécifiques en vigueur en Anatolie. Les employés de la Dette en service à la Douane ont été congédiés. Les juges ottomans de la Commission judiciaire mixte instituée pour la durée de l'armistice, en vertu d'un accord avec le Gouvernement de Constantinople, ont été avertis ne ne plus se rendre aux séances. La Commission de Contrôle sanitaire interalliée, qui a remplacé provisoirement, en vertu des décisions des Puissances occupantes, le Conseil sanitaire international, a été invitée à cesser ses fonctions

Si ces mesures et toutes autres décisions touchant à l'organisation et au fonctionnement des services du territoire occupé, prises sans leur consentement, n'étaient pas rapportées sans délai, les Hauts-Commissaires alliés se verraient obligés d'en référer à leurs Gouvernements.

PELLÉ.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 7 novembre 1922.

[E 13254/12790/44] **No. 663.**

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1024 A.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 17, 1922.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR CHARLES HARINGTON informed me on the afternoon of the 15th instant that he had received a visit from a man describing himself as Zeki Bey, who stated that His Majesty the Sultan considered his life to be in danger and requested the General's assistance in removing him from Constantinople immediately. General Harington and I agreed that, if the message was genuine, he could not do otherwise than accede to His Majesty's request. As Reshad Pasha, the Sultan's doctor and the only intermediary between His Majesty and this High Commission since the departure of Damad Ferid Pasha, was being escorted surreptitiously that evening on board a British warship, I requested the acting first dragoman to meet him at the landing-stage, with a view to ascertaining definitely whether Zeki Bey's message was authentic. Mr. Matthews saw Reshad Pasha, who confirmed the fact that the Sultan was alarmed as to his safety and anxious to leave.

2. In agreement with General Harington, Mr. Matthews, accompanied by Lieutenant Kendall, one of the general's aides-de-camp, went to Yildiz Palace that evening and had an interview, lasting some three hours, with Zeki Bey. The upshot of the meeting was that the Sultan did not desire to leave that night, but to wait till Friday morning, when a more favourable opportunity would occur. I enclose a memorandum by Mr. Matthews giving an account of the interview.

3. General Harington had wisely insisted on the necessity, before making the final arrangements, of receiving a written request from the Sultan asking for British protection and assistance in leaving Constantinople. The letter, a copy of which,

accompanied by a translation, is enclosed herein, was handed to General Harington the following morning, who at once proceeded to make the necessary plans, which were carried out without hitch the following morning.

4. The Sultan, accompanied by his 10-year-old son Ertoghrul, by his First Chamberlain, Yaver Pasha, his bandmaster and intermediary, Zeki Bey, and five other members of his suite and servants, left the Palace at 8 A.M. by the side door leading to the Yildiz Barracks, where he was received by Colonel Steele, commanding the Guards Brigade, Constantinople, and the battalion of the Grenadier Guards, which had been paraded for the purpose. His Majesty was also met here by Mr. Matthews and Lieutenant Kendall, the former acting as interpreter throughout the proceedings. It was a chilly and stormy morning; rain was falling, and very few people were about. The party left Yildiz Barracks in two military ambulances, and reached the naval base at Tophané at about 8·30. General Harington and his Chief of Staff, Major-General Sir Hastings Anderson, and myself and Colonel Baird were awaiting His Majesty at the landing-stage at Tophané. We embarked at once on the general's launch, the steamship "Yildirim," and proceeded direct to H.M.S. "Malaya" (Captain Payne), where His Majesty was received with naval honours by Admiral Sir Osmond Brock, Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

5. On reaching the captain's day cabin I bade the Sultan welcome to British territory on behalf of the King and His Majesty's Government, and enquired whether he had any special desires to express. His Majesty in thanking me said that, since they were both monarchs, he expected sympathy from His Majesty King George, and that he had asked for British protection because His Majesty ruled over so many Moslem subjects. The Sultan begged me to convey a message of thanks to His Majesty, His Majesty's Government and the great British nation for the protection thus extended to him. He repeatedly insisted on the fact that he had not abdicated, and that he did not intend doing so. By leaving Constantinople he had saved his honour, for his life he did not care. He enquired as to his destination, and was informed that the "Malaya" was proceeding forthwith to Malta, where further arrangements would be made. His Majesty said that he accepted Malta as a temporary destination, but asked that the fact that he was going there should not be made known locally. I assured him that his desire on this point would be complied with, and in the official communication issued to the press no reference was made to the fact that the warship on which His Majesty would embark was proceeding to Malta. He also requested that no communication respecting his departure should be made until the afternoon. I assured His Majesty that this request would also be complied with.

6. General Harington assured the Sultan, who expressed considerable anxiety on the subject, that he would do his utmost to ensure the safety of members of His Majesty's family and of the Palace staff left behind in Constantinople. I also undertook to ask your Lordship to arrange that a suitable person with a knowledge of Turkish would be placed at His Majesty's disposal on his arrival at Malta.

7. We then took leave of the Sultan, who kept us waiting for a quarter of an hour while he was having a letter written to a member of his household reassuring them as to his safety. The first draft submitted by Dr. Reshad Pasha did not meet with his approval, and he insisted with some heat that the letter should be rewritten.

8. I was struck by the composure shown by the Sultan during these trying moments. He appeared far less agitated than his suite at the great step that he was taking.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 663.

His Majesty the Sultan to Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington.

Imperial Palace, November 16, 1922.

Sir,

CONSIDERING my life in danger in Constantinople, I take refuge with the British Government, and request my transfer as soon as possible from Constantinople to another place.

MEHMED VEHIDEDDIN,
Caliph of the Mussulmans.

Enclosure 2 in No. 663.

Memorandum by Mr. W. D. W. Matthews.

IN accordance with your instructions, I met Dr. Reshad Pasha on the landing-stage at Dolma-Baytché on the evening of the 15th instant, and, with Commander M. H. S. MacDonald, R.N., naval attaché to this High Commission, accompanied him on board H.M.S. "Malaya," where we had a short conversation. Dr. Reshad Pasha stated very emphatically that the Sultan was anxious to leave Constantinople, as he feared that his life was in danger. He suggested that communication should be established without delay with Zeki Bey, and gave a careful description of Zeki Bey's quarters just outside the entrance opposite the mosque at Yildiz Palace. Reshad Pasha wrote a short note for delivery to his wife through Zeki Bey, and expressed his gratitude for the arrangements made for his departure from Constantinople, after which Commander MacDonald and I returned on shore.

In accordance with your further instructions I proceeded the same evening to General Sir Charles Harington's house, where I took part in a discussion with him, General Sir Hastings Anderson, Colonel Colston and Lieutenant Kendall. I repeated to these officers what Dr. Reshad Pasha had stated, and answered various questions put to me. General Harington stated that, if the Sultan were anxious to leave that very night, he could make the necessary arrangements with a few hours' notice. Owing to the uncertainty of communicating secretly by telephone with the Palace, it was decided that Lieutenant Kendall and I should proceed there and see Zeki Bey, and consult together as to the arrangements for His Majesty's removal.

We set out accordingly, and, after calling at the Embassy, hired a Ford taxi-car between Galata Serai and Taxim, which we selected because it looked inconspicuous and the driver was wearing a fez. It was after dark, between 7 and 8 P.M., and was raining heavily. Very few persons were in the streets and the environs of the Palace appeared deserted. We had no difficulty in finding Zeki Bey's quarters, and were admitted immediately without giving our names or any account of ourselves. I subsequently learned from Zeki Bey that he had given orders to admit at once some foreign journalists whom he was expecting, and his servants gave this explanation to our driver. After a wait of a few minutes Zeki Bey appeared, and I handed him the letter entrusted to me by Dr. Reshad Pasha, mentioning that the Pasha was safe on board a British warship. After some conversation respecting a misunderstanding which had occurred in connection with a communication to the British military authorities, Zeki Bey assured us that the Sultan wanted to leave Constantinople as soon as possible. The questions of place and time were debated at length, and we found great difficulty in bringing Zeki Bey and Eumer Yaver Pasha, the First Chamberlain, by whom we had been joined, to make any definite arrangements. He said that General Harington was prepared to get His Majesty away that very night if he believed that his life was in danger. He would, however, require a written request from the Sultan for British protection. Eumer Yaver Pasha went off to see the Sultan and returned to tell us that His Majesty had retired for the night and could not be disturbed.

It was finally proposed by Zeki Bey that the Sultan should leave the Palace grounds by the Orbanieh Gate at 8 o'clock on Friday morning, the 17th October. No Turkish guards would be about at that hour, and His Majesty's absence would not be noticed until midday, when he ought to appear at the Selamlik. He wished to take with him his son Ertoghrul, Zeki Bey, Eumer Yaver Pasha and five or six other persons, whose names Zeki Bey would communicate the following day. Zeki Bey would bring the request in writing asked for to General Headquarters the next morning and would show Lieutenant Kendall the actual site of the Orbanieh Gate. This was done in due course, and the provisional arrangements made with Zeki Bey and Eumer Yaver Pasha were put into execution on the morning of the 17th October.

Constantinople, November 1922.

[E 13255/27/44] No. 664.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1025.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 18, 1922.*

AS I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my telegram No. 716 of the 17th instant, the Allied High Commissioners agreed yesterday to suppress, as from the 20th instant, the inter-Allied press censorship which has been exercised here during the whole period of the military occupation of Constantinople.

2. I had for some time past anticipated difficulties with the Nationalist authorities in respect of this control. Refet Pasha had mentioned the subject to the Allied generals some days ago, and had been informed that press censorship was within the province of the High Commissioners.

3. Refet Pasha apparently thereupon approached General Pellé, who requested my Italian colleague and me to meet Refet yesterday evening at the French Embassy.

4. I went to the meeting prepared to agree to the suppression of the censorship provided Refet Pasha would guarantee that no incendiary or inflammatory articles and no information derogatory to Allied prestige should be published in the Turkish press. He declared that it was impossible to give this guarantee unless he himself exercised the duties of censor. I would myself have preferred no censorship at all, a solution which Refet was ready to accept, to agreeing to the substitution of a Turkish for an inter-Allied control, but my colleagues were both insistent in the interests of public order that an unbridled press should not be permitted.

5. Ultimately, after a very prolonged discussion which terminated in a deadlock, I agreed to such a substitution on condition that the Allied officers attached to Refet Pasha's headquarters could co-operate in the censorship in so far, at any rate, as non-Turkish papers were concerned.

6. I fear that the co-operation will be more theoretical than real. In one sense however, I was not sorry to be able to make a concession on an issue which is not an essential. There is some ground for belief that Refet, though himself an extremist, being on the spot realises that the best policy is not to go too fast, but is finding some difficulty in resisting the pressure from Angora for more precipitate methods. He urged the necessity for himself to provide some sop to satisfy temporarily the appetites of Angora. Refet Pasha is so untrustworthy that this necessity may have been feigned, but I am inclined to think that on this occasion it may have been at least partially true. I had made a point, early in the discussion, of expressing satisfaction at the procedure we were adopting for transacting business. It was the first occasion on which the High Commissioners as a body had discussed any question with Refet Pasha. I said that I did not doubt that in this manner it would be possible to achieve an amicable solution of questions which, if dealt with by other methods, might seriously compromise the whole situation.

7. An arrangement satisfactory to himself as the result of our initial meeting may encourage Refet Pasha to think that discussion is preferable to abrupt action. I do not doubt that, if no agreement had been reached, orders would merely have been given to all the Turkish press to refuse in future to submit proofs to the censors before publication. Short of forcible action through the Allied forces and police, which it is practically certain the French and Italian generals would have declined to take, the High Commissioners would have been powerless to insist and their prestige have been still more diminished by an open act of defiance.

8. Nevertheless, the High Commissioners' assent to the abolition of the press censorship is another step down the ladder leading to the establishment of an absolutely unfettered Nationalist administration of Constantinople. The Allied controls are vanishing one by one. The Provisional Financial Commission is completely ignored. No customs receipts are paid to the Ottoman Public Debt. The Inter-Allied Sanitary Commission is still functioning, but without executive power and concurrently with a Turkish administration. The Economic Commission has equally been deprived of all executive power. The customs régime instituted by the Allies has been abolished. It is true that certain concessions have been made in respect of customs duties, but those concessions can only be ascribed to a tardy perception of Turkish interests. Foodstuffs, for instance, are being admitted on the old specific tariff basis, which is generally less than the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff. This was probably due to the fact that for the first two days after the application of the specific tariff multiplied by five to fifteen times, the price of the necessities of life rose so high that the Nationalists feared lest

the popularity of their administration should be seriously compromised in Constantinople.

9. An equally important concession has been made in respect of transit goods, which formerly could be exported under payment of some small sum and production of the bill of lading. On the introduction of the Nationalist customs régime the Turkish authorities refused to allow goods in the customs depots or in transit warehouses to be sent back or re-exported unless the new customs duties were paid in full in cash on deposit. They refused to accept even bank guarantees. No merchant in these conditions could feel any security that he would ever recover the sums so deposited. All opportunity for merchants to get rid of their stocks here, of which there are considerable amounts in the customs depots, appeared therefore to be excluded.

10. At our meeting yesterday Refet Pasha informed the High Commissioners that he had given orders to revert to the old system respecting transit goods. He gave the French High Commissioner to understand that this reversal was in deference to French intervention. He seemed in this respect to be making a bid to recover some of the lost Nationalist popularity with the French here—at no expense to himself—as I have reason to know that the Turkish Chamber of Commerce itself petitioned Refet Pasha against the new régime.

11. Be that as it may, and, while certain concessions of this nature will doubtless be obtainable during the transition period, the fact remains that nothing short of a united show of force will arrest the gradual evolution of the Nationalist recovery of Constantinople. The authority of the occupying forces, if this process continues, will be a mere euphemism, as their occupation will be limited to the barracks in which they are quartered and their authority to the Allied troops themselves.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13260/9024/44] No. 665.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1032.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Acting Consul-General Urquhart respecting events at Smyrna.

Constantinople, November 20, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 665.

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to Sir H. Rumbold.

(No. A/14.)

Sir, *Smyrna, November 15, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report on the course of events in Smyrna during the past week as follows:—

1. As Smyrna is no longer the main point of contact between the Kemalists and Europe, the attitude of the local authorities is only partially determined by events here. I accordingly awaited with some interest the repercussion in Smyrna of recent happenings in Constantinople. It came on the evening of Thursday, the 9th November, when a meeting of the various military and civil authorities decided to take certain measures *vis-à-vis* foreigners in Smyrna.

2. No warning was given of the measures decided on. The first intimation of anything of the kind was the placing of armed sentries along the whole quay, who refused to allow anyone to land from ships or leave the shore except through the customs. I was stopped on the quay opposite the British consulate on Friday morning when landing from a boat of H.M.S. "Carysfort," which had conveyed me from Cordelio, but the fact that I carried a permit to land signed by the commandant of the place enabled me to disembark finally at that point. Captain Carpenter, of H.M.S. "Carysfort," arriving the same morning to meet the Vali at the Consulate, was not permitted to land, and had to lie off the shore for

about half an hour until the arrival and intervention of the Vali enabled him to land, and later to re-embark, I accompanying him on board. On disembarking after lunch, I was again ordered away, the sentries again threatening the men in the boat with bayonets, but on showing my permit, I was allowed to leave the boat. The permit, however, was of no avail when I attempted to re-embark at 5 P.M. As the boat approached, a sentry attempted to keep it off the shore, and when I stepped into it, he ordered me out. I produced my permit, which, however, he could not read, while the seal apparently meant nothing for him. I explained through my cavass who I was, and pointed out that the permit stated explicitly that no difficulties were to be offered to my embarking and disembarking. He would have none of it, and attempted to drag me out of the boat. I asked him to go to the captain of the Port for instructions, but he refused, and would have used his bayonet had I not left the boat of my own accord, realising that further parley was fruitless Having sent my cavass to the captain of the port, a messenger finally said I was to be allowed to embark there that night, but that in future I must go through the customs. My permit was retained.

3. All other consular officials in Smyrna attempting to communicate with their ships and naval officers attempting to communicate with their consulates suffered the same treatment at the hands of the sentries. But for the fact that I was in possession of a permit to land given me by the local authorities to ensure that I could land at any time of day or night from H.M.S. "Curacoa" with messages for Kemal, I should have been entirely cut off from His Majesty's ship, persons in uniform only being allowed to pass.

4. As indicated above, the Vali called at the consulate to meet Captain Carpenter. He caused me to be informed the previous evening of his desire thus to return the call on him made by Captain Thursfield of H.M.S. "Concord," and I am convinced that he was aware then of the decisions arrived at by the military authorities, and was desirous of mitigating the resentment with which he knew they would be received. He called, I think, on all the consular representatives in Smyrna, and was at some pains to explain away the measures taken. He remained with Captain Carpenter and myself for an hour and a quarter, and was very accommodating in regard to certain questions outstanding between the foreign naval authorities and the military on shore. He explained to us that the fresh restrictions were wholly due to the fact that the American Relief Committee had attempted to smuggle out a number of Greek military. It was not without surprise that I learned later in the day that no such attempt had been made to smuggle out anyone, and that the excuse advanced to the Americans was that the British had attempted to conceal Greeks. I was gratified to learn, too, that all other consulates had protested vigorously against the brutal methods of the patrols on the quay, and had obtained a promise, as we did, that the Vali would intervene personally to secure facilities for communication between consulates and ships.

5. Despite the Vali's attempt to explain away the restrictions on the movements of foreigners with regard to their ships, there can be little doubt that they were taken in sympathy with conditions in Constantinople, and I am inclined to attribute the fact that certain facilities were granted later less to the Vali's intervention than to the successful avoidance of conflict in Constantinople. The action of the military brought home to the Senior Naval Officer and myself how completely British subjects in Smyrna were under control of the military, and considering that they would run risk of being detained in the event of a state of siege being declared in Constantinople, we decided to prepare for secret evacuation, and to inform you and the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, of the situation. This was done by wireless on the 11th November.

6. Following the advice of Captain Carpenter, I decided to sleep on board ship from the 10th November onwards. I continued to land daily as usual through the custom-house, where the officials are friendly to me, and could be trusted not to offer obstruction

7. The facilities promised by the Vali were made known to us by the captain of the port on Monday, the 13th. He asked captains of foreign warships present to choose one spot on the quay at which to land when visiting their respective consulates. A meeting of American, British, French and Italian naval and consular representatives on H.M.S. "Carysfort" on the same day chose two spots, one outside the port and one inside, and this was accepted. A policeman is now stationed at each in addition to the sentries, and fresh permits are to be issued to the staffs of the various consulates to permit them to pass.

8. On receipt of your instructions to evacuate British subjects, it was decided to do so on Tuesday, the 14th November. On the 3rd November I had posted a notice ordering all British subjects to register in the consulate, and the register showed nineteen who had returned after the fire, of British extraction, and forty-six Maltese. An effort was made to give every person the option of leaving, and all were informed excepting one British and one Maltese, who could not be found at the addresses they had given. Of the nineteen British, five refused to leave their interests, being in possession of special guarantees from the Turks for their safety, or confident of their ability to leave later by stealth, eleven were taken off under cover of darkness, and three left openly, being in possession of permits to leave, previously obtained. Of the Maltese, many were unable to come, having been abandoned before on account of age or illness. Others did not wish to leave, and it was impossible to order them to as their excitability would certainly have roused the suspicions of the Turks and possibly have prevented the departure of the others. Every argument possible under the circumstances, however, was used to induce them to leave, and twenty persons did so. I represented to the Vali that they were all destitute, and obtained his permission to embark them. All these persons sailed this morning on board the steamship "River Araxses" for Chios and Volo, excepting three who are sailing to-morrow on H.M.S. "Somme." Mr. Edwards, consular shipping clerk, not included in the above, is being accommodated on this ship.

9. Besides the five who have refused to leave, at the moment there are in Smyrna a few elderly and infirm persons of British extraction who could not be induced before the fire to leave Smyrna. They are known as Turcophiles and have means wherewith to support themselves, so that no anxiety need be felt on their account.

10. The departure of these persons, so far as it is known, has caused comment in the town. I am hopeful that the explanation I gave to the Vali as to the necessity of sending away the Maltese will banish any suspicions he may have of my complicity in the disappearance of other British subjects. The surreptitious evacuation of those who had been unable to obtain permits was carried out by boats from this ship with such skill as to give no trace whatsoever of how it was done or who was responsible for it.

11. The greatest uneasiness prevails in the town among people of all nationalities. Article 4 of the Law on Abandoned Goods, sent to you under cover of my despatch No. A/8 of the 2nd November, is responsible for some terrorism, as few persons have been unable to resist the temptation to acquire abandoned or looted goods at a low rate, and are consequently at the mercy of the informers, as are those who for any reason are suspected of being politically anti-Kemalist. Among the Turkish officials and civilians there is competition to be more Kemalist than Kemal, and the result is not fortunate for the enemies or suspected enemies of Kemal. Finally, the activities of the Commission on Abandoned Goods in respect of houses formerly owned by Greeks and Armenians cause the greatest apprehension amongst the tenants of such houses. The military are systematically going to all such houses and ordering the tenants out, usually on a few hours' notice, and in such a brutal manner as to cause fear and distress. The Jews have suffered most so far in this way, and they apprehend more. Indeed, it is openly threatened by the soldiers that their turn will come.

12. In these circumstances, I regret to have to state that there does not appear to be much to be gained by British subjects in Smyrna at this moment.

I have, &c.

R. W. URQUHART.

[E 13267/27/44] No. 666.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 27.)

(No. 1039.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 21, 1922.

IN my despatch No. 1025, dated the 18th November, I had the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to certain measures of a financial and commercial character that have been taken by the Nationalist Administration in Constantinople.

The effect of the new specific tariff on British trade in Turkey has received close attention, and the British Chamber of Commerce was, at my request, instructed to ascertain from its members to what extent the augmented tariff was prejudicial to the

main branches of manufactures and produce in which British exporters to Turkey were principally interested.

As your Lordship is probably aware, the new specific tariffs are based on the scale introduced during the war, but with a long list of articles of which the importation is prohibited, and with the exception of certain foodstuffs, of which flour and sugar are the most important, import duties on all other articles are increased either five or fifteen times.

The result of the enquiries made by the Chamber of Commerce are in general reassuring in so far as British trade is concerned.

With the exception of spirits, in which British trade was steadily growing, the prohibition list contains no articles in which British manufacturers are particularly interested. In this connection, it is worthy of remark that French trade is very badly hit, and America, which has a virtual monopoly of the pure alcohol trade, is also affected.

All the important exports from Great Britain to Turkey are without exception included in the quintupled groups, and do not figure in those increased fifteen times.

The majority of cotton textiles benefit by the new tariff, even in its augmented form, the duty in most cases representing some 8–10 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Similarly, woollen goods, with the exception of heavy cloths, are also more advantageously treated, the duty on light underwear representing 7–8 per cent. *ad valorem*, on flannels 8·5–10·5 per cent., and on shirtings 10 per cent. British machinery and hardware, now that the basis customs duty is weight and not price, greatly benefit by the new tariff, not only by a reduction in tariff, but by the fact that cheaper and heavier German goods are more heavily taxed.

The import duty on coal is reduced under the new tariff from about 200 piastres per ton to 100 piastres, but up to the present, customs duty are being collected on the original 11 per cent. tariff by the Turkish authorities.

The danger of the specific tariff lies, of course, in the fact that the Turkish lira is by no means stable. Whilst it remains at its present rate of about 900 piastres to the £ sterling the new duties are in general by no means prejudicial to British trade, but should the lira appreciate to any marked extent, the tariffs will then become almost prohibitive, and importation will fall off in consequence.

A further undesirable feature of a specific tariff is the fact that it is a potential weapon in the hands of the Turkish Government, which can, if not controlled, make arbitrary increases in the duties on certain groups of articles in order to discriminate against the trade of a particular country.

On the other hand, as British manufactures are greatly in demand owing to their superior quality, even where appreciably more expensive, the specific tariff is advantageous, as duties are levied on the weight of articles and not their price. This will, of course, adversely affect cheap goods.

It is to be expected that various modifications will be imposed by the Nationalists themselves, who have quickly realised that an exorbitant scale of duties would at once defeat its own end, and would cause a total collapse of the normal import trade of the country.

As Turkey is not a manufacturing country and has no industries to protect, she will ultimately cut off the greater part of the country's revenue by the adoption of prohibitive customs measures and render her financial condition still more precarious.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13270/12891/44] No. 667.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1042.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 20, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 730 of this evening, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the communication from Refet Pasha notifying this High Commission that the Grand National Assembly had, on the 18th November, unanimously voted the deposition of Vahideddine Effendi (Sultan Mehmed VI), and had elected as Caliph of the Moslems His Majesty Abdul Mejid of the House of Osman.

2. I was absent when Madjid Bey, head of the Political Section of Refet Pasha's Administration, brought this communication to the High Commission. In delivering it to the third dragoman, he stated that a reception of Turkish officials was to be held to-morrow at the Dolma Baghtché Palace, to be followed by a reception by the new Caliph of the Diplomatic Corps. He said that the hour for the latter had not yet been fixed, but that, if I desired to attend it or to send a representative, I could ascertain the time by telephoning to him on the following morning. At the same time he added that, if I desired an audience of His Majesty the Caliph (great stress being laid on the word Caliph), Refet Pasha would be very glad to make the necessary arrangements.

3. Similar communications were made the same afternoon to my French and Italian colleagues, as well as to the American High Commissioner, and General Pellé summoned M. Maissa and myself to a meeting in the evening to discuss the attitude to be adopted.

4. There was no doubt from the beginning of our meeting that General Pellé was in favour of our attending the reception. Incidentally he mentioned that he had already sent a personal card to Prince Abdul Mejid *pour féliciter*. I heard later that Admiral Bristol had also done this.

5. I strongly urged the desirability of a uniform attitude on the part of the three High Commissioners, more particularly having regard to the opening of the Lausanne Conference, at which the delegates of the three Powers were acting in such complete accord. Both General Pellé and M. Maissa concurred. I then said that our attendance at the reception would imply the recognition of the right of the Grand National Assembly at Angora to elect a Caliph. I could not, in any circumstances, agree to this and prejudge thereby in any way the views not only of my Government, but of the Moslem subjects of the King. M. Maissa supported me in this, and agreed that such a step would be beyond the competence of the High Commissioners. Admiral Bristol, who joined us later, was of the same opinion. He quoted the case of the Œcumenical Patriarch and the joint action of himself and the three Allied High Commissioners in refusing to recognise the election of Melutios a year ago. General Pellé demurred on the ground that circumstances on that occasion had been different. I pointed out, however, that it might equally well be argued, in the present case, that the election of Prince Abdul Mejid was illegal. I could see every argument against attending the reception and none in favour, except, possibly, that of courtesy to a Prince. The Grand National Assembly itself was not recognised *de jure* by the Powers, still less so its right to elect Caliphs. The High Commissioners, during four years of armistice, had had no official, and only very slight personal, relations with the Sultan, to whom they were indeed not accredited. If we had had no official relations with the Sultan, I failed to see how, apart from the very doubtful legality of his position, we could begin them with a Caliph.

6. General Pellé finally yielded, but stated that he did so because he recognised the importance of united action, and because he realised that, whatever the others did, I could not modify my decision. It was accordingly agreed that we should send our dragomans to-morrow to Madjid Bey with a verbal reply to the effect that, the circumstances being unprecedented, we were unable to attend a reception without those instructions from our Government which the sudden nature of the invitation had not given us time to solicit.

7. Both General Pellé and M. Maissa then raised the question of the reply to be returned to the written communication which accompanies this despatch. I would have preferred to leave it unanswered. In deference, however, to their insistence and to my own plea for a uniform line of action, I agreed to a simple acknowledgment of the letter of the 20th November, in which General Refet Pasha was good enough to inform His Majesty's High Commissioner of the election by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey of His Majesty Abdul Mejid as Caliph of the Moslems. I told my Allied colleagues that I preferred to make no reference to the first paragraph, which it would have been difficult, for obvious reasons, to quote.

8. I trust that your Lordship will see no objection to such an acknowledgment, which does not appear to me to imply any commitment. I shall, however, refrain from sending it until Thursday morning, by which time I should have received a reply to my telegram under reference.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 667.

General Refet Pasha to Mr. Henderson.

LE Général Réfet Pacha a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique que dans sa séance tenue le 18 novembre 1922 la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a voté, à l'unanimité, et conformément au fetva du Ministère des Affaires religieuses, la déchéance de Vuhideddine Effendi, celui-ci s'étant réfugié à bord d'un navire étranger.

Il a été élu, à la même séance, Khalif des Musulmans, Sa Majesté Abdul-Medjid, fils de Abdul-Aziz, de la dynastie d'Osman.

(Sceau.)

Constantinople, le 20 novembre 1922.

[E 13211/13211/16] No. 668.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 26, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 405 of 24th November to Rome.

Italian delegation here have sent us note accepting Egypt's participation. French delegation have promised early reply, which seems likely to be favourable.

(Repeated to Rome.)

No. 669.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 27, 1922.*

AS soon as possible after Russian delegation has arrived, which will probably be to-day, I propose to take question of Straits in commission over which I preside. It is very desirable that Admiralty views should be presented with an authority that will balance that of Admiral Lacaze, and I shall be greatly obliged if First Lord of the Admiralty can send out Admiral Fuller, who was at San Remo when we framed original Treaty of Sèvres and is thoroughly conversant with the case.

No. 670.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 27, 1922.*

THIS morning we were to have discussed question of Syrian and Mesopotamian frontiers at meeting of Frontier Commission. Ismet Pasha came to see me yesterday evening, and we had a conversation of one and a half hours on the whole situation. I think that he regards me with some confidence, and accordingly I responded with equal frankness. He asked me what I was going to say. I replied, "nothing until I knew what he was going to propose or ask for." He said that he intended to ask for rendition of Mosul and Kurdistan, and when I asked on what possible grounds he could sustain such a request, he advanced a number of arguments, ethnic and otherwise, which it was not difficult to demolish. I then said that if demand were persisted in I should have no alternative but to say before the whole conference, "I cannot and will not": in fact, I should return an absolute refusal, and from that attitude nothing would induce me to depart. In these circumstances, I asked, what would be the use of such a sitting if it were merely to result in the creation of another point of absolute and irreconcilable difference between us? Surely that would not make for a treaty of peace. On the other hand, there were practical questions, such as settlement of frontier with possible modifications on both sides, which might well be discussed in an amicable spirit. Ismet Pasha then murmured word for which I was waiting, namely, "oil." Upon my asking what he meant, he said that Anatolia was a poor country without oil, and that he would very much like to have some. I replied

this seemed to me not an unreasonable request, which was well worthy of examination. I further remarked that, as poverty of Turkey had been mentioned, it would probably cover a wider area than Anatolia, and that when a peace had been concluded and a strong and independent Turkish Government had been set up, it would probably want cash. It was my experience that everyone who wanted cash ultimately turned up in London, and it might be well to contemplate this movement in advance. In other words, instead of a public disagreement in conference, would it not be well to see if we could arrive at a private agreement outside of it? Whereupon Ismet Pasha himself proposed postponement of discussion of to-morrow, and I shall now await his invitation to private conversation.

I have my own ideas as to way in which oil problem might be solved, but I shall be glad if you can ask Petroleum Department to send out Mr. F. C. Clark to advise me without delay. I know what modifications of frontier to press for.

Ismet then turned discussion on to wider issues and asked my ideas as to future of conference and subjects to be discussed, notably freedom of Straits and demilitarised zones and Capitulations. I gave him rough sketch of what I had in view without committing myself to any details, and warned him against complete absorption of Turkish in Russian point of view about Straits, since, I said, in a short time difference of ideals and interests between two peoples might compel Turkey to look to West rather than to East, and she might regret a subordination which would no longer be of use to her. He adopted a stiff attitude about Capitulations, but I urged that Turkey could not ask Europe to give all sorts of guarantees for protection to her while she declined to afford any guarantees to Europeans who resided in her midst.

I ended by enquiring to what extent Turkish Government would favour association of League of Nations in the various objects that we had in view, and strongly recommended Ismet to study question as likely to provide Turkey with a more effective and desirable guarantee than any other. He evinced no hostility to the idea and appeared far from indisposed to consider suggestion.

Of course, difficulty will arise when Russians appear on the scene.

For this reason I propose to embark on Straits discussion directly they arrive in order to curtail opportunities for propaganda and intrigue.

Conversation with Ismet was of a distinctly hopeful character, and every day that passes in such exchanges diminishes the chances of a rupture.

[E 13333/27/44] No. 671.

Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe.

THE Italian Ambassador called to-day in order to communicate to me personally his official note, dated the 25th November, of which he proceeded to give me a short summary, the note being in Italian. He expressed great gratification at the agreement which he said had been arrived at between Lord Curzon and M. Mussolini at Lausanne, on the question of a general understanding between our two countries. M. Mussolini, he said, fully realised the advantages of maintaining the closest co-operation between the Allies as regards the Eastern settlement, but it was important, if only from the point of view of Italian public opinion, that the special interests of Italy should be seen to be fully safeguarded. The Ambassador then explained that, according to a despatch which he had received from Rome, Lord Curzon had definitely agreed that Italy should "participate" in the British mandates in the East; that this agreement should be consigned in an exchange of notes between the Italian Ambassador here and this Office; and that the notes so to be exchanged should record the fact that this principle of Italian participation was accepted with the proviso that the detailed method of applying the principle should be left over for further negotiation.

I said that I was a good deal embarrassed by receiving this communication, since I was quite unaware of an agreement of the nature described having been arrived at between Lord Curzon and M. Mussolini. What I had gathered from the latest telegram on the subject which I had received from Lausanne (No. 13 of the 21st November) was that a vague allusion to Italian participation in the position created in the territories under British mandate had been made by M. Mussolini, and had been met with very friendly but very apposite criticism on the part of Lord Curzon, who finally promised that he would be willing to consider anything that M. Mussolini might in this connection wish to submit through the Italian Ambassador in London. The Marquis della Torretta

suggested that no doubt the telegram I had referred to dealt with an earlier interview, which probably had been followed by a later conversation, on which M. Mussolini's present communication must have been based. I said I was not in a position to deny this, although I should have expected to have heard of such an important agreement having been arrived at, and to have received Lord Curzon's instructions as to the exchange of notes into which M. Mussolini understood him to have authorised the Foreign Office to enter. All I could do for the moment was to report to Lord Curzon, and ask for his further instructions. Meanwhile, I asked the Marquis della Torretta whether he could explain to me what exactly M. Mussolini meant by Italian participation in the British mandates; the phrase conveyed nothing to me. Did he suggest that Great Britain and Italy should jointly administer, militarily occupy and account to the League of Nations for Palestine and Irak; or was it suggested that Italy should share the cost of our administration and of our troops of occupation; or, on the other hand, did M. Mussolini mean that, whilst Great Britain undertook all the burden of administration, finance and military occupation, she should go halves with Italy as regards any financial or other advantages to be derived from the mandates, advantages which I might at once say would be found exceedingly nebulous from a material point of view?

The Ambassador expressed his regret that he could throw no further light upon M. Mussolini's intentions. On the other hand, he was bound under his instructions to urge that the proposed exchange of notes should take place at the earliest possible moment, in fact immediately, for upon it, M. Mussolini declared, must depend the continuance of his co-operation in the general Allied policy in the East. I took strong exception to this statement, which the Ambassador at once tried to whittle away. I said I could not believe that the question of concluding peace with Turkey, in which the Italian Government had declared themselves to be solid with their Allies, could be affected by the result of negotiations on matters which the Italian Government might wish to raise with the British Government, but which were not strictly involved in the conclusion of the present peace. The Ambassador harked back in the usual Italian way on the absolute necessity of Italy deriving something tangible from her co-operation with the Allies, to which I replied that I had hoped the new Italian Government would not persist in the path, so unhappily followed by their predecessors, of making the pursuit of an Allied policy dependent, not on the safeguarding of Allied interests, but on the attainment of specifically Italian advantages. The Marquis della Torretta repudiated any such intention, but again dwelt on the necessity of doing something to win Italian public opinion.

I finally repeated I could do nothing at the present moment beyond referring to the Secretary of State at Lausanne, and promised to let him know as soon as I received his Lordship's further directions.

E. A. C.

November 27, 1922.

[E 13296/13296/44] No. 672.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 642.)
My Lord, *Athens, November* 10, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the acting British consul-general at Salonica on the subject of a complaint made by Turkish prisoners there regarding their treatment, and I have communicated the information confidentially to my Dutch colleague, who is in charge of Turkish interests.

2. At the same time there are so many thousand women and children refugees in this country considerably worse off even than these Turkish civilians that I have not felt called upon to speak on the subject to the Greek authorities.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure in No. 672.

Acting Consul-General Hole to Mr. Lindley.

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Salonica, November* 7, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for such action as your Excellency may consider called for, the attached paper which was presented surreptitiously to this consulate, and has presumably been distributed among my colleagues*; but, in view of the general housing conditions in Salonica and the fact that thousands of at least equally innocent refugees are without shelter, I do not feel that any action on my part is indicated.

2. The complaint is certainly reminiscent of the historic dispute between the pot and the kettle, and I find it hard, personally, to agree that the Anatolian peasant is as innocent and incapable of harm as the memorialist asserts; but the conditions inside the White Tower, to which allusion is made, are undoubtedly not exaggerated. It is a donjon, which constituted the chief defence at the eastern end of mediæval Salonica; the town walls were demolished some time ago, but the tower was retained and used as a café and centre of social life. For the last two months it has served as a prison for nearly 600 Turkish civilian (presumably political) prisoners, who have never been allowed to leave it. It has no accommodation whatever as a residence, and, although I have not visited the interior, the entire absence of sanitary arrangements is very evident to anyone passing within a hundred yards. It is a monument to the complete indifference to the precepts of ordinary humanity which is common to all the races round the Ægean basin. The Greek, however, should have sufficient intelligence to realise that it is a singularly bad advertisement.

3. In general the Turks in Macedonia are suffering from the inevitable repercussion of he Kemalist abuses in Anatolia. In Salonica itself they are so completely terrorised, that not one can be found bold enough to come to this consulate. Murders, though rare in the town, are frequent in the country; and refugees take possession of Turkish houses as a matter of course, even if the occupant has paid the tax which entitles him officially to exemption. They are not apparently allowed to leave the country, although many are anxious to do so, but are presumably being retained as pawns in readiness for a future exchange of prisoners. They suffer, in addition, from the customary petty tyrannies of the police.

4. There does not appear to be any way to relieve these prisoners except by hastening such an exchange. The White Tower would then be available for a number of refugees, who would be glad enough of the scanty accommodation it affords. There is no reason why it should not house 600 persons, provided they have liberty of egress.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 13297/10524/44] No. 673.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 644.)
My Lord, *Athens, November* 10, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 651 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit extracts from a report which the United States Chargé d'Affaires kindly lent to a member of my staff. This report was drawn up by a representative of the American Young Men's Christian Association, on the conditions of the refugees in certain of the Greek islands, including Crete. Mr. Caffery desires that the report be treated as confidential, and I venture to request that the attention of "Save the Children Fund," or the "All British Appeal" be drawn to this fact, should your Lordship decide to send a copy to one or other of those societies. The writer has now started on a trip to other islands, including Mitylene, Chios and Samos, and Mr. Caffery has kindly promised to let me see a copy of his next report.

2. Your Lordship will observe that the treatment of the refugees varies in each island. I venture to draw special attention to the condition of those at Milos, where the refugees were dying of starvation, whilst the Turkish prisoners were well cared for. This state of affairs may also be said to exist locally. Outside Athens there is a camp of Turkish prisoners, who would appear to be contented, well fed and cared for. The

* Not printed.

Dutch Minister, who is in charge of Turkish interests, confirms this, and says that he has nothing to complain of the treatment of Turkish prisoners in Greece. Unfortunately, there are refugees in Piræus, as I have already reported, lying about on the quays without shelter, and recently Dr. Doxiades, the Minister of Relief, informed Dr. Nansen's committee that about 150,000 refugees in Greece were without shelter—and the autumn rains have at last begun.

3. A brewery recently requisitioned away from the centre of Athens contains about 200 refugees, and 300 more are to come. Complaints have been made that these people were given shelter, but left to starve. The British committee and "Save the Children" representative feel they dare not increase their responsibilities, and the Greek Government have more than they can manage already—nor can the entire burden be left to the Americans.

4. In the British camp at Phaleron there has been a serious outbreak of small-pox, and there is a lot of scarlet fever among the refugees at Piræus. I fear serious epidemics are likely to break out everywhere.

5. In view of your Lordship's telegram No. 349, I am reporting somewhat fully upon the refugee situation here. Reports on the situation at Salonica and Patras, as well as at Athens, were forwarded in my despatch No. 605 of the 26th October, and in previous despatches. The reports of Dr. Nansen's committee are very voluminous, and could be forwarded to your Lordship, if desired. If the "Save the Children Fund" will say upon what particular points they desire information I can easily obtain it. This would be a more economical arrangement than sending out representatives to Greece to report on the situation. What is wanted here is money, supplies, and, if possible, a representative who could remain here and assist in organising the work.

6. I have the honour to transmit copies of the latest list showing the distributions of refugees throughout Greece. It will be seen that there are now about 105,000 at Athens and Piræus and about 160,000 at Salonica. I have placed a cross against the places where relief is being distributed by British workers.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 673.

Extracts from a Report on the Conditions of Refugees in the Greek Islands.

* * * * * *

Ægina.

Visited the 24th October, 1922.

On this island we found approximately 1,300 refugees, 10 per cent. men, 40 per cent. women, 50 per cent. children.

There is a committee of six members, of which Mrs. Helen B. Melas is chairman. This committee is doing good work in very difficult circumstances. The refugees are housed largely in warehouses. The food situation is unsatisfactory, due to the lack of production on the island. There is a general shortage of everything, especially flour. There is very little possibility of employment, except that which may be furnished through the approaching olive harvest.

Kea.

Visited the 25th October, 1922.

We found approximately 2,200 refugees here, about 7 per cent. men, 43 per cent. women, and 50 per cent. children.

At the time of our arrival the housing conditions were very bad; in fact, more than half of the people were on the quay. It is more than an hour's climb from the quay to the village where the people are being housed. The village is capable of taking care of these refugees; the local committee is, however, very inefficient, and a bad situation is likely to develop unless outside help is given immediately. We found a serious shortage of food, which cannot be much improved without careful supervision and systematic supply.

Kythnos and Seriphos.

Visited on the 25th October.

There were no refugees on either of these islands.

Milos.

Visited on the 26th October, 1922.

Here we found 760 refugees, though there had been landed on the island more than twice this number. The people are fairly well housed, but in twenty-five days they had been provided with only 1 oke of raw flour per person. However, there are 2,000 Turkish prisoners on the island, in excellent barracks, who are given $\frac{3}{4}$ of an oke of white bread daily, and who receive 3 drachmas daily. These men have money of their own, and are very well housed in French barracks. The refugees were dying of starvation at the rate of two per day. When we arrived we commandeered the bread baked for the Turkish prisoners and turned it over to the refugees, to be paid back on arrival of the allotment made to Milos by the Government. There is no capable organisation on the island, and it is absolutely necessary that effective measures should be taken. It is a disgrace to have these Turkish prisoners so well cared for and the refugees dying of starvation on the same island.

Canea.

Visited on the 27th October, 1922.

Here we found 20,000 refugees, about 20 per cent. of whom are men, 35 per cent. women, and 45 per cent. children.

The Metropolitan and the Governor of the island were interviewed, and we found that while much work was being done it was being done at cross purposes, and formed the opinion that only by providing an outside agency to co-ordinate the local efforts would it be possible to effectively proceed on this island. All of the refugees are housed, though for the most part in barracklike warehouses. The worst feature of the situation is that there has started an epidemic of scarlet fever, which we saw evidences of, and we were told that there are sixty cases known. That there are some cases unknown we are certain, as we found one in a large warehouse crowded with refugees, and especially with children. We recommended that this warehouse should be quarantined.

Rethymnos.

Visited the 27th October, 1922.

Here we found approximately 4,000 refugees, 20 per cent. men, 35 per cent. women, and 45 per cent. children.

Half of these refugees are Armenians, and for the most part they are quartered together in old Turkish mosques and schools. There is a very willing committee, which would be an important aid to any relief organisation working in Crete. The town has been divided into departments for relief work, and the local people have jumped into the situation with good spirit. However, the normal population is fully half Turkish, and though the Christians have raised funds and donated clothing, the Turks have been unwilling to participate up to the date of our visit.

Heraclion.

We did not call at Heraclion because we were having very rough weather, and there is no harbour. The captain thought it advisable not to make the attempt. However, we called the committee on the telephone from Rethymnos, and learned that probably the conditions in Heraclion are the worst of all the places in Crete. From the best information we could secure there are between 17,000 and 18,000 refugees, probably proportioned as are the other refugees in Crete, men 20 per cent., women 25 per cent., and children 45 per cent.

Thera (or Santorin).

Visited the 28th October, 1922.

Here we found 1,200 refugees, approximately, men 20 per cent., women 40 per cent., and children 40 per cent.

The situation is difficult here, but the local committee seems to have been rather generous in its aid to the refugees, having housed them all, though some of the houses are very poor affairs, really caves in the volcanic rock. There is a Catholic Sisters' Hospital, Saint Joseph's, I believe, capable of doing excellent hospital service for the island. There are many sick, and food conditions are difficult due to the situation.

Ios (or Nios).

Visited the 28th October, 1922.

We found here only 190 refugees, 15 per cent. men, 40 per cent. women, and 45 per cent. children.

The committee was composed of very ordinary men, quite incapable of handling the situation in a large way, so that refugees who originally came left in large numbers.

Paros.

Visited the 29th October, 1922.

We found 794 refugees here, 5 per cent. men, 45 per cent. women, and 50 per cent. children.

Here the refugees seem to be very unwelcome. There is flour on hand. If the present system is followed, free distribution of money to the refugees would provide them with the means of livelihood. The refugees seemed to be comparatively well on this island, but they were very much dissatisfied.

Naxos.

Visited the 29th October, 1922.

Here we found 1,200 refugees, 15 per cent. men, 35 per cent. women, and 50 per cent. children.

The committee is ineffective and the people are suffering; housing conditions are positively awful, as no good houses have been made available to the refugees. A strong outside influence must come in and redeem the situation.

Myconos.

Visited the 29th October, 1922.

Here we found 300 refugees, approximately 20 per cent. men, 30 per cent. women, and 50 per cent. children.

This island was the joy of the Cyclades, as here we found an effective committee. We found the refugees very well housed, receiving soup, and bread, and milk. The committee deserves the highest commendation and support, and should not be punished for their good work by sending more refugees to the island.

Syra.

Visited the 30th October, 1922.

Here we found 5,500 refugees, 15 per cent. men, 35 per cent. women, and 50 per cent. children.

The situation at Syra is not one to do credit to the place, due to the fact that the Governor, who has had the supervision of this work, has been relieved, and knew that he would be relieved. The refugees are poorly housed, there is a great deal of sickness, and effective supervision should be undertaken by an outside agency.

It should be mentioned in speaking of Syra that the Eastern Telegraph Company has organised a committee of their own, and they are effectively coping with the need for milk for little children and nursing mothers. In fact, this department of the work has been assigned to them by the so-called local committee.

Tinos.

Visited the 30th October, 1922.

Here we found that there were 1,000 refugees at first, though originally 379 families, or 3,000 refugees arrived. There are, at least, 20 per cent. men, 30 per cent. women, and 50 per cent. children.

The committee has not been particularly effective, although extremely businesslike. The monastery gave 20,000 drachmas to the committee, which distributed this money to the refugees. The committee then proceeded to sell the bread baked from flour sent to them for the refugees, and to-day they have in hand over 42,000 drachmas, as a result of selling this bread to the refugees. They are now perplexed to know what to do with this money. The refugees are fairly well housed; eighty-eight families are in the monastery, thirty families are in the town, but the committee certainly needs the assistance of a superviser

Andros.

Visited the 30th October, 1922.

Here we found 1,650 refugees, about 10 per cent. men, 35 per cent. women, and 55 per cent. children.

There is a committee which has the situation fairly well in hand, although it is ineffective in preserving order, sanitation and proper use for food available. The housing conditions are not bad, nor are they exceptionally good. Most of the families are in rather large buildings, and the macaroni factory is very unhealthy.

* * * * * *

Enclosure 2 in No. 673.

Liste des Réfugiés se trouvant en Grèce le 29 Octobre/11 Novembre 1922.

Localité.	Réfugiés d'Asie Mineure.	Réfugiés de Thrace.	Localité.	Réfugiés d'Asie Mineure.	Réfugiés de Thrace.
× Patras	10,000		Spétzès	750	
Larissa et Tricala ..	5,000	4,000	Cranidi	2,000	
× Volo	20,000		× Canéa	20,000	
Syra	5,000		Lassithium	4,000	
Skopelos	500		Itéa	1,500	2,000
Skiathos	1,500		Amphissa	3,300	
Paros	2,000		Missolonghi	2,000	
Naxos	1,800		Monemvassia	1,000	
Tinos	2,000		Florina	700	500
Myconos	570		× Patras	1,000	
Thassos	3,900*		Mégare	2,000	
Ios	800		Tripolis	1,000	
Mylos	1,100		Elea	2,100	
Kythnos	205		Ghythion	3,700	
Kéa	2,000		Eleusis	2,100	
Sériphos	500		Atalante	500	
Andros	1,400		Nicopolis	150	
Edypsos	2,100	1,200	Glossa	100	
Chalcis	2,800	2,900	Egine	1,000	
Icaria	700		Laurium	2,000§	
Lamia et environs ..	4,500		Agrinium	1,000	
Skylis	5,000		Kimi	2,000	
Calamata	6,200		Astros	2,000	
× Athènes	75,000†		Salamine	300	
× Pirée	30,000		Egium	2,100	
Samos	35,000		Cythère	300	
Mytilène	40,000		Corinthe	800	
Tenedos	450		Linni	..	1,200
Lemnos	4,000	3,500	Parga, &c.*	100,000	60,000
Réthymnos	4,000		× Salonique	10,000	23,000
Héraklcion	20,000		Cavalla	3,000	10,000
Chios	30,000		Comotis Xanthe ..	12,000	7,080
Oreoi	850		Serres et environs ..	..	20,000
Théra	1,200		Dédéagatch		

En outre, 90,000 en Thrace occidentale et Macédoine orientale voyageant par route et qui n'ont pas encore été répartis.

TOTAL: 595,420 d'Asie Mineure, 204,380 de Thrace et 8,800 du Pont.

* 3,800 du Pont. † De Constantinople. ‡ Dont 4,500 de Constantinople.
§ Dont 1,500 de Marmara.

[E 13281/13003/44] No. 674

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(P.S. No. 1.)

Procès-verbal of Opening and Public Session of the Near East Peace Conference held at the Casino de Montbenon, Lausanne, November 20, 1922, at 3·30 P.M.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 28.)

THE countries taking part in the conference were represented by their plenipotentiaries; the respective delegations of these countries were also present. Representatives of the press were admitted, and admittance was granted by the municipal authorities of Lausanne to numerous private persons.

M. Camerlynck acted as interpreter.

M. HAAB, President of the Swiss Confederation, opened the conference with the following speech:—

"Gentlemen, the Powers whose distinguished representatives we have the privilege of greeting here have been kind enough to express the desire that a citizen of Switzerland, a neutral country, should open the first session of the peace conference which is to put an end to the conflict in the Near East.

"The Swiss Federal Council, fully aware of the great historical importance of your task, has entrusted to the President of the Confederation this mission, and we are fully conscious of this honour. It is not without emotion that I have undertaken the task. I have felt myself called to it not only on account of my duties, but also on account of my strong desire to see your work crowned with success.

"In the name of the Swiss Federation, I wish your illustrious assembly a warm and cordial welcome

"The Swiss Government and people will be happy to see, thanks to the testimony of confidence which has been granted to them, a peace dawn in this country which will contribute to give back to humanity, crushed by moral and economic care, the hope of a better future.

"At all times, in every circumstance, when it is a question of aiding the conclusion of an international agreement or of settling a quarrel peacefully, Switzerland has regarded it as her duty, as a task high above all others, to grant her help, however modest this might be. Also we venture to think that, in choosing a Swiss town as the meeting-place of the conference, your Governments have desired to show us that they appreciate an attitude and a policy which are for us a holy tradition.

"Gentlemen, the battlefields of the recent war, of which all humanity so ardently awaits the end through the medium of your conference, these battlefields are situated at the point of meeting between the two continents of the old world, which have played the greatest part in history.

"These fiercely-disputed regions have been the scene of innumerable and bitter fights, recounted to us in the legends of heroic ages, tales of ancient times, and the chronicles of the middle ages. In our own time these legendary or historical events still exercise their influence on the fate of peoples. Up to some weeks ago that ground on which so many heroes have trod has once again been covered with blood by battles; and the features of that warlike valour, which used to fill us with enthusiasm at the time when we studied ancient history, have been witnessed once again. It is with respect and admiration that we bow before the tomb of the brave ones who, without hesitation, sacrificed themselves on the altar of their country. Honour to their memory! They have been loyal and faithful unto death.

"Gentlemen, may fate allow the Greco-Turkish war to be the last act in the terrible tragedy which for ten years past has laid waste Europe and a portion of Asia, the baneful consequences of which will be felt both by the conquerors and conquered for generations.

"The whole world therefore turns towards the shores of the Léman an anxious gaze in which, nevertheless, there shines a strong gleam of hope. All hearts are beating in harmony, animated by the same desire—to see your sagacity succeed in giving peace and quietude to the belligerent States, and thence to all humanity, which will thus be able to take up again its onward march towards the conquest of intellectual and economic prosperity.

"In your hands lies the fate of countries and peoples. Your task is as wide as it is delicate. We know also how great is your responsibility. The root problems which you have to solve lie deep down in past centuries.

"History teaches us that these problems have always influenced the fate of the old world.

"In our age of intimate independence of peoples, in the economic, financial and intellectual realms, the acute sickness of one member weakens the whole family of nations.

"That is why, Gentlemen, the wise policy of your Governments, after having put a stop to murderous combats, has devoted itself to the task of creating a situation which can obtain for one side as well as for the other the circumstances indispensable for existence and life, and shall not be an obstacle to an imminent reconciliation. The gratitude of the world and the comforting conviction of having worked for the happiness of humanity will be the rightful recompense of this spirit of conciliation and moderation, which is the indispensable condition for attaining any high common aim.

"The two great religions to which the two adversaries of yesterday owe their faith, and from which their civilisation is nourished, meet in this high thought; the best virtues of man are the spirit of harmony and love of peace.

"Gentlemen, in a few weeks we shall celebrate the feast of Christmas. From the bottom of my heart—and this wish is certainly that of thousands of human beings—I desire that on that solemn day the admirable words, 'Peace on earth and goodwill towards men' may become a reality, thanks to your beneficent work."

LORD CURZON rose and said in reply:—

"We have all of us listened with sentiments of profound respect to the eloquent and elevated language that has been employed by his Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation.

"We meet here to-day for the latest—and, let it be hoped, the last—of the various conferences that have been held during the past four years to conclude peace and to throw into the background, soon to be forgotten, the memories of the cruel and devastating war of more than four years ago. Hitherto those conferences have been held in the capital city, or in other places in the territories of the principal Powers that fought the war. I have attended—I shrink from saying how many of these conferences— myself in London, in Paris, in towns of Italy and elsewhere, but now for the first time we meet to-day, Sir, under your presidency, in a neutral country. And if a neutral country had to be selected for what I hope will be a gathering to conclude the final peace, what country could be better fitted for the honour of offering us her hospitality than Switzerland herself. Switzerland, who behind her ring of inviolable mountains has for more than a century never been invaded; Switzerland, who never has cause to fight, although, if she were provoked, everyone of her sons would spring at once to the defence of her soil; Switzerland, who, for a century and more, has preached peace and conciliation to the world; Switzerland, who sets an example to all Europe of a peace-loving and orderly community. Surely, Gentlemen, in this atmosphere, in this beautiful place and amid the surroundings in which we shall find ourselves for the next two or three weeks, it ought to be easy for a spirit of harmony and conciliation to grow up amongst us.

"The President has indeed spoken in a language of the most feeling character of all the sacrifices and the sufferings of the war, and he has appealed to us to bring about a state of affairs which will make them a soon-to-be forgotten memory of the past. Let everyone of us respond to the spirit in which he has spoken to us this afternoon. Let each one of our delegations—and I can speak for my own—enter upon every phase of this conference with no other desire than to come to an agreement upon all these complicated questions which will come before us, to make peace so that we may all go away from this place conscious that we have each made our own contribution to the final act of this great drama.

"I do not know, Gentlemen, how long our proceedings may last. I do not know how long we shall trespass, Sir, upon your hospitality. This I can say for my own delegation, and I am sure, I believe, for the others, that no effort will be wanting on our part to carry things to a successful issue, and to give the credit to your beautiful country of having provided the scene where the last act of all our troubles shall be terminated by an enduring peace."

When Lord Curzon had finished, ISMET PASHA made the following speech:—

"Gentlemen, an armistice concluded more than four years ago on the basis of, and in belief in, the principles of President Wilson officially suspended the hostilities in which the Ottoman Empire found itself engaged.

"The Turkish nation, continually deprived of the benefits of peace, realised the inadequacy and fruitlessness of its ceaseless peaceful efforts to obtain equity and justice, and understanding that no other hope of salvation remained to it, the nation succeeded in defending its existence by its own moral and material resources. In this course it has endured sufferings, and has made innumerable sacrifices which have been sympathetically witnessed by free nations. Turks of every age and condition, women and children, have contributed to this defensive struggle. I cannot refrain from mentioning the endless attacks and the sufferings to which the Turkish nation has been exposed since 1918—attacks and sufferings which cannot be justified in any way—and also the ravages systematically carried out without any military necessity and with the sole object of destruction in the richest and most prosperous of its territories.

"I must also mention that even at this time more than 1,000,000 innocent Turks are wandering homeless and hungry amidst the ruins on the plains and table-lands of Asia Minor.

"In making these superhuman sacrifices, the Turkish nation has conquered its place in civilised mankind with all these rights to existence and independence which are inherent in nations capable of a vigorous vitality, and also as an element of peace, harmony and industry. The highest aim of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is to maintain and consolidate this position.

"The events of these last years having established as a dogma in the conscience of humanity the truth that general peace and tranquillity can only be obtained in so far as nations mutually respect their rights to freedom and independence, I trust that the memory of these events will constitute a pledge of peace and stability for the future.

"I cling to the hope that the Turkish delegation, which is animated with the greatest possible goodwill, will find in the other delegations a similar goodwill, and that in this manner the efforts of the conference will lead to a satisfactory result.

"I end, M. le President, by thanking the Swiss Confederation, in the name of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, for the courteous hospitality which they are kindly granting us by consenting to the meeting of our conference on their national territory. I am all the more satisfied with the happy choice of the seat of this conference, since it is held in a country whose glorious history is the most irrefutable witness of the valour which a noble nation attaches to its independence."

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SWISS REPUBLIC then rose to thank Lord Curzon and Ismet Pasha for their complimentary speeches in regard to his country, and announced that the conference would meet again at the Hôtel du Château d'Ouchy at 11 A.M. on the following day. He then declared the session closed.

[E 13315/27/44] **No. 675.**

Papers communicated by the British Delegation, Lausanne (No. 3), with reference to Lord Curzon's Telegrams Nos. 26 and 27 of the 24th November.—(Received November 28.)

(1.)

Allied Representatives to Ismet Pasha.

IL a été signalé à l'attention des plénipotentiaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie que le Général Rafet Pacha continue à soulever des difficultés dans les conversations qui se poursuivent entre lui et les généraux alliés à Constantinople relativement aux questions d'ordre local qui ont surgi depuis le 4 novembre.

Les généraux alliés ont fait preuve d'un grand esprit de conciliation dans les conversations précitées. Plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne les questions des rapports entre la police alliée et les organes turcs, question qui a fait l'objet principal des dernières conversations le 20 et le 22 courant, ils se sont déclarés prêts à accepter un *modus vivendi*, d'après lequel la police alliée se bornerait aux fonctions strictement nécessaires pour sauvegarder les intérêts alliés à Constantinople. Elle s'occuperait seulement des actes dirigés contre les forces alliées à Constantinople, dont les coupables, s'ils étaient des sujets turcs arrêtés par les autorités alliées, seraient jugés par les tribunaux turcs, et des affaires concernant les sujets alliés, y compris les Hellènes et les Russes.

Les autorités alliées à Constantinople ont à se plaindre également d'autres mesures prises par Rafet Pacha ou par des autorités dépendant de lui, et qui sont de nature à entraver, si non paralyser, la vie économique de Constantinople. On signale entre autres, certaines mesures de restriction que les autorités turques cherchent à appliquer aux établissements financiers.

En attirant l'attention la plus sérieuse de son Excellence Ismet Pacha sur les faits exposés ci-haut, les plénipotentiaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de l'inviter à agir en sorte que le Général Rafet Pacha reçoive l'ordre d'avoir à accepter les dernières propositions des généraux alliés et à s'abstenir de toute mesure qui rendrait plus difficile la situation à Constantinople au moment où l'on cherche au sein de la conférence de trouver les bases d'une paix qui mettra fin à toutes les difficultés du moment actuel.

Lausanne, le 23 novembre 1922.

(2.)

Allied Representatives to Ismet Pasha.

IL revient de nombreuses sources aux plénipotentiaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie aurait pris dernièrement une décision visant le départ de l'Anatolie de toute la population chrétienne de cette région. Douze mille orphelins arméniens sont en effet en train de quitter l'Anatolie en vertu d'un ordre du Gouvernement susmentionné.

Les plénipotentiaires susmentionnés sauraient gré à son Excellence Ismet Pacha de vouloir bien leur préciser d'urgence la portée de la décision attribuée au Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale, et de leur faire savoir si cette décision est d'application générale, c'est-à-dire si elle vise toute la population chrétienne, y compris les hommes d'âge militaire.

Lausanne, le 23 novembre 1922.

[E 13305/13003/44] **No. 676.**

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1091.)

My Lord, *Rome, November 24, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the comments which have thus far appeared in the Italian press on the Lausanne Conference resolve themselves into a panegyric of Signor Mussolini. Little is written on the merits of the questions at issue, much about the personal ascendancy established by the Italian Premier.

For the dominating rôle ascribed to him it must be admitted that little evidence is brought forward beyond the gratuitous assertions of Italian journalists and the flattering remarks of the Balkan diplomatists.

Three indications of his success are, however, much insisted on. The first is the acceptance by your Lordship and M. Poincaré of the invitation to Territ; the second is the insertion of the phrase as to "complete equality" in the preliminary communiqué; the third is an alleged concession by your Lordship of Italy's claim to treat the Dodecanese question as one of exclusively Italian scope.

As to what has actually passed at Lausanne in this respect I am at present without direct information, and therefore think it worth while to mention that the Italian press is disposed to make great capital out of this alleged concession, and to interpret it in its widest significance.

The "Corriere della Sera" reports Signor Mussolini as saying, in a special interview with Italian journalists: "The question of the Dodecanese does not exist. It is of exclusively Italian concern, and already settled by the denunciation of the Italo-Greek Treaty. This is now admitted, and there will be no further discussion on the subject."

For the rest, the press acclaims Signor Mussolini's diplomacy at Lausanne as the beginning of a new era in Italian foreign affairs, in which Italy will assert the full influence of a Great Power. It is hardly necessary to quote in detail the numerous articles on this theme.

The only sceptical voice is that of the Socialist "Avanti," which writes: "The sole novelty is in Signor Mussolini's language, and it is not always a welcome novelty. The revival of the 'sacred egoism' which brought us such disaster in the past is likely to bring us fresh trouble in the future."

On the Turkish question itself little is written, since attention is so largely concentrated on the "reservations" said to have been made by Signor Mussolini to the British memorandum and on the position of Italy within the *Entente*. But the drift of the press in regard to Turkish claims is distinctly satisfactory and unanimous in following Signor Mussolini's sufficiently strong lead.

The "Corriere della Sera" writes: "Most likely, after alternations of gloom and optimism, a treaty of peace will get signed. What is unlikely is that the Turks will long remain satisfied with it. Who is going to keep them to its terms? The Turkish game is merely to discover at what point and in what manner the 'united Allied front' may eventually become a military front, and how much, if anything, they would have to lose even in the event of defeat." The principal interest of Italy, says the "Corriere," is to watch the new consolidation, under the Turkish threat, of the Balkan League, and not to be taken by surprise, as she was by the powerful consolidation of the Little *Entente*.

In conclusion, it is satisfactory to observe that the note of strident Anglophobia which marked the discussion of the Turkish problem till Signor Mussolini took office, and which he himself helped to accentuate, is now practically silent. Indeed, the only writer who persists in it is Signor Scarfoglio in the "Nazione."

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 13279/13003/44] No. 677.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 2779.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 27, 1922.*

AS was to have been expected, the statement made by the United States observer at Lausanne on the 25th instant regarding the attitude of the United States Government has produced considerable impression here. All papers publish long telegrams from their special correspondents at Lausanne containing conjectures as to the probable effect of this declaration on the progress of the peace conference.

Auguste Gauvain, in yesterday's "Journal des Débats," states that the American arguments can be summed up as follows:—

"We intend to take no responsibilities and to make no sacrifices, but we do intend to reserve to ourselves the same advantages as the States that take risks."

He reminds his readers that the United States refused to intervene in 1919, when their acceptance of a mandate might have saved the life of the Armenian nation, and in these circumstances he considers that the United States delegation should occupy itself with other things than the interests of the oil magnates, for, as at Genoa, oil is at the back of the negotiations.

The "Temps" states that France is probably the least affected by the American declaration, as she has made no secret agreements with Turkey. In view of the hostile criticism to which the San Remo Agreement has been subject in America, of the suspicions to which it has given rise and of the unlikelihood in existing circumstances of France reaping any definite benefit therefrom, the French Government could with equanimity see that agreement revoked. In any case the intervention of the American observer is likely to weigh heavily on the forthcoming debate on the Asiatic frontier of Turkey. It is probably no exaggeration to say that Mr. Childs's declaration is the heaviest blow which Great Britain has received for a long time, in view of her desire to see her Asiatic Empire consolidated.

The same note has been struck in the "Journal" of to-day, which heads its leading article, "The United States take their revenge on Great Britain at Lausanne." The writer of the article concludes that France has nothing to lose but everything to gain from the acceptance of the American doctrine of the "open door," as compared to a continuance of the existing division of Mosul oil provided for in the various agreements reached since 1919.

On the other hand, several papers, prominent among which are the "Écho de Paris," take the view that the American intervention was uncalled for, that it has

merely resulted in encouraging the Turks to demand a revision of the whole system of mandated areas, that France has really nothing to gain thereby, and that it affords an excellent pretext for the newly arrived Soviet delegation to proclaim once again the unity of views which is alleged to exist between Moscow and Angora.

Pertinax telegraphs to the "Écho de Paris" from Lausanne, under date of the 26th, a long article which may be summarised as follows:—

For several days since your Lordship's meeting with Ismet, Turkish circles have assiduously spread the report that your Lordship has offered to Turkey the empty sovereignty of Mosul, provided Great Britain is allowed to retain the oil. The truth is that it was Ismet Pasha who took the initiative in negotiating direct with the British delegation about Mosul. In their negotiations the Turks overlooked the essentials of the situation: they forgot that Mosul was part of the Mesopotamian region, the mandate for which had been approved by the League of Nations. The Turks must therefore apply to the League for any change. Mosul was not on a par with Cilicia, as the French had abandoned that district to Angora before their Syrian mandate was submitted to the League. With regard to the American declaration, Pertinax learns that Mr. Childs is somewhat disturbed by the extravagantly friendly reception which it met with at the hands of the Turks. As the Standard Oil, as a result of recent negotiations, have been promised a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company, the American protests were probably engineered by rivals of the Standard Oil. As regards the attitude of France, it must be remembered that in 1919 M. Clemenceau gave his word, that word must now be respected, and France must support the British point of view. The illusion prevalent in some French quarters that it would be to France's advantage to see the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession cancelled, when France has a 25 per cent. share in that company, seems to Pertinax only attributable to the excessive Turcophilism prevalent among certain Frenchmen. The arrival of M. Rakowsky will show how far Turkey is under Soviet influence, and what value should be attached by Frenchmen to the fine promises made to M. Herriot when he was lately in Moscow.

The "Action française" has an ironical article in which it states that the real interests behind Mr. Childs's declaration remind the writer of a remark attributed to Lord Beaconsfield that to consider Eastern affairs exclusively from the point of view of Christian minorities is a fundamental error.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 13322/13211/16] No. 678.

Italian Delegation, Lausanne, to British Delegation.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 28.)

(Translation.)

IN reply to the note addressed by the British Embassy at Rome on the 16th instant to the Italian Foreign Office, the Italian delegation has the honour to inform the British delegation that, in the event of the Egyptian Government expressing such a desire, the Italian Government would entertain no objection to an Egyptian delegation being summoned to take part in the discussion of the conference as regards Egypt.

Lausanne, November 25, 1922.

No. 679.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 742.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

LAUSANNE telegram No. 29.

In my opinion, situation is easier as a result of satisfactory development hitherto of peace negotiations at Lausanne. I am more confident than I was ten days ago of it being possible to prevent any danger of modification of *status quo*. A crisis

at Lausanne will doubtless react here, but, provided that no rupture occurs, I do not anticipate serious incidents in Constantinople, particularly since recognition of Allied police protection for Allied subjects, Russians and Hellenes.

My view of the position here is as follows:—

Turks control civil administration and refuse to admit any Allied interference therein. Our failure to impose state of siege, and thereby actively to resist their assumption of this control in its initial stages, renders it difficult and illogical for us to go back on our acceptance of the situation in this respect.

On the other hand, Turks under Mudania Convention admit the presence of Allied military forces, and therefore cannot reasonably expect us to give way on issues affecting the safety and prestige of our military position.

There is thus a dual control here. Turkish civil and Allied military. Difficulties should not arise if this principle be admitted except where these two controls clash, for instance, in respect of telegraphs and railway communications. Where concessions in such matters would modify military position, any change in *status quo* should not be tolerated. I venture to suggest that if representations be made at Angora they should take account of the distinction between civil and military controls, and while reserving position under treaties and Capitulations, disclaim desire to interfere with Turkish internal affairs so far as new régime does not affect Allied military situation.

No. 680.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 743.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 24.

French High Commissioner and I were received yesterday by Caliph.

After our audiences, Caliph similarly received number of neutral diplomats, doubtless with the object of endeavouring to give official character to French and my audiences.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 31.)

No. 681.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 744.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 1024.

In reply to joint note, Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses regret of his Government that objections of Powers to measures taken at Smyrna are based on [? non-]abolition of Capitulations. He states that full and entire liberty of Turkey is now recognised by opinion of world, and that Government of National Assembly cannot consider itself bound by Capitulations, which have hindered all progress. He argues that it is juridically incontestable that any treaty of indefinite duration may be invalidated by preliminary denunciation of one of the parties.

Note states that Turkish Government has decided to regulate its relations with other Powers on general international law, that measures of which High Commissioners complain are within rights allowed by international law to an independent State, and that Turkish Government are convinced that Allied objections will not be maintained.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 32.)

No. 682.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 2) to Sir R. Graham.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 28.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, November 27, 1922.*

RUSSIAN delegates, who have arrived here, have to-day addressed a letter to president of the conference quoting an opinion expressed by [? preceding] Italian Government in favour of participation of Russia in all labours of conference, and basing on this a demand to be admitted to the whole of our proceedings on a basis of equality with the Great Powers. We have drawn up draft reply referring to telegram of M. Poincaré and notes of British and Italian Governments to Russians in second week of November, in which invitation to Russians was confined to discussion of Straits question. This reply should have been forwarded to Russian delegation to-night, but, though Italian delegates accept it both in essence and form, they dare not join in sending it from fear of Signor Mussolini and his speech. Thus, we are held up by this gratuitous reference to Rome. Original invitation having been sent in the name of Italian Government, who agreed at Paris before Signor Mussolini assumed power, it is not possible now to depart from it, nor, I am sure, would Signor Mussolini wish to do so, since I explained to him quite clearly here conditions under which Russians are coming, and he raised no protest.

Please see him at once and ask that instructions be sent to Italian delegation to join in proposed reply.

No. 683.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 28, 1922.*

ARRIVAL at Lausanne of advance guard of Russian delegation renders it possible that question of Straits will come before conference towards the end of the week. I am endeavouring to ascertain in advance the probable attitude which will be adopted by the Russians, and if, as is possible, they raise question of principle not already covered by Cabinet discussion, I shall invite the opinion of Committee of Imperial Defence.

Meanwhile general line which may be adopted by Turks is becoming sufficiently apparent. Their aim is to secure international guarantee under guise of neutralisation such as will give them absolute security for Constantinople and Turkey in Europe, and leave them absolutely free to prosecute their Turanian policy in Central Asia. Procedure which I intend to adopt is first to invite the views of Turkish and Russian delegations, then to hear Greeks, Roumanians and Jugoslavs, and finally to allow French to produce as planned the three inviting Powers' treaty scheme of 18th November, as supplemented by Marshal Foch's proposal, and with modifications and additions suggested in your telegram No. 20. I hope I shall by then have induced French to agree to these modifications, although there is likely to be some difficulty in securing their abandonment of the principle of limitation of tonnage.

Point on which I desire immediate opinion of Imperial Defence Committee is following:—

Turks have already accepted principle of demilitarisation for northern and western frontiers of Eastern Thrace. They will doubtless also accept this principle as applying to zone of Straits. Eastern Thrace will then be surrounded on three sides by belts of demilitarised territory, and it will only be logical to demilitarise the whole. The Turks will probably agree to this on one condition only, namely, that Powers undertake to guarantee both severally and individually perpetual neutrality and inviolability of these territories. In other words, they will endeavour to apply to Turkey in Europe safeguards which existed in 1914 for Belgium. In my opinion, although Turkish demand would be logical in itself, and although a manifesto as apart from a collective and separate guarantee might possibly be given, yet we should be careful not to commit ourselves either to necessity of intervention in the event, for instance, of an attack by Bulgaria upon Turkey or to an undertaking

vis-à-vis other Powers in no circumstances to attack Straits if we were ourselves at war with Turkey. It would be of value to me to have before Saturday next the opinion of the Imperial Defence Committee upon this aspect as well as a considered legal opinion as to whether any formula could be devised which, while satisfying as far as possible Turkish apprehensions regarding our naval power, would not bind us to other signatories in no circumstances to exercise that power.

No. 684.

Mr. Peters to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 253.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Moscow, November 27, 1922.*

IN interviews in press, Chicherin defines Soviet programme at Lausanne as independence of Turkey, maintenance of her full rights on land and sea, closing of Straits for men-of-war and their free passage for merchant vessels.

He reiterates that no agreement in which Russia does not share can be lasting.

Policy of Britain and France, unlike that of Soviet Russia, is opposed to interests of Turkey. Italy shows signs of taking an independent line. She has already entered paths of rapprochement with Soviet Russia.

No. 685.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 28.)

(No. 627.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris.*

FOREIGN OFFICE despatch No. 3426.

Note from the Quai d'Orsay states that as the Allies have agreed that all interested countries may be heard at Lausanne, the French Government have no objection to the participation of the Egyptian Government in the conference under the same conditions as apply to other interested Governments.

Copy by bag.

No. 686.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 477.)
(Telegraphic.) *Washington, November 27, 1922.*

LAUSANNE Conference.

General tone of press here is to effect that Ambassador Child's statement with regard to "open door" is a hit at Great Britain or is at least calculated to give us a "jolt."

General trend of opinion of American correspondents at Lausanne is that we wish to make secret arrangements with Turkey at expense of United States.

New York "Tribune" alone publishes a telegram from Lausanne announcing that Marquess Curzon "came to unqualified support of American 'open door' policy in Near East."

I urge most strongly that utmost publicity be given through American correspondents in London to Marquess Curzon's statement as published by "Tribune," if this has not already been done, and that it be emphasised that Mr. Child's announcement was made after a consultation with, and hearty approval of, Marquess Curzon, and that "open door" policy is not an idea newly discovered by Great Britain, but our traditional policy throughout the Empire. Also I should be glad of any statement on these lines of which I could make use here.

[E 13369/27/44] No. 687.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 1044.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November 22, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Canellopoulos, who is a member of the present Greek Government, arrived in Constantinople on the 18th instant on a temporary mission as Acting Greek High Commissioner. He informed me on his arrival that the real object of his mission was to study the situation generally, and more particularly with a view to the possible evacuation of the Greek population of this city. He said that he was being replaced by General Katehakis, the late Civil Governor of Adrianople.

2. As a matter of fact, General Katehakis's appointment was announced in the press, and at a recent meeting of the Allied generals Refet Pasha declared that, Turkey being still at war with Greece, the presence of a Greek High Commissioner here could not be permitted.

3. M. Canellopoulos, who was informed of this declaration, came to see me the same evening, and asked what attitude the three Allied High Commissioners would take in the matter. I told him that, as ever since the armistice the Greek High Commission had had no relations whatever with the Turkish Government except through the Allied High Commissioners, that as we regarded Greece as an ally, and that as, in virtue of that recognition, the Greek High Commissioner had always been treated by the three Allied representatives here as a colleague, the question of Refet's recognition of his position did not arise, that I did not propose to raise it with Refet, and that, if the question was raised by the latter, I would adopt the view that the matter was one which solely concerned the Allied High Commissioners.

4. I saw my Allied colleagues later, and they both agreed to adopt a similar attitude. I trusted, therefore, that the matter would go no further.

5. General Harington, however, informed me to-day that at his meeting with the Allied generals this morning Refet Pasha had reverted to the question of General Katehakis's position, and, on learning that the general had already arrived in Constantinople, had declared that he would insist on his departure under pain of arrest, that the Greek Legation had no *raison d'être*, and that the interests of Greece should be entrusted to some neutral Power.

6. Refet Pasha's threats have, somewhat naturally, aroused the apprehensions of the Greek High Commission here, and M. Canellopoulos came round to see me again this afternoon on the subject. I told him that General Harington had informed Refet Pasha that the question was of a political nature, and that he had better discuss it with the Allied High Commissioners. I added that I had not modified the opinion which I had previously expressed to him, and that I would maintain it at any interview which I might have with my Allied colleagues and Refet.

7. The issue is closely connected with that of the Allied police. So long as the latter retain jurisdiction over all Allied subjects, including Greeks and Russians, it is improbable that the Nationalists will venture to interfere with the Greek Mission. If that control were, however, once abandoned, there would be no protection either for the Greek officials or for the 80,000 Hellenic Greeks in this city.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13390/27/44] No. 688.

Marquis della Torretta to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 29.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Italian Embassy, London, November 26, 1922.*

ON the 15th instant the British Ambassador in Rome handed to the Italian Government a memorandum containing a list of subjects on which the British Government expressed their desire that complete agreement should be reached among the Allies before the Lausanne Conference took place. His Britannic Majesty's Embassy added that the points enumerated in Part (A) were of cardinal importance and that the London Government considered it essential to obtain an absolute assurance of support

from the Allies regarding them, while with regard to the points enumerated in Part (B) they considered an agreement among the Allies to be extremely desirable.

As it was thus a question of deciding the obligations of Italy in regard to the settlement of the Eastern problem and consequently of Italian policy at the Lausanne Conference, Signor Mussolini intended, in reply to the British note and pending an interview with yourself, immediately to explain in writing the preliminary Italian views on the memorandum received from the British Government, but shortness of time made it impossible for Signor Mussolini to discuss this important question with your Lordship otherwise than verbally.

The object of the British Government's memorandum was to establish, as has always been the ardent desire of the Italian Government, complete agreement among the Allies at the Lausanne Conference.

As long ago as the 3rd November, in their reply of that date to your Lordship's note of the 15th October regarding the Dodecanese, the Italian Government made their attitude clear, viz., that they considered review of the situation essential in order to attain a new settlement in which a proportional equilibrium among the Allies might be effected. The Italian Government hold this view, notwithstanding the fact that they fully recognise their acceptance of the reciprocal settlement of Allied interests aiming at establishing an equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean, as created by the Treaty of Sèvres, the Tripartite Agreement and by the Bonin–Venizelos Convention, although it subsequently became impossible to carry out the arrangements prescribed by these treaties.

Now that the British Government have asked Italy definitely to pledge herself in questions which they consider to be essential to British interests, the Italian Government, in thus pledging themselves, intend to undertake the obligation of co-operating with the Allies, however far that obligation may lead and even in cases where non-Italian interests are involved. In order to decide upon their own line of conduct, however, the Italian Government must be definitely informed in regard to the views of the British Government on the proportional advantages which Italian interests will obtain in the new settlement, always with a view to the establishment of equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In his conversations with your Lordship, therefore, Signor Mussolini clearly explained the position as regards the relative compensations due to Italy in the Near East and in regard to the situation of Italy in so far as equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned, making it clear that the solution of this question would form the indispensable basis of Italian participation in the single front of the Allies at the conference of Lausanne.

The only questions of a special character to be considered in connection with equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean are those in Part (A) of the British memorandum concerning the Ægean Islands and the mandates, and certain other questions enumerated in some of the points in Part (B)

As regards the Ægean Islands, Italy is disposed to accept the formula proposed in the British memorandum in so far as that formula is compatible with the explicit clause of article 8 of the Treaty of London of 1915. In this connection it is desirable to make it clear that fixing the proportion of Italian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean the Dodecanese cannot be regarded as newly acquired by Italy, since, as the Italian Government explained in their note to your Lordship of the 3rd November, the position of Italy in the Dodecanese existed prior to the Treaty of London, which, in fact, by article 8 merely definitely recognised that position without prejudice to the compensation which Italy was to acquire in the Near East in virtue of article 9 of the same treaty.

Signor Mussolini declared to your Lordship in exact conformity with the foregoing, that Italy accepted the formula proposed in the British memorandum for the cession of the islands by Turkey to the Allies, provided that formula was taken in close conjunction with the explicit stipulations of article 8 of the Treaty of London of 1915.

Thus the only question dealt with in Part (A) of the British memorandum, which refers to the proportional settlement of the special interests of the Allies in the East, remains that of the mandates, which represent exclusively British and French interests. On this subject the Italian Premier, in the conversation which he had with your Lordship—it being understood that Italy, once she had given the required undertaking, intended to co-operate with the Allies, however far such co-operation might lead her—declared to you that, for that very reason, it was natural and essential that the action which Italy might be called upon to take should be justified by the defence

of interests which were not merely British and French, but were also Italian; and that, therefore, it was right that Italy should share directly and in a position of equality in those Allied interests for the defence of which she is called on to pledge herself, that is to say, in the mandates. I have been happy to learn that your Lordship was convinced of the necessity of giving satisfaction to this Italian request, which is so completely justified, reserving to yourself, however, the right to define the practical form which Italian participation should take, and that it has been agreed between your Lordship and Signor Mussolini that the agreement reached on this question of principle should be embodied in an exchange of notes between the Foreign Office and the Italian Embassy at this capital).

In so far as the points specified in Part (B) are concerned, the Italian Government request equal participation on the basis of perfect equality, according to the spirit of the Territet communiqué.

Having thus recapitulated the Italian point of view, which has already been put before you by the head of the Government, and having thus enumerated the points of agreement reached in the recent conversations which have taken place between your Lordship and Signor Mussolini, I have the honour to have recourse to your customary courtesy—under urgent instructions which I have just received from my Government—to beg you to take official note of the foregoing in a communication to myself, and to inform me at the earliest possible date of the practical form in which the British Government intend to embody the understandings reached and to settle agreement finally.

I have, &c.
TORRETTA.

[E 13354/13211/16] No. 689.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 2786.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs dated the 27th November, 1922, respecting the participation of the Egyptian Government in the Lausanne Conference.

Paris, November 28, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 689.

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 27, 1922.

PAR sa note en date du 17 novembre, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que le Gouvernement égyptien était intéressé à la revision des articles 101 à 114 du Traité de Sèvres, revision rendue nécessaire par le nouveau statut de l'Egypte, et désirait en conséquence participer à la Conférence de Lausanne.

Le Gouvernement britannique a, d'ailleurs, des raisons de croire que le Gouvernement égyptien serait disposé à agréer des clauses acceptables pour les Alliés et à signer un protocole d'adhésion au futur Traité de Paix.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre que, les Puissances alliées étant tombées d'accord sur le principe que toutes les Puissances intéressées pourront être entendues à la Conférence de Lausanne, le Gouvernement de la République n'a pas d'objections, en ce qui le concerne, à ce que la participation du Gouvernement égyptien à la conférence soit admise dans les mêmes conditions que les autres Puissances intéressées.

Paris, le 27 novembre 1922.

No. 690.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, November 28, 1922.*

FIRST meeting of Commission on Financial and Economic Questions was held under chairmanship of M. Barrère yesterday afternoon.

I had had some difficulty in advance with Barrère, who had drawn up a very precise and logical scheme for developing entire work of this commission upon sub-committees. In a personal interview, I told Barrère that I could not agree to this proposal because, first, it denied any opportunity for commission either to hear case of Turks or to lay down main principles of Allied policy in reply, and secondly, it referred matters of highest importance to bodies who were unlikely to possess requisite authority.

Barrère deferred to this reasoning, and while three sub-committees were set up to deal with different branches of subject, main question of indemnities, costs of occupation, reparation for damages, and pre-war Ottoman debt was reserved for discussion in main commission.

Ismet Pasha made a brief statement and principal discussion was reserved for to-day.

This afternoon Ismet Pasha and M. Venizelos stated their respective cases in several speeches which comprised number of charges and counter-charges on character and degrees of destruction wrought by Turkish and Greek armies. Barrère finally, under pressure from me, [? group omitted] to make a general statement on behalf of Allies on principal subjects mentioned above, but this was not so firm or so clear as I could have wished, and I look forward with some anxiety to future work of this commission with its sub-committees, which seem likely to consume an immense amount of time with doubtful results. M. Barrère in his conduct of business is not a Napoleon.

No. 691.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 29.)

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, November 29, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 27th November appears to have been despatched at 10 A.M., 28th November, and only reached me late yesterday evening.

President of the Council was occupied at Senate, and it was impossible to see him, but this morning his "chef de cabinet" has informed me that Italian delegates have been instructed by telegraph to accept reply to Russians as desired by you, in view of your present representations and of the fact that late Italian Government agreed to original restricted invitation, though President of the Council himself still considers that it would have been better to admit full participation of Russians, and that Allies may yet be obliged to give way on this point.

[E 13426/18/44] No. 692.

Consul Morgan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 138.)
My Lord, *Aleppo, November 15, 1922.*

SITUATION in Turkish districts near Syrian northern frontier.

I have the honour to report that on the 8th November the Turks gave notice to the Armenians of Aintab and Marrash and of the district stretching eastward to Birejik that they must all leave the country in a month. This is done in pursuance of the policy that no Christians are to be allowed to stay in Turkey.

Aintab, which formerly held 40,000 Armenians, now contains only 3,000.

The French consular representative in Aintab, M. de Sandfort, has been transferred to Adana and has not been replaced.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[E 13401/10524/44] No. 693.

Note by the Secretary-General, League of Nations.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 30, 1922.)

IN accordance with his note of the 15th November, the secretary-general has the honour to circulate for the consideration of the council and the information of the members of the League, the second part of the report by Dr. Nansen, which deals with the refugees in Greece and Asia Minor.

Geneva, November 18, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 693.

Report by Dr. Nansen.

Part II.—*The Question of Refugees in Greece and Asia Minor.*

IMMEDIATELY after the close of the session of the assembly of the League of Nations, I proceeded to Constantinople to carry out the enquiries into the problem of the refugees in the Near East with which the assembly had charged me.

From Constantinople I proceeded on a journey of inspection through Eastern Thrace, and from there to Athens.

In Constantinople, Salonica and Athens I had the advantage of establishing close contact on the problem of refugees with all the competent authorities of the Turkish and Greek Governments, and with the leaders of the relief organisations, which have already begun to bring assistance to the refugees. The conclusions which I venture to present to the Council of the League of Nations in this report are therefore based on a close study of the actual situation, and are arrived at after careful consideration of the problems which it raised.

2. Although I was prepared to make a journey in Asia Minor, I was unfortunately not able to carry this intention into effect. I have had therefore to rely for my information concerning the situation in Asia Minor upon what I have been able to learn from official sources and from relief workers on the spot. I am satisfied, however, from what they have told me, that there has been real distress on a large scale among a great number of the population inhabiting the area in which the military operations of September last were carried out. I endeavoured to do what I could to assist the authorities of the Turkish Red Crescent in alleviating this distress. I despatched 200 tons of flour, bought with the funds placed at my disposal by the assembly of the League, to Smyrna. I also provided transport for a number of Turkish refugees from Constantinople to reach their homes on the shores of Asia Minor in time to carry through the autumn cultivation of their fields. Colonel Gauthier, the representative of the League of Nations Epidemic Commission, was able to come to the aid of the Turkish Red Crescent with medical supplies, especially vaccine and serum. The International Red Cross has also brought a certain amount of relief and a number of blankets to Smyrna, and the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief are carrying out work of assistance on a generous scale.

Nevertheless it is clear, from the evidence which I have received, that the situation of the population in this area of Asia Minor, although undoubtedly serious, is one with which the Turkish authorities are in a position to deal without great assistance from outside, and I do not think that the problem there is comparable in gravity with that of the refugees in Greece.

3. There are already within the frontiers of Greece refugees of Greek and Armenian race amounting, according to information received, to not less than 900,000. The collection of exact statistics is still a matter of great difficulty, but it appears that at least 50,000 and probably a greater number of these refugees are Armenians. To these Armenians the Greek Government is with great generosity extending hospitality and relief.

It is calculated that of the 900,000 refugees approximately 300,000 are from Eastern Thrace and the remainder from Asia Minor. Those from Eastern Thrace who left their homes after the conclusion of the armistice of Mudania are in comparatively good conditions. They were able to bring away with them at least some of their movable possessions, including for the most part their cattle, waggons,

clothing and in some cases their agricultural implements. Although they were obliged to leave behind the abundant crops which they had reaped this year, they have nevertheless, generally speaking, a certain amount of money.

The refugees from Asia Minor, on the other hand, have left their homes with such precipitation that they have no other possessions of any kind than the light summer clothes which they wear. They urgently require not only shelter, but also winter clothing and blankets, to enable them to face the severity of the coming winter; they are also without any money with which to supply themselves with food.

The Greek Government has made great efforts to distribute these refugees throughout the country in such a way as to permit of their absorption by the local population.

For the refugees from Eastern Thrace who are agriculturists this absorption is less difficult, and a certain measure of success has already been achieved in placing them on the vacant lands in Macedonia and Western Thrace, where they will be able to grow for next year the crops which they will require to enable them to live. For the whole of the refugees from Asia Minor, however, and for the town population from Eastern Thrace the difficulties are far greater. In spite of the great efforts which have been made by the Greek Government and people and by the various relief agencies, the situation of these refugees is very grave.

4. It is not possible to give in this report a detailed account of the work which is being done and the problems that are being dealt with by the relief agencies. I will on a later occasion give a detailed account to the council of the use which I have made of the funds placed at my disposal. I succeeded in acquiring a considerable quantity of flour with the least possible delay, which was used to meet a difficult situation on the islands of Samos and Chios. League representatives are now carrying out direct relief in Western Thrace. I venture to appeal urgently and insistently to the Governments of the members of the League to provide the further contributions which are required to enable me to acquire the whole of the 50,000*l.* promised by the British Government when a similar sum has been contributed by the other members of the League.

I am very happy to be able to say that the American Red Cross, under the able leadership of Dr. Ross Hill, has come into the field and is now bringing help in the form of food and other direct relief which will go far to solve the most immediate problems. The American people, through the agency of the American Red Cross, are thus about to add another chapter to their already long record of great acts of charity. It may be hoped that if the response to the appeal for charity from other quarters of the world is equally generous, and if there is no further influx of refugees into Greece, the problem of feeding the refugees during the next few months may be satisfactorily solved. This result can only be achieved, however, if the charitable organisations of other countries make a response corresponding in degree to that of the American Red Cross.

5. Even if the problem of food for the next few months is solved, there remain other difficulties to be overcome which are not less grave. Hundreds of thousands of the refugees are without any proper shelter. The provision of tents, hutments and elementary building material (wood and roofing) is of urgent importance, and I venture to appeal to the charitable organisations and to the Governments to make any provision of this sort which may be within their power.

In addition a vast quantity of clothing and blankets is required to enable the refugees to face the hardships of the winter months. Unless supplies of these articles are forthcoming in great quantities and without delay, vast numbers of mothers and little children must inevitably die. The mortality among the babies and the mothers whose children have been born in refugee camps during the last month is already very great.

6. In addition, the presence of this great number of refugees in temporary camps gives rise to a grave danger of serious epidemics. In some camps smallpox has already broken out. In all of them dysentery is more or less common. Typhoid, cholera and above all typhus may be expected. It is therefore extremely important that every step which is possible should be taken to assist the Greek civil authorities to combat this great danger. I have been fortunate enough to secure for this work the services of the Epidemic Commission of the League of Nations, which has done such good work in Poland and the Border States of Russia. Representatives of the commission have already arrived in Greece and are carrying out investigations into the situation. They are of the opinion that the possibility of epidemics is one which threatens not only Greece alone, but the whole of Southern Europe. As a preliminary measure the Epidemic Commission have already provided some 100,000 doses of

vaccine for inoculating refugees against diseases, and they are preparing further large quantities. I venture, therefore, to appeal to the Government of the members of the League and to their Red Cross Societies to provide the Epidemic Commission with the resources—whether in the form of money or in the form of disinfecting apparatus and other medical supplies—which will enable them to bring effective assistance to the Greek authorities.

7. I need not draw the attention of the Council of the League in any detail to the serious results which the situation I have described must entail for the Greek State. It inevitably imposes a terrible strain upon its financial, economic and moral resources. If the food supply for this vast influx of refugees were to break down it might threaten the whole social and economic stability not only of Greece itself, but even of neighbouring countries in the Near East.

As I have already said, the Greek Government, in spite of the exhaustion of the Greek people after the events of the last ten years, have made great efforts to deal with the situation and to deal with it upon constructive lines. The problem which confronts them, however, is not merely that of nearly a million refugees living through the coming winter, it is also that of absorbing at least the greater part of these into the economic life of the country.

It is clear that for those of the refugees who are agriculturists—the estimate of the number of agriculturists is about 550,000—the obvious solution is to place them on the vacant lands of Greece. This can no doubt be done, and if it is done it will bring to Greece a great new source of wealth, but it can only be done if substantial capital is found. To establish an agricultural population on vacant land requires great quantities of all building material, animals, ploughs, seed and food. In addition, the settlement of the vacant lands of Macedonia necessitates the carrying out of great works of sanitation to remove the sources of malaria which at present decimate any new population which settles there. Much capital is required, and this capital the Greek people alone are not in a position at the present time to provide.

Moreover, it is of urgent importance that this capital should be provided with the least possible delay, in order that as large a proportion as possible of the agricultural refugees may be enabled to plough their own fields by the spring of next year. There is, therefore, no time to be lost.

In my opinion, the only way in which the necessary capital can be found is by some form of international loan. I believe it is in the interests of the other members of the League that such an international loan should be granted to the Greek people to enable them to re-establish on a firm footing their national economy. I venture to hope that this is a question which concerned the Governments acting through the Council of the League of Nations or otherwise as they may think fit may find it possible to study at the earliest possible moment. There is no need to add that the Greek Government would be prepared to allocate revenues for the payment of the interest and the amortisation of the capital of such a loan.

8. Even if the capital required for the scheme of agricultural settlement be found, all the difficulties of the situation will not be solved. In the first place, it must be mentioned that the refugees from Asia Minor consist principally of women and children and old men. Even if they are in a great part agriculturists, it would be extremely difficult to settle these people on the land without any men to help them to build their temporary huts or houses and to open up the fields.

In the second place, the town population, which amounts to 35 per cent. or 40 per cent. of the whole, is much harder to deal with. It must be hoped that the great immigration countries across the ocean will consent to receive some of these refugees within their shores. Others no doubt can be absorbed into the industries of Greece, but it is evident that for some time to come a great amount of direct relief will be required to enable these refugees to be maintained. There is therefore a wide field for the assistance of the whole world.

9. I have hitherto only spoken of the situation as it actually exists at the moment at which I write, the 10th November, 1922. There are certain grounds, however, for fearing that the situation may be rendered still more acute by a new great influx of refugees from Asia Minor. There is evidence that within the last few days a large number of refugees have arrived from the Black Sea ports of Anatolia, and they all report that a great new movement of the Greek and Armenian population from Anatolia has begun. They allege that at least 100,000 Armenians and 250,000 Greeks are now moving towards the coast to take refuge in Europe. These new refugees are arriving in the same condition as the first refugees from Asia Minor, that is to say, with nothing but the clothes they wear. There are, therefore, strong grounds for fearing that some quarter million additional refugees are to be

thrown upon Europe for support. We may still hope that the reports of these recent refugees may be untrue, or that something may be done to avert this new tragic exodus from Asia Minor. If, however, it takes place, the consequences to which it will lead will be grave in the extreme. It is more than probable that such an exodus will be followed by a further exodus of the Greek and Armenian population from Constantinople. If such an event occurs the burden of immediate relief thrown upon Greece would be one which it could not possibly support. The movement of refugees which followed immediately the military operation of September has already put a terrible strain upon the Greek resources. If the number of refugees is to be more than trebled by the events which have followed the conclusion of hostilities, the situation will be one which will affect the peace and prosperity of the whole of Europe.

I cannot too strongly insist that the support and the assistance of the world at large will be necessary to cope with these desperate problems.

Russian Refugees in Constantinople.

I have recently made arrangements with the Bulgarian Government for the transfer to that country of the remaining 5,000 destitute Russian refugees in Constantinople. The transport of these refugees is now in progress. The responsibility of the League in connection with the material welfare of the Russian refugees in Constantinople would thus have been liquidated. I was, however, informed by his Excellency Hamid Bey, the representative of the Angora Government in Constantinople, that, by virtue of an agreement between his Government and that of the Soviets in Moscow, all Russian refugees in Constantinople would have to be evacuated before the Turkish occupation. This would mean that at least 15,000 Russian refugees, who are now self-supporting in Constantinople, will have to be uprooted, and I frankly see no possibility whatever at present of securing the admission of such a number into any country, and certainly not into any of the countries, which have up till now so generously afforded hospitality to large numbers of refugees, even if the Turkish Government are willing to give us several months' grace for the purpose. I have opened negotiations with the Jugoslav Government with a view to the reception in that country of 5,000 of these refugees, but even if this Government consents to receive them it is beyond my powers to provide the requisite funds for their transport and maintenance. It must also be borne in mind that these 15,000 refugees in Constantinople are self-supporting, having succeeded in establishing themselves in productive employment, but immediately on their evacuation from that city they will become once more destitute.

As these refugees cannot return to Russia, and consequently have no Government to protect them, their position would be perfectly desperate, if the Angora Government insists on their evacuation.

No. 694.

Mr. Henderson (No. 34) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received November 30.)

(No. 745.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, November 30, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 736.

Greek Patriarchate estimates Greeks in Anatolia at about 260,000. Armenian statistics of a month ago gave number of Armenians as about 110,000, which has probably now been reduced to 80,000 or 90,000. This agrees with estimate of minorities expert.

No. 695.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, November 29, 1922.*

MEETING of Territorial Commission was held this afternoon, myself in the chair, to receive and discuss report of sub-committee appointed under General Weygand to examine demilitarisation of Ægean islands and North Dodecanese.

Sub-committee had recommended a form of demilitarisation for central group consisting of Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Kikaria, sufficient to save Turkey from their being used as a base for attack, while enabling Greece, in whose hands they will remain, to maintain order and ensure defence. This report was adopted subject to Turkish reserves on two points of minor importance.

Demilitarisation of northern group of islands outside Dardanelles, viz., Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace, which will probably be on more complete scale, was reserved for final decision of sittings of commission that will deal with freedom of Straits.

A discussion ensued on sovereignty of Imbros and Tenedos, a final decision on which was postponed, but which I declined to refer to Straits Commission on the ground that it is a political and not a military or naval issue.

Reply from inviting Powers to Russian demand to be admitted to all sittings of conference and not to Straits question alone, which has been delayed in consequence of a dilatory objection raised by Italians, will be issued this evening.

It reminds them of Paris decision, and renews invitation confined to sittings about the Straits. Should they either accept or not decline, I propose to put down Straits discussion for Friday, and it may last for two days. In any case, we shall not recede from decision about scope of Russian invitation, which embraces Ukrainian and Georgian representatives.

No. 696.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 747.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 1, 1922.*

MY telegram No 22.

Press has published following circular addressed to civil governor, generals and governors by Angora Minister of the Interior :—

"It appears that, contrary to decision of commissars, non-Moslems are in certain localities being expelled by force.

"Decision in question referred only to voluntary departure. Compulsion, which is at variance with orders given, should not be [? exercis]ed."

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 37.)

No. 697.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 1, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister :—

"I am astounded at statement quoted in House of Commons that Greek Ministers received encouragement, oral or otherwise, from me to continue their advance in Asia Minor. As is well known to Foreign Office, my entire efforts were directed to inducing them to withdraw and to place their case in the hands of Powers. My first effort was made at Paris in June 1921, when I proposed Allied mediation on basis of retirement of Greek forces from Asia Minor. My second attempt was in October and November 1921, when M. Gounaris and M. Baltazzis came to London and after a long discussion I induced them to place Greece in the hands of the Allies on the same basis. These discussions were reported to French and Italian Governments at the time. It is monstrous to detach an isolated expression of friendliness or sympathy for Greece from report of these proceedings and to cite it in a sense diametrically opposed to entire course of my policy and advice."

No. 698.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 1, 1922.*

YESTERDAY was a quiet day. The Financial Sub-Committee met in the morning and commenced discussion of pre-war debt without making much advancement. A meeting took place between our oil experts and Turkish delegates, about which a separate telegram is being sent. It seems probable that if we can make an arrangement by which Turks will be admitted to a share, either in produce or in royalties, their demand for Mosul will be altogether withdrawn.

War Office and Admiralty experts are considering Straits question with their French and Italian colleagues in the light of what appears likely to be Turco-Russian demands. In the course of the day Turks asked that discussion on Straits fixed for to-day should be postponed in order to enable Chicherin to arrive from Berlin. I agreed to this, and case will be opened Monday. I do not expect any further trouble about Russian demand for a place in other discussions. I am trying to hurry on setting up of commission on Capitulations, which is one of the corner stones of any new treaty, but find some difficulty owning to dilatoriness of Italians, who make little or no contribution to our proceedings, and to constant request by Turks for postponement arising from their case not being ready or their staff being insufficient for manifold labours in which they are called upon to take part. Behind the scenes Italians are giving great trouble, putting forward outrageous demands for commercial or other concessions as price of their remaining in the conference. I have had to speak plainly to them about this shameless attempt at blackmail, which seems to be inseparable from Italian conceptions of policy, and renders any dealings with them very difficult. I have been obliged to ask that certain proposals tentatively put forward by them should be withdrawn if they are to escape serious official notice at my hands.

I should not be surprised if they are all the while seeking to negotiate some private agreement with Turks, although what they have to offer them I am at a loss to imagine Further, I fully expect Mussolini, the arch anti-communist, who is seeking to make a trading agreement with Soviet Government, will also grant them full *de jure* recognition before conference has come to an end

Venizelos abstained for a day after news of Greek murders, but has resumed participation in conference proceedings. He again offered through an intermediary to place himself in my hands, but I refused to respond.

Statements in English newspapers that conference is at a standstill or is a failure have no foundation. While technical questions are being thrashed out in committee dramatic progress cannot be expected.

No. 699.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 481.)
(Telegraphic.) *Washington, November 30, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 478.

(R.) Amongst the most misleading articles are those sent from Lausanne to "Washington Post" by Henry Wales. In his last article appearing to-day he states that Great Britain and United States are "split" over the open-door policy in Asia Minor, and, despite Lord Curzon's announcement, are "still at loggerheads." British continue to demand special privileges, and main issue of conference is being held up while British seek to conclude direct private agreement with Turks regarding oil concessions. (End of R.)

As it is desirable to prevent as far as possible revival of oil discussions here, member of British delegation may think advisable to see Mr. Wales and put him right in his facts.

No. 700.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 1, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 47 of 28th November was considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence to-day.

View taken by the committee, and endorsed by the Prime Minister, is that His Majesty's Government ought not to shoulder grave responsibility of an individual pledge to guarantee perpetual neutrality and inviolability of Turkish territory. As regards a collective guarantee against foreign aggression, they consider that His Majesty's Government should not go beyond the obligation by which they will become bound under article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the event of Turkey joining the League, which it is understood she will be pressed to do.

So far as any demilitarised portions of Turkish territory are concerned it may be necessary, and His Majesty's Government should be prepared, to go somewhat further and undertake to act upon the advice which the Council of the League may give as to the means of fulfilling the obligation under article 10 of the covenant, provided the other signatories of the present treaty give the same undertaking. It would be well specifically to reserve to each signatory the right to act independently in the event of the council being unable to arrive at a unanimous decision.

The committee, having heard the advice of Sir Cecil Hurst, believe that the above suggestions will be found to meet the two-fold requirements to which your Lordship refers in the concluding sentence of your telegram.

If Turkish concession to the arrangement now proposed could more easily be obtained by restricting demilitarisation to the western and northern frontiers of Thrace and the zone of the Straits, the committee consider that no commensurate advantage would be obtained by insisting on the demilitarisation of Central Thrace.

[E 13502/13003/44] No. 701.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

Draft Minutes of the First Plenary Session held at the Hôtel du Château at Ouchy, November 21, 1922, at 11 A.M., under the Provisional Presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 2.)

Present:

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*in the Chair*).	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.
United States of America.	**Japan.**	**Greece.**
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Venizelos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.
Roumania.	**Serb-Croat-Slovene State.**	**Turkey.**
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandi.	M. M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.

Also present:

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Sir William Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. B. Nogara.
Major-General Burnett-Stuart.	General Weygand.	M. G. Ciamarra.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Laroche.	M. G. D. Guarnaschelli.
Mr. Fountain.	M. Fromageot.	
Mr. Malkin.	M. Bargeton.	
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. Serruys.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Bexon.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. Corbin.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Waley.	M. Barois.	
Mr. McClure.	Lieut.-Colonel Courtin.	
	Cmdt. de Lamoricière.	
	Captain d'Astier.	

Japan.	Greece	Roumania.
Mr. Sato.	General A. Mazarakis.	M. Dumitresco.
Colonel Saigo.	M. Vassili Dendramis.	
Captain Tsuru.		

Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
M. Anlich.	Moukhtar Bey.
Captain Tsuru.	Tevfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Mr. Spring Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. F. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Constantin Collas.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Vladimir Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

1. *Thanks to the Swiss Government.*

LORD CURZON stated that before proceeding with the business of the meeting he desired to express the thanks of the conference to the Government of the Swiss Confederation, and to the authorities of the Canton of Vaud and the town of Lausanne, not only for their courtesy in placing the necessary premises at the disposal of the conference, but also for all the facilities which they had offered to the various delegations for their postal, telegraphic and telephone communications. These facilities would contribute greatly to the rapidity and success of the negotiations.

M. BARRERE, MARQUIS GARRONI, BARON HAYASHI and ISMET PASHA associated themselves with these declarations.

2. *Language.*

LORD CURZON raised the question of the languages to be used at the conference. There were three official languages: French, Italian and English. His experience of conferences had convinced him that the translation of speeches into several languages occasioned much loss of time. Since French was understood by most of the delegations, speeches in French need not be translated generally; it would be sufficient to translate speeches made in languages other than French. If a delegate did not understand any statements made in French, he could either during the course of the speech or at the end ask for a translation or summary of all or part of it.

3. *Rules of Procedure.*

The first object of the present meeting was to discuss the draft rules of procedure which had been prepared the day before by a committee of experts. This draft had been communicated to all the delegations, and therefore need not be read through. He proposed to discuss it article by article in order that each delegation might have the opportunity of presenting its observations. (For the draft rules, see Annex.)

Article 1.

LORD CURZON said that article 1 was a simple enumeration of the Powers represented at the conference, and appeared to call for no observations.

ISMET PASHA observed, in reference to the title of the draft, that it would be better to replace the words "Draft Rules of the Conference on Eastern Affairs" by the expression "Draft Rules of the Conference of Lausanne."

He further remarked that the enumeration of the Powers represented by plenipotentiaries was not exhaustive, and that it would be better to specify the Powers which had been indicated in the notes exchanged between the Allies and Turkey with a view to the opening of the conference, as well as the questions which those Powers would be called upon to discuss. As regards the second paragraph of the article, he must insist on the representation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia in the discussion on the régime of the Straits.

With reference to the third paragraph, he declared that the Turkish delegation were not authorised by their full powers to engage in negotiations with Powers which had not been named in the above-mentioned notes.

LORD CURZON said that the title of the conference had better be "Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs." It had appeared unnecessary to name the participating Powers, since they were well known and had been enumerated in the press. As regards the representation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia in the discussion of the régime of the Straits, the draft submitted to the conference met the desire expressed by Ismet Pasha, since it provided for the participation in these negotiations of the States bordering on the shores of the Black Sea.

M. BARRERE thought that this discussion was due to a misunderstanding which could easily be cleared up. It would not be desirable to introduce into the rules of the conference questions of a political character which would be examined later on. If the Turkish delegation were willing to recognise the desirability of separating the discussion of political questions from those of procedure, the misunderstanding would be removed.

ISMET PASHA nevertheless maintained his reservations in regard to the first and third paragraphs of article 1.

Article 2.

ISMET PASHA said that the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had appointed three plenipotentiary delegates, and that Turkey had not adhered to the proposal of the Allied Powers to limit the number of plenipotentiaries to two from each Power.

LORD CURZON thought that in practice the observation of Ismet Pasha presented no difficulty, since the two plenipotentiary delegates could always be accompanied by a technical adviser and a plenipotentiary could attend in that capacity.

ISMET PASHA maintained the view which he had just expressed on the subject of the plenipotentiary character of the three Turkish delegates.

Article 3.

LORD CURZON said that this article concerned the presidency of the conference.

ISMET PASHA objected to the rotation of the presidency being limited to France, Great Britain and Italy, and asked that this rotation should also include Turkey on the ground that the latter had also in the first instance invited the Powers to Smyrna; the position of an inviting Power could also apply to her.

LORD CURZON pointed out that article 3 also concerned the institution of a general secretariat.

ISMET PASHA said that since his proposal on the subject of the presidency had not been adopted, he suggested as a minimum compensation the choice of a member of the Turkish delegation as secretary-general of the conference. He also took this occasion to reaffirm that the Turkish delegation was participating in the Conference of Lausanne on the same footing of equality as the other Powers.

LORD CURZON said that Ismet Pasha's request was contrary to all precedents. He was happy to propose the appointment of M. Massigli as secretary-general. He had had frequent opportunity for appreciating the ability and courtesy of M. Massigli, and he thought that the conference would be very fortunate if M. Massigli would be so good as to accept the office which he proposed to confide to him. (Assent.)

ISMET PASHA, while making reserves on the principle at issue, stated that he had no objection to the appointment of M. Massigli as secretary-general of the conference, and associated himself with the proposal made by Lord Curzon.

M. MASSIGLI thanked the conference for the confidence which they had been good enough to repose in him, and said that he would use all his efforts to show himself worthy of it.

Article 4.

Article 4 was adopted without observation.

Article 5.

LORD CURZON observed that this article concerned a very important question. It proposed that all questions involved in the scope of the conference should be examined by three commissions, the president of each commission being a delegate of one of the three inviting Powers. These commissions were also empowered to nominate sub-commissions and committees of experts, the chairmanship of which would be open to all the delegations. The plenary sessions of the conference would be rare; they would only take place when summoned to receive and discuss the reports presented by the commissions. The latter would perform the essential part of the work. He suggested that the first Italian delegate should preside over the second commission, the first French delegate over the third, and the first British delegate over the first.

ISMET PASHA accepted the method of work proposed by Lord Curzon. He thought that as the questions to be treated by the commissions directly and primarily concerned Turkish interests, the Turkish delegation should participate in the presidency of them. He further declared that the régime of the Straits could only be settled (as had already been stipulated in the notes which his Government had addressed to the Powers on the subject) with the express participation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia.

LORD CURZON said that he wished to repeat the statement already made by him in connection with article 1, that he attached the greatest importance, as moreover did all the other Allied Powers, to the participation of the States bordering on the Black Sea in the discussion on the régime of the Straits. As all those present knew, an invitation to this effect had been addressed to the Russian Government, but the latter had not yet given a definite reply.

As regards the question of the presidency of the commissions, he wished to observe to Ismet Pasha that the assumption of it by the inviting Powers did not imply any intention of failing in courtesy towards the Turkish delegation. In point of fact the responsibility for the conference rested on those Powers which had convoked it; that was why it belonged to them to direct the debates of the commissions. Moreover, the sub-commissions would certainly be very numerous, and there was no objection to these sub-commissions appointing a member of the Turkish delegation to preside over them. He was anxious to remove from the minds of the Turkish delegation any feeling that there was the slightest desire to treat them less favourably than the other delegations.

ISMET PASHA replied that his objection did not in any way arise from the fear that Turkey would be treated on a different footing from the other Powers; it was dictated to him by his concern for the very important interests represented by the Turkish delegation.

LORD CURZON took note of Ismet Pasha's remarks and proposed to pass to the discussion of the next article (No. 6).

Article 6.

Article 6 was adopted.

Article 7.

LORD CURZON said that he knew from experience how important it was for the smooth progress of the discussions that the proposals to be examined by the conference should be communicated in advance in writing, so that the delegations should know what was to be discussed. Only on this condition could discussion be fruitful. It was of course more difficult to prescribe the same rule in regard to amendments which often arose out of the discussion itself. It would, however, be convenient if the exact text of such amendments were handed to the secretary-general in writing as soon as possible. (Approved.)

Article 8.

Article 8 was adopted.

Article 9.

LORD CURZON thought that the provisions of this article were very important. They related to the secrecy which must attach to the deliberations of the conference. Having regard to the importance of the interests to be discussed, it was necessary to abstain from making any disclosure regarding the negotiations in progress. It should be sufficient if a daily communiqué were issued to the press, recording the results achieved; but it was important that the delegations should undertake not to disclose to anybody what had happened at the conference.

M. BARRÈRE entirely shared the opinion of Lord Curzon. He thought that discretion was indispensable in order to allow the conference to conduct its work to a successful conclusion. An endeavour should be made to let public opinion receive trustworthy information which could not in any way disturb it. At all costs, public passions must not be brought into the debates of the conference. For his part, he would loyally observe the undertaking proposed by Lord Curzon.

MARQUIS GARRONI associated himself with these declarations, and said that it would be well to direct the secretary-general to give the press suitable information every day.

ISMET PASHA said he would prefer that the debates should be public, but in order to associate himself with the opinion of the majority of the delegations present he adhered to Lord Curzon's proposal. He must, however, state that in case the Turkish delegation were not in agreement on the text of the communiqué, they must reserve to themselves the right of drawing up and publishing a separate communiqué.

LORD CURZON hoped that the communiqués published by the secretary-general would only contain information of a general character on which all the delegations would be able to agree. (Approved.)

Article 10.

ISMET PASHA proposed that the protocols should be signed by the secretaries-general of the delegations of the Powers enumerated in article 6. It was only on this condition that he could dispense with the reading of the protocol at the beginning of each meeting. A protocol, in his opinion, was a diplomatic act of an official character, and must therefore bear the signature of the Turkish delegation on the same footing as that of the secretary-general who represented the Great Powers.

M. MASSIGLI thought that the difficulty indicated by Ismet Pasha would easily be avoided by deciding that the drafting of the protocols should be made in close collaboration with the secretary-general of the Turkish delegation. He wished also to recall the fact that the protocols only became valid when they had been

approved by all the delegations. If the conference agreed, this approval could be certified by having the definitive protocols signed by the secretaries-general of the delegations. (Approved.)

4. *Position of the United States Delegation.*

MR. CHILD, on behalf of the United States delegation, desired to express his great satisfaction at taking part in the work of the conference. The United States delegation would be present at all the discussions, and desired to be treated and heard on a footing of entire equality with the other delegations. He must frankly state that the United States delegation did not ask to take part in the actual negotiations, to put its signature to any documents, nor to take any engagement whatsoever. He added that the declarations which he would have to make would be as clear and concise as possible.

5. *Future Business.*

LORD CURZON expressed the cordial satisfaction of the conference at the presence of the United States representatives.

He said that the conference would meet again in the afternoon at 4 o'clock in plenary session to hear the general observations of the delegations. The First Commission would sit the next day (22nd November) at 10·30 A.M.

M. BARRÈRE said he was anxious that the three commissions should not sit simultaneously, so that all the delegates could take part in the debates. (Approved.)

LORD CURZON preferred that only the First Commission should sit to begin with, and that the conference should wait before embarking on the work of the other two commissions until the first had made some progress.

He added that the secretary-general requested his colleagues from the various delegations to meet in his office at 2·30 P.M. in order to settle questions of detail as regards the working of the conference.

(*The meeting adjourned at* 1·5 P.M.)

ANNEX.

Projet de Règlement de la Conférence sur les Affaires d'Orient.

I.

La Conférence réunie à Lausanne, sur l'invitation des Gouvernements de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie, en vue de rétablir la paix générale en Orient, comprend les représentants plénipotentiaires des Puissances entre lesquelles l'état de paix a été rompu depuis 1914 et n'a pas encore été définitivement rétabli, ainsi que les représentants des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

En outre, et en ce qui concerne la discussion du régime des Détroits, la conférence comprend les représentants des autres pays qui, riverains de la mer Noire, ont été de ce chef invités à participer à cette discussion.

Les tierces Puissances, intéressées au règlement des affaires d'Orient, pourront être admises dans les discussions à faire connaître leurs vues soit oralement, soit par écrit, sur les questions les concernant directement.

II.

Les Puissances seront représentées par des délégués plénipotentiaires au nombre de deux au maximum par Puissance. Les délégués plénipotentiaires pourront être assistés de délégués techniques ou experts, dûment accrédités, ainsi que de secrétaires, interprètes et sténographes.

Les délégués plénipotentiaires ne pourront être accompagnés aux séances, en plus de leurs délégués techniques ou experts nécessaires, que d'un secrétaire, un interprète et deux sténographes au plus.

Les protocoles des séances mentionneront soigneusement le nom et la qualité de toutes les personnes présentes.

III.

Les Puissances qui ont organisé la conférence pourvoiront à tour de rôle à la présidence. Il sera constitué un secrétariat où sera représentée chacune des

Puissances visées au premier paragraphe de l'article 1er. Le secrétariat aura pour mission, sous le contrôle de la présidence, d'établir les protocoles de séances, de pourvoir à l'organisation administrative de la conférence, et, en général, d'assurer la marche régulière, ponctuelle et impartiale des services qui lui seront confiés.

Le secrétariat sera dirigé par un secrétaire général.

Le secrétaire général aura la garde et la responsabilité des archives.

IV.

Dès la constitution du secrétariat, chaque délégué remettra au secrétariat général les pouvoirs dont il est muni ainsi qu'une liste contenant les noms, titres et qualité des personnes qui font partie de sa délégation.

Le secrétaire général sera chargé d'examiner les pouvoirs et pourra, s'il est nécessaire, se faire assister à cet effet par le comité restreint de jurisconsultes ci-après prévu.

V.

Trois commissions, auxquelles participeront dans les conditions prévues à l'article 1er les Puissances visées audit article, seront chargées de l'étude des questions impliquées dans la conclusion du Traité de Paix, savoir :

1. Commission des Questions territoriales et militaires; régime des Détroits;
2. Commission du Régime des Etrangers et des Minorités en Turquie;
3. Commission des Questions financières et économiques; ports et chemins de fer; questions sanitaires.

Chacune de ces commissions sera présidée par un délégué d'une des Puissances qui ont organisé la conférence.

Dans les commissions, la présidence sera, en l'absence du président, occupée par le second délégué de la Puissance à laquelle la présidence a été attribuée.

Chaque commission aura la liberté de constituer, s'il y a lieu, des sous-commissions et de confier à des comités, composés de délégués techniques ou experts, l'examen de questions particulières avec mission de présenter un rapport et de proposer des solutions.

VI.

Un Comité de Rédaction, composé d'un nombre restreint de jurisconsultes qualifiés sera constitué pour assurer la coordination des résultats de la conférence et leur composition finale, ainsi que pour donner tous renseignements juridiques qui lui seraient demandés. Ce comité comprendra un représentant italien, un représentant japonais et un représentant ottoman.

VII.

Tous mémoires, propositions, amendements et, en général, tous documents destinés à figurer dans les protocoles ou à être discutés par la conférence ou par une commission ou sous-commission devront toujours être présentés, au préalable au secrétariat général, par écrit, signé par ou au nom du plénipotentiaire qui en aura eu l'initiative.

VIII.

Sauf pour les propositions ou amendements ayant trait aux questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour d'une séance et résultant des discussions en cours, tous mémoires, propositions ou documents émanant des plénipotentiaires membres de la conférence devront être adressés au secrétariat général, qui en assurera la distribution immédiate.

Tous mémoires, pétitions, projets ou autres documents adressés à la conférence et émanant d'autres personnes que les plénipotentiaires membres de la conférence seront reçus par le secrétariat général et distribués dans les limites du nombre d'exemplaires qui les auront accompagnés.

IX.

La publicité des travaux de la conférence sera assurée par les communiqués officiels préparés par le secrétariat général.

X.

Les protocoles rédigés par les soins du secrétariat seront signés du secrétaire général et distribués en épreuves provisoires à trois exemplaires au moins à chaque délégation, dans le plus court délai possible.

Pour accélérer le travail, la communication préalable ainsi faite tiendra lieu de lecture des protocoles au début des séances.

Si aucune modification n'est demandée par les délégués dans les quarante-huit heures qui suivront la distribution, le texte en sera considéré comme approuvé et déposé aux archives.

Le 20 novembre 1922.

[E 13503/13003/44] No. 702.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

Draft Minutes of the Second Plenary Session, held at the Hôtel du Château at Ouchy, November 21, 1922, at 4 P.M., under the Presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 2.)

Present:

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*in the Chair*).	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Venizelos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandi.	M. M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.

Also present:

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Sir William Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. B. Nogara.
Sir Adam Block.	General Weygand.	M. G. Ciamarra.
Major-General Burnett-Stuart.	M. Laroche.	M. G. D. Guarnaschelli
Captain A. D. Pound, R.N.	M. Fromageot.	
Mr. Malkin.	M. Bargeton.	
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. Serruys.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Bexon.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. Corbin.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. de Percin.	
Major McCleod.	M. Barois.	
Mr. McClure.	Lieut.-Colonel Courtin.	
Captain Ashley.	Cmdt. de Lamoricière.	
	Capitaine d'Astier.	

Japan.	Greece.	Roumania.
Mr. Sato.	Général A. Mazarakis.	M. Dumitresco.
Col. Saigo.	M. Vassili Dendramis.	
Cap. de Frégate Tsuru.		

Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
M. Anlich.	Moukhtar Bey.
	Tewfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. F. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Constantin Collas.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Vladimir Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON wished to make some explanations in regard to the rules approved in the morning. Article 2 provided that the plenipotentiary delegates might be assisted by technical delegates or experts, and also by secretaries, interpreters and stenographers. It was most important that the number of persons accompanying the plenipotentiaries should be limited as much as possible.

ISMET PASHA admitted that his statements at the morning meeting had not been fully understood. He renewed his general reservations and protests, especially on the subject of articles 1, 2 and 3 of the draft rules. The Powers which were to take part in the negotiations had been enumerated in the note of the 23rd September from the three Allied Powers, and also in the reply of the Turkish Government of the 4th October; and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had given its representatives full powers accordingly. The Turkish delegation therefore announced that they were unable to negotiate with third Powers, and added that the delegation would take part in the debates with their three plenipotentiary delegates.

LORD CURZON said that he had listened with the greatest respect to the remarks of the Turkish delegation. He considered it, however, inadmissible to reopen the discussion on a question which the conference had regarded as settled. The impression of the conference at the morning session had without doubt been that the draft rules submitted to the delegations were approved. The Turkish delegation, which had asked to be treated on a footing of perfect equality with the other delegations, now claimed a privileged situation. They wished to have three plenipotentiary delegates, while the other Powers were only represented by two. All he could do was to take note of the protest made by the Turkish delegation, but he was unable in any way to accept the reopening of the discussion, which had been closed.

M. BARRÈRE said that, despite his desire to take the fullest account of the legitimate protests of the Turkish delegation, he could not do otherwise than support Lord Curzon's remarks.

MARQUIS GARRONI also agreed with the opinion of M. Barrère and Lord Curzon.

ISMET PASHA said that he did not solicit any privileged situation or special treatment, but based his claim upon the decision taken in the morning to divest article 1 of any political character. On that condition only the Turkish delegation had, in the preceding session, accepted the draft submitted to them, and since the draft had not been modified in consequence, the Turkish delegation repeated their protest on the point, and considered the draft as not adopted by them. He thought that this was a question of principle which could not be settled by a majority vote.

LORD CURZON said that the point of view of the Turkish delegation would be placed on record. He had no intention whatever of depriving the Turkish delegation of the formal right to express their opinion. He proposed to the conference, after having registered the opinion of the Turkish delegation, to pass

to the order of the day. He requested the delegations to be good enough to express their general views on the questions which the conference had to solve; it seemed to him opportune to institute a general exchange of views before broaching the work of the commissions.

M. BARRÈRE made the following statement:—

"The mission with which the representatives of the Powers assembled here find themselves charged is one of the highest among those which fall to diplomacy. From this conference the return of peace in the East should ensue. That is the work which it is indispensable to accomplish with a view to the re-establishment of the prosperity of the world, which we cannot conceive apart from general pacification.

"After so many years of trouble and war, so much loss of human life and of material, so much suffering of every kind, humanity aspires to the return of tranquillity and confidence. Nowhere is this task more urgent than in the regions which had just undergone the horrors of war, even before the European war was let loose by the criminal ambition of those who wished to establish their hegemony in Europe.

"It is time to return to the normal laws governing the existence of peoples and to restore the order and tranquillity without which nations can neither work nor live.

"To accomplish this task recourse must be had to all the resources of diplomacy, that beneficent factor in international relations which is based on experience and knowledge of affairs. These are the methods, Gentlemen, under which we will work here. We are concerned to restore security and confidence, which cannot exist without respect for the immutable laws of justice and right; we will approach the grave problems placed before us with the desire and the will to devise a solution which will endure for all the legitimate interests involved.

"The Eastern problem interests not only the peoples directly concerned. It has a general bearing and is related to the maintenance of the peace of the world. We must never lose sight of this aspect of the question in the course of our common labours.

"To lead so arduous a task to a successful conclusion we shall need the entire co-operation and goodwill of all members of the conference. I feel sure we shall find them united with a single mind in collaborating for the establishment of an equitable peace, founded on the mutual respect of rights and legitimate interests, which will thus consecrate the principle for the sake of which the country which I have the honour to represent here has sustained, together with her allies, the most cruel of wars.

"Such, Gentlemen, are the sentiments with which the French delegation will be inspired in the deliberations now about to open. They recognise that the national interests which they have to preserve are solidarity with those of many others, and that there is nothing in them incompatible with respect for those legitimate rights which may be asserted here.

"Gentlemen, I see around me many eminent and experienced diplomats. Permit me to find in their presence a precious pledge for the issue of these negotiations. The virtue of diplomacy is the art of conciliating divergent interests, settling disagreements, preparing peace and not war. Diplomacy does not, thank God, seek publicity; it is repugnant to diplomacy to do business in the market place, to introduce into its work the fluctuations of an opinion which is apt to reject proposals one day and approve them the next; diplomacy seeks, in a word, to cultivate good sense, foresight and common-sense. This is why I found great hopes, in these memorable and difficult circumstances, on the activity and clear-sightedness of diplomacy in the work of pacification which we are seeking to realise."

MARQUIS GARRONI made the following statement in Italian:—

"In a conference for the purpose of concluding peace, it seems to me that it should be agreeable to hear the Italian language, which recalls in a special way the language of Rome, the mother of international law. That law has been constrained by human imperfection to devote itself to the study of war conditions, but it has interested itself far more—for the welfare, progress and civilisation of mankind—in all that concerns humanity, progress and civilisation. After long years of warfare, there now prevails among all peoples the longing to see arms laid aside, the desire and the need to heal by peace the consequences of war.

"We are to-day the spokesmen of this hope and this desire—all united, one must certainly hope, in a single purpose, that of attaining the object for which we are assembled here.

"Let a spirit of peace, therefore, reign in this room, and let us all agree to work closely together in order to encompass the desired end on the soil of this hospitable country, which has always held high the banner of peace.

"To the President of the Helvetic Confederation, to our allies, to all the representatives of the various States assembled here, I offer my cordial and respectful greeting."

LORD CURZON, in the name of the British delegation, said that he cordially echoed the sentiments so eloquently expressed by his French and Italian colleagues.

BARON HAYASHI said that the Japanese delegation had the keenest desire to co-operate in the work of the conference, and thus to ensure the re-establishment of definite peace; they would make every effort to smooth out any difficulties which might arise.

(The meeting rose at 4·40 P.M.)

[E 13499/13003/44] No. 703.

Note forwarded by the Peace Delegation at Lausanne on November 30, for the information of the Foreign Office, with reference to Lord Curzon's telegram No. 42 of November 27.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 9.)

LES présidents de la Conférence de Lausanne ont l'honneur d'accuser réception à MM. les délégués russes de leur note en date du 27 novembre.

Ils croient devoir faire connaître à MM. Rakovsky et Vorovsky qu'ils ne sauraient accepter l'interprétation qu'ils donnent du télégramme adressé, le 14 novembre, par le Gouvernement français à M. Tchitcherine. Ce télégramme est d'ailleurs conforme aux notes remises à M. Tchitcherine au nom des Gouvernements britannique et italien.

Ce télégramme précise que les représentants des Soviets "auront dans la discussion de la question des Détroits le droit de participer aux négociations et aux décisions et seront ainsi en mesure de faire connaître leur point de vue sur les différents aspects de cette question."

Les délégués britannique, français et italien à la Conférence de Lausanne estiment que cette invitation ne prête à aucun malentendu et qu'elle ne peut être interprétée dans le sens indiqué dans la note russe du 27 novembre.

En conséquence, les délégués russes seront invités à participer aux négociations pendant la discussion de la question des Détroits.

La première réunion de la commission chargée par la conférence de l'examen de cette question aura lieu vendredi, à 11 heures du matin.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
CAMILLE BARRÈRE.
GARRONI.

Lausanne, le 27 novembre 1922.

No. 704.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 748.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 1, 1922.

THERE is no essential modification in situation here, though Turkish press is showing a strong anti-British tendency and great dissatisfaction with conference proceedings.

Several articles have appeared in Turkish press on the subject of alleged journey to Constantinople of number of Armenian revolutionaries with object of creating disorder here and of assassinating Nationalist leaders. Report emanated from Angora, and as British connivance was implied, I have had denial of implication in that respect published in Turkish and foreign press.

But report itself, has, in my opinion, been published with definite object of creating panic amongst Armenians here. There is good reason to believe that Angora appreciates difficulty of getting rid of Constantinople Armenians, for whom there is no basis of exchange.

As in case of Ottoman Greeks in Anatolia, Turks prefer, if possible, to achieve object by methods of intimidation rather than overt compulsion, which would compromise their position in eyes of Western world, and particularly America. At the same time, reports provide semblance of good cause for massacres of Armenians in last resort, or if any untoward incident actually occurs.

While I prefer, however, not to anticipate massacre while Allied forces remain here, possibility of anticipatory or *post facto* reprisals is calculated to produce consternation amongst Armenians and induce them to leave apparently of their own free will.

Since dual control was instituted in police matters, Ottoman Greeks and Armenians no longer enjoy protection of Allied police. It is very probable that advantage will be taken of this to resort to persecution and extortion on continually increasing scale with double object of driving Ottoman Christians out of Constantinople and of getting as much money as possible out of them before they go. This is more probable as Turkish Administration is undoubtedly finding it difficult to provide money for salaries of officials, &c.

It is clear that if Turks definitely wish to get rid of Ottoman Greek population, one of the most effective methods of evacuation by intimidation would be through Œcumenical Patriarch. As Turks did not recognise latter's election they might insist on his resignation or, alternatively, his expulsion, possibly even his arrest. As Ottoman Greek subject, it would not be easy to justify Allied intervention on his behalf. If arrested I think we should insist on his release, but if expelled it would seem difficult to interfere, though his departure might produce serious panic.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 38.)

No. 705.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 63.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 1, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Secretary of State for the Colonies and President of the Board of Trade :—

"Following my conversation with Ismet Pasha, I arranged that Vernon, Clarke and Forbes Adam should have informal conversations with Turkish expert, Mukhtar Bey, regarding oil in Irak.

"At first conversation, Mukhtar asked at once definitely for participation of Turkey in Turkish Petroleum Company on same lines as France and United States. It was explained to him that question was one of participation in commercial company, in which His Majesty's Government could not dictate terms, and that great difficulties were involved. He did not seem much impressed with this argument in view of arrangement already made by His Majesty's Government to bring in French and Americans, although my experts pointed out that American participation was a purely commercial transaction between the American and British companies. He was satisfied that Turkey could find necessary capital to take up her shares. He also seemed generally aware that claim of company in pre-war concession might not be legally watertight.

"Given Turkish participation, he said that question of Mosul frontier might be regarded as decided in our favour. Of course, no one section of treaty can be definitely settled apart from the rest.

"At second conversation, experts, on my instructions, sounded Mukhtar as to Turkey accepting some percentage of royalties paid by company to Irak Government as an alternative to participation in the company. *Primâ facie*, this seemed to me to offer a less complicated method of satisfying Turkey. It would, of course, require the consent of the Irak Government, but experts discussed it informally with Jaafar Pasha, before putting it forward to Mukhtar Bey, and Jaafar seemed to think that if it really gave to Irak the frontiers which they desired and security for the Mosul Vilayet, his Government would not think the price too great. Mukhtar Bey promised that his delegation would consider this alternative, but

explained that his present instructions only allowed him to discuss direct participation in the company.

"This brings me to the question of Italian participation. Italian experts here have already made it quite clear to my experts that they think that His Majesty's Government should help Italy to participate in oil exploitation in Irak. Italy's claim is indeed difficult to resist. Article 9 of the Treaty of London, 1915, practically promised Italy as a prize for coming into the war compensating advantages for Italy in Turkey for any advantages secured by France and Great Britain. Whatever may be the French and British view of advantages actually accruing from administration of mandates, Italy regards them as definitely profitable to Great Britain and France. The tripartite agreement was framed in 1920 to meet Italy's claims arising from article 9 of the Treaty of London. So far as Italy is concerned, the actual benefits which she was to derive from the tripartite agreement depended in the main on the clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres, which gave the Allied Financial Commission control over the grant of new Turkish concessions. From this point of view the tripartite agreement is no longer applicable. It seems to me therefore of great importance, in order to liquidate Italy's general claim upon us, which Signor Mussolini is obviously determined to press, that every endeavour should be made, however great the technical difficulties, to give Italy some percentage of shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company, even if that percentage be not as great as those of France and America. It is for this reason that I personally favour the alternative of payment of royalties by the company to Turkey instead of actual participation of Turkey in the new company, provided Turkey would accept former in satisfaction of her claim on Mosul. I realise from experts' explanations here that it would be very difficult to secure a rearrangement of shares in the company so as to admit both Turkish and Italian participation.

"Political importance of a settlement on the above lines, from point of view of His Majesty's Government, Irak Government, Italian and Turkish Governments, cannot be overestimated, and I trust that matter may be taken up at once with interested parties and Irak Government, and that I may be informed as soon as possible what definite proposals can be made to Turkey and Italy. Company must be made to realise that the value of their rights is entirely dependent on diplomatic and political support, and that this means that due weight must be attached to political objects connected with the concession quite apart from commercial advantages resulting from a satisfactory political settlement.

"I would prefer that no representatives of Turkish Petroleum Company should come here without further consultation with me, as I am anxious to avoid giving colour to stories, already rife in press of London and Paris, that private commercial bargains on a large scale are being negotiated outside the conference."

No. 706.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 1, 1922.*

THIS afternoon I convened first commission to discuss question of exchange of Greek and Turkish populations and prisoners of war. I had circulated in advance statement by Dr. Nansen, who had been invested by League of Nations with charge of this subject, and had been in contact both with Greek and Turkish Governments.

He was present, but his official character was denied by Turks, who also admitted no recognition of League of Nations.

Nevertheless, after a long discussion, in which I pleaded immense urgency of subject, described numbers involved, and laid down principles on which exchange should be based, Turks agreed to appointment of sub-committee in order to draw up a convention with least possible delay. This sub-committee will meet to-morrow, chief points to be decided being whether exchange should be voluntary or compulsory, and whether it should apply to all areas concerned or only to some.

It was then decided to set up second commission on Capitulations under Marquis Garroni without further delay, and its first meeting will be held to-morrow afternoon.

No. 707.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 596.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 2, 1922.*

YOUR unnumbered telegram of 30th November: Alleged anti-Moslem excesses in Macedonia and Crete.

We have no information as to alleged massacres in Macedonia. If reports were true we should probably have heard.

Reports of massacres in Crete are baseless, but situation there is dangerous. Numbers of Moslems have been dispossessed of their farms and property by bands of refugees, of which there are a large number in the island. In the circumstances this is hardly to be wondered at.

Greek Government are endeavouring to arrange for return of Moslems to their farms and for accommodation being provided to reasonable number of Christian refugees on such farms.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 378.)

No. 708.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 350.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 477 and my telegram No. 349 of 1st December.

Prime Minister has suggested that the following extract from his speech in the debate on the Address on 22nd November might be of use to you:—

"The hon. gentleman (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) spoke about Mesopotamia and Mosul and all the rest. That is an obsession with his party—'the hidden hand.' I can assure the whole House—and here I am certain that I am speaking for my predecessor as well as myself—that we do not want to stop in Mesopotamia for any oil that is in Mesopotamia. What is more, our system of government does not lend itself to getting advantages for ourselves in countries which are in that way under our control. If I were speaking as one representing the trading interests of this country, I would be just as confident of our getting our share of any oil development if it were in the hands of another country as if it were in our own. There is nothing of that kind We are trying to get peace."

[E 13599/13003/44] No. 709.

Memorandum by Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 3.)

AT the request of Ismet Pasha I called upon his Excellency at 10 o'clock last night at the Lausanne-Palace Hotel, and spent two hours in his company alone.

The first subject Ismet took up was the question of oil, by enquiring whether the Turkish Government could look forward to a share in the Mosul supply. I replied that nobody would be more anxious than the British Government to afford every kind of economic assistance to the new Turkish State as soon as a satisfactory peace settlement had been concluded, but I repeated to him Lord Curzon's warning of the day before that he must not look upon any oil or financial contribution on our part as part of a bargain in connection with the drawing up of the treaty. Our economic contribution towards helping Turkey to rebuild herself after the war was a thing apart, and should be treated apart.

The next point his Excellency took up was the rectification of the Mosul frontier. Here again I reminded him of Lord Curzon's statement to him that to the demand for the restoration of the Mosul Vilayet he would be compelled to return an unqualified negative, but that he was prepared to consider in a friendly spirit any rectification that might be desirable owing to local considerations at Mosul.

Ismet Pasha then asked me what I should advise him to do in his position as chief Turkish delegate with regard to the presentation of his case. I answered by suggesting

that the Turks should not confine themselves to a constant reiteration of their demand to be considered as an independent State, master of its own destinies; but that they should rather concentrate their efforts on proving to us that they were qualified to assume such a position. The best way of doing this would be to create internal conditions of government and administration that would enable the European Governments to persuade their own nationals that Turkey was entitled to be granted the claim she made to absolute self-determination and self-management. The best way of doing this was to give the necessary guarantees to Europe that would enable Europe to renounce the special rights she possessed with regard to her nationals in Turkey. I also urged his Excellency to come out openly in favour of the League of Nations, and to utilise to the full the machinery which that body could place at his disposal, both with a view to obtain the guarantees which I thought Turkey was entitled to ask in the regions it was proposed to demilitarise, as well as the League's assistance for the settlement of such questions as, for instance, that of the protection of minorities. On this point Ismet Pasha at once interrupted me and said that Turkey could never admit any inspection of minorities, and that they had quite made up their minds to get rid of the Greek elements by an exchange of Greco-Turkish populations, but to retain the Armenians. I expressed to him my regret to hear this decision, as I felt convinced that by getting rid of the trading classes in his country he would fail to create a public opinion in Europe which would enable the Allied Governments to persuade their business men that Turkey was a country worth helping and saving; on the contrary, the business men of Paris and London would say: "A country which behaves in so stupid a fashion will not attract our money." I also assured his Excellency that he would fail in his endeavour to persuade England and French business men that the Turk could, from one day to another, become a successful trader and take the place of the Greek and Armenian, who had hitherto carried on his business for him. Under this head I also reminded his Excellency that quite a number of countries who had been created by the Treaty of Versailles had found it compatible with their independence and sovereign rights to accept the minority clause of the above treaty, and I suggested to him that what Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia had been able to accept, would surely also be acceptable to Turkey.

As regards Capitulations, his Excellency assured me that his Government would be most uncompromising.

He enquired whether there would be any interference with Turkey's military forces. To this I replied that my impression was that as regards Europe, Turkey would be expected to content herself with a strictly defensive contingent.

At the conclusion of our conversation Ismet Pasha assured me that he would at once make a thorough study of the League of Nations and its machinery, with a view to discover how far he could follow my advice. He also added that when he had made this study and had cleared his mind, he would again get into touch with Lord Curzon with a view to the resumption of his private conversations.

W. T.

Lausanne, November 28, 1922.

No. 710.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 3, 1922.*

YESTERDAY afternoon first meeting of second commission was held, Marquis Garroni in the chair, to deal with question of Capitulations. Chairman made brief introductory statement, laying down necessity of substituting for existing Capitulations some other variety that would be consistent with Turkish independent sovereignty, while guaranteeing necessary protection for foreigners. A general discussion followed, in which Turks, in the course of several speeches, repudiated all idea of Capitulations, and declared unwillingness to do anything beyond the substitution for them of provision in the new commercial treaties.

Japanese delegate pointed out that only after twenty years' minute study of question had Japan obtained freedom from judicial Capitulations. American delegate, in a halting sentence, indicated general concurrence with position of Allies. Commission then set up three sub-committees to deal with the different branches of the subject.

I look forward with some anxiety to their labours, since Turks are certain to adopt an absolutely intransigent attitude, and hope of reasonable compromise at this stage does not strike me as bright.

In the course of proceedings chairman announced transfer to my commission of protection of minorities, which he had previously proposed, referring to a sub-committee of Capitulations Commission. I had vigorously protested against latter proposal in private as wholly inconsistent with importance and world-wide interest of subject, but really because I knew in his hands it would never be properly argued or pushed. I shall take it at an early date and will press it with all [? force] at my command.

No. 711.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December 3, 1922.*

DISCUSSION on Straits begins to-morrow, when I shall invite views of Turks, Russians, Roumanians, Greeks, Bulgarians and other delegations concerned. Various schemes of demilitarisation and neutralisation extending to the whole of the Black Sea and will be put forward by one or other of these parties, and explanation of them will probably occupy greater part of the day.

I shall then adjourn the discussion to enable Allies to take various proposals into consideration before delivering concerted reply. This will probably not be till Wednesday.

We have been in close consultation with French and Italians, and they seem likely to join us in a formula embodying scheme contained in [? French] memorandum of 18th November supplemented by Foch's proposals and modified by suggestions of Committee of Imperial Defence. It is unlikely that either Turks or Russians will accept this proposal as it stands, and in that case British naval and military authorities here are anxious to propose the following alternatives:—

1. Acceptance by Turkey of unrestricted right of passage for merchant ships and men-of-war, not only in peace, but so long as Turkey remains neutral in time of war.

2. In return for this admission Turkey to be given full sovereignty over Straits and allowed to fortify them.

Authors of this scheme claim that it would be practical and reliable, and that our naval and military staff would be able to make their plans on a firm basis of fact, and not, as under first scheme, upon considerations which in time of war would prove uncertain. Further, they add that when Turkey is at war she would, under French proposals, have right and probably power to close the Straits, and although we might, by processes of demilitarisation, gain a few days in which fleet might rush Dardanelles, our position at the end of the week would be so precarious as in practice to be ineffective. On the other hand, they argue that by giving Turks complete control of Straits we should only be admitting in principle a privilege which after a few days would be theirs in fact, and we may, in return, gain unrestricted right of passage for warships in all eventualities except in that of Turkish belligerency. Finally, they think that by thus making a virtue of necessity and rendering Turkey capable of self-defence in case she is attacked, she will become less subservient to Russia, and will tend to look to us for support in the future.

For my part I am indisposed towards above proposals for the following reasons:—

1. I gravely doubt their acceptance by the Allies, while Russia will fight against them tooth and nail.

2. I think that they would be regarded as a cunning device by Great Britain to purchase friendship of Turkey.

3. I am not clear that they would work out in manner suggested.

4. They would be popularly regarded as complete surrender of all that we have fought for in the war, inasmuch as pre-war status in Straits would be not only restored but aggravated, while compensating advantages would be either ignored or misunderstood by public. Nevertheless, I shall be glad if a considered opinion upon them can be sent me on Tuesday next.

No. 712.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 638.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 2, 1922.*

SEVERAL correspondents of French press at Lausanne mention to-day a proposal made to adjourn the conference as soon as the military and territorial clauses of the treaty have been agreed to, leaving the economic and financial provisions to be worked out subsequently by commissions appointed *ad hoc*.

Comment, which is so uniform as to appear due to a *mot d'ordre*, is that France is greatly interested in the former category of questions, but that her moral and material interests in Turkey are so great that she could not agree to the signature of the treaty until adequate safeguards had been elaborated and incorporated in the provisions of that treaty.

[E 13552/13003/44] No. 713.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the First Meeting, held at the Hôtel du Château, Ouchy, November 22, 1922, at 10·30 A.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 4.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*in the chair*). Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Barrère. M. Bompard.	Marquis Garroni. M. Lago.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Child. Mr. Grew.	Baron Hayashi. Mr. Otchiai.	M. Veniselos. M. Caclamanos.
ROUMANIA.	**SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.**	**TURKEY.**
M. Duca. M. Diamandi.	M. Nincic. M. Rakitch.	Ismet Pasha. Riza Nour Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Colonel Heywood. Mr. Nicolson. Mr. Forbes Adam. Mr. Leeper.	Admiral Lacaze. General Weygand. M. Laroche. M. Fromageot. M. Bargeton. M. Corbin. M. de Percin. M. Barois.	M. Nogara. M. G. Cinnarra. M. Guarnaschelli.
JAPAN.	**GREECE.**	**ROUMANIA.**
Mr. Sato. Col. Saigo. Cap. de Frégate Tsuru.	General A. Masarakis. M. Vassili Dendramis.	M. Dumitresco.

SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. B. Christitch. M. M. Anlich.	Munir Bey. Moukhtar Bey. Towfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Mr. Spring-Rice. Mr. Wicks.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
United States of America.	**Japan.**	**Greece.**
Mr. F. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Constantin Collas
Roumania.	**Serb-Croat-Slovene State.**	**Turkey.**
M. Constantinesco.	M. Vladimir Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON opened the meeting and proposed to start immediately the discussion on the frontiers of Thrace. He requested the Turkish delegation to state their point of view on this subject.

ISMET PASHA said that the frontier of Thrace claimed by Turkey from the Black Sea to the mouth of the Maritza was that defined by article 7 of the Treaty of Constantinople dated the 29th April, 1913. He also demanded a plebiscite for Western Thrace.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the Turkish delegation did not wish to justify their demands by historical, geographical, political and ethnographical arguments. The conference could not make a pronouncement on this question after having heard a mere statement of claims; it wished to know on what grounds these demands were based.

ISMET PASHA replied that the necessity for including within the frontier a small tract of country situated to the west of the Maritza arose out of the following considerations :—

1. In their note of the 24th September, 1922, and by the Convention of Mudania, the Allied Powers had accepted the retrocession to Turkey of Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople.

Seeing that the ancient town of Adrianople was situated on the left bank of the Maritza, the restoration of Eastern Thrace to Turkey also involved the restitution of that part of Adrianople. The fact that Adrianople had been specifically named in this note clearly indicated the intention to restore to Turkey at the same time the station of Adrianople, the suburb of Karagatch, and also the properties belonging to the inhabitants of Adrianople and of its suburb, whence the citizens derived their subsistence. This was what the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had understood.

2. Further, since Adrianople was being returned to Turkey it was essential that the territory comprising the Kouleli Bourgas–Mustapha Pasha railway section, connecting Adrianople with Constantinople, should also be handed back to her.

In order to guarantee the security of Adrianople and of this section of railway, and in order to maintain friendly and cordial relations with Turkey's neighbours, it was indispensable that the frontier should be removed to an adequate distance from the town of Adrianople and from the railway line.

3. The great majority of the population in the district claimed to the west of the Maritza was Turkish.

LORD CURZON asked Ismet Pasha to give the conference some further explanations in support of his statement that the greater part of Thrace west of the Maritza was Turkish in character. In particular, it would be useful if the Turkish delegation were to indicate precisely to what districts they were referring in their statement.

ISMET PASHA said he would reply to this question after consultation with his expert advisers.

LORD CURZON said that the Turkish claims raised two points: firstly they suggested that the frontiers of Eastern Thrace should be those of 1913, and secondly that a plebiscite should be held in Western Thrace.

ISMET PASHA said that in the territory which he was claiming in the Demotika district, the Turks had been in a majority both before and after the Balkan wars, and that economic considerations also were on the side of the Turkish claims.

LORD CURZON invited Ismet Pasha to lay before the conference figures in support of his statement.

ISMET PASHA, in addition to the ethnological arguments which he had just put forward, urged the necessity of establishing peace and quiet in Western Thrace, in order to prevent the frontiers of Eastern Thrace from being exposed to constant disturbance. He added that he would have more to say on this question later.

LORD CURZON enquired whether Turkey claimed for herself the whole of Western Thrace.

ISMET PASHA replied that he was not asking for the possession by Turkey of Western Thrace.

LORD CURZON expressed the desire to know the limits of Western Thrace as understood by the Turkish delegation, when they asked for the plebiscite there.

ISMET PASHA promised to indicate these limits after consultation with his experts.

LORD CURZON invited the delegations to state their views on the demands put forward by the Turkish delegation.

M. VENISELOS said that in his opinion Greece was the country most directly interested in the question under discussion, and that in consequence it was his duty to make the first reply to Ismet Pasha's statements.

Before examining the arguments brought forward by the president of the Turkish delegation, he wished to set forth the moral aspect of the question. In this connection, he outlined the circumstances which had brought Greece before the present conference, which was destined to conclude peace with Turkey. He thought that one should not apply the same scale of values to the State which had precipitated the war and to the State which had been attacked. It was not Greece who started the war which was just finished, although she might have been driven to such a step by the desire to realise her national unity. Aggression came from the other side. At the beginning of the world war, neither Turkey nor Greece took part in the fighting; it was Turkey who first engaged in the war on the side of the aggressor. Greece was bound to Serbia by a treaty of defensive alliance. Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, she notified the Central Powers that she would observe a benevolent neutrality towards Serbia by allowing the transport over her territory of war material destined for the use of her ally, and also that she would not tolerate any aggression by Bulgaria against Serbia. Internal complications had not allowed the Greek Government to stand by its agreements at the moment when the *casus fœderis* occurred. The then reigning King, in violation of the Constitution and in spite of the majority accorded by Parliament and by the country to the head of the Government, refused to agree to the intervention of Greece in conformity with her treaty of alliance; civil war was necessary in order to allow Greece to fulfil her engagements and to wipe out the shame which would have weighed upon her if she had betrayed her ally.

By this statement he wished to show that no responsibility for the war lay on Greece. Greece claimed the honour of having carried out to the end the duty of a faithful ally; and she claimed this with all the more force, since the operations in which she had engaged had led to the present disastrous results.

The Greek Government might be asked why it had laid claim to Turkish territories. He thought it his duty to state that his Government had never stipulated in advance for territorial compensations in return for its intervention. Greece only entered the war in order to keep her promise towards her ally and in order to defend the principles upheld by the Allies, and entirely approved by himself. He had not, of course, lost sight of the fact that, if the war ended in a complete victory, it would be fair that Greece's territorial claims should be taken into consideration, always assuming that they were recognised as just. The Greek Government had asked for Eastern Thrace, for Smyrna and its hinterland, because it was convinced that its

claims were in conformity with the principles for which the Allies had fought. Indeed, in all these regions, there was no Turkish majority, at any rate, up to the end of the Balkan wars. Since that time, notably in Eastern Thrace, the Bulgarians had been expelled and replaced by Mussulmans from Bosnia. By this means the racial proportions had been slightly altered; but even after these changes the Turks had not obtained an absolute majority.

In Smyrna also there was not a Turkish majority. In order to show the absurdity of the Greek claims in Anatolia, the unity of Asia Minor had often been quoted. He did not consider this argument sound. Asia Minor was somewhat larger than the whole Balkan Peninsula south of the Danube. Why had it been possible to set up several States in the Balkan Peninsula and why was it not possible to form three States in Asia Minor: Armenian in the east, Greek in the west, and Turkish in the remainder? In compliance with the Allies' request, Greece had resigned herself to the loss of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace.

Another argument could be brought forward; some months before the war, in the early summer of 1914, the Ottoman Empire, although at peace with Greece, had started to expel the Greek population by force from its territory, first from the coast of Asia Minor and later from Eastern Thrace. 450,000 Greeks had already been forced to take refuge in Greece. These measures continued and the Greek Government felt that they were intolerable. That was why he (M. Veniselos), speaking from the tribune of the Greek Parliament, had been forced to address to the Ottoman Government what was almost an ultimatum. It was, in fact, unbearable for the Greek Government to submit to the continuance of these expulsions. They resulted in great masses of the population being thrown back towards Greece, whose territory was too small to lodge and nourish them. At the invitation of mutual friends, an interview had then been arranged between the Grand Vizier and himself at Brussels for the purpose of putting an end to these forcible expulsions, and of devising a scheme for an exchange of populations between the two countries. He was at Munich, on his way to Brussels, when the war broke out, and had to abandon the proposed interview; the Grand Vizier had, moreover, informed him that he was unable to proceed to Brussels.

In stating these facts he had no intention whatever of being disagreeable to the Turkish delegation, and if by chance a hard word should escape him, he was ready to withdraw it. But facts were facts, and it was necessary to take them into account. Since 1914 the Turkish Government, in order to rid itself of non-Turkish population, had resorted to other means, which, if not massacres, were, at any rate, deportations and expulsions *en masse*. Greece was thus threatened with having to furnish the means of subsistence to 1,000,000 refugees, and that number might perhaps become even greater.

On the other hand, in order to justify Greece's action in going to Smyrna and Asia Minor, he wished to observe that his country had not undertaken operations on its own initiative. The Allied Governments had recognised the validity of his arguments and claims, and even before giving their consent to the cession of Smyrna to Greece the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had invited her to go to Asia Minor. It was true that the war began in the name of all the Allies and had been continued without the Allies' assent after the return of King Constantine. The return of the King had broken up the alliance, and thenceforward the combat had continued solely as a duel between Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, during this period no proposals of peace had been made which could fairly be said to have been rejected by Greece and accepted by Turkey. Without doubt it was folly on Greece's part to continue the war in the interior of Anatolia, hundreds of kilometres from her military bases. Greece had paid the penalty for her mistake by the loss of Asia Minor; she had also lost Eastern Thrace, not in consequence of military operations, but by the armistice of Mudania. The army, which had gone on strike in Asia Minor, on its return to Athens had carried out the revolution and reorganised itself with the object of saving Eastern Thrace. When he had been asked to represent his country at the peace conference, he had said that, although he had retired from political life, he would undertake this mission, but only on condition that the Greek Government accepted the grievous sacrifice of Eastern Thrace in compliance with the desires of the Allies. He had believed, and still believed, that as he had accepted the Allied note of the 23rd September, whereby Greece was to cede Eastern Thrace as far as the Maritza, no new demands would be made of him nor fresh sacrifices required of him. Turkey was now putting forward new claims, firstly for the direct extension of Turkish sovereignty on the right bank of the Maritza, and, secondly, for the holding of a plebiscite in Western Thrace, the limits of which, incidentally, the Turkish

delegation had not yet defined. He regretted this omission, for it was very important for him to know exactly what was meant by "Western Thrace."

The fate of these regions had been settled by a treaty which was completely independent of the Treaty of Sèvres. The task of the conference was to recast this latter treaty, not to renew discussion on other treaties, signed and ratified by the Allies and actually in force. The tract of country in question was dealt with by the Treaty of Neuilly, with which the Angora Government had nothing to do, especially as before the war this territory did not belong to Turkey. This region had been ceded by Turkey on her own account during the war, as a result of negotiations with Bulgaria, and not under the pressure of military operations or of a defeat in the field. That proved that this territory had not the importance for Turkey which Ismet Pasha now attributed to it. The Turkish Government could not now assert that this territory was indispensable to it, seeing that it had previously renounced it of its own freewill.

With regard to the station of Karagatch, it must be remembered that this station was very important for the Bulgarian traffic towards Dedeagatch, but not for Adrianople, which was connected by rail with its natural commercial outlet, Constantinople. Greece was ready to give the most precise international guarantees to Bulgaria with a view to the traffic of this railway never being interrupted.

Turning to the ethnical arguments advanced by Ismet Pasha in regard to the Demotika region, M. Veniselos declared that the proportion of Greeks to Turks was at least two to one. He was ready to supply the conference with precise statistics on this point. The question at issue was the situation prior to recent events, for the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace had had to flee towards other parts of Greece, even as far as Macedonia; and a large number of them had remained in Western Thrace, thus increasing still more the numerical superiority of the Greeks there.

Ismet Pasha had not defined the economic arguments which he had mentioned in favour of his case. There might possibly be some Turkish properties in that district, and these the Greek Government would of course respect. The fact remained, however, that the economic life, industry and trade there were largely in the hands of Greeks.

With reference to the plebiscite to be held in Western Thrace, the Turkish delegation had first advanced the ethnical argument and then the necessity for ensuring the security of Eastern Thrace. He regretted that Ismet Pasha had not exactly defined the limits of what he meant by Western Thrace. If he referred to that part of Western Thrace which had remained Bulgarian under the Treaty of Neuilly, it was undeniable that the majority there was Turkish. On the other hand, in the Greek part scarcely one-half of the population was Turkish.

The argument based on the security of Eastern Thrace could not be sustained; if it were taken into account, there would be no reason why Eastern Macedonia should not be ceded in order to protect Western Thrace. Central Macedonia to protect Eastern Macedonia, and so on as far as the sea. But it must not be forgotten that considerable ethnical changes had now taken place in this region. These changes were in no way due to the action of Greece. The fact was that the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace had been forced to leave their native land, which had been inhabited and enriched by their ancestors for twenty centuries, long before the Turks came to Europe. It could not be said that these people really left under direct pressure from the Government of Angora, seeing that that Government had not yet taken possession of the country; they had left because they knew that once the Turks arrived there, their continued presence would not be tolerated, and they would be obliged to leave their homes like their compatriots in Asia Minor, who had fled, only carrying away with them what they had on them, and often not even that. The arrival of thousands of refugees had changed the ethnical features of Western Thrace, and the bare Greek majority had greatly increased; but one really could not say that Greece had brought about this change deliberately and by artificial means. The change had been due to the arrival of the many Greeks who had left Eastern Thrace in search of a refuge, and in the endeavour to begin a new life. It would really be too cruel, it would be unthinkable, to call in question the bases of the Treaty of Neuilly, with the inevitable result that these people would once more be obliged to leave *en masse* for another destination—he wondered where.

Greece, a country of 5,000,000 inhabitants, really could not be asked to house and maintain 1,000,000 refugees; still less could this be demanded of her if her territory was to be further restricted, for that would bring the Greek Government

face to face with insoluble problems, social, political and economic. Greece had already paid for her faults, and no more could be asked of her. She had loyally complied with the proposals drawn up by the Allies at Paris and embodied in their note of the 23rd September.

She could say that she had done all she possibly could in order to achieve the peace which she so earnestly desired.

ISMET PASHA reserved the right to reply to M. Veniselos's statement.

M. NINCIC said that the question now under review was the most delicate of all those submitted to the conference. It did not interest his country directly, but Serbia was interested in the question indirectly to the highest degree. The capital issue was to re-establish a real peace and to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence in the Balkan Peninsula, which was the indispensable condition for good neighbourly and friendly relations. The solution of this question was equally important for Turkey, in order that all grounds for apprehension should be removed as far as possible from the minds of her neighbours.

Serbia wished to declare her constant desire for conciliation, of which she had already given proof in accepting the note of the 23rd September. She had acceded to the Powers' proposal that the frontier of Eastern Thrace should be the line of the Maritza, and in conformity with that note she had asked for the establishment of a neutral demilitarised zone along the north and west frontiers of Eastern Thrace. The Turkish delegation, in his opinion, had put forward proposals which could not be accepted. The Maritza formed a natural frontier, which gave Turkey complete security. By claiming territory on the other side of this river, Turkey would create among her neighbours suspicion and anxiety. M. Veniselos's argument that Turkey had ceded this district to Bulgaria voluntarily and without war considerably weakened the demand made by Ismet Pasha.

On being asked by Lord Curzon to explain what he meant by a demilitarised zone, M. Nincic said that he only wished to suggest a principle. What he had in mind was a zone running from the Black Sea to the Ægean along the Turkish frontier, the limits of which would be determined by experts, in agreement with the Turkish delegation.

The proposed plebiscite in Western Thrace appeared unnecessary, since Greece was already bound by treaty to respect the minorities in that region. If the Turkish delegation desired to establish by means of the plebiscite an autonomous political organisation, the Serbian delegation thought such complications would in no way advance the cause of peace in the Balkans. The Treaty of Neuilly had been ratified and was actually in force. The Serbian Government was entirely opposed to any modification of the treaties, which it regarded as the charter of Central Europe.

The railway on the right bank of the Maritza was most important for all the neighbouring countries. The Greek Government had no desire to oppose the utilisation of that railway for the traffic of the three interested States. He knew that Greece had promised Bulgaria every facility for access to the Ægean, and he thought that the internationalisation of the railway would be in the interest of all the three countries concerned. He was most anxious to ensure good neighbourly relations between the Balkan States, who should at last be able to devote themselves freely to the fruitful works of peace.

M. DUCA said that Roumania was animated in this matter by an eminently pacific and conciliatory spirit. He agreed with M. Nincic. This being so, he did not think it necessary to repeat the reasons why he thought that the best frontier for Eastern Thrace was the line of the Maritza.

The Roumanian delegation was not in favour of a plebiscite, which would merely make Western Thrace an apple of discord in the Balkans.

As regards the right bank of the Maritza, the Roumanian delegation, like Ismet Pasha, thought it necessary to guarantee the security of that district; but to his mind the best way of ensuring this security was not to extend Turkish sovereignty beyond the Maritza, but to demilitarise a zone from the Black Sea as far as the Ægean, the limits of which would be determined by the experts.

LORD CURZON said that the speeches just delivered made quite clear the points of view of the various delegations on the Thracian question. It was natural that the Turkish delegation should not reply there and then to the arguments brought forward. Meanwhile it would be well to hear the Bulgarian delegation, who, in accordance with the note of the 23rd September, were to have opportunity for setting forth their claims as regards an economic outlet on the Ægean.

ISMET PASHA agreed that the Bulgarian delegation should be heard on the question of Bulgaria's access to the Ægean, especially as that matter did not directly affect Turkish interests. He would reply *seriatim* to the arguments used by the various delegations, but he wished first to learn the views of the other delegations, so that he could examine all the arguments as a whole.

On the proposal of LORD CURZON, it was decided to hear the statement of the Bulgarian delegation in the afternoon.

[E 13551/13003/44] No. 714.

Memorandum forwarded by the Peace Delegation at Lausanne on December 1 for the information of the Foreign Office, with reference to previous Communication Lausanne No. 3 of November 24.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 14.)

FAISANT suite à leur aide-mémoire en date du 23 courant, les plénipotentiaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'attirer encore une fois l'attention de son Excellence Ismet Pacha sur le fait que les pourparlers entre les généraux alliés à Constantinople et le Général Rafet Pacha traînent toujours en longueur. Il est vrai qu'un accord est intervenu au sujet des fonctions respectives des polices turque et alliée. Cependant la question de savoir à quel tribunal doivent être déférés les sujets turcs arrêtés par la police alliée attend toujours sa solution, Rafet Pacha ayant déclaré ne pouvoir répondre aux dernières propositions des généraux alliés avant de s'en référer à Angora.

Lorsqu'ils ont adressé au Général Ismet Pacha leur aide-mémoire du 23 courant, les plénipotentiaires alliés ne possédaient pas de renseignements précis sur cette seconde question. Ayant reçu dans l'intervalle des informations plus exactes, ils saisissent cette occasion pour mettre les choses au point. Les généraux alliés se sont bien déclarés prêts, dans un esprit de conciliation, à renoncer à la juridiction exercée jusqu'ici par leurs tribunaux prévôtaux pour les délits de peu importance dont seraient prévenus les sujets turcs arrêtés par les autorités alliées, mais ils persistent à soutenir que même les sujets turcs arrêtés pour des actes dirigés contre la sécurité des forces alliées ou bien pour des crimes et délits graves commis au préjudice des sujets alliés, doivent être jugés comme auparavant par les conseils de guerre alliés.

En faisant cette rectification, les plénipotentiaires alliés tiennent à déclarer qu'ils considèrent le point de vue soutenu par les généraux alliés comme pleinement justifié. Ils renouvellent donc instamment leur demande tendant à ce que le Général Rafet Pacha reçoive les instructions nécessaires pour que l'accord complet soit réalisé sur la base des propositions des généraux alliés.

Lausanne, le 1er décembre 1922.

No. 715.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 750.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 4, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 736.

French High Commissioner has received reply from Colonel Mougin to his enquiry respecting treatment accorded to Christians in Anatolia.

Reply is echo of Angora version, namely, that it is a calumny to talk of expulsion or deportation, that many Christians are indeed leaving, but solely because they are taking advantage of permission which could not be granted them before, &c.

In private letter informing me of this answer French High Commissioner just observed that Colonel Mougin is very simple-minded.

I would like to know how Angora reconciles its version with limited period wherein permission can be taken advantage of.

French High Commissioner is leaving for Lausanne 5th December.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 42.)

No. 716.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 351.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 4, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 467 of 23rd November: Relief of refugees in Near East.

His Majesty's Government have themselves spent 52,000*l.* on charter of ships to convey refugees to places of safety. They have granted 10,000*l.* worth of medical stores to British charitable organisations, and have offered 50,000*l.* on certain conditions to League of Nations, of which 16,000*l.* has been paid. British charities are at work, but are hampered by lack of funds and inadequate response of public to appeals. Owing to financial stringency, Parliament is averse to any considerable grants of public money.

Meanwhile, situation is entirely without precedent. No country can take any considerable body of refugees except Greece, who has already received 800,000. Several hundred thousand more are likely to seek flight from Asia Minor immediately, and from Constantinople as soon as Allies evacuate. There is no country where they can be accommodated. (End of R.)

Above may not be helpful to you, and you should exercise your discretion as to using it.

[E 13390/27/44] No. 717

Note by Sir Eyre Crowe.

THE Italian Ambassador called upon me to-night at my request, as I wished to convey to him Lord Curzon's answer to his note of the 26th November on the subject of M. Mussolini's request for an exchange of notes recording the understanding alleged to have been arrived at between Lord Curzon and M. Mussolini at Lausanne. I began by saying that the surprise to which I had given expression when the Ambassador communicated to me his note of the 26th November had not been dispelled by what I now learnt from Lord Curzon had actually passed between his Lordship and the Italian Prime Minister at Lausanne. The surmise, which I then expressed, that M. Mussolini must have been under a complete misapprehension as to what Lord Curzon had said on the occasion was fully confirmed. I then read to the Marquis della Torretta the memorandum, of which I attach a copy hereto, giving in detail the version of what passed, based on the records made at the time. This memorandum I handed to the Marquis della Torretta. I then said I was reluctant to send a written reply to his Excellency's note, principally for the reason that, if I did so, I should have to give formal expression to the strong objections which Lord Curzon was bound to take to some of the statements appearing in that note. I was anxious to avoid aggravating in any way a situation already sufficiently delicate, and I therefore begged the Ambassador to let me put to him verbally what Lord Curzon thought it necessary should be said. The Ambassador would remember that already, when he handed me the note, I had, speaking for myself, deprecated M. Mussolini's attitude in declaring his co-operation with his Allies at the Lausanne Conference to be dependent on the conclusion of an agreement with Great Britain, under which Italy was to obtain certain not clearly defined but apparently far-reaching advantages. This point in the Italian note had, not unnaturally, attracted Lord Curzon's special attention. According to the Italian note, M. Mussolini "made it clear in his conversations with Lord Curzon that the solution of the problem of Italy's position in the Eastern Mediterranean would form the indispensable basis of Italian participation in the single front of the Allies at the Lausanne Conference." These words appeared to Lord Curzon to amount to a claim on the part of M. Mussolini to the right to break the Allied front at Lausanne unless he were given whatever terms he might choose to put forward for the maintenance of what he described as "the equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean." This was a menace which Lord Curzon could not bring himself to believe that M. Mussolini intended to offer, and it certainly was entirely alien both to the spirit of the very friendly conversations between them and to the specific conclusions at which, as stated in the memorandum I had just handed to the Marquis della Torretta, they had arrived.

The Ambassador said he fully appreciated the feeling of courtesy and amity which made me make these observations verbally instead of consigning them to an official note. He would not fail to make clear to M. Mussolini the impression which his statements had made upon Lord Curzon. He desired at once to say that he felt sure that such an impression was far from anything that M. Mussolini could have wished to produce. He must reluctantly admit that evidently M. Mussolini misunderstood the general drift of the conversations which he had with Lord Curzon. There was, however, no doubt that M. Mussolini did desire a friendly understanding with Great Britain in regard to Italy's position in the mandated territories, and he still thought it ought to be possible for us to agree upon a formula which would give satisfaction to the desires of the Italian Government. He earnestly begged me to help him, not only in smoothing over the misunderstanding which had arisen, but in advising a friendly solution on the basis of some concessions to Italy as regards the British mandates.

I replied that I thought I had given evidence of my desire to help in smoothing over the misunderstanding by giving to the communication which I had to make to his Excellency the particular form in which I was making it. The Ambassador gratefully acknowledged this. As regards the idea of an understanding on the subject of mandates, I said I must really decline to put forward proposals. The position was that Italy wanted something. Neither M. Mussolini nor the Marquis della Torretta had yet been able to have any clear idea what it is they require, and it seemed to me, therefore, quite futile that I should put forward suggestions in order to give satisfaction to a demand the essence of which was unintelligible to me. The only suggestion that I could make was that M. Mussolini should put forward what he wished to propose in such a precise form that we could understand it. The Ambassador said that, of course, he would lose no time in urging M. Mussolini to do this, but begged me that I should declare here and now our readiness to accept any reasonable proposal which M. Mussolini might make. I said that even if I had authority to bind the British Government in this way—which I certainly had not—I should not dream of binding myself to accept blindfold anything that might be put before me, and, in any case, it must be clearly understood that any consideration to be given to whatever proposals M. Mussolini might put forward must be strictly on their merits, and not be treated as part of a bargain in which the continuance of Italy's upholding the Allied front at the Lausanne Conference was involved.

The Ambassador, evidently anxious to let down M. Mussolini as easily as possible, finally asked me for an assurance that any proposal which the Italian Government were to submit would receive sympathetic consideration. To this I replied that the Italian Government could certainly rely upon any proposal submitted by them being carefully considered by the British Government, and of receiving the friendly attention which any such communication from an allied Power naturally merited.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1922.

Annex.

Memorandum.

It is clear from the following summary of Lord Curzon's record of his conversations with the Italian President of the Council that Signor Mussolini's impressions of the purpose and result of those conversations, as set forth in the Italian Embassy's note of the 26th November, are based in certain essential particulars upon a complete misunderstanding of the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government as expounded by the Secretary of State.

The question of the mandates was discussed on three occasions. The first was the meeting of the three Ministers at Territet on the 19th November when, according to the recorded minutes, Signor Mussolini "made a reservation as regards the question of the mandates in Syria, Irak and Palestine, as between France, Italy and England," but "agreed that it was only a question as between the Allies" and did not apply to Turkey. The second was when the discussion was resumed at Lausanne on the morning of the 20th of November and after a series of speeches by the Marquis Garroni an agreement was reached that the question should be "left open as between the three Powers, but it must not be raised by or with the Turks—to which proposition Signor Mussolini signified his assent." This clearly implies that, while Signor Mussolini explicitly agreed that the question of mandates, if it were to be raised at the conference,

must be met by a refusal on the part of the three Allied Powers to discuss it with the Turks as being outside the pale of the conference, Italy retained entire liberty to express her own views or to make any independent proposals on the matter, either to Great Britain or to France, whenever she chose.

The third occasion was when, presumably in pursuance of this undertaking, Signor Mussolini explained his views on the question of the mandates in a long conversation with Lord Curzon on the 21st November. Signor Mussolini spoke at length, albeit somewhat vaguely, of Italian participation in the mandates; he did not specify which particular mandates he was referring to, nor, for instance, even mention the name of Palestine. He hinted that Italy might be prepared to take her share in the military and financial responsibilities deriving from the mandates, but did not explain precisely what form of participation he was contemplating.

In reply, after outlining the history of the mandates and explaining the obligations they involved towards the League of Nations, Lord Curzon expressed the view that the subject could not with advantage be pursued between himself and Signor Mussolini at Lausanne, but suggested that the latter, after further study of the question, might submit in writing to the Foreign Office, through the Italian Ambassador in London, any proposals he might desire to put forward, when they would receive the fullest consideration. To this proposal Signor Mussolini agreed.

There is thus no ground for the statement in the Italian Embassy's note to the effect that Lord Curzon had been convinced by Signor Mussolini of the necessity of satisfying the Italian request regarding the mandates, while reserving the right to define the practical form to be taken by Italian participation, and had further consented that the agreement reached on a question of principle should be embodied in an exchange of notes between the two Governments. Not only did Lord Curzon not reserve the right to define the practical form of Italian participation in the mandates, but he expressly stated that he had no proposals to offer, because he had no idea what form of participation the Italian Government desired, or would prove to be feasible in practice. He added that it was, therefore, for the Italian Government to furnish him with such proposals as they might contemplate. Still less did he suggest embodying in an exchange of notes an agreement on a question of principle, which had in itself neither been admitted nor defined; all he did was to suggest an exchange of views through the recognised diplomatic channels.

As regards the question of the Dodecanese, it is only necessary to say that when the question of the islands came up for discussion at the Conference at Lausanne, Lord Curzon succeeded in preventing it from being raised with the Turks and thereby elicited an expression of warm thanks from the senior Italian delegate, Marquis Garroni.

December 4, 1922.

[E 13600/13003/44] No. 718.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Second Meeting, held at the Hôtel du Château at Ouchy, November 22, 1922, at 4 P.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 5.)

(Strictly Confidential.) Present :

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.
M. Diamandy.	M. M. Rakitch.

TURKEY.	BULGARIA.
Ismet Pasha.	M. Stambouliisky.
Riza Nour Bey.	M. Stanciof.

Also present :

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Nogara.
Mr. Nicolson.	General Weygand.	M. Ciamarra.
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. Laroche.	M. Guarnaschelli.
Mr. Leeper.	M. Fromageot.	
	M. Bargeton.	
	M. Corbin.	
	M. de Percin.	
	M. Barois.	

JAPAN.	GREECE.	ROUMANIA
Mr. Sato.	General Mazarakis.	M. Dumitresco.
Colonel Saigo.	M. Dendramis.	
Captain Tsuru.		

SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.	BULGARIA.
M. Christich.	Munir Bey.	General Savof.
M. Anlich.	Moukhtar Bey.	Mdlle. Stanciof
	Tevfik Bey.	

Secretariat-General.

M. MASSIGLI, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Wicks.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. F. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Collas.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Reshid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter : M. CAMERLYNCK.

LORD CURZON said that at the previous meeting it had been decided to hear the Bulgarian delegation state their case regarding the outlet for Bulgaria on the Ægean Sea, in accordance with the terms of the Paris note of the 23rd September.

The Bulgarian delegation having entered the room—

M. STAMBOULIISKY read the following statement :—

"M. le Président,

"Gentlemen,

"I must thank you for the honour of being permitted to expose to you a question of vital importance to Bulgaria. I will try not to weary you with needless dissertations. I have already had the honour to outline the Bulgarian point of view in my letter to the Genoa Conference, a copy of which I will annex to the documents which will later on be presented by my delegation to the members of the conference.

"The Eastern question, which your Excellencies are in process of considering, affects very closely Bulgaria's interests on the following points:—

"1. The Bulgarian outlet on the Ægean Sea.
"2. The fate of refugees from the two parts of Thrace.
"3. The fate of minorities in the two parts of Thrace.
"4. Our territorial integrity as a disarmed nation, in face of the situation recently created.
"5. The régime of the Straits.

"I will only dwell on the first point now, in the hope that you will later on give me your benevolent attention in regard to the others.

"You are aware, gentlemen, that before the cessation of hostilities in the Near East, and before the Mudania decisions, Bulgaria had expressed the desire to see Eastern and Western Thrace constituted as an autonomous region, placed under the control of the League of Nations or of the Great Allied Powers, to whom Bulgaria and Turkey ceded this same region by the Treaties of Neuilly and Sèvres respectively. I need not remind your Excellencies that under the Treaty of London of 1912 and the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, the whole of Thrace belonged to Bulgaria.

"Later on we ceded Eastern Thrace to Turkey by a Turco-Bulgarian Agreement, while Western Thrace with a corridor to the east of the Maritza was left to Bulgaria by the treaties of 1913 and 1915. Bulgaria cannot regret having formulated the principle of autonomy in respect of the whole of Thrace. We think indeed that such a solution of the question would have been the best and fairest, since it would have assured liberty of existence for all the elements which make up the population of Thrace (Turks, Bulgars, Greeks, Armenians and Jews), not one of which forms by itself a really important majority. The autonomy of Thrace would moreover have contributed largely towards consolidating peace in the Balkans and ensuring the freedom of the Straits and the efficacity of the Bulgarian outlet to the sea; and above all, as far as Europe is concerned, it would in no way have affected the integrity of the peace treaties.

"However, the Allied Powers have already consented to the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, as regards Europe, by giving back Eastern Thrace to Turkey.

"We have no sentiments of animosity towards the Turkish people; on the contrary we rejoice at their successes. The Turkish people is worthy of our admiration and of that of the whole world. It deserves to be rewarded and guaranteed.

"The Bulgarian people, although seriously affected by the Treaty of Peace, has chosen another method, namely, an attitude of complete loyalty, in the firm conviction that that attitude (of which all Europe has witnessed the satisfactory results) would be appreciated at the right moment.

"In my opinion that moment has now come; I think it necessary to make every effort to avoid anything which might make nations think that they cannot obtain the indispensable satisfaction of a legitimate desire without first having bathed in their own blood. Lastly, I think one must not resort to half measures for the settling of great questions and render war, so to speak, chronic, especially in the Balkan Peninsula.

"In these circumstances, the retrocession of Eastern Thrace to Turkey should have been followed by the retrocession of Western Thrace to Bulgaria. This retrocession seems to be dictated by logic, by justice, and by the very interests of both Balkan and European peace. But I am convinced that the eventual accomplishment of such retrocession would be considered as a terrible blow to the Treaty of Neuilly.

"That is why we Bulgars, in our effort to remain loyal to the end, only make the following request: If you will not consent to constitute Western Thrace as an autonomous region, would it not be possible to return to the situation as it was at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Neuilly, including article 48 thereof? What I mean is this: We ask that Western Thrace should remain at the disposition of the Great Allied Powers, and that they invest it with a régime which would really transform it into a neutral zone: our railway system would extend across it; on its shores we would construct our ports, which would serve on the one hand the export and import trade of all civilised States of the West and beyond the seas, and on the other hand Bulgaria and her neighbours, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Ukraine, &c.

"In this way the whole of Western Thrace, restored to the conditions contemplated by article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly and provided with a régime of absolute neutrality, would constitute a region thoroughly fit to enjoy an independent administration, and offering all desired guarantees in its internal economy.

"Under these conditions only the Bulgarian outlet to the Ægean Sea will not be exposed to threats either on the east or on the west, and our railways and ports will be capable of development to the point of satisfying the evergrowing needs of commerce and industry, and of causing the closest relations to be established by way of the Ægean Sea with the whole civilised world.

"In conclusion, I consider it my duty to thank your Excellencies once more for the honour which you have done me in giving me your attention to-day.

"I venture to hope that the technical details and other necessary documents bearing on this question, which my delegation will have the honour to submit to the conference, will be examined by the appropriate commission.

"I look forward, not only with hope, but also with full confidence to this modest and legitimate desire of Bulgaria being satisfied by the honourable conference. The Bulgarian people is making a supreme effort to free itself for ever from the numerous and pernicious prejudices of the past, and is fully resolved to live in peace and complete accord with its neighbours and with all nations. By granting my request you will give this people the opportunity to breathe freely, to develop itself in all tranquillity and to enter definitely on the way of progress and of civilisation.

"I wish to end by repeating what I had the honour to say at Genoa.

"It is not only impossible, but also psychologically inadmissible, that the access to the Bulgarian outlet on the sea should pass across Turkish or Greek territory.

"As you see, gentlemen, we plead for the inviolability of the Peace Treaty. We even go further; we insist that the treaty be fully and exactly applied in the form in which it was signed by us with you.

"I beg you not to leave us any grounds on which new passions and dissensions may arise between two sorely-tried nations, Bulgaria and Greece, but to establish by your decision (which will no doubt be inspired by the highest sentiments of justice) conditions which will allow these two neighbouring nations to live in sincere harmony and complete accord.

"This state of things can only contribute to the peace of the world."

LORD CURZON congratulated M. Stambouliisky, on behalf of the conference, on the clearness and compression of his statement. He invited the Turkish delegation to acquaint the commission with their views on the arguments developed at the preceding meeting.

ISMET PASHA said that the Bulgarian delegation had been heard in accordance with the decision taken by the commission, but he did not know that this hearing arose out of an agreement reached at Paris. As regards the purport of M. Stambouliisky's statement, he reserved the right to express his views at a suitable moment.

The S.C.S. delegation had proposed as the frontier of Turkey in Europe the line of the Maritza, and also the creation of a demilitarised neutral zone to the north and west of Eastern Thrace. In response to an enquiry from Lord Curzon, M. Nincic had stated that he merely wished to raise a question of principle, and said that the neutral zone in question could be defined later on by a commission of experts. The Turkish delegation asked that first of all this proposal should be put in a precise form, indicating clearly on whose territory the demilitarised neutral zone was to be established. Before answering on the whole problem, the Turkish delegation wished to obtain further information on this subject.

LORD CURZON said that the S.C.S. and Roumanian delegations had simply enunciated a principle; it would be for the experts to examine its practicability, if required to do so. He would be glad to hear the opinion of the Turkish delegation before stating the views of his Government.

ISMET PASHA thought that the question at issue was mainly territorial; and the military aspect of the problem should be examined also. For the moment the question was being discussed from the territorial and boundary point of view only. He would, therefore, be grateful if the S.C.S. delegation would be so good as to define their proposal further. He thought it indispensable to know explicitly and in advance all the proposals which the delegation wishes to make, and he hoped the commission would find no difficulty in recognising the reasonableness of his request. If the other delegations had no further remarks to lay before the commission, he proposed to adjourn the discussion till the next day, so that the Turkish delegation might have the necessary time to examine the proposals in their entirety.

LORD CURZON said he did not think that any points put before the conference that day could have come as a surprise to the Turkish delegates. He could have

understood if difficulty had arisen over the statement made by M. Stambouliisky, which had been heard that afternoon for the first time. But that was not the point at issue. Three speeches had been made in the morning in reply to the Turkish claims. The Turkish representatives had challenged these statements; they had asked for an opportunity to reply, and had undertaken to do so; their interests were at stake, and they knew more about the matter than anyone else. He must, therefore, express his extreme surprise that they were not ready. He was loth to waste the labours of the conference by proposing another adjournment; in fact, he declined to do so, and must proceed with his own remarks; but he would have been able to speak with more authority and impartiality had he been in possession of the Turkish arguments. He therefore wished to suggest with all courtesy that the Turkish delegation should do the conference the honour of delivering as soon as possible their replies on a subject which must be thoroughly familiar to them.

ISMET PASHA said that when he had not seen in advance the documents and proposals submitted to the commission, and had not had the necessary time to study and analyse them, he could not broach their discussion. His purpose in asking for an adjournment was to examine the question from a general point of view; this request seemed to him quite natural, and was also consonant with the rules of the conference. He asked the meeting to afford him the possibility of working freely and methodically.

LORD CURZON said that that was also his desire. The most methodical arrangement was that when a speech was delivered the reply should be delivered immediately after; if that were not possible, the next most methodical plan was for the debate to be continued. That was the course he now proposed to follow.

He would devote his observations to the widest aspect of the Turkish case put forward that morning. He had had the advantage of consulting with his colleagues, the representatives of the inviting Governments. What he had to say represented their united opinion. They had heard that morning the remarks of the representatives of three other Governments. With a great deal of what they said he was also in agreement. The observations he was about to make therefore represented a very considerable body of united opinion among the Powers present.

Four questions had been raised :—

1. The western frontier of Eastern Thrace.
2. The demilitarised zones on the north or west of Eastern Thrace.
3. Western Thrace.
4. Access to the Ægean Sea for Bulgaria.

On the first question, the claim put forward by the Turkish delegation that morning was that the new treaty should restore the Thracian boundary of 1913.

He would like the conference to be quite clear as to the juridical position of the matter, as defined by the treaties. An attempt was being made to deal with the treaties in an extraordinarily disrespectful manner.

Up to 1913 the whole of Western Thrace belonged to Turkey. The greater part was ceded to Bulgaria in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest. In 1915 an additional portion of Western Thrace, including Karagatch and Demotika, was ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria. By the treaty of Neuilly in 1919, Bulgaria had renounced in favour of the Principal Allied Powers the whole of Western Thrace, including the part ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915. Finally, in August 1920, the Thracian Treaty was signed (but not ratified), by which the whole area was handed to Greece. Western Thrace had since that time been occupied and administered by Greece. That was the position, as he understood it, as laid down by the treaties.

The Turkish delegates now came forward with the claim to recover the pre-war frontier. That morning the Turkish delegates had listened to a number of arguments against this position. These were the arguments to which he hoped the Turkish delegates would be able to give a reply; he would summarise them, and state what appeared to be the relative degree of their importance.

The first argument, arising out of the treaties, was employed with great force by M. Venizelos—that the territory now claimed by Turkey had nothing whatever to do with the Treaty of Sèvres, and had not belonged to Turkey before the war, except a small part voluntarily ceded to Bulgaria in 1915. Its fate was already decided by the Treaty of Neuilly, from which the Allied Powers had not the slightest intention of departing.

The second argument, which had been used with much force by M. Nincic and supported by M. Duca, was the geographical argument that the Maritza was the best natural frontier, far better than any artificial frontier which could be created, and one which would provide, from the point of view of security, as good a boundary as could be found.

The third point, which had not yet been made by anybody, but to which he attached very great importance, was that the Maritza frontier was the frontier consistently put forward by the Turks themselves. Their present demands were entirely new. All previous demands made by the Turks, such as those put forward by Hamid Bey to the High Commissioners at Constantinople, had invariably been for the Maritza frontier. When he went to Paris, and on the invitation of the Powers drew up the note of the 23rd September, which had brought about the present conference, the Turkish case—strongly supported by the French Government, who were very familiar with the Turkish claims—was for the recovery of Thrace up to the Maritza. The words of the note of the 23rd September were as follows :—

> "The three Allied Governments avail themselves of this opportunity to state that they are favourably disposed towards the desire of Turkey to recover Thrace as far as the Maritza and Adrianople."

The Turkish reply to that invitation asked, "that there should be restored to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Thrace as far as the western bank of the Maritza, including Adrianople." In a later note dated the 4th October the Turks said that "they had received with satisfaction the recognition of their incontestable rights in Thrace." Lastly, the Mudania Convention described the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw, which was "the Maritza line down to the Ægean Sea." Therefore, during the past two or three months the frontier consistently claimed by Turkey had been that of the Maritza and no further.

The fourth argument employed that morning rested on ethnical and economic grounds. M. Venizelos had said that the population, before its displacement by the influx of refugees from elsewhere, which had entirely upset the balance, was predominantly Greek in the proportion of at least two to one, and he had undertaken to give exact figures. He (Lord Curzon) hoped to receive figures from the Turkish delegation too. M. Venizelos had also said that the trade and agriculture of the district were in the main Greek. These arguments would undoubtedly require detailed consideration later on.

The Turkish delegates then raised the question of the military security of their position. In this connection the proposal had been made for a demilitarised zone or zones on one or both sides of the River Maritza. The proposal took a double form. In the morning, M. Nincic had suggested that such a demilitarisation (by which he meant the razing of forts and the exclusion of troops, rather than neutralisation) might be effected along the northern frontier of Eastern Thrace. The Turkish delegation had quite properly and reasonably asked for a definition of the area to be demilitarised. He thought that if the idea were to be pursued it ought to be examined by the military experts in a sub-commission on which the Turks would doubtless speak with great authority. Whether it was necessary or desirable to demilitarise the frontier on the north from the Black Sea, he, as a civilian, could not say; but when the corner running southwards was turned, he was in a position to give a definite opinion on the line from the frontier to the sea, for the matter had been carefully considered by the inviting Powers, who were united in their opinion. Starting at a point north of Adrianople on the Bulgarian frontier, there would be a demilitarised zone for an area to be determined, of some 20 or 30 kilom. in breadth on either side of the Maritza River throughout its whole course, between Eastern and Western Thrace, down to the sea in the neighbourhood of Dedeagatch and Enos. The Turkish delegation would see at once how such a suggestion touched the question of their military security. It was clear that with the demilitarisation of Adrianople on the one side, and of Karagatch on the other, the military danger to Adrianople from the forts on the other side of the river would disappear. The matter would no doubt have to be investigated by experts, but he desired to submit the proposal as the deliberate opinion and advice of the inviting Powers as the best solution possible.

Involved in this problem were also the questions of the railway and of Bulgarian access to the sea. The Turkish delegation must remember that no part of the railway on the right bank of the Maritza from Mustapha Pasha to Kuleli Burgas was in their hands at the time of the armistice. Moreover, Karagatch was not the sole railway station of Adrianople; there was a station on the other side of the river

across the bridge, connected with the main line at Karagatch. The railway, in these circumstances, could be under some form of international control by a commission or otherwise. The railway in question did not concern the Turks alone, but was equally of interest to Bulgaria and Greece. If Karagatch were taken out as the Turks proposed, a small Turkish block would be created in the middle of the line which might be used later for an attack on Bulgaria. He therefore, on behalf of his colleagues, advocated a broad neutral strip from the angle of the Bulgarian frontier to the Ægean Sea, which would remove any military menace, solve the railway difficulty and provide access for Bulgaria to the sea. These questions would require to be fully examined by a sub-commission. He hoped he had made it clear that the railway and port of Dedeagatch must be in the hands of some body or commission of an international character, sitting at Dedeagatch or elsewhere, and a good many alterations at Dedeagatch would be necessary to make that port adequate for Bulgarian trade. He merely mentioned this in order to show that these were points upon which the inviting Powers would be quite prepared to give their advice in the proposed sub-commission.

There remained for consideration the question of Western Thrace, for which, or a portion of it, the Turkish delegation had that morning demanded a plebiscite, although the area in question had not been defined by them. On this matter the Powers took a firm stand. The question of Western Thrace did not admit of doubt or dispute: the point had been settled by the Treaty of Neuilly, subject to the article which gave Bulgaria access to the sea. The area did not belong to Turkey before the war; Turkey had voluntarily surrendered it. The Greeks could not fairly be asked to give it up, not only because they were in legal occupation, but also because the area was absolutely necessary in order to enable them to accommodate the enormous influx of refugees who had gone there from Eastern Thrace and elsewhere. The inviting Powers were united on this and could not let the matter be reopened. There was no more case for a plebiscite in this area than in any other area outside the Turkish frontier. Even if a plebiscite were taken, it would afford no genuine test, owing to the extensive movements of the population in these troublous times. But it was clear, as shown by the statements of the various delegates, that the idea of setting up a little autonomous State on the west bank of the Maritza and in the eastern portion of Western Thrace could not commend itself to any sensible person. The Powers would hold themselves up to ridicule if they allowed the Treaty of Neuilly to be reopened in this way. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that they would hear no more of the matter.

On the questions which he had placed before the conference the inviting Powers were unanimous and were prepared to hear the Turkish reply next day. To sum up, the cession of Western Thrace up to the Maritza had been consistently and continuously demanded by Turkey, and had been conceded at Paris. He himself had been a party to the concession. A further concession, not contemplated in March, had been made at Mudania, namely, the immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza even prior to the meeting of the present conference. He would ask in all friendship and regard that the Turkish delegates should confine themselves to the demands in the Turkish programme which the Powers were perfectly ready to concede, and not render the negotiations more difficult by persisting in demands which it would be quite impossible to grant.

M. BARRÈRE said he had followed with keen interest this courteous, moderate and conciliatory discussion which did honour to all the delegations taking part in it. He hoped the debate would continue with the same breadth and rapidity. He wished to state that he entirely concurred in the clear and moderate statements of Lord Curzon, which corresponded with the views of the French Government and with his own. He specially appreciated the conciliatory spirit shown by M. Nincic and M. Duca, who had indicated their desire to avoid creating any subject of discord in the Balkans. He trusted that the Turkish delegation would take heed of the views expressed that day.

MARQUIS GARRONI also shared the views of Lord Curzon and M. Barrère. Even when the Allies contemplated a frontier favourable to Turkey, he had never ceased to recommend the adoption of the boundary now proposed by the Powers, and he asked the Turkish delegation to accept it. In his view, Lord Curzon's proposals were perfectly acceptable and of such a nature as to prevent fresh conflict.

M. VENISELOS said in connection with M. Stamboulliisky's statement regarding the Bulgarian outlet on the Ægean Sea that he was ready to give all

necessary guarantees with a view to the utilisation of the Maritza, the railway and the port of Dedeagatch under the control of an international commission, similar, for instance, to the Danube Commission.

In reply to a question from Lord Curzon, he handed to the secretariat-general statistics concerning the region ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915 (see annex).

(*The commission rose at* 6 P.M.)

ANNEX.

Statistique.

Populations comprises entre la Maritza et la Frontière turco-bulgare de 1913.

STATISTIQUE grecque de 1912.

	Grecs.	Turcs.
Caza de Dimotika	22,080	6,315
Partie du caza de Moustafa-Pacha ...	4,962	3,335
Partie du caza d'Ortakioï	1,714	1,775
Partie du caza d'Andrinople ...	8,400	3,200
Total	37,156	14,625

STATISTIQUE turque de 1902.

	Grecs.	Turcs.
Caza de Dimotika	19,045	8,499
Partie du caza de Moustafa-Pacha ...	3,065	3,479
Partie du caza d'Ortakioï	1,302	1,939
Partie du caza d'Andrinople ...	5,750	3,200
Total	29,162	17,117

Note.—Comme les cazas de Moustafa-Pacha, d'Ortakioï et d'Andrinople ont été traversés et partagés par la frontière de 1913, les chiffres compris dans la statistique grecque sont plus exacts, parce que cette statistique donne la population par village et par nationalité. Par contre, la statistique turque ne donnant que la population des cazas entiers, il a fallu, pour ne pas trop s'écarter de la vérité, utiliser les chiffres des statistiques turques diminués dans les mêmes proportions que les chiffres correspondants de la statistique grecque.

STATISTIQUE grecque de 1920

Département d'Evros.

(Cazas de Dédéagatch, Soufli, Dimotika, Ænos, Kypsala.)

Grecs.	Turcs
53,000	26,500

Note.—Si on retranche de ces chiffres officiels les populations des cazas de Dédéagatch, Ænos, Kypsala et Soufli, où la population turque était en majorité, on en arrive au même résultat qu'avec les statistiques précitées, c'est-à-dire à la grande majorité grecque dans la région de Dimotika.

[E 13615/10524/44] No. 719.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 5.)

(No. 670.)

My Lord, *Athens, November* 23, 1922.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 348 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that I have endeavoured to obtain an accurate estimate of the numbers of Moslems at present living in Greece. It has been

extremely difficult to form an estimate—how difficult your Lordship will realise when I state that the estimates given me from "reliable" sources have varied from 85,000 to 800,000—as no one appears to have very much knowledge of the question, no reliable or complete statistics have been taken for some years, and the last published were completely falsified by the subsequent movements of the Moslems inhabiting Thrace and Macedonia, who have been considerably upset by the sequence of wars to which their districts were exposed.

2. I have, however, caused careful enquiries to be made, and have the honour to submit the following figures, prepared for me by Mr. S. Atchley, second secretary and translator at His Majesty's Legation, who, having lived in Greece for about thirty years, is in a better position to judge than anyone else at my disposal.

3. Mr. Atchley estimates the Moslem population of Greece at roughly 400,000, distributed as follows:—

Macedonia	250,000
Thessaly	20,000
Epirus (Albanian Mussulmans)	30,000
Western Thrace	(?) 160,000
Crete	28,000
The islands (Mitylene, Chios, Samos, Thasos, Lemnos, Tenedos)	12,000

4. I submit these figures, especially in the case of Western Thrace, with great diffidence, having no possible means of checking them; it is, however, in my opinion, a probable figure, and likely to prove accurate enough for all practical purposes.

5. If I am right in assuming that the information asked for is needed in connection with the proposed exchange of populations, it should be borne in mind that the Epirote Mussulmans belong to a category distinct from the other Mussulman inhabitants of Greece, and I believe have no desire for expatriation.

6. As regards the Macedonian Mussulmans, the letter from Mrs. Hasluck, forwarded in my despatch No. 654 of the 17th instant, is interesting, as throwing some light on their desires and condition.

7. I also have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo, which throws an interesting light on the general question of the Moslem population of this country.

8. I regret that the above information was not obtained in time to catch the bag which left here on the 20th instant, but I was awaiting reports from His Majesty's consular officers on the subject.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure in No. 719.

Vice-Consul Knight to Mr. Lindley.

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Volo, November* 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to state that, to my regret, I have been unable to obtain any more accurate estimate of the Mussulman population of Thessaly than that (about 2,000) given in my telegram No. 18 of the 11th instant. The Mufti of Volo, to whom I had intended applying tactfully for information, proved to have left for Constantinople, and there is no other member of the local Moslem community to whom I could have had recourse under the circumstances. There are indeed practically no Moslems in the town save a few hundred gipsies, whose allegiance to the Prophet is purely nominal

In the plains of the interior there are believed to be from 400 to 500 Mussulmans, most of whom live at and around Larissa, where there are still a number of Beys with their families and retainers. The town and district of Elassona, which were under Turkish rule until just ten years ago, contain the highest proportion of Moslems, but even there they are said hardly to amount to more than a 1,800 souls.

The Muhammedan population has been steadily diminishing, mainly owing to emigration, since the annexation in 1882, until what was a small minority even in Turkish times has now become an insignificant remnant. A few individuals are well-to-do in a modest way, and one merchant, a Cretan Moslem by origin, is credited

with being extremely wealthy, but the great majority are now merely hewers of wood and drawers of water to the once despised "rayahs," by whom they have been overwhelmed without being absorbed.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT.

[E 13633/120/44] **No. 720.**

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1048.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 25, 1922.

I HAVE been informed on good authority that Lieutenant-Colonel Delaunay, who was at one time member of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission and who is now administrator of the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway and a director of the French railway group at Paris operating as the "Régie directe," recently visited Smyrna with a view to inducing the Angora Government to agree to the control of all railways in Asia Minor by the "Régie directe." Lieutenant-Colonel Delaunay's mission is reported, however, to have failed so far in its object, and he has now returned to Constantinople.

2. The Grand National Assembly is said to be considering the following propositions in regard to the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways:—

(*a.*) Nationalisation.
(*b.*) To hand over to the group above mentioned.
(*c.*) To hand over to the old company, whose headquarters are in Berlin.

3. I understand that the last-mentioned proposal is the most favoured at present.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13638/12891/44] **No. 721.**

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1054.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 26, 1922.

THE French High Commissioner having informed me that he had received instructions similar to those contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 7 from Lausanne of the 22nd instant, and having stated that he proposed to send his dragoman yesterday to Refet Pasha to ask for an audience with the Caliph, I thought it desirable, in order to avoid giving the appearance of following General Pellé's example, to make my own request for an audience before the general's had actually taken place. I accordingly arranged for an interview with Refet Pasha at the Sublime Porte this afternoon.

2. I began by expressing regret at not having returned earlier the visit which his Excellency had paid to me ten days before. I said that I knew that he had been exceedingly busy with the arrangements for the enthronement of His Majesty the Caliph, and that I had not wished to encroach upon his valuable time. I then reminded him that he had been good enough to send an A.D.C. to the British High Commission some days before to enquire whether I desired to attend a reception by His Majesty of the Diplomatic Corps, and to state that if I desired an audience with the Caliph that he (Refet) would be happy to arrange it. I pointed out that I had been unable to attend the reception for the reason that the Allied High Commissioners had had no official relations during the armistice with the late Sultan, by whom they had been received only on rare occasions and in an entirely personal and unofficial manner. There could be no question of altering for the moment this procedure in the case of the Caliph, but I hoped that His Majesty would deign to receive me in a similar personal manner. I could not, however, ask for an audience until General Pellé, who was now senior Allied High Commissioner, had done so. I would, however, then ask him to be good enough to make the necessary arrangements.

3. Refet Pasha replied that General Pellé had already made his request, and that an audience had been arranged for him at 4 o'clock the next afternoon. Would 4·15

the same afternoon be convenient for me? Since His Majesty was to receive a deputation at 4·30 it would, however, not leave me much time for my audience.

4. Refet Pasha's manner of arranging an audience seemed to me somewhat cavalier, and I replied that the matter appeared to me one for His Majesty to decide, and that I would be happy to be received at whatever hour might seem most suitable to His Majesty. Refet Pasha at once promised to make the necessary enquiries at the Court and to let me know His Majesty's wishes by telephone. I again impressed upon Refet Pasha the essentially personal nature of the audience I was soliciting, adding that since His Majesty spoke French I did not propose even to take a dragoman with me. I laid the greater stress on this inasmuch as I anticipate the possibility of Refet himself assisting at the audience, a contingency which I would avoid if possible.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13639/12891/44] No. 722.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1055.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November 26, 1922.*

AFTER having arranged to-day for my audience with the new Caliph (please see my despatch No. 1054 of the 25th November), Refet Pasha asked me what my impressions were of the progress being made at the Lausanne Conference. I said that they were so far decidedly favourable. He then said that a very bad impression had been created at Angora by the refusal of the Allies to accept a plebiscite for Western Thrace and by the appearance of a Balkan *bloc*. He seemed particularly irritated by M. Ninchitch's attitude, and asked what interests had Jugoslavia or Roumania in Western Thrace. He expressed at the same time the personal opinion that the Marmora was the real frontier of Turkey, and that though, since Constantinople must remain Turkish as the seat of the Caliphate, enough territory must be secured to Turkey to ensure its safety, she would be well advised not to extend that territory beyond the Maritza. He implied in fact that the bad impression was not caused by a prejudice to Turkey's real interests so much as by a disregard of a just claim, however inherently disadvantageous to Turkey.

2. I said that I attributed the unity shown by the Balkan States to the change which had taken place in the situation during the last two months. Prior to Mudania it was the Turks who distrusted the British. Perhaps Turkey still continued to distrust Great Britain, but in any case Turkey herself was now distrusted. How could it be otherwise, when the Angora Government was keeping a large army concentrated round Ismidt. Refet at once said that the leaders at Angora fully appreciated that there was a limit to the effect which could be produced by menace. He then proceeded to argue the community of British and Turkish interests. He said that Great Britain had no reason to regard Turkey as a danger to India. The population of India was nearly 400,000,000; only 80,000,000 of these were Moslem, and, though they were certainly the more vigorous part as compared with the Hindoos, it was a mistake to regard Turkey as a danger to British India. The threat, he said, to India came from quite another quarter. He could not understand why we did not appreciate the advantage of having on the Straits an army and a fleet which England was not paying for and which was yet protecting British interests. Russia was a common danger to both. Even in the most difficult times and in spite of the greatest disappointments, there had always remained some Turkish leaders in Angora who persisted in considering that friendship with Great Britain was Turkey's best policy. He himself was among the number. Since Mudania, though distrust of Great Britain was still very deep-rooted, there were many Turks who would be only too ready to be friends again with England, if only she would give them some proof of friendship. I confined myself to observing that Turkey had already received a very striking proof of England's friendly disposition. Mr. Lloyd George's fall had been largely due to public disapproval of his Near Eastern policy. A Conservative Government, the traditional friend of Turkey, had obtained a large majority in the elections. These two facts and the conciliatory attitude which your Lordship was adopting at Lausanne were, in my opinion, abundant proof of Great Britain's goodwill towards Turkey. I added, however, that we would also like a proof of Turkish goodwill, and that he himself could best afford one by preventing any awkward situation from arising in Constantinople. Any

attempt further to upset the existing administration of Constantinople, and to reduce the Allied controls beyond the limit compatible with the safety and dignity of the Allied forces, would be firmly resisted here and produce a most unfavourable impression at Lausanne. Refet Pasha again pleaded the difficulty of withstanding pressure from Angora. The latter, he said, based its action on the terms of the Mudania Convention. That convention merely admitted the presence of the Allied troops in occupied territories, and made no mention of the civil administration. Angora consequently could not understand the claim of the Allies to interfere in any way in internal affairs. At Angora they were dissatisfied with what they considered his lack of energy in this respect. I told him that I differed in both cases with the views of Angora. Firstly, the Mudania Convention had laid down that the territories in Allied occupation would be respected. To my mind that respect covered not only the Allied forces, but also the Allied administration of this city. Nor, secondly, if I were a Turk, would I share Angora's dissatisfaction with him. I would, on the other hand, say that he had deserved well of his country, inasmuch as he had, with the assistance of 126 gendarmes, succeeded in restoring a Nationalist administration in Constantinople. I hoped that in any case he would be satisfied with what he had accomplished, and take no further action of a nature calculated to produce fresh incidents.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13642/27/44] No. 723.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1060.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. 1100 of the 16th November, transmitting copy of a communication received from the Greek Legation in London regarding the position of Greek and Greek Ottoman subjects in Constantinople.

2. I cannot but agree with M. Caclamanos that the position of these persons is precarious, and I had already nearly a month ago advised the late Greek High Commissioner to do what he could to ensure the departure of all those who had served in the Greek or Allied armies.

3. As regards Hellenic Greeks, I hope that their safety is assured, so long as the Allied occupation lasts, by the agreement reached with Refet Pasha, as reported in my telegram No. 735 of the 25th instant, which will afford them the protection of the Allied police. The Ottoman Christians, however, reap no benefit from this arrangement and, although I trust that no excesses on a large scale will take place so long as the Allied occupation continues, they are undoubtedly exposed to intimidation and arrest. Such arrests, which were numerous at the first advent of a Nationalist administration, have now fallen off in number, but we have no assurance that they will not in the near future recur on an even greater scale. There has, so far as I am aware, been no attempt as yet to deport to the interior Greek Ottomans under military age, but the possibility of this cannot be excluded.

4. It is indeed difficult to see what assistance His Majesty's Government can render to Ottoman subjects in the conditions at present prevailing, so long as excesses do not occur on such a scale as to call for military intervention. As for those who have incurred the odium of the Nationalists through services rendered to the British authorities, everything in the power of the General Officer Commanding-in-chief or myself has already been and will be done to assist their departure. For the rest I have endeavoured to obtain a simplification of the passport control formalities in order that those who wish may leave Constantinople without unnecessary delay.

5. I endeavoured recently to ascertain from Refet Pasha what the future intentions of his Government were in regard to the Greeks here, both Ottoman and Hellenic. Whether purposely or because Angora's policy as regards the Christian population of Constantinople is not yet definitely decided, Refet's reply was vague. His actions hitherto have been equally so. He has done nothing obviously calculated to create a panic with a view to inducing the Greeks to leave, and has indeed several times expressed his anxiety to avoid such a panic. Nor has he yet attempted seriously

to interfere with their departure. I am myself of opinion that no Hellenes at any rate will ultimately be allowed to remain, but that Angora is not yet sure how far the expulsion of the Ottoman Greeks from Constantinople will ruin this city and be prejudicial to Turkish interests. While anathematising the Greeks who lived in palaces while the Turks lived in huts, Refet spoke to me the other day as if the Grand National Assembly, when it returned to Constantinople after the peace, might allow its Ottoman Greek subjects to remain. The ground he gave for this leniency was a religious one—the precepts of the Koran in respect of hospitality and the treatment to be accorded to the non-Moslem guest. He also told me that the Greeks, if they were not actually expelled, would be well advised to leave, as in future in a new Turkey they would be unable to make a living here. The Turks were going to take the commerce into their own hands; he had already started to organise for this purpose. Though I am very sceptical of the commercial capacity of the Turks or the success which would attend their efforts if confined to legitimate competition, I do not doubt that means will be found to ruin Greek commerce.

6. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Athens.

I have, &c
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 13645/12891/44] No. 724.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1064.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the ceremony of the investiture of Prince Abdul Medjid Effendi as Khalif of all the Mussulmans took place here on the 24th instant.

2. The details of this ceremony constituted a marked departure from those of the enthronement of past Turkish Sultans. The latter invariably proceeded in full military uniform and amid scenes of Oriental splendour from the Palace to the ancient sanctuary of Eyoub, where they were girded with the sword of Osman by the Tchelebi of Konia, who was considered to be the representative of the dynasty of the Seljuks—the predecessors of the Ottoman Turks. With the abolition of the Sultanate and the assumption of all civil and military power by the Great National Assembly of Turkey, however, this ancient ceremony was for the first time abandoned, its place being taken by one of a purely religious nature as befitting the elected head of the Moslem world.

3. His Majesty the Khalif, in morning dress and white tie, left the Palace of Dolma Baghtche at 10 A.M. and drove in an open State carriage to the Top Kapu Palace (Old Seraglio). Rafet Pasha accompanied His Majesty in the State carriage, which was preceded by a carriage containing Mufid Effendi, president of the delegation consisting of twenty members of the Great National Assembly who had come to Constantinople specially for the ceremony. Following the State carriage came eight street carriages containing Selaheddin Adil Pasha, Under-Secretary for War in the Angora Government, who recently arrived in Constantinople, Abdurrahman Nafiz Bey, Commandant de la Place, and the remaining members of the Angora delegation.

4. On arrival at the Old Seraglio the Khalif proceeded to the Pavilion of the Sacred Relics, where he was received by the Angora delegation. Thereupon Mufid Effendi read the "mazbata," or letter, announcing the election of the Khalif, and handed it to the latter in a red silk portfolio. The Khalif replied invoking the assistance of God in his labours, and expressing his wishes for the happiness of the Turkish people as the standard-bearers of Islam. A golden key was next handed to His Majesty, who with it opened the three cases containing the sacred relics of the Prophet, and thus received them in trust as the appointed successor of Mahommed.

5. The next part of the ceremony took place in another room of the Palace, where the Khalif, standing in front of a golden throne, with the Princes of the Khalifat family on his right and Rafet Pasha on his left, listened to a long prayer recited by one of the ulema. The presence of a number of cinematograph operators and the noise of their machines deprived, however, the occasion of all dignity and solemnity. Thereafter the Princes, led by their senior, Ziaeddin Effendi, the Angora delegates, the leading officials of the town, hodjas, officers and Court officials, paid homage and kissed hands, and the second part of the ceremony was over. It may be

remarked that, while no member of my staff attended this or any other part of the ceremony, several representatives of the French and Italian High Commissions were present as spectators.

6. On the conclusion of this second part of the ceremony the procession was re-formed, and the Khalif, attended throughout by Rafet Pasha, proceeded through crowded streets lined with armed gendarmes to the Mosque of Mohammed the Conqueror, where he made his first public devotions as Khalif before a large congregation. It was during this service that perhaps the most interesting and significant breakaway from all previous practice was made, for the "houtbé," of which I enclose a French translation herewith, was for the first time read in Turkish. The reading of the "houtbé" was announced to the multitude by a salute of 101 guns, and thereafter followed a prayer which had been composed by the Khalif himself.

7. After leaving the mosque at 12.45 P.M., His Majesty stopped at the mausoleums of Sultan Selim and Sultan Mahmoud, the latter of which contains the tomb of his father, Sultan Abdul Aziz. He then returned to the Palace by the same route as had been followed on the outward journey.

8. Thanks chiefly to the fine weather which prevailed, the procession and ceremonies were viewed by a fairly large and orderly crowd. While a certain organised welcome accorded to His Majesty, his reception could scarcely be termed enthusiastic. This may in part be attributed to the entire absence of the gorgeous display attendant on the enthronement of Turkish Sultans in the past. It was, however, doubtless principally due to the fact that the spectators must have realised that the ceremonies were devoid of all meaning, that the elected Khalif (the civil chief of a religious community) was a mere figurehead and that, deprived of all temporal power, he was unable to exercise even those spiritual powers which are in the hands of any other religious chief.

9. After his return to the Palace, His Majesty, as Khalif of all the Mussulmans and servitor of the two Holy Cities, issued the proclamation, of which I have the honour to enclose a French translation herewith.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 724.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of November 25, 1922.

VOICI le texte du "houtbé," qui s'inspire de la plus haute élévation de pensées et de sentiments :

"Mille fois merci au Tout-Puissant pour avoir consacré le triomphe de notre peuple sur tous ceux qui voulaient l'anéantissement de la race turque et, par voie de conséquence, celui de tous les musulmans. Il est certain que le Tout-Puissant examinera les désirs et les vœux de ceux qui firent preuve de patience et d'endurance jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient repoussé les attaques des agresseurs.

"O peuple!

"Un verset vénéré que je viens de vous citer nous commande de répondre à l'appel qui est fait par le Prophète pour secouer notre faiblesse, reprendre nos droits sacrés et nous rendre forts et puissants.

"Quoique nous soyons aux prises contre des privations de toute sorte, c'est en comptant sur la force de la foi et l'énergie que Dieu a mises dans nos cœurs que nous avons répondu à cet appel. Grâce à la protection divine, nous avons réussi à nous défaire de toute restriction et de toute domination étrangère, et à demeurer les maîtres incontestés de nos destinées. Nous savons que ceux qui se sont sacrifiés pour cette cause rejoindront Dieu.

"Nos martyres ('chéhids') eurent ce bonheur. Nous avons méprisé la mort et nous n'avons ressenti aucune lassitude. Grâce à la protection divine et à la volonté de notre peuple, nous avons réalisé ces jours de bonheur. Notre Prophète vénéré a dit: 'Le fidèle dont la foi demeure entière ne se trompe pas deux fois sur la même chose et profite de l'expérience.' En nous inspirant de ces paroles sublimes, nous avons décidé de ne plus nous tromper, de ne plus rien accepter qui puisse porter atteinte à notre souveraineté et à notre indépendance.

"Musulmans, vous avez la charge de vous soumettre à ces commandements

"Même Sa Majesté Abdul Médjid, que nous venons d'élire Calif, a accepté cet ordre sublime et nous recommanda de lire en son nom ce houtbé.

"Dans une autre phrase sainte (hadice) prononcée par notre Prophète vénéré il est dit : 'Nous sortons d'une petite guerre sainte ("djihad"): nous en commencerons maintenant une grande.'

"Que peut-elle être cette grande guerre sainte? On ne peut songer qu'à cette vérité: 'Il n'est pas de pire calamité pour un peuple que l'ignorance.' Dès lors, armons les enfants de notre pouple avec les armes de l'instruction et de la culture. Nous allons mener contre l'ignorance une lutte acharnée à laquelle tous sont invités à prendre part, hommes et femmes.

"Nous devons aussi réaliser à l'avenir cette prescription sacrée qui affirme que 90 pour cent des chances d'assurer sa subsistance résident dans le commerce et l'agriculture. Nous devons donc assurer le bien-être et la fortune de notre peuple en le conduisant vers le travail.

"Nous tâcherons de même d'administrer avec un parfait esprit d'équité les affaires publiques et de supprimer la débauche et la rébellion, qui constituent des entraves matérielles et morales dans le relèvement de notre peuple."

Enclosure 2 in No. 724.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of November 25, 1922.

PROCLAMATION DE SA MAJESTÉ ABDUL MÉDJID, CALIF DE TOUS LES MUSULMANS.

EN me soumettant à la protection et à la volonté divines, à l'esprit de miséricorde de notre Prophète vénéré, en m'appuyant sur le concours et le suffrage de la grande Assemblée nationale, qui par ses décisions judicieuses, conformes aux besoins du peuple et du temps, a prouvé depuis trois ans sa maturité, sa sagacité et, confirmant ainsi sa souveraineté, je viens d'occuper respectivement la fonction sublime du Califat de l'islam.

Je me prosterne avec parfaite humilité pour exprimer ma profonde reconnaissance devant les brillantes victoires, sans exemple dans l'histoire, qui se manifestèrent dernièrement pour le bien du monde musulman. Grâce à la bienveillance et à la protection, à l'esprit de miséricorde de notre Prophète et aussi grâce aux vaillants soldats et défenseurs de la religion.

Je signale avec un profond sentiment de reconnaissance et de fierté, le haut concours fraternel que le monde musulman n'a pas cessé de prodiguer, notamment dans cette dernière période d'épreuve pour rendre hommage aux efforts dévoués de notre peuple turc et de la dynastie ottomane qui ont l'honneur et la fierté d'être depuis des siècles les serviteurs et les défenseurs du Califat. J'implore la protection divine pour qu'il accorde au monde musulman le bonheur et la prospérité digne de sa haute valeur.

L'idéal de la grande famille musulmane est de travailler dans un parfait accord pour assurer la manifestation des perfections matérielles et spirituelles qui ont été annoncées et promises par les paroles divines et par la sublime religion musulmane.

En conséquence, afin de pouvoir accomplir judicieusement la haute mission de chef et de commandeur des musulmans, qui est dépôt du divin, et de réussir autant que possible dans le service vénéré de l'islam, auquel j'ai consacré tous mes efforts, j'ai recours particulièrement aux lumières et au concours de la communauté musulmane et aux érudits de notre religion vénérée. Que le Tout-Puissant accorde à nous tous ses succès divins et nous réserve la joie de voir la réalisation de la paix mondiale ainsi que du bonheur et de la prospérité public.

ABDUL MEDJID,
(fils d'Abdul Aziz),
Calif de tous les Musulmans et Serviteur des deux Villes-Saintes.

Le 4 Rebiul Ahir 1341.

[E 13651/12891/44] No. 725.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1070.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

IN accordance with the arrangement made with Refet Pasha on the preceding day, as reported in my despatch No. 1054, I was received yesterday in private audience by His Majesty the Caliph.

2. The French High Commissioner's audience immediately preceded mine. In order to emphasise the personal and unofficial nature of my visit, I went alone to Dolma Bagtché Palace, but I found that General Pellé had taken with him his first dragoman.

3. The entrance hall and staircase was lined by a double row of guards in white and red uniform, and I was introduced to the presence by the First Marshal of the Ceremonies, Memdouh Bey. Refet Pasha was in attendance and assisted at our interview, though he made no attempt to break into the conversation, as I heard he had done at an audience given to the Polish Minister a few days previously.

4. After shaking hands with me, I was invited to sit down opposite the Caliph, with Refet Pasha in a chair on my right. An awkward silence then ensued, the Caliph apparently waiting for me to begin the conversation. In despair, I eventually did so by observing that I was greatly honoured by being received by His Majesty and that I had come to offer him my personal felicitations on his accession to the Caliphate, an event which I trusted would inaugurate a period of peace in the East.

5. Abdul Mejid replied that such was also his earnest hope. So far as lay in his power he would work to that end. All depended on the attitude which Great Britain adopted at the Peace Conference. Great Britain and Turkey had been friends in the past. He himself remembered the Treaty of San Stefano and the arrogance of the Russians, and he and Turkey could never forget the support which Lord Beaconsfield and England gave to Turkey on that occasion. Great Britain should not impute to the Turkish nation the events of the past ten years. It was not the Turkish nation which had made war on England. The nation had been led astray by its leaders, and should not be held responsible for their misdeeds. Those guilty leaders had now disappeared, and Turkey was on the threshold of a new life. Like a new-born child, she required assistance. Would Great Britain help her to grow to a new manhood? British and Turkish interests were not opposed to each other. The Turkish nature was noble, generous and frank. The new Turkish nation was fully prepared to return to the old relations of friendship with England if the latter would only make a gesture to prove her willingness to be the friend of Turkey.

6. On the last occasion that I saw Refet Pasha he similarly expressed a wish for some British gesture of this sort. I told His Majesty that, once a satisfactory peace had been signed, I did not doubt that England would show her readiness to return to the former relationship. So much depended on the issue of the peace negotiations which we were conducting with our Allies. I said that your Lordship was the Foreign Minister of a Conservative Government directly descended from that which Lord Beaconsfield had represented at the Congress of Berlin. Your Lordship's remarkably conciliatory attitude at Lausanne and the traditions of the Conservative Party should be a sufficient guarantee of Great Britain's friendly intentions. I told His Majesty, for Refet Pasha's benefit, that what I chiefly feared now was the impatience of the Grand National Assembly at Angora.

7. The Caliph replied that all would be well provided Great Britain was just and was ready to make a just peace. The conversation then stopped, and after another awkward pause, during which I waited to be given, but did not receive, a sign that my audience was at an end. I got up and took my leave.

8. The Caliph spoke in French and quite freely, but it was somewhat pathetic to observe the manner in which, after making certain of his remarks, such as in regard to the misdeeds of the former leaders of Turkey, presumably the Committee of Union and Progress, he turned towards Refet Pasha as if to ask for some expression of his approval.

9. The audience lasted about twenty minutes, and on leaving I met the Persian Ambassador waiting to be received. I subsequently ascertained that all the neutral diplomatic representatives here (Dutch, Swedes, Danish, Apostolic delegate, &c.) were received later in the afternoon. I cannot but believe that, after the arrangements had made for General Pellé's and my audiences, Refet Pasha contrived to

arrange for the reception on the same day of the neutral diplomats in order to give our audiences an air of official receptions.

10. I took care to inform both my French and Italian colleagues as soon as the hour for my audience had been fixed. M. Maissa has now asked for an audience, of which the date is not yet arranged.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 726.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 751.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 5, 1922.*

TURKS are attempting to prevent departure of all Greek and Armenian Ottoman subjects who are not provided with Turkish passports. Procedure hitherto has been that all Ottoman subjects could leave provided they had inter-Allied visa on special *laissez-passer*.

My French and Italian colleagues will not [? co-operate if we] resist a Turkish claim of principle which they consider fundamentally justified, as indeed it is. There is no question of objecting to inter-Allied visa, which would still, of course, always be required.

Refet has assured High Commissioners that no difficulty will be raised to granting of Turkish passports to Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, whose departure Turks are anxious to facilitate.

At the same time issue of passports will facilitate extortion, even if Refet's assurance be sincere.

By despatch of British platoon of marines and machine gun to quay yesterday, departure of Ottoman subjects was arranged in spite of Turkish opposition.

Question is to be raised by Refet with Allied generals to-day. It will, however, be difficult for General Harington to take up strong position, as neither of his colleagues is likely to afford him any support.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 44.)

No. 727.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 752.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 5, 1922*

MY telegram No. 735.

Question of Allied military tribunals was settled yesterday between High Commissioners and Refet Pasha on the lines that trials will be suspended pending conclusion of peace. Turkish offenders will be detained in Turkish prisons and *vice versâ*, preliminary enquiries being conducted by each party independently.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 45.)

No. 728.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 753.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, December 5, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 1044.

Refet has again raised very insistently question of Greek High Commission, which he claims has, in altered situation here, no right to continue except as branch of neutral mission. He declares that Spanish Legation is still regarded, as during the war, as in charge of Greek interests.

Decision was postponed for a week, as French High Commissioner, who left to-day, undertook to raise question at Lausanne with M. Venizelos.

However regrettable it may be to give way on matters which are clearly derogatory to Allied prestige and calculated to increase panic, I fear it will be

impossible to get united decision here for strong line in questions not of Allied or military importance. If we agree to Turkish view, we must at least make it quite clear that our acceptance in no way prejudices the right of Hellenes to enjoy Allied police protection.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 46; repeated to Athens, No. 262.)

No. 729.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 27) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 5.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 4, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 38, last paragraph.

I see by your telegram No. 41 that General Harington has obtained personal assurance from Refet regarding Patriarch. Should he nevertheless be in danger in future you should not stand too much on technicalities of national status, but should do your utmost to prevent his expulsion or arrest. I agree that if he is actually arrested you should insist on his release. If he wishes to leave of his own accord facilities should be given, but we cannot advise him to do so in view of panic which would ensue.

No. 730.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 5, 1922.*

THIS morning first sitting of commission on Straits question, myself in the chair, provided a sequence of curious scenes. Hall was crowded, in addition to ordinary attendance, with Bulgarian and Russian delegations, latter attended by a swarm of myrmidons. Upon my inviting Turkish delegation to speak, Ismet Pasha responded in half a dozen sentences of purely general character, affirming Turkish sovereignty in the abstract and indicating sympathy with commercial freedom of Straits, but containing no proposals or arguments and formulating no plan. I expressed my surprise at this reticence, from which he declined to depart, and I then invited views of Russian delegation. Chicherin thereupon read a statement in which he claimed on behalf of Turkey, as well as of Russia

1. Complete and permanent freedom of waters from Ægean Sea to Black Sea for commercial navigation of all nations in peace and war.

2. Closure both in peace and war to ships of war and aircraft of all nations except Turkey.

3. Recognition of full sovereignty of Turkey on land and sea, and right for her to arm and fortify shores, own a war fleet and employ every engine of modern warfare.

He further demanded withdrawal of all foreign forces, but made no mention, as was expected, of neutralisation of Black Sea. Duca, the Roumanian delegate, then made excellent speech, in which he proposed under international sanction (1) freedom of Straits equally for ships of commerce and war; (2) demilitarisation of coasts from Ægean Sea to Black Sea; (3) creation of Straits Commission; (4) demilitarisation of Black Sea.

Bulgarian Prime Minister then advocated freedom for ships of commerce only, both in peace and war, and expressed desire to participate in international administration. I then challenged Turkish delegation to say whether Russians had expressed their views, and commented on extraordinary situation in which Chicherin had been called on to appear in the quadruple capacity of representative of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey as well, while the latter maintained an inexplicable silence.

Stirred by this challenge, Ismet declared that he still awaited expression of views of Governments who had not spoken, but that Russian proposal corresponded generally to Turkish point of view.

I have not a doubt that it did not, but that Russia was put up by agreement to state extreme case. Turkey desiring not to commit herself at present stage.

I pointed out that Turkish attitude was hardly respectful to the conference, and would be received with general astonishment in the world, and said that I had no alternative but to adjourn discussion to an early date, when I would state views of inviting Powers. Chicherin intervened with rude complaint that these were not at once placed before the meeting, but was easily suppressed. I also reminded him that, while I concurred in hoping that foreign forces in the Straits would not be permanent element in the situation, they were a not unimportant factor in immediate solution of the problem.

General impression produced by sitting was that Turkey had openly and unnecessarily placed herself in position of humiliating subjection to Russia, and that latter had proposed a ridiculous plan designed only to convert the Black Sea into a fortified Russian lake, and to make Turkey her vassal.

One of Turkish delegates has since been to see me and desires to-morrow to have private conversation based, as he definitely asserts, on genuine Turkish desire (*a*) to conclude peace; (*b*) to break with Russia; (*c*) to resume ancient friendship with Britain. He said my attitude had convinced them of wisdom of this policy. I will report further developments.

No. 731.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 5) *to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.*—(*Repeated to Foreign Office: Received December 5.*)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 5, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 420.

Invitation to Egyptian Government to send a delegation to Lausanne Conference in connection with discussion of Egyptian articles was on the point of being issued by three Allied Powers when Sarwat's Ministry fell. Invitation has been suspended pending clear indication of attitude of new Cabinet to programme already agreed with Sarwat. If Nessim accepts that programme as it stands invitation can be despatched at once, and your Lordship should therefore ascertain his attitude on this question without delay.

No. 732.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 5, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister:—

"Your telegram No. 68 has been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Chiefs of Naval, Military and Air Staffs are so decidedly opposed to conceding the right to fortify the Straits, that the committee feel unable to recommend endorsement of the proposal of your naval and military advisers.

"A difference of opinion has arisen on the point whether, in the event of your being unable to obtain both demilitarisation and free passage for warships, the first or the second of these desiderata should be regarded as the more important.

"As political considerations are involved, this question may have to come before the Cabinet, and as yet there has been no opportunity for this. I do not anticipate that you will have to take a final decision immediately on this particular point, and I feel sure we shall hear again from you before this stage is reached. My personal view is that the main thing to aim at is demilitarisation."

[E 13682/13003/44] No. 733.

Sous-Commission pour l'Etude de la Démilitarisation de certaines Iles de la mer Egée.—(*Received in Foreign Office December 6.*)

ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE.

M. F. Lammot Belin.

EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE.

Major-General J. T. Burnett-Stuart.
The Honourable Harold Nicolson.

Assistés de:

Captain A. D. Pound, R.N.
Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. G. Heywood.

FRANCE.

Vice-Amiral Lacaze.
Général Weygand.

Assistés de:

M. Bargeton.
Lieutenant-Colonel Courtin.
Capitaine de Corvette de La Moricière.

GRECE.

S. E. M. Vénisélos.
Général Alexandre Mazarakis.
M. le Dr. Michel Theotokas.

Assistés de:

M. Vassili Dendramis.

ITALIE.

M. Mario Arlotta.
Colonel Umberto Vitale.

Assistés de:

M. Mario Indelli.

JAPON.

Capitaine de Frégate N. Tsuru.

ROUMANIE.

S. E. M. Diamandy.
Colonel Toma Dumitrescu.

SERBIE.

M. Milan Antitch.
M. Vladimir Milanovitch.

TURQUIE.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tevfik Bey.
Capitaine de Frégate Chefket Bey.

Assistés de:

M. Nousret Bey.
M. Djevad Bey.

Rapport de la Sous-Commission d'Experts réunie pour étudier la Question de la Démilitarisation des îles de Lemnos, Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria (Résolution de la première Commission, en date du 26 Novembre, 2me alinéa).

LA sous-commission, dans sa séance du 28 novembre:

1. A l'unanimité, a émis l'avis qu'il y a lieu de prendre, dans les cinq îles envisagées, certaines mesures de démilitarisation.
2. En ce qui concerne ces mesures:

(1.) A l'unanimité, elle a estimé que, pour Lemnos, ces mesures devraient être définies en même temps que celles à fixer pour les îles d'Imbros, Tenedos et Samothrace, au moment où le problème des Détroits sera examiné.

(2.) Pour les îles de Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria, la majorité a estimé que les mesures de démilitarisation doivent consister dans les restrictions suivantes:

(*a.*) Aucune base navale, aucune fortification.

(*b.*) Interdiction réciproque pour les aviations militaires de survoler respectivement les îles et le territoire turc.

(*c.*) Limitation des forces militaires dans les îles au contingent normal appelé pour le service militaire, qui pourra ainsi être instruit sur place, et à un effectif de gendarmerie et de police, calculé sur la base de l'effectif de la gendarmerie et de la police existant sur l'ensemble du territoire hellénique.

La majorité est d'avis de ne pas proposer de restrictions plus étendues qui, sous peine de mettre les îles grecques à la merci de la Turquie, appelleraient l'application au territoire anatolien de restrictions correspondantes.

Le but des dispositions préconisées ci-dessus est, en effet, d'interdire à la Grèce la possibilité de procéder dans ses îles à des préparatifs offensifs contre Turquie, tout en lui concédant les moyens dont elle a besoin pour maintenir l'ordre dans ses îles et protéger leur territoire contre les incursions de bandes et autres tentatives du même ordre.

La délégation turque, constituant la minorité, a présenté la réserve ci-jointe.

Le 28 novembre 1922.

Enclosure in No. 733.

Réserve de la Délégation turque.

LES considérations que la délégation turque à la Sous-Commission militaire désire émettre et les réserves qu'elle tient à formuler sur les propositions faites cet après-midi par M. le président sont les suivantes :

Dans la séance de ce matin, M. le président de la sous-commission avait soutenu et démontré, à la suite de longues discussions, l'évidence du fait que les îles en question constituaient une base d'opération pour une attaque contre l'Anatolie et que de là on pourrait menacer le cœur même de l'Asie Mineure ; après quoi, la nécessité de démilitariser ces îles avait été acceptée en principe.

En discutant les limites de cette démilitarisation, M. l'Amiral français Lacaze avait soutenu la thèse que dans la phrase proposée par M. le président : "aucune base navale, aucun port militaire," était incluse l'interdiction d'entretenir des hydroplanes.

Lorsque M. le président avait proposé d'interdire l'introduction de toute artillerie dans les îles, son Excellence M. Vénisélos avait demandé l'autorisation d'y maintenir des canons anti-aériens, et M. le président avait répondu que, les canons anti-aériens pouvant également être utilisés comme canons de campagne, l'autorisation demandée ne pouvait être accordée.

En outre, M le Général Weygand, se basant sur le grand rayon d'action des aéroplanes et sur les nombreux inconvénients qui pourraient en résulter, s'était opposé au maintien dans les îles de ces appareils.

D'autre part, il avait été constaté dans la même séance que les installations militaires des îles étaient à même de menacer l'Anatolie, tandis que les batteries placées sur la côte anatolienne ne pouvaient en aucune façon constituer un danger pour la Grèce elle-même, et que, par conséquent, il n'y avait pas lieu de considérer les moyens militaires se trouvant sur la côte anatolienne comme ayant une importance de même ordre.

La délégation turque a été étonnée de constater que les propositions qui lui ont été faites dans la séance de l'après-midi n'avaient aucun rapport avec les décisions prises en se basant uniquement sur des considérations d'ordre militaire durant la séance de ce matin. Elle a été également surprise de voir que ces propositions avaient le caractère d'une décision comme prise par les autres délégations en dehors de ce qui avait été convenu durant la réunion du matin de la sous-commission.

En se plaçant au point de vue du maintien de la tranquillité et de la sécurité de l'Asie Mineure, la délégation turque, pour des raisons d'ordre technique, se voit dans l'obligation d'insister afin que le régime de démilitarisation des îles soit le suivant :

1. Il n'y aura aucune base militaire et navale et aucun port de guerre dans les îles de Mitylène, Samos, Chio et Nikaria ;
2. Il n'y sera procédé à des travaux de fortification d'aucune sorte et aucune installation militaire n'y sera maintenue.
3. En dehors de la gendarmerie, aucune force armée ne devra s'y trouver ; on ne devra y installer aucun dépôt, ni y faire aucun préparatif militaire.
4. On ne devra y maintenir aucun aéroplane ou hydroplane, ainsi qu'aucune installation pouvant être utilisée par l'aviation.
5. On a exprimé le désir d'étudier la question de la démilitarisation de l'île de Lemnos lors de l'examen de celle des Détroits.

Vu l'étroite relation qui existe entre ces deux questions, la délégation turque demande que la souveraineté à laquelle devra être soumise cette île soit examinée lorsqu'on traitera de la question des Détroits.

No. 734.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 754.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, December 6, 1922*

MY telegram No. 753.

Greek High Commissioner, who came to see me to-day, begged me, if it were decided to entrust Hellenic interests here to neutral country, to arrange that his mission should continue to function as branch of three Allied High Commissions.

Such arrangement would, he said, prevent danger of panic.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 48, and Athens, No. 263.)

No. 735.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 756.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 6, 1922.*

I TOOK opportunity of visit to Refet Pasha yesterday on the subject of Anatolian refugees to warn him that his attitude in question of passports threatened to produce most serious consequences. I added that this attitude coincided strangely with a certain tension at Lausanne, and that if Turkey allowed Russia to drive her into rupture, Turks themselves would be principal losers in the catastrophe.

Refet admitted possibility, and professed to deplore contingency, which he said was being thrust unwillingly upon Turkey. Up to present, Turkey was in no way bound to Russia. In spite of latter's remonstrances, Turkish delegates had gone to conference even though Russia was excluded from discussions except on the Straits question. Turkey had all through difficulties of past few years been clever enough to keep her full liberty of action, because she realised danger of subserviency to Russia. Balkan peace or war at Lausanne was in Lord Curzon's hands. Other delegates merely nodded their acquiescence in whatever he said. He had only to give a sign and Turkey would do anything she was told by Great Britain. That sign was expression of willingness to accept National Pact, which had been drawn up so as not to clash with any British interests, which was based on Wilsonian principles, and which recognised loss of two-thirds of old Turkish Empire. Turkey, however, could not accept less than National Pact. If her representatives at Lausanne or her leaders at Angora attempted to do so they would be repudiated and overthrown. Turkey was honestly and sincerely desirous of peace, but she could not accept less than her minimum demands, which had been drawn up four years before at time of her lowest ebb.

He professed to be not in the least alarmed by Balkan *bloc*, in which fissures, he said, were already apparent. He seemed quite convinced that Jugoslavia would not intervene actively (see my telegram [group undecypherable]). He said repeatedly that only Power at conference which counted was Great Britain; that [? Great Britain] had been largely responsible for driving Turkey into the arms of Germany, and was repeating now the same mistake for both countries in case of Russia.

As he spoke with considerable emotion, I report gist of what he said. I pointed out suicidal nature of Turkish policy. He did not dispute my arguments, but attributed blame to Great Britain and [group undecypherable].

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 50.)

No. 736.

Colonel Humphrys to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received December 6.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Kabul, November 30, 1922.*

THIS morning Ameer invited me to his private room in palace, and said that he was watching the progress of the negotiations at Lausanne with keenest interest. Hopes of the whole Mahommedan world, he said, were centred on an equitable and lasting solution of the Turkish problem, and he had decided to send a personal appeal on the subject, by telegram, to His Majesty King George, through Afghan Minister, London. I replied that I had just received the gratifying news that the work of the

conference was proceeding smoothly, and that the important question of the western boundary of Turkey had already been settled. Ameer said that, after final peace with Turkey had been signed, he looked forward to immediate change of attitude of the Mahommedan States of Middle East towards Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government so desired, he undertook to work with all his strength for the establishment of close *entente* between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Great Britain. In his opinion, it was essential that these three Islamic nations should draw closer together by, and be fortified by, assistance of one of the great European Powers. Russia was trying to involve whole world in ruin which she had brought on herself. He incidentally mentioned that Russia, by stopping Central Asian trade with Afghanistan, had halved Afghan customs receipts. Germany was heading towards bankruptcy, Italy did not command sufficient influence in international politics. Islam's choice of a coadjutor must fall on either France or England, and in his view, England was incomparably best fitted for the purpose, on account of her traditions and geographical position, and the numbers of her Mahommedan subjects. He begged me to communicate his views to His Majesty's Government, which I promised to do. (End of first part.)

Part 2.

Comments. Whether his megalomania and inexperience are such as to make Ameer imagine that he can really influence Turkish or Persian policy or not, he apparently thinks that a successful settlement is probable at Lausanne, and that it would be followed by gravitation of Turkey towards Great Britain, a tendency to which interests of Afghanistan might induce her to conform. His proposal seems to aim at securing the prestige and credit of initiating what will thus, in his opinion, probably be the inevitable result of forces beyond his control. Through consequent goodwill of His Majesty's Government he perhaps hopes to secure British diplomatic support *vis-à-vis* Russia, if not for withdrawal of Soviet forces from his northern frontier, at least for reopening of Afghan trade, now closed, with Central Asia. In return he might offer active co-operation towards maintenance of peace on north-west frontier of India.

Such proposition[s] may remain for future consideration, but however mixed Ameer's motives may be, I believe that he is at the moment disgusted with Russian policy, and that it would be impolitic to disturb such a sentiment by rebuffing his overtures. Consequently, although Ameer's personal message (copy of which is contained in the third part of this telegram) may appear presumptuous, I would urge from local standpoint that its crudity may be overlooked, and that cordial reply may be sent as from the King.

I suggest that, in reply to the Ameer's main proposal, I may be authorised to convey, in non-committal terms, appreciation of His Majesty's Government of this sign of the Ameer's goodwill, and their assurance that the Ameer can always count upon the desire of His Majesty's Government for friendship of Islamic peoples, leaving the next move to the Ameer if he has any definite proposals to make. (End of second part.)

Part 3

Afghan Foreign Minister informed me this afternoon that Ameer's personal message to the King was being telegraphed to Abdul Hadi in London, with orders to transmit it through Foreign Office. He gave me copy of the message, translation of which is as follows :—

"From His Majesty the Ameer of Afghanistan to His Majesty the King of Great Britain :—

"It is my friendly request that Your Majesty may give instructions to the representatives of your Royal Government, in regard to question[s] which will be brought forward for discussion at the Lausanne Conference, that they may give equitable consideration and attention to the Turkish problem, which is concerned with general peace of all the Moslems of the Eastern world."

Afghan Foreign Minister hinted that similar message would probably be sent by Ameer to King of Italy and French President

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No. 737.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe. - (*Received December* 6.)

(No. 80. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December* 5, 1922

SECOND Turkish delegate, Riza Nur Bey, called this morning to renew private conversation which he had begun yesterday. After many protestations of friendly intentions on both sides, his case boiled down to this, that Turkey would meet us on every point, conclude satisfactory treaty and even break with Soviet, if only we would give them vilayet of Mosul. Grounds upon which he based this request were four in number :—

1. Ethnic, which I sharply contested.
2. Historical, *i.e.*, long connection with Turkey.
3. Economic, *i.e.*, necessity for future economic life of Turkey in Asia.
4. National Pact, *i.e.*, absolute and unalterable refusal of Angora to conclude any treaty that does not embrace Mosul.

I combated the whole of these points, and declined to yield upon any points.

Colonial Office argument has led me to think that Mosul cannot be given away without loss of Bagdad, nor Bagdad without loss of Irak and collapse of Irak kingdom, nor collapse of Arabs without return of Turks and final defeat of British policy in the East. I also wondered somewhat how far Turks' demand for Mosul was really genuine, how far it might be inspired by hope of thus wresting formal victory for Turkey in Asia; or, again, whether it might not be subtle device of Turks, perhaps instigated by Russia, to be able to say to the world later on : "We offered to make peace with Allies, and notably with Great Britain; we were willing to meet them on every point provided only we recovered Mosul; but for the sake of Mosul and its oil, Britain flouted us and refused peace to the world."

This afternoon idea occurred to me that it might perhaps be possible ostensibly and partially to meet Turkish wishes by offering them Kurdish part of Mosul Vilayet following line of mountains and including Keui Sandjak, Rowanduz and Suleimanieh, while retaining for Irak Amadia for the sake of Assyrian Christians, Mosul town, Erbil, Kirkuk and whole of plain country inhabited by Arabs. Jaffer Pasha, to whom I submitted proposal, was quite favourable, while pleading strongly against any surrender of plain country.

Please ask Colonial Office to send out Young if he is sufficiently recovered, or, failing him, Bullard, who has great local knowledge, and to favour me with their views on above suggestion. It is not intended to exclude Turkish participation in Mosul oil on lines already under examination.

No. 738.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 6.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December* 6, 1922.

THIS morning at meeting of First Commission I spoke at length in reply to Chicherin's proposals of Monday last with regard to Straits, demonstrating their impracticable character and inner meaning. I understand that my speech is to be telegraphed *in extenso* to British press, so I need not recapitulate it here. I then went on to give a general exposition of plan of the Allied Governments for the freedom of the Straits and demilitarised zone, announcing that detailed proposals would be circulated at the close of the meeting and that military and naval experts of the Allies would be available this afternoon to give detailed explanations to delegations.

As regards offer of any guarantees in return for demilitarisation, I said that this question must be reserved for further examination in relation to all the

demilitarised zones. My statement was followed by cordial expressions of Allied solidarity from M. Barrère, who made a useful little speech, and from Marquis Garroni.

American delegate then made a well phrased and effective declaration of American views, particularly with regard to freedom of access, both for ships of commerce and ships of war, to the Black Sea, viewing the Straits as an international highway and claiming right of every State to protect its commerce.

Serb-Croat-Slovene representative followed with a declaration of interests of his Government in the Straits question.

Ismet Pasha reserved reply of Turkish Government to a later stage.

Chicherin then intervened with a voluble and rather fiery harangue, in which he defended himself from criticism which I had applied to his scheme, and insisted on innocent, friendly and disinterested character of Russian proposals.

Russia and Turkey having insisted on a full day for consideration of their full reply, discussion was then adjourned till Friday morning. There will probably be some lively encounters then. But first impression produced by Allied statement is unquestionably good, and I expect it to receive warm support of smaller States.

Marquis Garroni having called to tell me that Signor Mussolini will spend a few hours here to-morrow night on his way to England, I have invited him and Italian delegation to dinner. (End of R.)

But I am not to escape without an hour's private conversation in advance, an experience to which I am looking forward with some trepidation.

No. 739.

Mr. Bentinck to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 738.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December 6, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 746.

To-day's press publishes statement from Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding declaration in Bulgarian Parliament by Minister of the Interior as to alleged insurrection in Western Thrace.

According to statement perfect order reigns in Western Thrace. Bulgarian komitaji were dispersed in two encounters with Greek troops. Prisoners taken carried Bulgarian army rifles, &c. Inter-Allied Commission in Bulgaria are stated to be aware of above.

(Repeated to Constantinople, Sofia and Lausanne.)

No. 740.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 757.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 6, 1922*

MY telegram No. 44.

General Harington is telegraphing separately result of passport dispute.

In my opinion situation is as follows :—

Turks regard Mudania Convention only as binding on them. They will respect Mudania Convention, but only as interpreted by themselves. Convention makes no mention of occupation. By article 12 they undertake to respect *presence* of Allied troops in territories in which they are stationed (not in territories "which they occupy"). Hence they do not recognise Allied forces in Constantinople as constituting military occupation. They admit that military forces have certain inherent rights practically restricted to that of self-protection. They have also agreed to

admit, pending conclusion of peace, right of Allied forces to protect persons of Allied subjects.

But they do not admit that presence of Allied forces gives any right to interference in internal administration of Constantinople, especially in matters affecting Turkish subjects, including native Christians.

Issue therefore lies in interpretation of (*a*) presence or (*b*) occupation.

If we accepted Turkish interpretation of presence, most that will be possible will be to avoid incidents and excesses and to do what we can to alleviate the lot of native Christian population.

On the other hand, if Turks are to be properly made to realise that latter is true interpretation, only course likely to be really effective would be declaration of martial law, for which it would be necessary first once more to obtain sanction of French and Italian Governments.

Even less than before, however, this sanction would be considered insufficient without promise of immediate reinforcements. It is also questionable whether such declaration would be calculated to help matters at Lausanne.

Nevertheless, some form of action is desirable, even if it does not go so far as martial law. We are once more at parting of the ways.

Through failure to institute state of siege a month ago, we have, in fact, abandoned all protection of native Christian population. Last step in this respect has been admission of principle that henceforth Ottoman subjects to leave Constantinople must be provided with Turkish passports. We cannot now go back on this.

But first step on new road will be Turkish claim to subject Allied citizens and interests to Turkish jurisdiction in all matters except actual arrest (personal liberty), which is provided for under police arrangement. Turkish action will follow, in fact, same lines as in Smyrna, Cilicia and in Anatolia generally.

Already foreign companies have been officially invited to conform immediately with company law of November 1914. Penalty for not complying is closure. Press has announced that foreigners are to pay municipal taxes.

Turks are claiming right to interfere with landing and departure of Allied subjects here who have not got Turkish visa.

We will not be able to resist these claims unless we are prepared to use force, even though martial law be not instituted, from which both my Allied colleagues shrink. Best method of avoiding incidents in this respect would be to leave no doubt in the mind of Refet and Angora that force really will be employed if attempt be made before conclusion of peace to apply to Allied persons or companies regulations not in accordance with capitulatory régime. Would French and Italian Governments be prepared to instruct their representatives to make such a communication? Without instructions neither would be prepared to act.

I have shown this telegram to General Harington, who agrees, except that he sees no half-measure between martial law and mere presence here.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 52.)

No. 741.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 7.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 642.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 6, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 3 from Lausanne.

Your Lordship's representations to M. Barrère have evidently had a satisfactory result, as telegrams from Lausanne in French press this morning all state that complete accord exists between the British and French delegations on the question of the Straits.

The "Eclair," in an article headed "Le Quai d'Orsay est optimiste," states that this information is confirmed at Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 742.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 397.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, December 7, 1922.*

I HEAR that Roumanian Minister has been informed by Kemalist representative that Turkish silence as regards Straits question at Lausanne was due to lack of sympathy with Russian views and desire to avoid openly opposing them.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 743.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 7, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister :—

"Situation at Constantinople as described in Sir C. Harington's telegram No. 3163 of 6th December makes it necessary to consider without delay what instructions should be given to him as to imposition of martial law and consequential matters. Do you think it possible by arrangement with Ismet Pasha to arrive at some definite understanding that Turks at Constantinople will cease their unreasonable and aggressive attitude?

"Cabinet would be glad to learn whether you share serious view of the situation taken by Sir C. Harington, and whether you would advise that in present circumstances he should be directed to continue doing his best to maintain the position without provoking a conflict."

No. 744.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 57. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 7, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 80 of 5th December : Mosul.

Cabinet decided to-day to refer question to Cabinet Committee under Duke of Devonshire's presidency which is considering future policy in Irak. Committee will meet to-morrow and will deal at once with your suggestion. Bullard will, if still necessary, leave to-morrow in possession of proceedings of the committee. Young is not available in any case.

[E 13747/13003/44] No. 745.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

COMMISSION ON TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY QUESTIONS.

Draft Minutes of the Third Meeting held at the Hôtel du Château at Ouchy, November 23, 1922, at 11 A.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 8.)

Present :

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.

Also present :

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir William Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. B. Nogara.
Major-General Burnett-Stuart.	General Weygand.	M. G. Ciamarra.
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. Laroche.	M. Guarnaschelli.
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Fromageot.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. Bargeton.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Corbin.	
Mr. McClure.	M. de Percin.	
	M. Barois.	

JAPAN.	GREECE.	ROUMANIA.
Mr. Sato.	General A. Mazarakis.	M. Dumitresco.
Colonel Saigo.	M. Vassili Dendramis.	
Capitaine de Frégate Tsuru.		

SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. B. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
M. Anlich.	Moukhtar Bey.
	Tewfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary General of the Conference.*

France.	Great Britain.	Italy
M. Jagarde.	Mr. Spring-Rice. Mr. Wicks.	M. Arlotta.

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece
Mr. F. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Constantin Collas.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Vladimir Milanovitch.	Reshid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON asked the Turkish delegation to speak.

ISMET PASHA, before stating the view of the Turkish delegation on the proposals submitted to the commission at the meetings of the previous day, wished to refute the arguments of the first Greek delegate.

M. Veniselos had opened his speech by reviewing the circumstances which had caused Turkey and Greece to take part in the world war. The Turkish delegation thought it quite out of place to discuss before the commission the factors which had driven the Ottoman Empire to take part in the war. In order to obtain a clear idea of this it would be necessary to describe and analyse minutely the political events of the thirty years preceding the conflict. The Turks thought that such an investigation would have no practical utility; it would, indeed, more probably impede negotiations for the re-establishment of peace by starting useless polemics. Moreover, Turkey had not had to fight Greece during the world war. The war between those two countries dated, rather, from the Greek disembarkation at Smyrna in May 1919. That date, as everyone knew, marked the opening of a new phase. Turkey could not in any way be taxed with having been the aggressor in that phase of the operations; on the contrary, she had undergone superhuman sacrifices in order to defend her national patrimony against a wholly unjustifiable enterprise of conquest. Such was the truth as regards the respective moral positions of the two belligerents in the war which had brought bloodshed to Asia Minor.

In the course of the last four years of conflict between Turkey and Greece, it was always the latter who had refused to listen to the various proposals of peace and mediation repeatedly put forward by the Allied Powers.

At the Conference of London in the spring of 1921 Turkey had accepted a plebiscite for Thrace and for Smyrna and its neighbourhood; Greece had opposed it; if Greece had shown the same goodwill as Turkey with a view to the pacific settlement of the conflict, the war could have come to an end at that time.

At the end of the conference the Allied Powers, on the 12th March, 1921, put forward proposals which each delegation was to submit to its Government. On the 23rd March, while the Turkish delegation was still on its way to Angora, the Greeks started an offensive which ended with the second battle of In Enun. Thus it was Greece who replied to the peace proposals of the conference with gunfire.

A little later, in June 1921, the Allied Powers made offers of mediation to the two belligerents: Greece, having decided to attempt a new offensive for the conquest of Angora, disdainfully rejected these proposals and undertook an advance which ended with the defeat of Sakaria. In view of this uncompromising attitude on the part of Greece, the Allied Powers had to announce that Greece thenceforward was fighting at her own risk, and that she no longer had any mandate from them. The responsibility of Greece was therefore indisputable.

Turkey for her part had never ceased to declare her readiness to lay down arms as soon as her legitimate national claims had been satisfied. She accordingly intensified her efforts to achieve peace, as was well known to the Allied Powers and to the whole world.

In the course of his argument M. Veniselos had maintained that Turkey was reopening a territorial question already decided by the Treaty of Neuilly, and he had sought in this way to avoid all discussion regarding Western Thrace; but by article 48 of that treaty the fate of inter-Allied Thrace was left for decision later on. The question, therefore, was still open. The Turkish delegation desired to state once more that it did not claim the retrocession of inter-Allied Western Thrace to Turkey; but they did wish to save the overwhelmingly Turkish population of that district from a régime against which it had constantly protested, and they therefore persisted in claiming that the people of that country, whose fate was still not settled, should have the right of self-determination which figures in the Great Powers' programme of peace.

Ismet Pasha then laid on the table of the commission statistics by cazas and villages for the area in dispute (Annex A).

He wished to give at once the total figures for the four cazas making up the area, viz.:—

	Turks.	Greeks.	Bulgars.	Jews.	Armenians
Gumuldjina	59,997	8,854	9,997	1,067	360
Dédéagatch	11,744	4,800	10,227	253	419
Sofoulou	14,736	11,542	5,490	..	..
Iskétche	42,671	8,728	552	220	114
	129,148	33,901	26,266	1,480	923

Total, 191,191.

The idea of a plebiscite should not cause any anxiety to the Greek delegation, as the latter said they could assert that a large majority of the population in Western Thrace was Greek; if this were so, the plebiscite would confirm Greece's right to the possession of that country.

M. Veniselos had also mentioned the numerous mistakes made by the Greek Government during the course of several years of occupation. Ismet Pasha had no desire or intention to make the slightest reproach to M. Veniselos, but he begged leave to say that the faults to which he had alluded had cost the unfortunate Turkish population very dear. Was it admissible that these sufferings should continue in Western Thrace in consequence of the Greek occupation?

M. Veniselos had objected to the 1913 frontiers of Thrace, which left to Turkey the suburb of Kara-Agatch and the districts of Mustafa Pasha, Sémenli and Demotica. These objections appeared to the Turkish delegation quite groundless.

M. Veniselos had said that in that district the majority of the population was Greek, that was untrue; once again M. Veniselos had put forward statistics of his own, just as he previously supplied the Supreme Council with statistics of purely Greek origin in order to justify his demands for the annexation of essentially Turkish territory.

The Turkish figures contradicted those of M. Veniselos. The former, dating from 1914, were as follows:—

	Turks.	Greeks.	Armenians.	Miscellaneous.
Mustafa Pasha	11,857	6,131	..	
Sémenli	4,594	4,235	..	568
Demotica	20,110	21,447	174	10
				1,212
Total	36,561	31,816	174	1,790

Number of Villages:

	Turkish.	Greek.	Mixed.	Greco-Turkish.
Mustafa Pasha ..	28	7	1	1
Sémenli	17	16	1	..
Demotica	31	3	1	13
Total	76	26	3	14

3. The creation of an outlet on the Ægean for Bulgaria.
4. The internationalisation of the railway.

The neutral zone was to extend according to one proposal from the Black Sea to the Ægean, and according to another from the Toundja to the Ægean.

The Turkish delegation had the honour to make the following counter-proposals :—

1. They felt bound to stand by their proposal for the adoption of the 1913 frontier, since in their opinion the possibility of such a solution had been proved by the arguments given above.
2. They assumed that the institution of a neutral zone would not in any way affect the existing sovereign rights and administration in the district to which that neutrality applied; but certain restrictions could be imposed with a view to the defence of the country. Ismet Pasha asked that the question of the neutral zone should first be thoroughly examined by a sub-commission, which should present a detailed report to the commission. He thought that this investigation could be completed by a technical commission in a few hours.
3. They had already expressed the view that an outlet could be assured to Bulgaria on the Ægean Sea. They wished to repeat that they welcomed this proposal.
4. They had no objection to the setting up of an international organisation which would enable Bulgaria, Turkey and Western Thrace to utilise the railway. A sub-commission could usefully investigate this point.
5. The proposal for a plebiscite in Western Thrace was fair. The neutralisation of Western Thrace, in such form as might be established as a result of the plebiscite, was of a nature to ensure the safety of the neighbouring countries and militated in favour of the constitution of a neutral zone.

LORD CURZON asked Ismet Pasha to state the date of the statistics quoted by him with regard to the population of the four cazas of Western Thrace.

ISMET PASHA replied that the statistics in question were those of 1914.

LORD CURZON enquired how Ismet Pasha had been able to obtain statistics for 1914, since the region had ceased to be under Turkish rule in 1913. Were these statistics drawn up by the Bulgarian Government?

RIZA NOUR BEY replied that the figures given by the Turkish delegation were those of 1914, drawn up by the Turkish functionaries whom the Bulgarian Government had left at their posts after taking possession of the country. These figures also corresponded with those drawn up by the Turkish Administration in 1913.

LORD CURZON said that M. Venizelos would doubtless inform the conference later on whether the figures quoted by the Turkish delegation corresponded with those given by the Greek delegation. He thought it would be the general opinion that the Turkish delegation had stated their position with great conciseness and clearness. He would not now pause to reply to the Turkish statements which were in conflict with what he had said the day before, but he had no doubt that his colleagues would justify their position at a later stage.

Ismet Pasha had made two definite proposals. In the first place, he had referred to the suggestion made by M. Xinzic, and subsequently supported by other speakers including himself, that the question of a demilitarised zone on the borders of Eastern Thrace should be examined. He (Lord Curzon) thought that it was a mistake to refer to a "neutral" zone, which would raise the question of sovereignty; what was wanted was a demilitarised zone to provide for security. He agreed with Ismet Pasha that a sub-commission should be set up, and that the creation of a demilitarised zone or zones should be specified in its terms of reference. Two suggestions had been made which could be taken either separately or together :—

1. For a demilitarised zone on the northern frontier of Eastern Thrace from the Black Sea to the north-west angle of the frontier. This suggestion was almost entirely military in its application, and ought to be examined by military experts, including those of the Turkish delegation.
2. He had himself suggested, and he gathered that the Turks were prepared to agree, that the sub-commission should examine a demilitarised zone extending along the Maritza boundary of Eastern Thrace only.

He thought it most desirable to proceed at once to constitute the sub-commission. Each of the Powers should appoint two delegates, to be assisted by such experts as they pleased. He would be prepared to do so on behalf of Great Britain.

Ismet Pasha's second suggestion was for another sub-commission to consider the question of the railway and access for Bulgaria to the sea. He thought this suggestion a very good one, and was prepared to agree to it unless, on discussion, it were found that one sub-commission could do all the work. It would be the business of the sub-commissions to discuss these questions not only from the point of view of the future treaty, but also having regard to local interests and local information. Different accounts had been given to the commission on such questions as the river, the nature of the country, and the circumstances at Kara-Agatch; these should be examined by the sub commission.

He was disposed for his part to agree to both the Turkish proposals, but before submitting them formally to his colleagues he would like to hear their opinion; and there was nothing to preclude the continuation of the general discussion of the larger aspects of the matter, upon which some of the delegates might wish to speak.

M. BARRÈRE thought it very desirable to set up a sub-commission of experts on the military questions at issue. He welcomed Ismet Pasha's suggestions regarding the creation of a neutral zone and the study of guarantees for the interested States in respect of traffic by the railway and port of Dedeagatch. In his opinion it would be well to set up two sub-commissions, one to deal with military questions and the other with the railway and the port.

M. DUCA entirely agreed with the proposal of Lord Curzon and M. Barrère to set up two sub-commissions for the purposes indicated. In this connection he wished to make it clear that what he had in mind was not a neutral but simply a demilitarised zone. He proposed that the presidency of the technical military sub-commission should be assigned to General Weygand, whose high authority was recognised by all.

MARQUIS GARRONI also concurred in the proposal before the conference, but wished to make one observation. Instead of setting up two sub-commissions he would prefer only one, for, in his opinion, the two questions were to some extent inter-dependent. He thought it would suffice, at any rate for the present, to set up a single sub-commission; later on, if necessary, a second could be created. He thought it generally desirable not to set up too many sub-commissions.

ISMET PASHA wished to define his proposals, so as to avoid all possible misunderstandings; the question of a demilitarised zone should be thoroughly examined by a sub-commission, which would present a detailed report to the commission. A technical committee could complete this task in a few hours.

LORD CURZON said that Ismet Pasha had proposed one sub-commission for the neutral zone question and another for the question of rail traffic and the port of Dedeagatch. There was much force in Marquis Garroni's argument regarding the connexity of the two subjects, and he agreed that a single sub-commission should be able to study both problems with the assistance of experts. If the sub-commission found later on that it could not cope with both questions alone, a second sub-commission could then be set up.

M. BARRÈRE thanked M. Duca for having proposed General Weygand as president of the sub-commission in such complimentary terms; but according to the rules it was for the sub-commissions themselves to nominate their presidents; in this respect the sub-commissions had complete liberty of action.

LORD CURZON was sure that the conference would be delighted if the sub-commission were to offer its chairmanship to an officer of the great distinction of General Weygand. He agreed with M. Barrère's view that the sub-commissions should be free to nominate their own chairmen.

MARQUIS GARRONI agreed with M. Barrère and Lord Curzon.

LORD CURZON proposed the following resolution :—

"It is decided to appoint a sub-commission to consider the question of demilitarised zones on the frontier of Eastern Thrace, the question of railway communication with the Ægean and the provision of a port for Bulgaria at

Dedeagatch. Each Power will nominate two delegates on this sub-commission, and they will have power to associate with themselves any experts whom they may desire to consult. This sub-commission, when it has finished its labours, will report to the main commission, by which its report will be considered."

This resolution was carried.

LORD CURZON invited the delegations to nominate their representatives on the sub-commission, which should meet in the afternoon.

He called on M. Veniselos to speak, and said he presumed that the other delegations would be willing to await the report of the sub-commission.

M. VENISELOS wished to reply briefly to Ismet Pasha's remarks. It could not be said that war was declared between Greece and Turkey in 1919 at the time of the disembarkation at Smyrna. During the world war a Turkish division had operated in the Balkans. The Greek fleet for its part had co-operated in the naval operations since 1917, and had contributed effectively to the blockade of the Asiatic coast and of the Straits. Ismet Pasha had reproached Greece for not having made any effort to conclude peace. M. Veniselos wished to recall the fact that in October 1921, according to information in his possession, M. Gounaris had, at the invitation of Lord Curzon, accepted the abandonment of Asia Minor, and even a rectification of the Thracian frontier at Tchataldja, in order to give Constantinople more elbow-room. At that time, however, the Angora Government was not disposed to make peace without obtaining Adrianople as far as the Maritza, which the Greek Government could not then accept. As regards Western Thrace, Ismet Pasha considered the question as not yet settled, because article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly left the fate of this region in suspense. M. Veniselos said that this argument was unsound; in point of fact, by article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly Bulgaria had renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers her rights and claims over Western Thrace and had undertaken to recognise the measures which those Powers might take in regard to that province. Later on the Powers had embodied their decisions on this subject in a treaty signed with Greece; the question was therefore finally settled, and the Angora Government had nothing to do with the matter. Ismet Pasha apparently thought M. Veniselos had argued that Western Thrace contained a Greek majority. M. Veniselos did not quite say that; he had merely stated that, if the Greek and Bulgarian parts of Western Thrace were put together, there was in this region a large preponderance of Turkish elements. If, on the other hand, Western Thrace were taken without the part which belonged to Bulgaria, barely half the population was Turkish. Moreover, these figures were of no importance in view of recent events; ethnological changes had taken place which entirely transformed the character of the country.

Ismet Pasha had referred to M. Veniselos's statement respecting the murders committed by the Greek Government, with unhappy results for the Greek people, and he had added that the Turkish population had also suffered cruelly in consequence. M. Veniselos wished to assure his hearers that neither in Western Thrace nor in Macedonia had any excesses been committed against the Mussulmans. The Greek Parliament included forty-one Mussulman Deputies who took an effective part in the work of Parliament, and had on several occasions decided the fate of the Government which was carrying on the war in Asia Minor. He considered it unjust to allege that atrocities had been perpetrated and that the Turkish element had been subjected to harsh treatment by the Greek authorities. He would even go further: in Asia Minor, in the territory ceded to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres, Mussulmans had not only had the same rights as Greeks, but in doubtful cases the benefit of the doubt was given to the Mussulmans.

True, the Greek army had later on committed excesses during its retreat, but he would doubtless have another occasion to speak on this point if Ismet Pasha took the initiative in raising it.

As regards the part of Western Thrace ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915, M. Veniselos recognised that in 1914 the Greeks, far from being in the majority, were a negligible element; possibly there was not a single Greek there. The fact was that after the Balkan wars this territory was assigned to Bulgaria, who expelled the Greek population wholesale. This population, which was driven away in 1913, hastened to return to its native country after the Treaty of Neuilly.

Ismet Pasha had accused M. Veniselos of supplying the Peace Conference of 1919 with Greek statistics. Ismet Pasha was not present at that conference, and must have been wrongly informed, for M. Veniselos's strength had always been that

he quoted before the Supreme Council both Greek and Turkish statistics so as to get at the truth by means of comparisons. He took the opportunity of laying before the conference the official Turkish statistics of 1902 as given in the "Salnamé" of Adrianople. He believed that, although these figures were more than twenty years old, they gave a true picture of the distribution of the various races. Indeed, the character of the population could only have changed in favour of the Greeks, since the Greek element increased more rapidly than the Turkish. Besides, the statistics for that period were much more reliable than those drawn up later.

Ismet Pasha had asserted that the territory claimed by Turkey had been Turkish since time immemorial. M. Veniselos did not wish to start a polemic on that theory of Greek history, which was quite new to him; as a democrat, he thought that historical arguments should not serve as grounds for territorial claims. What must be considered was the present; the present aspirations of the population must be satisfied first of all, and that was the line he had always taken in defending his own country's claims.

Ismet Pasha had stated that if Western Thrace remained Greek the incoming refugees would oblige the Turks who lived there to leave the country. This assertion was not correct. M. Veniselos wished to say, in all justice to the Turkish population in Greece, that it constituted a first-class element of the population when well administered. These people had, on their own initiative, consented to give up part of their houses to refugees, and also gave them the necessary means of subsistence for several days. He was happy to be able to make this declaration. To sum up, the question of Thrace did not arise, since it had already been settled by a treaty other than that of Sèvres, which was the only one to be recast.

As for the statements attributed to General Mombelli and to Sir Charles Harington, they had made a certain impression, but they had never come to the knowledge of the Greek Government; what they knew was the Convention of Mudania, which was considered as the preliminaries of peace. But even if these statements had been made, they could not be quoted against Greece. Eastern Thrace, which Greece had been asked to cede, had been defined in the Mudania Convention as extending up to the line of the Maritza.

In connection with Ismet Pasha's statements about Kara-Agatch, M. Veniselos observed that Kara-Agatch was not a quarter but a suburb of Adrianople, situated on the other bank of the Maritza. There were other similar cases of towns divided by a river where two distinct administrations were possible; for example, Fiume and Sussak.

As regards Dedeagatch, its port could serve as the outlet both for Bulgaria and for Adrianople if Turkey wished it, although he thought that Adrianople's natural outlet was Constantinople. Greece was ready to entrust the railway and the port to an international administration which would give all necessary guarantees for the freedom of Bulgarian commerce.

Ismet Pasha had questioned the figures quoted by M. Veniselos in regard to refugees. Perhaps he (M. Veniselos) had made a mistake in speaking of Greek refugees only, since many of them were Armenians; but Greece did not consider she had the right to make any distinctions between the unfortunate peoples driven out of their homes who had taken refuge on her soil. Dr. Nansen, in a report of three weeks ago, estimated the number of refugees in Greece at 850,000. M. Veniselos hoped that the figure of 1,000,000 given by him would not be exceeded by several hundred thousand within a few weeks. Ismet Pasha had stated, on the other hand, that there were more than 1,000,000 dispossessed Turks now wandering on the tablelands of Anatolia. This figure was certainly much exaggerated. In the course of the Greek army's retreat, excesses had certainly been committed; but an army which was no longer willing to fight, even if it had set fire to the villages on its path, could not have gone out of its way to set fire to wide tracts of country to right and left; at the most it could only have set fire to what was on its line of retreat.

If it were assumed that there were about 200,000 homeless Turks in Asia Minor, there were, on the other hand, more than 700,000 Greeks who had left that country in addition to 250,000 who had left Eastern Thrace. All these refugees had left their houses intact. Thus there were many more untouched houses than was necessary to accommodate the Turks who had been left without shelter. In any case, he thought that the sufferings on one side could not be compared with those on the other.

ISMET PASHA reserved the right to reply later to the statements of M. Veniselos.

LORD CURZON proposed to adjourn the First Commission until the sub-commission was ready to present its report.

(This was agreed to.)

M. MASSIGLI read the following declaration :—

"The Turkish delegation at the outset declared their preference for holding the debates in public, and it was only out of deference that they concurred in the opinion of the honourable president regarding the secrecy of the negotiations. They observe that in defiance of the decision arrived at, important leakages to the press have occurred in respect of the statements and speeches of other delegations."

In reply to an enquiry from Lord Curzon, ISMET PASHA said that, in addition to many other items of news in the press which did not appear in the official communiqués, the "Petit Parisien" had that morning published practically *in extenso* the declarations made by M. Veniselos at the meeting of the day before.

M. VENISELOS replied that he was entirely ignorant of this fact, and that in any case he was not guilty of any indiscretion. Moreover, he had been present at a great many conferences during the past ten years and more and had invariably observed the most scrupulous discretion.

LORD CURZON thought that there was no occasion to complain of the way in which the press in general had treated the conference. M. Veniselos and he himself had sufficient experience to know that the solemn pledges given with a view to keeping the discussions secret were not always very strictly observed.

(*The commission rose at* 1·20 P.M.)

Annex (A).

Thrace occidentale interalliée.

La Thrace occidentale interalliée est composée de quatre kazas (arrondissements) : Gumuldjina, Dédé-Agatch, Sofoulou (Sofli), Iskétché (Xanthy) :

	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Gumuldjina	59,967	8,854	9,997	1,007	360
Dedeo-Agatch	14,741	1,899	10,227	253	149
Sofoulou	14,736	11,542	9,139	..	
Iskétché (Xanthy)	42,671	87.8	552	220	114
	129,120	35,910	26,266	1,480	923

Total général, 191,699.

Annex (B).

Distribution de la Propriété foncière en Thrace occidentale.

	Pour cent.
Turcs	84
Bulgares	10
Grecs	5
Divers	1

L'agriculture est exercée dans les mêmes proportions, c'est-à-dire presque entièrement par les Turcs ; d'ailleurs, le Turc est par excellence un agriculteur.

Le commerce de la région est exercé par les Turcs, les Grecs, les Bulgares et surtout les Israélites.

Voici d'ailleurs les statistiques contenues dans les mémoires remis aux Puissances alliées, le 30 décembre 1918, par son Excellence M. Vénisélos au sujet de la Thrace occidentale (Annexe 2) :

	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.
Dédé-Agatch	10,670	7,371	11,358
Sofili	32,140	17,880	5,380
Gumuldjina	50,000	9,160	10,550
Xanthie	22,000	10,275	1,695

Enclosure 1 in Annex (B).

Kaza (arrondissement) de Gumuldjina.

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Gumuldjina	18,568	2,709	72	1,007	360
Touzdjou	185	..			
Kalfa	208	..	..	..	
Bouldoudjou	266	..			..
Jalodjykly	245		..		
Demerdjilli	49	..		..	
Barakly	258	..	..	..	..
Bademli-Déré	211	..	..	..	..
Araly-Bournou	426	..	..	..	..
Jani-Keuy	695	..	..	.	
Semetli	237	..	..		..
Jouvadyly	316	..	..	..	.
Sendeli	377	..	..	..	..
Ajazma	254	..	..	..	..
Mecquedjyly	393		..	.	..
Joni-Keuy	188	..	..	..	..
Boulvel	493	246	..	..	..
Gueleidjili	79	..		..	..
Tchejeli	783	..	..	..	..
Bajuk-Mussclim	752	..	..		..
Melequli	345		..		..
Khasbey	156	..	..		..
Kutchuk Doghandji	305	..		..	..
Bayuk Doghandji	425	..		..	..
Kutchuk-Keuy	..	1,017	..	..	..
Gussally	409	..		..	
Simen	147	..	..	..	
Jabeyli	411	.	..	.	..
Névrouz Fakih	335	..	..	..	..
Sathy	181	..	378	..	..
Kutchuk-Gyzlou	.	..	..	..	.
Pynar-Déré	439	..	..	..	..
Yrdjan-Hissar	..	539	..	..	..
Marogna	..	1,997	..	..	
Jardonli	116	..			.
Deuchet	174		174	..	..
Miadly	376	..	..	..	..
Sevindjuli	81			..	..
Hadjylar	..		796	..	
Indjefs	85	..	..	..	
Demir-beyli	353	..			..
Salmanly	390			.	
Koudelinly	..	..	1,043	.	.
Osmanlé	341	..	..	.	
Jassy	218	1,019	..	..	..
Kiuju	179	..	..	.	..
Semsygyry	295	158	..	..	..
Jalymly	110	..	..	..	
Balaban	297	..	..	..	.
Kara-Moussa	139		..	..	..
Jalandyyly	266	..	.	..	..
Ouadjy	107	..	..	..	..
Sarly	508	..	..	..	..
Baglega	246	..	..	..	..
Teke-Dere	159	..	..	..	..

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Kodjoum-Dere	455	..	..	..	..
Dagh-Kara-Moussa	61	..	..	..	..
Medjid Mahle	116	..	..	..	..
Yehyklar	61	..	..	..	..
Kavadjik	51	..	..	..	..
Ghuzghtchéli	132	..	..	..	..
Kaja Bachy	51	..	..	..	..
Bajatly	161	..	173	..	..
Sassaly	397	318	..	..	..
Pahuly	396	..	..	..	..
Sary-Yar	366	..	..	..	..
Kara-Ghuzlu	260	..	..	..	..
Hamidié	399	..	..	..	..
Erdougrod	483	..	..	..	..
Medjidie	451	..	..	..	..
Burhanié	386	..	..	..	..
Medjidie-Hassa	180	..	..	..	..
Sary-Yar	18	..	..	..	..
Burunduldin	270	..	..	..	..
Sarydja Bulgare	124	..	236	..	..
Buyuk Kozlou	754	..	..	..	..
Menetbe	270	..	..	..	..
Dérmen Déré	205	..	..	..	..
Fajamlar	254	..	..	..	..
Tach Kesur	292	..	..	..	..
Tchakyrdjeli	38	..	..	..	..
Déli-Naz	254	..	..	..	..
Bajkiz-Osman	258	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk-Musselim	282	..	..	..	..
Kemdjidy	260	..	..	..	..
Ezzen	241	..	99	..	..
Jassy-Tepé	163	..	241	..	..
Kyzyllar	81	..	353	..	..
Yelkylar	208	..	..	..	..
Hadyn	86	..	..	..	..
Domassadar	240	..	..	..	..
Fyndykdik	744	..	..	..	..
Dessoudylar	275	..	..	..	..
Kyzyl-Ordyk	..	..	1,750	..	..
Chardjy	2,257	..	..	..	..
Bek-Keuy	231	..	..	..	..
Gaïk	241	..	..	..	..
Erdel	..	..	113	..	..
Fitougrod	628	..	..	..	..
Kalaché-Dere	..	..	1,148	..	..
Kyrsa	..	733	..	..	..
Sofylar	155	..	278	..	..
Kara-Avatch	..	..	571	..	..
Kara-Kourdjaty	536	78	192	..	..
Yrdjan	785	..	..	..	..
Hadji-Mostafa	384	..	..	..	..
Tchevre-Bachi	350	..	..	..	..
Sary-Dere	114	..	..	..	..
Bujuk-Serguéli	578	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk-Sirkeli	171	..	..	..	..
Tchaïrdjaly	209	..	..	..	..
Lefedjiler	417	..	158	..	..
Aïredj	326	..	..	..	..
Ballahour	328	..	..	..	..
Bassyrly	431	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk-Oglan	227	..	..	..	..
Dunus	192	..	..	..	..
Pazar	16	..	..	..	..
Kalender	161	..	..	..	..
Dourmouch-Oba	145	..	..	..	..
Tchelebi	161	..	..	..	..
Dougandjy	220	..	..	..	..
Tchobyrdy	..	..	243	..	..
Mamastyr	..	..	277	..	..
Kaetaik-Dere	675	..	..	..	..
Baldyran	553	..	..	..	..
Kyzyl-Yarlach	618	..	..	..	..
Kozlou-Dere	420	..	..	..	..
Kara-Dere	647	..	..	..	..
Qaradjouc	191	..	..	..	..
Saroudjyca	452	..	..	..	..

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Hémidli	600	..	..	..	..
Kousuren	534	..	..	..	..
Kouyanlyk	237	..	..	..	..
Tchatahy	441	..	..	..	..
Usturen	291	..	..	..	..
Moussadjik	451	..	..	..	..
Quéa-Euren	421	..	..	..	..
Pekili	130	..	..	..	..
Pekili-Hodja	84	..	..	..	..
Atabudy	84	..	..	..	..
Kachykdjilar	82	..	..	..	..
Total	59,967	8,834	9,997	1,007	360

Enclosure 2 in Annex (B).

Le Kaza (arrondissement) de Dédé-Agatch.

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Dédé-Agatch	1,742	2,471	408	253	449
Makri	400	940	20	..	..
Dolmas	11	..	..	..	..
Sarylar	92	..	..	..	..
Dikili-Tach	137	..	..	..	..
Ghuvenlique	129	..	..	..	..
Khotallar	124	..	..	..	..
Moussalar	79	..	..	..	..
Ghuredjé	62	..	..	..	..
Tachlyk	132	..	..	..	..
Keussé-Mézil	217	..	..	..	..
Hassanlar	156	..	..	..	..
Tchoban-Keuy	..	29	970	..	..
Kara-Kaja	214	..	..	..	..
Derbend	6	..	1,611	..	..
Jéni	..	..	1,322	..	..
Bodima	3	..	375	..	..
Youruk-Déré	..	..	1,133	..	..
Dougan-Hissar	4	15	1,895	..	..
Tchaoush-Veren	..	..	321	..	..
Roumélyork	..	638	..	..	..
Baly-Bulgar	..	..	601	..	..
Katchuk-Vakouf	..	..	700	..	..
Yildja	200	6	601	..	..
Férédjik	2,948	494	174	..	..
Beyuk Vakouf	192	..	..	..	..
Kychlak	326	..	..	..	..
Bodjalik	258	..	..	..	..
Baly-Turc	299	..	..	..	..
Sélimié	253	..	..	..	..
Erdeniéne	170	..	..	..	..
Kaldyr-Kos	253	..	..	..	..
Féro-Barkhanly	228	..	..	..	..
Tekékirdekli	195	..	..	..	..
Bey	158	..	..	..	..
Chahinler	456	..	..	..	..
Dsanié	404	..	..	..	..
Tchat-Bachi	77	..	..	..	..
Bâdyr-Euren	220	..	..	..	..
Khodja	140	..	..	..	..
Khalil Oglou	163	..	..	..	..
Kunstili	119	..	..	..	..
Dougandja	192	..	..	..	..
Doui-Ali	131	..	..	..	..
Total	11,714	4,806	10,227	253	449

Enclosure 3 in Annex (B).

Le Kaza (arrondissement) de Sofoulou.

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Sofoulu-Sofoudji	886	7,643	..	..	..
Kara-Byuar	24	1,374	..	..	..
Yanyrtan	5	..	302	..	..
Bayuk-Orhan	..	741	..	..	..
Mazanly-Tecke	..	..	419	..	..
Mazanly	..	..	175	..	..
Pachmakdji	..	432	..	..	..
Mircos	1,118	..	..	..	..
Haïl-Euren	743	..	..	..	..
Hadjuren	183	..	..	..	..
Junkary Canberler	225	..	..	..	..
Achy Canberler	125	..	..	..	..
Jylanly	116	..	..	..	..
Kara-Tunez	203	..	..	..	..
Ramadan Mahlé	64	..	..	..	..
Keusseler	79	..	..	..	..
Ciftuchi	74	..	..	..	..
Keusse	52	..	..	..	..
Ahladji	93	..	..	..	..
Kalaviye Oba	260	..	..	..	..
Dyche-Boudak	152	..	..	..	..
Yakout Sandal	156	..	..	..	..
Bdiqui	225	..	..	..	..
Kavak Koïon	239	..	..	..	..
Luttié	191	..	..	..	..
Maranly	180	..	..	..	..
Musselim	294	..	..	..	..
Osmanlia	186	..	..	..	..
Hamdie	269	..	..	..	..
Baltchi Bey	264	..	..	..	..
Handjaz	348	..	..	..	..
Tchakmakdji	278	..	..	..	..
Keupekli	194	..	..	..	..
Copmeder	274	..	..	..	..
Simenli	424	..	..	..	..
Yelkendji	466	..	..	..	..
Guemadji	223	..	..	..	..
Tchamboldji	517	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk-Derbend	226	..	703	..	..
Karadjyk	8	4	742	..	..
Armudlou	190	..	..	..	..
Insanlar	424	..	..	..	..
Jenidji	67	..	..	..	..
Meskeuat	144	..	..	..	..
Euneyler	406	..	..	..	..
Bally-Kaya	96	..	..	..	..
Tchelebi-Oba	83	..	..	..	..
Dikte-Tas	14	..	..	..	..
Chendjalar	64	..	..	..	..
Reuyuendji	87	..	..	..	..
Acmadjas-Mahlé	18	..	..	..	..
Tchenaklia	163	..	..	..	..
Babalar	221	..	..	..	..
Sarisler	153	..	..	..	..
Spyrs-Mahlé	57	..	..	..	..
Mesandet	117	..	..	..	..
Bunar-Dchenad	270	1	332	..	..
Tach-Aghil	210	..	362	..	..
Bozaut	72	..	299	..	..
Smet-Bournou	85	..	97	..	..
Féré-Coubakléri	165	..	110	..	..
Kervan-Tchari	77	..	215	..	..
Dunar-Euren	179	..	..	..	..
Tchaoular	..	..	284	..	..
Pechman	..	..	743	..	..
Kabeurdje	302	..	158	..	..
Saya-Koya	134	..	..	..	..
Tchoukour-Euren	334	5	..	..	..
Moukatan	224	..	..	..	..
Chekir-Oba	334	..	..	..	..
Kavarak	..	1,342	..	..	..
Tahtadjy	..	..	180	..	..
Total	18,284	12,569	5,190	..	..

Enclosure 4 in Annex (B).

Le Kaza (arrondissement) d'Iskédjé (Xanthy).

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Iskédjé (Xanthy)	8,297	6,216	552	220	114
Kiretchdjiler	859	..	..	..	..
Bayuk Murcelli	341	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk Murcelli	271	..	..	..	..
Saltykly	252	..	..	..	..
Emirler Tecke	59	..	..	..	..
Dougandja	110	..	..	..	..
Tchemender	82	..	..	..	..
Hamamlı	339	..	..	..	..
Horozlou	175	..	..	..	..
Kara ghur	372	..	..	..	..
Musselim	80	..	..	..	..
Musselim Tecké	11	..	..	..	..
Saran	143	..	..	..	..
Cojoun	229	886	..	..	..
Sary Kashy	14	..	..	..	..
Mis'eputy	298	25	..	..	..
Mizanly	241	..	..	..	..
Yassydja	204	..	..	..	..
Atmatchaly	77	..	..	..	..
Emirli	125	..	..	..	..
Guédjili	256	..	..	..	..
Makaflar	78	..	..	..	..
Jendjo	814	100	..	..	..
Son-Oba	58	..	..	..	..
Kara-Tacarlar	58	..	..	..	..
Tachlyk	22	..	..	..	..
Ytchi Ghendjelli	82	177	..	..	..
Mandra Gchoucourou	11	..	..	..	..
Kara-Agatch	37	17	..	..	..
Yighyn	40	..	..	..	..
Cudja-Oba	143	..	..	..	..
Cudja-Mahmoudly	93	..	..	..	..
Alatdjilar	155	..	..	..	..
Havdjylar	12	..	..	..	..
Bolistra	18	808	..	..	..
Tchakmak-Mahlé	..	498	..	..	..
Ischjyklar	150	..	..	..	..
Dumenli	40	..	..	..	..
Kreuz	38	..	..	..	..
Elmaly	32	..	..	..	..
Odjoudar	503	..	..	..	..
Tchakyryy	280	..	..	..	..
Ferdjdy	253	..	..	..	..
Davoud	201	..	..	..	..
Tchoban-Mahlé	166	..	..	..	..
Ehyk, zly	212	..	..	..	..
Bahchanly	115	..	..	..	..
Kemaf-Tchally	152	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk-Osmanly	155	..	..	..	..
Kara-Guenzly	248	..	..	..	..
Djelebler	398	..	..	..	..
Ghuristan	263	..	..	..	..
Bey	193	..	..	..	..
Bey-Ghessy	169	..	..	..	..
Iné-Hanly	151	..	..	..	..
Euzuzlu	164	..	..	..	..
Kyr	372	..	..	..	..
Tchenkelli-Mahlé	35	..	..	..	..
Hussein Bey	20	..	..	..	..
Nouhoudjou	113	..	..	..	..
Kourt-Hassanly	823	..	..	..	..
Guendjerli	379	..	..	..	..
Ghumuschli	182	..	..	..	..
Tchelebanly	195	..	..	..	..
Zinedli	258	..	..	..	..
Buyuk-Osmanli	81	..	..	..	..
Gueldpules	2	..	..	..	..
Cudja-Belli	14	..	..	..	..
Bomuq-Beman	16	..	..	..	..
Ghenidli	87	..	..	..	..

Villes et Villages.	Turcs.	Grecs.	Bulgares.	Israélites.	Arméniens.
Kalfalar	6	..	..	..	..
Ghenpejeler	408	..	..	..	..
Ujuja	113	..		..	..
Sakar Kaja	220	..	..	..	..
Kutchuk-Korou	117	..	..	..	..
Kyzyldja	184	..	..	..	..
Mueé-elhadjik	39	..	..	..	..
Keussler	88	..	..	..	..
Sunnetdji	104	..		..	..
Kara-Tchaklar	245	..		..	..
Dinegeler	308	..	..	..	..
Jelquindjiler	132	..	.	..	..
Otman-Euren	811	..	..	..	
Jassy-Euren	1,539	..	.	..	.
Sadnyiché	248	..		..	..
Gueuqueyeé-Pinar	1,228	..	..		.
Pachtépe	950	..	..	..	..
Balkan	425	..	..	..	..
Cozloudja	649	..	..	..	..
Demerdjik	468	..	..	..	..
Qaetenlique	928	..	..	..	..
Djanlja	259	..		..	..
Moustafchouva	1,566	..	..	..	..
Chahin	2,190	..	..	..	..
Kara-Machat	376	..	..	..	..
Sinouva	1,363	..	..	..	..
Ahmatyka	1,258	..	..	..	..
Sengoudjouk	931	..	..	..	..
Carlouj	1,170	..	..	..	..
Sary-Jar et Ylydja	950	..	..	..	..
Menikouva et ses environs	1,158	..	..	..	..
Total	42,671	8,728	552	220	114

[E 13751/27/44] No. 746.

Note by the Russian Delegation at Lausanne.—(Communicated by the British Delegation (No. 25); received at Foreign Office, December 8.)

PAR leur réponse du 27 novembre remise à la délégation russe le 29, les délégués des trois Puissances invitantes, sans avoir réfuté un seul des arguments invoqués dans la note de la délégation russe du 27 novembre, confirment leur décision de ne laisser participer la Russie qu'à la discussion de la question des Détroits.

La délégation russe voit dans cette persistance à tenir la Russie et ses alliés à l'écart de la délibération des questions concernant les États et les peuples qui leur sont voisins immédiats ou proches et à la mettre en face de faits et décisions accomplis, une atteinte grave à leurs intérêts vitaux.

La délégation russe exprime son profond étonnement du fait que les Puissances invitantes refusent, sous prétexte que l'état de guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie a pris fin, de considérer comme indispensable la participation de la Russie à l'ensemble des travaux de la conférence. En limitant la participation de la Russie à la discussion de la question des Détroits, les Puissances invitantes font du régime des Détroits une question indépendante des autres, divisant ainsi en plusieurs parties le problème de la pacification du Proche-Orient. Depuis que, en 1840–41, la question des Détroits fut réglée pour la première fois comme un problème international, nul n'a jamais douté de l'importance toute particulière pour la Russie d'une paix stable dans le Proche-Orient ni du droit de la Russie à collaborer à une "œuvre de pacification générale" indispensable "dans une intérêt européen."

Plus explicite fut l'attitude à cet égard de la Grande-Bretagne à la veille de la convocation du Congrès de Berlin en 1878. Se trouvant depuis de longues années en paix avec la Turquie, la Grande-Bretagne non seulement crut indispensable de participer au congrès, mais posa comme condition préalable et *sine quâ non* la revision du Traité de San-Stefano "en entier," "not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what articles require acceptance or concurrence by several Powers and what do not." Les Puissances considéraient donc toujours les problèmes du Proche-Orient comme un ensemble indivisible. Or, nous les voyons aujourd'hui rompre d'une

façon inattendue avec cette tradition presque séculaire et aboutir à la conclusion qu'une paix durable dans le Proche-Orient puisse être réalisée sans le concours de la Russie et de ses alliés. L'Ukraine et la Géorgie – et que le régime des Détroits puisse être traité comme problème indépendant pouvant trouver sa solution en dehors du vaste complexe des problèmes du Proche-Orient.

C'est pourquoi la délégation russe se voit obligée de protester encore une fois et de déclarer que la Russie et ses alliés ne se tiendront pas liés par des décisions prises en leur absence, déclinant en même temps toute responsabilité pour l'état de choses anormal qui en suivra.

D'autre part, pour ne pas aggraver les inconvénients que l'absence totale de la Russie à cette conférence produirait inévitablement, la délégation russe participera aux travaux de la Commission des Détroits.

Délégation de Russie, Lausanne, le 3 décembre 1922.

No. 747.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 7, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister :—

"When Signor Mussolini came this evening, I was fully prepared for an assault upon familiar Italian lines. Greatly to my surprise, however, he said not a word about mandates or islands or economic concessions or formulæ for Italian consumption. He devoted himself entirely in conversation before dinner to enquiries about the London Conference, British attitude towards reparations and Allied debts and personality and opinions of British Prime Minister, being apparently nervous that he might arrive to find a *chose jugée* and an unwillingness to discuss solutions [? group omitted] from those previously favoured. I assured him that no decision had been formed in advance upon any of these subjects, that any or every plan would admit of discussion and that Prime Minister would be the last person to enter conference with a *parti pris*. He seemed much relieved. I attributed his anxiety to inexperience of international situation and procedure.

"As regards his silence on Eastern questions, I cannot doubt that after the fright I gave to Italian delegation some days ago, when I told them that incessant Italian blackmail during conference was intolerable, and that if they were unable to continue loyal co-operation with France and ourselves we might be forced to act without them, they had warned their chief against exerting illegitimate pressure now if Italy was to hope to get anything later on.

"Mussolini left in most amiable mood, and I think you will find him easy of approach, though startlingly ignorant of external affairs."

No. 748.

Sir A. Geddes to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 489.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, December 7, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 481.

I think it is of extreme importance that all the Allies represented at Lausanne should recognise that there is no chance of United States Senate ratifying any treaty which includes a provision that Straits are to be controlled by an international board or commission of any sort on which United States is represented by official member.

This may be known to Lord Curzon, but from some of press comments I am inclined to doubt if it is fully realised at Lausanne.

General belief in responsible circles in Washington is that a treaty with Turkey freeing Straits from all control over passage of merchant-ships when Turkey is at peace and leaving them free to neutral ships when Turkey is at war is, with some simple provision against transport of contraband, all that is required on commercial side. With regard to warships, it is held that same treaty should provide for their passage when Turkey is at peace, perhaps with limitation as to numbers, and when

Turkey is at war for passage of neutral warships, with perhaps same limitation as to numbers.

With regard to belligerent warships, it is held that no treaty regulation is required, as doings of belligerents are a matter of force anyhow.

Same treaty, it is thought, should provide for demilitarisation of zone of Straits.

Such a treaty United States would, I am reasonably satisfied, sign and ratify; but Senate will not, in my judgment, go further.

It may be of use to Lord Curzon to know this.

No. 749.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 490. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Washington, December 7, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Child at Lausanne has instructions from Secretary of State not to oppose at this stage any Allied proposal to set up an international commission to control the Straits. His later instructions either are or will be to announce that United States cannot accept membership of such a body, and that United States will be satisfied with treaty on lines indicated in my foregoing telegram. Conceivably in this way United States hopes to appear as Turks' best friend.

I to-day asked Secretary of State if Child had instructions to make plain to Lord Curzon real position of United States, and he told me that his instructions were to make "it clear at appropriate moment."

Neither Secretary of State nor President has slightest intention of asking Senate to authorise United States participation in an international commission of control.

This information as to intentions of Secretary of State and President is absolutely sure and may be implicitly relied on. It comes to me direct from best possible source.

No. 750.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 60. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 8, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 57 of yesterday: Mosul.

Question was considered this morning by Cabinet Committee. Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Chief of Air Staff were in attendance as well as representatives of Colonial Office. Committee were unanimous in supporting attitude taken up by your Lordship in regard to four arguments advanced by Riza Nur Bey. They were also unanimously of opinion that compromise suggested by you in latter part of your telegram would not furnish acceptable solution of difficulty. They based this opinion on following grounds:—

1. It would weaken our whole position to offer Turks a compromise which they would be very unlikely to accept. The view taken was that, assuming Turkish offer to be a genuine one and not prompted merely by desire to put us in the wrong, what they really want is Mosul itself and Turkish-speaking towns of Erbil, Kurkuk and Kifri, not wild Kurdish hills which would bring them trouble rather than advantage. It seemed to the committee that so long as we adhere to the position that our obligations, &c., make it impossible for us to cede any part of territory within present Irak boundary we are on solid ground, and that it would be very undesirable to abandon this ground for sake of making an offer which Turks would probably reject.

2. It is open to grave doubt whether, even supposing compromise were accepted, arrangement could be maintained for any length of time. Once we had surrendered Kurdish tracts, we could not indefinitely resist Turkish pretensions to above-named Turkish-speaking towns, to which Turkish claims on ethnical grounds are much stronger. Sooner or later we should be bound to admit Turkish influence up to edge of plains and should thus be cut off from natural line of communications between Mosul and Bagdad, which runs viâ Kifri–Kirkuk–Altun Keupri and Erbil.

3. Even supposing that compromise frontier were accepted and could be maintained, whole length of our Bagdad–Mosul communications for some 200 miles would be flanked by turbulent hill country. Our communications could be cut at any moment, and, in fact, retention of Mosul from a military point of view would be rendered impracticable.

4. Turkish control over Kurdish areas could scarcely be more than nominal, while we should be precluded from direct intervention. In the event of raids and disturbances, &c., our only remedy, viz., diplomatic action at Constantinople, would clearly be inadequate.

5. Cession of Kurdish country would similarly endanger important line of communications between Bagdad and Persia viâ Kizil Rabat and Khanikin.

6. Suggested division of tribesmen of Southern Kurdistan would create administrative difficulties.

7. Considerable reinforcements to existing garrison would become necessary if position was to be maintained.

Upshot was that your suggestion did not appear to the committee to contain the elements of a real compromise. If accepted by the Turks, it would be merely as a first step towards further expansion, which would inevitably lead to our abandonment of the whole Mosul Vilayet with all the consequences which that would entail. Committee regret that they are unable to suggest any alternative local readjustment of territory that would meet the case. They consider that, if Turks persist in making Mosul crux of whole question of peace settlement, it will be necessary to decide whether their claim is to be accepted or rejected *in toto*.

Bullard arrives Lausanne 8 A.M. Sunday.

No. 751.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 760.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 9, 1922.*

THERE appears to have been an incident a few days ago in Grand National Assembly in connection with proposed modification of Electoral Law, whereby only persons born within Turkish National Pact frontiers or having resided five years in an electoral district can be elected Deputies.

Modification, if accepted, would have excluded Mustapha Kemal, who treated proposal as direct attack on himself.

I learn from Smyrna that all Deputies in that district have been urgently recalled to Angora until conclusion of peace. Deputies in Constantinople area have similarly been recalled.

It is alleged, possibly in view of coincidences, that their recall is due to opposition to Mustapha Kemal having grown to serious proportions. It would be equally reasonable to think, however, that they have been recalled in view of importance of decisions to be taken in connection with Peace Conference.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 58.)

No. 752.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 8, 1922.*

AT sitting this morning Turkish delegation delivered carefully prepared reply to Allied proposals regarding Straits, tacitly accepting main principles, but demanding guarantees for protecting Straits and Constantinople against sudden attack, as well as some other limitations of Allied plan.

Ismet Pasha then named seven additional points in respect of which Turks asked for assurances or modifications. Chicherin spoke next and delivered a reply to my speech of Wednesday, but indicated no departure from his original scheme, though he subsequently read out a formula proposing a conference on certain unrealisable conditions with Black Sea riverain States on question of their security. In the course of his remarks he let out that Turkish views had come upon him with

surprise. Representatives of Roumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Greece followed with hearty and unqualified acceptance of Allied proposals. I then adjourned discussion till the afternoon to enable me to reply to Turkish case.

On resuming I made full statement on behalf of Allies, whom I had consulted in the interval. I adopted a very conciliatory attitude towards Turkish demands, many of which were quite reasonable, and suggested a discussion between our respective experts. Japanese Ambassador followed with cordial endorsement of Allied proposals and an appeal to Turkey to accept solution. Then ensued a period in which Chicherin was continually jumping up with purely obstructive object, his main contention being that Russia had a right to be consulted on every matter affecting Turkey's position, whether military or naval, because all such questions were bound up in freedom of the Straits. I firmly resented this pretension, acceptance of which would mean intrusion of Russia in every sub-committee or experts' meeting. But I fully expect it will be revived. Soviet delegation being out for mischief.

No. 753.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe. (*Received December* 9.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December* 8, 1922.

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister:—

"Your telegram No. 53.

"I do not agree, nor does Sir H. Rumbold, with General Harington's conception of position at Constantinople. No doubt it is humiliating and difficult to tolerate, and I propose to take following steps to produce some amelioration: It is, I think, useless to appeal again to Ismet, who did intervene before both at Angora and with Refet, but with only temporary effect. I propose, if my colleagues will agree, to send joint telegram from three presidents of the conference here to Mustapha Kemal at Angora to say our proceedings at Lausanne are gravely prejudiced by Turkish refusal to recognise position of Allied armies of occupation and constant encroachments of [? Turkish representative] at Constantinople, and urging him, if he wants a treaty of peace, not to destroy all hope of it by allowing situation there to develop, as it will shortly do if not checked, into armed collision between Kemalists and Allied forces.

"As regards Harington's proposals, I think it is too late now to declare martial law, which he had two previous opportunities of doing. Until reply from Angora has been received I am not in favour of sending further instructions to him, either in the direction of increased firmness or of conciliation, because he will evidently regard latter as an additional proof of weakness, while, as regards former, if a collision ensues in consequence of resolute action authorised by us his one solution seems to be to clear out, which I can only regard as disastrous. All the more will this be the case if, as he now foreshadows, French and Italians, instead of clearing out with us, persist in staying, leaving entire odium of retiring upon the British. Further, I cannot contemplate without dismay repercussion upon negotiations here, just at the moment when we seem to be coming to an agreement about the Straits, of military withdrawal of entire British forces from Constantinople and Ismid and Chanak to Gallipoli. That, I think, would be death-blow to hopes of Lausanne.

"I have contemplated asking War Office to allow Director of Military Intelligence to go from here to Constantinople to steady Harington, but will postpone this request until I receive reply from Angora."

No. 754.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 9.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December* 9, 1922.

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and Cabinet:

"I am amazed at the audacity of attempt made by some of my recent colleagues to throw upon me blame for a policy which, as everybody knows, late Prime Minister

carried on, sometimes in Cabinet, more frequently outside it and behind the back of Foreign Office, in favour of Greece, and I am quite willing that all papers should be published. None were ever withheld by me from the Cabinet. Circulation is arranged automatically by Foreign Office.

"It is exceedingly difficult for me here without any official papers to recall exact course of events. But broad fact remains that it was I who had persuaded Greece in October 1921 to recognise that her case was lost in Asia Minor, and who from that date forward was pressing Allied Conference to bring about retirement without bloodshed, desiring only that *débâcle* which I foresaw should not take place before conference began. I am not willing that this gross and malicious travesty of my conduct, which is simply designed to cover up deplorable policy of late Prime Minister, should pass unchallenged, and I am prepared to write a letter to be read by you in Parliament or to take any other step which you may advise, to make truth known. Real facts are to a large extent revealed in 'Morning Post' communication of 8th December."

No. 755.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 762.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 10, 1922.

MY telegrams Nos. 757 and 761.

Failing unanimity as regards declaration to Turkish authorities that Allies will employ force rather than permit encroachments on rights of Allied subjects in Constantinople, I see no alternative but to advise British companies to register under special reservation with regard to ultimate decisions of Peace Conference.

Terms of reservation would be drafted by Allied juridical advisers and be uniform.

At the same time, joint note would be addressed to Turkish authorities placing on record similar reservation on behalf of Allied Governments.

Joint representations to Angora by conference might possibly have effect of preventing any modification of *status quo* as regards Allied interests.

I had hoped that our Allies would take strong position once their own interests were threatened, but I see no sign of this, and unity of action seems above all desirable.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 62.)

No. 756.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 763.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 10, 1922.

ARMENIAN Patriarch left to-day for Bulgaria without incident.

Attempts made to secure his resignation and elect *locum tenens* failed, as quorum could not be obtained in either National or Mixed Council.

Mgr. Zaven, before leaving, said he was decided not to resign. He expects that Arshar[? oun]i, who was put in as *locum tenens* by Turks during the war, will again act.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 63.)

No. 757.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December* 10, 1922.

YESTERDAY was taken up with meetings of important sub-committees and also with conferences between our military and naval experts and Turks about the Straits.

At former meetings, which dealt with Capitulations and debts, the two chairmen, Sir H. Rumbold and M. Bompard, report that Turkish delegates were not only frankly obstructive but insolent. They are said to be waiting to see what happens in

London. I propose with M. Barrère [? to] send for Ismet Pasha and point out to him that we cannot go on treating the Turks with courtesy and conciliation in main commissions if they are to respond with obstinacy and rudeness in the committee rooms. Sub-Committee on Exchange of Populations has also come to a standstill owing to insistence of Turks on complete expulsion of Greeks from Constantinople. Telegram [? as] drafted by me from three presidents here to Kemal at Angora about Constantinople situation was despatched yesterday. Discussion between our naval and military experts and Turks represented by Ismet continued throughout yesterday on the subject of demilitarised zones. He was intensely suspicious, and demanded guarantees against every conceivable contingency, being apparently quite unable to imagine a world at peace. Nevertheless I cherish hope that we can come to terms over the Straits. I propose to have a serious talk with him about prospects of a peace treaty.

No. 758.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No 65)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 94 of 9th December : Greek policy of late Government. Following from Prime Minister :—

" In view of my last letter to you, further action on your part does not seem to be necessary at present.

" Case will be restated in both Houses to-morrow in answer to questions."

[E 13848/10524/44] No. 759.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1079.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 5, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from General Refet Pasha protesting against the persecution by the Greeks of the Moslem population of Western Thrace.

2. I am not in a position to estimate the veracity or otherwise of Refet Pasha's allegations, which do not materially differ from those issued in the past with such patient regularity by the late Ottoman Government whenever peace negotiations with the Allies were in progress. At the same time the despatch of this note coincides somewhat unfortunately with the appearance of inspired reports, to which great prominence has been given in the local press, to the effect that the Moslem population of Western Thrace had risen, seized arms depots of the Greek army, and had constituted a Provisional Government at Gumuldjina. A wealth of sensational detail was added.

3. On seeing this news I warned the British press correspondents that reports from purely Turkish sources of events so strikingly in harmony with Turkish contentions at Lausanne must be treated with great caution. So far as my present information goes, these reports are entirely without foundation or are at most based on the activities of some komitaji bands, which the large Greek forces on the spot should have no difficulty in suppressing.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 759.

General Refet Pasha to Mr. Henderson.

LE Général Réfet Pacha a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique les faits suivants qui viennent de lui être confirmés par des sources authentiques, et sur lesquels il croit devoir attirer sa sérieuse attention. Il le prie de vouloir bien faire les démarches nécessaires auprès de son

Gouvernement afin que des mesures, aptes à mettre fin au système d'extermination que les autorités helléniques continuent à appliquer contre le malheureux élément turc de la Thrace occidentale, soient prises :

1. Moussa Kiazim Effendi, Mufti de Drama ; Raik Effendi, Député ; Moustafa Bey, fils du Député Mehmed Bey ; Mehmed, Abdul-Rahim, Abdul-Baky Beys, notables de Xanthie ; ainsi que Hafiz Salih Effendi, Député de Goumouldjina avec son épouse et le notable Ahmed Bey avec sa famille, ont été assassinés d'une manière atroce.
2. Le village Chahine, de Xanthie, a été complètement brûlé et sa population entièrement massacrée.

Tout en protestant de la façon la plus énergique contre ces atrocités, le Général Réfet Pacha est persuadé que le Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien reconnaître la gravité de la situation d'une population de 700,000 personnes, et user de son influence auprès de son Gouvernement en vue de provoquer l'adoption des mesures efficaces qu'exige cette situation.

Constantinople, le 28 novembre 1922.

[E 13860/10524/44] No. 760.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1092.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 5, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 748 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a French translation* of the communication of the Anatolian Agency, which was published in the local press of the 29th ultimo, stating that a band of Armenian komitajis had left Italy for Constantinople with the object of provoking massacres in order to bring about foreign intervention, and of making attempts on the lives of members of the Government of the Grand National Assembly. The plot is alleged to have been designed at the beginning of last month at Ventimiglia. Among other details it was stated that with the exception of one, who was bearer of an Italian passport, these Armenians were provided with British passports and were in relations with an employee of the British police.

2. I caused enquiries to be made of the Inter-Allied Police Commission, and, having definitely ascertained that there was no truth in this last allegation, I addressed a letter to Refet Pasha, of which I enclose a copy,* pointing out that it was impossible that British passports should have been issued to Armenians proceeding to Turkey, and that no Armenian of the name mentioned in the communication was, or had been, employed by the British police at Pera. I asked Refet Pasha to have a denial to this effect inserted in the newspaper which had published the communication. The denial duly appeared, as did, subsequently, a similar denial from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs respecting the issue of Italian passports to Armenians.

3. I have also the honour to forward herewith an account of an interview which the Armenian Patriarch gave, on the 30th instant, to a representative of the "Journal d'Orient" respecting the alleged plot, his visit to Refet Pasha and the feelings of Armenians living in Turkey towards this country. Mgr. Zaven does not attempt in this account to conceal his anxiety as to the possible fate that may be reserved for the Armenian population of this city. The French text of the communication, for which the Patriarch thanks Refet Pasha, will be found in the cutting from the "Stamboul" of the 30th ultimo entitled, "L'Affaire du Complot," which is included with enclosure No. 1.*

4. Late in the evening of the 1st instant, an unofficial representative of the Armenian Patriarchate called at this High Commission, and informed the acting first dragoman that Refet Pasha had informed certain Armenian merchants that, owing to his relations with England, it was necessary for the Patriarch to resign. The representative stated that the Patriarch did not intend to resign, but asked for British assistance to proceed to Bulgaria by the steamship "Tsar Ferdinand" on the 3rd December. I authorised Mr. Matthews to give this assistance, provided a formal request were made to that effect.

* Not printed.

5. On the following day, however, the dragoman of the Patriarchate called and stated that the Patriarch was disposed to think that Refet Pasha's remarks to the Armenian merchants were less serious than had been at first imagined. The Patriarch was convinced that if he once left the country the Turks would never allow him to return, nor would they authorise the election of a Patriarch to succeed him. His responsibility to his people was very great, and he had, therefore, decided to put off his departure.

6. I have thought it desirable to place these facts on record, as it is possible that they may be not without interest in the light of subsequent events. I am not inclined to regard the announcement of the Anatolian agency or the extensive comments which it provoked in the Turkish press as without significance or ulterior motives. Its object may have been double, as a justification for future excesses if they occur, or as a form of intimidation with a view to inducing as many Armenians as possible to leave Constantinople.

7. It is difficult to appreciate exactly the intentions of the Grand National Assembly in regard to its non-Moslem subjects in Constantinople. Whereas for Anatolia the principle of purely Moslem Turkey is undoubtedly fixed, the Angora Government's plans for Constantinople itself may not be so definite. My own view is that while ultimately Turks will, in their own interests, be not unwilling to institute special régime for its Christian subjects here, they prefer to get rid of as many as possible before peace is concluded. This I suspect to be particularly the case as regards the wealthier Greek and Armenian traders and business men, whom they fancy that they will be able to replace by Turks or even Jews.

8. It is difficult otherwise to explain the fact that, while hitherto Refet Pasha has abstained from extreme measures calculated to cause excessive panic and an exodus *en masse*, he has, on the other hand, done nothing to discourage departures.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

E 13862/27/44] **No. 761**

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1094.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 5, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 752 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the text of an arrangement agreed to between the Allied High Commissioners and Refet Pasha for the provisional working of the Allied military tribunals pending the conclusion of peace.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 761.

Text of an Arrangement for the Provisional Working of Allied Military Tribunals.

AJOURNER les jugements des Tribunaux militaires spéciaux.

2. Mener les instructions parallèlement par les autorités turques et par les autorités alliées, chacune interrogeant ses nationaux en se renseignant mutuellement et verbalement de l'état de l'instruction par leurs officiers de liaison.

3. En ce qui concerne les prévenus et les condamnés, les généraux alliés examineront dans chaque cas de prendre les mesures de clemence.

4. Les condamnés ottomans qui n'auront pas été mis en liberté seront remis aux autorités turques, qui s'engagent à les maintenir en état de détention jusqu'aux décisions qui seront prises à la Conférence de Lausanne.

5. Les prevenus ottomans qui également n'auront pas été mis en liberté seront remis aux autorités turques pour que l'instruction soit continuée à leur égard dans les conditions prévues au paragraphe 2.

[E 13866/53/44] **No. 762.**

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1099.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, with reference to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 748 of the 1st December, two extracts from local French newspapers recounting interviews granted by the Œcumenical Patriarch to representatives of the Turkish press.*

2. Mgr. Meletios has taken this opportunity to appeal to the Turks to forgive and forget, quoting the magnanimity shown to his predecessors in office by the Caliph Omar and the Conqueror Mohamed II. For his own flock he counsels patience and discourages panic, and he upholds his rights of Œcumenical Patriarch as against those of a Patriarch of "Orthodox Turks."

3. In a situation menacing for himself as for the future of his office, and rendered still more precarious by the irregularities which have been held by both Turks and Greeks to invalidate his election, his utterances, though far removed from the resounding Hellenism which he voiced in earlier days, still show courage and a certain pathetic dignity.

4. For my own part, I believe that Mgr. Meletios will remain consistent in this attitude, and that he will not in any circumstances desert his flock, though he has stated that, if the Greeks leave Constantinople, the Patriarchate will follow.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[C 16960/131/7] **No. 763.**

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 359.)
My Lord, *Sofia, December 6, 1922.*

NOW that more accurate information has been received here regarding the progress of the discussions at Lausanne on the question of the Bulgarian outlet to the Ægean, profound dissatisfaction is expressed by the press, both Governmental and Opposition, at the inadequacy for the purpose of the proposal for a demilitarised zone and an international commission to supervise the railway and the port to be constructed at Dedeagatch.

I need not trouble your Lordship with the details of the criticism which has appeared on the subject. It consists mainly of a wearisome repetition of the argument that the Treaty of Neuilly promised to Bulgaria an effective outlet, that no outlet passing through territory belonging either to Turkey or Greece can be otherwise than illusory and that therefore the Powers have failed to carry out their treaty obligations. The disappointment is the greater in view of the exaggerated reports which were published regarding the supposed success of M. Stambolisky's visits to Belgrade and Bucharest.

There is also a certain amount of talk of the necessity for this country to seek a new orientation of policy, its attempts at conciliation with the neighbouring Powers having failed. Reports have, moreover, reached Sofia of the establishment of intimate relations by the Bulgarian delegation with those of Russia and Turkey at Lausanne with this object. While your Lordship is in a better position than I am to judge as to the truth of these stories, I am personally not inclined to attach serious importance to them at present. It seems to me more likely that M. Stambolisky will continue as hitherto to maintain an attitude of neutrality and to await future developments without committing himself deeply to either side.

I may mention that a few days ago in the Sobranjé M. Daskaloff renewed his former assurances that there was no intention of seeking alliances with the Russians or Turks. He also repudiated the charge that the Bulgarian Government had taken part in the formation of bands on the Thracian frontier, and denied that they were in any way responsible for the disturbances now in progress in Western Thrace. These,

* Not printed.

he said, were the result of the military and political disasters suffered by Greece, and autonomy for that province was the only solution which would ensure a lasting peace. Speaking of the Lausanne Conference, he said that the Bulgarian delegation would raise the question of minorities and refugees and would also call attention to the dangerous situation of Bulgaria, disarmed, while surrounded, on all sides by States fully armed.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

E 13845/27/44] No. 764.

Note by Mr. Ryan on the Participation of Neutrals in Discussion of Question of Régime des Étrangers.—(Received from British Delegation, Lausanne (No. 28), December 11.)

Sir H. Rumbold,

I SAW Reshid Safvet Bey this afternoon about the above question. I said that the attached circular, though couched in general terms, was thought to have been issued at this moment in view of the proposal to hear certain neutral Powers in the sub-commission dealing with the future position of foreigners in Turkey. I explained the position of the inviting Powers. They had decided at Paris on the 18th November to give the interested neutral Powers an opportunity of laying their views on this particular question before the conference, and had asked them to send representatives to Lausanne with that object. I said that the first sub-commission appointed under the second commission would probably meet to-morrow, and that your Excellency was to preside over it. I explained that you were anxious to show every consideration for the Turks, and had therefore sent me to explain the procedure which you intended to follow. You proposed, I said, to ask the neutral representatives to be in attendance, but to open the sitting without them, and having done so to propose that they should be introduced. This would mark the distinction between the actual participants in the negotiations and the neutrals who had been invited simply in order to be heard. I pointed out that it would be disagreeable for everyone, including the Turks, if any exception were taken to this procedure at the meeting, and that you therefore wished to make sure beforehand that it would not give rise to any question.

Reshid Safvet Bey said that he could not give me an answer, but would refer the matter to Ismet Pasha. His general attitude was unaccommodating, and it was evident that if the matter were in his hands he would take exception to the presence of the neutral representatives as being at variance with the Turkish view expressed in the attached paper. When I said that the Allied Powers were bound by their invitation, he said that Ismet Pasha might also consider himself bound by the reservations which he had made, and which were on record in the minutes of the conference. I said that these reservations had not prevented the Turkish delegate from sitting in conference with representatives of Bulgaria. I also said that in the Angora note of the 4th October, replying to the invitation to the conference the Turkish Government had by implication recognised the principle that Powers interested in particular questions might be parties to the conference though they had not been belligerents. I said that though the point had then arisen in connection with the Straits a similar view might also be held on the question of the status of foreigners, which was of great interest to European neutral Powers. I said that, of course, they would not be parties to the treaty, but that it was very reasonable that they should be heard.

Reshid Safvet Bey said that it might be disagreeable for us to have friction about the presence of the neutral Powers, but that it might be equally disagreeable for the Turks to have the neutrals saying unpleasant things to them. I replied that the neutral representatives were diplomatists, and could be counted on not to be rude. I hinted that the Turks need fear nothing from the presence of the neutrals unless they had a bad conscience.

I avoided saying anything as to whether the neutral representatives would be introduced and asked to retire after stating their view, or whether they would be present throughout the deliberations of the sub-commission.

A. R.

December 6, 1922.

The Turkish delegates, after demurring to the admission of the neutral representatives at the opening meeting of the first sub-commission of the second commission this morning, acquiesced on the understanding that the subject-matter would be discussed on a basis of general public law. After all the neutral representatives had spoken, and all had talked about Capitulations, the Turks renewed the reservations formulated by Ismet Pasha at the first meeting of the main commission. The neutrals sat silent through the rest of the proceedings, and the matter was left at that.

A. R.

December 7, 1922.

W. T.

December 8, 1922.

Seen by Lord Curzon.

December 9, 1922.

Annex.

Aide-mémoire adressé au Secrétariat général de la Conférence avec Prière de le communiquer aux Représentants des Puissances participants à la Conférence de Lausanne.

LA délégation turque reçoit, par l'entremise du Secrétariat général de la Conférence, les copies des requêtes adressées par certains Gouvernements, voire par des associations nationales soi-disant mandatées, en vue d'être représentés à la conférence, dans le cas où le principe de cette admission serait favorablement accueilli.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie dans sa réponse du 4 octobre 1922 à la note alliée en date du 23 septembre, ayant pris acte de la proposition limitative des Alliés au sujet des États invités et fixé de son côté le nombre des États avec qui il aurait à traiter sur des objets déterminés, la délégation turque estime, ainsi qu'elle l'a déjà précédemment et officiellement déclaré à la Conférence, que les instructions et les pouvoirs qu'elle détient de son Gouvernement l'empêchent d'accepter la participation aux débats et l'immixtion, à n'importe quel titre, des représentants des autres Puissances qui n'ont pas été invitées à la suite de l'accord établi par l'échange de notes susmentionné.

Ces Puissances non invitées ont la faculté d'entrer indépendamment en négociations directes soit avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, soit avec les Puissances invitantes pour tel objet qui pourrait les intéresser.

Lausanne, le 4 décembre 1922.

No. 765.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 35) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 11.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 46 and 48.

I cannot agree to suggestion that Greek High Commission should be made branch of three Allied High Commissions and neutral legation put technically in charge of Greek interests. If Refet cannot be induced to leave matters as they are and you foresee danger of action on his part, most suitable arrangement would be to make Greek High Commission branch of Spanish Legation and arrange with latter to invoke assistance of Allied High Commissioners in the event of Turks taking advantage of new arrangement to interfere with persons or property of Hellenic subjects.

No. 766.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, December 11, 1922*

MY telegram No. 60 of 8th December:

Sir P. Cox in secret and personal telegram of 10th December offers following observations on frontier proposed under compromise suggested by you:—

"Previous to the Angora National Pact Turks had repeatedly given out that they were resigned to the loss of Irak and Syria, and only desired freedom for national development in territories inhabited by the pure Turks. I submit that there can be no doubt that their present demand as suggested by Lord Curzon, is simply a card in Turco-Soviet policy directed against Great Britain in Middle east, which is only likely to be stimulated to further enterprise if they succeed in their present effort.

"Modification of frontier suggested by his Lordship appears to me to be open to the following strong objections:—

"1. In the event of war between Irak and Turkey it would be much more dangerous, from a military point of view, than existing frontier.

"2. Result of bringing Turkish frontier so close to important line of communications and future railway from Bagdad to Mosul viâ Kifri, Kerkuk and Arbil would undoubtedly be that latter three centres in which pro-Turkish factions already exist would either 'go Turk' forthwith or would need to be held by very strong garrison in order to prevent the contingency. The danger and inconvenience in general in having the Turks right down to our right flank is *[groups undecypherable] particularly dangerous.

"We should be restoring to Turkey a large tract of territory included in our mandate and covered by our recent treaty with Irak and should thus be imitating the example of France in regard to Cilicia which was the subject of [? most] hostile criticism in Irak.

"4. To take such a step without consulting the Kurds, whom we have recently been encouraging in direction of independence under the suzerainty of Irak, would be regarded as a signal breach of faith.

"5. As the concession in any case does not give the Turks what they really want, they would only accept as a step calculated to facilitate the achievement of their real objective later. On above grounds I earnestly hope it will be possible to satisfy the Turks with participation in oil projects in Mosul Vilayet and at the worst the restoration of Rowanduz town and immediate neighbourhood in exchange for Amadia.

"I am now returning to Bagdad, and strongly advise, provided that he can get there in time, I be authorised to despatch my secretary, Major Bourdillon, to Lausanne by air. He is much more up to date in regard to the present Kurdish situation and topography than either Major Young or Mr. Bullard. He can leave immediately on receipt of your reply."

Full text goes by to-night's bag.

[E 13875/39/44] No. 767.

Consul-General Waugh to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).—(Received at Foreign Office, December 12.)

(No. 725.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 28, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith minutes of the Juridical Commission of the Allied High Commissions recommending a draft scheme for temporary Mixed Courts in Turkey to try cases between Allied and Ottoman subjects pending the reform of the Turkish law courts.

This scheme appears to be the only acceptable alternative to the re-establishment of the pre-war Capitulations system, and to offer in practice great advantages over the latter, while it may be less repugnant to Turkish chauvinism.

It will be noticed that article 139 of the draft provides for at least two British judges of the Mixed Court in Constantinople. It will be necessary to be prepared

* Cyphered.

to name them at once, and I suggest that in addition to Judge Thorp, Mr. Henry Ernest Longston-Garle, Barrister-at-Law (Middle Temple) should be appointed. He is at present acting as Board of Trade Commissioner for reparation claims in Constantinople. He is well qualified to sit on the Mixed Court by his knowledge of French and of French law and procedure, as he is an "avocat à la cour d'appel."

The scheme was re-examined to-day in consultation with the British, French and Italian judges, whose amendments I have inserted in the original draft. To save time and to catch to-morrow's messenger, I am forwarding the scheme direct in agreement with Mr. Henderson. There is no time to make clean copies. I draw attention to two points which are left open for discussion:—

1. The presidency of the commission by the Turkish member, articles 140 and 142, to which our judges object.
2. The payment of the Allied members of the court out of the court fees, article 149.

It would be better if the Allied Governments would accept this expense themselves. It would not greatly exceed the expense of a staff of dragomans under the old capitulatory system.

With regard to the third point mentioned in the minutes of the 20th November—a law published by the Angora Government on limited liability companies working in Turkey—my attention has been called to this matter by the British Chamber of Commerce here.

This question had been the subject of protracted negotiation between the Sublime Porte and the foreign missions when the war broke out. It affects seriously all foreign enterprise in Turkey, and especially insurance business.

I suggest that it should be made clear to the Angora Government that no such law can be applied to British companies in Turkey until it has been accepted by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
A. T. WAUGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 767.

Minutes of the Inter-Allied Juridical Commission.—Meeting of November 14, 1922.

Revision du Traité de Sèvres (suite).

LA Commission relit le texte des modifications et additions au Traité de Sèvres suggérées par elle.

A l'article 300 elle croit préférable de mettre les mots "ayant agi" au lieu de "agissant."

Au nouvel article proposé par elle, elle décide d'ajouter les mots "de quelque nature que ce soit."

MR. WAUGH fait observer que puisqu'on admet que les étrangers devront payer l'impôt, il y aurait lieu de prévoir une commission locale pour examiner les réclamations qui pourraient être faites contre la taxation.

M. CILLIERE approuve cette suggestion. Il signale à ce propos que des cas de taxation tout à fait excessive se sont déjà produits en Anatolie. Cette commission pourra être composée de délégués des missions alliées et trancherait en dernier ressort.

La Commission juridique approuve ce point de vue et propose un nouvel article ainsi conçu:

"Une commission composée d'un délégué de chacune des Puissances alliées capitulaires et de délégués ottomans examinera les réclamations qui pourraient être présentées par des ressortissants alliés au point de vue de l'évaluation et de l'application des taxes impossibles aux étrangers et se prononcera en dernier ressort sur ces réclamations."

La commission estime que cet article devrait être placé après l'article 264 et deviendrait ainsi le 264 *bis*. L'article proposé par M. Picard deviendrait le 264 *ter*.

La commission relit ensuite le procès-verbal de la dernière réunion ainsi que le texte modifié des propositions de M. Picard. Elle procède à un certain nombre de rectifications qui sont portées sur ce texte même.

Enclosure 2 in No. 767.

Minutes of the Inter-Allied Juridical Commission.—Meeting of November 20, 1922.

Pour le Haut-Commissaire de France : M. Cillière, Ministre plénipotentiaire.
Pour le Haut-Commissaire d'Angleterre : Mr. Waugh, Consul général.
Pour le Haut-Commissaire d'Italie : M. Galli, Premier Drogman.

Ordre du Jour.

1. Réforme judiciaire en Turquie.
2. Révision du Traité de Sèvres.
3. Loi sur les Sociétés publiée par le Gouvernement d'Angora.

1. *Réforme judiciaire en Turquie.*

M. CILLIÈRE entretient la commission de la future réforme judiciaire en Turquie.

Jusqu'à ce que celle-ci soit réalisée, il n'existe que deux moyens de protéger les personnes et les biens des étrangers, soit de rétablir les Capitulations, soit le tribunal mixte provisoire, solution qui serait beaucoup plus facilement acceptée, semble-t-il, par les Turcs.

M. Cillière rappelle à la commission qu'elle a reconnu l'intérêt de cette dernière solution. Il se propose, pour en faciliter l'application et en vue d'une décision dans ce sens des Gouvernements alliés, de préparer le texte de certains articles qui pourraient être insérés dans le futur traité de paix à la suite de l'article 136, dont le texte pourrait être modifié dans la forme pour donner certaines satisfactions aux délégués ottomans (participation des juges ottomans aux délibérations et aux décisions de la commission, avec présidence ottomane), mais dont la disposition essentielle (réserve à une commission spéciale de l'étude de la future réforme judiciaire) serait expressément maintenue. Avant de commencer la rédaction de ces articles, M. Cillière désire entretenir de nouveau ses collègues de cette question et se mettre d'accord avec eux sur le détail des dispositions à proposer aux Gouvernements alliés.

Il estime que le régime transitoire à instituer devrait s'appliquer non seulement aux affaires civiles et commerciales, comme dans le cas de la Commission judiciaire mixte, mais aussi aux affaires pénales. Seules seraient laissées en dehors les actions réelles immobilières, qui seraient laissées, comme par le passé, à la compétence exclusive des tribunaux ottomans et les questions de statut personnel, de succession et de faillite qui continueraient à être réservées à la juridiction de l'intéressé (tribunaux ottomans ou consulats, selon le cas).

La commission approuve cette manière de voir.

Pour que le régime puisse fonctionner, même à titre transitoire, il faudrait étendre les pouvoirs de la commission aux affaires pénales, la juridiction militaire pénale interalliée étant sur le point de disparaître.

Il faudrait aussi appliquer ce régime à tout le territoire turc, alors que la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire n'a été instituée que pour le territoire de l'occupation interalliée de Constantinople. La commission approuve ces suggestions et en examine l'application pratique. Il lui paraît que la combinaison la meilleure serait de créer deux ou plusieurs commissions mixtes dans les villes où les Puissances alliées seraient représentées par des consuls (Constantinople et Smyrne pour commencer.

M. GALLI propose que, pour les commissions à instituer dans les villes secondaires, il puisse être interjeté appel devant la Commission de Constantinople, qui offrirait plus de garanties au point de vue juridique.

M. CILLIÈRE objecte que tous les délégués alliés seront également nommés par les Gouvernements et auront par conséquent des pouvoirs égaux et que *à priori* cette distinction ne semble pas justifiée en droit, sinon en fait.

En matière pénale le Ministère public serait ottoman. La commission estime que cette concession doit être faite aux Turcs. Il serait impossible d'avoir un nombre de juges alliés suffisant pour assumer le Ministère public, et, d'ailleurs, ce qui importe seulement c'est que l'instruction soit confiée à un juge allié. Celui-ci pourrait être soit un juge de la nationalité du prévenu, soit un autre juge allié. Mr. Waugh fait observer qu'il serait préférable que le juge d'instruction ne soit pas de la nationalité

du prévenu. Il suffit comme garantie de justice que ce soit un allié et on éviterait ainsi le soupçon de partialité. En outre, le régime pouvant être étendu aux autres Puissances alliées, celles-ci pourraient être tentées de réclamer le même privilège. La commission adopte ce point de vue.

On pourrait admettre que dans les cas de flagrants délits d'un allié l'arrestation soit effectuée par la police ottomane, mais avec remise à l'autorité consulaire du prévenu.

Prison préventive dans les prisons consulaires pour les Alliés et les prisons ottomanes pour les Ottomans.

Quant à l'exécution des jugements, elle serait assurée selon les cas par la police ottomane contre les Ottomans et les consulats alliés pour les Alliés.

M. Cillière attire l'attention de la commission sur la difficulté, en nature pénale, d'établir un seul degré pour les peines criminelles, la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire jugeant à la majorité de trois juges seulement et sans appel ni cassation.

Pour remédier à cet état de choses, il serait possible de constituer en matière criminelle un tribunal d'appel de cinq juges, dont trois juges alliés et deux ottomans.

M. GALLI propose que, dans ce cas, pour le prévenu l'appel puisse être porté à Constantinople.

M. CILLIÈRE adhère à cette proposition, car, dans ce cas, le personnel de six commissions judiciaires des provinces ne permettrait pas la constitution d'un tribunal d'appel ainsi composé. Ce serait une nécessité de fait. Pour Constantinople même l'appel serait ainsi porté devant un tribunal composé de trois juges alliés n'ayant pas siégé en première instance et de deux juges ottomans. La commission approuve ce point de vue.

M. Cillière propose que, en définitive et sauf le cas d'appel en matière criminelle qui vient d'être examiné, le tribunal en toutes autres matières civile, commerciale et pénale soit composé, comme la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire actuelle, de trois juges, dont deux alliés et un président ottoman. Quant aux affaires entre seuls Ottomans ou seuls Alliés, elles devront continuer à relever, selon le cas, des tribunaux ottomans ou des tribunaux consulaires alliés.

Enfin, le traité pourrait prévoir que, sur la demande des autres Puissances, la compétence des commissions fût étendue aux ressortissants de ces Puissances.

La commission approuve ces diverses propositions et estime qu'il y aurait intérêt à préparer, dès maintenant, le texte des dispositions dans ce sens qui seraient soumises aux Gouvernements alliés pour servir de base, le cas échéant, aux négociations de la future conférence.

M. Cillière veut bien se charger de la rédaction de ce projet, qu'il soumettra très prochainement à la commission.

* * * *

3. *Loi sur les Sociétés publiée par le Gouvernement d'Angora.*

M. CILLIÈRE donne lecture d'une note signalant que le Gouvernement d'Angora prétend appliquer dans les territoires occupés par lui la Loi sur les Sociétés, qui est contraire au régime capitulaire.

M. Cillière demande à la commission si elle croit que l'on doit donner pour instruction aux sociétés de se soumettre, le refus pouvant entraîner pour elles de graves conséquences, tout en protestant, en faisant également remettre une protestation par les consulats.

La commission estime qu'il est impossible de faire autrement ; les sociétés doivent continuer à exercer leur autorité tant qu'elle le pourront, en protestant contre les violations de droit qui seraient faites à leur encontre.

M. Cillière donne ensuite lecture d'une note parue dans le "Stamboul" et invitant les sociétés à se faire inscrire jusqu'au 30 novembre au Commissariat de l'Économie publique.

La commission ne peut que prendre acte de cette communication.

Enclosure 3 in No. 767.

Minutes of the Inter-Allied Juridical Commission.—Meeting of November 24, 1922.

Pour le Haut-Commissaire de France : M. Cillière, Ministre plénipotentiaire.
Pour le Haut-Commissaire d'Angleterre : Mr. Waugh, Consul général.
Pour le Haut-Commissaire d'Italie : M. Galli, Premier Drogman.

Ordre du jour : Revision du Traité de Sèvres.

M. CILLIÈRE donne lecture du projet qu'il a préparé concernant l'organisation d'un régime judiciaire provisoire établi sur les bases de la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire, en attendant la réforme judiciaire définitive.

La commission approuve entièrement ce texte. A l'article 145 de ce projet, seulement, M. Cillière signale à la commission les difficultés qui pourraient naître pour l'application de la loi ottomane, si aucune réserve n'était insérée dans le projet. Quelle serait cette loi ? L'accord avec la Sublime Porte concernant la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire pour la période d'armistice avait dit simplement que cette commission appliquerait la loi ottomane et les usages locaux. Mais de nombreuses lois ont été promulguées à Angora que nous ignorons actuellement et dont certaines ont un caractère politique ou affectent le statut des étrangers.

La commission estime qu'il y a lieu, pour éviter ces inconvénients, de spécifier que la législation appliquée serait le Code civil et le Code pénal ottoman, tels qu'ils existaient au 1er août 1914.

A l'article 148, qui prévoit que les ressorts des Commissions judiciaires en Anatolie pourront être modifiés d'accord avec les Gouvernements alliés, M. Galli signale que cet article devrait être présenté sous la forme d'une obligation pour le Gouvernement turc, si les Gouvernements alliés le demandent.

La commission adopte ce point de vue et sous réserve de cette modification approuve entièrement le projet préparé par M. Cillière.

Projet de dispositions à insérer dans le futur Traité de Paix, à la suite de l'article 136 du Traité de Sèvres, dont la disposition essentielle sera sans doute maintenue (institution d'une commission spéciale allié, chargée de préparer, avec le concours d'experts techniques des autres Puissances capitulaires alliées ou neutres et consultation du Gouvernement ottoman, un projet de réforme judiciaire destiné à remplacer en Turquie le régime des Capitulations en matière judiciaire); le texte de cet article pouvant d'ailleurs et devant probablement être remanié dans le but d'accorder certaines satisfactions au Gouvernement ottoman, par exemple : participation effective de ses délégués aux délibérations et aux décisions de la commission, sans qu'ils y aient la majorité, mais avec présidence ottomane.

Le projet ci-après adopté par la Commission juridique interalliée, quoique n'ayant que le caractère d'une simple suggestion, a été établi sous la forme d'articles à insérer dans le futur Traité de Paix, afin de faciliter la tâche des négociateurs alliés, s'ils jugent opportun de retenir la suggestion de la Commission juridique. Il leur appartiendrait, dans ce cas, d'apporter au projet ci-après telles modifications de forme ou de fond qu'ils jugeraient nécessaires et de l'inclure dans le traité à la place qui leur paraîtrait le plus convenable. Il a paru à la commission que cette place venait naturellement après l'article 136, et c'est pour cela qu'elle a adopté la numération donnée par elle aux articles de ce projet.

Il va sans dire que le projet suppose la suppression de l'ancien article 261, qui rétablissait les Capitulations, mesure qui soulèverait certainement l'opposition déterminée du Gouvernement ottoman.

Article 137.

Jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur de la réforme judiciaire prévue à l'article précédent, des Commissions judiciaires mixtes provisoires, dont la composition, les pouvoirs et les sièges seront ci-après établis et déterminés connaîtront en Turquie de tous les différends en matière civile, commerciale et maritime,* ainsi qu'en matière pénale,

* Le présent projet reproduit (en la distinction entre les affaires commerciales et maritimes adoptée, à la demande des délégués ottomans, dans l'accord qui a institué la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire pour la période d'armistice. Il y avait, dans l'ancien Tribunal du Tribunal, une chambre spéciale pour les affaires maritimes.

entre Anglais, Français ou Italiens (ressortissants et personnes morales) d'une part, et Ottomans d'autre part, demandeurs ou défendeurs, à l'exclusion des actions réelles immobilières, dont la compétence continuera, comme par le passé, à relever exclusivement de la juridiction ottomane, et des affaires en matière de statut personnel (état-civil, mariage, divorces, tutelle ou curatelle) et en matière de succession et de faillite, dont la compétence continuera, comme par le passé, à relever de la juridiction de l'intéressé ou du decujus.

Article 138.

Il y aura une Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire à Constantinople, qui siégera au Ministère de la Justice, et une autre à Smyrne, qui tiendra audience au siège du tribunal de cette ville.

Le ressort de la Commission judiciaire mixte de Constantinople s'étendra dans les conditions établies par l'article 137 aux vilayets de Constantinople, d'Andrinople, de Brousse et au sandjak des Dardanelles ainsi qu'aux vilayets du littoral de la mer Noire.

Le ressort de la Commission judiciaire de Smyrne s'étendra, dans les mêmes conditions établies par l'article 137 et avec l'exception en matière pénale instituée à l'article 142, paragraphe 2, au vilayet d'Aïdin et aux autres vilayets de l'Anatolie.

A la demande des Gouvernements anglais, français et italien, les ressorts des Commissions judiciaires instituées par le présent article pourront être modifiés et de nouvelles commissions judiciaires pourront être instituées dans les mêmes conditions et avec les mêmes pouvoirs dans d'autres villes de Turquie où l'importance de l'élément étranger le nécessiterait.

Article 139.

Ces commissions seront composées, dans la même proportion, de juges ottomans et de juges anglais, français et italiens.

Les juges ottomans seront désignés par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, qui désignera également les greffiers, interprètes, huissiers et divers employés ottomans attachés aux commissions. Les juges anglais, français et italiens seront désignés, dans une proportion égale entre eux, par les Gouvernements anglais, français et italien. A Constantinople il y aura au minimum deux juges anglais, deux juges français et deux juges italiens.

Article 140.

Chaque affaire sera jugée, sauf l'exception établie ci-après en matière criminelle par l'article 142, paragraphe 2, par trois juges, dont un ottoman, [qui aura la présidence*?], un deuxième juge de la nationalité de la partie alliée et un troisième juge d'une autre nationalité alliée.

Quand il y aura en cause deux parties alliées, anglaise, française ou italienne, les deux juges alliés seront de la nationalité des deux parties. Dans le cas où il y aurait en cause des parties appartenant aux trois nationalités, anglaise, française ou italienne, le sort désignera parmi les trois juges alliés les deux juges alliés qui seront appelés à siéger.

Article 141.

Les commissions auront le pouvoir d'assigner les parties directement et de les juger contradictoirement ou par défaut.

Les jugements seront rendus, à la majorité des voix, au nom du Gouvernement de grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Ils seront susceptibles d'opposition en cas de défaut.

Les jugements contradictoires ne seront susceptibles d'aucun recours, sauf la requête civile en matière civile, commerciale et maritime et les dispositions de l'article 142, paragraphe 2, ci-après en matière criminelle.

Article 142.

En matière pénale, les Commissions judiciaires, composées comme il est indiqué à l'article 139, connaîtront indifféremment des contraventions, des affaires correctionnelles et des affaires criminelles.

* ? Suppress.

Toutefois, en matière criminelle et correctionnelle, et quel que soit le siège de la Commission judiciaire qui aura prononcé la condamnation, appel pourra être interjeté, à Constantinople, devant une commission judiciaire spéciale, composée de deux juges ottomans, [dont le président*], et de trois juges alliés, un juge anglais, un juge français et un juge italien, lesquels juges ottomans ou alliés n'auraient pas siégé en première instance.

Le Ministère public sera ottoman. Le juge d'instruction sera ottoman, si le prévenu est ottoman. Il sera allié, si le prévenu est allié, ou s'il y a un Allié parmi des prévenus ottomans.

Un roulement établi par la Commission réglementaire instituée à l'article 148 ci-après désignera ceux des juges ottomans ou alliés qui devront faire fonctions de juges d'instruction pendant telle ou telle période déterminée, chaque juge pouvant, à tour de rôle et selon les nécessités du service, exercer les fonctions soit de juge d'instruction, soit de juge en matière pénale, soit de juge en matière civile, commerciale ou maritime.

Il ne sera pas nécessaire que le juge d'instruction soit de la nationalité de la partie alliée. Il suffira, si un prévenu est allié, qu'il soit anglais, français ou italien.

Article 143.

Les prévenus anglais, français ou italiens qui auront été arrêtés en cas de flagrant délit par la police ottomane, seront comme par le passé, consignés par elle à leur autorité consulaire, qui devra les tenir à la disposition de la juridiction compétente.

Article 144.

Les requêtes, plaintes ou dénonciations seront rédigées en turc et en français. Elles seront adressées directement à la Commission judiciaire et, selon qu'il s'agira d'affaires civiles, commerciales ou maritimes ou d'affaires pénales, remises aussitôt au président de la Commission jugeant en matière civile, commerciale ou maritime ou au Procureur impérial ottoman, lequel, si un prévenu est allié, transmettra l'affaire au juge d'instruction allié désigné par le roulement, et s'il est ottoman à un juge d'instruction ottoman.

Un règlement intérieur, établi dans les conditions qui seront indiquées à l'article 148 ci-après, déterminera les conditions dans lesquelles les diverses affaires seront inscrites au rôle en matière civile, commerciale et maritime, et instruites en matière pénale.

Article 145.

Les citations et tous les actes de la procédure seront rédigés en turc et en français. Toutes pièces produites par les parties devront être également en turc et en français. Les plaidoiries pourront avoir lieu en turc ou en français.

Les jugements, rendus conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 141, seront rédigés et prononcés en turc et en français. En cas de différence ou de contestation sur le sens de leur libelle, le texte français fera foi.

Article 146.

Les Commissions judiciaires appliqueront la loi ottomane, excepté dans celles de ses dispositions qui seraient contraires aux dispositions du présent traité. Elles appliqueront notamment, et dans ces conditions, en matière civile, commerciale et maritime, le Code de Commerce ottoman et les lois civiles appliquées devant les Tribunaux du Tidjaret ainsi que le droit coutumier local ; et en matière pénale le Code pénal ottoman.

La procédure sera réglée par la Commission judiciaire de Constantinople, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 148 ci-après, en prenant pour base, en matière civile, commerciale et maritime, le Code ottoman de Procédure commerciale, en la simplifiant et en en abrégeant les délais autant que possible, et en matière pénale les articles du Code de Procédure pénale. Les dispositions établies ainsi par la Commission judiciaire de Constantinople seront applicables devant les Commissions judiciaires des autres sièges.

* ? Suppress.

Article 147.

Les services administratifs des Commissions judiciaires seront dirigés par un juge ottoman en qualité de président administratif. Ils comprendront un greffe, un drogmanat et un bureau exécutif. Chacun de ces services sera dirigé par un chef ottoman, avec un sous-chef anglais, français ou italien, désignés dans la même proportion numérique par les Ambassadeurs de France, de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie.

Le bureau exécutif procédera à l'exécution des jugements et ordonnances des Commissions judiciaires, d'après les instructions du président administratif, en requérant, s'il y a lieu, quand il s'agira d'exécuter vis-à-vis d'un Ottoman, le concours de la police ottomane, et en requérant le concours de l'autorité consulaire intéressée, quand il s'agira d'exécuter vis-à-vis d'un ressortissant allié. Dans ce dernier cas, les instructions du président administratif devront être contresignées par un juge allié.

La police ottomane prêtera son concours à l'autorité consulaire intéressée, si celle-ci lui demande pour l'exécution contre des ressortissants alliés des jugements ou ordonnances des Commissions judiciaires.

En attendant l'installation de prisons ottomanes répondant aux conditions de discipline et de salubrité nécessaire, les condamnés anglais, français et italiens continueront à subir leurs peines dans les prisons consulaires.

Article 148.

À Constantinople, une commission spéciale, composée de deux juges ottomans désignés par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, dont l'un exercera les fonctions de président, d'un juge anglais, d'un juge français et d'un juge italien, désignés par leurs Ambassadeurs, fixera par des règlements intérieurs, dont elle déterminera elle-même le mode de publicati n, les conditions de son fonctionnement et notamment le roulement à établir entre les divers juges pour les divers services auxquels ils seront affectés, le mode d'exécution et de rédaction des jugements, ainsi que les questions concernant le personnel et le budget de chaque Commission judiciaire.

La commission spéciale établie ainsi à Constantinople fixera, à la majorité des voix, la procédure qui sera applicable aux termes du paragraphe 2 de l'article 146 devant les diverses Commissions judiciaires. Elle statuera également sur les modifications qu'il lui paraîtrait nécessaire d'apporter aux taxes judiciaires, modifications qui seront dès lors applicables devant les diverses Commissions judiciaires, quel que soit leur siège.

Article 149.

Les dépenses nécessaires au fonctionnement des Commissions judiciaires ainsi que les traitements des juges et fonctionnaires ottomans*) desdites Commissions judiciaires seront prélevés sur les recettes de ces commissions, qui seront administrées par les commissions elles-mêmes. L'excédent des recettes sera versé au Trésor ottoman.

A l'entrée en fonction des commissions, pour parer à une insuffisance possible des recettes et jusqu'à ce que ces recettes soient suffisantes, les dépenses indiquées au paragraphe ci-dessus seront assurées par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Article 150.

Les Commissions judiciaires constituées conformément aux articles précédents continueront, à l'entrée en vigueur de la future réforme judiciaire ottomane, à juger les affaires dont elles auraient été saisies antérieurement.

L'exécution de leurs jugements et ordonnances continuera, en ce cas, à être assurée dans les conditions fixées par les paragraphes 2 et 3 de l'article 147.

Article 151.

Dans le cas où d'autres Puissances le demanderaient, la compétence des Commissions judiciaires, constituées conformément aux articles précédents, pourra, jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur de la future réforme judiciaire ottomane et dans les conditions établies par les articles ci-dessus, être étendue aux ressortissants desdites Puissances.

* ? Suppress if Allied judges are to be paid by Turks.

Dès maintenant, les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour reconnaître que la compétence ainsi définie des Commissions judiciaires s'étend aux ressortissants (belges, helléniques, roumains (2), polonais (2), tchécoslovaques, yougoslaves, russes, américains).*

ARTICLE 152.

La compétence des tribunaux ottomans dans toutes les affaires où aucune partie alliée n'est intéressée n'est pas affectée par les dispositions du présent traité.

Les affaires judiciaires de toute nature dans lesquelles aucune partie ottomane ne sera intéressée continueront, pendant la durée du fonctionnement des Commissions judiciaires instituées par le présent traité, à être déférées aux Tribunaux consulaires anglais, français et italiens, helléniques, russes, américains,† sous réserve des dispositions établies par l'article 137 en ce qui concerne les actions réelles immobilières.‡

[E 13912/10524/44] No. 768.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 687.)

My Lord, *Athens, December 2, 1922.*

WITH reference to Mr. Lindley's despatch No. 614 of the 10th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith further extracts from a report kindly lent me by the United States Chargé d'Affaires regarding the conditions of the Asia Minor refugees in other of the Greek islands. Mr. Caffery again asks that this report may be treated as confidential.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

Enclosure in No. 768.

Report on the Condition of the Asia Minor Refugees in certain Greek Islands.

(EXTRACT.)

THERE are at least 150,000 refugees on the Greek islands at this time. Of these, I have visited 100,000 in the last two weeks. These refugees came to the islands not only from Smyrna and the zone formerly occupied by the Greek army, but also from the areas in Asia Minor in front of the Greek lines, *i.e.*, from country occupied by the Turks which had never been occupied by the Greek forces. In addition to the refugees from Asia Minor, there are on the northern islands many refugees from Thrace and the islands of the Marmora.

The refugees from Asia Minor brought away nothing. They have no bedding, no blankets and no mattresses; they have only the clothes which they wore when they escaped. They have no food, they are without money and, worst of all, they are without men.

I stepped into a schoolroom where eighty-seven people from the Turkish zone are quartered. The only personal effects in this room, aside from the ragged clothing on

* Le Gouvernement belge et le Gouvernement hellène avaient demandé et obtenu pour leurs ressortissants la compétence de la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire pour la période d'armistice. La Porte avait admis une disposition pareille du Gouvernement yougoslave, parce que les Serbes ne bénéficiaient pas autrefois des privilèges capitulaires, et du Gouvernement tchécoslovaque, la République tchécoslovaque n'étant pas encore reconnue du Gouvernement ottoman. Elle a écarté, pour le même motif, les demandes du Gouvernement polonais. Enfin, elle a repoussé une demande analogue faite par les Hauts-Commissaires pour les Russes, ceux-ci d'après elle, ayant renoncé aux Capitulations par le Traité de Brest-Litovsk. Les Roumains, qui ont droit au régime capitulaire en vertu seulement du régime de la nation la plus favorisée que leur a concédé l'article 54 du Traité de Berlin, se sont abstenus de demander la juridiction de la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire, jusqu'au moment où la demande a été présentée à la Conférence de Lausanne, ce que n'avaient eu ce ni les Belges ni les Hellènes, ni les autres Alliés. Seuls les Américains avaient formulé cette demande. Les Alliés, sans la répugnance qu'avaient manifestée au commencement de la Sublime Porte signataire avec eux de l'armistice. Les négociations directes engagées sur ce point entre l'Amiral Bristol et le Gouvernement ottoman n'ont pas eu de résultat.

† En principe, en ce qui concerne le présent traité, il s'entendra de compétence des Tribunaux consulaires alliés aux affaires entre ressortissants d'une même nationalité, et cela non seulement en matière civile, commerciale et maritime, mais encore en matière pénale, ce qui donnerait satisfaction sur ce dernier point à une ancienne revendication du Gouvernement ottoman.

the backs of the people, was a single coffee sack stuffed with hay and an odd-shaped cooking pot, pathetically empty. For four days the only food that these people had eaten was "St. John's bread," the fruit of a variety of locust tree—the food that the prodigal son of the parable shared with the swine.

I have often seen people without bedding sleeping on stone floors so damp that their clothing was wet, or if they had found an old burlap bag to spread on the floor it was wet to the touch. In one case I found an old woman, whose leg had been broken by the Turks, and who had so serious a case of the prevalent eye disease that she was blind, lying on an unstuffed burlap bag so wet that when I picked up a corner I could squeeze water out of the coarse fibre. Wherever I found refugees on stone or tile, I found sickness, pneumonia, pleurisy and universal colds.

The clothing that these people wore at the time of their escape was invariably the poorest they had, because there was more chance of their escaping if they appeared to be poor and without worldly goods. Anyone who appeared to be in comfortable circumstances was suspected by the Turks of having money, and was, of course, subject to every possible means of extortion. It must be remembered that the people are practised refugees, and that they are, some of them, in their seventh epoch of suffering caused by the cruelty of Turkish rule. The severity and extent of this evacuation alone marks it as different from other similar drives made against Christians by the Turks. These people left their homes with their poorest clothing, baggage, and with their money hidden in their rags. One poor woman had hidden a draft for £T. 1,000 in her stocking during the march. It had worked down to her foot and worn a hole where the signature had been. They cannot wash and be clean for want of a change of clothing. The hardships of the journey wore out their shoes, tore their miserable clothes and soiled them beyond belief. Vermin got into their dirty clothing and hair, and their bodies are tortured by all manner of unclean things.

Most of the islands have very small stores of food at all times. This autumn, due to the fall of the drachma, there has been practically no store of flour in Greece, and on the islands it has been a struggle to get flour enough for the normal population. With the influx of the refugees, the small stores of flour were immediately consumed, for to these people bread is the "staff of life" to an extent not understood in England or America. When the flour was gone the stores of vegetables were called on, and in many cases these have been exhausted, leaving the refugees in a pitiable plight. I saw grass that the goats had refused cooking in a pot to make a meal for a family of six; this was on the Island of Milos, within half a mile of the spot where the beautiful Venus de Milo was found.

Among the Asia Minor refugees there are scarcely 5 per cent. of males over 14 years of age. The men are such pathetic wrecks, blind, more helpless than the women with their large families of young children. Of girls there are a few between the ages of 14 and 18, but very few. On the Island of Lemnos I saw two girls and an old crone in a room 4 ft. by 6 ft. on the edge of the quay. The two girls and the old woman had been carried from the refugee ship that brought them, and had been put into this room. For ten days they had been unable to move, the old woman too aged, and the two girls so horribly maltreated by the Turks that they cannot stand, and only their robust health has permitted them to live this long.

These forlorn people need everything. Thirty per cent. of them must have quarters on wooden floors instead of stone and tile. The refugees on the islands alone need 100,000 blankets, and 12½ tons of flour daily to sustain life. They need 600,000 yards of white cloth to make a single change of underwear. They need coats, dresses, children's clothing, socks, stockings, and shoes. Everywhere we saw women and little children, who, on the long marches to the seaport towns, from which they escaped to the Greek islands, had worn through their shoes and wounded their feet. These wounds, having become infected, are causing intense suffering. These people must have medical and surgical attention. As the winter approaches the number of sick is increasing by leaps and bounds. Sanitary measures must be taken to prevent the spread of diseases. Well-started epidemics of scarlet fever and dysentery may be found in more than half of the islands.

If these lives are to be salvaged effective help must be made immediately available. The problem is one that demands immediate energetic and comprehensive measures. There is work to be done which pleads for countless hands, active brains and money. My greatest fear is that the people on the islands, distributed in apparently small groups, will be neglected. Their wants and their sufferings, unseen, are likely to be unheeded, and, unheeded, the toll of death will be enormous. These unsalvaged lives will be lost for want of heeding the distant cry.

The refugees in the large centres on the mainland will undoubtedly receive attention from the numerous relief agencies, but I fear wholesale death by starvation and disease for the neglected refugees in the Ægean Archipelago.

KYMI (Island of Euboea.) Visited November 4, 1922.

Kymi has a population of 4,600, with 966 refugees in the immediate vicinity. These refugees come from Thrace for the most part, and they have with them a considerable quantity of personal effects, consisting of bedding, clothing, grain, &c. It is also noticeable that their men are with them to a very large extent. We found these men very restless and very anxious for work, for no opportunity for work available. The housing conditions are for the most part bad, though the people are under cover. It will be necessary to feed all of these people by the 1st December. I would recommend, however, that this group of refugees be removed to some area where the men can find work.

SKOPELOS.

Skopelos has a population of approximately 6,000, and there are 400 refugees quartered there. There is a good committee which has worked diligently for the care of the refugees. All are well housed and have been fed to the best of the local possibilities. Flour is very greatly needed, and these people must be fed by outside interests immediately. These refugees are mostly from Smyrna, or near by, and have absolutely no clothing, bedding, &c., except what the local people have provided them with.

MUDROS (Isle of Lemnos.) Visited November 5, 1922.

Mudros has a normal population of approximately 3,000, with 696 refugees quartered there. These people are largely from Asia Minor, and absolutely destitute, needing clothing, bedding and food. The housing is very bad, as there is scarcely a decent house in the village, and, naturally, the worst houses have been given over to the refugees. There is no food available at present except local products—principally black beans. Practically no food is in store there from the local fields.

KASTRO (Island of Lemnos). Visited November 6, 1922.

Kastro has a normal population of something over 4,000, only one-half of which is Christian. 6,000 refugees have been sent to Kastro, about one-third of whom come from Smyrna, and are absolutely destitute. Over 4,000 are from Thrace, having personal effects consisting of clothing, some food and bedding. The Smyrna refugees are absolutely destitute, needing everything. All refugees are housed, though many of them badly housed. An effort is being made to distribute these Thracian refugees to the smaller villages of the island, but the committee is experiencing considerable difficulty in getting the refugees to stay in the villages.

Both at Mudros and Kastro there are Russian refugees from Wrangel's army, with whom the Red Cross worked, and, on leaving, the Red Cross presented a more than adequate supply of stores to each place on the promise that a hospital would be opened on the island. Neither place has opened a hospital. The supplies left at Mudros were sent to the Queen's Committee, when the present emergency arose, by Captain Palmer, the British consular agent.

SKIAPHOS. Visited November 7, 1922.

Skiaphos has a population of 3,100, with 750 refugees, mostly from Smyrna, and absolutely destitute. Food conditions are bad, there being practically no food for the local population. All refugees are housed, but in many cases badly.

VOLO. Visited November 7, 1922.

Volo has a normal population of approximately 35,000, with 17,000 refugees quartered in the city. These refugees are in a very bad condition, coming, most of them, from Asia Minor, and being without clothing, bedding or food. They are crowded in warehouses under most unsanitary conditions. The local people have done a great deal for the refugees, but they are in a very bad condition and need help.

We recommend that Volo be made a centre of distribution, and that at least three Americans be sent to the city to work there and in surrounding islands and ports.

Thracian refugees were arriving in Volo in large numbers at the time of our visit, but were being immediately shipped out to the north by train with all of their belongings.

Also we found at Volo some 7,000 refugees from Nicomidia, who had been there for some time over a year. These people are living in tents just outside the city, and to a large extent have secured employment and are becoming assimilated. However, they need some attention, particularly medical, and co-ordination of their food supply.

STYLIS. Visited November 8, 1922.

Stylis has a normal population of 2,800, with approximately 1,300 refugees. It is a small town, the officials are incompetent to handle the local situation, and the housing conditions are bad for the most part. These refugees are largely from Asia Minor and absolutely destitute, needing clothing, bedding and food immediately. Bread was being supplied when we were there, but it was very bitter, and although the refugees were very hungry they were eating as little of it as possible, feeling confident that it was not healthy; certainly it was most unpalatable. There is much sickness.

AIDIPSOS. Visited November 8, 1922.

Aidipsos is a summer resort with a winter population of perhaps 300 people. There were 1,000 refugees there when we arrived, and while we were there 1,300 additional refugees arrived. These latter seemed to be from Thrace, as there were many men among them. There is ample housing for refugees at this point, as it is calculated that there are 1,000 rooms. However, there is absolutely no industry, very few stores and no food except what may be sent in from the outside. There are great possibilities in this place as a refugee home, but absolutely everything must come from the outside. Perhaps the greatest suffering will result here of any place we visited unless this help is sent immediately. The 1,000 refugees that we found there are from Asia Minor.

CHALKIS. Visited November 8, 1922.

At Chalkis we had a very unsatisfactory visit due to our inability to get into touch with the committee during the time available for our stop. It was raining when we arrived; we went directly to the police headquarters and sent for the chief of police. After waiting for him for an hour we started out to visit the refugees, and found them quartered in warehouses, churches and a few houses. Though all refugees were under cover, still we found the overcrowding intolerable and impossible. In a very few days conditions must become very bad unless the refugees are transported elsewhere or steps are taken to properly house them. Most of the refugees are from Thrace, and have only recently arrived in Chalkis. Conditions evidently warranted our recommending Chalkis as a centre from which to work neighbouring places and needing immediate attention.

ERMIONI. Visited November 9, 1922.

Ermioni is a small town of 2,500 inhabitants on the Peloponessos, and has 1,051 refugees quartered on it. We found many people who had nothing but locust pods to live on, and who were crying for bread. We were literally swamped by the refugees on our arrival, and a crowd followed us to the wharf on our departure, with their arms outstretched, crying for bread. This is the reason for our urgent telegram asking for immediate help.

SPETSAI. Visited November 9, 1922.

Spetsai has a normal population of 5,000, with approximately 1,300 refugees, a large proportion of whom are absolutely destitute and in the greatest need for food, clothing and bedding. The local officials have done very well in housing the people, and fed them to the best of their ability; we would commend the work of the committee very highly. This is also a summer resort, and the resources are very limited locally. Outside help is essential, and should be immediately provided. Good co-operation can be expected from the local officials, especially the chairman of the committee, the chief of police and Dr. Oeconomos.

POROS. Visited November 10, 1922.

Poros has a normal population of 4,000. There are approximately 800 refugees in the town. The local committee is absolutely incompetent, the only member energetically

interested being the police officer. The people are all housed, though very badly. There is a large amount of sickness and very little medical attention. These people are also from Smyrna and in the greatest misery due to the poor housing, lack of bedding, clothing and food. No bread has been available for some days, and the beans and rice sent by the committee were most welcome.

COULOURI (Salamis). Visited November 10, 1922.

Coulouri is a small town of approximately 2,000 people, and there are 350 refugees in the town. The committee is inefficient, the housing conditions are very bad, though there are roofs for all of the refugees. These people are extremely destitute, and as the local committee has done practically nothing for them, there is much suffering. For four days there has been no bread, and as there is nothing else to supplement it, there is great danger amongst the refugees. They need food, clothing and bedding, and they need it at once.

[E 13868/13003/44] No. 769.

Statement by Turkish Delegation at Lausanne on December 8.—(Received in Foreign Office December 12, 1922.)

THE Turkish delegation have listened attentively to the speeches made by the various delegations, and to the explanations of his Excellency Lord Curzon. They have also examined the scheme for the regulation of the Straits put forward in the name of the Allied Powers.

As a result of this examination, the Turkish delegation have the honour to make the following remarks:—

For five centuries the Turks have been masters of the Straits, which they have fortified and defended with all the forces at their disposal.

The fact that the Turks have been guardians of the Straits has exercised a varying influence on the relations of the Black Sea and Mediterranean Powers when at war with each other.

Thus, for instance, these varying influences led in 1833 to the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which recognised certain rights to the advantage of Russia; this state of things did not bring about a war.

Later, in 1856, Turkey was engaged, together with her allies, in fighting against Tsarist Russia, and accordingly allowed her allies' warships to pass through the Straits. Again, quite recently, in 1914, Turkey was placed between Russia and Russia's Western Allies, and closed and defended the Straits against both parties at once.

It must be recognised that in all these instances the Turks did nothing contrary to the provisions of the international treaties concerning the régime of the Straits, and never confronted either their friends or their enemies with a situation which had not been foreseen by those treaties.

It follows that if any complaints can be made in regard to the way in which the Straits were utilised or defended, these complaints can only be directed against the international acts relating to the Straits, and cannot in any way be connected with the fact that the Straits happened to be defended by the Turks.

The permanent disarmament of the Straits would influence events just as much as putting the Straits in a state of defence; each party might gain or lose by enforced disarmament in different ways in various future wars, according to the affinities and divergences existing between the Powers at the time.

Consequently, the influence which the Straits are to exercise on international relations must depend, not on the fact of their being put in a state of defence or not, but on the treaties which lay down the régime to be applied to warships in the Straits.

Moreover, the defence of the Straits covers the defence of the capital of Turkey, of the Sea of Marmora and of Eastern Thrace.

The non-fortification of the Straits, therefore, amounts to leaving the most vulnerable and important districts of Turkey defenceless and at the mercy of a sudden attack.

None of the Powers represented at the conference is deprived of the right to defend its capital. Turkey, on the other hand, would be constantly exposed to the danger of her capital being suddenly destroyed by a foreign fleet or occupied by

foreign troops. The existence of this possibility would obviously expose the capital to the risk of all manner of calamities.

There is another point which I wish to raise in the interests of general peace. The strategical importance of the Straits is so great that any Mediterranean or Black Sea Power which conquered them would secure an overwhelming advantage as soon as a war broke out. It is, therefore, only natural that as soon as a possibility of war exists between a Black Sea and a Mediterranean State each side should try to obtain possession of the Straits as quickly as possible. The first result of this attempt would be to provoke a sudden war over a dispute which might have been settled without recourse to arms. The second result would be to bring about the participation of Turkey in that war, even though she were in no way interested in the dispute, by the mere fact of her having been attacked.

These considerations show that the state of things created by demilitarising the Straits would render peace illusory between the Black Sea and Mediterranean States on the one hand and Turkey on the other. It is, therefore, essential that the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and Constantinople should not be accessible through a surprise attack by land or sea. Moreover, our experience in the past shows that this security can only be attained by means of fortifications and defences.

Once these districts are secured against surprise attack, any State which violated its international engagements would have no chance of gaining an immediate victory, and the Powers would be enabled to take such measures as the circumstances required.

Turkey, for her part, would, of course, be bound to observe the line of conduct to which she had committed herself by agreement with the other Powers. It is hard to believe that a single State would dare to repudiate an engagement undertaken by it in face of the whole world.

In any case, there is hardly any likelihood of such an event taking place. The Allied Powers' proposal recognises that Turkey could not defend herself by the means at her disposal, and so there is almost no reason to fear that Turkey might not fulfil her engagements. The Allied Powers can, therefore, regard such apprehensions as a completely negligible factor in the solution of the problem.

The security of Turkish territory also requires that the warships which pass through the Straits should not be of such strength as to endanger the district lying between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Turkey entirely agrees with the Powers represented at the conference in recognising that merchant vessels should have complete liberty of navigation and of passage night and day.

An international commission, similar to that for the Danube, could settle questions relating to the navigation of merchant vessels.

In war time, whether Turkey be neutral or belligerent, the right for merchantmen to pass could be adapted to the general interests at stake.

In view of these considerations, the Turkish delegation have the honour to set forth as follows the bases of the régime which they wish to see applied to the Straits:

1. A guarantee securing the Straits, Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora against any surprise attack by land or sea.
2. Limitation of the naval forces which may enter the Black Sea, so that they shall not constitute a danger for the districts between the two Straits and in the Black Sea. These forces could consist of light craft employed for the protection of international commerce.
3. Freedom of passage both in war and peace for merchantmen; in case Turkey is a belligerent, she will be satisfied with such technical control as is indispensable

While reserving the right to make observations on all the articles of the Allied Powers' proposal, the Turkish delegation declare that all the points enumerated below are particularly harmful to Turkey, even regarding the question from the point of view of the Allied Powers:—

1. The term "Straits" which is employed in the Allied proposal must not comprise the Sea of Marmora, since defensive preparations on the shores of that sea, though exercising no influence on the freedom of passage for ships, are necessary for the defence of Anatolia and Thrace.
2. As the railway line constitutes an important means of connection between Anatolia and Thrace, and as Constantinople possesses a garrison, it is

useless to have a demilitarised zone round the Bosphorus. It will be sufficient to indicate that there should be no land or sea fortifications on either shore.

3. It is proposed to prohibit movements of troops in the demilitarised zones; but these movements must be allowed, because the zones in question connect the two parts of the country.
4. With a view to defending the shores of the Sea of Marmora by means of a fleet, Turkey needs to maintain arsenals and other naval establishments at Constantinople and in the Straits.
5. The area of the demilitarised zones is too extensive.
6. As regards the four islands situated near the Straits, Turkish sovereignty must be recognised and affirmed over Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace, and Lemnos should be declared autonomous.
7. A minimum means of defence should be permitted on the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to protect it against a surprise attack.

No. 770.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 766.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 12, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 758.

Consul-general at Smyrna reports attitude of Turkish authorities much improved. He would welcome return, at their own risk, of British subjects, if conference gives definite prospect of peaceful settlement, but otherwise is opposed to it.

Only railway employees are at present pressing to return. Though I have no precise information, I presume some of these would be called on to serve inland, which would remove them, in case of emergency, from all possibility of limited protection which might be offered in Smyrna itself. Further, if request of senior officials of Aidin Railway is granted, application would certainly follow for large technical staff now in Malta.

Consul-general reports all important business men left or leaving.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 66.)

No. 771.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 11, 1922.*

MY conversation with Ismet yesterday was friendly, but unfruitful; for he continued to insist on surrender of Mosul, and declared that he could never go back to Angora without it. I declined to yield in the smallest degree, and propose to send him a note which may be useful for subsequent publication, stating in detail our reasons for refusal. I shall make a good deal out of point that surrender is not even consistent with first article of National Pact, to which he constantly appeals as Magna Charta of new Turkey.

At meetings of sub-committees to-day, Turkish delegates, who had evidently been reprimanded by Ismet after my protest, displayed a much more conciliatory attitude and some progress was made.

Sub-committee on exchange of populations, which had been brought to standstill owing to Turkish insistence on expulsion of all Greeks from Constantinople, also made a slight move forward.

Military and naval experts have completed detailed examination of Straits proposal with Turks, and matter will now come back to my commission. Turkish acceptance will depend on nature of political guarantees.

M. Barrère intends to see Ismet and give him a serious warning to the effect that unless Turks descend from pedestal and show a disposition to conclude an early agreement on essential points there will be no use in going on. M. Bompard is confident that in last resort Turks will yield on majority of points.

To-morrow I propose to initiate discussion on protection of minorities.

[E 13982/13003/44] No. 772.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Fourth Meeting held at the Hôtel du Château at Ouchy, November 24, 1922, at 4·30 P.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 13.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Cachamanos.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.
M. Diamandy.	M. M. Rakitch.

TURKEY.	BULGARIA.
Ismet Pasha.	M. Stambouliisky.
Riza Nour Bey.	M. Stanciof.
Hassan Bey.	

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Guariglia.
Major-Gen. Burnett-Stuart.	General Weygand.	M. Vitale.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Laroche.	
Mr. Malkin.	M. Fromageot.	
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. Bargeton.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Corbin.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Barois.	
Mr. McClure.	Lieut.-Colonel Courtin.	
	Captain d'Astier.	

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Nagaoka.	M. A. Politis.
	Mr. Sato.	M. V. Dandramis.
	Colonel Saigo.	General A. Mazarakis.
		M. A. Michalopoulos.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.
M. Dumitresco.	M. Christitch.
	M. Antitch.

TURKEY.	BULGARIA.
Munir Bey.	General Savof.
Moukhtar Bey.	Mlle. Stanciof.
Tevfik Bey.	M. Noikof.

Secretariat-General :

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Wicks.		M. Indelli.
United States of America.	**Japan.**	**Greece.**
Mr. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Constantin Collas.
Roumania.	**Serb-Croat-Slovene State.**	**Turkey.**
M. Constantinesco.	M. Vladimir Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter : M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON said that a sub-commission had been appointed the day before to consider two questions: The demilitarisation of a zone or zones on the frontiers of Thrace, and the access of Bulgaria to the Ægean Sea. The commission had presented a report in two parts. He would begin by asking General Weygand to read the report. He was informed by General Weygand and other members of the sub-commission that their labours had been greatly facilitated by the conciliatory temper and helpful attitude of the various members, whether of Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian or other nationality, and it was only fair that the conference should express their appreciation of the friendly spirit which had marked the work of this sub-commission.

The Bulgarian delegation having entered the room, GENERAL WEYGAND read the report of the sub-commission (Annex A) and a note by the Bulgarian technical delegation (Annex B).

LORD CURZON invited the delegations to express their views on the report which General Weygand had just read.

ISMET PASHA made the following remarks on the military recommendations set forth in the sub-commission's report :—

1. The request that the Turkish delegation should consent to the demilitarisation of a strip of territory 30 kilom. broad round Turkish territory in Europe meant that Turkey was being asked to renounce altogether her means for defending a district of vital importance for her. Under these conditions Adrianople, which had hitherto been a defensive fortress, would lose that character, and Turkey would be deprived of the power to defend the line of the Maritza.

On the other hand, neither Bulgaria nor Western Thrace had any need of means of defence on those frontiers; this was proved by the principles of military science and by past experience. It would be a very serious sacrifice for Turkey to be deprived of a zone encircling her territory which constituted a means of defence.

This sacrifice would not be justifiable unless the signatory Powers formally guaranteed the inviolability of the zone which it was proposed to deprive of its means of defence.

If no such guarantee were given, Turkey's neighbours would profit at her expense by the demilitarisation of a zone round her frontiers. The consequent weakening of Turkey would encourage the ambitions of other countries, and such a solution would never conduce to the establishment of lasting peace.

Consequently, the Turkish delegation could not consent to Turkey being deprived of the means of defending a zone along her European frontiers, unless there were an international undertaking to prevent the violation of that zone. This proved conclusively that Turkey meant to ensure and respect the peace of the world, and wished to be an element of order and peace in Europe.

2. As regards the guarantee for the non-military character of this zone, Turkey could not in any way accept the exercise of foreign supervision over any part of her territory. She would faithfully fulfil all her engagements. Any penetration of the Turkish army into the neutral zone, in violation of Turkey's promises, would immediately be known; and fortifications could not be erected secretly at Adrianople within the space of a few days. Demilitarisation, therefore, did not involve the exercise of any surveillance. The signatory Powers could only be called upon to defend the neutrality and inviolability of the demilitarised zone when the armies of one of the two parties penetrated into the neutral zone for offensive purposes, or when offensive and defensive military measures on a large scale were undertaken there. Fair complaints and protests on this subject by one of the two parties could be investigated by a commission of the signatory Powers.

3. The frontiers of Eastern Thrace claimed by the Turkish delegation were those given to Turkey by the Treaty of Constantinople of the 29th September, 1913, because that claim appeared to her, both in fact and in law, to be as moderate as it was justified. Surely it would be recognised that in claiming that frontier, and at the same time consenting to demilitarisation, the Turkish Government had no offensive purpose in mind, and that their claim rested on ethnic and economic considerations.

4. It must be expressly and formally stipulated that Turkey's sovereign rights over the neutralised and demilitarised zone should not be impugned in any way whatever.

M. VENIZELOS agreed with the Turkish delegation in recognising that the demilitarisation of the zone in question would have no real value without the guarantee of all the Powers signing the treaty, but he could not accept or understand the refusal of the Turkish delegation to agree to a continuous surveillance over that zone. It was essential that this surveillance should be permanent, for if the proposal of the Turkish delegation were accepted, whenever an incident occurred in the zone, the fact would first of all have to be reported. An enquiry would then be ordered, and this would take some time: but in twenty-four hours an army could cross the zone in question and reach the neighbouring frontier, and even cross it.

It must be recognised that the exercise of a continuous control was absolutely necessary in order to prevent, if possible, any violation of the requirements of demilitarisation. Permanent surveillance could prevent incidents. The system proposed by the Turkish delegation would only provide for the verification of an accomplished fact.

M. STAMBOULIISKY agreed in principle to all necessary measures being taken for the preservation of peace in the Balkans. He added, however, that Bulgaria was already demilitarised under the Treaty of Neuilly, and that the creation of a demilitarised zone on her territory was in no way imposed on her by that treaty. By accepting such a stipulation, the Bulgarian Government would thus be giving its benevolent consent to a concession which it was in no way obliged to make.

ISMET PASHA said that in consenting to demilitarisation the Turkish delegation were making a great sacrifice, namely, that of the great fortress of Adrianople. Everyone knew that new fortifications could not be constructed at Adrianople within twenty-four hours. His Excellency M. Venizelos had spoken of unexpected incidents; such incidents could not have the character of a military offensive. Concentrations of troops of any importance were always noticed immediately. He would not touch on the other sacrifices which this demilitarisation would involve; the one which he had mentioned was very important in itself, and could not be compared to that made by the other States. He drew the conclusion that supervision was not in the least necessary.

LORD CURZON wished to make some observations on the remarks which the commission had just heard. He was very glad to find that the suggestion for the creation of demilitarised zones on the Turco-Bulgar and Turco-Greek frontiers had been so favourably received by the sub-commission. He was sorry to hear the Turkish delegation speak of the creation of these zones as entailing a grave sacrifice for Turkey; the proposal had on the contrary been made in the interests of general peace and of the security of Turkey herself. Ismet Pasha had spoken about the sacrifices imposed upon Turkey in respect of the demilitarisation of Adrianople. That was a military question upon which he hesitated to offer an opinion; but military experts had told him that the geographical position of Adrianople at the very corner of Turkish territory did not, in the conditions of modern warfare, constitute such powerful means of defence as the Turkish observations had seemed to imply.

The Turkish delegates had said that they were most reluctant to agree to demilitarised zones unless guaranteed by all the Powers who were to sign the treaty.

That raised a very large question which could not be decided at the conference table and would have to be considered by the various Governments concerned. Such a guarantee was of a very serious and ominous character, and any Government assuming it must consider most carefully the consequences which it would entail. The kind of neutrality which the Turkish delegation had in view was that the signatory Powers, in the event of violation, should be bound individually and collectively to regard it as an act of war. That statement alone was a measure of the seriousness of the obligation which they invited the Powers to assume. That was not, however, the only kind of neutrality possible. It might prove desirable to examine in due course the various other forms of neutralisation which could be adopted. The delegates were dealing that day with only a very small section of this great question, namely, two strips on either side of one particular frontier. As they proceeded further with their labours, they would find several other zones to be demilitarised. The question of zones would be raised again in connection with the Straits—the security and demilitarisation of both sides of the Dardanelles—a question which had been admitted by Turkey in her correspondence with the Powers. The same question would arise in connection with the Bosphorus. It was therefore somewhat risky to lay down general principles applying to a particularly narrow territory, which would not be properly applicable elsewhere. He therefore thought that discussion on the degree and manner of neutralisation should be deferred until the conference came to deal with those other areas.

He was somewhat surprised at the attitude of the Turkish delegation on the question of inspection. They had said they were not prepared to consent to foreign inspection in any form, except when violation of the neutralised area had formed the subject of complaints. Their attitude had been very forcibly criticised by M. Venizelos. He (Lord Curzon) could not imagine how demilitarisation was possible without inspection. It was surely very inconsistent to ask the Powers of Europe to assume the responsibility of guaranteeing a demilitarised zone and yet to deny them the opportunity of entering it from day to day, from month to month, or from year to year, or of knowing what was going on there. If Turkey were going to approach the Powers in that spirit, she would undoubtedly find great difficulty in getting a favourable reply to her request for a guarantee. Such an attitude taken up by the Turkish delegation was not quite consistent with the report of the sub-commission, which said that while all the signatories had agreed to inspection by officers attached to the Economic Commission, the Turkish delegation had made a reservation to the effect that they would only accept inspection if the zone were placed under the guarantee of the Powers. It was therefore clear that when the Turkish delegates signed the report on the matter, they did not hold the opinion in regard to inspection which Ismet Pasha had just indicated in his speech. He must say, on behalf of the British Government, that they would certainly be most reluctant to assume the responsibility for a demilitarised zone without having every opportunity of knowing what was going on inside it.

M. BARRERE said that he was in entire agreement with Lord Curzon's views. The guarantees asked for by the Turkish delegation were far too grave to be accepted without consulting the Governments concerned. Like Lord Curzon, he thought that it would be better to seek for other forms of neutralisation than that proposed by the Turkish delegation, of such a nature as ultimately to satisfy that delegation. This investigation would in any case be of the greatest interest. Whatever the final decision might be, he wished to put one clear question to the Turkish delegation, and hoped to obtain a clear answer: Were the guarantees which Ismet Pasha had in mind of a military nature?

ISMET PASHA said that for him the point was this: Turkey was asked not to construct fortresses on her frontiers; she agreed, and opened her frontiers. She thus renounced her means of military defence. It was perfectly just that she should claim in return guarantees of the same sort, that is to say, military and political. He thanked Lord Curzon for his readiness to have the question examined further in a broad and conciliatory spirit.

LORD CURZON said that the question would be thoroughly examined later on in conjunction with that of other zones to be demilitarised under the treaty. He proposed that the commission should pass on to discuss the question of a Bulgarian economic outlet on the Ægean Sea

ISMET PASHA observed that in the second part of the sub-commission's report treaties were quoted of which the Turkish delegation were not cognisant. Nevertheless, they accepted some of the ideas contained therein.

1. In connection with the constitution of the proposed commission for the port of Dedeagatch, mention had been made of a treaty between Greece and the Principal Allied Powers on the subject of Western Thrace. That treaty not having been ratified, he asked that the passage alluding to it in the report should be suppressed.

2. The supervision by the Dedeagatch Port Commission over the railway related exclusively to Turkey's intention to facilitate matters, but must not imply any right to intervene in the administration of the railway.

LORD CURZON said that Ismet Pasha had objected to the sub-commission referring in its report to the Thracian Treaty of 1920. Ismet Pasha might not like to admit that he knew anything about this treaty, which had not been ratified; but in point of fact his Excellency knew just as much about it as anyone else in the room. If the sub-commission had not mentioned it in their report, it would have had the effect of making that document almost ridiculous, and he therefore hoped that Ismet Pasha would shut his eyes to the irregularity of which he had complained. Ismet Pasha had said that the report of the sub-commission must not be interpreted as implying any right for the port commission to intervene in the administration of the Dedeagatch railway. He could only assume that Ismet Pasha had not read the report, which spoke at the end of paragraph 2 of "the supervision of the exploitation of the railway running from Dedeagatch to the Bulgarian frontier." It was obvious that the international commission was not going to look after the port only, but also to supervise the management of the railway going to it. He thought it quite impossible to separate the two questions. Of course, the commission to be set up were not going to be so foolish as to attempt to manage the railway themselves.

M. VENISELOS said that the Greek Government would accept the dispositions limiting their sovereignty in so far as the control and exploitation of the railway from the Bulgarian frontier to Dedeagatch were concerned, and would even agree to the direction of the port of Dedeagatch being confided to an international commission. He had himself proposed to the Greek Government that they should accept the setting up of an international commission with full powers for supervising the railway and managing the port; for he knew that without such measures the port would not be really free. The Greek Government had given him full power to accept that solution. He noted with regret that the sub-commission's resolutions did not apparently satisfy the Bulgarian delegates, as was shown by their reservation to the report.

M. NOIKOFF read the following statement in the name of the Bulgarian delegation:

"The Powers' decision to re-establish Turkey in Europe with the frontiers which she possessed before the Treaty of Sèvres of necessity involves a resettlement of the status of Western or Bulgarian Thrace.

"Greece occupied that province in virtue of a mandate from the Principal Allied Powers, to whom the Treaty of Neuilly had obliged Bulgaria to cede the territory comprised between the Mesta, the mountains of Rhodope, the Maritza and the sea. This mandate itself was conferred after the San Remo Conference (April 1920) by a treaty which three months later gave Greece Eastern or Turkish Thrace. If that treaty (that of Sèvres), including its territorial provisions, had not been under consideration, it would be difficult to explain this double transmission of powers, since all the other territorial cessions imposed on Bulgaria were made directly to the neighbouring States, including Greece, without the interposition of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Still less could it be explained when it was realised that Bulgarian authority in Western Thrace had been replaced not only by an Allied military occupation, but also by an inter-Allied civil administration, which had continued for nearly a year and had required considerable local assistance.

"The situation contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres has just undergone a radical change; the Principal Allied Powers have re-established Ottoman sovereignty over all territory to the east of the Maritza; by this act they have implicitly recognised the necessity for a re-examination of the whole Thracian territorial problem.

"Bulgaria, more than any other State, is interested in this settlement, not only as the former sovereign of Western Thrace, but also because she wishes to obtain

effective guarantees of her right to free access to the Ægean, which was recognised by the Powers in article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

"Bulgaria obtained possession of Western Thrace by two treaties which she had to sign as a conquered, isolated and abandoned country: the Treaty of Bucharest of the 10th August, 1913, and the Treaty of Constantinople of the 13th September, 1913.

"While negotiations were proceeding at Bucharest, Greek troops occupied the whole of Western Thrace, and Bulgaria was at the mercy of her enemies; nevertheless, M. Veniselos, Prime Minister and head of the Greek delegation, abandoned without difficulty the first proposals of peace, which he had made under pressure from King Constantine.

"The difference of opinion did not then relate to Dedeagatch and the shores of Thrace, where Bulgaria's claim was not contested; it concerned Kavalla, which M. Veniselos was ready to hand over to Bulgaria, and the Powers at that time advised him to cede it. Despite this, Kavalla was given to Greece and the Græco-Bulgarian frontier fixed at the Mesta, owing to the energetic intervention of the Emperor William II at the instigation of King Constantine.* In return for that service the Emperor William, as will be remembered, demanded on the 4th August, 1914, a proof of gratitude from King Constantine by reminding him, through the Greek Minister at Berlin, that it was 'thanks to the support of His Imperial Majesty that Greece had finally kept Kavalla.'† King Constantine's ambition thus triumphed over the moderation of his Minister.

"M. Veniselos's policy towards Bulgaria was based in 1913, as in 1915, on a reasonable conception of Hellenic interests. In a speech made in the Chamber at Athens on the 15th March, 1913, M. Veniselos declared openly and courageously that he claimed no territory east of the Struma, not because Bulgaria claimed possession of it, but because 'we are forced to this by geographical reasons.' These geographical reasons were so strong that M. Veniselos deliberately refused ever to extend the frontiers of Greece in that direction. 'I would not accept such a frontier, which would involve us in great danger; for if we were to extend our boundaries indefinitely along the coast so as to include all the Greek population in Thrace, Greece would be weaker with such a long spineless strip of territory than if her frontiers were rounded off in another direction.'

"The truth of these remarks and the force of the reasoning used by M. Veniselos are obvious on looking at the map. Western Thrace is, in fact, organically connected with the upper valley of the Maritza, a Bulgarian river, and with the mountains of Rhodope, which the Treaty of Neuilly left to Bulgaria; it is the prolongation and natural terminus of the roads and communications which connect Bulgaria with the sea by the valleys of the Mesta and the Maritza. This is so evident that when, as a result of the war between the Balkan Allies in 1913, Turkey recovered Eastern Thrace (which she had lost by the Treaty of London of the 30th May, 1913), and threatened to divide Southern Bulgaria, she voluntarily consented by the Treaty of Constantinople and by a later convention with Bulgaria to recognise Bulgarian sovereignty in this region, regarding the line of the Maritza as a perfectly secure frontier. This is the same line as that claimed by the National Pact of the Grand Assembly of Angora, beyond which the Turks after their victory in Anatolia did not wish to pass.

"This evidence, based on topography, should render other arguments superfluous. It is, however, striking that so early as 1838, when Bulgaria was only a Turkish province and the Bulgars an oppressed people with no national organisation, a learned foreign traveller (Griesebach) mentioned the mouth of the Maritza as the site for the port of the Bulgaria of the future.

"This port, situated on the left bank of the river and near its mouth, is Dedeagatch.

"Dedeagatch was designed to be the port of all the eastern Balkan peninsula, *i.e.*, of Bulgaria. The railway which connects it with Adrianople, Philippopolis and Jambol—one of the first lines to be constructed in Turkey—was inaugurated in 1872, before the Constantinople line. This indicates the importance which the port was destined to have in the development of relations between overseas countries and what has since become Bulgaria.

* The late King Carol of Roumania said, at an interview on the 22nd March, 1914, in speaking of Kavalla: "I did not insist, because the Emperor of Germany had sent an energetic telegram in King Constantine's favour, and because I knew his wishes in this connection."

† Greek White Book, 1917, No. 19.

"The district of Stara-Zagora and Tirnovo-Seymen in the centre of Southern Bulgaria is nearer to Dedeagatch on the Ægean than to Bourgas on the Black Sea. The railway along the Maritza from this district to Dedeagatch is a much more convenient and less expensive route than that to Bourgas. On the other hand, although the centre of Danubian Bulgaria (the district of Gorna-Grehovitza) is nearer Varna than Dedeagatch, the advantages of direct communication with Dedeagatch and thence with foreign countries are so manifest that they largely compensate the difference in distance.

"Finally, a large portion of Bulgarian exports which are now obliged to go down the Danube for further transport by sea will necessarily be diverted towards Dedeagatch when that port has been constructed and equipped. However, in order to attain its full development this port should be directly connected with the country whose needs it is to serve.

"A great port is not merely a place for loading and unloading goods. It is the centre of import and export trade, and consequently of great economic importance. Its influence extends over all the districts whose products it receives. It is the market where the prices of goods are fixed in accordance with those ruling at their destinations. It is the exchange where business is transacted and transport terms regulated between the producer, the purchaser and the shipper. Law suits and disputes between the parties are heard and settled there. All these complicated operations require chambers and tribunals of commerce, banks, steamship agents, brokers, &c. All these institutions and persons cannot work together for the good of the country served by the port unless their interests coincide with those of the local Government, which must be of the same nationality. A foreign authority and the individuals whom it favours would only seek to subordinate the traffic to their own interests. Dedeagatch as a Bulgarian port will attract two-thirds of the traffic of Bourgas, one-third of that of Varna and a quarter of the traffic on the Danube, and would thus come to deal with 600,000 to 700,000 tons of imports and exports with the prospect of an even greater development later. If, on the other hand, the port is left in its present state, it will languish like a wretched little landing-stage, of no interest to anybody.

"But the point at issue is not merely the future prosperity of a port whose equipment is still inadequate; it is the economic prosperity of the hinterland, which extends as far as the Danube, and even beyond; it is the commercial relations of these naturally rich countries with the Mediterranean basin and all the industrial world to the west.

"Bulgaria, which comprises all the south-eastern part of the Balkans, with a southern frontier only 30 kilom. from the coast in places, is the only country interested in the fitting up of a modern port on the Ægean capable of serving as an *entrepôt* for goods from all Western countries. Greece, on the other hand, possesses too many ports, and would be the last country to incur the enormous expense entailed by the fitting up of Dedeagatch.

"The present frontier between Bulgaria and Greece in Thrace, if maintained, would not only kill the future of this port, but also permanently injure Bulgaria's economic relations with the countries on the Mediterranean and beyond. It would be disastrous to the vital interests of the local population, which deserves all sympathy after its many sufferings. The population of Western Thrace consists of farmers in the plains and artisans or cattle-breeders in the hill country. Each year under Turkish or Bulgarian rule 8,000 to 10,000 men used to go down into the plains to work in the fields or in the manipulation of tobacco; the vast herds, which formed one of the chief riches of the country, also used to leave the hill country at the approach of the bad season and go in hundreds of thousands to spend the winter in the milder climate of the plain. The political frontier of 1920 has put a stop to these movements, causing great uneasiness among the people of both hills and plains.

"Geographical and economic considerations alone are sufficient to justify a change in the present status of Western Thrace; they carry the same conviction as natural phenomena. Ethnical considerations, which cannot be neglected without the risk of perpetuating unrest in the East, also tell against the maintenance of a Greek mandate over the province.

"Western Thrace is inhabited by three main elements: Bulgars, Turks and Greeks plus an insignificant minority of Jews and Armenians. The Bulgars and Turks, who live in the hills and the country as well as in the towns, are farmers and artisans. The Greeks, as is the case throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, live in colonies on the coast and are sailors and fishermen; they rarely work on the land.

and if one sees a village of Greek agriculturalists one can always be sure that they are Bulgars Hellenised by the efforts of the Greek Church. That Church, while planning a Byzantine restoration, has made special endeavours in Thrace to consolidate Hellenic positions, taking great advantage of the privileges accorded to it by the old régime in Turkey.

"However, the resistance of the large, healthy, hard-working Bulgar element was so strong that it succeeded in surviving, despite the double persecution, political and national, to which it was subjected for so many years. On the eve of the Balkan war, the Bulgars formed 41 per cent. of the population in the sandjak of Dedeagatch, and 57 per cent. in that of Gumuldjina, including Mussulman Bulgars or Pomaks. The Greeks, on the other hand, only constituted 27 per cent. and 5 per cent. respectively.

"All the country to the north and north-west of Dedeagatch is essentially Bulgar. Even Greek statistics admit the preponderance of the Bulgar over the Greek element in the old kaza of Dedeagatch, giving 11,358 Bulgars and only 7,371 Greeks. The Bulgarian population is in fact much more numerous and gives to the region between the mountains, the Maritza and the coast its ethnical physiognomy.

"The Treaty of Neuilly deprived Bulgaria of 61 Bulgarian communes in this district, some of which like Golem (Buyouk)-Dervent, Merikos, Doughan Hissar, Monastir, &c., are really small towns. In the town of Dedeagatch itself Bulgarians already owned three-quarters of the land immediately before the Balkan war.

"The Treaty of Neuilly left to Bulgaria part of the mountainous district to the north of Xanthi, Gumuldjina and Dedeagatch, inhabited chiefly by Pomaks, who speak remarkably pure Bulgarian. But in the part first administered by the Allies and subsequently occupied by Greece, the Bulgarian element exceeded the Greek. The census made in March 1920 by the inter-Allied authorities, under conditions specially favourable to Hellenism (it was known that the province was going to be given to Greece, whose troops were already in occupation of the department of Xanthi), gave the following results:—

"Christian Bulgars	69,154	80,893
"Mussulman Bulgars (Pomaks) ...	11,739	
"Turks		73,220
"Greeks		51,706
"Jews		3,000
"Armenians		1,969
"Tsiganes		1,834

"The authenticity of these figures could not be disputed by any of the nationalities concerned. Any other statistics which the Greeks might set against the figures given by the inter-Allied authorities would be tinged with partiality.

"*Conclusion.*

"Geographical, economic and ethnical reasons demand the withdrawal of the provisional mandate from Greece, and the conferring on Western Thrace of a status conforming more closely with the general interests of the peoples of the Balkans and of Europe in general. The political events of the last two years in the Near East strongly confirm this necessity.

"What should the solution be?

"The Bulgarian Government aspires to no territorial expansion and its sole concern is the welfare of the population and the pacification of these troublous regions; it therefore suggested converting the whole of Thrace into an autonomous State—a solution which seemed to it capable of reconciling all the various points of view. Bulgaria would view with sympathy the formation of such a State on her borders. But since the Powers recognised Turkey's right to take back Eastern Thrace up to the line of the Maritza on the west, the aspect of the problem has changed. The Bulgarian Government thus finds itself forced to claim the rights to which it is entitled under article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly. This treaty imposed grievous sacrifices on the Bulgarian nation and crushing burdens on the still young and impoverished Bulgarian State; but it contains the promise of the Great Allied Powers regarding free access to the Ægean. The Bulgarian Government has already had the honour to explain to the Powers several times, notably at the Genoa Conference, that this access will not be effective unless it leads across a territory possessing *at* least an autonomous régime. The Bulgarian

Government, trusting in the wisdom of the three Great Allied and Associated Powers, co-sovereigns in Thrace, thinks that the proposed solution is at present the only one in harmony with the purpose of the conference and the supreme interest of peace."

The Bulgarian delegation reserved the right to present later on its desiderata in regard to refugees and minorities.

LORD CURZON said that a very carefully prepared document setting forth the views of the Bulgarian delegation had been read out, but for the moment the point at issue was the demand made by the Bulgarian delegation in the note annexed to the sub-commissions's report, to the effect that if Dedeagatch was to be of any use to Bulgaria she must have full sovereignty over it, or that there should at least be an autonomous régime there. It would take a long time to discuss this matter, but he wished to make the following observations. The creation of an autonomous area at Dedeagatch or of a Bulgarian property there was never contemplated by the Treaty of Neuilly. Article 48 of that treaty only said: "The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to ensure the economic outlet of Bulgaria to the Ægean Sea." The present meeting was trying to give effect to this undertaking. In the treaty of the 10th August, 1920 (if Ismet Pasha would pardon him for mentioning it), articles 4, 5 and 6 contained detailed provisions whereby Greece undertook to accord a lease in perpetuity of the area required for the service of the port. The case put forward by Bulgaria was therefore an entirely new one, to which he was most reluctant to assent. Further, what was the object of all the arrangements with which the conference was concerned? It was to produce a spirit of reconciliation and peace in those parts of the world. The plans for a railway and separate port were designed for that end. On the other hand, if it were now decided to set up a little Bulgarian enclave in Greek territory, that would be making for friction, trouble and even worse in the future. He would say to the Bulgarian Prime Minister that by the arrangements proposed by the sub-commission, Bulgaria was going to get a great deal—to achieve the object for which she had contended for three years, namely the implementing of the Treaty of Neuilly. The Powers were now doing their best to secure it; he would therefore urge M. Stambouliisky to accept what he was now offered and not to seek the impossible. It was thanks to his (Lord Curzon's) action at Paris in September that the Bulgarian delegation were now afforded the opportunity of stating their case.

M. STAMBOULIISKY said that he was grateful for the benevolent support given him by the Powers. He had ventured to ask for facilities for the Bulgarian economic outlet on the Ægean because the commission had asked him to indicate the conditions necessary for the efficient working of that outlet. He thought that if the land on which the port of Dedeagatch was to be constructed were not confided to an international administration or to the League of Nations, efficient working would be impossible. Bulgaria was asked to consent to the demilitarisation of a zone contiguous to her frontier, for which no provision was made in the Treaty of Neuilly. He thought he could not be refused the right to make observations about a treaty which was not yet ratified.

M. VENISELOS said that the Bulgarian delegation had tried to put him in a false position by stating that he had contradicted himself. In 1912 he had tried to create a Balkan Confederation, and had done everything possible to achieve this end. He had consented, in particular, to the Bulgars obtaining a large portion of Eastern Thrace, Western Thrace, Eastern Macedonia, and even half of Central Macedonia. He had gone so far as to concede that the Bulgars should establish themselves up to 16 kilometres north of Salonica. He had thus abandoned to Bulgaria 1,000,000 Greeks. He had only asked in exchange from Bulgaria some concessions in Western Macedonia for the benefit of the three other allies, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. But Bulgaria did not accept his offer, and that was why the second Balkan war broke out.

Again, although Bulgaria had possessed Western Thrace for several years, she had never thought of creating a port at Dedeagatch. She was then constantly claiming Kavalla. During the Great War he had proposed to the then King of Greece to cede Kavalla to Bulgaria in order to induce the latter to come to the side of the Allies. Bulgaria did not accept this; she sided with the Central Powers of her own free choice

He was surprised that the Bulgarian delegation should now declare that Bulgaria could not utilise the port of Dedeagatch if it were under foreign rule.

Czechoslovakia was a much richer and more important country than Bulgaria—he hoped that the Bulgarian delegation would have no difficulty in recognising this; but she had no port of her own and had to ship her goods through a port belonging to another State. The same was true of Hungary and Poland. Bulgaria, on the other hand, had good ports on the Black Sea. Why could not Bulgarian goods pass through a port under an international control in a foreign country?

The Bulgarian delegation said that Bulgaria needed territory of her own for the concentration of her goods; but the present question was one of transit and reshipment, not of concentration.

Bulgaria's demand seemed all the more strange since she would agree to Dedeagatch belonging not to Greece, but to some other State, for instance, to an autonomous State of Western Thrace, and recognised that in the latter case she could utilise the port.

As regards the demilitarisation of a zone contiguous to the frontier, the Bulgarian delegation said that such a demand entailed a sacrifice for which Bulgaria desired compensation. M. Venizelos observed that there was a counterpart to this demilitarisation, namely, the demilitarisation of the frontiers of Bulgaria's neighbours. As the Bulgarian delegation itself declared, Bulgaria was already partly demilitarised under the Treaty of Neuilly, and therefore the demilitarisation of her neighbours was, if anything, an advantage and a further guarantee of security for her.

The conference had met in order to make peace, and all the delegations, he hoped, were imbued with this desire. Greece, after her defeat by Turkey, had asked M. Venizelos to represent her at the conference; he had accepted that mission, but only on condition that the Greek Government should abandon Eastern Thrace in order to terminate hostilities and comply with the desire of their former Allies. But it was really too much that a third Power, who had not taken part in the last struggle, should consider Greece as beaten by it and demand the cession of part of her territory. Such a demand exceeded all bounds.

M. STAMBOULIISKY regretted that Bulgaria and Greece had respectively changed rôles. The conference had just heard arguments which unfortunately reminded the Bulgarians of their own late rulers, those very politicians who had burdened the present Bulgarian Government with the responsibility incurred through two national disasters. The very purpose of his (M. Stambouliisky's) previous speech was to decline such a responsibility as regards the future. Once more he appealed to new Greece and to the Lausanne Conference to settle definitely the question of Bulgaria's outlet for the sake of peace in the Balkans. M. Venizelos had said that Bulgaria had many other ports; it seemed that this reproach should rather have been addressed to Greece, for it was very easy to count the ports of Bulgaria and difficult to count those of Greece. He repeated that he was a sincere friend of peace in the Balkans, and that was why he had insisted so strongly that the question should at last be happily and satisfactorily solved. Finally, if he might say so, the tone in which M. Venizelos had spoken seemed to prove in advance that he (M. Stambouliisky) might have some legitimate doubt regarding the efficacy of a Bulgarian outlet on the Ægean so long as the existing circumstances and régime continued.

ISMET PASHA said that Bulgaria was right in wishing to profit to the greatest possible extent by the port of Dedeagatch. The only thing which had prevented Bulgaria from utilising and improving the port had been the useless prolongation of the war by Greece. He recognised that Greece had also caused much suffering to Bulgaria. He felt obliged for conscience's sake to add this to his previous remarks.

M. VENIZELOS protested against the reproach made against him by the Bulgarian delegate of having spoken with passion. His tone had perhaps been rather vivacious, but he had spoken without any animosity.

LORD CURZON said that during the exchange of fraternal embraces which had just been witnessed the commission had rather forgotten the report before them. The greater part of the report was apparently accepted, but one important point had been reserved by the Turkish delegation, namely, their suggestion that the demilitarised zone should also be neutralised. That point could be held over for a more opportune moment when other demilitarised zones would be under consideration. Further, he understood that the intention of the Bulgarian delegation was merely to place their views before the conference regarding the best

way in which arrangements could be made for providing access for Bulgaria to the Ægean. It remained only for the conference to take note of the report of the sub-commission. He proposed to resume on the following day the general question of frontiers, and to pass on to other questions as soon as the discussion on the frontiers of Thrace was completed.

ISMET PASHA reserved the right to reply next day to the further remarks of M. Venizelos.

(The commission rose at 6·50 P.M.)

ANNEX A.

Rapport de la Sous-Commission constituée par la première Commission pour Etudier:*

1. LES conditions dans lesquelles peut être organisée une zone démilitarisée de part et d'autre de la frontière de la Thrace orientale;

2. Les dispositions à adopter pour assurer à la Bulgarie un libre débouché à la mer Egée.

Le présent rapport comporte deux parties:

La première comprend les questions d'ordre militaire.

Le deuxième comprend les questions d'ordre économique.

Le Président de la Sous-Commission,
WEYGAND.

Le 24 *novembre* 1922.

PREMIÈRE PARTIE.

Questions militaires (Zone démilitarisée).

1. Il a paru nécessaire de définir tout d'abord ce que l'on doit entendre par zone démilitarisée.

Il faut entendre par zone "démilitarisée" une étendue de territoire dans laquelle, en vue d'éviter les causes de conflit:

(*a.*) Ne doit exister aucune organisation offensive ou défensive, c'est-à-dire aucun ouvrage de fortification, permanente ou de campagne, aucun arsenal, dépôt de munitions ou de matériel de guerre, en général toute installation à but militaire;

(*b.*) Ne doit stationner ou se mouvoir aucune force armée en dehors des éléments spéciaux nécessaires pour assurer l'ordre intérieur et la surveillance des frontières tels que (gendarmerie, police, douanes, gardes frontières) dont les effectifs et l'armement seront limités.

La délégation turque, en approuvant cette définition, a fait toutefois la réserve suivante: elle estime que la démilitarisation ainsi définie ne comporte pas pour la Turquie de garanties suffisantes.

La délégation turque fait observer en particulier qu'à l'obligation qui lui serait imposée de supprimer la place forte d'Andrinople ne correspondrait aucune contre-partie de même ordre pour les Grecs et pour les Bulgares.

Elle demande, en conséquence, que la zone démilitarisée soit déclarée neutre et que l'inviolabilité de cette zone soit placée sous la garantie collective et séparée des Puissances signataires. La délégation grecque s'associe à cette demande.

2. L'étendue de la zone démilitarisée devra être telle que sa largeur soit supérieure à une journée de marche des troupes et à la portée de l'artillerie moyenne. Ces considérations amènent à proposer une étendue de 30 kilom. environ de part et d'autre de la frontière. La carte ci-jointe† porte à titre d'exemple le tracé d'une zone démilitarisée ainsi déterminée en prenant pour base la frontière du Traité de Neuilly de la mer Noire à la Maritza puis le cours de la Maritza jusqu'à la mer Egée.

* L'Annexe I donne la liste des délégués des différentes Puissances à la sous-commission, qui a désigné comme président le Général Weygand.

La sous-commission a estimé nécessaire d'inviter la délégation bulgare à participer à cette étude.

† Not reproduced.

La démarcation exacte des limites de cette zone serait à déterminer de façon plus précise sur la carte une fois le principe adopté.

Il a été admis à la demande de la délégation turque que, si la frontière était reportée plus à l'ouest, la zone démilitarisée le serait d'autant.

En outre, la délégation turque a fait la réserve suivante: son adhésion de principe au mode de détermination de l'étendue de la zone démilitarisée n'implique pas l'abandon du point de vue exposé par le premier délégué turc sur les frontières revendiquées par la Turquie, en particulier en ce qui concerne le territoire cédé à la Bulgarie par le Traité de Neuilly, cession qui n'est pas reconnue valable par la Turquie.

D'autre part, le délégué turc a fait encore la réserve suivante: la participation du délégué grec à cette discussion n'implique pas que le délégué turc accepte l'attribution à la Grèce de la Thrace occidentale.

Bien que le Traité de Neuilly ne comporte pour la Bulgarie aucune obligation de démilitariser une partie de son territoire, le délégué bulgare, dans l'intérêt de la paix, a donné son adhésion à ce projet, qui devra, semble-t-il, faire l'objet d'un protocole spécial en ce qui concerne la Bulgarie.

3. Tous les ouvrages de fortification permanante ou de campagne actuellement existants dans cette zone devront être désarmés et démantelés par les différentes Puissances intéressées sur leurs territoires respectifs. Il n'y sera construit aucun nouvel ouvrage de ce genre ni organisé aucun dépôt d'armes ou de matériel de guerre offensif d'ordre militaire naval ou néronautique.

4. Les seules forces dont le stationnement et le mouvement sont autorisés dans cette zone (telles que les forces de gendarmerie, de police, de douaniers, de gardes frontières) auront un effectif maximum déterminé en tenant compte de la superficie et de la population des territoires démilitarisés, des grands centres habités qu'ils contiennent, de l'étendue des frontières et du caractère du terrain.

D'après ces considérations, l'effectif maximum proposé est:

(*a.*) Dans la zone démilitarisée du territoire turc, de 5,000 hommes au total.
(*b.*) Dans la zone démilitarisée du territoire bulgare, de 2,500* hommes au total.
(*c.*) Dans la zone démilitarisée du territoire grec, de 2,500 hommes au total

L'armement de ces forces ne comprendra que le revolver, le sabre, le fusil et quatre fusils mitrailleurs par cent hommes,† à l'exclusion de toute artillerie.

Ces forces ne devront comprendre aucun élément d'aviation.

Le survol de la zone démilitarisée par des avions militaires devra être interdit.

Nota.- En ce qui concerne les mitrailleuses, l'avis de la majorité de la sous-commission est de les supprimer totalement. Le délégué turc "estime, en raison de l'insécurité de la frontière et des territoires neutralisés, nécessaire d'accorder deux mitrailleuses par 1,000 hommes."

L'exécution et la surveillance des mesures ci-dessus exposées seront assurées par l'adjonction à la Commission économique dont l'organisation est prévue à la deuxième partie ci-après, d'officiers qui en seront spécialement chargés.

La délégation turque déclare ne se rallier au principe de la surveillance qu'à la condition que soit admis le principe d'une zone neutre dont l'inviolabilité serait placé sous la garantie collective et séparée des Puissances signataires.

Deuxième Partie.

Questions économiques.

En ce qui concerne le débouché économique de la Bulgarie à la mer Egée, la sous-commission émet l'avis suivant:

En vue de réaliser les débouchés économiques à la mer Egée promis à la Bulgarie par l'article 48 du Traité de Neuilly et d'en assurer la liberté, une commission internationale devrait être constituée laquelle aurait les pouvoirs les plus étendus pour

* Voir le renvoi au paragraphe suivant

† Il est entendu que ces dispositions n'auraient pour effet d'augmenter ni les effectifs prévus pour les catégories mentionnées à l'article 162 du Traité de Neuilly, ni l'armement prévu pour ces effectifs.

Etant donné que l'armée bulgare ne possède pas de fusils mitrailleurs, la Bulgarie devra être autorisée à se procurer les fusils mitrailleurs nécessaires

entreprendre, par tous les moyens qu'elle jugerait nécessaires, la construction et l'équipement à Dédéagatch ou dans ses environs d'un port franc ouvert au commerce de toutes les nations.

Cette commission assurerait également, en s'inspirant, s'il y a lieu, des dispositions prévues par le traité du 10 août* relatif à la Thrace et des autres dispositions analogues la direction, l'administration, l'exploitation et l'amélioration progressive de ce port et de ses annexes ainsi que la surveillance de l'exploitation du chemin de fer allant de Dédéagatch jusqu'à la frontière bulgare.

L'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie, la Bulgarie, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'Etat serbe-croate-slovène et la Turquie devraient avoir chacun un représentant dans cette commission.

La présidence serait exercée à tour de rôle par les représentants des trois premières Puissances énumérées.

La commission établirait son propre règlement.

Annex B.

Note by the Bulgarian Technical Delegation.

DANS la "sous-sous"-commission, le délégué technique bulgare a exposé les motifs d'ordre purement technique et économique, en vertu desquels le régime prévu par la formule discutée par la "sous-sous"-commission le 24 novembre: "Dans le but de réaliser et garantir la liberté des débouchés économiques à la mer Egée promise à la Bulgarie par l'article 48 du Traité de Neuilly . . . .," n'assure aucunement à la Bulgarie la possibilité d'entretenir un commerce libre avec les Etats d'outre-mer.

Ce n'est que par la possession directe du territoire, avoisinant le chemin de fer et le port, ou par l'assujettissement de ce même territoire à un régime pleinement autonome, qui serait économiquement lié à la Bulgarie par des stipulations spéciales, que le port de Dédéagatch pourra être construit, aménagé et exploité en concordance avec les intérêts économiques de la Bulgarie.

Délégation technique bulgare,
Le 24 novembre 1922.

No. 773.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 770.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 13, 1922.

IN the course of conversation with reliable American journalist Refet Pasha stated that Ismet Pasha, in the event of adjournment of conference being proposed prior to signature of definite agreement, had been instructed to demand as condition of adjournment:—

(*a.*) Immediate demobilisation of Greek army in Thrace; and
(*b.*) Immediate evacuation of Constantinople by Allied forces.

Reason of these demands, according to Refet, was that Turkey must have definite guarantee that peace would result from conference, since she could not, in her present financial situation, retain her army mobilised indefinitely.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 70.)

No. 774.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December* 12, 1922.

TEXT of my speech this afternoon introducing question of minorities has, I believe, been telegraphed to English press. Upon entering room, Turkish secretary asked me privately to excuse Turks from delivering an immediate reply, to which I

* Traité signé par les principales Puissances alliées et la Grèce et non ratifié.

readily assented. Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha produced a paper, and for over an hour read a dissertation, probably dictated beforehand at Angora, which contained—

1. A lengthy travesty of bygone history;
2. Quotations from innumerable authorities of every nationality who had ever said anything favourable to Turkish rule; and
3. A statement of views of Turkish Government full of contempt and hostility towards Armenia, disparagement of League of Nations, and refusal to allow that there was any minority question that required to be dealt with otherwise than by expulsion of Christian populations and by ordinary Turkish law.

I expressed my profound disappointment and regrets at this exhibition, which, if at all fully reported in press, will produce lamentable impression throughout the world. I added that if this were real view of Turkish Government it would be useless to set up sub-committee which I had proposed in order to pursue matter in detail, but that I would adjourn until 11 to-morrow to permit of Turks preparing a considered reply to my proposals. In the course of discussion, these were unanimously and warmly supported by French, Italian, American, Greek and Serbian delegates, and Turks found themselves not only isolated, but hopelessly in the wrong. It was their first big blunder since tactical mistakes of opening days, and can only be explained either by orders from Angora, or by Russian pressure, or by complete obliquity of mental vision. If they adopt a similar attitude to-morrow they will have to be told that it is useless to proceed with conference; and should a rupture come on these grounds, there would not be a voice raised in their defence in the world.

I warned Ismet Pasha afterwards that if he did not completely change his attitude disaster was inevitable.

No. 775.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 13, 1922.*

THIS morning Ismet Pasha delivered his reply to my speech yesterday about minorities. It was scarcely more satisfactory than its predecessor. As to Armenians, they would live fraternally and harmoniously with the Turks in future and require no protection. A national home was out of the question, since it would involve dismemberment of Turkey and was inconsistent with independent sovereignty. League of Nations, which he had derided yesterday, he now said was regarded by Turkey with respect, but there was no hint of co-operation. He altogether rejected the idea of an independent body or organisation to supervise minority protection in future. He was prepared to consider an amnesty, but absolutely refused to commute military service, although, as I pointed out, Turks are levying such a tax at this moment upon Greeks in Constantinople. As to special guarantees, analogous or superior to those contained in minority clauses of European treaties, he ignored them altogether.

I then delivered much the most serious speech that I have made in this conference. Turkey, I said, if she persisted in this attitude, would set against herself public opinion of the world. No one wanted to infringe her sovereign independence. But this fetish could not be invoked to resist every reasonable proposal of guarantee. Turkey must make up her mind definitely whether she proposes to utilise and appeal to League of Nations or not. Decision could not be in suspense. Allies had spent three weeks in trying to throw down barriers to peace. Every day Turkey persisted in erecting new ones. This could not go on. Neither I nor Allies were prepared to sit indefinitely at Lausanne while this process was repeated on every subject. If Turkey chose to break on question of minorities not a voice would be raised anywhere in her defence. I concluded by warning Ismet Pasha that critical moment had arrived and that we must advance or separate. He will reply to-morrow.

No. 776.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 13, 1922.*

REPEAT following to Jeddah, No. 39:—

"Ex-Sultan's visit to Mecca.

"Ex-Sultan of Turkey having expressed desire to visit Mecca, arrangements have been made for his conveyance to Suez in British man-of-war to enable him to catch Khedivial liner leaving there 11th January for Jeddah.

"We do not wish to interfere in arrangements made by King Hussein for ex-Sultan's reception, but should be glad to feel that no hitch will occur on ex-Sultan's arrival.

"Please enquire and telegraph."

Ex-Sultan will reach Port Said in H.M.S. "Ajax," and will be conveyed through Suez Canal in H.M.S. "Clematis."

No. 777.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 771.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 14, 1922.*

AT meeting with High Commissioners yesterday Refet Pasha expressed apprehension at possible consequences of any adjournment of Lausanne Conference. I told him that I did not contemplate any interruption in labours of conference, though I anticipated that once agreement on general principles was reached chief plenipotentiaries would leave Lausanne while experts were working out details.

He appeared somewhat reassured, but I think that Turkish peace party is genuinely alarmed lest any break in continuity of conference occur on account of its possible effect on impatience of Turkish army, which is, I believe, suffering considerably from climatic discomforts, inadequate supplies, and which demands to be either demobilised or allowed to advance on Constantinople.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 71.)

No. 778.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 38) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office: Received December 14.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 60 and 62.

Matter has been discussed by Sir H. Rumbold with American, French and Italian High Commissioners. Sir H. Rumbold stated that I was prepared, if necessary, to authorise protection of British companies by use of force in Constantinople if Turks close offices of those companies. Other High Commissioners were unwilling to contemplate above procedure at present juncture, though they did not preclude possibility of having recourse to it in the last resort if other steps failed.

High Commissioners decided to ask three presidents of conference to address to Ismet note, substance of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. American High Commissioner promised that American delegation would associate itself in some manner with this note.

You should address a similar communication to Refet when your colleagues are instructed.

No. 779.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 13, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is substance of note referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"Principal delegates of Great Britain, France and Italy learn that Turkish authorities in Constantinople have invited foreign companies there to register themselves at Commissariat of National Economy before 1st January, failing which they will no longer be recognised.

"Delegates point out that law invoked formed subject of conversations before the war between Turkish Government and Embassies, but that these conversations were inconclusive. Status of foreign companies in Turkey is now under consideration at conference, and delegates cannot admit question under deliberation here should be settled in fact and unilaterally by Turkish Government before conference has taken decision.

"Delegates therefore request Ismet Pasha to cause instructions to be issued to Constantinople authorities to suspend application of law."

No. 780.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December 14, 1922.*

PROLONGED discussions between Allied and Turkish military and naval experts have been proceeding for some days. Former have now agreed upon a plan which is to be submitted to Turks to-morrow. It provides for demilitarisation of reduced zones on each side of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, as well as of islands at entrance to former and in the Sea of Marmora, and for Turkish liberty to fortify southern shore of the latter, but absolute prohibition of all military works on the northern shore, passage free from gun-fire being thus assured. We propose to insist upon inspection of demilitarised zones both in above areas and in Thrace, but shall encounter great difficulty with Turks.

A question has now arisen on which I must seek instructions from Cabinet. French military and naval advisers, claiming that they were acting on authority of their Government, told Ismet Pasha that Allies were not going to put any naval or military clauses into the treaty, or, in other words, that Turkey may have such navy and naval establishments and armament as she pleases, and that there will be no limit to her army except in Thrace and Constantinople, which it is proposed to deal with in connection with demilitarisation clauses, and no prohibition of conscription. I have thus been placed in a situation of great embarrassment, inasmuch as these declarations neither conform entirely to my own sentiments nor to any instructions that I have hitherto received from His Majesty's Government. As regards navy, I realise that it is unnecessary and therefore unwise to insist on restrictions, mainly because Turks will not have money to build a fleet. But I should like to press, at this stage, for a limitation of submarines, even if I have to abandon claim later on in the process of bargaining that will probably ensue. I shall, of course, claim surrender of the "Goeben." As regards army, abandonment of all military clauses will mean two things: (*a*) acceptance of conscription; (*b*) possible creation of a large Turkish army in Asia Minor. Concerning conscription, I have argued difficulty and danger of conceding to Turkey what we have refused to Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria and Germany. To this my military advisers replied that any insistence upon voluntary service will be absolutely rejected by Turks, and will be entirely inopportune, since any form of inspection or control in Asia Minor is out of the question. I cannot resist this argument, and am disposed to give way while endeavouring, in minority clauses of treaty, to secure exemption by compounding for minorities in Asia Minor. As to future Turkish army in Anatolia, while I realise

that this may be a danger to Mesopotamia I do not see how any provisions in treaty could prevent it. I see no alternative therefore, case having been in main given away, but to acquiesce in abandonment of military clauses, European army of Turkey being limited in manner already suggested on lines originally proposed by Marshal Foch. I should be glad, however, to know that in taking this line I shall have the support of His Majesty's Government.

No. 781.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 14, 1922.*

CONFERENCE resumed this morning to hear reply of Ismet to my speech of yesterday. This had produced startling effect upon the Turks, who had been closeted the entire afternoon, declining to see anyone until they had prepared their answer. This was in a very different tone from previous Turkish performances. For not only did it reveal a conciliatory attitude as regards minorities, but it contained salutary and unexpected announcement that Turkey is prepared to join the League of Nations on the conclusion of peace. When we contrast this announcement with the captious and hostile utterances of two days earlier, I cannot doubt that my threat to leave Lausanne brought them to the ground. Ismet also reiterated firm desire of his delegation to conclude peace. I warmly welcomed Ismet's declaration and stated the nature of the problem to be investigated by sub-committee, which thereupon commenced its labours.

Outlook is therefore more promising.

As soon as I receive views of the Cabinet I will take military and naval questions and endeavour to finish the Straits.

No. 782.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 603.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 14, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 766 of 12th December: Return of British subjects to Smyrna.

Presence of British subjects at Smyrna would enable Turks at any moment to embarrass negotiations by making hostages. We consider it most desirable to maintain prohibition against British subjects proceeding there.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 603; repeated to Lausanne, No. 80.)

No. 783.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).**

[By Bag.]

(No. 454.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 14, 1922.*

AMEER of Afghanistan has sent a message to the King requesting that British representatives at Lausanne Conference may be instructed to give equitable consideration to Turkish problem, which is concerned with the general peace of all Moslems. Reply is being made in sense that His Majesty is fully sensible of concern of Moslems in this question and that his Ministers are sedulously striving for an equitable and lasting solution.

Above for your guidance as it appears that a similar message may be addressed to President of French Republic and King of Italy.

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* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 413.

No. 784.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 15, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 118 of 14th December.

Cabinet Ministers are unanimous in considering that, in the situation you describe, you must clearly be the best judge of the conditions which we can hope to impose on the Turks in regard to the naval and military clauses generally and which they could be relied upon to observe. The Cabinet quite approve of your dealing with them on the lines which you suggest.

[E 14101/13003/44] No. 785.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

FIRST (TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY) COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, November 25, 1922, at 11 A.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 16.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Nincic.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Vitale.
Major-General Burnett-Stuart.	General Weygand.	M. Guarnaschelli.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Laroche.	
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. Bargeton.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Corbin.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. de Percin	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Barois.	
Mr. McClure.	Commandant de Lamoricière.	
	Lieut-Colonel Courtin.	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Sato.	Gen. Mazarakis.
	Col. Saigo.	M. Dendramis.
	Captain Tsuru.	M. Michalopoulos.
	Mr. Tani.	
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
Col. Dumitresco.	M. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Antich.	Moukhtar Bey.
		Tevfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Wicks.		M. Indelli.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

Frontiers of Thrace (continued).

LORD CURZON invited the Turkish delegation to open the discussion.

ISMET PASHA said that in spite of his great desire not to revert to questions already examined by the conference, he could not let pass without reply the observations of M. Veniselos in regard to the statement made by the Turkish delegation at the meeting of the 23rd November (see F.C. 3 and 4).

M. Veniselos had first of all endeavoured to throw the whole responsibility for the war on Turkey, and to absolve Greece entirely; he had then, in his speech of the 23rd November, sought to lay that responsibility on both countries. In support of his statements, M. Veniselos said that in 1921 M. Gounaris, in a private interview with Lord Curzon, agreed to evacuate Anatolia on condition that Greece kept Eastern Thrace; but the knowledge that Turkey did not intend to renounce Thrace had prevented the evacuation of Anatolia and consequently the restoration of peace. In reply to this argument Ismet Pasha said that as the legality of Turkey's claims on Eastern Thrace was not contested by anybody, the act of linking up the conclusion of peace with Turkey's consent to abandon her rights left the whole responsibility for continuing the war with the party which, contrary to justice, desired to keep Eastern Thrace under its domination. It was also a matter of public knowledge that Greece, by not replying to the note of the 26th March of the Allied Powers and by not spontaneously evacuating Asia Minor, had been the cause of that evacuation taking place under the pressure of the Turkish armies. Apart from that, Turkey had never had cognisance of the private conversation mentioned by M. Veniselos, and no proposal of that kind had been made to her. The fact cited by the Greek delegation could not therefore in any way lessen the responsibility of Greece in this war.

As M. Veniselos had once more stated that the fate of "inter-Allied" Thrace had been settled by the Treaty of Neuilly, he (Ismet Pasha) felt obliged to repeat that that treaty had left the fate of this country in suspense, and that the Great Powers, who at the time when the Treaty of Neuilly was concluded had doubtless taken into consideration the existence of a Turkish majority in the population, had postponed their decision on this subject until the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The Powers, it is true, wished later on to transfer "inter-Allied" Thrace to Greece by treaty; but as peace could not be effectively concluded with Turkey at the time when this treaty was signed, the same Powers, acting from a high sense of justice, had abstained from ratifying it.

This treaty having remained incomplete from the point of view of the Allies, who, on grounds of equity, had been unwilling to give it a definitive form, it could not, of course, be used as an argument against the Turkish case nor be invoked by Greece as proof that the question was already settled. He had, moreover, shown that Turkey had the right to participate in settling the fate of this country, where the Turks were in a majority according to M. Veniselos's own statistics. He was glad to take note of M. Veniselos's declaration regarding the existence of a Turkish majority in Western Thrace. He must also add that the arrival of emigrants in a country could not and should not influence the determination of its fate, which must in all justice depend solely on the freely expressed will of its former inhabitants.

The last statements of M. Veniselos were, moreover, confirmed by the statistics in the memorandum which M. Veniselos himself presented to the Allied Powers on the 30th December, 1918. He (Ismet Pasha) would quote them once more :—

	Turks.	Greeks.	Bulgars.
Dedeagatch	10,670	7,371	11,358
Sofoulou	32,140	17,880	5,380
Gumuldjina	50,000	9,160	10,550
Xanthi	22,000	10,275	1,695
	114,810	44,686	28,983

Thus M. Veniselos himself recognised not only that the Turks had a majority as compared with the Greeks, but also that their number far exceeded that of all the other ethnical elements combined.

M. Veniselos had spoken of the good treatment which the Turks had enjoyed under the Greek administration. Ismet Pasha reserved this question for detailed treatment later on; for the moment he would content himself with saying that M. Veniselos's statements were not borne out by the presence in Constantinople, up till quite recently, of 200,000 Turkish refugees drawn from all the districts occupied by the Greeks, whose terrible misery had been verified by both Allied and neutral persons.

The statistics taken from the Year Book of the Vilayet of Adrianople for 1902, which M. Veniselos had quoted, only confirmed the existence of an overwhelming Turkish majority in the two Thraces. He ventured to recall the figures :—

I.—Eastern Thrace.

	Mussulmans.	Greeks.
Kaza of—		
Adrianople	44,491	28,749
Djessri Moustafa Pacha ...	10,432	4,325
Kirdja-Ali	37,388	102
Ortakeuy	16,692	11,062
Dimetoka	8,499	19,045
Djessri Erguene ...	16,959	18,063
Havza	8,278	6,411
Total ...	142,739	87,657

142,739 Turks against 87,657 Greeks.

II.—Western Thrace.

	Mussulmans.	Greeks.
Kaza of—		
Gumuldjina	53,740	8,994
Eghri-Déré	38,086	...
Dari-Déré	21,151	...
Sultan-Yéri	41,366	...
Iskétché	25,368	3,126
Ali Tchélébi	21,857	1,223
Dedeagatch	14,241	7,096
Sofoulou	38,991	22,573*
Enos	3,561	4,484
Total ...	253,361	47,506

253,361 Turks against 47,506 Greeks.

It was desirable to examine more particularly the two districts whose fate was now under discussion, namely, the territory to the west of the Maritza, which formed

* All non-Mussulmans included.

part of Turkey until 1915, and inter-Allied Thrace. The figures of the Year Book were for the first district :—

	Mussulmans.	Greeks.
Djessri Moustafa Pacha ...	10,432	4,325
Ortakeuy and Seymenli ...	16,692	11,062
Dimetoka	8,499	19,045
Total ...	35,623	34,432

35,623 Mussulmans against 34,432 Greeks.

For the second district there were :—

	Mussulmans.	Greeks.
Gumuldjina	53,740	8,994
Xanthi	25,368	3,136
Dedeagatch	14,241	7,096
Sofoulou	33,991	22,573*
Total ...	127,340	41,799

127,340 Mussulmans against 41,799 Greeks.

Thus M. Veniselos could not even claim in his favour the old statistics which he had quoted, and the majority of the population was Turkish in both districts.

He had one important observation to make in regard to the statistics drawn up in Turkey, which applied both to the figures given in his own present statement and to the figures which he had laid before the commission at the last meeting.

It was an established custom in the East to define nationality according to religion, so all Orthodox persons spiritually dependent on the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople were considered as Greeks, which increased the number of the latter in all the statistics. One must therefore deduct from the number of Greeks given both by M. Veniselos and by himself persons belonging to other races, such as Orthodox Albanians, who only spoke Albanian and Turkish, and the Gagavouz, who were Turcomans settled in Thrace long before the arrival of the Ottoman Turks, converted to the Orthodox faith, and speaking Turkish only.

Taking these considerations into account, the number of 33,910 Greeks (which he had already mentioned to the Commission when speaking of the population of inter-Allied Thrace) would be reduced by one-half; and the same deduction should be made for all the so-called Greek population of Thrace.

M. Veniselos had then spoken of the generosity of the Turks and of their solicitude for the Greek emigrants, going so far as to offer them their houses. While recognising the great value of this testimony to the Turkish character, he must say (and nobody would deny) that the Turks in the regions subjected to Greek rule or occupation had been expelled from their homes, and Greeks had settled in their place. These acts of violence could not be interpreted as implying consent on the part of the Turks.

M. Veniselos had also said that the attribution of the districts in dispute was not a question of majority or minority, but a question already settled by treaties. While noting that M. Veniselos had once more recognised the existence of a Turkish majority in these two districts, and while maintaining his view as already expressed on the treaties relating to Thrace, he wished to remark that it was difficult to reconcile the democratic principles invoked by M. Veniselos with his opposition to a plesbiscite, the purpose of which would be to allow the inhabitants of Western Thrace to express their will as regards the destiny of their country in accordance with the right of self-determination.

The comparison made by M. Veniselos between Fiume and Adrianople was in no way justified. In the first case, the question was one of an outlet only; in the second case, it was proposed to deprive a town of its suburb and its railway station without any reason.

M. Veniselos had admitted that the Greek army during its withdrawal had burned and destroyed villages, but only those on its line of retreat. While taking note of this statement, Ismet Pasha said it was obvious that an army extending over a front several hundred kilometres long could not retire along one road only. The Greek army must therefore have retreated along several lines, and it had

* Including all non-Mussulmans.

destroyed all the towns and villages within its course. He observed in this connection that the devastations committed by the Greeks were not confined to those effected during their retreat. A large part of the destruction was prior to the last offensive.

Ismet Pasha believed that the explanations which he had just given answered all the points made by M. Veniselos, and furnished fresh proof of Turkey's right to claim the frontier of 1913 for Eastern Thrace. He hoped that his explanations would assist the conference to take a just and equitable decision.

M. VENISELOS felt it necessary to reply to some of Ismet Pasha's statements. According to the latter, M. Veniselos had stated that the Turks formed the great majority of the population in Western Thrace. What M. Veniselos had really said was that if one included in the denomination "Western Thrace" the districts which remained Bulgarian after the Treaty of Neuilly, the preponderance of the Turkish population would be considerable; but if one only included the part of Western Thrace assigned to Greece in consequence of the Treaty of Neuilly, then the Turkish population represented scarcely half the total population. M. Veniselos maintained this statement in connection with the plebiscite demanded by the Turkish delegation. It was true that democratic principles inclined him to recognise the right of self-determination; but it must be admitted that this right was not the only factor to be considered in deciding the attribution of districts inhabited by mixed populations. Between two Governments disputing the possession of such territory, the preference should go to the Government which had proved its superior administrative capacity.

M. Veniselos also insisted on the fact that in 1913, before the European war, Turkey had renounced all rights over Western Thrace; in 1915 she had gone still further and renounced the enclave on the right bank of the Maritza which she had previously retained.

In these conditions it seemed difficult to allow the Turkish Government to go back upon the decision already taken by it in regard to this enclave.

Ismet Pasha had spoken of 200,000 Turks from the territories possessed by Greece who had taken refuge at Constantinople. M. Veniselos replied that even if this statement were correct, these refugees had certainly come from districts where military operations were in progress, not from districts administered by Greece. Even at Smyrna, ten days after the establishment of the Greek administration in 1919, not a single Turk had emigrated. Moreover, there were among the Constantinople refugees, people who came from the regions occupied by the Turkish troops, probably because they believed that the Greek army would push the operations as far as those regions.

The question of excesses which the Greek army was said to have committed in Asia Minor in the course of its retreat would be dealt with in a later discussion and M. Veniselos reserved the right to explain then his point of view regarding the situation of the Greek army at that time.

ISMET PASHA said that the statistics which he had supplied to the conference in regard to Western Thrace concerned not the districts which had passed under Bulgarian domination, but those which had remained in Greek occupation. The Turkish majority in both parts of Western Thrace was incontestable, as shown by M. Veniselos's own statistics. He took note of M. Veniselos's statement regarding the generous welcome given by the Mussulmans of Western Thrace to the Greek refugees, but he maintained his declaration regarding the bad treatment previously undergone by the Turks of these districts, who had been obliged to flee from Greek oppression. The Turkish refugees had unanimously described the administrative régime of Greece as a scourge.

M. NINCIC did not wish to discuss the attitude of the Greek and Turkish authorities in the territories respectively administered by them, but he felt bound to thank Ismet Pasha for the extremely courteous tone in which he had spoken.

As regards Western Thrace, he thought it undesirable to decide solely according to statistics, because in many modern States it was in fact the minorities who governed: the important point was to secure the necessary guarantees for the minorities. The point of view of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation was as follows: if in consequence of a plebiscite Western Thrace was constituted as an autonomous district, that would, without any doubt, cause grave trouble in the Balkans. It was indispensable that the fate of this province should not remain in suspense and that everybody should know to whom it was going to belong. He was so thoroughly convinced that this point of view was right that when there had been a question of

making Eastern Thrace an autonomous district, at the beginning of the negotiations for the settlement of Eastern affairs, he had employed the same arguments as those which he now used, and had succeeded in convincing all those who had favoured this scheme. He had constantly expressed the view that it was better for Eastern Thrace to be Turkish than autonomous. The creation of an autonomous province in the Balkans could only result in compromising the peace.

As regards the region of Demotika, he wished to reply to the two arguments of the Turkish delegation. Firstly, Ismet Pasha had said that the Angora Government had never accepted the line of the Maritza as the frontier of Turkey; and secondly, that the district of Demotika had never been legally ceded by Turkey, because the Turkish Parliament had never ratified the Treaty of 1915. On the first point, M. Nincic thought that the Angora Government had definitely agreed to the line of the Maritza forming the Turkish frontier; the truth of this was shown by the note of the 4th October, in which the Turkish Government noted with satisfaction that the Powers recognised the right of Turkey to possess Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza, including Adrianople. On the second point, the Turkish delegation argued that the Treaty of 1915 was invalid because the cession of territory then made to Bulgaria had not been voluntary nor duly recognised, the Turkish Parliament not having ratified it. M. Nincic thought it necessary to ask what pressure of events induced the then Turkish Government to make that cession? The issue was nothing less than prevailing on Bulgaria to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers; and the Turkish Government certainly hoped to obtain through this intervention ulterior advantages, at least equivalent to those which they were conceding to Bulgaria. It was therefore fair to say that the Turkish Government of 1915 acted as it did, not in consequence of any pressure, but of a calculation of its own interests. As for the argument that the Convention of 1915 had not been ratified and therefore could not be valid, that was simply a Turkish internal affair. What interested the Powers was that the Turkish Parliament did not at the time manifest any disapproval towards the Government which had just signed the Convention, and that Government was not driven out. On the contrary, the Turkish Government had regarded this treaty as perfectly valid and had consented to the immediate occupation of the ceded territory by Bulgaria.

One might well wonder whether, in the event of the Central Powers having won the war, Turkey would have thought herself entitled to claim the restoration of this province by Bulgaria on the pretext that the Treaty of 1915 had not been ratified. M. Nincic only put this question in the most conciliatory spirit, and believed it to be his duty to draw the very serious attention of the Turkish delegation to the desirability, in their own interest, of not insisting too much on this demand.

LORD CURZON said that perhaps the time had come when he would be expected to say a few words from the chair. All would agree that there had been a very useful discussion, conducted mostly by experts, in a spirit of moderation and conciliation. There had no doubt been occasional breezes, but most of the discussion had taken place in an atmosphere of complete tranquillity. He was now about to speak, as on previous occasions, for the whole of the Allies, who were unanimous upon the issues laid before the delegates.

Ismet Pasha, at the end of his speech, had pointed out that there was a difference between the Turkish claims for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, and for territory to the west of the Maritza. Western Thrace Turkey did not claim for herself, although she made certain proposals, but the latter she did claim.

Western Thrace was an area which had ceased to be Turkish since 1913. It had then been ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria, as the result of one of the Balkan wars, by a treaty which was valid, had been ratified, had never been challenged, and had remained in force until after the great war. Then it was replaced by the Treaty of Neuilly of 1919, which transferred the territory from Bulgaria to the hands of the Allied Powers. He could not conceive what justification the Angora Parliament could have for claiming a voice in the disposition of this territory. The Allies were not prepared to concede such a right. The actual form of the claim was not to hand the territory back to Turkey: that would be too extravagant: the Turkish delegation proposed a plebiscite. What was the object of the plebiscite? It could only be political: to establish the Turkish majority (which was indisputable, but in view of recent circumstances might have altered) so as to make it appear that Turkey had a stronger claim, and to give her a chance of recovering the territory at some time in the future. That claim the Allies were not prepared to concede. The Turks appealed

to the doctrine of self-determination and the principles associated with the name of President Wilson. Mr. Wilson was in many ways a great man, but he (Lord Curzon) was not sure that in inventing the phrase "self-determination" Mr. Wilson had not dealt a considerable blow to the peace of the world. If this appeal were made in favour of the Turks in one place, it might also be used against them in other places. They were willing to apply it where they knew they were in a majority, but would they be equally willing to do so where the reverse was the case? If the principle of a plebiscite held good for Western Thrace, why should it not hold good for Karagatch, Demotika and Gallipoli? He wondered how the principle of self-determination would work if it were applied to Constantinople. It certainly was a fact that up to a short time ago the Turks were not in a majority in Constantinople. If a vote were taken there on Wilsonian principles, it might well be that the Turks would find they were recovering a capital from which they would shortly be expelled. Self-determination cut both ways, and it should be remembered that as M. Nincic had well said, the conference had met to decide broad questions of policy, and the effect which its decisions would have upon the recovery of peace.

He would now pass to the territory claimed by Turkey on the west of the Maritza. A few days ago he had referred to the various replies given by the Angora Government to the communications addressed to it by the Powers at Paris in September and at Mudania in October. He had pointed out that on none of these occasions had the Turkish Government claimed the frontier which they now desired to possess. The Turkish delegation now said that they were only thinking for the moment of evacuation. But when they claimed the evacuation of Eastern Thrace, why had they not claimed it up to what they considered their legitimate frontier? As a matter of fact they forgot all about it, and even when they mentioned Adrianople in their note of the 29th September, they made no reference to the intimate connection which they now claimed to exist between Adrianople and Karagatch. All they had asked for then was, "up to the west bank of the Maritza." They did not even mention the little railway station. As for Mudania, they never mentioned Karagatch there. They forgot all about their claim to the right bank of the Maritza; they only asked for the left bank. Therefore, the Turkish delegation must pardon the Allies if the latter attached great importance to the fact that on the several occasions during the past three months when Turkey had had the opportunity of making her present claim, she had altogether failed to make it.

The second argument of Ismet Pasha was to quote General Harington as having agreed during the Mudania negotiations to the occupation by Turkey, or the return to Turkey, of Karagatch. He (Lord Curzon) had felt sure there must be some misunderstanding and that General Harington had said nothing of the kind, because it was directly contrary to the instructions of His Majesty's Government. He had observed at various conferences that the *procès-verbaux* prepared by the different nations never quite agreed, but always showed a tendency to be slightly coloured to suit the parties respectively preparing them. He had, therefore, telegraphed to General Harington at Constantinople and had received a reply, which he would read:

> "The exact words of my speech on the 9th October, when presenting the final draft, are: 'The Allied Governments are agreed as to the generous terms which they are prepared to offer you. We have embodied them in the convention which we have prepared. They offer you the terms of the Allied note of the 23rd September, by which you obtain the whole of Eastern Thrace, which will be prepared for you by the Allies. They go so far as to provide for an Allied buffer west of the Maritza. They give you the protection asked for regarding Karagatch and the Adrianople forts.' On the 4th October I said the question of the line of forts outside Adrianople, referred to by Ismet, was one of principle, and it was beyond the power of the Allied generals to do anything more than recommend that the Greeks be withdrawn behind the Maritza line. They proposed, however, to recommend that Allied detachments be sent to Karagatch."

It was perfectly clear, from the above, that General Harington, acting on the instructions of his Government, had in no way concurred in the Turkish claim, and that when he spoke about the forts of Karagatch, he was alluding only to a temporary Allied occupation pending the present conference.

Lastly, there was the Turkish argument about the territory west of the Maritza River. The Turkish delegation maintained that the cession of this block of territory

to Bulgaria in 1915 ought not to be regarded as valid, because the treaty embodying it had not been ratified by the Turkish Parliament. That might be so, but as M. Nincic had quite justly pointed out, there was no evidence before the conference that the cession had ever been repudiated by the Turkish Parliament. This cession of territory was not exacted by a victorious enemy, though pressure might have been put upon Turkey at the time by a somewhat imperious ally. The cession of 1915 was indeed so formal a matter that boundary pillars showing the line of delimitation had been set up and were still standing between Adrianople and Karagatch. The Allies, therefore, could not accept the argument of non-ratification.

At a previous meeting the Turkish delegation had advanced an entirely novel reason: that Demotika was the ancient capital of the Turks in Europe. He had been a student of history all his life, and he had always studied with special interest those passages which related to the incursions of the Turks into Europe, but he had never heard of Demotika as their European capital. He had now consulted his history books. In 1360 Sultan Murad had crossed the Hellespont and entered Europe. A year later he had made Adrianople his capital, and it remained so until the capture of Constantinople in 1453. On his way to Adrianople he may have, and probably did, pass through Demotika. He may even have stayed at Demotika and exercised the functions of Government there for a short time, but the claim that this place ought to be given to Turkey because Sultan Murad stayed a few weeks or months there in 1360 passed his comprehension. The conference had been told that there were evidences of the past splendour of the alleged capital at Demotika, and reference was made to a mosque, a palace and a fortress. It was true that there was a mosque, but wherever there were devout Moslems a mosque was to be found. There was no trace of a palace nor of a fortress. Were they to settle the future of this territory on such very shadowy evidence of events alleged to have taken place nearly 600 years ago? Let them pass to the real facts of the case.

Take the question of Karagatch. The Turkish delegation had a few days ago asked for an extension of the frontier beyond the Maritza line, including Karagatch, mainly on grounds of military security. That ground was cut away by the decisions arrived at on the preceding day. If the demilitarised zones were to be set up—quite apart from the question of neutralisation—it was clear that there would be no forts in that quarter to threaten the security of Adrianople; in other words, the military danger had disappeared, and therefore the Turkish claim must be examined on different grounds.

The second ground for the retention of Karagatch by the Turks was that it was a part of Adrianople, a suburb of the town, inseparable from the main city and inhabited by the same class of population. This was not at all the case. He had a full scale map of the district. Karagatch was, it was true, on the opposite bank of the river, but it was separated from Adrianople by a road 4 kilom. in length running through the open country. Karagatch was a small town of 8,000 inhabitants, the enormous majority of whom were Greeks. He did not know whether the Turkish delegation would contest this. If he was rightly informed, the claim that Karagatch was a *faubourg* of Adrianople, uniform with it in population and ethnic physiognomy, could not be sustained.

The third argument of the Turkish delegation, however, had some weight. Adrianople was a great city at one time of some 80,000 inhabitants, and the Turkish citizens naturally did not like having to arrive or depart by rail at a Greek station on a Greek railway in Greek territory: they felt that they were entitled to have independent railway access on Turkish soil. He recognised that there was some force in that plea, and his colleagues agreed with him. He would be most reluctant to do anything which would in any degree wound the legitimate national self-respect of the Turks. The map before him showed that, when the Treaty of 1915 ceded this territory to Bulgaria, the Turkish Government had attached so little importance to the connection of Karagatch with Adrianople that they actually drew the line with the frontier pillars right across the road between the two places. This line placed in Turkish territory a section between the pillars and the right bank of the Maritza. In that section was the little railway station to which he had referred at an earlier meeting, and the beginning of the little railway line connecting the bridge over the Maritza with the main line and main station at Karagatch. The Powers were prepared to offer as a fair concession to Turkey this little enclave between the 1915 boundary line and the river. Without this enclave they could have their own branch line and their own station. If this should prove possible on technical grounds, and the Turkish delegation were prepared to accept it, it would solve the particular

difficulty to which he had referred. The plan could be understood by reference to the large scale map. He had fully discussed the matter with his colleagues, and was prepared to make the offer. He did not ask for an immediate reply, but perhaps the Turkish delegation would recognise the spirit of conciliation in which the offer was made and refrain from pressing their opposition on the major question.

On the larger question he had twice explained, on behalf of his colleagues as well as himself, the views that they were obliged to take. It was certainly most impressive to find that these views were urged upon the Turkish delegation not only by the Great Powers, but by every representative of a Balkan State present. He believed it was the first time in history, and certainly the first time in his recollection, that so complicated a question had received the general support not only of the Great Powers, but also of the Balkan States. What did this mean? Much more than the mere fact of Allied unity; it meant a terrible risk for those who declined to recognise the value and importance of this unity. It meant that those who might challenge it, and in the long run fight against it, would be provoking a contest of a one-sided character in which they could not hope to succeed.

He was always glad when he heard the various speakers pronounce the word "peace," a word which with constant repetition might sound like a platitude, but which was far more than that, and really ought to figure in every speech. Delegates were perhaps apt to forget at times the object of peace, for which this conference was being held, but he could not believe that any party would voluntarily bring about a state of affairs that would threaten peace. He ventured to put these considerations before the conference, and before the Turkish delegation in particular. He asked the Turkish delegation to reflect upon the statements he had made and the conciliatory proposal he had put forward, and to let the conference have their considered reply later on.

MR. CHILD said that the United States delegation wished to congratulate the conference on the real progress already made towards peace. His delegation thought the present moment appropriate for making a statement which they might have to repeat on other occasions. For the purpose of setting forth the point of view of the United States in as few words as possible, he had reduced his statement to writing:—

"It is not, and will not be, the concern of the representatives of the United States to express at this conference views which have not for their bases the legitimate national interests of the United States or those humanitarian considerations which I assume are shared by every delegation present. We will, however, and I trust acceptably, state, when the occasion arises, the position of the United States. We believe that a convenient and appropriate occasion has now arisen.

"It is not unknown to those who have observed the history of conferences and negotiations that few subjects may be considered by themselves. I am not referring to the specific subject under discussion, but all the various points of negotiation must in the end be considered as a unit, and it is often true that not one detail of a negotiation can be considered as isolated from the others. The representatives of the United States are unable, therefore, to hear concluded a discussion of any territorial settlement which, in its turn, may affect other settlements, without drawing the attention of the conference to certain traditional principles of the foreign policy of America. Reference to this policy was made in an *aide-mémoire* delivered to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the three inviting Powers on the 30th October, less than one month ago, in the following words:—

"'As the object in view in submitting this suggestion (*i.e.*, to send observers) is the elimination of any possible cause of misunderstanding, it is considered appropriate to call attention to the attitude of the United States in respect to secret treaties and agreements. It is not felt that agreements previously made with respect to Turkish territory which provide for the establishment of zones of special commercial and economic influence, such, for example, as the tripartite agreement of 1920, are consonant with the principle of the equality of economic opportunity. It is assumed that the Allied Powers will not now desire, and do not now intend, to carry into effect previous arrangements of this nature.

"'The United States has no desire to take any action which might embarrass the Allied Powers in the proper effort to secure peace. It desires nothing which need conflict with the interests of other countries, if the principle of commercial

opportunity for all nations is recognised from the outset. The United States has no intention of seeking for itself or its nationals a position of special privilege, but it desires to protect its rights and to assure the open door.'

"This conference may be glad to know that the overwhelming sentiment of the people of the United States is in favour of this policy, not only as a national policy, but as one which, were it to be adopted by every nation on the earth, would be in contrast, perhaps, to the search for territorial or other special privilege on foreign soils, a powerful element in the establishment of any stable peace, a foundation for a greater equity in the relation of nation with nation, and the basis for a more progressive economic development of territories."

ISMET PASHA said that he felt obliged to make a statement which no one could contest, namely, that the Turks were in a majority at Constantinople, and had no more fear of a plebiscite in their capital than in any other part of their present possessions. He was also firmly convinced that the cause of world peace would be much better served if peoples could determine their own fate everywhere. He reserved the right to reply to certain of Lord Curzon's arguments relating to the part of Eastern Thrace claimed by Turkey after closer examination of the subject.

He thanked the representative of the United States of America for his frank and liberal statement, and expressed the hope that American public opinion would always be on the side of right and justice.

LORD CURZON announced that the discussion on Eastern Thrace was adjourned, and that at the next meeting at 3·30 P.M. the same day the question of the islands in the Ægean Sea would be examined.

(The commission rose at 1 P.M.)

[E 14134/13003/44] No. 786.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, November 25, 1922, *at* 3 P.M., *under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December* 16.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Nincic.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	Colonel Vitale.
Major-General Burnett-Stuart.	General Weygand.	M. Guarnaschelli.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Laroche.	
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. Bargeton.	
Mr. Nicolson.	Colonel Courtin.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Barois.	
Mr. McClure.	Commandant de Lamoricière.	

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Nagaoka. Mr. Sato. Col. Saigo. Captain Tsuru. Mr. Tani.	General Mazarakis. M. Dendramis. M. Michalopoulos.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
Colonel Dumitrescu.	M. Christitch. M. Antich.	Munir Bey. Moukhtar Bey. Colonel Tefvik Bey.

Secretarial-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Mr. Spring-Rice. Mr. Ronald.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta. M. Indelli.

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. Lammot Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Mihanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON invited Ismet Pasha to state his views on the question of the Ægean Islands.

ISMET PASHA said that the Ægean and Mediterranean Islands, which depended geographically on Asia Minor, were of great importance for the peace and security of Anatolia; they included small islands close to the coast, situated in territorial waters, and larger islands. The small islands in territorial waters could seriously threaten the peace of Asia Minor and formed an integral part of that country; they must remain under Turkish sovereignty on this account, and also because they were situated in Turkish territorial waters.

As regards the larger islands, by the treaty of May 17/30, 1913, the disposal of Tenedos and Imbros was left to the decision of the Great Powers. Turkey's rights over these two islands were confirmed by the joint note from the Great Powers of the 14th February, 1914. They were thus placed under Turkish sovereignty.

It was also necessary and equitable that the island of Samothrace, situated in the neighbourhood of the Turkish coast and of the Straits, should likewise be left to Turkey.

The islands of Lemnos, Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria were left to the Greeks by the Great Powers. These islands were of vital importance from the point of view of the security of Turkey, and it was an economic necessity for them to be united to Asia Minor; for these reasons the Powers' decision had not been accepted by Turkey. The disposal of these islands had been confided to the Great Powers on condition that the decision should be in conformity with the interests of the parties concerned; the solution which the Powers proposed did not fulfil this condition, and therefore did not satisfy Turkey.

The imperialist designs of Greece on Anatolia, which had recently been revealed to the whole world, had shown Turkey how dangerous it was for the security of Asia Minor that these islands should be owned by a country like Greece, which had artificially created on her own soil aspirations towards the establishment of a Greek empire in Asia Minor.

Thus it was necessary in the interests of general peace that an undertaking be given for the complete demilitarisation of these islands; all existing fortifications and batteries must be entirely destroyed and dismantled; no new fortifications should be constructed in future; none of these islands should be utilised as a military base; no aeroplanes must be brought there, nor sheds for aircraft be constructed; except for a police force sufficient to keep order, no armed forces must be maintained; and these

islands must not serve as a centre for agitators or as a refuge for smugglers. Turkey must also receive guarantees for the strict observance of the undertakings given in these respects.

It was therefore necessary that these islands should enjoy a neutral and independent political existence.

M. VENIZELOS thought that a distinction should be drawn between those Ægean Islands which had for a long time been under Greek sovereignty, and those which had not yet formed the subject of any international Act. If he had rightly understood Ismet Pasha's statement, Turkey claimed to retain sovereignty over the latter category of islands. Now the population of the greater part of these islands was exclusively Greek, without any foreign element. Some, such as Cos, Tenedos and Rhodes, contained a small Turkish minority.

In this connection he quoted the following figures:—

		Greeks.	Mussulmans.	Jews and Foreigners.
Imbros	...	9,207	...	...
Tenedos	...	5,420	1,200	...
Cos	...	14,550	2,020	...
Rhodes	...	37,777	4,854	2,445

The other islands were purely Greek, and it was not in Turkey's interest to own them.

The security of Turkish territory could not be compromised by these islands. In this connection he wished to recall recent military events. When disembarking at Smyrna, the Greek troops were transported direct to Anatolia and the islands were not used as a stopping-place. It was therefore clear that the possession of the islands by a Power other than Turkey did not constitute a menace for the latter. Besides, it was difficult to see what interest Turkey could have in placing under her dominion a large Greek population, especially after the events of the last few months.

He would agree to examining the question whether it was necessary to demilitarise these islands, and, if so, to what extent; for this purpose it would be best to consult the military experts. But in no case could there be any question of re-establishing Turkish sovereignty over territory which had long since ceased to belong to Turkey, including Tenedos and Imbros.

As regards these two islands, he was ready to go even further and agree to a considerable limitation of Greek sovereignty on account of their nearness to the Dardanelles. He thought that it would be well to discuss the demilitarisation of these islands and that of the Dardanelles simultaneously.

He wished to state once more that he had no objection to the demilitarisation of these islands, but it must be remembered that no decision had been taken regarding the adoption of such a measure; it had only been decided that the commission should examine the question whether demilitarisation of the islands was expedient, and, if so, to what degree.

LORD CURZON said that he had discussed the matter with his Allied colleagues and was speaking on their behalf as well as on his own. He wished first of all to place the matter on a proper juridical basis. For this he had to begin by referring to the 1913 Conference of London, which resulted in a treaty being signed by Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, dated the 30th May, 1913. Article 5 of this treaty dealt with the islands. Ismet Pasha had suggested that the handing over of the islands for disposal and distribution by the Great Powers implied certain conditions; there were none. This would be seen by a reference to the concluding words of article 5, which simply confided to the Great Powers "... le soin de statuer sur le sort de toutes les îles ottomanes de la mer Egée, l'île de Crète exceptée, et de la péninsule du Mont-Athos."

The meeting in London was followed by a Conference of Ambassadors of the Great Powers, who were instructed to decide to whom the islands were to be handed over. The Conference of Ambassadors did not deal with the Dodecanese, because the fate of those islands had already been decided provisionally by the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and Italy. All the remaining islands were given to Greece except Imbros, Tenedos and Castellorizo, whose proximity to the mouth of the Dardanelles or to the Asiatic coast appeared to justify their retention by Turkey.

On the 14th February, 1914, the conference addressed a note to the Turkish Government in which they communicated to them the decision that all the islands then in the occupation of Greece should be ceded to that country with the exception

of the three islands above mentioned, which could be retained by Turkey. The islands of Imbros and Tenedos were to be demilitarised. In their reply of the 15th February the Turkish Government did not commit themselves to anything definite. They regretted the general attitude of the Great Powers, but took note of their decision about Imbros and Tenedos, the realisation of which they promised to do their best to assure.

Ismet Pasha had put forward two suggestions:—

1. That Imbros and Tenedos, on account of their nearness to the mouth of the Dardanelles, should be returned to Turkey as proposed by the Powers in 1913. They also asked for the inclusion of Samothrace—which was now mentioned for the first time—in the same group of islands, as being, so to speak, sentinels to the Straits.
2. That all the other islands, especially Lemnos, Mitylene, Chios and Nikaria, which had been given to Greece in 1913, should now be taken away from her and placed under a special régime.

M. VENISELOS asked whether they were merely to be demilitarised.

RIZA NOUR BEY replied in the negative: they were to have a neutral and independent political existence.

LORD CURZON said that this meant that the islands were not to be assigned to Turkey, but should be taken from Greece and given some form of political autonomy. This would result in great difficulties, both from the point of view of law and right and also as regards practicability. The islands in question were a lawful Greek possession by treaty and their populations were entirely Greek in character. If the Turkish delegation were arguing "à la Wilson," the result of a plebiscite would assuredly be in favour of Greece's retention of the islands; but they did not desire a plebiscite, only a sort of constitutional experiment in autonomy. Previous experience offered warnings against such an experiment. For instance, for a long time Samos had enjoyed a curious form of autonomy; there the results had not been encouraging, but rather a warning. Then again, an experiment had been made with the island which had the honour of presenting M. Veniselos to the world, namely, Crete. The result had been disastrous. When he, Lord Curzon, was Under-Secretary of State to the great Marquess of Salisbury, one of the most thorny questions was that of Crete. M. Veniselos had not then emerged above the horizon, or he would doubtless have applied his own special form of remedy. What had happened? Internal conflicts, risings, widespread loss of life, and general anarchy, until finally Crete decided on union with Greece. These two illustrations were warnings against the acceptance of the Turkish proposals.

As regards Ismet Pasha's second point, namely, demilitarisation in a very stringent form, much more could be said. But a distinction must be made between the three islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace on the one hand, and the rest of the islands on the other. The fate of the first three and the degree of demilitarisation to be effected there could best be considered in conjunction with the question of the freedom of the Straits. He could not prejudge the final decision in that question, which must be examined later. Concerning the rest of the islands and the advisability of carrying out stringent demilitarisation there, M. Veniselos had pointed out that during the war these islands had not been a source of danger to the Turkish military position in Anatolia, as the Greeks had made no use of them as bases; they could not, therefore, be reasonably regarded now as a menace.

To sum up, his conclusions were:—

1. That the fate of the three islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace should be examined in conjunction with the question of the freedom of the Straits.
2. That the suggestion of a constitutional experiment in autonomy for the other islands should be rejected on account of the warnings offered by the past.
3. That while the question of detaching the islands from Greek sovereignty could not be contemplated, he was quite willing that their demilitarisation should be examined by the military experts.

In stating these conclusions he was speaking for his Allied colleagues who were in complete agreement with him.

ISMET PASHA asked for the president's observations on the future sovereignty of the three islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace.

LORD CURZON said that this matter required very careful study, embracing, for instance, the figures given by M. Veniselos, and he could not say what would be the decision regarding the sovereignty of the three islands. He was inclined to think that when the proposed sub-commission to examine delimitarisation was set up, it should be asked to investigate the question of sovereignty also. At present no pronouncement was possible.

M. VENISELOS said that the sovereignty of Samothrace was already settled: only the degree of demilitarisation to be effected there was still in dispute.

ISMET PASHA reserved his observations regarding Samothrace for a later occasion.

LORD CURZON asked whether Ismet Pasha understood that the question of demilitarising all the islands (and not merely the three specifically named) should be reserved, and that the sovereignty of Imbros and Tenedos should likewise be discussed later. He had stated the views of the Allies as regards the political position of *all* the remainder of the islands.

ISMET PASHA replied that he wished to defer giving his views until later on.

M. BARRERE said that except for the question of autonomy which had been rejected, and the question of sovereignty which was in suspense, the conference had now all the elements necessary for a reference of the whole matter to a sub-commission of experts.

M. LAGO enquired which islands were to be referred to the experts.

LORD CURZON replied only those enumerated by M. Veniselos.

It was decided:—

1. To refer to a sub-commission of experts, which should meet when the time came for examining the Straits problem, the question of sovereignty over the islands of Tenedos and Imbros, and that of the demilitarisation of those two islands and of the island of Samothrace.
2. To refer to the same sub-commission the question whether the islands of Chios, Mitylene, Lemnos, Samos and Nikaria should be demilitarised, and if so to what degree.

The Turkish delegation made reservations as regards the discussion of sovereignty over Imbros and Tenedos.

LORD CURZON stated that he wished to make a few remarks as to the order of business. He understood that the Turkish delegates were ready to discuss the frontiers of Syria and Iraq on the 27th November at 11 A.M. The time for the discussion on the freedom of the Straits must depend upon the arrival of the Russian delegation. The First Commission also had to deal with military questions, but these had better not be discussed until the questions of the Straits, Eastern Thrace and Constantinople had been decided. As regards the Second and Third Commissions, presided over by Marquis Garroni and M. Barrère respectively, the work of the former could not begin until the delegates from the capitulatory States had arrived. But there was no reason why M. Barrère's Commission should not begin its work on the afternoon of the 27th November or the morning of the 28th November. Thenceforward the territorial and economic commissions could work concurrently, but not simultaneously.

ISMET PASHA wished to sum up the views expressed by him as follows:—

1. He did not regard the Thracian question as settled, and intended to revert to it.
2. He could not agree to Turkish sovereignty over Imbros and Tenedos being brought up for discussion.
3. That as he had previously said, he could not negotiate with any "capitulatory Power" which might be invited to the conference.

M. BARRERE explained, with a view to removing any misunderstanding, that there was no question of negotiating with third parties, but simply of giving their representatives a hearing on certain questions in which their interests were concerned.

LORD CURZON said that as regards Ismet Pasha's first point, the Turkish delegation would be given an opportunity later on to express their views on the frontiers of Thrace: he had that morning asked Ismet Pasha to reflect very carefully on the statements and proposals already made on the subject. As regards the second point, the sovereignty over Imbros and Tenedos would not be discussed until the sub-commission presented its report. The third point had been answered by M. Barrère.

ISMET PASHA expressly maintained his reservations on this subject.

(The commission rose at 5·20 P.M.)

[E 14132/13003/44] No. 787.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the First Meeting, November 27, 1922, at 4 P.M., under the presidency of M. Barrère.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 16.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Lago.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Venizelos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.
ROUMANIA.	**SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.**	**TURKEY.**
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Hassan Bey.
		Riza Nour Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir William Tyrrell.	M. Bargeton.	M. Guariglia.
Sir Adam Block.	M. Barois.	
Mr. Fountain.	M. des Closières.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. de Lacroix.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Sanguinetti.	
Mr. MacClure.		
Mr. Waley.		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Admiral Bristol.	Mr. Sato.	General Mazarakis.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Tani.	M. Dendramis.
Mr. Heck.		M. Theotokas.
		M. Michalopoulos.
ROUMANIA.	**SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.**	**TURKEY.**
Colonel Dumitresco.	M. Milanovitch.	Munir Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Wicks.		M. Indelli.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.
ROUMANIA.	**SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.**	**TURKEY.**
M. Constantinesco.	M. Christitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.
	M. Antitch.	

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

M. BARRERE, in opening the proceedings, said he felt sure that the co-operation of all the delegations was necessary in order to bring to a successful conclusion the very important work with which the commission had to deal. The commission would have to take into account the interests of all countries represented, those of Turkey equally with those of other States. He wished, in particular, to assure the Turkish delegation that the commission would constantly be animated with feelings of justice and equity in the discussions which were about to begin. The first thing to do was to organise the commission's work. The commission would have to deal with many delicate technical problems. The best course seemed to be to distribute the work among a series of sub-commissions; but there were some general financial questions—the Ottoman Public Debt and its distribution, repayment of military occupation expenses and reparation for damage—of such great importance that it appeared preferable to reserve them, provisionally at any rate, for discussion by the full commission.

He proposed to set up the three following sub-commissions at once:—

1. Sub-commission on communications and transport: To deal with ports, railways, transit, posts and telegraphs, commercial aviation, submarine cables and water power.
2. Sub-commission on the customs and commercial régime: Customs tariffs, regulations for ships; industrial, literary and artistic property; trade-marks.
3. Sub-commission on economic questions:
   - (*a.*) Problems relating to the period of war and occupation: Restoration of property sequestrated by Turkey; settlement of debts and contracts between private persons, and also between private persons and the Turkish State, during the said period; liquidation of German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian property in Turkey (articles 155 and 260 of the Treaty of Versailles, and corresponding articles in the other treaties of peace); liquidation of Turkish property in Allied countries.
   - (*b.*) Questions relating to the period subsequent to the Treaty of Peace: Concessions and adjudications.

A further sub-commission to deal with sanitary questions would be set up later.

Each delegation would be represented by two delegates on each of these sub-commissions, and the delegates could be assisted by such experts as they considered necessary.

He invited the delegations to examine this scheme.

ISMET PASHA said that as the questions with which the commission would have to deal were not yet precisely defined, he would be willing to make known the

views of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, whenever some definite subject came up for discussion by the commission. He wished, however, to set forth at once, and as concisely as possible, certain general considerations.

The Turkish delegation thought that the chief questions to be dealt with by the commission would be :—

1. The distribution of the debt of the former Ottoman Empire among the countries in whose favour parts of that Empire had been detached. It went without saying that in all calculations account would be kept of such share of debt as was incumbent on countries detached from the Empire at various dates, but had not yet been assumed by them; in this way a general liquidation of these debts could be effected.
2. Reparation for all damage and devastation caused by the Greeks.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey recognised its due share in the debt of the former Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, it claimed reparation for damage of every kind done by the Greeks, who had reduced the provinces occupied by them to a mass of ruins.

The economic and financial development of Turkey depended on its full and complete independence. That was the essential condition of Turkey's existence. Like every independent nation, the Turkish nation must be released from all restrictions which interfered with its full economic liberty. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey took the opportunity of declaring that in its international economic relations, and in the conventions and treaties which it would have to conclude in order to regulate those regulations, it would conform its conduct to the requirements of its sovereignty and independence. That principle was one of the factors in the development of every nation, and would also serve as the basis for Turkey's national economy.

Like all other independent States, Turkey fervently desired to maintain economic relations with other countries on the basis of reciprocity and international law. Durable economic relations could only be established between Turkey and other countries in so far as those relations were governed by the principles of modern law. The Turkish delegation hoped that this legitimate demand would not meet with any opposition.

The questions indicated above could be divided into two groups, and it would be well to set up two sub-commissions to examine them. One would deal with juridico-economic questions, and the other, or others, with financial questions.

Ismet Pasha proposed that the sub-commission to deal with juridico-economic questions should meet first.

M. BARRERE took note of Ismet Pasha's observations, and said that the plan of work which he had proposed was adopted. He thought it desirable to set up the sub-commissions at once. In order that all members of the delegations might participate in the work of all the sub-commissions, he thought that the latter should not sit simultaneously. As regards two of the sub-commissions—those on the customs régime and on economic questions—the discussion of the questions allotted to them could begin forthwith, and they should be set up without delay.

M. VENISELOS reserved the right to state the views of the Greek Government on each occasion when a question was brought up before the commission or the sub-commissions.

M. BARRERE invited general discussion on the questions enumerated by him at the beginning of the meeting, which were not to be referred immediately to sub-commissions.

LORD CURZON wished to say a few words on the procedure suggested. The president had divided up the subjects within the scope of the commission into five heads, and had proposed that the greater part of them should be dealt with by sub-commissions. With this he (Lord Curzon) was in agreement, and thought it the most businesslike way of proceeding. The president had proposed that two of the sub-commissions should be set up at once and begin their sittings with the least possible delay; and had also made a very wise and necessary reservation in regard to the subjects under the first heading. He had begun by inviting observations of a general character; to this Ismet Pasha had responded with a brief declaration of his point of view, which was entirely appropriate to the occasion and delivered with his customary lucidity and conciseness.

The subjects under the first heading, which the president proposed to reserve for discussion in the full commission in the first instance, were obviously questions of capital importance, namely, those of the Ottoman Public Debt, expenses of military occupation and reparation of damage. As he would not be able to join in the discussions of the sub-commissions, he would very much like to hear in the full commission statements of the views held by the various parties, and particularly by the Turkish delegation. The president had invited immediate discussion on the subjects in the first heading, but, as his draft scheme had only just been circulated, it seemed doubtful whether the delegates could be ready to speak at once. In any case, whether the discussion took place forthwith or on the next day, he (Lord Curzon) begged the delegations, and especially the Turkish delegation, to give their views on the questions under the first heading to the full commission. Ismet Pasha had alluded to the fact that Turkey had great claims which he proposed to put forward, and the newspapers had published figures of the claims which the Turkish delegation proposed to make, mainly against Greece. There would also be claims to be made on behalf of the Allies. These matters ought to be discussed before the main commission. The details might have to be examined by sub-commissions, whether on the economic or juridical side, but he hoped to hear himself from the Turkish delegation a formal statement with details and figures of the case which they proposed to present under heading No. 1, and he also hoped that the president would in full commission invite the opinion of the other delegations on the matters contained under this heading. Then, if further examination were required after discussion in the full commission, these questions could be referred to sub-commissions.

As none of the delegations were in a position to state their views immediately,

M. BARRERE proposed to postpone the continuation of the discussion until the following day. (Approved.) It was understood that the commission reserved to itself the general discussion on financial questions, the necessity of which had been pointed out by Lord Curzon.

ISMET PASHA replied that as he had not had previous notice of the proposed dividing up of economic and financial subjects, which included the questions of public debt and reparations, he had only been able to state his views on these two points in summary fashion. He therefore reserved the right to approach these questions again as a whole, and to set forth the general view of the Turkish delegation in regard to them.

(*The commission rose at* 4·45 P.M.)

[E 14103/13003/44] No. 788.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pasha.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 16.)

Dear Ismet Pasha, *Lausanne, December* 14, 1922.

IN our various conversations about Mosul, you mentioned to me the grounds, racial, political, strategic, historical, &c., on which your Government rested their claims for the return of the Mosul Vilayet. I told you in reply that I contested each one of these claims, and I now send you a memorandum with the reasons for which I do so, and which—quite apart from the fact that Great Britain cannot give back a country of which she is a mandatory under the League of Nations—render it quite impossible for my Government to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul Vilayet.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 788.

Memorandum on Mosul.

THIS memorandum is submitted by the British delegation in order to summarise the reasons for which the demand made by the Turkish delegation for the restoration to Turkey of the Mosul Vilayet cannot possibly be entertained.

These reasons are racial, political, historical and economic. In each case they contradict and destroy the arguments, based on the same considerations, upon which it is understood, from such explanations as have been received, that the Turkish delegation relies in support of its case.

1. *Racial.*

The population of the Mosul Vilayet consists of Kurds, Arabs, "Turks" (Turkomans) and Christians, with some thousands of Yazidis. The number of these various elements may be deduced from two tables of statistics, which were compiled by British officers employed in the vilayet, who, partly on horseback, and partly with the aid of the roads made and the motor transport introduced since the British occupation, visited most of the corners of the vilayet in the years after the war. Table A is an estimate made in 1919, in which the population of the vilayet is shown by religions. Table B is an estimate made in 1921 as the result of a close and more prolonged investigation. The population in this table is divided according to race.

The total population of the Mosul Vilayet is returned as 703,000 odd in the 1919 estimate and 785,000 odd in the 1921 estimate, the difference being due to an increase in the population in the Mosul plain area, formed by the Mosul plain and the surrounding hills, arising from—

1. The return of large numbers of the population from the Turkish or Arab armies.
2. The return of still larger numbers of families to villages which, owing to the state of starvation resulting from war conditions, had been abandoned before the British occupation.
3. The settlement of a large number of Assyrian refugees.

It was established by these investigations that the whole of the great town of Mosul, the whole of the country north of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris as far as the boundary of the vilayet, the whole of the country south of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris, and most of the country south of Mosul on the left bank of that river as far as the Erbil–Kirkuk–Kifri road, is Arab.

As to the "Turks," they are not Osmanli Turks; they call themselves Turkomans, and the Turanian language they speak resembles Azerbaijani rather than the Turkish of Constantinople. They are undoubtedly descendants of Turkomans who came to Irak long before Osman founded the Ottoman Empire, probably from those Turkomans whom the Abbaside Caliphs hired to defend their territory. The theory that the Turkomans are descendants of what was formerly a foreign mercenary garrison is supported by their distribution. Tall Afar, an almost exclusively Turkoman town, stands guard 45 miles west of Mosul on the border of the Syrian desert. Except for this town and the neighbouring Turkoman villages, and for a few scattered Turkoman villages in the Mosul plain, the whole of the Turkoman population is distributed along the eastern road from Mosul to Bagdad, notably in and around the towns of Erbil, Altun Keupru, Kerkuk, Taza Khurmatu, Tauq, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri and Qara Tepé. The estimates of numbers are :—

Tall Afar and surrounding villages	10,000
Villages in the Mosul plain	4,895
	14,895
Kirkuk and surrounding villages	25,000
Kifri, Taza Khurmatu, Tauq, Tuz Khurmatu and Qara Tepé	10,000
	35,000
Erbil and Altun Keupru	15,000
Grand total of "Turks" (the few in the Suleimaniyah area being omitted)	64,895

The proportion of "Turks" to Arabs can be shown most effectively by the statement that the "Turks" in the whole of the Mosul Vilayet are less numerous than the Arabs in the *town* of Mosul alone.

The Kurds are estimated to be more than twice as numerous as the Arabs in the Mosul Vilayet, and about seven times as numerous as the Turkomans. They are separated from the Arabs by a line which follows roughly the line of Turkoman towns mentioned above and north of that the foothills of the mountains. They are believed to be descended from the Medes, who were so closely identified with the Persians in early times; but whether this is true or not, they speak an Iranian tongue closely allied to Persian and resemble the Persians far more closely than either the Turks or the Arabs.

Of the non-Mahommedan populations, though in the aggregate they outnumber the Turkomans considerably, it is not necessary to speak in great detail. The estimates are :—

Yazidis (probably of Kurdish origin, but holding a non-Moslem belief)	30,000
Christians (mainly Assyrians—some Nestorian, some Catholic)	62,225
Jews	16,865

The main body of the Yazidis live in Jebel Sinjar, but there are many Yazidi villages north-east of Mosul. The Christians are to be found mainly in Mosul city, in the Erbil area, in a string of prosperous villages (of which Al Qosh and Tall Kaif are the largest) to the east of the Tigris, and in the Dohuk–Amadiyah country. Most of the Jews live in Mosul city, but Jewish communities are to be found in the Kurdish and Turkoman towns, and isolated individuals or families among the Kurdish tribes.

The case of the Turkish delegation in so far as it is based on ethnic considerations comes, therefore, to this :—

They ask that there should be united with the Turks of Asia Minor a population consisting as to one-twelfth of Turkomans, with whom they may be admitted to have some racial affinity; as to nearly seven-twelfths of Kurds, who have no more affinity with the Turk, except the possession of a common religion, than have the Chinese; as to three-twelfths of Arabs, who not only differ from the Turks in race and language, but are connected by the strongest bonds of language, race and sympathy with the population of Bagdad and Basra; and as to more than one-twelfth of non-Moslem elements, which, however much they may differ from each other, have not a single bond—racial, linguistic, religious or cultural—with the Turks.

Table I.—Population of the Vilayet of Mosul by Religions according to an Estimate made in 1919.

Division.	Sunni.	Shiah.	Jewish.	Christian.	Other Religions.	Total.
Mosul	244,713	17,180	7,635	50,670	30,180	350,378
Erbil	96,100	...	4,800	4,100	1,000	106,000
Kirkuk	85,000	5,000	1,400	600	...	92,000
Suleimaniyah ...	153,900	...	1,000	100	...	155,000
Total	579,713	22,180	14,835	55,470	31,180	703,378

Table II.—Population of the Vilayet of Mosul by Races according to an Estimate made in 1921.

Division.	Arabs.	Kurds.	"Turks."	Christians.	Jews.	Total.
Mosul	170,663	175,820*	14,895	57,125	2,665	432,168
Erbil	5,100	77,000	15,000	4,100	4,800	106,000
Kirkuk	10,000	45,000	35,000	600	1,400	92,000
Suleimaniyah ...	...	152,000	1,000	100	1,000	155,000
Total	185,763	454,720	65,895	62,225	16,865	785,168

* Including 30,000 Yazidis.

2. *Political.*

The next claim of the Turkish delegation is that the population of the Mosul Vilayet desires to return to Turkey because of its political or historical affinities with Turkish rule. Even if this were true of a majority of the inhabitants of the Turkoman towns who, under Turkish rule, enjoyed a position of privilege by no means warranted by their numbers, it cannot possibly be sustained in so far as the Kurds, the Arabs and the non-Moslem elements of the population are concerned. It is undeniable that the Arabs of Mosul are enthusiastic supporters of the new Irak State and of King Feisal. The result of a plebiscite conducted throughout Irak in 1919 gave a unanimous vote on the point that Basra, Bagdad and Mosul should be united and form one State. Since then, on the arrival of the Emir Feisal in the country, the Mosul Arabs showed quite unmistakably their desire to be connected with the Arab Government at Bagdad and to be under the rulership of King Feisal. They received the Emir with acclamation, they voted unanimously that he should be King, they swore allegiance to him. This latter plebiscite included the whole of the vilayet except the Kurds in the Suleimaniyah, Raniya and Rowanduz areas, who, being a compact body of people of an entirely different race and language, obviously required separate treatment. The Arab areas with the Kurdish districts adjacent to them, and the Turkoman towns, all gave their votes, and with the exception of Kirkuk all voted for inclusion in the Irak State and for the accession of Feisal to the throne of Irak.

As to the Kurds, they are a people with a keen sense of nationality, a deep pride in their race and language, and a desire to be as free to manage their own affairs as their pursuit of economic progress will allow.

It is said to be the contention of the Turkish delegation that the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet are one with the Turks of Asia Minor in aim. Two points may be stated in reply :—

1. It is perfectly well known to people who lived in Irak before the war that communications between Suleimaniyah on the one side and Bagdad and Mosul on the other were constantly cut, that Turkish officials appointed to Suleimaniyah often waited at Mosul for months before they could venture to set out on their journey, and that when such Turkish officials reached their posts in Southern Kurdistan they were frequently helpless in the face of the determination of the Kurds to brook no interference from the distant Government of Constantinople.
2. The Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet showed, throughout the war, that far from being united with the Turks in aim, they regarded the Turkish quarrel with the *Entente* as none of theirs. The Turkish delegation can be challenged to produce any evidence that the Turkish forces in Irak ever received any assistance from the Kurds against the British. A small Kurdish tribal contingent was present with the Turkish force at Shu'aibah, near Basra, in the spring of 1915. They were present, but they took an insignificant part in the operations; they returned to their homes after the battle; and from that time the Turks got no more help from the Kurds than they did from the Arabs. The Kurds of the Kifri and Kirkuk areas left their homes and lands in great numbers to avoid conscription, and as soon as those areas were occupied by British troops thousands of local Kurds came down from the hills whither they had fled to avoid having to identify themselves with the aims of Turkey.

Finally, there remain the large Christian element (mainly Nestorians and Chaldeans) and the Yazidis. If the claim of the Turkish delegation is weak in so far as the non-Turkish Moslem population is concerned, it is still weaker as applied to these non-Moslem communities. It is to Turkish misrule, active and passive, that the Yazidis attribute the enormous reduction in their numbers which has occurred during the last generation. The Chaldeans remember too well what their co-religionists in the Diarbekir-Mardin-Jazirah area suffered during the war to desire the restoration of the Turkish rule. And finally, the Nestorians, who were driven from the region of Julamerk and the Persian border by Turkish troops during the war, who died in thousands in their flight to Irak, and who have settled in that alien country rather than submit to Turkish rule in their own land, would fight to the death rather than permit the return of their new homes to a people who to them are the symbol of misrule and oppression.

3. *Historical.*

The Turkish contention that the long historical connection of Mosul with the Ottoman Empire justifies their demanding its return would apply with equal force to Bagdad: for, except for insignificant periods when it was under Persian rule, Bagdad was part of Turkey as long as Mosul. Both are Arab towns built by Arabs and maintaining their Arab character, in spite of their long inclusion in the Turkish Empire. In point of fact, the close connection between Mosul and Bagdad was recognised by the Turks to this extent, that the Mosul Vilayet was formerly part of the Pashalik of Bagdad. Even as late as the eighties of the last century, when Midhat Pasha was Vali of Bagdad, Mosul was included in his governorship. The conversion of Mosul into a separate vilayet in Turkey, depending upon Constantinople, was a measure dictated by administrative convenience only.

The argument from history is therefore not one to which importance can properly be attached. It could equally be applied to a demand from Turkey for the return of all the territories and States which she has lost. It would justify the demand by any country for any city or province of which it had been deprived as the consequence of defeat in war.

4. *Economic.*

If we turn to the economic argument, it is the weakest of all. The economic relations of the Mosul Vilayet are entirely with Bagdad and with the Arab City of Aleppo, both of which cities the National Pact itself leaves outside the boundaries of Turkey. If we take the three chief towns in the vilayet, viz., Suleimaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul, the exports of Suleimaniyah all go to Bagdad, whence all its requirements in foreign goods are obtained in exchange; Kirkuk lives mainly on the carrying trade between Bagdad on the one hand, and Mosul and Suleimaniyah on the other, and its prosperity depends on the maintenance of the connection between the three; as for Mosul, which, being nearest to Turkey, should present the most favourable case for the argument of the Turkish delegation, it is notorious that the trade of Mosul is almost entirely down-river with Bagdad and across the desert with Syria. The imports of the vilayet are piece goods, tea, sugar and coffee. Not one of these is produced in Turkey or could even be obtained through Turkish territory except with great difficulty and by diverting trade from routes which it has followed for centuries. As to the exports, the principal are grain, wool and hides, and tobacco, and the smaller but still important exports are timber, gum-tragacanth and gall-nuts. Every ounce of the tobacco grown, except the relatively small quantity needed for local consumption, goes to Bagdad and is consumed in the Bagdad and Basra Vilayets; the surplus grain of the Mosul Vilayet goes to feed the people of Bagdad, and the timber to build houses in Bagdad. The wool, the hides and the gum, and the gall-nuts which are an important ingredient in the manufacture of European ink, go entirely to foreign countries. How could Mosul dispose of grain, wool or hides in Turkey, when Turkey itself is a large producer of all these products; or of tobacco in a country which has large tobacco producing areas of its own? Bagdad is dependent on the Mosul Vilayet for its wheat supplies to such an extent that during the war, when the two vilayets were separated by military operations, the British military authorities had to import wheat from India to feed Bagdad city and district. A striking instance of the manner in which economic considerations cut across ethnic boundaries is the fact that the Erbil-Altun Keupru district, which is partly Turkoman as to the towns and mainly Kurdish as to the agricultural areas, lives almost entirely on supplying Bagdad with grain. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that if the country north of the existing boundary between Turkey on one side, and Syria and Irak on the other, ceased to exist, the economic life of the Mosul Vilayet would hardly be disturbed at all. Irak, as it is, can do without Turkey, but Mosul is indispensable to Bagdad.

5. *Strategic.*

It is further urged by the Turkish delegation that the southern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul, which runs along the Jabal Hamrin in a south-easterly direction as far as the River Diyalah, and then along the Diyalah as far as the Persian frontier, would constitute an excellent strategical frontier between Turkey and Irak. This contention cannot be accepted for one moment. The adoption of the Jabal Hamrin–Diyalah line would in fact make the position of the Irak State untenable. In the first place, the Power occupying Mosul need only hold up the

export of grain from that place to cut off the capital of Irak from its main source of wheat supply. Secondly, a day's easy march would enable any such Power to cut the sole road between Irak and Persia, a road which is vital to the economic life of Bagdad and Basra, whose people live very largely on the Persian trade. Thirdly, the position of an Arab Government in Bagdad, which is some 560 miles by river from the southern limit of the Irak State, would be quite impossible if the frontier of a possibly unfriendly State were only 70 miles distant. Lastly, there appears to be no particular reason why the Arab State of Irak or Great Britain as the Mandatory Power, should hand over to the Turkish Government a place where it might think fit to maintain an army corps as a menace to the surrounding regions.

6. *The National Pact.*

Lastly it has more than once been stated by the Turkish delegation that their claim for the recovery of the Mosul Vilayet, or at any rate of Mosul town, is supported by the first article of the National Pact, passed by the Turkish Chamber of Deputies on the 17th February, 1920. It can easily be shown that this is not the case. The article reads as follows:—

> "Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30th October, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said armistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance."

In the first place it is both a novel and a startling pretension that a Power which has been vanquished in war should dictate to the victors the manner in which they are to dispose of the territories which they have wrested from the former. It would be interesting to know if a single instance can be found in history in which the Turks having conquered any territory by force of arms have ever encouraged the vanquished to demand a plebiscite in the area in question or have expressed a willingness to abide by the result of such a vote.

But let us examine the argument a little more closely in reference to the present case. The first proposition of the article is that the plebiscite is to be held in areas "populated exclusively by an Arab majority." It is difficult to understand how any area can be populated exclusively by a majority since the existence of a majority implies the existence of minorities also. But further it is the contention of the Turks themselves that the Arabs are not in a majority in the Mosul Vilayet, but that they are outnumbered by the other elements in the population, viz., Kurds and Turks: and that this is the case is shown by the figures of the second table to which reference has been made, and which reveal a total of 454,720 Kurds and 65,895 Turks or Turkomans, as compared with 185,763 Arabs. Therefore, if the Turks are to claim a plebiscite, it would seem that their argument does not admit of its being applied to the Mosul Vilayet, because the Arabs are not in a majority there.

But, thirdly, supposing the argument to apply to the entire area, irrespective of majorities or minorities, it has already been pointed out that such a plebiscite has already twice been held and that on each occasion it has resulted in a verdict hostile to the Turkish claim. In 1919 the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet voted unanimously in favour of continued incorporation with Bagdad and Basra. In 1921 the whole of the Arabs, the Kurds of the adjacent districts and the whole of the Turkomans (with the exception of Kirkuk) voted again for inclusion in a State of Irak, and chose the Emir Feisal as their King.

But the article in the Pact introduces another and still more fantastic distinction. According to it, only those portions of territory which were occupied by enemy forces on the 30th October, 1918, are to be allowed thus to decide their destinies. On that day the British forces were about 30 miles distant on the south from Mosul, which they entered immediately afterwards. We are thus led to this absurd result that the Arabs who live in the entire territory south of the armistice line are to be invited to dispose of their fate four years later by plebiscite, while the Arab population of Mosul town itself, who form more than one-third of the Arab population of

the whole vilayet, are to be deprived of that right. The case has only to be stated to demonstrate the absurdity of such a claim. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that armistice conditions have nothing to do with the provisions of peace treaties and that no European peace treaty made since the armistice of 1918 has attempted to follow the lines of occupation laid down in the armistice which preceded them.

Finally, a claim, equally untenable and even more incomprehensible, is put forward in the second half of the article, which reads: "The whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said armistice line, which are inhabitated by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifices and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance." It may be remarked in passing that the word "Ottoman" is not easily understood in this context. The sympathy which unites Moslem peoples is generally recognised; it is a matter of religion; but it is difficult to appreciate what unity of race can link together Semitic Arabs, Iranian Kurds and Ural-Altaic Turks, or why the fact that they have once been forced to submit to Ottoman rule should bind them to remain in the Ottoman Empire for all time. In fact, the Turkish Government and the Turkish people are apparently ready at one moment to concede the free determination of their future destinies to the Arab peoples, and at the next moment to demand that territories inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority—a phrase which, if it means anything at all, applies equally to the Kurdish, Turkish and Arab populations of the former Turkish Empire—should not be divided "for any reason in truth or in ordinance."

It would appear, therefore, that the claim for the restoration to Turkey of the Mosul Vilayet is not only prohibited by the considerations, racial, political, historical and economic, which have been enumerated in the earlier part of this memorandum, but that it is quite inconsistent with any interpretation that can possibly be applied to the first article of the National Pact.

Lausanne, December 14, 1922.

No. 789.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 772.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 16, 1922.

MY telegram No. 716.

Telegraph administrator has requested Eastern Telegraph Company to give full effect to article 9 and article 4 of conventions of 1878 and 1912 respectively, governing working of their cables to Syra and Odessa.

These articles prescribe (1) Turkish control of telegrams transmitted, (2) Ottoman nationality of all employees on Turkish territory, and (3) delivery and receipt of all messages by Turkish telegraph office.

In virtue of Mudros armistice Turkish "counter" was taken over by company and non-Ottoman employees have been introduced whom company would find great difficulty in replacing. They realise, however, that sooner or later they must revert to pre-war practice.

I have requested Eastern Telegraph Company to reply that, control of cables being vested in Allies by Mudros armistice, they are unable to comply with Turkish demand until they receive instructions from competent Allied authorities. So far as official telegrams are concerned, we cannot, of course, surrender so definite an armistice right. Both General Harington, whom I have consulted, and I would insist, for obvious reasons, on all official messages being despatched and delivered without intervention of any kind by Turkish officials. For purely official purposes this would suffice. It would be better than even where general public is concerned no compromise should be made, since Turks, subsequent to Mudania, recognised explicitly our right to control telegraph services, when they asked for use "free from Allied control" of one line in Constantinople for the purposes of communication with Lausanne (see your telegram No 533)

If, therefore, Refet raises the point, I shall adopt attitude that no modification in present system can be considered before Constantinople is evacuated I would

done with design since, if not, a far simpler version would have been to state that the Allied troops shall remain in the territories which they occupy. Incidentally, in case the sequence of events render it ultimately of importance, the vagueness of the sentence limiting the respect even of that presence till the decision of the Peace Conference is worthy of remark. In the event of the conference breaking up and deciding to reach no decision, the Turks would probably consider themselves justified in regarding that limit as having expired.

5. Having thus adopted a principle and an interpretation, the Turks since Mudania have unswervingly striven to push both principle and interpretation to their logical conclusion.

6. The announcement made immediately after Mudania that Angora had appointed a Governor for Gallipoli was the first indication that the Grand National Assembly intended to claim the right to take over the civil administration of the occupied zones. There was no little skill in the choice of Gallipoli as the first step, since that district is in fact administratively a part of Eastern Thrace over which full Nationalist sovereignty had been recognised at Mudania.

7. It was foreseen at this High Commission that an admission of the claim as regards Gallipoli would lead eventually to a similar claim as regards Constantinople For various reasons, however, the claim was not resisted and the ground was thus prepared for the first act of the drama, which began with the arrival of Refet Pasha in Constantinople on the 19th October.

8. Previous to Refet Pasha's arrival, the Allied High Commissioners and generals had agreed that the Nationalist gendarmerie destined for Eastern Thrace should not be permitted to pass through Constantinople. Refet himself, however, arrived with 126 gendarmes, and on the pretext that these were his personal attendants, they were allowed to disembark. Generally speaking, it may be said that Refet and his 120 gendarmes succeeded, in a fortnight, in imposing a Nationalist administration on Constantinople.

9. Refet Pasha's initial objective was the overthrow of the Central Government. The first move to that end consisted in a decree of the Grand National Assembly declaring all acts, treaties and financial engagements of the Constantinople Government, since March 1920, to be null and void. The decree was calculated to ruin the financial credit of the Constantinople administration and to render it incapable of continuing to function. The Allied High Commissioners, it is true, took steps to solicit the assistance of their Governments with a view to enabling the Sultan's Government to carry on in spite of this decree, but before any decision had been arrived at, that Government had ceased to exist.

10. The second attack was launched in the reply from the Grand National Assembly to the invitation to the Lausanne Conference. It was therein stated that the participation of the Central Government in that conference might prevent Angora from sending its delegates to Lausanne, and was in any case contrary to the spirit and even to the existence of the Mudania Convention.

11. The decisive blow was struck by the decisions of the Grand National Assembly on the 1st November. Those decisions decreed the abolition of the Sultanate and declared that, the sole sovereignty of Turkey being vested in the Grand National Assembly as representative of the Turkish people, no other Government except that of the Grand National Assembly had existed since March 1920. The Central Government thereupon resigned (the 4th November) and Refet announced himself to be the representative of the Grand National Assembly and the *de facto* Governor of Constantinople.

12. The first part of Refet's programme having thus been brought to a successful conclusion, no time was lost in ringing the curtain up on the second act, namely, the establishment of an uncontrolled Nationalist administration in Constantinople. On the 5th November, Hamid Bey, the agent of the Angora Government, communicated to the High Commissioners two notes asking for the withdrawal of the Allied military and naval forces. In the first of these notes it was stated that as the result of the abolition of personal sovereignty and of the spontaneous desire of the population of Constantinople, the city had been placed under the authority of the Government of the Grand National Assembly henceforth responsible for the maintenance of order and the transaction of public business in the Vilayet of Constantinople. In these circumstances, the Angora Government deemed the presence of Allied forces in the city to be no longer necessary or even possible. A reply was immediately addressed to Hamid Bey, declaring that the Allies could not admit this standpoint, which was contrary to the terms of the Mudros armistice, of the Paris note of the

23rd September, and of the Mudania Convention. It was at the same time made clear verbally to Hamid Bey that, while the Allies had no intention to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Turkey, they could not admit any change in the Allied régime in Constantinople, and that so long as the Allied occupation lasted, the control of the administration, whatever its form, must remain vested in the Allies. The representations of the High Commissioners produced little result, inasmuch as during the following days a whole series of measures were introduced of a nature entirely contrary to that régime. In place of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, the specific customs tariff as in force in Anatolia was introduced. Instructions were given that its 3 per cent. share of the customs should no longer be paid to the Public Debt and that all customs duties should henceforth be paid direct to the Nationalist financial representative here instead of to the Ottoman Bank for the account of the Provisional Financial Commission. Orders were also given to the Turkish president of the Mixed Judicial Tribunal that that court should cease to function, and the International Sanitary Commission was notified that sanitary control would in future be exercised by the Angora Government.

13. It was clear that it was a question of a trial of strength and that remonstrances without action would be likely to have little effect. The Allied High Commissioners, therefore, in concert with the Allied generals, decided to ask their respective Governments for authority to institute martial law in the city as the sole effective method of maintaining Allied prestige, of protecting the Christian population, and of preventing the establishment in Constantinople of the same régime, involving a complete disregard of the Capitulations, as had already been introduced in Smyrna.

14. The reply of His Majesty's Government was an immediate and unequivocal concurrence in the proposal for a declaration of martial law. But, owing to an interruption of the telegraph cable, three days passed before the French and Italian High Commissioners received the answers of their Governments. When they did arrive, the concurrence was grudging and conditional, and the unity of Allied High Commissioners and generals had not survived the delay involved. In the intervening period the Allied generals had come to the conclusion that the imposition of martial law, entailing as it might the disarmament of the Turkish police and gendarmerie, would probably lead to an armed conflict in Constantinople, followed immediately by an advance of the Kemalist forces in Anatolia, for which they were not prepared without at least the promise of immediate reinforcements. As no Government was willing to send reinforcements, it was finally decided that it was inexpedient to attempt for the moment to declare martial law, which must be reserved as a measure to be used in the last extremity.

15. The failure of the Allies to impose their will by force at this critical juncture was decisive. They thereby receded from their original standpoint that, whatever the form of administration set up in Constantinople, Allied control thereover should in no respect be less than it had been over the old Central Government administration. The Allied Provisional Financial Commission, Mixed Tribunal and Sanitary Commission consequently ceased to function, the customs régime established by the Allied High Commissioners was abolished, and even the Ottoman Public Debt was deprived of some of its chief sources of revenue.

16. Having made good his claim to control the civil administration of the city, Refet then proceeded to attempt to assume as much of the responsibility as he could for the maintenance of law and order in it. The presence of the Allied forces was, however, textually recognised in the Mudania Convention, together with, by inconvertible implication, certain rights inherent to the safety of those forces. Refet's object, since the Allies persisted in refusing to withdraw their forces, was to restrict those rights to a minimum and to acquire as preponderating a share as possible of the dual régime. Allied military and Turkish civil, henceforward established in Constantinople.

17. The most important issue at stake in this connection was the question of police control. After prolonged discussions, it was settled by a compromise, which in itself constituted a further stage in Refet Pasha's programme. Under an agreement reached between him and the Allied generals, it was decided that all Ottoman subjects, Christian or Moslem, should henceforward submit to the jurisdiction of the Turkish police, while all Allied subjects, including Hellenes and Russians, should enjoy the protection of the Allied police. The inclusion of Hellenes and Russians in the latter category was only accepted by Refet after the intervention of the Allied High Commissioners, and even then in a manner which left the door open for future arrangement. One point in connection with police control has even now not been

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settled, namely, the question of the detention and trial of Ottoman subjects guilty of offences against the Allied forces themselves.

18. The division of the population of Constantinople for police purposes into Ottoman and Allied subjects was the only logical solution once the principle of dual control had been conceded. It nevertheless involved the first humiliating step in the complete abandonment of those native Christians whose protection the continued presence of the Allied forces in Constantinople was largely intended to secure. The surrender of the native Christians was finally accomplished when Refet insisted and obtained on the 5th December that every Ottoman subject desirous of leaving Constantinople must be provided with a Turkish passport. Up to that date the passport control had remained solely in the hands of the Allies, who had by that means been able to get out of the country, without any interference on the part of the Turks, all those who for various reasons considered it advisable to depart.

19. In the meantime, and in various respects, the controlling powers of the Allies in Constantinople had been considerably curtailed. The Allied High Commissioners had renounced their right of press censorship, which had been assumed by Refet. The Allied military control of the Ottoman posts and telegraphs was abandoned and the proceedings of the Allied military tribunals were suspended.

20. Generally speaking, it is scarcely exaggerated to state that by the 5th December the Allied military control has been reduced practically to matters directly affecting the immediate safety of the Allied forces; the Turkish civil control has been correspondingly extended, and all claims on the part of the Allies to protect the native Christian population, except as a moderating influence against the grosser forms of excess, has been, in fact, surrendered.

21. The successful accomplishment of this part of his task will now enable Refet Pasha to devote his activities to questions affecting Allied and foreign interests and to make good the claim of the Angora Government to full sovereignty and independence of action, no less than in Anatolia, in all matters appertaining to the Constantinople Vilayet. Smyrna furnishes a precedent for the procedure which is likely to be adopted. That procedure involves a number of administrative acts in complete disregard of capitulatory privileges. Nor can the Turks be accused of leaving any doubt as to their intentions. On the introduction of similar measures in Smyrna the Allied High Commissioners addressed a strong protest to the Angora Government declining to recognise their validity. Reouf Bey's reply was categorical. It was to the effect that the Grand National Assembly did not consider itself bound by Capitulations which had been incontestably and legally abolished. The measures against which the High Commissioners had protested were within the rights permitted under international law to an independent State.

22. The Turkish authorities in Constantinople have already shown their hand by the publication of an official notice calling upon foreign companies to register under the Turkish Companies' Law of 1914. Compliance with this notice would mean a renouncement of capitulatory privileges, since such registration involves complete subjection to all Turkish laws and regulations.

23. The first encroachment on Allied interests will, if not resisted, be followed by others, such as a demand for the closing of Allied post offices and interference with foreign banks and shipping. It will, of course, be open to the High Commissioners to place on record written protests, reserving all rights and privileges under the Capitulations pending the final decisions of Peace Conference. But it cannot be anticipated that such protests will produce more satisfactory results than those obtained in the case of similar encroachments at Smyrna and in respect of the Allied civil administration in Constantinople. And in the meantime Angora will have presented the conference with a number of *faits accomplis*.

24. If the Allied occupation of Constantinople is to mean anything more than the mere presence of our troops, action of a more vigorous nature than written communications will certainly be required.

25. In my telegram under reference I have suggested that this action should take the form of a definite intimation to Refet Pasha that any interference with Allied interests here in a sense contrary to the Capitulations will be resisted by force. But I am under no delusion as to the difficulty of persuading the French and Italian Governments to agree to such a course. I have already mentioned the suggestion to my French and Italian colleagues, who, especially the latter, exhibited considerable alarm at the possible results of forcible action.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
Acting High Commissioner.

[B 14187/53/44] No. 794.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 1104)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 12, 1922.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 763 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Armenian Patriarch, Mgr. Zaven, that day left Constantinople for Bulgaria on board the steamship "Praga" of the Lloyd Triestino Company.

2. As your Lordship is aware from my despatch No. 1092 of the 5th instant, Mgr. Zaven, who had first contemplated flight from Constantinople some ten days ago, subsequently changed his mind, and decided to remain at his post. On the 4th instant, however, the Patriarch was summoned by Refet Pasha, who asked him to send a telegram to the conference at Lausanne, disavowing the Armenian delegation there under M. Nouradounghian, and stating that the Turkish delegation was alone competent to represent his community. This the Patriarch refused to do, and from that time considered his life to be in such danger that he again decided to leave Constantinople.

3. Meanwhile, in the Armenian community itself the Patriarch's position had become less secure. Several Armenian notables, acting possibly at the instigation of Refet Pasha, had commenced a private campaign against the Patriarch, which found expression in an anonymous letter, dated the 4th December, of which I enclose a French translation herewith,* informing the Patriarch of a meeting of Armenian notables to be held at the Armenian Club in Pera on the following day. Those present at this meeting belonged to the anti-Zaven Party, and decided to send a delegation to the Patriarch asking him to resign.

4. The Patriarch informed the delegation that the question of his resignation could only be dealt with by the National Assembly which had elected him, and which he had summoned to meet on the 8th December. On the same date Mgr. Zaven informed the acting first dragoman that he proposed to intimate to the Assembly that, if there was a majority in favour of his resignation, he would be ready to tender it.

5. On the 6th instant, Mgr. Zaven sent his dragoman to this High Commission to ask that passes might be issued to enable him and his family to leave This was followed on the 7th instant by a written application, copy of which I likewise enclose,* asking for British protection to enable him to proceed to Bulgaria. Owing to the arrangement between the Allied generals and Refet Pasha, according to which all Ottoman subjects must travel with Turkish passports, the departure of the Patriarch could not be arranged in the ordinary way. On receipt of his Beatitude's letter, I had to make arrangements for his departure without the knowledge of the Turkish authorities. This was done in co-operation with the British military authorities. Special passes were prepared for the Patriarch, his nephew, two nieces and his dragoman, and the whole party was put on board the steamship "Praga" in midstream after she had weighed anchor late in the afternoon of the 10th instant.

6. Prior to the Patriarch's departure the meeting of the National Assembly had been held as arranged The Patriarch addressed a letter to the Assembly, stating that he would not be present at the meeting, as he wished to leave the delegates complete liberty of speech. As only twenty-eight delegates were present, however, a quorum was not formed, and the sitting was not opened. The delegates did, nevertheless, meet in private session, and at the close the malcontents, who seem to have been in a slight majority, sent two representatives to advise the Patriarch to resign, and to send his dragoman to ask Refet Pasha to indicate whom he wished nominated in his place. Mgr. Zaven merely promised to take their advice into consideration.

7. Efforts were also made to induce his Beatitude to summon a meeting of the Mixed Council, consisting of thirteen lay and thirteen religious members, to elect a *locum tenens*. This the Patriarch refused to do for the double reason that he was still Patriarch and that the lay council, owing to resignations and departures, did not in fact exist. The petitioners did, however, succeed in inducing Mgr. Norayan, the vice-president of the Religious Council, to convoke a meeting of the council for the same afternoon. The meeting was held, but again a quorum was not obtained, and the sitting was postponed until to-day. I learn, however, that the five members present offered to Mgr. Norayan the post of *locum tenens*, which he refused to accept.

8. For several days before his departure, the local press stated definitely that Mgr. Zaven had resigned, but such reports probably emanated in the first instance from

* Not printed.

interested Turkish and Armenian sources. At the time of his embarkation his Beatitude informed a member of my staff that he had not resigned, that he had no intention of doing so, and that he proposed publishing in the near future a statement giving the reasons for his departure and for his refusal to tender his resignation.

9. During the days immediately preceding his departure Mgr. Zaven showed considerable nervousness, clearly considering himself in imminent danger. Once he had reached the British military base, however, he became quite calm and collected. He was most grateful for the measures taken by this High Commission on his behalf.

10. There has not yet been time to appreciate the effect of the flight of the Patriarch, which will doubtless put an end to the close relations which have existed between the Patriarchate and this High Commission since the Armistice. There is little doubt that the new authority at the Patriarchate will be a Kemalist nominee. It is not expected that a new Patriarch will be appointed at least for the present, even if Mgr. Zaven were to resign, but a *locum tenens* will probably be elected irregularly, as it is most unlikely that a quorum can be obtained either in the National Assembly or in the Mixed Council. It is also probable that the Patriarchate will shortly disavow the Nouradounghian Armenian delegation to the Peace Conference. Mgr. Zaven himself held this view, and was of opinion that for the post of *locum tenens* the choice would fall on Mgr. Arsharouni, himself Patriarch up to 1913, when Mgr. Zaven was elected, and a man in whom he said he had no confidence. Other possible candidates are Mgr. Norayan, who has been mentioned above, and Mgr. Djevahirdjian, an archbishop without a see, who was a tool in the hands of the Turks and *locum tenens* when the Patriarchate was suppressed during the war.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 14189/6569/44] No. 795.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 1106.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 12, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the local Turkish press has for some time been publishing reports of the measures being taken for the registration of the property of those Ottoman subjects who have fled from Constantinople and the surrounding area during the past few months.

2. It appears that orders have, in fact, been given by the Angora Government for the registration of all such property. This is probably a prelude to the introduction in the Constantinople area of the Abandoned Property Law (see Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No 983 of the 7th November, 1922). This law was first applied in Anatolia, and later its provisions were extended to cover property in Smyrna and Thrace. According to the press of the 9th instant, instructions for its application here are daily awaited. It has, indeed, been stated that the property of Damad Ferid Pasha and other prominent Turks has already been confiscated, but up to the present this report lacks confirmation.

3. According to the Turkish newspaper "Tanin," of the 10th instant, the registration of abandoned houses has now been completed, and shows a total of 5,000 in Constantinople and about 7,500 in the surrounding villages on the Marmora littoral, which were almost entirely inhabited by Ottoman Greeks.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 14192/14192/44] No. 796.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 1112.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 12, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to telegrams received by the Turkish press from their correspondents in Angora, the Grand National Assembly have decided to resume diplomatic relations with the Balkan States, and have appointed

Ismail Jambolat Bey Minister at Belgrade, and Jevad Abbas Bey Minister at Sofia. Other appointments are stated to be under consideration.

2. Ismail Jambolat Bey, who was born at Ismid in 1881, received a military education, and in 1902 was posted as a second lieutenant to Salonica, where he made the acquaintance of Talaat Pasha (then Effendi), and became an active member of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was appointed Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, in 1910, and was Vali of Constantinople for some six weeks in 1911. On the fall of the Committee of Union and Progress Government in 1912, he shot dead with his own hand the policeman sent to arrest him, and eventually escaped to Roumania. In 1915 he was again Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, and was Prefect of Constantinople in 1916. In 1917 he was appointed Turkish Minister at Stockholm, where he remained for a very short period, as the Swedish Government refused to recognise him. In 1919 he was interned at Malta on charges of murder and of being implicated in the Armenian massacres. He was released in 1921, and proceeded to Italy. In July 1922 he arrived here with Bekir Sami Bey, leaving a few days later for Angora. He is married to a daughter of Redvan Pasha, a former Prefect of Constantinople. The press state that he is at present at Samsun, whence he will proceed to Angora for instructions before setting out for his new post.

3. I understand that Jevad Abbas Bey is Deputy for Bolu in the Grand National Assembly, and that he has been resident for some time during the last eighteen months in Sofia, where he gave out that he was the representative of the Angora Government. While in Bulgaria he engaged in various intrigues, and was in relations with Fuad Bey, the notorious organiser of bands for action in Thrace.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Belgrade and Sofia.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 14195/76/44] No. 797.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 1129.)
My Lord, *Rome, December 12, 1922.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1423 of the 30th ultimo, relative to aeroplanes, &c., said to have been sold to the Turks and awaiting shipment at Venice, I have the honour to report that I received yesterday a further *note verbale* from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that the Italian authorities had made further investigations and had satisfied themselves that there were no war materials awaiting shipment at Venice for the East, and that no information was obtainable concerning any such proposed shipments.

This note has crossed the *note verbale* which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, I addressed on the subject to the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 9th instant. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the latter note, to which I will not fail to press for a reply.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure in No. 797.

Note verbale.

ON receipt of the *note verbale* from the Royal Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 20th ultimo, relative to the export of war materials from Italy, His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at once informed His Majesty's Government of the contents of that note.

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has now called the attention of the Embassy to the fact that, while the Royal Italian Government have satisfied themselves that the aeroplanes, &c., said to have been sold to the Turks and to be awaiting shipment at Venice, have not in fact reached that port, they do not refer in any way to the general question of possible military pressure being exerted by the Turks on the Allies during the Lausanne Conference, as was suggested in the last

paragraph of the *note verbale* of the Embassy of the 30th October last. His Majesty's Government hold that it may fairly be considered that recent developments in the Near East have terminated Græco-Turkish hostilities, and so have liquidated the neutrality adopted by the Allies in those hostilities. The present situation is dominated by the danger of hostilities between the Turkish forces and those of the three principal Allies in Turkey, and in these circumstances it would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be to the last degree imprudent were the Allied Governments, which are admittedly unable to reinforce their own troops in Turkey, to allow the continued supply of arms to the Turkish forces, with whom it is not impossible that their troops might yet find themselves engaged in hostilities.

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy are therefore instructed to bring the matter again to the earnest attention of the Royal Italian Government, and to urge that all possible steps may be taken to prevent any military supplies from reaching Turkey from Italian sources.

Rome, December 9, 1922.

No. 798.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 775.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, December 18, 1922.*

IT is most important that a clause should be inserted in Peace Treaty clearly stipulating that no concession made to Turkey by Allied Powers concerning taxation of their nationals in Turkey or renunciation of capitulatory privileges shall have retroactive effect, and that date of their coming into force shall be date of ratification of treaty. Insurance companies, in this connection, have received notices claiming several years' arrears of *temettu*. Question is of importance also in connection with jurisdiction over claims for fire insurance losses at Smyrna.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 83.)

No. 799.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 18, 1922.*

WE have had a disappointing afternoon, the result, it would appear, of concerted action between Russians and Turks. After ten days of careful and friendly examination between Allied and Turkish experts of every aspect of Straits question, in which we have deferred to their representations or fears on a score of points and had arrived at what was believed to be an agreed decision on majority, I unfolded scheme at meeting of conference this afternoon, M. Barrère following with a statement of its underlying principles and main objects. Turks replied by reviving a number of points which have been raised a dozen times in private or public discussions, and as usual by demanding more time. Then followed a characteristically disagreeable speech from Chicherin rejecting our scheme *in toto* and attributing to it most sinister motives. He ended by producing an entirely new project of his own, covering four or five pages of type, and claimed that it should be discussed article by article by a sub-committee. This I declined to allow, promising to give views of Allies upon scheme as a whole to-morrow. Then Turks, emboldened by Russian manœuvre and possibly in collusion with it, joined in. They complained that discussions of last ten days, in which they have assisted throughout, have been unauthoritative and insufficient; they demanded a reopening of principal issues, and they ended by producing two counter-schemes of their own. Their attitude had a strong flavour, not merely obstructive, of bad faith, and I remarked, with strong support of my colleagues, that we declined to defer to these tactics.

If meeting to-morrow is of similar character it will probably be necessary to see Ismet Pasha, and tell him plainly that Straits question is closed, and that he can either take solution proposed or leave it, with the result that all accompanying concessions will be withdrawn. Now that Russians have realised that their own proposals lack any support they are setting out deliberately to wreck ours, Turks being stalking-horse behind whom they advance to the attack.

No. 800.

**Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 18.)*

[By Bag.]

(No. 666.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 17, 1922.*

M. POINCARÉ told me to-day that he had received simultaneously information from M. Barrère at Lausanne to the effect that Ismet Pasha was in a conciliatory mood, and from French representative at Angora to the effect that extremists in National Assembly were getting the upper hand. He therefore begged me to urge on your Lordship extreme desirability of signing treaty before Christmas, leaving, if necessary, details to be settled later. He says that Ismet has full powers to sign, but that if he be permitted to return to Angora before signature National Assembly will probably decline to allow him to return with them to Lausanne, and thus wreck work of conference. I observed that our information from Constantinople showed the situation there was improving. M. Poincaré admitted this, but harped on seriousness of position at Angora.

His Excellency feels grave misgivings with regard to Signor Mussolini, and fears he may renew his blackmail of insisting on agreement on economic questions before consenting to sign treaty.

No. 801.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 19.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 17, 1922.*

M. CHICHERIN asked to see me this afternoon, and we spent more than an hour in conversation. Setting aside the question of recognition, he asked me what were the intentions of the present British Government towards Russia. Did we desire by methods of conciliation and compromise to arrive at a friendly understanding, starting from the basis of the trade agreement and proceeding to co-operation over a wider area? His Government had the impression that we were more hostile than our predecessors. In reply I welcomed the opportunity of speaking with perfect frankness to M. Chicherin. I said that he knew as well as I did what were the conditions of such an understanding. No Prime Minister could have been more disposed towards close relations with Russia, and certainly none had worked harder to achieve them than Mr. Lloyd George, both because of his broad conception of European policy, and because his personal attitude towards the Soviet Government had been more elastic than that of some of his colleagues. But Russia herself by her behaviour at Genoa and The Hague seemed to have deliberately thrown away the opening, and to have only produced irritation where she pleaded for friendship. As regards the present Government, the conditions on which friendship could be attained had been restated a few days ago by Prime Minister in House of Commons. Until these were satisfied, how could advance be made? To one of them I called special attention. I had been personally responsible for paragraphs in trade agreement renouncing political propaganda against British Empire, notably in East. Nevertheless, I had overwhelming evidence up till present hour to show that in every part of East, Afghanistan, Persia, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Soviet Russia had been persistently intriguing and spending large sums of money in anti-British policy and propaganda. How could we be expected to embrace a would-be friend who thus stabbed us in the back? Until there was an absolute desistence from this pestilent activity, there could be no real reconciliation, although present British Government were not less anxious than their predecessors that Russia should play her due part in scheme of world reconstruction, and realised that her permanent estrangement was an international loss.

Chicherin in reply made only the feeblest defence. He denied all my charges, which, he said were based on worthless secret service reports; he actually accused us of intriguing against Russia in Afghanistan, Northern Persia and Caucasus, whereas, as I pointed out, under system in which Caucasian States had been absorbed in the caresses of Russia, we had no agent and no information there at all. Moscow

* In cypher D to Lausanne.

having ignored our request to send a trading representative. He declared that Soviet Government were not responsible for what irregular Russian agents might do, and that it was necessary here as elsewhere to establish a compromise between our two points of view.

I replied that where one of two parties was exclusively guilty of propaganda, while the other was wholly innocent, no mid-way house or compromise appeared to be possible, and I challenged him, though without result, to name a single part of world in which we were doing towards Russia what Russia was daily and weekly doing towards us. Even while I was here he was puting out malicious articles in the press attacking the British, and trying to embroil me with Labour Party in England; while simultaneously he succeeded in exasperating the latter by such follies as the Stan Harding case. I gave these replies in presence of Sir William Tyrrell, who can corroborate that Chicherin found no response except repetition of formulas about communistic principles and necessity for Russia of following what he called a diagonal line.

We then turned to Lausanne situation, where he complained of Russia being left out in the cold and not permitted to discuss matters in sub-committees, where they could put forward amendments and where, by this process, a mid-way point could be found between British and Russian proposals.

I replied as regards the personal aspect of the case that Russia had only herself to thank for her isolation. She had refrained from establishing any contact with the other delegations. She had declined to send her experts to discuss details with the Turkish and European experts; and she had thus placed herself in a position where she stood alone. It was I who had pressed for her admission to main conference on Straits question instead of a separate palaver at Geneva, as M. Poincaré had proposed; who had procured the representation of Georgia and Ukraine; and who was anxious that her signature should be placed to a Straits convention. But she had responded by an attitude of hostility and aloofness from start which no one regretted more than myself.

As to public aspect of case, I reminded M. Chicherin that we were here not to arrive, as he thought, at a compromise between the views of Great Britain and Russia about Straits, which appeared to be diametrically opposed, but to conclude peace between certain European Powers and Turkey, with whom we were still at war. In the course of this discussion, Russia had thought fit to put forward a plan for Straits with which no one, not even the Turks, agreed. To-morrow I should explain to conference the amended proposals in which all the remaining Powers, after prolonged expert discussion, in which the Russians had declined to participate, had concurred. These amendments had been designed to relieve Turkey from the very apprehensions as to her future security which Chicherin himself had expressed on her behalf. Why, then, should we tear up this scheme in order to arrive at an impossible compromise between our own views and the unsupported Russian plan?

M. Chicherin seemed greatly disappointed at idea that he would not be permitted to assist in search for this phantasmagorical compromise, and complained that Soviet delegation were being presented with an ultimatum, and in that case would have no alternative but to refuse to sign.

I said that I should not have pressed for their presence at Lausanne unless I had held the view that any Straits convention would be much the better and stronger for Russian signature; but that if she decided to withhold it, I would prefer a convention signed by everybody else to none at all, and that perhaps on reflection Russia might adhere later on.

Personal impressions of a conversation given by one of the two parties are proverbially fallible and may be unintentionally misleading. But this I can say, that Chicherin has heard, probably for first time from lips of a British Minister, what I believe to be the sentiments of nine Englishmen out of ten on the subjects which we discussed. I shall see to-morrow whether any effect has been produced upon his attitude.

Cabinet will note with interest the conception of policy openly laid down by Chicherin as applicable to every situation. One party is to be at liberty to indulge in most extravagant action or to put forward most extreme proposals. The other party is regarded as stationary at the opposite pole. An equation is then to be reached by scaling down the proposals or plans of the former 50 per cent., while the latter is to make a corresponding modification or advance in order to produce a happy equipoise.

No. 802.

Sir P. Loraine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 451.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, December 18, 1922.*

I HAVE received note from Persian Government requesting admission of Persian representative to Lausanne Conference as regards western and especially Kurdistan frontier. Similar note has been addressed to my French and Italian colleagues, and I understand same request has been made direct in London, Paris and Rome. My support is requested, and Persian Government presumes that, pending despatch of its representative, whatever rights it may have will be preserved.

No. 803.

Sir P. Loraine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 452.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 19, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Reference numbers are those of papers in Persian print, volume 1920, part 8. Persians invoke 54 in support of their claim, which thus seems not unfounded; see also 111 and 126. Has anything occurred meanwhile to invalidate assurance given at that time?

I do not know whether His Majesty's Government and their allies are prepared to admit claims at this stage. Doubtless it would give considerable satisfaction here if a Persian representative were granted a hearing; also, Russians would be thereby deprived of any pretext for championing Persian cause, which they might do merely to give trouble.

On the other hand, request comes very late; Persian object is vaguely stated, and their views would probably be tedious and not to the point. It might also be pointed out, if request be considered inadmissible, that Persian claim can be referred to commission of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives contemplated by Treaty of Sèvres, if that or a similar provision for rectifying boundary where Turkish and Persian frontier is coincident be preserved in treaty now under negotiation.

I do not know whether any new border State is now contemplated to be interposed between Turkey and Persia; I gather, however, that Persian Government is interested in any possible rectification of Kurdish frontier between Turkey and Irak, and would dislike Mosul reverting to Turkey.

(Confidential.)

A refusal will certainly cause disappointment here, but if one is necessary I hope my French and Italian colleagues and I may receive identic instructions in such manner as to make it clear that decision is an Allied, and not a British, one.

(Copies to India and Bagdad.)

[E 14422/27/44] No. 804.

Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe.

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day in order to say good-bye before proceeding to Rome on a short holiday. He said M. Mussolini would certainly consult him as to the best means of getting on with the proposed general understanding on Italian economic interests in the East. He hoped I had noticed that at Lausanne the question had been dropped, and that there was no idea of disturbing the united front by introducing this question of a separate agreement with Italy. I said I was indeed glad to hear that, in the matter of the Straits and other questions, all the Allies, under

Lord Curzon's guidance, were acting together. It was quite clear that if the conference ended in a success, which we ardently hoped, this would be entirely due to the effective manner in which the Allies were co-operating.

The Marquis della Torretta said it would facilitate his discussions with M. Mussolini very much if he could place before him some views as to what kind of proposals might eventually be found acceptable to the British Government. I said I rather deprecated the idea that there should be a general search for something that might be agreeable to the two Governments, as if it were of little importance what the particular things were on which agreement was to be reached. Surely the only justification for concluding such an agreement could be that there was, at least on one side, some precise need of something that the other side could give. If the Italian Government did not themselves know what they were to ask for, it seemed to show that there was no real object in proposing an agreement. I therefore must adhere to the view I had previously expressed, that it was for the Italian Government to say what they wanted. The Ambassador agreed that this was reasonable, but he said he was afraid of advising his Government to put forward things which he might afterwards be told he ought to have known the British Government would not agree to. I said: quite so; but, in order that I should tell him whether something was or was not agreeable, it was obviously essential that I should be told what it was.

After this preliminary fencing, the Ambassador mentioned oil. I said I believed that conversations on this subject had taken place between experts at Lausanne. So far as Mesopotamian oil was concerned, I could not say what the present position, as a result of those conversations, might be; I could only repeat, what we had always declared, that there was no opposition on the part of the British Government to Italian association with British, French and American enterprise, provided that such association could be arranged in the proper manner between the commercial parties directly interested.

The Ambassador then asked whether the Italians might not hope to receive concessions from the Mesopotamian authorities of land suitable for development by Italian labour. I said this was a matter on which I could not off-hand express an opinion. We had already, I reminded him, given a general assurance that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Italian labour, if such were found desirable and suitable for local purposes. The Ambassador thought that we might go further and make an offer of definite regions to be handed over to Italian syndicates. I asked what were those syndicates; what were their resources and what was the prospect of their doing remunerative work? He admitted that he was speaking entirely at random, and nothing definite was in his mind. I said that, without something much more precise, it would be difficult for me to obtain the opinion and advice of the Colonial Office, who would, no doubt, have to consult the authorities on the spot; but it must be obvious that, in a country like Mesopotamia—in a still rather unsettled condition, inhabited by a somewhat fanatical Mahommedan population—it would be exceedingly difficult to promise vague arrangements for settling Italian colonists on the land in unspecified regions.

The Ambassador then reverted to M. Mussolini's original suggestion that Italy should take a part in administering the mandates. I reminded him that I had once before asked him the question how exactly he understood such participation, and that he was then quite unable to enlighten me. I could only repeat that such a suggestion could not be considered unless at least it took a more definite form, but I begged the Ambassador to remind his Government that the administration of the mandates was no amusement, and that the burden it actually placed on the British Government was at this present moment causing the very greatest anxiety, both from the point of view of defence and from that of finance. The Italian Government had better first study the question whether they would be prepared to finance the administration and to provide the necessary military forces, before they embarked on the even more difficult problem of advising how a mandate over one country could be exercised by two Powers at the same time.

The Ambassador said he would not fail once more to impress all this on M. Mussolini, and hoped in due course to be able to put forward some concrete proposals, and I once more assured him that such proposals would, of course, be received in the friendliest spirit and be considered with every sympathy and desire to meet Italian views wherever it was practicable without harm to British interests.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, December 19, 1922.

No. 805.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 19, 1922.*

TO-DAY was a better day.

After careful examination by our experts of various counter-projects for the Straits submitted by Turks and Russians, I delivered this morning full and final Allied reply. We had agreed between ourselves that these protracted and dilatory discussions must be brought to an end, and that Turks should be told that we had reached limit of concessions. I first rejected Russian scheme *in toto* as mere reproduction of Chicherin's original proposal for *mare clausum* in Black Sea, remarking that it had not found a friend and was so inconsistent with Allied ideas that even consideration was useless. So it perished without a sigh from anyone and with barely a groan from its authors. I then took Turkish counter-schemes both for demilitarised zones and for navigation of Straits, which consisted for the most part of demands already put forward a dozen times in expert discussions, debated *ad nauseam*, and already rejected, and refused them for definite reasons, accepting, however, one or two of a harmless nature. I closed my remarks by summing up advantages which our proposals secured for Turkey. Ismet Pasha, as usual, asked to reserve reply, but protested strongly against proposed Straits Commission and denounced political guarantees as inadequate. Chicherin tried, without success, to muddy the stream. Two Black Sea States, Roumania and Bulgaria, then declared complete acceptance of Allied scheme, and repudiated Turkish and Russian proposals. Greece and Serbia took the same line, representative of latter entering a vigorous and timely protest against waste of time in these interminable debates.

I took advantage of this opening to say that Allies had meant to end debate on the subject to-day, but would grant one more sitting to hear Turkish reply to-morrow. This was accepted without demur and announced in official communiqué. Russia will thus have no reason for prolonging her stay at Lausanne. Turkey will realise that she must either accept Straits Convention as it stands or lose it altogether. To-day's proceedings were in reality presentation of ultimatum by Allies, although the phrase was never employed.

No. 806.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 20, 1922.*

THERE were rumours this morning of impending crisis, of Turkish intransigence, and inevitable rupture. When we met, however, Ismet Pasha made speech of a conciliatory character in which, after a rhetorical but perhaps pardonable allusion to great sacrifices being accepted by his country, he definitely accepted Allied proposals with regard to freedom of the Straits, but reiterated Turkish views on points of special importance to them.

First of these was existence of Greek population in islands near Dardanelles and presence of Greek fleet in those waters. I did not reply to this because it is inseparable from geographical conditions. His second point was renewed demand for a Turkish garrison, however small, on Gallipoli peninsula, to which I replied that presence of a regular force is incompatible with demilitarisation, and that Turks are to be allowed gendarmerie, mounted and unmounted, but, of course, without artillery.

He then asked for abolition of stationnaires at Constantinople, to which Bompard and I rejoined that this is an act of courtesy analogous to ambassadorial privileges elsewhere, to which it is surprising that they should object.

Finally came their crowning objection to proposal to entrust Straits Commission with duty of inspecting militarised zones, arising from Turkish anger that such a function should conceivably be exercised by smaller Powers, especially Greece. There is some force in this plea, although it is largely a question of *amour-propre*. I had previously gained assent of French and Italians to proposal to entrust this duty,

which I described at conference as *sine quâ non* of demilitarisation, to military and naval attachés of Great Powers at Constantinople and, accordingly, I reserved final answer on this question for conversation with Turks. I think it can be arranged. Last question raised by Ismet was renewed demand for individual and collective guarantee by Powers. This he knows he will not get, so I did not repeat my previous refusal. My general object this afternoon, in harmony with my statement of yesterday that to-day would be last sitting of commission on Straits, was to reserve the still disputed points for private discussion with Ismet. At conference he is obliged to pose for Angora and Turkish world.

Russian delegation, though present, preserved a significant silence and undoubtedly this afternoon's sitting worked a definite break-away by Turks from Russian thraldom, which may have larger consequences.

[E 14278/13003/44] No. 807.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Second Meeting, November 28, 1922, at 4 P.M., under the presidency of M. Barrère.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 21.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold	M. Bompard.	M. Montagna.
		M. Lago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Cachamanos.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Nintchitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE	ITALY
Sir William Tyrrell.	M. de Lacroix.	M. Guariglia.
Sir Adam Block.	M. Bargeton.	M. Nogara.
Mr. Fountain.	M. des Closières.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. Barois.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Sanguinetti.	
Mr. Waley.	M. de Lamoricière.	
Mr. MacClure.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Sato.	M. Dendramis.
Mr. Heck.	Colonel Saigo.	M. Theotokas.
	Mr. Tani.	M. Politis.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
Colonel Dumitrescu.	M. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Antitch.	

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Bentinck.		M. Indelli.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Savfet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

M. BARRÈRE believed that Ismet Pasha wished to amplify his previous statement of the views of his Government on the financial questions with which the commission was to deal, and invited him to speak

ISMET PASHA said that one of the questions classified among financial problems by the Third Commission was the distribution of the Ottoman debt. As the Ottoman Empire had ceased to exist, it was natural that these debts should be distributed among all the countries to whom territory formerly belonging to that Empire had been assigned. In accordance with the same principle of justice the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, being a Government constituted on the territory of the former Empire within the limits of its national frontiers, was ready to accept liability for its due share of the debt and was anxious to see the amount of that share fixed as soon as possible. In that connection it must be noted that there were some States which, although they had in the past annexed territory formerly included in the Ottoman Empire, had not yet accepted liability for their portion of the debt; it was therefore necessary to assign their due share to them. Thus the task before the commission was to undertake a general liquidation of the debt of the former Ottoman Empire.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey accepted liability for part portion of the debt which would fall to its share on the basis which he had just defined. It also considered that it was no longer concerned in any way with the amount of the debt to be assigned either to the States formed out of the Ottoman Empire in consequence of the great war, or to those which had previously acquired Turkish territory.

As the method to be adopted for the distribution of the debt was a technical question he thought it could with advantage be examined by a special sub-commission of experts.

As regards the repayment of expenses incurred for military occupation, which was included in the programme of the commission, the Turkish delegation thought it necessary to make the following remarks:—

They knew nothing of the reasons which led to the inclusion of this item, and could not refrain from expressing their surprise at its inclusion. However, as the question had been raised, they felt bound to express their opinion.

As would be remembered, an armistice putting a stop to hostilities between the former Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers was concluded at Mudros; but the peace proposals which the Turkish nation expected to follow this armistice were not made to it; on the contrary coercive measures began, such as the occupation of Adana and Constantinople.

The Turkish delegation considered that these occupations did not take place in virtue of the terms of the armistice, but were undertaken as coercive measures with the object of compelling the Ottoman Empire to accept and carry out the conditions which the Allied Powers intended to impose upon it.

There was therefore no reason why Turkey should be made to bear the expenses arising out of a military occupation which the Allies decided to execute with a view to imposing their will.

On the contrary, it was the Turkish State which suffered damage in consequence and had a legitimate right to ask for reparation; for these occupations had inflicted on the Turkish State and nation all manner of loss and suffering, both material and moral.

Consequently, it was just and fair that far from demanding of Turkey reimbursement of the costs of military occupation, reparation should be made for the damage inflicted on her by these occupations.

The fact that there was no juridical basis for this demand led the Turkish delegation to hope that the Lausanne Conference, which had met to lay the foundations of a just peace, would not insist on so inequitable a claim.

In regard to reparation for damage, the Turkish delegation had the honour to submit for the impartial consideration of the commission the following general observations:—

In accordance with the principles of law and equity, they considered that civilians who had suffered direct damage from acts and operations of war and from acts contrary to international law should be indemnified reciprocally.

Thus if civilian nationals of the *Entente* Powers had suffered bodily harm or damage to their property through acts or operations of war (such as attacks, bombardments, &c.), executed by the armies of the former Ottoman Empire, they would be indemnified by the successors of the said Empire, and the Turkish Government would be bound to contribute a fair share towards that indemnity.

The *Entente* Powers, being inspired with the same sentiments of justice, would in like manner indemnify Turkish civilians placed in the same position within the territory of the former Ottoman Empire or elsewhere.

Damage to civilians of both sides arising directly from acts contrary to international law, and damage to property belonging to the contracting States or their nationals which had been confiscated, seized or deteriorated directly and in any place, would be settled on the same principle.

Full indemnity must be given for the devastation and destruction perpetrated by the Greek army in Asia Minor from the occupation of Smyrna (*i.e.*, after the regular suspension of hostilities by the Mudros Convention) up to the final defeat of the Greek army. Documents from absolutely neutral sources and evidence of indisputable value proved the formidable extent of the destruction done. Ismet Pasha had questioned the offenders himself. Among all—from the highest officers down to men in the ranks, from priests down to private individuals—he had found the same premeditation and persistent will to destroy systematically everything Turkish. The heartrending spectacle of those vast devastated areas rendered any other evidence unnecessary. This devastation demanded imperatively the reparation of all damage.

As the present discussion was limited to general observations, he proposed to refer the matter to the sub-commission, which would be instructed to furnish a detailed report to the commission.

M. VENIZELOS wished first to find out what foundation there was for the theory whereby a State ceding part of its territory should be relieved of part of its national debt.

The basis of that theory was that the annexing State deprived the conquered State of part of its resources, and the creditors of the conquered State of part of their guarantees.

It was therefore desirable to see, firstly, whether it could truly be said that the Balkan States had deprived the Ottoman Empire of part of its resources; secondly, whether the creditors of Turkey had suffered any loss on account of the cession of Turkish territory to the Balkan States; and, thirdly, whether the provinces occupied had shared in the advantages procured for Turkey by the various loans which she had contracted.

The two railway lines in the occupied provinces (the Salonica–Monastir and Salonica–Dedeagatch junction lines) had been constructed by companies, to which the Ottoman Government only assured the payment of a kilometric guarantee by means of earmarking some of the revenues of the district crossed by the railway. The works executed in the port of Salonica were likewise due to a private enterprise. The religious, educational and benevolent establishments had been founded and endowed by the communities to which they belonged, the chief of them by the generosity of patriotic persons who had made money abroad.

It was well known that, with the exception of two or three loans contracted with a view to the execution of public works in Asia Minor, such as the Bagdad and

Soma–Panderma railways, all the loans of the Ottoman State had been floated under pressure of financial embarrassment and had been neither useful nor productive. The loans of the Ottoman Empire were designed to meet the budgetary deficit created by troubles which had to be suppressed, insurrections, wars or actual destruction; they had never afforded the smallest advantage to any of the occupied provinces; none of them had been used for works of economic utility to those provinces, nor for the encouragement of science, letters or arts.

It was universally admitted that the revenue raised by the Ottoman Government in the Vilayets of Salonica, Kossovo and Monastir was never sufficient to cover the expenses of administration in those provinces.

In 1907 it was estimated that 85,000,000 piastres, or £T. 850,000, was the minimum yearly contribution required by the Sublime Porte to meet the expenses of the three provinces. According to a statement in the German "Red Book" the estimated expenses for the three vilayets for the financial year the 1st March, 1907, to the end of February, 1908, excluding extraordinary expenses, amounted to 277,944,648 piastres (Salonica, 113,441,757; Kossovo, 91,169,942; Monastir, 73,332,949); estimated receipts to meet these expenses amounted to 191,121,818 piastres (Salonica, 81,321,750; Kossovo, 58,451,696; Monastir, 52,348,372). For the financial year 1907–8 there was thus a deficit of 86,822,830 piastres; for 1906–7, 82,255,636 piastres; and for 1905–6, 90,479,740 piastres. The Financial Commission estimated that the amount to be withdrawn by the Porte from the revenues of other parts of the Empire in order to cover the deficit for 1907–8 amounted to at least £T. 850,000.

It was not possible to wipe out that deficit by the yield of the customs surtax of 3 per cent. levied on foreign imports in 1907. The accounts of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which had the management of the revenues from the three vilayets, showed that for the financial year 1909–10 Turkey had paid into the account of expenses for those provinces the sum of 60,575,000 piastres, despite the earmarking of the general yield of the customs surtax to those expenses. If one added to this sum the 25,000,000 piastres yielded by the customs surtax, which was levied in other parts of the Empire outside Macedonia, the sum paid by the Ottoman Government for the administrative expenses of the three provinces during the financial year 1909–10 amounted to 85,000,000 piastres, *i.e.*, £T. 850,000.

It was essential to note that this sum exceeded the annual yield of the revenues raised in those provinces or administered by the Administration of the Public Debt for the service of the various loans governed by the Decree of Moharrem. This meant that the three provinces in question in no way contributed to the service of the general debt of the Empire. Their share of the debt was really borne by the Asiatic provinces, part of whose revenue was used each year to meet the deficit caused by the earmarking of certain Macedonian revenues for the service of various loans.

To sum up, the Ottoman Empire suffered no diminution of its resources by the loss of the European provinces.

There was another argument against the Turkish demand for the attribution of public debt to the annexing State, namely, that the provinces which Turkey had lost, notably Macedonia, had always been a hotbed of insurrection, and involved Turkey in military expenditure wholly out of proportion to the revenues derived from those provinces.

It was hardly necessary to say that the creditors of the Ottoman Empire could not have suffered any real loss through the cession of Turkey's European provinces. The lien on the revenue which served as a guarantee for their credits was a reality as regards the creditors, but entirely fictitious as regards the Ottoman Government. The latter was obliged to take every year out of the revenue of other parts of the Empire a sum far larger than the annual yield of the revenues under lien and earmarked for the public debt, and to utilise that sum for meeting administrative expenses in its European provinces. As a substitute for this transfer of revenues, which, in fact, was purely nominal, the Ottoman Government could easily give its creditors a new guarantee, based on the revenues of the provinces which Turkey retained.

None of the equitable grounds on which the theory of distribution of debts was based could be invoked in the special case of the cession of Turkey's European provinces. As there had been no diminution in the resources of the ceding State, no harm had been done to its creditors. Moreover, the detached provinces had derived no profit from the loans contracted by the Ottoman Empire.

It was true that at the time of drafting the Treaty of Sèvres, which had now lapsed, Greece had undertaken to assume part of the Ottoman Public Debt; but she

had been able to do so on account of the considerable advantages accorded to her by that treaty. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, which had acquired no Turkish territory by the war, had refused to sign the Treaty of Sèvres because that treaty provided for part of the debt being imposed upon it. Now the situation had entirely changed, for the advantages given to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres had disappeared and only part of Western Thrace remained to her.

Passing to the question of the reparation now demanded by the Turkish delegation for the damage done by the Greek army in Asia Minor, M. Venizelos said that the basis on which the Allies had founded their recognition of the right to such reparations was a moral basis, *i.e.*, the responsibility of each State for the war. Now in the present case it was the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the Government of Angora, which was responsible for the war. It was Turkey who started the war; Greece only came into the war in order to fulfil her obligations of alliance with the former Kingdom of Serbia, which had been attacked by those with whom Turkey had made common cause. When Greece came into the war she formed nine divisions, and thus gave the Allies a numerical superiority on the Macedonian front. She thus contributed to the breaking of the enemy's front, and later to the success of the offensive in Macedonia, thus possibly shortening the war by six months, which was as much in the interests of the conquered as of the conquerors.

As regards the damage done, M. Venizelos stated firstly that, during the first two years of occupation of Asia Minor, when the Greek army had been uniformly successful, there had been no destruction at all. The burning of villages between the Valley of Sakharia and the railway line, Afiun–Karahissar–Eskisheir, at the time of the first Greek retreat, had been necessitated by purely military exigencies. The Greek army wished to destroy those places on its line of retreat which could afford shelter to the Turkish army, and therefore constituted an obvious danger for the Greek army. As regards the damage done during the last retreat, preceding the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek army, he had no official information. In any case these excesses had been committed by a retreating army on its course, and were nothing extraordinary, even in the case of very well disciplined armies. It must also be remembered that the retreating army was attacked by Turkish irregulars scattered about in the Turkish villages through which the Greek army passed. One really could not compare the excesses committed under such conditions with the devastation done by the German army in the north of France and in Belgium. These devastations had been perpetrated at a time when the German army was victorious. When Germany felt that she was going to lose the war, and that the German army would have to evacuate the territory occupied by it, all excesses were avoided: that proved the systematic and premeditated character of these devastations.

The Greek army, while in occupation of Turkish territory, committed no excesses; they took place during the retreat when discipline was relaxed. It must be added that excesses were never committed outside the military zone, and none were reported as taking place under the Greek administration which, on the contrary, always favoured the Turkish element in doubtful cases rather than the Greek. He was convinced—at least he hoped—that the conference could only regard the question in this way. He even hoped that the Turkish delegation would not insist on their demand.

Even supposing it were admitted that Greece was responsible for the war, and was consequently bound to repair the damage committed under the conditions just indicated, there existed other considerations which would practically exonerate Greece from any reparation at all, and would also give her the right to present counter-claims, the total of which would far surpass the amount of reparation claimed by the Turks.

It was recognised that the Greek army disembarked at Smyrna, not on its own initiative, but upon an invitation from the Allies—not in the special interest of Greece, but in that of all the Allies. He referred to his correspondence with M. Clemenceau, who had written to him that the military occupation of Smyrna did not signify the cession of that territory to Greece; that proved that Greece had landed at Smyrna and undertaken the military operations in Asia Minor, not on her own account, but in the common interest of the Allies. It was only on the 21st June, 1921, that the Powers informed the Greek Government that if it did not accept their intervention they could not persevere in a sterile enterprise, and Greece would have to continue the struggle at her own risk. But even before that time, even if one did not go farther back than the beginning of 1921, the expenses of the Greek occupation were much larger than the value of the damage done in Asia Minor.

Greece had yet another counter-claim against Turkey, which would also much exceed the latter's claim for reparation. Turkey, during the months just before and after her coming into the great war, had expelled from the coasts of Asia Minor and of Thrace 480,000 Greeks, who had had to take refuge on Greek soil without being able to carry off any of their movable property. Greece had had to provide for the maintenance of these people from May 1914 until the middle of 1920, when it was possible to have them repatriated to their old homes on the territory which had been assigned to Greece by the treaty, either as annexed territory, or as territory in military occupation. The expenses occasioned by the maintenance and assistance given to these refugees, by their transport to Greece, and subsequent repatriation to Asia Minor and Thrace, together with the expense incurred by the Greek Government in giving them a little pittance with which to make a fresh start in life after repatrintion, greatly exceeded the damage done by the Greek army in the zone of military operations.

Greece was confronted with another formidable problem—the arrival of refugees in masses in consequence of recent events. A fortnight ago 905,000 such refugees had passed through the official refugee service, and to that number must be added about 40,000 more who, being rather better off, had come to Greece without the assistance of the refugee service. If one took account of all that Greece had to spend both in the past and the present on housing and feeding these masses of old and new refugees, none of whom except those from Eastern Thrace had been allowed to carry off anything with them, one arrived at a figure much higher than that of the Turkish claim.

For all these reasons he asked the conference to reject the Turkish demand concerning reparation. It had no moral foundation, since not Greece but Turkey was responsible for the war. Besides, even if the claim were examined, Greece's counter-claims (which he had just explained briefly) should be examined too. Each of these counter-claims exceeded the total amount of damages several times over. But Greece understood quite well that no useful purpose would be served by pressing for an examination of these claims and counter-claims. By article 231 of the Treaty of Sèvres Turkey recognised "that by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied Powers she had caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation"; but the Allied Powers recognised, on the other hand, "that the resources of Turkey are not sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation," and in these conditions they gave up those claims. Again, by article 238 of the same treaty the Allies agreed not to require from Turkey any payment in respect of claims transferred to them by Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary. If in August 1920 Turkey was considered incapable of paying these reparations, she would be even more so now. But supposing, on the other hand, that the examination of these claims and counter-claims resulted in a net credit in favour of Turkey against Greece, it was evident that the present economic and financial situation in Greece was incomparably worse than that of Turkey in 1920. It should not be forgotten that Greece had undertaken a general mobilisation in September 1915, and that she had been at war since September 1916. Her resources were exhausted, and now she was confronted with the terrible problem of having to house, feed and eventually settle in a million refugees. Consequently, it was impossible for her to contemplate the payment of indemnities.

M. NINTCHITCH said that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had no direct interest in the question of reparations; it could only be interested in the question of the Ottoman Public Debt. This question had been examined for a long time past; first, by the Conference of London, and later by the Inter-Allied Financial Conference at Paris, where a very detailed investigation had been made. The Serb-Croat-Slovene State had no wish to evade its obligations; but it was evident that the solution of the problem would require very considerable work which might greatly prolong the negotiations and so delay the conclusion of peace, which was so urgently required. He therefore thought that it would be preferable to set up a special financial commission to examine the subject; it should be understood that the conclusions reached by that commission would later on be annexed to the Treaty of Peace.

LORD CURZON recalled the fact that the question of the Ottoman Public Debt had been very carefully studied at the time of drawing up the Treaty of Sèvres, and precise clauses had been drafted. He did not think M. Nintchitch need have any anxiety as regards prolonged enquiry being required; the sub-commission would find that a large portion of its labours had been accomplished in 1920.

M. NINTCHITCH did not object to the immediate discussion of the question, but he wished to point out that at the time when the Treaty of Sèvres was concluded there was no free discussion with the States concerned. It was precisely because of the economic and financial clauses inserted in that treaty that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had refused to sign it. The discussion of the question would therefore take a very long time.

ISMET PASHA maintained that the principle of the distribution of the debt among the States which had benefited by cessions of territory had been formally approved by the treaties and agreements concluded up to the present time. He definitely refused to allow that principle to be called in question again. This distribution had constantly been delayed, and could not be indefinitely postponed. Turkey could not bear the burden of the total debt, and it was most desirable that the methods of distributing it should be settled concurrently with the other work of the conference.

In reply to M. Veniselos's arguments, Ismet Pasha said that once more he was obliged to call attention to the inexactitude of M. Veniselos's point of view as regards the responsibility for the war. In order to determine that responsibility, one must draw a distinction between two entirely different phases. First, there was the responsibility for the prolongation of the war, and, secondly, that of having let slip opportunities of concluding peace. Greece's responsibility had become undeniable, particularly from the date when the Powers informed her that they disassociated themselves from her aggression; it became still more grave as the result of the Greek devastations, in perpetrating which Greece could not have received encouragement from the Powers. He did not think that anyone could have invited Greece to commit these acts of destruction, and he felt sure that the Powers had tried to prevent them. These acts of vandalism had taken place in defiance of the wishes of the *Entente* and despite the advice offered by the Powers. There had been a war of considerable extent and intensity, the consequences of which should logically be borne by the iniquitous aggressor. Damage done by shells and other military means were acts of war; but even this damage implied a responsibility for the unjust aggressor, who had lost the war.

He noted once more M. Veniselos's admissions on the subject of the acts of devastation committed by the Greek army on its line of retreat. It was easy to realise that this retreat had not been effected over a single line or along a single road. As he had already had occasion to explain, the Greek army retired on a front several hundred kilometres long, and had used not only one, but all, the roads leading from the interior to the coast. As it was admitted that the villages situated on the lines of retreat had been sacked, burnt and razed to the ground, and as these lines formed a sort of network covering Asia Minor, the enormous extent of the devastation and its systematic character would be realised.

M. Veniselos had tried to draw a contrast between these acts of destruction and those carried out by the Germans in the north-east of France. Ismet Pasha said he could assure M. Veniselos that the Greek devastations were entirely different from the German, because the former were much more drastic and widespread. He was ready to quote in this connection the evidence of French travellers, who had been horrified by what they saw in Anatolia. Under certain circumstances armies might lose their discipline, but even then wanton destruction could not be justified. Moreover, the devastation done by the Greeks could not be put down simply to lack of discipline. The Greek army abandoned its war material and everything except the materials for destruction. The devastation was carried out according to plan, with a systematic organisation. During the retreat generals and officers detailed special parties to carry out the work of demolition, and never left a village or a town before making sure that every building had been burnt. He himself had questioned officers of high rank on this subject. They answered that they had done all in their power to restrain the evil. They told him that there were among their troops vagabonds whom it was difficult to keep in order. Ismet Pasha had also interrogated Greek private soldiers, who asserted that they were acting on the orders of their officers and under a special discipline. M. Veniselos alleged that this destruction was due to military exigencies. Could it be maintained that all these acts had helped, however little, to delay the pursuit? Ismet Pasha repeated that these devastations and burnings had been organised and carried out according to a prearranged and methodical plan, in order to wipe out every sign of life in the evacuated districts. One might indulge in a whim to destroy, but if one lost the game restitution must be made. These dreadful events must at least serve as a lesson to future generations, and it must be known in

future that no army can with impunity indulge in such systematic rapine for the mere pleasure of destruction. War, in so far as it was the defence of one's national heritage, was something sacred; it did not in any way imply the right to perpetrate gratuitous devastation. The reparations claimed by the Turkish people, to which they had every right, would contribute to the future security of all peoples. Even war had its humane laws, and these could not be transgressed without suffering in consequence.

Ismet Pasha proceeded to examine the question of refugees, which had been raised afresh by M. Veniselos. He thought that this problem had been settled in principle between the two Governments before the Great War, and that it was not related to the subject under discussion. He pitied the unfortunate people who, having been driven by the aggressor to take part in the fighting, had naturally had to follow the invading army in its retreat. The responsibility for this could only fall on Greece. If he might be pardoned for using such an expression, he perceived a sort of manœuvre in M. Veniselos's argument when the latter sought to justify the conduct of his Government by appealing to an invitation to Greece from the Powers to undertake the campaign in Asia Minor. That explanation, if it could be so described, in no way weakened the argument of the Turkish delegation. Ismet Pasha knew for a fact that the Allies had constantly advised Greece not to perpetrate any destruction.

He asked the conference to accept the principle that reparation should be made for the destruction wrought in the districts previously occupied by the Greeks.

M. VENISELOS replied that in examining the question of responsibility for the war one could not attribute the original initiative in aggression to one side, and then transfer the responsibility to the other side because the latter had not felt able to accept offers of mediation made to it by third parties during the war. Responsibility for the war could only lie with the original aggressor, *i.e.*, the party which provoked the war, not the party which had been attacked.

He had already exposed the inaccuracy of the statement that the immigration question had been settled between the Greek and Turkish Governments. It was true that in 1914, after the forcible expulsions effected by Turkey, he had accepted the principle of an exchange of populations, but only on condition that all forcible expulsions of Greeks should cease, and that the exchange should only affect those persons who had already left their homes, and those on both sides who in future might want to emigrate of their own free will. But no definite agreement had been reached on that subject, and the forcible expulsion of Greeks had been continued on a much larger scale.

M. BARRÈRE took note of M. Nintchitch's statement in regard to the responsibility of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in the repartition of the Ottoman public debt. Since the Turkish, Greek and Serb-Croat-Slovene delegations had indicated their views on the subjects under discussion, he wished to make certain observations, particularly concerning the statements of Ismet Pasha.

The Allies could not consent to any discussion regarding the maintenance of the Ottoman Public Debt with all its attributions and guarantees. The Debt was an institution whose status had been defined by the Decree of Mouharrem, and officially notified to the Powers. That status was thus placed under their guarantee. It also constituted a safeguard for the private interests to which revenues had been ceded, together with powers of management.

It must be noted that the arrangement instituted by the Decree of Mouharrem was a real concordat whereby Turkey's creditors accepted forty years ago a writing down by at least two-thirds of what was owing to them, the counterpart of that reduction being the granting of pledges which could not be taken away from the creditors.

The Turkish delegation certainly realised that the integral maintenance of the Ottoman Public Debt was an absolute condition of Turkey's credit. The economic development and modernisation of their country was one of the first objects of their programme, and everyone wished to see Turkey enjoy new prosperity in an era of peace. That eminently just desire could not be realised if Turkey herself destroyed her credit.

The principle must therefore be admitted that the administration of the debt should be maintained integrally in all its functions.

Thus the only question at issue was that of distributing the burden of the debt among the States in whose favour Turkish territory had been detached.

That distribution must be effected in proportion to the capacity of the ceded territories, calculated on the basis of the share contributed by each towards the

general revenues of Turkey. Creditors had lent money to Turkey under the guarantees of an institution—the Ottoman Public Debt. Their guarantees must not be modified. The Council of the Debt must remain responsible for the service of the whole debt, but a contribution would be furnished by each of the States to which Ottoman territory had been assigned.

M. Barrère did not think that the treaty should specify the amount to be contributed by each State, since that amount could not at present be calculated exactly. He thought, however, that the Financial Sub-Commission could make approximate estimates of the contribution to be made by each State.

In this connection he wished to state that Albania's participation in this section of the negotiations was necessary in order to allow her to take her share in the Ottoman public debt by a formal adhesion to the treaty.

Ismet Pasha had said that the demand for repayment of the expenses of occupation was difficult to justify, since the sole purpose of the Armistice of Mudros was to prepare peace with Turkey and consequently the occupation itself was unjustifiable. M. Barrère pointed out that by article 7 of the Mudros Armistice Turkey recognised the Allies' right to occupy such strategic points as they wished if the position of the Allies were menaced.

There was no doubt that these occupations were chargeable to Turkey. That was the rule which had been admitted in respect of all the countries with which the Allies had had to make peace. This principle had always been recognised and the Allies could not abandon it.

These occupations had, it was true, been continued longer than had been expected; and so the Allies would be disposed to consider an appreciable diminution in the amount of their claims. That was a question which the sub-commission could examine.

Ismet Pasha had stated that the Allied armies of occupation had themselves caused considerable damage in the occupied territories. That was a statement which the Allies could not accept. Even if some accidental damage might have been done during the occupation, this could not outweigh all the improvements which the Allied armies had brought into the country. It would be futile to start a discussion on that subject. This question of the costs of occupation should therefore also be referred to the sub-commission.

Ismet Pasha had presented the arguments which he regarded as justifying a demand for reparation by Greece for the damage done in Anatolia. M. Veniselos had replied by referring to the necessities of war, the expenses of occupation, and the obligation to come to the assistance of the Greek people who had been forced to leave Anatolia ever since pre-war times. M. Veniselos thought that if the two claims were weighed against each other, the balance would be in favour of Greece. Ismet Pasha thought differently. M. Barrère, for his part, thought that such a solution could with advantage be examined by the sub-commission; if a fair solution were reached in this way, it would be advantageous as expediting the work of the conference.

There was another question of the highest importance which he had to raise. It was a principle accepted by everyone, and (if he had rightly understood Ismet Pasha) recognised by the Turkish delegation, that complete reparation should be made for the damage done to Allied nationals during and since the war, through the action of Turkey. But in respect of this reparation all would be unanimous in thinking that every guarantee of impartiality should be given to Turkey. The sub-commission would study the means of ensuring this.

M. NINTCHITCH thanked M. Barrère for having proposed the participation of Albania in the discussion on the distribution of the Ottoman debt. Albania was now an independent State which, from a juridical point of view, enjoyed the same rights as every other State, and consequently should participate on a footing of complete equality in the discussion of a question of direct interest to her.

He wished to state at once that the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation would strongly oppose in the sub-commission the proposals which, in the opinion of the inviting Powers, were apparently to serve as a basis for the solution of the Ottoman public debt question.

As regards reparation for damage, the question was perhaps very important in itself, but it did not interest European public opinion, to which great heed must be paid with a view to the establishment of a lasting peace. An examination of that question, however important it might appear, was less urgent than that of the other problems, and he thought it would be best to postpone it for a while. He also

thought that the experience which the sub-commission would acquire during its investigations would enable it to modify and improve its plan of work. In any case, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation would collaborate to the best of its ability in the work of the sub-commission.

M. BOMPARD thought it necessary for the sub-commission to start its work and make every effort to solve the problems referred to it. If later on another plan of work seemed preferable, the commission would always be able to adopt it.

As regards the question of reparation for damage, it could not be denied that even if it excited less interest abroad, it was of very considerable interest to Turkey.

M. BARRERE said that the general discussion was now closed and the sub-commissions could start their work at once. He proposed that the third sub-commission should meet on the next day at 10·30 A.M., and the fourth sub-commission on the following day at the same hour.

ISMET PASHA observed that the question of repayment of expenses of occupation was apparently justified, in the view of the Allies, by the provisions of the Mudros Armistice. Now the position of the Turkish delegation at the present conference was based on the Armistice of Mudania. He could not therefore agree to this subject being referred to the sub-commission. The Turkish delegation renewed their most express reservations as regards their non-acceptance of the principle whereby expenses of occupation should be repaid.

He noted with satisfaction that the principle of distributing the debt had been accepted by the conference. On the other hand, he made formal reservations as regards the interpretation placed by M. Barrère on the Turkish delegation's statement respecting the reparation question. He agreed that the third sub-commission should begin its work the next day.

LORD CURZON said that Ismet Pasha had stated—as he had every right to do—the views of his own Government on the Armistices of Mudros and Mudania; he must not, however, imagine that these views were shared by the British or Allied Governments, who would enter the discussion on an entirely different basis. The fact that Ismet Pasha's remarks had been allowed to pass must not be regarded as implying acceptance of his views.

(*The commission rose at* 5·50 P.M.)

No. 808.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 21.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 675.
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December* 20, 1922.

I AM forwarding by bag the text of leading article in this evening's "Temps," which makes a venomous attack on Great Britain in connection with the terms for the settlement of the Straits question now offered by the Allies to the Turks. The "Temps" maintains that the effect of these arrangements is to place the Straits in the hands of the Power which possesses supremacy at sea, and protests strongly against a proposal which it is pleased to interpret as drawn up entirely to the advantage of Great Britain. It deprecates the association of France in a sort of ultimatum which compromises her relations with the Turks without defending any French interest in Turkey, and objects to her joining in a refusal to discuss the Russian proposals at a moment when France and Russia have no conflicting interests in the East. It concludes its article with disparaging remarks as to the rôle of the French delegation at Lausanne.

I will not analyse the arguments put forward by the "Temps" in support of its theory that the proposed settlement is in reality a purely British scheme, as the text of the article will be in your Lordship's hands almost simultaneously with this telegram; but I feel bound to draw your Lordship's attention to its hostile character. It seems deplorable that an article of this kind, attempting to sow dissension among the Allies, should appear in what is practically a semi-official French newspaper at a moment when all the Allies at Lausanne have agreed upon a settlement.

No. 809.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 459.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 21, 1922.*

YOUR despatch No. 2886 of 11th December: Export of arms to Greece and Turkey.

Please inform French Government that we agree, and propose to enforce as from 1st January prohibition against export of war material to both Greece and Turkey. We are urging Italian Government to take similar action.

No. 810.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 21, 1922.*

YOUR despatch No. 1129 of 12th December: Export of arms to Greece and Turkey.

French Government state that they have prohibited export of war material both to Greece and Turkey. We agree, and propose to enforce the same measures as from 1st January. Please urge Italian Government to do likewise.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 607, and Athens, No. 391.)

[E 14322/13903/44] No. 811.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Seventh Meeting, November 29, 1922, at 4 P.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 22.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Montagna.
		M. Iago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Caclamanos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	

ROUMANIA	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Ninčic.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE	ITALY.
Sir William Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Guariglia.
Admiral Sir R. Keyes.	General Weygand.	M. Vitale.
Maj.-Gen. Burnett Stuart.	M. de Lacroix.	
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Bargeton.	
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Barois.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	Commandant de Lamoricière.	
Mr. Leeper.		
Mr. McClure.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Admiral Bristol.	Mr. Sato.	General Mazarakis.
Mr. Amory.	Colonel Saigo.	M. Michalopoulos.
	Captain Tsuru.	M. Dendramis.
	M. Tani.	

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
Colonel Dumitrescu.	M. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Antitch.	Moukhtar Bey.
		Colonel Tevfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Ronald.		M. Indelli

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Belin.	M. Hotta.	M. Collas.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

At the invitation of Lord Curzon,

GENERAL WEYGAND read the report of the Sub-Commission of Experts convoked for the purpose of examining the question of the demilitarisation of the islands of Lemnos, Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, in compliance with the second paragraph of the resolution passed by the Territorial and Military Commission on the 26th November (Annex 1).

General Weygand wished to make some remarks on the reservation of the Turkish delegation, which consisted of two parts: firstly, a statement of the views of the Turkish delegation, on which he had no observation to make; secondly, an assertion which, in his opinion was due to a misunderstanding. The Turkish delegation stated that at the second meeting of the sub-commission the decisions reached at the preceding meeting had not been taken into account. General Weygand recalled the fact that at the end of its morning meeting the sub-commission had reached agreement on the necessity for demilitarising Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, and also on the need for discussing the demilitarisation of Lemnos, together with the Straits problem, but not as regards the kind of demilitarisation to be applied to the four first-named islands. No decision had been arrived at on the latter point. The Turkish delegation were therefore under a misapprehension in thinking that the sub-commission had pronounced on this question at its first meeting.

At its second meeting the sub-commission had examined the question of demilitarising the islands near the Straits. General Weygand had pointed out that by its terms of reference the sub-commission was directed to examine the measures of demilitarisation to be taken in these four islands. The Turkish delegation had remarked that that question was so closely bound up with that of the Straits that it was impossible to examine it unless all the Powers interested in the Straits problem were present, particularly the Powers bordering on the Black Sea. He had answered that the sub-commission could make a provisional examination of the subject without prejudice, of course, to the decisions which might be taken later on as regards the Straits. The Turkish delegation had, nevertheless, maintained their view, and had announced that they did not intend to take part in the discussion. In order that the

meeting of the sub-commission should not be entirely fruitless, he had thought it well to invite a summary discussion of the question; the Turkish delegation had not refused to remain present during that discussion.

ISMET PASHA shared the view expressed by the Turkish delegate at the sub-commission. In the report the Turkish delegate had made reservations in regard to the demilitarisation of Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, and had demonstrated that the measures and restrictions proposed were inadequate; he thought, and Ismet Pasha agreed with him, that aviation should be forbidden in these islands and that no military detachments should be stationed there. The insufficiency of the restrictions recommended in the sub-commission's report made the demilitarisation almost illusory. Aviation was the most modern of all weapons of war; the report recognised that these islands could serve as bases of operations, and that the very object of the proposed measures was to make it impossible for Greece to prepare offensive operations against Turkey in these islands; it was therefore essential to demilitarise them effectively from the scientific and military point of view, *i.e.*, to prohibit aeronautics there as well as the presence of armed contingents.

Ismet Pasha also shared the views of the Turkish delegate on the sub-commission concerning the status and demilitarisation of the other islands. As regards Tenedos, Imbros and Samothrace, he recommended that the question be examined in connection with that of the Straits. He confirmed the reservations made by the Turkish delegation at the sub-commission.

M. CACLAMANOS wished to make a brief statement on behalf of the Greek delegation in regard to the report of the sub-commission. After careful study of the matter, the sub-commission had admitted the principle of complete demilitarisation of the four islands near the Straits. These islands would thus become absolutely inoffensive, and in settling the fate of Imbros and Tenedos—the only islands in this group assigned to Greece solely by virtue of the Treaty of Sèvres—the factors to be taken into account would not include the possibility of using them for military purposes. The question of sovereignty over Lemnos and Samothrace did not arise, since those islands had been Greek since 1913. Imbros and Tenedos were purely Greek in character and their population was almost exclusively Greek. The Greek character of Imbros had become even more pronounced owing to the arrival there of 10,000 refugees from Gallipoli. If Greek sovereignty over Imbros were not confirmed the refugee problem in Greece would become still more acute, for these refugees would be obliged to leave Imbros. Besides, Imbros and Tenedos had been continuously occupied by Greece for ten years, and it was no fault of hers that the Greek occupation had been maintained there since 1913; this was done because Turkey did not accept the decision of the Powers in that year to assign to Greece all the islands except Tenedos and Imbros, which they assigned to Turkey.

ISMET PASHA observed that the question of sovereignty over Imbros and Tenedos had been raised by the Greek delegation in such a way as to ignore the existence of treaties and of notes previously exchanged. He had already examined this question and explained the juridical basis on which Turkey's claim to the sovereignty of these islands was based. He claimed Samothrace also, because that island was in a similar position as regards the Straits; and the status of the Straits could not be examined apart from that of the islands opposite them.

In mentioning Lemnos, his purpose had only been to get that island put under the same régime as the Straits and to confirm the sovereignty over it. Turkey had never officially recognised Greek sovereignty over Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria; on the contrary, she had protested to the Powers when they wished to give her Imbros and Tenedos only. He repeated that as regards demilitarisation Samothrace and Lemnos must have the same régime as the Straits.

M. CACLAMANOS recalled the fact that when the question of sovereignty was raised at a previous meeting of the commission, Lord Curzon had clearly proved that Samothrace and Lemnos were not concerned. These islands belonged to the group which was put under Greek sovereignty by the decision of 1913, and the question could not be reopened. The sub-commission had only had to deal with these islands because, like Imbros and Tenedos, they lay near the Straits and had been included, together with the two last-named islands, in a group for which a special régime of demilitarisation would apparently have to be devised; but the inclusion of Samothrace and Lemnos in that group had nothing to do with the question of sovereignty, which was not under discussion. The only point at issue was the definite assignment of sovereignty over Imbros and Tenedos; Greece claimed

the recognition of her sovereignty over those islands for the reasons already stated by the Greek delegation.

Ismet Pasha was therefore in error when he said that the question of sovereignty over Samothrace and Lemnos must be examined. That question was already solved, as in the cases of Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria; and the commission only had to examine the means for ensuring the more complete demilitarisation of the islands in question.

ISMET PASHA replied that as the commission had agreed to Lemnos and Samothrace forming part of the Straits system, the sovereignty of those islands must be examined simultaneously with the Straits régime.

M. CACLAMANOS said that Ismet Pasha's proposal was entirely new, and contrary to the view clearly stated by Lord Curzon as regards the juridical position of these islands; he therefore thought that the commission could not accept it.

LORD CURZON said he would deal with the question of sovereignty just raised by Ismet Pasha at the close of the remarks which he was about to make, embodying his own views and those of his Allied colleagues. He wished to divide his statement into three parts, and would begin by dealing with the four islands of the central group, namely, Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria. The degree of demilitarisation to be applied in these islands had been referred to the sub-commission. He wished to thank the sub-commission for the work which they had accomplished and for their report, which stated very clearly and concisely the reasons on which they based their opinion.

As regards the central as opposed to the northern group of islands, M. Venizelos had said a few days ago that he was prepared to discuss the degree of demilitarisation to be applied there, which might perhaps be different from that for the islands near the mouth of the Straits. For the central group the sub-commission had recommended a modified form of demilitarisation which was designed to protect the Turks in Anatolia against an attack based on these islands, while leaving to the Greek Government the necessary power to defend the islands and preserve order there. The Turkish delegation made a reservation on two points. Firstly, they wished to prohibit all aviation and anti-aircraft defences; and secondly, they urged a more complete scale of demilitarisation than that proposed by the sub-commission, approximating to that suggested for the northern islands. He was happy to hear that Ismet Pasha accepted the greater part of the report, and he asked the commission to take note of this and accept the sub-commission's conclusions.

He wished at this point to congratulate General Weygand on having so successfully cleared up a misunderstanding which was obviously quite accidental. It was now clear that the Turkish delegation had misunderstood General Weygand's statements at the first meeting of the sub-commission, and had misinterpreted the alleged change of attitude at the second meeting. Lord Curzon hoped that the incident was now closed.

He now came to the second question, that of the group of islands near the mouth of the Straits. He had expected that the sub-commission would have received a vote of thanks from the Turks, because in London in 1913 the Powers had suggested that only the two islands of Imbros and Tenedos should be demilitarised and given to Turkey. A few days since the Turks had asked for a third island, Samothrace; but for the first time the Turkish delegation, who had hitherto not missed a single point in the discussion, had forgotten a point of primary importance: they had forgotten Lemnos. This was also one of the islands necessary for the defence of the Straits. This extraordinary lapse of memory on the part of the Turks had been made up for by the intelligence and commonsense of the sub-commission. The Turks were now offered the demilitarisation not of two islands as in 1913, nor of three as a few days ago, but of four.

General Weygand had explained why the Turkish delegates had felt unable to take much part in the meeting of the sub-commission held that morning; but he (Lord Curzon) could hardly believe that the Turks would decline to accept the report, which recommended the complete demilitarisation of all four islands. Perhaps the Turkish delegation would, on reflection, realise the great advantage they had thus somewhat unexpectedly obtained and agree to accept the report.

The Turkish delegates had raised a most important point by suggesting that the fate of these four islands should be reserved for discussion by the commission dealing with the freedom of the Straits. There was a great deal to be said for this contention. The demilitarisation of these islands was clearly part of the Straits problem; and he and his colleagues agreed that the question of the islands should be

taken up again, as regards their demilitarisation only, in the presence of the Russian, Georgian and Ukrainian delegates.

The third and last question at issue was that of the sovereignty over the northern islands. M. Caclamanos was quite right in contending that the sovereignty of Samothrace had already been excluded from the discussion; the commission should accordingly confine itself to Imbros and Tenedos. The Turkish delegates had asked that the sovereignty as well as the demilitarisation of Lemnos should be referred to the commission dealing with the Straits problem. But with all due respect to his Excellency, Ismet Pasha, this contention could not be sustained. Sovereignty was a political question, whereas the questions to be discussed by the Commission on the Freedom of the Straits were uniformly naval and military. That commission would have to suggest the nature of the demilitarisation, the extent of the demilitarised zones, the measures to be taken on both sides of the channel and the degree of surveillance to be exercised. Sovereignty was an entirely different issue and must be discussed by the First Commission alone, not by the Straits Commission. It was most important that the First Commission should be in possession of the full views of the Turks, and of the juridical arguments by which they supported their claim. They had quite fairly based their contentions in the case of Imbros and Tenedos on the offer of 1913; but the character of the population should not be disregarded altogether. According to the last census of 1912, there were 9,200 Greeks and no Turks in Imbros. M. Caclamanos had just said that 10,000 more Greeks from Gallipoli had taken refuge there; thus there were now 19,000 Greeks and still no Turks. The Island of Tenedos was less important, but in 1912 there were 5,420 Greeks and 1,200 Mussulmans. Some answer to these figures was manifestly necessary, and he hoped to have one—not necessarily at once—from the Turkish delegation.

ISMET PASHA summed up the point of view of the Turkish delegation as follows: Imbros and Tenedos incontestably belonged to Turkey already by a decision of the Powers. Secondly, the Turkish delegation asked that Samothrace should be attached to the group of islands to be included in the Straits system. Thirdly, they demanded a system of effective demilitarisation and the establishment of a neutral and independent régime in the islands close to the coast of Asia Minor.

They had refrained from proposing the inclusion of Lemnos in the first group of islands because they thought that the other islands also would be thoroughly demilitarised. Their omission to name Lemnos was therefore not due to forgetfulness.

To revert to Imbros and Tenedos, their position as regards the attribution of sovereignty was not in any way in suspense. These islands, together with Castellorizzo, had been given to Turkey by a note of the Powers dated the 14th November, 1914. On the authority of the Turkish reply, dated the 15th February, 1914, Ismet Pasha maintained that the then Imperial Ottoman Government, while taking note of the Powers' decision with a view to the restoration of Tenedos, Imbros and Castellorizzo to Turkey, had formulated objections to the cession to Greece of the other islands, as regards which they intended to establish their just and legitimate claims.

In reply to Lord Curzon's argument about the ethnical character of these islands, and also of Samothrace, Ismet Pasha said that their ethnical character could not have any importance nor exercise any influence when the issue was to settle the fate of the Straits and the system of islands dependent thereon, for these islands formed, together with the territorial system of the Dardanelles, a single whole. In a matter so essential, the presence of several thousand men, of no matter what race, could not outweigh geographical and political considerations of the highest importance. He recalled the fact that during the discussion on Western Thrace, where the existence of a Turkish majority was incontestable, the superiority of geographical and political necessities over ethnical considerations had been asserted. Now, in dealing with the islands, the process was being reversed.

LORD CURZON had no wish to indulge in a debate with Ismet Pasha, but he wished to reply very briefly to the assertions just made by his Excellency.

Firstly, Imbros and Tenedos were not given to Turkey by the Treaty of London, which merely placed all the Ægean Islands in the hands of certain Great Powers. The attribution of the islands was first mentioned in the correspondence which ensued. The Turkish reply to the Powers of the 15th February, 1914, had been inexactly quoted by Ismet Pasha; that note had picked out all the plums in the pudding and had rejected the rest as something uneatable. In the last sentence, the

Ottoman Government merely said that they had taken note of the Powers' proposal respecting Imbros, Tenedos and Castellorizzo; this could not mean that the Turkish Government had been vested with the sovereignty of these islands. Historical documents could not be treated in such a way. If any argument were to be based on the Turkish note, it must be based on the note as a whole.

Secondly, the Turkish delegation, who had used the population argument as regards Western Thrace, now said that it should be ignored as regards the islands. They also ignored geography. Was it to be pretended that the islands were not islands at all, and that their Greek population was really living on the mainland? Such juggling with geography was wholly inadmissible.

Thirdly, as regards the autonomy which Ismet Pasha had proposed for the Greek islands on the 25th November, what was good for the Greeks must be good for the Turks. Did the latter also propose autonomy for the islands claimed by them; as well as for the mainland of Anatolia, of which, according to the Turks, the islands formed a part? This point needed elucidation as soon as possible. It was important to know whether these islands were to be considered as islands or not; were they to become Turkish because they were not islands, or were they to be considered as islands and accordingly given autonomy?

ISMET PASHA again formulated his reservations in regard to Turkish sovereignty over the islands near the Straits, and said that he wished to have an opportunity of returning to the subject in greater detail. He proposed that his two objections respecting aviation and military contingents should be included in the draft resolution relating to the measures of demilitarisation to be enforced in Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria.

LORD CURZON read the following resolution, which was carried:—

"The commission adopts the recommendations contained in the report of the Sub-Commission of Experts regarding the measures of demilitarisation to be applied to the islands of Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria.

"The Turkish delegation makes a reservation on two points, that of aviation and that of military contingents."

(*The commission rose at* 6·20 P.M.)

Annexe 1 to F.C. 7.

Rapport de la Sous-Commission d'Experts réunie pour étudier la Question de la Démilitarisation des îles de Lemnos, Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria.

(Résolution de la première Commission, en date du 26 Novembre, 2e alinéa.)

Le 28 novembre 1922.

États-Unis d'Amérique: Mr. F. Lammot Belin.
Empire britannique: Major-Général J. T. Burnett-Stuart, l'Honorable Harold Nicolson, assistés de Captain A. D. Pound, R.N., Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. G. Heywood.
France: Vice-Amiral Lacaze, Général Weygand (*Président*), assistés de M. Bargeton, Lieutenant-Colonel Courtin, Capitaine de corvette de la Moricière.
Grèce: Son Excellence M. Veniselos, Général Alexandre Mazarakis, M. le Dr. Michel Theotokas, assistés de M. Vassili Dendramis.
Italie: M. Mario Arlotta, Colonel Umberto Vitale, assistés de M. Mario Indelli.
Japon: Capitaine de frégate N. Tsuru.
Roumanie: Son Excellence M. Diamandy, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu.
Serbie: M. Milan Antitch, M. Vladimir Milanovitch.
Turquie: Lieutenant-Colonel Tevfik Bey, Capitaine de frégate Chefket Bey, assistés de Nousret Bey, Djevad Bey.

La sous-commission, dans sa séance du 28 novembre:

1. A l'unanimité a émis l'avis qu'il y a lieu de prendre, dans les cinq îles envisagées, certaines mesures de démilitarisation.

2. En ce qui concerne ces mesures:

(1.) A l'unanimité, elle a estimé que, pour Lemnos, ces mesures devraient être définies en même temps que celles à fixer pour les îles d'Imbros, Tenedos et Samothrace, au moment où le problème des Détroits sera examiné.

(2.) Pour les iles de Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria, la majorité a estimé que les mesures de démilitarisation doivent consister dans les restrictions suivantes :

(*a.*) Aucune base navale, aucune fortification.
(*b.*) Interdiction réciproque pour les aviations militaires de survoler respectivement les iles et le territoire turc.
(*c.*) Limitation des forces militaires dans les iles au contingent normal appelé pour le service militaire qui pourra ainsi être instruit sur place et à un effectif de gendarmerie et de police calculé sur la base de l'effectif de la gendarmerie et de la police existant sur l'ensemble du territoire hellénique.

La majorité est d'avis de ne pas proposer de restrictions plus étendues qui, sous peine de mettre les iles grecques à la merci de la Turquie, appelleraient l'application au territoire anatolien de restrictions correspondantes.

Le but des dispositions préconisées ci-dessus est, en effet, d'interdire à la Grèce la possibilité de procéder dans ses iles à des préparatifs offensifs contre la Turquie, tout en lui concédant les moyens dont elle a besoin pour maintenir l'ordre dans ses iles et protéger leur territoire contre les incursions de bandes et autres tentatives du même ordre.

La délégation turque, constituant la minorité, a présenté la réserve ci-jointe.

Annex 2 to F.C. 7.

Réserve de la Délégation turque.

Les considérations que la délégation turque à la Sous-Commission militaire désire émettre et les réserves qu'elle tient à formuler sur les propositions faites cet après-midi par M. le Président sont les suivantes:

Dans la séance de ce matin, M. le Président de la Sous-Commission avait soutenu et démontré, à la suite de longues discussions, l'évidence du fait que les iles en question constituaient une base d'opération pour une attaque contre l'Anatolie et que de là on pourrait menacer le cœur même de l'Asie Mineure; après quoi la nécessité de démilitariser ces iles avait été acceptée en principe.

En discutant les limites de cette démilitarisation M. l'Amiral français Lacaze avait soutenu la thèse que dans la phrase proposée par M. le Président: "Aucune base navale, aucun port militaire" était incluse l'interdiction d'entretenir des hydroplanes.

Lorsque M. le Président avait proposé d'interdire l'introduction de toute artillerie dans les iles, Son Excellence M. Veniselos avait demandé l'autorisation d'y maintenir des canons anti-aériens et M. le Président avait répondu que les canons anti-aériens pouvant également être utilisés comme canons de campagne, l'autorisation demandée ne pouvait être accordée.

En outre, M. le Général Weygand, se basant sur le grand rayon d'action des aéroplanes et sur les nombreux inconvénients qui pourraient en résulter, s'était opposé au maintien dans les iles de ces appareils.

D'autre part, il avait été constaté dans la même séance que les installations militaires des iles étaient à même de menacer l'Anatolie tandis que les batteries placées sur la côte anatolienne ne pouvaient en aucune façon constituer un danger pour la Grèce elle-même et que, par conséquent, il n'y avait pas lieu de considérer les moyens militaires se trouvant sur la côte anatolienne comme ayant une importance de même ordre.

La délégation turque a été étonnée de constater que les propositions qui lui ont été faites dans la séance de l'après-midi n'avaient aucun rapport avec les décisions prises en se basant uniquement sur des considérations d'ordre militaire durant la séance de ce matin. Elle a été également surprise de voir que ces propositions avaient le caractère d'une décision comme prise par les autres délégations en dehors de ce qui avait été convenu durant la réunion du matin de la sous-commission.

En se plaçant au point de vue du maintien de la tranquillité et de la sécurité de l'Asie Mineure, la délégation turque, pour des raisons d'ordre technique, se voit dans l'obligation d'insister afin que le régime de démilitarisation des iles soit le suivant :

1. Il n'y aura aucune base militaire et navale et aucun port de guerre dans les iles de Mitylène, Samos, Chio et Nicaria;

2. Il n'y sera procédé à des travaux de fortification d'aucune sorte et aucune installation militaire n'y sera maintenue;

3. En dehors de la gendarmerie, aucune force armée ne devra s'y trouver, on ne devra y installer aucun dépôt ni y faire aucun préparatif militaire;

4. On ne devra y maintenir aucun aéroplane ou hydroplane ainsi qu'aucune installation pouvant être utilisée par l'aviation;

5. On a exprimé le désir d'étudier la question de la démilitarisation de l'île de Lemnos lors de l'examen de celle des Détroits.

Vu l'étroite relation qui existe entre ces deux questions, la délégation turque demande que la souveraineté à laquelle devra être soumise cette île soit examinée lorsqu'on traitera de la question des Détroits.

No. 812.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 777.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 21, 1922.*

I UNDERSTAND that arrangements have definitely been made for ex-Sultan to leave early in January for Mecca.

If this is so, I think it most desirable that I should inform representative of Angora Government here. Ex-Sultan's move to Mecca is calculated to cause considerable resentment and will revive Turkish mistrust as to our intentions with regard to him. They will certainly think that we propose to use him for counter-Nationalist purposes. Frankness as regards our reasons for wishing him to seek hospitality elsewhere might dispel to a certain extent this mistrust, whereas secrecy in making arrangements will undoubtedly excite it.

If you concur, I should be glad of instructions as to manner of making communication.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 89.)

No. 813.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 780.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 22, 1922.*

IF Turks raise question of immediate evacuation in connection with signature of preliminary treaty, I venture to suggest following possible [group undecypherable]:—

We could express our readiness to reduce our military and naval forces as proof of our good intentions and of faith in Turks. We could ask for reciprocal expression of good faith on the part of Turkey by demobilisation of Turkish forces at Ismid which constitute a menace to Constantinople. We could inform Turks that if they are prepared to do this we will withdraw all our forces from Asiatic side of Bosphorus.

I have consulted General Harington, who expressed entire agreement with above proposal. I understand from him that if it were so arranged he would send Guards Brigade back to England, replacing present garrison here by troops from Ismid Peninsula.

Proposal, while apparently having much to recommend it from purely technical military point of view, might afford measure of satisfaction to Turks. Fact that withdrawal from Asiatic side of Bosphorus would be entirely British move is also perhaps worthy of consideration.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 92.)

No. 814.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Repeated to Foreign Office, Received December 22.*)

[By Bag.]

(No. 679.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 21, 1922.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram from Lausanne of yesterday. I obtained an interview with M. Poincaré this evening, and made representations to him as instructed by your Lordship in regard to the pernicious campaign of "Temps" Lausanne correspondent.

M. Poincaré was full of protestation, and begged me to assure your Lordship that he was as indignant as yourself with Rollin, who, he said, had been to Russia before M. Herriot's mission, and was, he admitted, very much under the influence of the Soviets. He promised that he would do his utmost to stop this campaign, but was at pains to convince me that he had little or no influence over the "Temps," and particularly over Rollin. I took advantage of this opportunity to draw M. Poincaré's attention to venomous leading article in last night's "Temps" on Straits question, reported in my telegram No. 675 of 20th December, and pointed out what a deplorable effect would be created on public opinion by such articles in a journal which, rightly or wrongly, is looked upon as semi-official. I made earnest appeal to M. Poincaré to bring all possible pressure to bear on the "Temps" to stop such articles in future, and even suggested that it might be possible for the Quai d'Orsay to threaten to withhold from it information which they supplied to it. M. Poincaré, though he took my observations in good part, persisted in protesting that he had no more influence over the "Temps" than any other French newspaper, but he promised to do his best.

[E 14133/76/44] No. 815.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 22, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state that His Majesty's Government have recently been in correspondence with the French and Italian Governments with a view to preventing further shipments of war material to the Turkish forces. The desirability of an embargo was urged upon both Governments in view, firstly of the threat to the Allied troops at Constantinople and the Straits, and secondly of the possibility of Turkish military pressure being exerted on the Allies during the Lausanne Conference.

2. In reply to the suggestion that an embargo on war material should be applied by the three Governments to shipments to Turkey, the French Government have answered that in their view it is desirable to withold war material not only from Turkey but from Greece, and that they have taken the necessary measures to this end.

3. The Secretary of State is disposed to accept this suggestion, and is so informing the French Government, while the Italian Government are being urged to adopt similar measures. It has been proposed to both Governments that the embargo should be imposed as from the 1st January next.

4. I am accordingly to request that the Board of Trade will take measures to prevent as from that date the export of war material to either Greece or Turkey; it is presumed that this would be effected, as heretofore, by the refusal of export licences in the event of any applications being received.

5. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Disposals Board.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

No. 816.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December 23.*)

(No. 782.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 23, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 1113.

Refet Pasha visited me yesterday to tell me that he was leaving Constantinople to organise administration of Eastern Thrace. When I asked him how long he proposed to stop there, he said inspection would take him not less than three weeks. I gather, therefore, that his departure is definite.

He said he was uneasy as to Greek intrigues west of Maritza, and wanted to see for himself what was going on.

I have great opinion of Refet's organising abilities, and he will doubtless use them to the full extent for the purpose of building up Turkish forces in Eastern Thrace.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 94.)

No. 817.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran).

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 451 of 18th December.

The conference is not now dealing with the Eastern frontier of Turkey or of Kurdistan, and there is not the remotest chance of Persian claims being heard.

No. 818.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(*Received December 24.*)

(No. 784.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 24, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 782.

Refet Pasha has also visited General Harington for the purpose of saying good-bye. He used practically identic language to both of us. Following is summary of his remarks:—

He himself had always been a partisan of Anglo-Turkish friendship. (This I believe to be true.) But Angora for the moment neither liked nor trusted us and regarded us as only trying at Lausanne to patch up in our own interests a peace which would not be lasting.

Turks wanted to get away from Russia, but, though they had been fighting for ten years, they preferred to continue fighting now rather than have to start again in five or ten years' time. Turkey wanted money, and he frankly admitted that that was one reason why she wanted British friendship. But money or not, Turkey was a proud nation like ourselves, and she could not be a worthy ally unless she were truly independent.

Including North Africa, she had lost what he described as nine-tenths of her old empire, and whatever happened she was determined that the last tenth should be truly Turkey's and free of all foreign interference. Ismet had made a great mistake in not asking your Lordship straight out whether you wanted peace and friendship with Turkey or not. But Turks wanted no half-measure. They must have a clean-cut peace with no ambiguities, which subsequent Governments could take advantage of to contest later. Present Conservative Government was one thing, but without a clear peace anything might happen if and when Mr. Lloyd George's Government came back to power.

Generally speaking, he was more pessimistic than usual. He did not believe peace was possible at Lausanne unless you gave Turkey unmistakably to understand that Great Britain wished for friendship with her and would not interfere with her independence.

It is clear from all sources that Turks distrust your Lordship on account of your connection with former Government and regard you as unconvinced of desirability of good Anglo-Turkish relations.

In my opinion it is uncertainty as to our real future intentions which makes them hesitate. Refet mentioned that in 1908 and again at the time of Mudros armistice, England could have done anything she liked with Turkey. But Turks considered they had twice been let down by us and dared not risk a third failure They must feel certain of British goodwill.

Incidentally, in this connection I hear Reouf's influence is largely handicapped by fact of his having signed Mudros armistice, as he is regarded as having been once already deceived in his belief in England's good faith.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 98.)

No. 819.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 24.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 22, 1922.*

SINCE the suspension of sittings of my Commission on Straits, I have had two meetings with Ismet Pasha, in company with my French and Italian colleagues, on the points which still remain unsettled. Thes are in main :—

1. Future inspection of demilitarised zones.
2. Nature and wording of general guarantee demanded by Turks.
3. Sovereignty of islands outside Dardanelles.

At these discussions, which last for hours, Ismet repeats same propositions over and over again, refusing to budge an inch, while I have to fight solitary battle, my colleagues overflowing with unctuous civility to the Turks and showing an inclination to bolt at every corner from the course. I submitted to-day a formula about inspection to which I procured their assent, and which M. Barrère is to do his best to induce Ismet to accept. If he fails the wrangle will begin again. In my judgment these tactics are condemned to failure; and time will shortly arrive when we must submit Straits Convention to Turks to sign or leave.

All indications from Angora point to desire of Turks for peace; but this finds little reflection in attitude of their delegation here, who are difficult and obstructive to last degree.

Russians, though their *raison d'être* here has gone, intend to remain, and by working on Turks will do their best to make a treaty impossible.

In sub-committees same tactics are pursued, and on all points of importance, such as minorities, Capitulations and Patriarchate, something like a deadlock is reached, solution of which is then advocated either by a meeting of whole commission at which I am expected to do the frightening business, or by private conversations which would break down the patience of the Prophet Job.

In this melancholy environment I seem fated to pass my Christmas, Barrère and Bompard having found an irresistible lure in the call of Paris, and Garroni intending to join the bosom of his family at Genoa. I shall endeavour to start things again on Tuesday or Wednesday next, and mean if possible to bring matters to a head by end of next week. But the further we go the colder become the feet of my colleagues, of whom Barrère is deservedly incensed at the monstrous attacks upon him in columns of "Temps." If I were at liberty to deal with Ismet alone, I should be more sanguine of definite result. But this is rendered impossible by conditions of case.

Turks after prolonged gestation have produced a twelve-page reply about Mosul, which it will be my sole Christmas relaxation to destroy.

No. 820.

Mr. Phipps to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 24.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 682.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 23, 1922.*

FOLLOWING received from Lausanne, No. 7 of 20th December :—

"While M. Barrère, M. Garroni and I are acting in closest harmony here, and I make no statement of Allied policy or action without prior consultation with them, Lausanne correspondent of 'Temps,' Rollin by name, continues daily to telephone to 'Temps' mischievous and entirely false accounts of our proceedings, openly accusing me of acting in independence of my colleagues and applying offensive epithets to my proceedings. I have spoken about matter to M. Barrère, who is as indignant as myself. In view of close connection of 'Temps' with Quai d'Orsay, I shall be glad if you will make a personal representation to President of the Council on the subject. Everyone here knows that M. Rollin is in close touch with Soviet delegation, even if his connection with them is not of a more binding description. But this may not be [? equally] known outside, and attempt of leading French newspaper to make mischief between France and Great Britain at most critical moment is calculated to excite very legitimate indignation. Were a British correspondent of an important British newspaper at Lausanne to be guilty of similar conduct at expense of French representative, I can well imagine what would be said at Paris."

No. 821.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 24.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 683.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 23, 1922.*

A CERTAIN uneasiness is shown in French press to-day lest France's interests be sacrificed at Lausanne Conference. The "Ere nouvelle" declares that to-day at Lausanne there is one man who disposes, viz., your Lordship, and one who does not even propose, viz., M. Barrère. When latter speaks in commissions it is merely to fall in with British views, and this he calls reconstituting the *Entente*. An alliance does not, however, mean subordination, and your Lordship speaks not only as head of the Foreign Office, but in the name of the Quai d'Orsay. The servile tactics of MM. Barrère and Bompard are dangerous to French prestige and security.

Hervé, in the "Victoire," expresses fear lest Allies, in order not to displease Great Britain, should prepare a bad peace for France at Lausanne. Rights of a future Russia should be reserved, for she will never forgive France for imposing such a settlement of Straits question on her.

No. 822.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 9) to Mr. Phipps. —(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 24.)*

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December 24, 1922.*

PERSIAN Government have asked British, French and Italian Governments to admit Persian representative to Lausanne Conference as regards Persia's western and particularly Kurdistan frontier.

* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 5.

Since French and Italian plenipotentiaries are away for 25th December holiday, please ask Government to which you are accredited to instruct their representatives at Tehran to join their British colleague at once in explaining to Persian Government that no question of modifying existing boundary between Irak and Persia will arise during this conference and that Allied Powers regret, therefore, that they cannot invite any Persian representative to come to Lausanne.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 1.)

No. 823.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 10) to Mr. Phipps.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 24.)*

(No. 150. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 24, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Persian Government are trying to link up their claim to be heard by conference with promise given by us under entirely different circumstances in 1920 as a sequel to Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.

Persian Government have since torn up that agreement, and this absolves His Majesty's Government from any such promise. Moreover, there is now no question of setting up a Kurdish State or a Kurdish autonomous province under Turkey as was contemplated in Treaty of Sèvres.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 2.)

No. 824

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jeddah, December 25, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 37.

In view of apparent imminence of settlement of treaty terms with Turkey, King Hussein is anxious that statement as to how Arab rights in general, and particularly question of Hedjaz Railway, Haramein Wakf and restoration of loot from Prophet's Tomb at Medina, will be presented and enforced.

Am I right to assume that in all that concerns him nothing is changed from Treaty of Sèvres?

No. 825.

Mr. Henderson (No. 100) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 26.)

(No. 780. Personal and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 25, 1922.*

I LEARN from reliable sources that Ismet telegraphed to Angora on 23rd December that as Allies were still [? insisting on] [? *control*] in Straits, minorities and other questions, and that as Turkey could not yield in matters vital to her independence, a sudden rupture of negotiations has to be expected. Spirit of conference did not point to definite results being secured, and Allies were trying to cow the Turks. The latter had got their backs to the wall on all questions and could not give in. He accordingly asked for necessary instructions to be sent to Refet.

* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 6.

In a reply dated 24th December Reouf says matter has been reported to Smyrna, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace, that Fevzi Pasha has replied that his army is ready and that he, Reouf, can guarantee that Turkish army is prepared for all emergencies.

Please inform me whether situation at Lausanne is such as to necessitate recall of Commander-in-chief from Malta, where he has gone with part of the fleet for Christmas. General Harington would also be glad of earliest possible information should breakdown seem in any way possible.

No 826.

Mr. Henderson (No. 101) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 26.)

(No. 788.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 25, 1922.*

ANGORA Government has protested against despatch by British military authorities of 8,000 Greek and Armenian volunteers to Dardanelles as reinforcements, which it describes as violation of Mudros armistice.

Allegation is entirely unfounded, and in replying to that effect I have furnished full information as to number and employment of all civilians transported to the Dardanelles by military authorities, who amount to less than 2,500.

(Copies of correspondence by bag.)

No. 827.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 26, 1922.*

TREND of telegrams received this morning, notably those from Constantinople, is in accord with apprehensions expressed in my recent telegrams and, still more, in my private correspondence with Prime Minister and others. Whether adverse influence brought to bear upon Turks has emanated from Angora or from Russia or has arisen from extravagant deference paid to Turks here, it has perceptibly stiffened their attitude, which is becoming increasingly hostile, and even insolent. They make scenes in sub-committees and oppose an impenetrable negative to every proposition, even sometimes to those which they have already accepted. Constantinople telegram No. 784 reporting a conversation with Refet indicates extent to which he has been, as it would appear, deliberately, misinformed by Ismet. Latter knows perfectly well that Great Britain desires peace on basis of an honourable friendship with Turkey. That has been the subject of every one of our conversations, and I am at a loss to understand how any doubt can exist on the subject.

Ismet has himself said more than once that I am the only person who can conclude such a peace, and that he is here to assist me to do it.

Ismet's telegram to Angora of 23rd December, reported in Constantinople telegram No. 786, is palpably untrue.

Surveillance of demilitarised zones has not been pressed to breaking-point alleged, and is in temporary suspense pending settlement of other issues. Question of minorities is still before sub-committee, who are continuing to sit, and has not even been referred back to main commission, with whom final decision will lie. These excuses, therefore, are unfounded and fictitious.

More probably Turks, finding that we do not yield to them on every point, or realising progressive wastage of their army, are now trying familiar Turkish game of a little external pressure. Hence military orders from Angora, reported in General Harington's telegram of to-day, containing his proposals A, B and C.

I have not, unfortunately, received his No. 3307 and No. 3308 to War Office, which would be very useful to me, and which I understood from War Office that he had orders to repeat to Lausanne. As regards military situation, while I do not regard position here as critical, and while I do not believe that rupture is likely within next week or perhaps longer, I yet think that all precautions should be taken, and that combined staffs should concert plan of action in the event of this being required.

As to fleet, I was astonished to read in papers of departure of portion of fleet for Christmas at Malta. I protest most strongly against such a decision having been taken without reference to me, and must ask for their immediate recall to Constantinople.

As soon as my colleagues return to-morrow from their unseasonable absence, I will consult them as to immediate steps to be taken with Ismet here.

Grave warning will have to be addressed to him, if possible, in conjunction with them; if not, by myself alone. An opportunity may occur this afternoon when he has just asked to see me.

I will do everything in my power to avoid a breakdown, and do not yet despair. But, as I have before telegraphed, crisis must arise before long, and I will see to it that, if it does, it arises on issues that are clear and will present an unchallengeable case to the world.

I have, throughout, implored press here not to be too sanguine, and I wish I could impress a similar attitude upon newspapers at home. It is, of course, possible that, just as there was a period of suspense at Lausanne during recent conference of Prime Ministers in London, so this may be a deliberate device to await results of Paris meeting on 2nd January, failure of which would accelerate rupture here.

No. 828.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 26.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 687.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 25, 1922.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 9.

French Government yesterday instructed their representative at Tehran to inform Persian Government that as Persia was not a belligerent or State bordering on Black Sea there was no reason for her to be heard at Lausanne, where, moreover, question of Irak-Persian boundary would not come up for discussion.

[E 14398/13003/44] No. 829.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Eighth Meeting, December 1, 1922, at 3·30 P.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 27.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Montagna.
		M. Lago.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Venizelos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Cachamanos.
Admiral Bristol.		
ROUMANIA.	**SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.**	**TURKEY.**
M. Duca.	M. Nincic.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Ryan.	General Weygand.	M. Guariglia.
Lieut.-Col. Heywood.	M. de Lacroix.	M. Vitale.
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Bargeton.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Leeper.	Lieut.-Col. Courtin.	
Mr. McClure.	M. Barois.	
	Commandant de Lamoricière.	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Sato.	Gen. Mazarakis.
Mr. Heck.	Mr. Nagaoka.	M. Politis.
	Col. Saigo.	M. Michala Opoulos.
	Capt. Tsuru.	

And: Dr. Nansen and Mr. Philip Baker.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Indelli.
Mr. Wicks.		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Tani.	M. Collas.
SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	**TURKEY.**	
M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.	

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON said that he had invited the commission to meet in order to discuss a question of immediate importance arising directly out of the exchange of prisoners of war, namely, the exchange of populations between Turkish and Greek territory. This question closely affected the interests of both peoples and called for an early solution, because the livelihood of the people and the cultivation of the crops for next year were involved. Dr. Nansen had for some time been in negotiation with both Turkey and Greece on the subject, and had also been responsible for similar arrangements on a large scale elsewhere. Dr. Nansen had kindly prepared in English a speech which he would have liked to read to the conference, and in order to save time copies of it had been communicated to the Turkish and Greek delegations in advance. He (Lord Curzon) proposed to have this speech read out in French by the interpreter, and then to ask for the views of the Turkish, Greek and any other delegations who might wish to address the commission on the matter. He hoped that the discussion would eventuate in something tangible being done.

The following statement by Dr. Nansen was read:—

"1. I am very happy to have been able to accept the invitation conveyed to me by Lord Curzon to address this commission of the Peace Conference on the subject of the proposed exchange of the Greek and Turkish minorities in their respective countries.

"It is a matter to which I have been able during the last two months to give a great deal of attention and one which I venture to think deserves the consideration, and the immediate and earnest consideration, of the delegates gathered in Lausanne to-day. It is a matter which, after the investigations I have been privileged to make,

I believe to be, and I speak advisedly, of real importance to the peace and economic stability of the Near East.

" It may perhaps be right for me to explain in a few words why I have devoted some time to the study of the proposed exchange of populations and why I have felt it my duty to make a report on the subject to the Governments of the members of the League of Nations. Having been charged by the Assembly of the League of Nations with work for the hundreds of thousands of refugees, who, as a result of the recent war, had left their homes in the Near East, I proceeded at the beginning of October to Constantinople and Greece. While I was engaged in investigating refugee problems there I was privileged to enter into relations with the authorities both of the Turkish and Greek Governments, and to bring some small relief with the funds placed at my disposal by the members of the League to the starving refugees of both nationalities.

" It was while I was engaged on this task that I was invited by the representatives of the four Great Powers in Constantinople to endeavour to initiate negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Governments with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the exchange of minority populations. In view of the fact that the Governments of the four Great Powers all believed such an exchange to be desirable, and as I shared their view that such an exchange, if it were made, should be made at once and without waiting for the conclusion of the final Treaty of Peace, I immediately entered into negotiations with the two Governments with a view to arranging an immediate agreement. I received the necessary consent of the Greek Cabinet and I made some progress in my negotiations with the representatives of Angora. It is in the hope that the matter may be taken up without delay and at the point which it had reached when I left Constantinople that I venture to address this commission to-day.

" 2. I should explain that in everything which I have done to impress upon the attention of individual members of the conference the importance of this question, I based my action upon a knowledge that all the Governments here represented are in favour of what I proposed. I know that the Governments of the Great Powers are in favour of this proposal because they believe that to unmix the populations of the Near East will tend to secure the true pacification of the Near East and because they believe an exchange of populations is the quickest and most efficacious way of dealing with the grave economic results which must result from the great movement of populations which has already occurred.

" In addition to the support given to the proposal by the Great Powers, I understand that the two Governments principally interested both desire that an agreement should be made. The Turkish authorities have assured me on no fewer than four occasions that they are in favour of such an exchange. The Greek Government has given me the same assurance in a series of official documents.

" 3. I think that the wishes of the Governments are sufficient justification for any effort which I have made to press the matter. But I do not disguise from the commission that my experience of the past two months and the very careful enquiries which I have made and the consideration which I have given to the whole subject have also brought me to believe that on its own merits the proposal for an exchange is one which is highly desirable in the interests of the countries principally concerned and in the interests of the peace of Europe. I do not pretend that the question is not full of grave difficulties. Anyone who has reflected upon what is involved in the displacement of populations of many more than 1,000,000 people, in uprooting these people from their homes, transferring them to a strange new country, in registering, valuing and liquidating their individual property which they abandon, and in securing to them the payment of their just claims to the value of this property, will understand that the difficulties are immense.

" On the other hand, the commission must remember that these difficulties, as I hope to show in a moment, are less at the present moment than they would have been at any earlier time, and that the reasons which make an exchange desirable are of greater force. I am also in a position to assure the commission that the experts whose assistance I have had in my consideration of this question—I refer to the two neutral members of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Commission on Inter-Migration—who have spent some years in considering the practical execution of just such an exchange of populations as we are now considering, are of opinion that what I may call the technical difficulties—difficulties, that is to say, of securing the just, prompt and efficient application of any agreement that may be made—are not insuperable. I think this view of these two experts, whose opinion on this question is certainly of more value than that of any other person or authority, should carry great weight with this commission and with the two Governments principally concerned.

" 4. I do not wish to be understood to say that I believe that any treaty which may be made for the exchange of the Greek and Turkish minorities will give entirely satisfactory results. On the contrary, I believe that any exchange of populations, however well it were carried out, must impose very considerable hardships, perhaps very considerable impoverishment, upon great numbers of the individual citizens of the two countries who are exchanged. But I also believe that these hardships, great though they may be, will be less than the hardships which will result for these same populations if nothing is done. I wish I could impress upon this commission the gravity of the economic situation in the Near East as I see it to-day. There have been already very great displacements of populations, almost 1,000,000 people have left their homes in one country and flocked into the territories of the other. They have left their productive employment in Turkey and are without any possibility of securing other productive employment in Greece. This is a very grave matter, and I think it is not too much to say that unless something is done, and done quickly, to deal with it, the economic results for both countries—and these remarks apply in my view with as much force to Turkey as to Greece—will be disastrous.

" More can be done by a prompt and efficient exchange of minority populations to prevent these disastrous economic results from coming about than by any other measure which can be taken. Such an exchange will provide Turkey immediately and in the best possible conditions with the population necessary to continue the exploitation of the cultivated lands which the departed Greek populations have abandoned. The departure from Greece of its Moslem citizens would create the possibility of rendering self-supporting a great proportion of the refugees now concentrated in the towns and in different parts of Greece.

" But the consideration of the economic aspect of the matter—and I venture to think that for the present moment it is a most important aspect—obliged me to urge upon the commission that if such an exchange is to be made it should be made without the least delay. This seems to me desirable on every ground. Undoubtedly it would be easier from the political and psychological point of view to carry through an exchange of populations at a moment such as the present, immediately after the great crisis, which has already caused a vast displacement of populations, than it will be when affairs have settled down to a quieter routine. The exchange will be more welcome now than it would be then to the individual citizens who are its object; and, on economic grounds, an immediate exchange is of the very first importance. It is vitally in the interest of both Turkey and Greece that in the coming summer they should have the maximum possible production of food; in other words, it is vitally desirable, from the Turkish point of view, that the rich lands of Thrace should give their normal crop in 1923, while it is equally in the interest of Greece that her agricultural refugees should be maintaining themselves by their own crops before next summer ends.

" To achieve these objects it is necessary that the actual exchange should be carried out, at least in part, by the end of February, three months from now.

" 5. This is by no means impossible to achieve if the two Governments are willing to come to an immediate agreement, and are willing to put that agreement into immediate effect. I do not believe that the negotiations for such an agreement should be a lengthy or a difficult matter, and as for its practical application, I have only to remind the commission that in Eastern Thrace there are empty villages capable of accommodating easily 300,000 people, with ample supplies of seed and foodstuffs, with great quantities of agricultural tools, with many fields already ploughed and many more only waiting for their annual cultivation, all ready for immediate occupation by the incoming immigrant population.

" 6. I have just said that, in my view, the negotiations for the necessary agreement need not be a lengthy or difficult affair. I say this because I believe the existing agreement between the Greek and Bulgarian Governments might be taken as a model, perhaps modified in some such way as I have modified it in the draft treaty, which I presented for the consideration of the Turkish Government on the 2nd November. I assume that such an agreement as this does not cover every conceivable detail or point that may arise, but I suggest that these should be left for settlement in a special règlement which could be drawn up by the Mixed Commission, which would have to be established to apply the treaty. This was the procedure adopted by the Greco-Bulgarian Commission, and it was a procedure which worked extremely well. It is quick and efficient, and it absolutely safeguards the interests of both the parties.

" I understand that both the Turkish and Greek delegations are in the fortunate position of having at their disposal experts in this question of exchang

I believe that with the assistance of these experts it should be possible for the delegations, if I have rightly understood that it is their desire to make an exchange, to draw up the necessary treaty within a week or two's time from now.

"7. I need not say that I am aware that there are several highly important political questions which must be answered before such an agreement can be made.

"Whether the treaty, for example, should be based on the principle of compulsory or of voluntary emigration.

"What is the area of its application.

"What is to be the nature of the Mixed Commission or other machinery which must be established to carry it into practical execution.

"These questions require answers before any agreement can be made. I believe, however, from what I gathered to be the views of the two delegations, that agreement could be reached on all these points with a minimum of delay, and I do not think, therefore, they constitute any reason for postponing the immediate treatment of the question.

"8. Perhaps I may be permitted to add just one word on the last of the three questions which I have raised: the nature of the Mixed Commission or other machinery which would have to be established to apply the treaty of exchange.

"As everyone here is aware, the Mixed Commission, established under the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty of Exchange, consists of one representative of each Government and of two representatives appointed by the Council of the League. May I venture to suggest that in any agreement by the Turkish and Greek Governments, they would do well to adopt this same plan. I know something of the working of the Greco-Bulgarian Commission. I know that the very real success which it has hitherto achieved has been due, and I think I may say due exclusively, to the absolute impartiality of the two neutral members: to the fact that these members were responsible to no particular Government, but had only as their sole duty to execute faithfully and conscientiously the mandate they had been given by the Council of the League of Nations. I venture to suggest to my Turkish friends that they could confide their interests in this matter to the Council of the League with absolute confidence, and they would be in safe hands. I have had much experience of the League. I have seen its dealings with countries which are not yet among its members, and I have no hesitation in saying that its spirit of impartiality is not only the great weapon by means of which it has brought about the very great results which it has already been able to achieve, but that it is a guarantee of justice, in which every Government, whether a member of the League or not, can place implicit confidence."

ISMET PASHA was surprised to see on the programme of the meeting a question not mentioned in the official agenda previously issued, which only included the question of the exchange of prisoners of war. The problem raised by Dr. Nansen's statement bore no relation to the subject which he had prepared himself to discuss. Nevertheless, he had listened with interest to Dr. Nansen's statement, to which he could only attach a personal character as no official relations existed between Turkey and the League of Nations; he regarded it as emanating from a private person. It was also because of the private character attributed to Dr. Nansen's activities that it had proved impossible to carry his negotiations with Turkish officials beyond a certain point.

The question of the exchange of populations seemed to him to be bound up with the solution of the question of minorities in Turkey. If the conference recognised (as he hoped they would) the connexity between the two problems—exchange of populations and minorities—the Turkish delegation would expound their views at a subsequent meeting.

His general view was that it was certainly important to remedy as soon as possible the lamentable and pitiable situation of the hundreds of thousands of unfortunate people now homeless or destitute, both in Anatolia and in Thrace. He thought that the present meeting could not profitably deal with other questions besides the exchange of prisoners.

LORD CURZON wished to make a few observations in reply to Ismet Pasha because he thought there must be some misunderstanding. He had never intended that the discussion that afternoon should be limited to the question of prisoners of war, for that was only a small corner of a very much larger issue, and he had informed the various delegations that the discussion would extend to the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.

Ismet Pasha had said that Dr. Nansen's statement emanated from a private individual, and that the relations of Dr. Nansen with the Turkish Government had been entirely unofficial. This point was unimportant. The real importance of the question lay in the fact that it vitally affected the interests of Greece and Turkey, no matter who brought it forward.

Ismet Pasha had quite fairly made the point that Dr. Nansen proposed to bring in the League of Nations, with which the Turkish Government were not in relations. Perhaps later on the Turkish Government might think fit to establish such relations; but surely it was not necessary to raise such a question of machinery at the present meeting. The task before the commission was to consider the general principles on which they were to proceed.

Ismet Pasha had said that the question really involved the larger issue of the protection of minorities as a whole. That was quite true. When the question of exchanging populations between Turkey and Greece came to be examined it would be found impossible to remove the whole of the population in every case. Those left would be in a minority, and measures for their protection would doubtless have to be discussed in due course. He rejoiced to hear that Ismet Pasha would be ready to discuss the whole minorities problem at an early date, and he derived some encouragement from Ismet Pasha's statement at the end of his speech that it was a matter of urgency to remedy the state of all the poor people now wandering about without shelter. That raised the whole question of the exchange of populations, which was the object of the present discussion. He had much to say on the subject himself, and so doubtless had the Greek delegates, and possibly others too.

His own feeling about all the proceedings of the conference was that he wanted to get on. The delegates had now been in Lausanne nearly a fortnight, and had already made considerable progress. The Turkish delegation had been very good in responding to all the calls made upon them, and he hoped that they would not think he was driving them too hard. Lausanne was a very agreeable town, but they did not all want to spend Christmas there. He therefore urged that the discussion on the exchange of populations should begin at once, and that, if it was not finished that afternoon, it should be continued at an early date, because the lives of men, women and children depended on it.

M. VENISELOS agreed with Ismet Pasha as regards the exchange of prisoners of war.

On the subject of the exchange of populations, he accepted the principles suggested by Dr. Nansen. If the Ottoman Government did not accept those principles, he was ready to discuss with it the possibility of reaching agreement on other conditions. The point which he wished to emphasise was that a solution was urgently required. Thousands of people had left Eastern Thrace; the fields had been abandoned before the sowings could be finished. It was therefore to the interest of everybody, Turks as much as Greeks, that a solution should be devised as quickly as possible.

M. BARRERE observed that the discussion had shown all delegations to be agreed regarding the necessity of effecting the exchanges as early as possible. If the two delegations specially concerned could arrive at an agreement by means of direct negotiations and conversations, it would certainly be for the greatest good of humanity.

M. VENISELOS thought that the most expeditious method would be to set up a very small sub-commission consisting of one Turkish delegate, one Greek delegate and a president nominated by the conference. Dr. Nansen could be called upon by the sub-commission to give his opinion. This would be the quickest way of reaching a solution, and it would only be necessary to refer the matter back to the conference if differences arose in the course of the sub-commission's work.

ISMET PASHA agreed to the question being studied by a sub-commission, but thought it necessary to express the general view of the Turkish delegation on the two connected problems now laid before the conference. It was essential that the Turkish point of view should be known in advance and that two most urgent questions should be discussed and settled before that of the exchange of populations.

His delegation demanded the immediate release of the Turkish civilian prisoners carried off by the Greek army and deported to Greece; they had a complete detailed list of them. This measure must be unilateral, because there were no Greek civilian prisoners in the hands of the Turks, whose armies had not operated in Greece.

His delegation also claimed that the Turkish prisoners of war detained in Greece should be set free without delay. The Greek prisoners interned in Turkey would only be restored to Greece when peace was concluded. However, if the Greek Government gave evident proof of its good-will in liberating the Turkish prisoners, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey could consider the possibility of setting the Greek prisoners free before the conclusion of peace.

Ismet Pasha then examined the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece from a general point of view. Eastern Thrace had only been handed over to the Turkish authorities the day before (the 30th November). It had thus been impossible to collect the necessary data by which to estimate the housing capacity of the villages abandoned there by the Greeks. In the liberated part of Anatolia a countless number of people were still wandering about without any possibility of obtaining shelter. While the Greek refugees, as M. Veniselos had admitted, were able to find lodging with the Mussulmans of Greece, hundreds of thousands of Turks would have to leave their homes in Greece and go to swell the numbers of the homeless in Turkey.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government understood that the Greeks, when leaving Thrace, had carried off a large portion of the property, crops and cattle belonging to the Turks. It was difficult as yet to estimate how much the number of homeless persons in Asia Minor had been increased by the arrival of thousands of other Turkish emigrants from Greek territory.

It was necessary to examine whether such measures were applicable and to what degree, and this required careful investigation. In any case, if an exchange were effected the Greek population of the whole of Turkey, including Smyrna and Constantinople, would be included. After comparing once more the lot of the Turks who had left their houses and property in Greece and gone to settle in Anatolia, which was wasted by the Greek invasion, and the fate of the Greek refugees who would go and take possession of properties left intact by the Turks in Macedonia or other Greek territory, Ismet Pasha concluded by saying that he could only agree to the question being examined by the sub-commission if and when Greece had given proof of her goodwill in the question of prisoners.

M. VENISELOS noted that Ismet Pasha accepted the exchange of prisoners of war on condition that the Turkish prisoners of war should be handed over by Greece to Turkey immediately, whereas Turkey would only liberate the Greek prisoners of war on the conclusion of peace. The Greek Government could not negotiate on such a basis, but was ready to propose the exchange of an equal number of prisoners of war now in the hands of the two parties. In this way, the sufferings of the prisoners of war would be diminished as far as possible, although they could not be entirely eliminated with the best will in the world.

He must, on the other hand, contest Ismet Pasha's argument that the exchange of populations would result in an increase in the number of homeless people in Asia Minor. In point of fact, there were a million refugees in Greece. These refugees had left their houses without destroying them. True, out of that million some 200,000 came from Smyrna, and in consequence of the burning of that town the Greek population who had had to depart had not left habitable houses behind them. In Eastern Thrace and Anatolia, however, there was housing accommodation for 800,000 persons: Dr. Nansen, who had examined the question and visited the country, could give evidence to this effect. That was why the problem of homeless persons was so acute for Greece, but really non-existent for Turkey, whatever Ismet Pasha might say.

He did not wish to insist on the Turks resident in Greece being obliged to leave. In that connection he must observe that the majority of the refugees in Greece were without shelter and were at present accommodated in churches, schools or tents. There were, in fact, very few who had been lodged in the houses of Mussulmans; the latter had merely been invited to house some refugees in such parts of their dwellings as were available. He repeated that he did not wish to oblige the Turkish population to leave Greece. What he had in mind was a voluntary exchange of populations. His idea was that it would be best to settle this question in a definite and humane manner.

A special question arose as regards Constantinople. M. Veniselos could not allow that the thousands of Greeks who lived there, with the addition of numerous refugees from Thrace and Anatolia, should be obliged to leave that city. Such an expulsion would amount to an unprecedented political, economic and social catastrophe. If Turkey actually insisted on such an exodus the number of refugees

in Greece would be so great that he would be obliged to ask America, the great democracy of the West, to increase for the benefit of these refugees the percentage of immigrants which she was willing to receive. Apart from this reservation he was ready to consider an exchange of populations, either obligatory or voluntary.

LORD CURZON said that the discussion had shown how grave and urgent the question was. It was evident that the exchange of populations could only be carried out after careful examination, and above all, with goodwill on both sides. He hoped that the further discussion of the matter would be pursued with the good temper which had prevailed that afternoon.

He would like to add a word upon the principles to be adopted. M. Veniselos was prepared to consider either the voluntary or the compulsory exchange of populations. Doubtless everyone would instinctively prefer a voluntary exchange if that were possible. Exchange had been voluntary in the Greco-Bulgarian case. If a sub-commission were appointed, they would no doubt consider the matter; but he thought that compulsion would very probably be found necessary for more reasons than one.

If the exchange were left on a voluntary basis, months might pass before it was carried out, whereas what was wanted was firstly to get the Turkish population back into Eastern Thrace so that they might till the soil early next year; and secondly, to provide for the accommodation in Greece of the refugees pouring in from other parts. Also, if the exchange were compulsory, it would be easier to secure payment for the property which people were obliged to leave behind them.

On the question of the numbers affected, Ismet Pasha had said that the Turkish delegation were not in possession of sufficient data. He (Lord Curzon) had taken some trouble to obtain the figures which he would now quote, in order to show the magnitude and urgency of the problem.

According to American figures, there were in Asia Minor in 1914 1,600,000 Ottoman Greeks; during the years 1914–18 they had decreased, through deportation and otherwise, by between 300,000 and 400,000. Between the spring of 1919 and the summer of 1922, some 200,000 more were believed to have died from the effects of deportation or other forms of suffering. According to other statistics of great authority, which he had received from people who had been there, at least 500,000 Ottoman Greeks reached Greece from Ionia in September and October 1922. Thus out of the 1,600,000 Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor in 1914, 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 had been killed or deported, had fled or died. There remained about 500,000 in Asia Minor still to be dealt with. The majority of these were probably males between 16 and 50 years of age who were working on the roads and the devastated areas. In this connection, the Turkish Government had invited all the Christians of Asia Minor, with the exception of the above-mentioned males, to leave before the 30th November (in some cases the 15th December), and to sell their property to Moslems when they went.

He would next turn to the Greek population in Constantinople. In 1914 the number was estimated at about 300,000. The figure recently given was 400,000, the increase no doubt being attributable to the influx of refugees. The Greeks of Constantinople had of late been leaving very rapidly, at the rate of 3,000 a day (it was said) since the Mudania Agreement; he had recently heard that 15,000 Greeks had left Constantinople during October alone. Nevertheless, many still remained. He wanted to put to the Turkish delegates the following point, to which M. Veniselos had already alluded. This population of several hundred thousands was, of course, included in the problem now under discussion; but his (Lord Curzon's) experience led him to think that its removal would entail a very serious economic and industrial loss to Turkey herself. He believed this population was vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city of commerce and industry, and that without it Constantinople would be in danger of losing its authority, wealth and trade. He therefore hoped that the sub-commission, if set up, would consider the desirability of persuading the Turkish Government to keep the Greek population in Constantinople.

As against this, one could set the Turkish population of Western Thrace, which had been estimated a few days previously at 124,000 in 1912. The Turkish delegation had expressed no desire to expatriate these persons, and it was believed that they were not anxious to leave. He suggested that a sub-commission might examine these two aspects of the case, and see whether the two elements could be set against each other

The next point was the number of Hellenic Moslems in Greece. The number in old Greece was about 4,000, and in new Greece, including Crete and the islands, but not Eastern or Western Thrace, approximately 380,000. The Turkish population of Western Thrace was about 124,000. These figures, if correct, gave a total of between 450,000 and 480,000 Moslems in Greek territory.

The Greek population of Eastern Thrace before recent events was said to be about 300,000, if not more. As M. Veniselos had said, the whole of this population had now fled to Greece; the total number given to Dr. Nansen by Hamid Bey in October was 320,000. Thus an empty area was now left in Eastern Thrace, occupied until last month by 320,000 people, and awaiting the return of a corresponding number of Turks if they could be found. Although the Greeks might have carried off their cattle with them as suggested by Ismet Pasha, they had left behind them large stocks of grain which could be set off against the cattle.

The number of military Turkish prisoners of war in Greek hands was estimated at 10,000, and in addition there were a number of Turkish civilians from Asia Minor held as hostages by the Greeks, who were said to number 3,800. On the other hand, the number of Hellenic and Ottoman Greek prisoners in Turkish hands was about 30,000; and to these must be added 70,000 to 120,000 deported male refugees in Asia Minor who were presumably to be returned to Greece, subject to some such condition as that they should not serve in the Greek army.

Such being the dimensions of the population concerned, how was the commission to deal with the problem? Both Ismet Pasha and M. Veniselos were apparently in favour of referring the matter to a sub-commission. M. Veniselos had suggested a small sub-commission, consisting of a Greek and a Turkish representative, with an independent chairman, which should take evidence from Dr. Nansen or any other source. He (Lord Curzon) thought this a very good idea, and suggested that the sub-commission should be directed not merely to explore the subject, but also to draw up a draft convention for signature by the two parties with as little delay as possible. He hoped the sub-commission would bear in mind the points on which he had just spoken, namely, the voluntary versus the compulsory system; the special conditions in Constantinople and Western Thrace; the prisoners of war; the refugees; and the population as a whole. This, however, only touched a fringe of the question; guarantees for the minorities left behind after the exchange would have to be discussed later on. He would propose the immediate formation of a small sub-commission consisting of representatives of the three inviting Powers Greece and Turkey. The sub-commission might perhaps invite the Italian representative to be chairman (as Italy was very much interested in the problem), and would doubtless take evidence from whatever quarter it desired.

M. VENISELOS could understand Ismet Pasha's desire to get back the civilian prisoners detained by Greece. He wished, however, to point out that these prisoners had not been carried off, as Ismet Pasha said, contrary to international law. In the course of the occupation of Turkish territory by the Greek armies, the Greek command had only exercised its right to detain persons whom it considered as dangerous for the safety of the army. In any case, did Ismet Pasha think that the sufferings of these civilian prisoners' families—which arose simply from the absence of the prisoners from home—were comparable with those of the people who had had to leave Anatolia? Among those unfortunate people, who numbered some hundreds of thousands, almost all were women, children or old men; all able-bodied men had been kept in the interior of Anatolia. He hoped these sufferings would be weighed in the balance, and that the two questions would be considered simultaneously.

The commission adopted the following resolution:—

"It is decided that the question of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, including the return of prisoners of war and civil hostages, shall be examined by a sub-commission consisting of representatives of the three inviting Powers, of Turkey, and of Greece, under the chairmanship of an Italian delegate. The sub-commission will hear Dr. Nansen on the question, and collect such evidence as it may think fit."

ISMET PASHA said that the sub-commission to which these three questions had been referred should deal, first of all, with the liberation of Turkish civilian prisoners. It was essential that the witnesses to be heard by the sub-commission should know the country and all the circumstances which he himself had experienced.

The Turkish delegation intended to examine and verify the statistics given by Lord Curzon and M. Veniselos, but they had no hesitation in stating at once that

in 1914 there had never been 1,600,000 Greeks within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, including Constantinople. On the other hand, the figures given for the Turks resident in Greek territory seemed to be far below the real figures.

He had only wished to consider the problem in its general aspect. Eastern Thrace, of which mention had been made, had only been recovered by the Turkish authorities on the previous day (30th November), and therefore he could not know how many of the villages there were habitable. On the other hand, according to the Allied generals' reports, the crops which the Greeks had not been able to carry off had been burnt by them at the time of their departure.

To sum up, the subjects to be examined by the sub-commission ought to be classified in the following order:—

1. Question of civilian prisoners.
2. Question of prisoners of war.
3. Exchange of populations.

He insisted that the carrying off and deportation of civil prisoners had no analogy with the other problems. The Greeks had deported to Greece from all the villages and towns occupied by them thousands of Turks chosen specially among the intellectual, rich and prominent classes. The Turkish delegation had lists of these deportees. International law did not allow the deportation and imprisonment of the civil population in an occupied country. The Greeks had acted in this manner with the sole object of annihilating Turkey's popular, intellectual and economic life.

Ismet Pasha demanded that a decision should first of all be taken regarding the immediate release and return to Turkey of these deportees.

The Turkish Government considered it its duty to insist on most scrupulous enquiry being made in order to discover what had happened to all the deportees who might be missing when the civil hostages were set free. He felt sure that his request would be supported by the Powers because at the time of the Mudania negotiations the Allied generals, at the second meeting of the fifth session held on the 7th October, 1922, had formally promised to telegraph to their Governments asking them to require of the Greek Government the immediate liberation of the Turkish deportees.

(*The commission rose at* 7·20 P.M.)

[E 14399/13003/44] No. 830.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

COMMISSION ON THE REGIME OF FOREIGNERS.

Draft Minutes of the First Meeting, December 2, 1922, *at* 4 P.M., *under the presidency of Marquis Garroni.*—(*Received in Foreign Office, December* 27.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard	M. Montagna.
		M. Lago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Caclamanos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Ninčic	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M Spalaikovitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
	M. Rakitch.	Hassan Bey.

Also present:

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	M. Laroche.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Ryan.	M. Fromageot.	M. Guariglia.
Mr. Malkin.	M. de Lacroix.	M. Ciamarra.
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Bargeton.	M. Salem.
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Leeper.	M. Barois.	
Mr. Waley.	M. des Closières	
Mr. McClure.		

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. Heck.	Mr. Nagaoka.	Gen. Mazarakis.
	Mr. Tani.	M. Dendramis.
		M. Politis.
		M. Joannidis
		M. Theotokas.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
Col. Dumitresco.	M. Christitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Antitch.	Moukhtar Bey.
		Tevfik Bey.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Indelli.
Mr. Wicks.		

United States of America.	Japan.	Roumania
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Constantinesco.

Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

MARQUIS CARRONI read the following speech:—

"Before proceeding to the work entrusted to our commission, I feel that I should recall the fact that the Capitulations were originally granted to foreigners by a spontaneous act on the part of the Turkish Government, which desired to attract them to the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of developing the commerce and resources of the country by giving them guarantees and the means to live there according to their habits and customs.

"Further, the capitulatory privileges were so appropriate to the needs of the times and to the interests of both the foreigners and the concessionary State that the Capitulations were repeatedly confirmed later on by various treaties.

"It must, however, be recognised that according to present-day ideas of law the capitulatory régime is regarded as liable to diminish the sovereign powers of an independent State; and it is intelligible that Turkey should demand the abolition of this régime, which has had its day.

"We are disposed in principle to meet this legitimate desire of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; but it must be recognised on the other hand that foreigners have established themselves in Turkey and built up important enterprises there in reliance on the guarantees offered to them by the treaties. They have therefore acquired certain rights which must be taken into account and safeguarded.

"As regards the future, Turkey, who now claims her independence and sovereign rights, is equally interested in attracting foreign initiative and activity; she needs foreign co-operation for the profitable development of the numerous resources of the country, which are still in great part unexploited. It will, therefore, no doubt be agreeable to the Turkish Government, which wants the capitulatory régime to disappear, to substitute for it such guarantees as regards legislation and the administration of justice as will inspire confidence in all those who will be obliged to have recourse thereto.

"Our commission was also to deal with the question of minorities; but our task is already very heavy, and this question has partly been taken in hand by the First Commission under the able presidency of his Excellency Lord Curzon, who directs its work with so much authority and understanding. It therefore seems desirable, if you have no objection, to hand over to the First Commission the completion of the work relating to this question.

"I am well aware of the difficulties which our commission will have to overcome, but I am convinced that by working with a firm will to achieve the desired object it will succeed in finding such a solution as will reconcile all the interests concerned.

"With this wish I propose to open the work of our commission by a general discussion on the questions laid before it. I shall be happy to listen to such observations as may be made in this respect, that is to say, remarks of a general character, questions of detail being referred to the three sub-commissions whose formation I have the honour to propose, viz.:—

"*First Sub-Commission:* The legal position of foreign persons in Turkey, physical, juridical and moral, as regards the right to establish themselves in the country, and as regards the judiciary régime

"*Second Sub-Commission:* The legal position of foreigners from the economic point of view.

"*Third Sub-Commission:* Questions of nationality and of archæological research."

ISMET PASHA understood from Marquis Garroni's statement that the latter recognised the incompatibility of the Capitulations with a nation's independence and with its concern for its existence and sovereign rights. He took note that this principle was established. Both in juridical matters and in the region of fact Turkey had for many years past repeatedly shown that it was possible in practice to dispense with the Capitulations. The sub-commissions would therefore only have to settle Turkey's future relations with the interested States in conformity with the principles governing relations between States where no capitulatory régime existed.

He wished to make it clear that his Government could not possibly agree to negotiations with a view to the Capitulations being suppressed in form and in name, but maintained in substance. Such a régime would be a fresh source of complications and would make relations even more difficult than in the past. This was the basis on which the Turkish delegates would participate in the work of the sub-commissions. The position of foreigners in Turkey was guaranteed by general legislation similar to that existing in all civilised nations which were independent and masters of their own fate. He warned the conference that the Turkish delegates could only work in the sub-commissions in this spirit.

M. BARRÈRE wished to confine himself to a statement of principle. The fact that people spoke of suppressing the Capitulations implied that they still existed. The task of the conference was to devise a system more suited to modern requirements in place of the capitulatory system, which was in consonance with archaic ideas. It would, however, be necessary that the new régime should contain provisions which gave foreigners adequate satisfaction and guarantees from the juridical point of view. Having made this statement of principle, he reserved the right to define in the course of subsequent discussion the point of view which the French delegation would have to defend.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to add a few words to the observations that had fallen from the president and M. Barrère, and desired to associate himself with the very conciliatory and courteous language which they had adopted.

The president had indicated to the meeting that what the conference had to do was to discover some substitute for the Capitulations. The Capitulations depended

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upon treaty rights and arrangements made by mutual consent, which extended over a period of centuries; and the fact that the Capitulations could not be destroyed by either of the contracting parties without the consent of the other, and without the substitution of some new system in their place, had been laid down on more than one occasion. For instance, there was a treaty in 1871 between the Powers and Turkey in which he found the words "they recognise that it is an essential principle of international law that no Power can absolve itself from the obligations of a treaty nor modify its stipulations except in pursuance of the assent of the contracting parties in virtue of an amicable agreement." In 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin was signed, particular mention was made in it that the rights of consular jurisdiction "shall remain in force so long as they shall not have been modified with the consent of the parties concerned." In October 1914, after the beginning of the Great War, the Turkish Government took advantage of the occasion to proclaim the abrogation of the Capitulations. All the Powers, including even Germany and Austria, the allies of Turkey, who had treaty rights, immediately protested against this act on the ground that no treaty could be abrogated solely by the decision of one of the parties. He agreed with Ismet Pasha's view that it was desirable to avoid using the word "Capitulations," which had an invidious sound; but as the president had observed, certain guarantees were required which would be as much in the interest of the Turks themselves as of foreigners. He was glad to know that while making all legitimate reservations on behaf of the Turkish Government, Ismet Pasha had recognised the necessity of providing such a system and had indicated the willingness of the Turkish delegation to serve on the sub-commissions which it was proposed to appoint. He hoped both parties would realise that this was one of the most important questions which the conference had to discuss. It was a question which the Turkish delegation, holding the views they did as to the sovereignty and independence of their State, regarded as of capital importance. So did the inviting Powers. He hoped all delegates would go into the discussion in the sub-commissions with the firm intention of providing some settlement which would be equally fair to all parties. If that spirit prevailed, there was good hope of carrying matters to a successful solution.

ISMET PASHA noted with satisfaction that there was complete agreement as regards the Capitulations being incompatible with the sovereign rights of an independent country. If a régime which was recognised as inapplicable were replaced by another régime of a fundamentally similar character, the latter would be condemned to suffer the same fate as its predecessor.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was convinced of the necessity of firmly maintaining the theory that Turkey had the same rights as every nation worthy of the name and master of its destinies.

He reserved the right to give in the course of the discussion detailed explanations regarding the unilateral and revokable character of the Capitulations. He thought that the questions to be referred to the sub-commissions should be the conclusion of commercial treaties, treaties concerning the establishment of foreigners in Turkey, extradition treaties and consular conventions, on a basis of reciprocity and in conformity with the general rules of international law. The Turkish delegation would maintain this principle in the sub-commissions.

BARON HAYASHI was glad to see that France, Italy and Great Britain were approaching this matter in a spirit of sympathy for Turkey. He wished to say that Japan was perhaps one of the foremost among the Powers to sympathise with the desire of Turkey, because Japan had, herself, had a capitulatory régime like Turkey for a number of years. He would, however, like to point out for the kind consideration of Ismet Pasha that Japan had taken twenty years or more in order to prepare for herself a complete juridical system. It was only after hard work by Japan, lasting more than twenty years, that the Powers were able to agree to the Capitulations being brought to an end. In these circumstances he sympathised with the Powers and would like Ismet Pasha to sympathise with them too. It would take some considerable time and work to devise a new system which would be satisfactory both to the Powers and to Turkey; and it was the intention of Japan to contribute her full share to that work, with a view to complete Turkish independence being realised as soon as possible.

M. BOMPARD called attention to an omission in Ismet Pasha's speech; this concerned the exercise of jurisdiction—a point of capital importance—with a view to giving foreigners resident in Turkey the necessary guarantees. He noted with pleasure that attention had been called to that omission by Baron Hayashi.

MR. CHILD said that the United States, if it were stating a legal case or claim of rights, would be obliged to take the same point of view as the Allied Powers. He felt obliged to state that the present case was a fortunate one in which both parties had a common interest, and that therefore it would be the opinion of his Government that the sooner the seeking for that common interest were found the better for the present conference.

ISMET PASHA wished to reply to all the arguments advanced by Lord Curzon, Baron Hayashi, M. Bompard and Mr. Child by reading a memorandum, the text of which he handed in (see Annex).

MARQUIS GARRONI associated himself with Lord Curzon and M. Barrère in pointing out that since the Capitulations were based on treaties the questions which had hitherto been governed by the Capitulations must naturally be settled by a new international act. The three sub-commissions which were about to be set up would take into account the remarks made by Ismet Pasha. He felt sure that with the good-will of all the delegations a system could be devised which would satisfy the interests of all and give birth to relations of true friendship between the interested States to their great mutual advantage.

(The commission rose at 5 P.M.)

Annex to No. 830.

Mémoire lu par le Délégué turc à la Séance du 2 décembre 1922 de la Commission du Régime des Étrangers.

L'ORIGINE des Capitulations, qui instituent un régime manifestement contraire aux règles du droit public international moderne, et qui apportent des restrictions à la souveraineté exercée par un État dans les limites de ses territoires sur des personnes et des biens, est d'une importance que l'on ne saurait méconnaître. Le système qui était en vigueur à peu près partout, au moyen âge, était la personnalité des lois, système qui n'était point alors considéré comme incompatible avec les prérogatives de la souveraineté de l'État. Ainsi, on accordait aux communautés étrangères des privilèges en vertu desquels les consuls assumaient la charge des autorités publiques en ce qui concerne le maintien de l'ordre et appliquaient leurs lois nationales dans des affaires n'intéressant que leurs ressortissants.

Cette même conception exerçait aussi une certaine influence sur les relations des étrangers avec les indigènes, et on ne voyait pas d'inconvénients à ce que les lois du pays ne fussent appliquées aux étrangers qu'avec certaines restrictions. C'est pour cette raison que les Croisés, lors de leur passage à Constantinople, ont pu se faire octroyer certains privilèges par les Empereurs de Byzance. Les Vénitiens et les Génois habitant Galata en ont obtenu aussi de leur côté. De même, bien avant l'occupation de Constantinople par les Turcs, la colonie musulmane en cette ville se trouvait soumise à la juridiction d'un Cadi qui rendait la justice conformément aux lois du Chéri. Quand Mohmed II s'est emparé de Constantinople, il a maintenu, sans y être nullement obligé, les privilèges dont jouissaient les Vénitiens et les Génois.

Si, à une époque où l'Empire ottoman était parvenu à l'apogée de sa gloire et de sa puissance, Soliman 1er a octroyé des privilèges à la communauté franque, c'est parce qu'alors la souveraineté de l'État ne présentait pas un caractère absolu et exclusif, comme de nos jours. Nul ne serait fondé à prétendre aujourd'hui qu'en concédant ces privilèges, le Sultan entendait restreindre et amoindrir la souveraineté de son Empire. Tous ces privilèges procédaient, comme il a été dit plus haut, du système de la personnalité des lois qui était à cette époque généralement appliqué.

Au surplus, les étrangers qui venaient en Turquie pour s'y établir ou pour y exercer le commerce étaient soumis à des restrictions tant de la part des autorités ottomanes que de celle de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

C'était, en général, des gens choisis et recommandables qui fournissaient à leurs Gouvernements un cautionnement pour pouvoir venir en Turquie. Leur séjour dans ce pays était d'ailleurs limité.

Plus tard, les rapports de commerce internationaux s'étant développés peu à peu, le nombre des étrangers venant en Turquie s'est trouvé augmenté. D'autre part, les États occidentaux supprimèrent, avec le temps, les règles soit prescrivant à leurs sujets

d'obtenir une autorisation pour se rendre en Orient, soit de fournir le cautionnement requis.

Parallèlement à ce développement des relations internationales, l'idée gagna du terrain, aussi bien en théorie qu'dans le domaine pratique, de substituer à la notion de la personnalité des lois celle de "la territorialité" et en même temps la nature juridique de l'État mieux compris; le droit de légiférer et de distribuer la justice devint un des attributs exclusifs de la souveraineté. C'est pourquoi l'État moderne considère comme un effet tout naturel de sa puissance de ne pas exempter les étrangers habitant dans le pays de l'application des lois qui y sont en vigueur. Surtout, il ne tolère point que ceux ci aient, en quelque matière que ce soit, des droits et privilèges les plaçant au-dessus des nationaux, considérant cet état de choses comme une atteinte portée à sa souveraineté et à sa sécurité; et enfin, par des traités et conventions qu'il conclut en toute indépendance, il règle les conditions du séjour des étrangers sur son territoire et fixe les lois et les règlements auxquels ces derniers doivent être soumis durant leur séjour.

L'anomalie du régime capitulaire par rapport au droit public international et à la conception moderne de la souveraineté fut reconnue par les Puissances qui ont participé au Congrès de Paris en 1856.

En effet, le Comte de Clarendon s'est prononcé dans la séance du 28 mars dudit congrès en faveur de "la nécessité pour les Puissances contractantes qui ont appelé la Turquie a faire partie du système politique de l'Europe, de donner un témoignage éclatant des dispositions qui les unissent et de leur sollicitude pour les intérêts généraux de leurs sujets respectifs, en cherchant à s'entendre dans le but de mettre les rapports de leur commerce et de leur navigation en harmonie avec la position nouvelle qui sera faite à l'Empire ottoman.

"Le Comte Walewsky a appuyé cet avis, dont il a recommandé l'adoption en se fondant sur les principes nouveaux qui vont sortir des délibérations du congrès.

"De son côté, le Comte de Cavour a fait remarquer que: 'aucune Puissance ne possède une législation commerciale plus libérale que celle de la Turquie et que l'anarchie qui règne dans les transactions ou plutôt dans les rapports personnels des étrangers résidant dans l'Empire ottoman, tient à des stipulations nées d'une situation exceptionnelle.' Sur les déclarations d'Aali Pacha, concernant la suppression des Capitulations, les autres plénipotentiaires, y compris le Baron de Bourqueney, ont hautement reconnu que les Capitulations répondent à une situation à laquelle le Traité de Paix tendra nécessairement à mettre fin et que les privilèges qu'elles stipulent pour les personnes circonscrivent l'autorité de la Sublime Porte dans les limites regrettables; les explications échangées, MM. les plénipotentiaires ont reconnu unanimement la nécessité de reviser les stipulations qui fixent les rapports commerciaux de la Porte avec les autres Puissances, ainsi que les conditions des étrangers résidant en Turquie, et ont décidé de consigner au protocole le vœu qu'une délibération soit ouverte à Constantinople après la conclusion de la paix entre la Porte et les représentants des autres Puissances contractantes pour atteindre en double but dans une mesure propre à donner une entière satisfaction à tous les intérêts légitimes."

On voit qu'il y a déjà soixante-six ans, les représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France et de l'Italie reconnaissaient, dans un congrès si solennel, la nécessité d'abroger les Capitulations, à cause de leur incompatibilité avec les conceptions modernes du droit et de l'atteinte qu'elles portaient à la souveraineté de l'État.

Pendant la période qui s'est écoulée depuis la conclusion du Traité de Paris, la Turquie a travaillé fiévreusement à parfaire son organisation judiciaire qu'elle avait déjà commencée.

Le Code de Commerce, le Code pénal, les Codes de Procédures civile et pénale, ainsi que les lois sur les tribunaux de paix, et aussi toutes les lois ou règlements administratifs ont été élaborés sur le modèle des codes et lois en vigueur dans les pays européens.

Surtout ces derniers temps on a pu réaliser une réforme très importante dans le domaine du droit civil, par suite de laquelle nos institutions juridiques ont été complètement sécularisées; la volonté des parties en fait de contrats et conventions a été reconnue souveraine; et à la règle de l'autonomie de la volonté a été donnée la même valeur qu'en Europe; d'autre part, en même temps qu'on élaborait et promulguait les lois, on institua à Constantinople une faculté de droit dont le programme est à peu près identique à celui de ses pareilles en Europe. Cette situation prépare depuis quarante ans des juges et des avocats distingués et possédant toutes les qualités requises; c'est à eux qu'est confiée actuellement la tâche importante de distribuer la justice.

Nombre de jeunes gens ont fait, depuis le changement de régime en 1908, leurs études dans différentes facultés de droit de l'Empire et sont actuellement nommés aux différents postes dans la magistrature.

Notre organisation et réforme judiciaires ayant été exécutées sur la base des institutions européennes, la nécessité de supprimer les Capitulations fut reconnue, de nouveau, à des dates et dans des occasions différentes par les Gouvernements qui avaient constaté la même nécessité déjà au Congrès de Paris. Ces Gouvernements admettraient ainsi que notre organisation judiciaire était sensiblement modernisée et pouvait garantir les droits des étrangers vivant en notre pays. Ils conviennent donc que l'abolition du régime capitulaire ne représentait pour eux aucun inconvénient sérieux.

En effet, par une clause du protocole que la Turquie et l'Autriche-Hongrie ont signé en 1909, après l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, cette dernière Puissance consentait à la suppression du régime capitulaire. Le Traité de Lausanne, conclu trois ans après, contenait également un article par lequel l'Italie prenait le même engagement; elle reconnaissait le bien-fondé du point de vue de la Sublime Porte, et affirmait son intention de lui prêter un plein et sincère appui.

Depuis lors, l'Autriche, l'Allemagne, dernièrement la Russie, ont nettement accepté la suppression des Capitulations par le Gouvernement ottoman et reconnu catégoriquement le droit légitime de la Turquie à cet effet. Comme des lacunes de notre organisation judiciaire ont été comblées jusqu'ici et comme, d'autre part, les Capitulations sont des dispositions absolument incompatibles avec la souveraineté d'un État, leur abrogation ne devrait faire l'objet d'aucune controverse.

La continuation du régime capitulaire, loin d'assurer un avantage aux ressortissants étrangers, engendre d'innombrables difficultés dans les affaires et portent préjudices aux intérêts aussi bien des Turcs que des étrangers. Ce point est de la plus grande importance, et mérite d'être étudié avec une attention minutieuse. L'application des dispositions judiciaires des Capitulations doit être examinée tant au point de vue des affaires civiles et commerciales qu'à celui des questions pénales, ainsi qu'au point de vue de l'exécution des jugements.

D'abord, s'il s'agit d'un procès civil ou commercial entre deux étrangers de nationalités différentes, il devait être jugé par le tribunal du consulat du défendeur selon les lois et conformément à la procédure en vigueur de son pays. Dès lors, chaque étranger résidant ou exerçant le commerce en Turquie se trouvait obligé de connaître les lois nationales des autres étrangers avec lesquels il entretenait des relations commerciales, et d'en tenir compte lorsqu'il fait ses actes ou passe ses contrats. Ainsi, dans le même pays il existait autant de lois, de juges et de tribunaux qu'il y avait de Puissances. En cas d'appel, il fallait s'adresser aux cours d'appel du pays dont ces étrangers étaient ressortissants; et naturellement même si l'on parvenait à obvier à ces difficultés et on arrivait à comparaître avec l'adversaire devant le tribunal mixte, de nombreux obstacles ne cessaient de surgir de nouveau au cours des débats. Les membres étrangers de ces tribunaux mixtes étaient, dans leur grande majorité, des gens qui n'étaient pas tout à fait initiés à la science du droit; la plupart d'entre eux croyaient que, au lieu d'appliquer la loi et d'observer la justice, leur devoir consistait à se prononcer en général en faveur de l'étranger. Au reste, membres, ayant très souvent d'autres occupations, ils n'assistaient pas régulièrement au tribunal; ce qui faisait que les procès subissaient d'interminables retards. Les étrangers en souffraient autant que les Turcs. L'absence des juges et des drogmans est plus fréquente dans les litiges où l'étranger est défendeur. Les archives du premier Tribunal de Commerce de Constantinople font souvent mention des procès qui durèrent depuis vingt à trente ans. Par exemple, les questions de moindre importance, telle qu'une notification, passent souvent du domaine des tribunaux dans celui de la diplomatie et font surgir des conflits interminables entre le Gouvernement et les Ambassades. Quand on prévoyait que les débats allaient avoir un dénouement contre l'étranger ou quand un jugement défavorable à celui-ci était rendu, l'absence de l'étranger ou le refus injustifié du drogman de signer ce jugement empêchait le différend d'être résolu. Les mêmes difficultés se faisaient jour naturellement quand l'étranger était demandeur. L'attitude des membres étrangers (qui soutenaient ce dernier avec une grande partialité comme s'ils étaient ses avocats) et surtout des drogmans causaient de regrettables malentendus qui faisaient passer l'affaire du domaine judiciaire à celui de la diplomatie. Cet état de choses était la cause que les procès traînaient très longtemps, et enlevait au Tribunal de Commerce la possibilité de terminer les procès. Une fois le jugement rendu, son exécution donnait également lieu à des difficultés de toute espèce. Aussi, n'était-il pas rare de voir que des jugements rendus contre les étrangers fussent restés sans exécution.

On voit bien que cette regrettable situation lésait les droits des étrangers autant que ceux des Turcs.

D'une part, les Turcs, envisageant les suites fatales des différends qui pouvaient surgir, agissaient avec beaucoup de précaution et de méfiance envers les étrangers avec

qui ils désiraient entrer en relations et même tâchaient de les éviter autant que possible. D'autre part, les étrangers aussi, se heurtant plus ou moins aux mêmes difficultés, ne donnaient pas l'ampleur voulue à leurs relations commerciales en Turquie et même, quoique désireux de provoquer la compétence des tribunaux connaissant seulement des procès entre les Turcs, se rencontraient à la défense formelle des représentants diplomatiques de leurs pays. Il est à ce propos intéressant de faire remarquer que les affaires relevant des tribunaux étaient peu nombreuses.

Les sociétés fondées avec la collaboration des capitaux étrangers exploitant de vastes entreprises en Turquie, telles que la Banque ottomane, la Société des Tramways, la Société des Chemins de Fer, &c., sont, comme sociétés ottomanes, soumises à la juridiction des tribunaux turcs.

Toutes les affaires ayant trait soit au bail, soit aux biens immobiliers, indépendamment de la nationalité des parties, étaient du ressort des tribunaux turcs en vertu du protocole annexé à la loi du 7 Séfer.

D'autre part, les procès entre les ressortissants serbes et monténégrins, qui ne bénéficiaient pas des Capitulations, ont été de tout temps jugés directement par les tribunaux du pays. Il en fut de même des différends survenus, après la guerre générale, entre les Turcs et les sujets des Puissances capitulaires De ce chef, aucune plainte n'a été formulée par les intéressés aux procès.

Quant aux dispositions des Capitulations en matière pénale, bien que l'inviolabilité de la personne et du domicile, le droit de défense par devant les tribunaux soient déjà assurés par les lois turques, les pouvoirs des autorités judiciaires chargées d'appliquer ces lois se trouvaient limités par des restrictions des Capitulations. De plus, les autorités consulaires usaient de ces restrictions dans la plus large mesure de façon à pouvoir soustraire délibérément à l'action de la justice les délinquants qui avaient violé l'ordre et la sécurité publics du pays.

Toutes les fois qu'un assassin ou l'auteur d'un délit quelconque réussissait à gagner le domicile d'un étranger, la police turque se trouvait empêchée d'y entrer et obligée de suspendre la poursuite jusqu'à l'arrivée du drogman et, dans l'intervalle, le délinquant trouvait le moyen de s'esquiver.

La nécessité qu'il y avait à entendre un témoin de nationalité étrangère, dans un procès pénal, en présence du drogman, aboutissait très souvent à des résultats fâcheux ; le témoin et le drogman, ou seulement ce dernier, pouvaient, en répondant à l'invitation ou en faisant défaut, influer sur la marche de la poursuite judiciaire.

Ces difficultés n'étaient pas moindres quand il s'agissait de l'exécution du jugement rendu en matière pénale, et constituaient également de graves atteintes à la souveraineté de l'État ainsi qu'au prestige de l'autorité judiciaire.

Les auteurs étrangers les plus qualifiés n'ont pu empêcher de relater ces effets regrettables de l'application des Capitulations et ont reconnu que les circonstances qui avaient donné naissance à ce régime ont depuis longtemps cesser d'exister.

Hâtons-nous d'enregistrer ici ce que dit à ce sujet le très regretté Professeur L. Renault :

"La souveraineté de la Porte est aujourd'hui amoindrie à bien des points de vue ; mais il ne faut pas oublier que l'état de choses exposé plus haut date d'une époque ancienne où la Sublime Porte était toute puissante. Soliman le Magnifique, dont François Ier recherchait l'alliance en 1553, n'aurait pas fait une concession qui aurait pu être regardée comme humiliante Il faut songer, d'abord, qu'autrefois la souveraineté territoriale avait un caractère moins exclusif qu'aujourd'hui et ne répugnait pas à l'exercice de la juridiction par des autorités étrangères. Ainsi, on a relevé le fait curieux que soixante ans avant que Constantinople passât sous la domination des Turcs une communauté musulmane y résidait sous l'administration du Cadi, qui rendait la justice selon les lois mahométanes. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que Mehmed II, après la conquête, ait accordé aux marchands de Gênes et de Venise la continuation des privilèges dont ils jouissaient sous les empereurs chrétiens.

"Enfin, il est surtout important de remarquer que jusqu'au commencement de ce siècle les Capitulations s'appliquaient dans tout autre condition qu'aujourd'hui. N'allait pas s'établir dans le Levant qui voulait ; spécialement en France, des précautions étaient prises ; il fallait être autorisé par le Gouvernement, fournir un cautionnement. Les colonies européennes étaient donc minutieusement choisies, peu nombreuses ; en outre, elles étaient matériellement séparées de la population indigène avec laquelle elles entretenaient les rapports strictement nécessaires pour le commerce. L'autorité des consuls avait pour but de faire régner l'ordre dans ces petites colonies et non de faire échec à l'autorité locale. Les abus étaient rares. La situation a changé du tout au tout. Chaque pays a supprimé les anciennes restrictions et laissé ses nationaux s'établir

librement en Turquie. Le nombre des étrangers y a donc singulièrement augmenté. Les étrangers ne sont pas toujours recommandables ; ils sont mêlés à la population. Il est facile de comprendre que l'application des anciennes règles a dû entraîner des abus et des scandales et que des sérieuses entraves ont été apportées à la police et à l'administration du pays et que l'état de choses, qui pouvait être naturel dans les siècles passés, est devenu à la fois humiliant et dommageable pour la Puissance territoriale."*

Et aussi, dans un ouvrage publié sur les Capitulations, M. André Mandestam, qui a rempli longtemps les fonctions de premier drogman à l'Ambassade de Russie à Constantinople et qui ne pouvait naturellement pas ne pas partager le point de vue des Ambassades en cette matière, écrit ce qui suit :

"Nous devons reconnaître que les lignes générales du système judiciaire appliqué aux affaires civiles et aux affaires pénales entre étrangers et Ottomans en Turquie sont très confuses et présentent fort peu de points de repère. Les conflits juridiques entre la Sublime Porte et les missions sortent rarement du domaine diplomatique ; ils n'ont qu'une importance politique fort restreinte, dont l'examen, du reste, n'entre pas dans le cadre de cette étude. Ces conflits journaliers sont devenus presqu'un droit commun.

"Mais, si les grands intérêts politiques ne semblent pas demander une solution immédiate des conflits juridiques exposés dans cette étude, les intérêts des parties, soit étrangers, soit Ottomans, l'exigent péremptoirement. Quinconque aura suivi notre travail peut aisément comprendre l'incertitude juridique et les difficultés inextricables dans lesquelles se débattent souvent les intérêts particuliers pris dans l'engrenage d'un pareil régime. Au criminel, le désaccord entre le consulat et le tribunal sur le lieu de la détention préventive ou à l'exécution de la peine peut mener soit à un long emprisonnement sans jugement jusqu'à la solution du conflit, soit à un jugement sans assistance consulaire, soit parfois même à l'impunité du prévenu s'il est renvoyé dans sa patrie. Le désaccord entre le drogman et la majorité du tribunal quant à la sentence à rendre peut avoir les mêmes conséquences, qui varient, en fait, selon que c'est le consulat ou le tribunal qui a l'accusé en son pouvoir. Au civil, la même incertitude se produit chaque fois qu'un conflit éclate entre les opinions des juges et celle de leur contrôleur. D'un autre côté, les intérêts étrangers sont insuffisamment sauvegardés dans la composition du tribunal mixte, où les Ottomans ont toujours la majorité. Sans doute, le drogman peut bien ne pas signer la sentence rejetant l'action d'un étranger contre un Ottoman, mais l'étranger restera frustré de son droit. D'un autre côté, le veto drogmanal revêt une force bien réelle quand il s'applique à une sentence rendue au profit d'un Ottoman contre un étranger, car une telle sentence ne sera pas exécutée par l'autorité consulaire. Les droits des parties dépendent donc trop souvent de l'issue changeante des conflits entre les juges et le drogman."

Les auteurs étrangers reconnaissent, et les faits, d'ailleurs, le démontrent, que les Capitulations portent préjudice tant aux nationaux qu'aux étrangers eux-mêmes. Elles permettent à ces derniers de se soustraire à l'autorité de leur juge naturel et sont, en outre, humiliantes et dommageables pour la Puissance territoriale Aussi, ne pouvant plus les tolérer, le Gouvernement ottoman, par une décision prise les 9–26 août 1914 a-t-il aboli les Capitulations de cette nature.

Il est hors de doute qu'en prenant une telle résolution, la Turquie n'a fait qu'exercer un droit légitime. En effet, les Capitulations sont essentiellement des actes unilatéraux. Pour qu'un acte puisse être considéré comme synallagmatique, il faut avant tout qu'il comporte des engagements réciproques. Or, de l'examen des textes, il ressort à l'évidence qu'en octroyant aux étrangers en Turquie les privilèges en question, les empereurs ottomans ne songeaient nullement à en obtenir de pareils en faveur de leurs sujets voyageant ou faisant le commerce en Europe. C'est pour cette raison que Féraud Giraud dit :

"Ces actes sont moins des traités internationaux que des concessions de privilèges."

Le Professeur Louis Renault fait aussi remarquer que "ce sont des concessions gracieuses et spontanées, toujours révocables et caduques par la mort du souverain qui les avait faites." Il leur manque, en effet, dit-il, ce qui constitue par excellence le traité, ce qui est le caractère distinctif et éventuel de toute convention, c'est-à-dire le caractère synallagmatique attesté par la réciprocité des engagements et la double signature.

* Louis Renault, "Grande Encyclopédie" : article, "Capitulations."

À supposer même que les Capitulations fussent des conventions bilatérales, il serait injuste d'en inférer qu'elles sont immuables et qu'elles doivent demeurer éternellement irrévocables

Les traités dont la durée n'est pas fixée impliquent la clause *rebus sic stantibus* en vertu de laquelle la transformation dans les circonstances qui ont provoqué la conclusion d'un traité peut entraîner l'annulation par l'une des parties contractantes de ce traité, s'il n'est pas possible de l'annuler par consentement mutuel.

" Il faut nécessairement admettre des cas où l'État doit pouvoir se déclarer dégagé de tout engagement, quand bien même il ne se serait pas expressément réservé ce droit par une clause du traité. Le respect des engagements contractés ne doit pas être, par exemple, poussé jusqu'au suicide. Si l'on peut exiger d'un État qu'il exécute les engagements onéreux contractés par lui, on ne saurait demander de sacrifier à l'exécution d'un traité son développement et son existence."*

De même, le Professeur Despagnet, le célèbre juriste français, s'exprime de la façon suivante :

" Les cas où la dénonciation des traités est légitime peuvent se ramener à trois principaux :

" (*a.*) Quand l'observation d'un traité est devenue compromettante pour l'existence politique ou économique d'un pays ;

" (*b.*) Quand les circonstances qui ont motivé le traité ont changé et enlèvent à l'ancien accord sa raison d'être ;

" (*c.*) Enfin, un traité peut être dénoncé quand il est devenu incompatible avec le droit commun international des États civilisés auquel prennent part les pays contractants ; tel serait aujourd'hui un traité ancien, non formellement abrogé, qui consacrerait la traite des noirs par le droit des gens moderne."

Vu les raisons ci-haut exposées, l'abrogation du système capitulaire est une nécessité plus que justifiée. En effet, l'application continuelle de ces règles extrêmement nuisibles portait une atteinte grave à l'existence politique de l'État.

Au reste, les circonstances et les conditions qui avaient donné naissance à ce régime se trouvent changées du tout au tout. Il est unanimement affirmé que les Capitulations sont absolument incompatibles avec les principes du droit public moderne.

D'autre part, comme il a été expliqué plus haut, les Capitulations ont leur origine dans le principe de la personnalité des lois. Tandis que selon la conception juridique actuelle, chaque État, pour être considéré un État indépendant, doit jouir, dans les limites de ses frontières, d'une indépendance pleine et entière. Ses lois et institutions doivent présenter un caractère complètement territorial. Partant, les Capitulations constituent de nos jours, comme le remarque fort justement Pélissier de Rosas, une anomalie et un anachronisme.

En résumé, l'atteinte et la restriction portée au droit de légiférer de l'État, sous le prétexte que la plupart des lois du pays ne sauraient être appliquées aux étrangers ;

L'impossibilité de poursuivre les étrangers qui ont troublé l'ordre et la sécurité publics ;

La violation des principes du droit public résultant de la nécessité d'observer certaines conditions et restrictions en fait de poursuite et d'arrestation d'un délinquant étranger ;

L'obligation de trancher les litiges identiques par devant les tribunaux différents et conformément aux lois et procédure différentes, selon la nationalité des contractantes ;

Et l'empêchement des particuliers de s'adresser à leur juge naturel, &c.,

Sont autant de résultats regrettables de l'application du régime capitulaire.

Vu ce qui précède, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ne peut nullement consentir au rétablissement des Capitulations, qui sont en opposition directe avec la conception moderne de l'État ainsi qu'avec les principes du droit public. D'ailleurs, il est notoire qu'un tel régime n'existe dans aucun des autres pays européens, ni même en Grèce et dans les autres États balkaniques.

Le Gouvernement turc ne saurait non plus adhérer à un régime qui, en réalité, aurait un caractère capitulaire. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale est prêt à conclure avec les Gouvernements intéressés des traités de commerce, d'établissement, d'extradition, ainsi que des conventions consulaires sur la base de réciprocité et des principes du droit international général.

* Pradier-Fodéré, vol. II, p. 624, année 1911.

[E 14400/13003/44] No. 831.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Ninth Meeting (First Meeting of the Straits Commission), December 4, 1922, at 11 A.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 27.)

Present :

BRITISH EMPIRE.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
Sir H. Rumbold.

FRANCE.
M. Barrère.
M. Bompard.

ITALY.
Marquis Garroni.
M. Montagna.
M. Lago.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Mr. Child.
Mr. Grew.

JAPAN.
Baron Hayashi.
Mr. Otchiai.

GREECE.
M. Venizelos.
M. Cachamanos.

ROUMANIA.
M. Duca.
M. Diamandy.

SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.
M. Nincic.
M. Rakitch.

TURKEY.
Ismet Pasha.
Riza Nour Bey.
Hassan Bey.

BULGARIA.
M. Stamboliisky.
M. Stanciof.
M. Theodorof.

RUSSIA.
M. Chicherin.
M. Rakovsky.
M. Mdivani.
M. Vorovsky.

Also present :

BRITISH EMPIRE.
Sir W. Tyrrell.
Mr. Lindley.
Admiral Sir R. Keyes.
Major-Gen. Burnett Stuart.
Mr. Malkin.
Captain Pound, R.N.
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.
Mr. Nicolson.
Mr. Forbes Adam.
Mr. Leeper.
Major McLeod.
Mr. McClure.

FRANCE.
Admiral Lacaze.
General Weygand.
M. Laroche.
M. Fromageot.
M. de Lacroix.
M. Bargeton.
M. de Percin.
M. Barois.

ITALY.
M. Arlotta.
M. Vitale.
M. Guariglia.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Mr. Dwight.
Mr. Amory.
Mr. Wheeler.

JAPAN.
Mr. Sato.
Colonel Saigo.
Captain Tsuru.

GREECE.
General Mazarakis.
M. Michalopoulos.
M. Dendramis.

ROUMANIA.
Colonel Dumitrescu.

SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.
M. Christitch.
M. Antitch.

TURKEY.
Munir Bey.
Moukhtar Bey.
Tevfik Bey.

BULGARIA.
Mgr. Stephan.
M. Mouravief.
M. Morfof.
Colonel Noicof.
M. Grozkof.

RUSSIA.
M. Berens.
M. Chapochnikof.

Secretariat-General:

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

British Empire.	France.	Italy
Mr. Spring-Rice. Mr. Bentinck.	M. Lagarde.	M. Indelli.

United States of America.	Japan.	Greece.
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Tani. Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.

Roumania.	Serb-Croat-Slovene State.	Turkey.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

Bulgaria.	Russia.
Mlle. Stanciof. M. Altinof.	M. Sabanine. M. Pastoukhof. M. Ahrens. Mme. Zaretzkaia.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON expressed some concern at the appearance of the conference room, which seemed hardly sufficient for the number of persons assembled. He was far from wishing to exclude those whose presence was necessary; but, as great moderation had hitherto been observed in this respect, he urged that, in the interest of general convenience, a smaller number of experts and secretaries should in future accompany the delegations now present for the first time.

The question of the Straits was one of the most important before the conference, since it concerned not only the countries recently at war and the States in the immediate neighbourhood, but the whole world. This great international highway had figured in various treaties for the best part of a century, and he hoped that the conference might succeed in laying down a new règlement for its future. He felt sure that all would approach the question with the gravity, sincerity and courtesy which had hitherto characterised the proceedings of the conference.

As at previous meetings, he would first invite the Turkish delegation and then the other delegations to state their views. The commission would be glad to hear the views of the Russian delegation (which was now present for the first time, and was greatly interested in the question), and also those of the Roumanian, Bulgarian and Greek delegations. The conference might be assured that these views would be most carefully examined. No reply would be returned by him and his Allied colleagues without complete deliberation, and it might be necessary for the commission to adjourn for this purpose.

ISMET PASHA said that the Turkish Government had had the honour to inform the Allied Powers in the note of the 4th October, 1922, that the Straits question could not be discussed and settled without the participation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia. At the conference itself the Turkish delegation had constantly expressed this view whenever the discussion touched the Straits question. They now hastened to express their satisfaction at seeing the delegates of those Governments take part in the proceedings.

As the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were situated in territory under the sovereignty of the Turkish State, it was hardly necessary to say that the question was of the greatest interest and of very special importance for Turkey. The Turkish delegation trusted that, with a view to establishing general peace on a solid basis, this problem would be solved in such manner as to reconcile all the legitimate interests concerned.

The view of the Turkish Government in this matter had been proclaimed four years since in the National Pact, as follows:—

"The security of Constantinople—the capital of Turkey and seat of the Caliphate—and that of the Sea of Marmora must be unassailable.

"This principle being laid down and accepted, the Turkish nation is ready to subscribe to any decision which may be taken by common agreement between the Turkish Government, of the one part, and the Powers concerned, of the other part, with a view to ensuring the opening of the Straits to world trade and to communications between different countries."

These principles reflected the general point of view of Turkey. The Turkish delegation proposed to take this criterion as the basis for all comments and requests which they might have to make in connection with proposals from the interested States for the solution of the Straits problem.

LORD CURZON expressed the earnest hope that the declaration just made by his Excellency Ismet Pasha was not to be the only contribution of the Turkish delegation to the discussion. He had observed that the Turkish delegation often began by giving their views with great modesty in two or three sentences which they expanded into a fuller statement later on. He trusted they would do so in the present case. Ismet Pasha had expressed satisfaction—which he (Lord Curzon) shared—at the presence of the Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Bulgarian delegates; he had said that the Straits, being situated in Turkish territory and under Turkish sovereignty, were of the greatest interest and importance to Turkey; that the inviolability of Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora was a part of the National Pact; and that the Angora Government was ready to conclude international agreements whereby the Straits would be open to the commerce of all nations. That was all; the Turkish delegation had supplied no indication whatever of how their views were to be put into effect. In their note of the 23rd September, the inviting Powers had given a distinct sketch of their views on the matter, including such questions as the demilitarisation of zones and the placing of the Straits under the protection of some supervising body, possibly the League of Nations. The Turkish delegation would also remember that the question of demilitarisation had recently been discussed in connection with the frontiers of Thrace, and a decision had been postponed pending a debate on the demilitarisation of the Straits. He had thought that Ismet Pasha would furnish his views on this and other aspects of the subject, and indicate how the interests of Turkey could be reconciled with the other great interests involved. It was obvious that unless Ismet Pasha made such a contribution, the present discussion, on which the eyes of the whole world were fixed, would be abortive. If Ismet Pasha were not ready to speak, another delegate must be invited to do so.

ISMET PASHA replied that he had nothing further to say at present.

LORD CURZON expressed the hope that, although the delegates could not hear the views of the Turkish representatives that morning, they might have the pleasure of doing so during the afternoon.

M. CHICHERIN read the following statement:—

"The main object of the Russian Government and of its allies in the Near East, and also in the whole of their foreign policy, is to contribute towards establishing and consolidating general peace. The Russian Government and its allies therefore welcome the assembling of a conference having as its object the establishment of peace in the Near East. The Russian Government, when claiming to participate in all the labours of the Lausanne Conference, was guided by the conviction that this participation was an indispensable condition to ensure the stability of the decisions taken by the conference. As, however, this request of the Russian Government unfortunately was not granted, the delegation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia will endeavour to realise two fundamental ideas in those questions where the delegation is to participate in reaching a solution: (1) equality for Russia and her allies with other Powers as regards position and rights, and (2) the preservation of peace and security in the territories of Russia and of the republics allied with her and freedom in their economic relations with other countries.

"The Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian delegation, while reserving the right to submit later on detailed schemes for the solution of the Straits question and of the problems connected therewith, think they need only deal for the moment with the fundamental principles of their programme. Permanent freedom for commercial navigation and for peaceful maritime communications in the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles must be ensured absolutely and without any restriction. There must be lasting guarantees for the maintenance of peace in the Black Sea, the safety of its shores, peace in the Near East and the security of Constantinople; that is to say, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be permanently closed

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both in peace and in war to warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey.

"The principle of freedom for peaceful navigation in the Straits and the principle of closing the Straits to all vessels of war mutually complete each other, as only the fact that they are closed to all warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of other nations can effectively guarantee the freedom of peaceful navigation in those waters. The Russian Government and its allies, basing their argument on the fact that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus belong to Turkey, and respecting as they do the sovereignty of each people, insist on the re-establishment and full maintenance of the rights of the Turkish people over Turkish territory and waters. The Russian Government and its allies insist further on the fact that the Turkish Government will only be in a position to defend the Straits and the Sea of Marmora effectively against all attacks if it receives express recognition of its right to fortify and arm its coasts, to possess a war fleet and to apply to the defence of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmora all the technical accessories of modern warfare. The system recommended by us has always been recognised in the past by the States represented here as that which is best able to reconcile divergent political interests. The closing of the Straits to warships is also in accordance with the principle of equality between all States, whereas the opening of the Straits to warships would confer a preponderant position on the strongest sea Power. The Russian Republic and the republics allied with it have no aggressive, militarist or warlike intentions whatsoever, and harbour no plan against the liberty of other peoples; that is why these Governments, whose permanent aim it is to watch over the interests of the working masses and to contribute towards the economic development of the world, put forward the principles outlined above as the only possible solution of the Straits problem. Soviet Russia has annulled without any compensation all the agreements regarding the transfer of Constantinople to Russia; she has thereby enabled Turkey to defend her existence victoriously; she has liberated all the States of the Mediterranean from the threat of the century-old ambitions of Tsarism; but it was never her intention to acquiesce in a solution of the Straits problem aimed directly against her own safety.

"The Russian Government and its allies must once more lay stress on the paramount importance of the Straits for the economic life of the Soviet Federation. They need only point out that, according to the statistics of 1910, more than 70 per cent. of the whole export of corn from Russia was shipped from ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof. Moreover, from the point of view of defence, the solution recommended by us establishes the only possible guarantee for the most vital and elementary interests of Russia and her allies. It will suffice to refer to the situation of the southern coasts of the Soviet republics during recent years, under the maritime régime instituted by the armistice of Mudros, when the fleets of the Powers were able to enter the Black Sea without hindrance. One need only recall the occupation of Odessa, Nikolaief, Kherson, Sebastopol, Batum and other ports of the Black Sea by the Allies. It was only the passage of the Allied naval forces through the Straits which enabled the Powers of the *Entente* to create in our southern districts the armies of Denikin and Wrangel and to support their fight against the Governments of Russia and her allies. In 1921 Allied naval forces were still operating on the coasts of Georgia, fighting against the Georgian people, who had taken command of their own country. It is not only the interests of Russia and her allies, but also those of the Turkish people, which are at stake. We note that article 4 of the Turkish National Pact declares, in terms almost identical with ours:—

> "'The safety of Constantinople—the capital of the Empire and seat of the Caliphate and of the Ottoman Government—and also the safety of the Sea of Marmora must be sheltered from any attack.
>
> "'This principle having been laid down and accepted, the undersigned are ready to adhere to any decision which may be taken by common agreement between the Ottoman Government and the Powers concerned with a view to ensuring the opening of the Straits to world trade and international communications.'

"The safety of Constantinople—that is to say, the closing of the Straits to warships, and freedom for commercial navigation and peaceful transit through the Straits—is absolutely in accordance with our programme. The Russian delegation is convinced that the present *de facto* situation in the Straits must be replaced with the least possible delay by the permanent and equitable régime advocated by Russia and Turkey. If it is legitimate to suppose that certain Governments, whose naval and military forces are now at the entrance to the Black Sea, are harbouring

hopes having no basis in reality, we must point out that certain positions are untenable. Any solution based on the presence in the Straits of forces belonging to certain Powers and tending to create a preponderant situation for one Power or group of Powers will encounter determined opposition not only from Russia and her allies, but also from public opinion in all countries, which desires to eliminate those causes of conflict in the Near East which constitute a permanent menace to the cause of peace."

M. DUCA wished to state the reasons for which Roumania felt it desirable to make known her views on the Straits question—a question of great importance both politically and economically.

Roumania had a population of 18,000,000 and her economic life was developing vigorously; she had great natural riches; she had access to one free sea only; it was of the greatest interest for her that that sea should not be closed. Roumania, who had always been jealous of her national sovereignty, understood the concern of other States to have their own sovereignty respected; but that desire must not be pushed to such an extreme that the sovereignty of other States would be injured thereby. In other words it was desirable that a State whose interests were opposed to those of Roumania should not be able to close the Straits.

The conference had already recognised the need of giving Bulgaria access to the Ægean Sea. Agreement had not yet been reached regarding the method whereby that outlet was to be given to Bulgaria, but there was no longer any difference as regards the principle itself. Bulgaria had a population of 5,000,000 only, the importance of her economic life was not equal to that of Roumania, and she possessed two ports on the Black Sea; and yet the need of giving her access to the Ægean had been recognised. It was therefore necessary *a fortiori* that there should be no danger of the Black Sea—on which Roumania had her only outlet—being closed.

For a long time past the Powers had found it necessary to place the Danube, which flowed into the Black Sea, under a régime of international freedom. That freedom could not be real unless this international river were free up to its final outlet, the Straits.

In these circumstances it was clear that Roumania must insist on a régime of complete liberty as regards the Straits, and could not be satisfied with the assertion of a platonic wish or with a declaration of principle recorded in a treaty. She wished for the establishment of a régime which would ensure the practical and effective liberty of the Straits. The Roumanian Government could not, therefore, agree to the key of the Straits being in the pocket of one Power alone, which could open or shut the gate at its will. An international régime should be set up which would merge the interests of one Power in the common interests of all the other Powers.

The Straits must therefore be free for the passage of ships of war and of commerce without any restriction or limit. The coasts of the Straits from the Ægean Sea to the Black Sea should be demilitarised in a manner to be settled by experts, and in this respect account should be taken of the measures to be adopted for demilitarising the frontier of Thrace.

With a view to ensuring the execution of these measures a commission of the Straits should be set up in a form to be defined later on.

M. Duca wished to invite Ismet Pasha's attention in a friendly manner to the fact that present circumstances, which apparently dictated the attitude of the Turkish Government to an excessive degree, might change; Turkey might one day come to regard the system advocated by M. Duca as a more complete guarantee of her sovereignty.

Finally the Roumanian Government, which had proposed at Genoa the conclusion of a permanent pact of non-aggression with Russia, proposed the disarmament of the Black Sea.

The Roumanian delegation made these proposals to the conference in the conviction that they were in harmony with the general and lasting interests of all the Powers, and not merely with their interests of the moment. They would therefore make every effort to secure the adoption of these proposals, and were convinced that in doing so they were serving the cause of world peace, which was the goal of all the aspirations of the Roumanian people.

M. STAMBOLIISKY read the following statement:—

"We have the honour to explain to the conference that the vital interests of Bulgaria call for the establishment of the principal market for her national pro-

duction and also of her most important maritime position on the Ægean Sea at the mouth of the Maritza.

"The reason for this is that the natural highways of the country lead to that sea, and that the place indicated is the only one where we could create a real maritime base which is essential for our commercial relations with all overseas countries.

"But as Bulgaria is also a country bordering on the Black Sea, and as part of our produce will continue to be exported by the ports of Varna and Bourgas, Bulgaria cannot disinterest herself from the régime which is to be instituted on the only route connecting the Black Sea with the other seas of the world. We consider that the freedom of the Black Sea is a question of equal interest to all the riverain States.

"Bulgaria has in the past given abundant proof of strictest equality and absolute impartiality as regards the treatment granted in her ports to all ships of whatever nationality in respect of berthing of ships, utilisation of machinery and the levying of dues. In this respect there has never been any preference whatever, not even for ships flying the national flag.

"Our attitude towards world shipping enables us to announce to-day that Bulgaria is ready to adhere to the measures whereby a régime will be established in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles assuring full liberty of passage to all commercial vessels both in peace and in war.

"Bulgaria also wishes to participate on a footing of equality in the international administration to be set up for the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of navigation through the Straits.

"As our State is a neighbour of the possessors of this world route we regard it as absolutely necessary and most desirable to set up once and for all a régime which will prevent conflicts in future and deliver us for all time from any political and economic restrictions."

M. VENISELOS said that he agreed to the creation of an outlet for Bulgaria on the Ægean Sea and to the internationalisation of the Maritza for that purpose, under the same conditions and with the same guarantees as in the case of international rivers such as the Danube. As regards the régime of the Straits he pointed out that among the Powers interested in the traffic of the Straits, Greece came second, and he reserved the right to make some remarks on this subject after the Turkish delegation had stated their case. The problem now under discussion was of supreme importance. A proposal had been made for the demilitarisation of a zone on the Bulgarian frontier. It was a matter for consideration, whether similar measures should not be taken as regards the Straits, the importance of which was far greater, with a view to guaranteeing the freedom of passage.

LORD CURZON said that he would only add a few words at the present stage, and would not criticise or attempt to reply to the statements which had been heard, as these required close and careful consideration. The conference should understand the exact present position. The Turkish delegation had declined to give their views until later. The Russian delegation had put forward a complete, carefully thought out scheme comprising certain definite suggestions, namely, the permanent liberty of commercial navigation both in peace and in war for ships of all countries without distinction; the closing of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora to warships and aircraft of all nations except Turkey; and liberty for Turkey to fortify the shores of the Straits, and to maintain there such naval and military forces and appliances as she might think desirable. It seemed remarkable that this programme, which provided chiefly for the defence of Turkish interests, should be put forward by Russia. Whilst listening to this proposal, he had thought M. Chicherin must have mistaken his rôle and assumed the kalpak of Ismet Pasha. M. Chicherin had said that his views were those of both Russia and Turkey; then why did not Turkey say so? M. Chicherin was already present in a very representative capacity, on behalf of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia. It now appeared that he was to represent Turkey also. Lord Curzon had for a long time looked forward to meeting M. Chicherin, whom he had hitherto only encountered on paper, and he was particularly gratified to meet him in this four-fold shape. He hoped that the conference would hear later on whether M. Chicherin's views were, in fact, those of the Turkish delegation.

M. Chicherin had alluded to the international forces now in or near the Straits, and had expressed the hope that those forces would not be a permanent factor in the situation. Lord Curzon shared that hope, but nevertheless these forces were now there and they constituted a factor which must not be forgotten.

M. Duca, on behalf of Roumania, had put forward a very clear and precise scheme, which provided that the Straits should be free at all times both for commercial and for war vessels; that both coasts should be demilitarised like the proposed zones in Thrace, in a form to be determined; that a commission should be formed to supervise this demilitarisation; and that some measures (not yet defined) should be taken with a view to the disarmament of the Black Sea.

The Bulgarian delegation had suggested a third alternative, namely, that commercial vessels only should enjoy freedom of navigation both in peace and in war, and had added that Bulgaria wished to be represented on any organisation which might be set up for watching over the Straits.

There were therefore three schemes, differing on various essential points. Were the Turkish delegation going to adopt any one of these three, or to put forward a fourth of their own? The matter was of vital interest to them, and they had been writing and reflecting on the question for many weeks. He hoped it would be convenient to the Turks to state both their opinion on the proposals already made, and their own view of the whole problem, preferably in the afternoon, as he was reluctant to waste any time, or at least on the following morning.

ISMET PASHA said that he had taken note of the views expressed and the proposals made by the Russo-Ukrainian-Georgian, Roumanian, Bulgarian and Greek delegates in succession. He was not aware that there was any question of an outlet for Bulgaria by the Maritza, since he had thought that the port in question was Dedeagatch. In general, M. Stamboliisky's remarks in regard to the Straits did not appear to him to be in contradiction with the principles stated by the Turkish delegation. The restrictions advocated by M. Duca seemed likely to entail consequences which would be injurious to the vital interests of Turkey. Only one statement—that of M. Chicherin—corresponded with the general point of view of the Turkish delegation as regards the opening of the Straits to international communications, while it took into account the necessity of assuring the safety of Constantinople and of the basin of the Sea of Marmora.

M. STAMBOLIISKY said that the words "mouth of the Maritza," which he had used, were merely a geographical indication; what he had in mind was Dedeagatch, since it was technically impossible to utilise the Maritza for shipping.

LORD CURZON felt that he must be allowed to put one or two questions regarding the latter part of Ismet Pasha's statement. He had previously asked whether the Turkish delegation agreed with any of the proposals put forward, particularly with those of M. Chicherin; and also whether Ismet Pasha would be able to state the Turkish case that afternoon or later. Ismet Pasha's reply was that the Russian delegation had put forward very definite proposals, which corresponded to the Turkish view in so far as they secured the safety of Turkish territory and the opening of the Straits to commerce; but he had so far failed to give any indication of the solution advocated by his own Government. Lord Curzon must therefore ask him whether he accepted the Russian case as the case of the Turkish Government, or whether the commission was to have the pleasure of hearing a separate statement of the Turkish case later. On hearing Ismet Pasha's reply, he would be able to advise the conference in regard to the course to be pursued.

ISMET PASHA pointed out that as the Straits were situated between territories under the full sovereignty of Turkey, the rights of possession of the State which owned the neighbouring territory were of fundamental importance in any discussion on the subject; he need not insist on the point. The foreign nations who wished to have the advantage of these waterways asked Turkey for certain facilities or guarantees. Turkey, as the territorial Power concerned, required to be able to examine the demands which might be made in full exercise of her rights of sovereignty; and he saw no need for going into detailed explanations before these proposals were known. He repeated that among the various proposals submitted to the conference those of the Russo-Ukraine-Georgian delegation seemed to him to correspond with the point of view of the Turkish delegation. He was obliged to examine all proposals which might be made in close connection with the sovereign rights and the absolute independence of Turkey. He therefore reserved the right to develop his views later on.

LORD CURZON said that he understood Ismet Pasha's reply to be a refusal on the part of the Turkish delegation to put their own views before the conference at the present stage; the only information which he would vouchsafe was that the

Russian proposal corresponded more closely to the Turkish view than any other yet put forward, and that he awaited the views of the other Powers represented. He must be allowed to say that this reply really amounted to trifling with the conference. The delegates had all met and passed days in a serious effort to grapple with the various problems confronting them. When they approached the most difficult of all, the Turkish delegation were unable or unwilling to put forward their views beyond saying that the proposal made by the Russian delegation was more acceptable to them than the other suggestions made. This was not treating the conference with the confidence and respect to which it was entitled. When the attitude of the Turkish delegation became known, it would produce a most unfavourable impression throughout the world. His colleagues agreed with him that the discussion could not proceed, and that they must adjourn in order to consider the situation and decide what measures to take. The various sub-commissions would continue their work during the afternoon, and later on he would make an announcement regarding the resumption of the present commission's labours.

M. CHICHERIN wished to state that the Russian delegation desired to hear the views of Great Britain, France and Italy at the present stage of the discussion. Lord Curzon had asked the Balkan Governments to state their views, but unfortunately he had not expressed his own, nor had he asked Italy or France to express theirs. M. Chicherin was therefore obliged to ask two questions: Did the Powers disinterest themselves from the Straits question? Or did they, on the other hand, wish to place themselves above the other Powers represented at the conference and to play the rôle of an arbiter in the matter? The Soviet delegation wished to state that they formally repudiated the second of these alternatives and would not agree to discuss the question of the Straits save on a footing of complete equality with all the Powers. In any case, it was disagreeable for him to be asked to give his views and to be unable to learn the views of the British, French and Italian Governments.

LORD CURZON said that M. Chicherin was under a complete misapprehension, and could not have listened very attentively to what he had said. All the delegates were assembled to hear in the first place the opinions of the riverain States, and it would have been discourteous for his colleagues and himself to speak before all these opinions had been heard. He had spent the best part of an hour in trying to elicit the views of the Turkish delegation, and he had already said that the French, Italian and British delegates would have to meet and discuss the terms of their eventual reply. Also no one knew better than M. Chicherin that it would be disrespectful both to him and to the other representatives of the riverain States if a reply were returned without taking the necessary time for a careful examination of the views expressed by them.

(*The commission rose at* 1·10 P.M.)

[E 14402/13003/44] No. 832.

Ismet Pasha to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received in Foreign Office December* 27.)

Cher Lord Curzon, *Lausanne, le 23 décembre* 1922.

A CHACUNE de nos réunions j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer à votre Seigneurie les arguments irréfutables sur lesquels je me base pour demander la restitution du vilayet de Moussoul à la Turquie. De même que j'ai chaque fois écouté avec l'attention la plus soutenue les considérations que vous avez bien voulu émettre à ce sujet, j'ai de même longuement étudié le mémorandum relatif à la question de Moussoul que vous avez eu la bonté de me faire parvenir dernièrement.

Je ne doute pas que le mémorandum responsif que j'ai l'honneur de remettre ci-inclus à votre Excellence constitue une réponse convaincante aux arguments émis en faveur de la thèse britannique.

Je me permettrai d'ajouter que le Gouvernement turc ne peut songer à renoncer à ses droits souverains sur Moussoul, qui fait partie intégrante de la patrie turque.

Votre très dévoué,
C. N. ISMET.

Enclosure in No. 832.

Réponse au Mémorandum britannique relatif à la Question de Moussoul.

SE basant sur une série de considérations extrêmement légitimes, la délégation turque affirme avec insistance que le vilayet de Moussoul appartient à la Turquie.

Les raisons sur lesquelles se fonde notre demande sont les suivantes :

I.—*Raison d'ordre ethnographique.*

La population sédentaire du vilayet de Moussoul s'élève à 503,000 hommes ; il s'y trouve, en outre, des tribus nomades kurdes, turques et arabes comprenant environ 170,000 individus.

Ces tribus changent de place suivant les saisons, et même quittent à certaines époques de l'année le vilayet de Moussoul, il est donc impossible de fixer d'une façon exacte leur nombre. Elles passent, suivant leurs besoins, les différentes saisons de l'année dans les régions de Bagdad, de Nedjef, de Moussoul, de Zor, de Diarbékir, et même sur les plateaux de l'Iran ; c'est pourquoi il n'est pas non plus possible de les considérer comme faisant effectivement partie de la population du vilayet de Moussoul.

Les 503,000 hommes formant la population sédentaire du vilayet de Moussoul se composent d'après les dernières statistiques officielles turques de :

	Kurdes.	Turcs.	Arabes.	Yézidis.	Non-Mussulmans.	Total.
Sandjak de Suleymanié ..	62,830	32,960	7,210	..	..	103,000
„ Kerkuk ..	97,000	49,000	8,000	..	..	184,000
„ Moussoul ..	104,000	56,000	28,000	18,000	31,000	216,000
Total pour le vilayet de Moussoul	263,830	146,960	43,210	18,000	31,000	503,600

Ce tableau montre :

Que l'élément arabe est insignifiant dans les sandjaks de Suleymanié et de Kerkuk ;

Que dans le sandjak central de Moussoul il n'y a que 28,000 Arabes contre 139,000 Turcs et Kurdes ; et

Qu'enfin dans tout le vilayet de Moussoul contre 410,790 Turcs et Kurdes il y a 43,210 Arabes et 31,000 non-musulmans. Plus des 4/5 de la population du vilayet sont donc constitués par les Turcs et les Kurdes et moins de 1/5 par les Arabes et les non-musulmans.

Les Arabes du vilayet de Moussoul se trouvent presque entièrement à Gayara, au sud de la ligne de Sandjar et sur la rive droite du Tigre. Si l'on excepte une étroite bande de territoire s'étendant de Féthié (placé entre le Djebel-Hamrine et le Djebel-Fouhoul) vers Kerkuk, la région située à gauche du Tigre est entièrement peuplée de Kurdes et de Turcs.

Dans la ville de Moussoul on parle en même temps le turc, le kurde et l'arabe ; ceux des habitants de cette ville qui actuellement parlent l'arabe et que l'on prend pour des Arabes sont en réalité des Turcs qui, ayant été pendant longtemps en contact continuel avec les Kurdes et les Arabes, ont appris également ces deux langues.

Ceux qui connaissent les affaires de l'Irak savent que la population de Moussoul ne s'est, jusqu'à présent, jamais considérée comme étant arabe et comme faisant partie de la population de l'Irak.

Le mémorandum britannique reconnait que la ville de Tel-Afr est une ville turque et qu'il se trouve une foule de villages turcs autour de Moussoul. Effectivement, le nahié de Cheikan rattaché à Moussoul et comprenant 48 localités, celui de Achair-Seïd, qui en comprend 78, sont peuplés en totalité par des Turcs et le nahié dépendant directement de Moussoul, qui comprend 77 localités, est peuplé en très grande majorité par des Turcs.

L'existence tout autour de Moussoul de villages portant des noms purement turcs, tels que Kara-Koyoundou, Kara-Ali, Kétchi-Hani, Narine-Keupru, Buyuk-Keuchk, &c., est une preuve de plus de ce que nous venons de dire.

Les Yézidis sont des Kurdes au point de vue de la race et ont les mêmes mœurs et les mêmes coutumes qu'eux ; il n'y a entre eux qu'une différence de secte, ce qui évidemment ne peut en aucune façon servir de prétexte à les différencier les uns des autres. Le même fait s'observe d'ailleurs chez les peuples chrétiens ; il ne viendrait par exemple à l'esprit de personne de considérer comme faisant partie de groupements ethniques différents des individus de même race dont les uns seraient catholiques et les autres protestants

Quant aux Turcs du vilayet de Moussoul, nous dirons que la différence que l'on veut établir entre eux et les Turcs anatoliens en les appelant Turkmènes n'existe nullement en realité et que c'est là une opinion indéfendiable. On dit dans le mémorandum britannique que la langue turque parlée à Moussoul n'est pas identique à celle parlée à Constantinople ; mais existe-t-il en Anatolie un endroit où l'on parle un turc identique à celui de Constantinople ? Par contre le dialecte employé par les Turcs de Moussoul est le même que celui qui se parle en Anatolie ; la différence qui existe entre eux est moindre que celle qui existe entre le français parlé au nord et celui parlé au sud de la France. Il est d'ailleurs naturel que dans les différentes parties d'un pays une même langue présente quelques variations.

Au sujet de la différence qui existerait entre les Turcs et les Turkmènes, nous croyons superflu d'entrer à ce sujet dans des considérations historiques ; qu'il nous suffise seulement de dire que les Turcs anatoliens sont des Turkmènes et que ces deux mots signifient une seule et même chose.

Contrairement aux assertions contenues dans le mémorandum britannique, le *peuple kurde* n'est pas d'origine iranienne, mais au contraire d'origine touranienne. Cette opinion est actuellement presque unanimement partagée par tous les historiens qui se sont occupés de cette question. Il est établi en effet qu'un peuple d'origine touranienne appelé "Gudu" habitait aux temps les plus reculés de l'histoire les montagnes dominant l'Assyrie, que ce peuple était très belliqueux et que son nom qui signifiait "guerrier" se traduisait en assyrien par le synonyme "Gardu" ou "Kurdu," d'où dérive le mot Kurde.

Les annales cunéiformes parlent souvent des "Kardus," qu'ils citent sur un pied d'égalité avec les Syriens, les Hittites, les Susiens, les Elamites, les Akkadiens, &c.

Les considérations ethniques qui précèdent suffisent à démontrer que le vilayet de Moussoul doit revenir à la Turquie.

A la présence à l'intérieur de ce vilayet d'une certaine quantité d'Arabes habitant la rive droite du Tigre on peut opposer l'existence en Irak et en dehors de ce vilayet d'une nombreuse population turque et de nombreuses localités peuplées par cet élément

Si l'on voulait s'appuyer sur les Arabes de la province de Moussoul pour demander son rattachement à l'Irak nous pourrions avec tout autant de raison nous réclamer de la présence de Turcs dans les vilayets arabes et notamment dans le vilayet de Bagdad pour demander l'annexion de ces territoires à la Turquie.

II.—*Raisons d'ordre politique.*

Les Turcs et les Kurdes, qui constituent la grande majorité de la population du vilayet de Moussoul, sont fermement décidés à obtenir le rattachement de leurs pays à la Turquie ; aucun doute n'est possible là-dessus

Ceci est démontré par le fait que les habitants des sandjaks de Suleymanié et de Kerkuk ont refusé de voter en faveur de leur annexion à l'Irak et, lorsque la population de Moussoul et de ses environs aura acquis la possibilité d'exprimer librement ses volontés, on verra qu'elle non plus, n'est pas partisan de son rattachement à l'Irak.

Si sur les habitants de 18 kazas qui constituent le vilayet de Moussoul seules les minorités de la ville de Moussoul ont pu, soit par suite de la violente pression qui fut exercée sur elles, soit encore par intérêt personnel, voter pour l'Irak, il est évident que ce vote d'une infime minorité ne peut en aucun cas servir à déterminer le sort de toute la population du vilayet de Moussoul.

Pour ce qui est des aspirations du peuple kurde, la délégation turque a l'honneur de déclarer que la population kurde se trouve unie au peuple turc sous tous les rapports et en particulier au point de vue de la race, de la religion, des mœurs ainsi que des us et coutumes. Ces deux peuples ont décidé de mener une vie commune et de maintenir unies leurs destinées. Si l'on étudiait leur histoire, on s'apercevrait que les Kurdes ont passé de plein gré sous l'administration turque et ont, depuis des siècles, lié leur sort à celui des Turcs.

Tous les chefs de l'armée turque, ayant participé à la guerre générale et à la guerre d'indépendance, ont proclamé avec respect et admiration les services rendus et es sacrifices consentis par le peuple kurde pour le salut de la patrie.

Surtout dans la lutte contre le Sultan et contre le Gouvernement à jamais disparu de Constantinople, dans la défense des différents fronts anatoliens assaillis par nos ennemis ainsi que dans l'offensive qui aboutit à l'écrasement complet des Grecs, les Kurdes travaillèrent en parfaite communauté avec les Turcs pour l'obtention d'un même but et à la poursuite d'un même idéal.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie est le Gouvernement des Kurdes dans la même mesure que celui des Turcs.

Les véritables et légitimes représentants des Kurdes siégeant à la grande Assemblée nationale proclament qu'ils considèrent comme d'un intérêt vital pour eux que leurs frères restés en dehors des territoires administrés actuellement par le Gouvernement turc soient rattachés à la Turquie.

Dernièrement encore, à la suite des tentatives pour passer du côté turc faites par les détachements kurdes, enrôlés par le Gouvernement de l'Irak, le peu de fidélité de ceux-ci avait été annoncé par les communiqués officiels britanniques.

Les efforts tentés au moyen d'escadrilles aériennes de bombardement en vue d'affaiblir l'attachement témoigné par la population du vilayet de Moussoul envers la Turquie suffisent à eux seuls à montrer la force de cet attachement pour la patrie commune.

Nous voulons, avant de terminer cette partie de notre exposé, parler également des Nestoriens, des Assyriens et des Chaldéens.

Les premiers ont, lors de l'invasion du vilayet de Van par les armées de la Russie tzariste, agi si traîtreusement envers leurs compatriotes avec lesquels ils vivaient tranquillement depuis des siècles, ils ont tellement surpassé en cruauté les envahisseurs eux-mêmes, qu'au moment du départ de ceux-ci, ils ont cru ne pouvoir plus vivre en commun avec les Turcs et les Kurdes et sont partis avec les Russes.

Quant aux Chaldéens et surtout aux Assyriens du vilayet de Diarbékir, comme ils ne se sont jamais laissés influencer par les excitations venues du dehors, ils continuent à vivre en parfaite intelligence avec leurs compatriotes turcs.

III.—*Raisons historiques.*

Les raisons historiques qui militent en faveur du rattachement du vilayet de Moussoul à la Turquie ne datent pas de la période ottomane seulement ; dans le cas contraire, nos arguments auraient également pu s'appliquer au vilayet de Bagdad ainsi qu'aux autres vilayets perdus par nous et le raisonnement formulé à ce sujet dans le mémorandum britannique aurait été justifié.

Depuis plus de onze siècles, le vilayet de Moussoul et même la région s'étendant jusqu'au nord de Bagdad se trouvent au pouvoir des Turcs.

Du temps des Khalifes Abbassides, ces pays étaient aux mains des Gouverneurs, des soldats et de la population turcs. Ces Gouverneurs turcs jouissaient d'une indépendance complète et de droits souverains ; le premier de ceux-ci fut Itah (année 229 de l'Hégire) ; parmi eux, Kir-Boga et Ak-Soungour se sont distingués par les monuments d'art et d'utilité publique qu'ils ont édifiés.

Imad-el-Dine Zengui, fils de Ak-Soungour, un des Gouverneurs cités plus haut, fonda à Moussoul l'État turc des Ata-Beys.

Il y eut également des États turcs où régnèrent des membres de la dynastie des Ata-Beys, à Sandjar et à Djéziret-ibn-Eumer, région formant la partie ouest de Moussoul.

Plus tard, la dynastie des Artiks fonda des États turcs à Moussoul, à Djéziret-ibn-Eumer, à Harpout et à Mardine. Tel-Keyf, situé près de Moussoul, fut une des principales forteresses des Artiks, Il-Gazi-Han, un Souverain de cette dynastie, détruisit à Tel-Afr une importante force croisée.

On trouve dans ces régions de nombreux monuments d'art et d'utilité publique que ces Souverains ont fait construire et dont quelques-uns sont en ruines ; on trouve de même dans les musées de nombreuses pièces de monnaie qu'ils ont fait frapper.

Après ces dynasties, les Turcs Seldjoucides se rendirent maîtres de Moussoul ; ils l'embellirent et l'agrandirent considérablement et firent de cette ville un centre de haute culture. Ce n'est qu'après les Turcs Seldjoucides que les Turcs Osmanlis régnèrent sur ces pays.

Comme on le voit, depuis onze siècles, cette région a toujours été possédée et gouvernée par les Turcs.

Le territoire s'étendant de Bagdad jusqu'au sud de la limite actuelle du vilayet de Moussoul est désigné dans les anciens ouvrages d'histoire sous le nom de Tataristan; cela prouve qu'une tribu turque s'y était installée. On trouve encore la trace de cette appellation dans la vallée désignée sur les cartes sous le nom de Vadi-i-Tatar.

Le mémorandum britannique déclare que Moussoul a été rattaché à Bagdad à l'époque de Midhat Pacha; il faut remarquer que ce rattachement temporaire était dû à certaines considérations d'ordre personnel et administratif. D'ailleurs, à cette époque les régions d'Ourfa et de Diarbékir avaient également été placées temporairement sous l'administration du Vali de Bagdad, Midhat Pacha.

Le fait que dans le passé Moussoul ait été de la sorte rattaché momentanément à Bagdad ne peut être considéré aujourd'hui comme une raison suffisante pour la détermination de son sort.

IV.—*Raisons géographiques.*

Le vilayet de Moussoul n'est pas compris dans l'Irak-i-Arabi; il fait, au contraire, partie de l'El-Djézaïré. L'histoire comme la géographie laissent la région de Moussoul complètement en dehors de l'Irak.

Au point de vue du climat, non plus, Moussoul ne fait pas partie de l'Irak; on peut citer à l'appui de ceci le fait qu'on ne trouve plus de dattiers au nord de la ligne Kefri-Tekrit. La frontière qui sépare l'Anatolie de l'Irak est la ligne Djébel-Hamrine–Djébel-Fouhoul–Djébel-Sandjar.

Au nord de cette ligne, le vilayet de Moussoul présente les mêmes conditions climatériques et la même constitution de terrain que l'Anatolie, tandis qu'à ces points de vue le vilayet de Bagdad diffère complètement de celui de Moussoul, ainsi que de l'Anatolie.

V.—*Raisons économiques.*

Les relations économiques et commerciales de Moussoul avec l'Anatolie méridionale, et particulièrement avec les régions de Diarbékir, Van, Bitlis, sont en tout cas beaucoup plus importantes que ses relations de même ordre avec Bagdad. De plus, l'unique voie commerciale reliant le sud de l'Anatolie à la Perse passe par Moussoul.

Ceux qui connaissent ce pays savent qu'à l'encontre de l'assertion contenue dans le mémorandum britannique, le bois de construction employé à Bagdad ne vient pas de Moussoul, mais de Diarbékir. En outre, la quantité de blé que Moussoul achète à Diarbékir à meilleur marché pour la revendre plus cher à Bagdad dépasse la quantité de blé exporté directement de Moussoul à Bagdad. De plus, les relations économiques entre Suleymanié et Van sont extrêmement importantes, et Moussoul exporte en Anatolie une grande quantité de bestiaux, surtout des buffles.

La ville et le vilayet de Moussoul ont une importance considérable au point de vue des relations commerciales et des communications par le fait qu'ils se trouvent au croisement de toutes les routes reliant les unes aux autres l'Anatolie, la Syrie, l'Irak et la Perse.

Un autre fait que nous tenons à faire remarquer est qu'actuellement, par suite de la construction du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, qui a coûté tant d'argent à la Turquie, la région de Moussoul se trouve, au point de vue économique, reliée plus intimement que jamais à l'Anatolie.

Moussoul se trouve par là même plus rapproché actuellement des ports de la Méditerranée que de ceux du golfe Persique. Il est, d'ailleurs, inutile d'expliquer, que, au point de vue des facilités d'écoulement et des avantages commerciaux qu'ils présentent, les ports méditerranéens sont de beaucoup préférables aux ports de la région de Basra.

VI.—*Raisons d'ordre militaire.*

La ville et la région de Moussoul se trouvent, comme nous l'avons dit, au croisement des routes venant des régions de Suleymanié, Kerkuk, Van, Bitlis, Diarbékir, Siird, &c. Les communications faciles et naturelles entre les différentes parties de l'Anatolie méridionale ne peuvent donc avoir lieu qu'en passant par Moussoul.

D'ailleurs le mot de "Moussoul" signifie "liaison ou union."

Sans la ville de Moussoul la liaison des régions de Suleymanié et de Kerkuk avec la mère patrie serait impossible, et, au point de vue de la sécurité des parties méridionales de notre pays, la possession de Moussoul nous est indispensable.

Nous indiquons la ligne de Djébel-Hamrine–Djébel-Fouhoul et Djébel-Sandjar comme frontière entre l'Anatolie et l'Irak parce que cette ligne constitue, indépendamment des considérations ethnographiques, géographiques, politiques, &c., que nous venons de citer une ligne de séparation précise et naturelle entre ces deux régions.

L'argument d'après lequel cette frontière menacerait Bagdad ainsi que les communications entre Bagdad et la Perse ne peut être sérieusement invoqué au sujet de la délimitation d'une frontière; d'ailleurs la frontière persane est aussi proche de Bagdad que la ligne que nous proposons. On sait en outre qu'un grand nombre d'Etats ont leur capitale ou des villes importantes situées sur ou près de la frontière. Si les arguments de cette sorte devaient être prises en considération, il nous faudrait, afin de préserver Constantinople, fermer les Détroits aux navires de guerre étrangers; nous pouvons encore ajouter qu'autrefois, lorsqu'il y avait des souverains turcs à Moussoul, il existait un Gouvernement différent à Bagdad.

Tandis qu'on nous refuse un petit territoire autour d'Andrinople, qui est une ville historique si importante pour nous, on ne peut en toute justice nous opposer comme un argument valable au sujet de nos demandes relatives à Moussoul le fait que notre frontière en se rapprochant de 70 milles de Bagdad constitue une menace pour cette ville.

VII.—*Le Pacte national turc.*

Il n'est pas possible qu'un peuple ne s'intéresse plus en aucune façon aux destinées de la population d'un territoire qu'il a perdu à la suite d'une guerre.

C'est pourquoi nous avions obligation morale de dire que les régions à majorité arabe et musulmane se trouvant sous l'occupation étrangère lors de la conclusion de l'armistice étaient libres, conformément aux principes wilsoniens de disposer de leur propre sort. D'autre part, c'était pour nous un droit naturel de demander la restitution des régions à majorité turque tombées sous l'occupation étrangère.

Il est également évident que les territoires occupés continuent et continueront à nous appartenir en droit jusqu'à ce que nous y ayons renoncé.

Quant au vilayet de Mossoul, il fut préservé de l'occupation étrangère jusqu'à la conclusion de l'armistice et fut, sans aucun droit, partiellement occupé, comme beaucoup d'autres régions de la Turquie, seulement après la suspension des hostilités. Comme pour Adana, Smyrne, Ourfa, Constantinople, Aïntab et la Thrace orientale, tombés sous l'occupation étrangère, le peuple de Turquie a également décidé d'employer, jusqu'à la dernière limite de ses forces, tous les moyens en son pouvoir afin d'obtenir le retour à la mère patrie du vilayet de Moussoul. Il a donc établi son pacte national en conséquence.

La nation turque ne peut, en aucun cas, consentir à ce que, par suite de la présence d'une petite minorité arabe dans la province de Moussoul, ses frères turcs et kurdes, constituant la majorité de la population de ce vilayet, restent en dehors de la Turquie.

Conclusion.

Les raisons d'ordre ethnographique, politique, économique, géographique et militaire énumérées ci-dessus suffisent à démontrer que le vilayet de Moussoul forme partie intégrante de la Turquie.

Le vilayet a été occupé contrairement à tout droit après l'armistice.

Le maintien sous une occupation étrangère de la majorité turque et kurde de ce vilayet constitue un grave danger pour nos futures relations de bon voisinage ainsi que pour la paix en faveur de laquelle le peuple turc et le monde entier ont consenti de si grands sacrifices.

D'autre part, si la ville de Moussoul restait en dehors des frontières de la Turquie, cela aurait pour résultat, en dehors de toutes les autres considérations émises, de laisser exposée à de grands dangers l'Anatolie méridionale et d'empêcher les communications entre les différentes parties de notre patrie.

Pour toutes ces raisons, la délégation turque est convaincue que, sa demande relative au vilayet de Moussoul est entièrement justifiée.

No. 833.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 616.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 777 of 22nd December.

Facts are as follows:—

It was intimated to ex-Sultan that he could not remain indefinitely at Malta as guest of His Majesty's Government. Probably he had no such intention, and he accepted invitation of King of Hedjaz. He will be sent in British warship as far as Egypt, and thence will proceed in ordinary mail steamer.

You may use this information for verbal communication to Angora authorities in most suitable manner.

No. 834.

Sir Eyre Crowe to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 464.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 27, 1922.*

THERE is every indication that the Turkish attitude at Lausanne is becoming increasingly obstructive. There is obstinate opposition to the most reasonable requirements, and the prospect of agreement on points where it recently seemed in sight is now rapidly receding.

His Majesty's Government feel that only by the firmest display of Allied solidarity can a breakdown of the conference be avoided, and I require you to see President of the Council and urge him strongly to instruct French representative at Lausanne to seize the first opportunity of making it clear to the Turkish delegation that France and Great Britain continue to stand together, and must insist on the abandonment of tergiversations and on the prompt acceptance of reasonable terms of peace.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 103.)

No. 835.

Sir Eyre Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne).

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 27, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Admiralty:—

"Constantinople telegram No. 786.

"Commander-in-chief and all available ships are returning to Constantinople."

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 618.)

[E 14492/27/44] No. 836.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1116.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 14, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Refet Pasha again raised, at a meeting with the Allied High Commissioners yesterday, the question of the Greek High Commission in Constantinople. Both my Allied colleagues had in the meantime received instructions similar to those contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 35 from Lausanne. M. Canellopoulos had also been instructed by his Government to approach the Spanish Minister here with a view to his assuming charge of Greek interests in this city.

2. We accordingly informed Refet Pasha that the necessary arrangements had been made to fall in with the wishes of the Angora Government in this matter, that M. Canellopoulos was returning to Greece before the end of the week, that the Greek High Commission would be closed, and that the Greek consulate-general would continue to function as a branch of the Spanish Legation.

3. In thanking us for our intervention in this matter, Refet assured us that the Hellenes of Constantinople would lose nothing by being treated in future as Spanish subjects. We at once contested this point of view, asserting that the concession made in respect of the Greek High Commission, which we had agreed to in order to satisfy Turkish *amour-propre*, could not be regarded as in any way affecting the arrangement come to between us on the subject of the protection of Hellenic subjects by the Allied police.

4. A long argument then ensued, Refet Pasha maintaining the view that the present arrangement was that foreseen in the formula whereby he agreed to the provisional jurisdiction of the Allied police over Hellenes, and demurring to our contention that the question of police protection for Hellenes was *une chose jugée*.

5. Ultimately, since neither would give way, Refet Pasha said that he would leave things as they were at the moment, but would propose to us in the immediate future some *modus vivendi* which would give a measure of control over the Hellenes to the Turkish police without absolutely depriving them of Allied protection.

6. Incidentally Refet Pasha stated that the Soviet Government were continually pressing the Angora Government to hand over to them the Russian Embassy and consulate-general at Constantinople. Refet Pasha, who, whatever else he may be, is no lover of the Russians, said that his Government and he himself were finding it difficult to refuse to comply with this request. I told the general that the answer seemed to me an obvious one. In virtue of the arrangement which he had himself concluded, whereby Russians of the old régime continued to enjoy Allied police protection, it was now impossible for the Turkish authorities to evict the present Russian occupants of the Russian Embassy buildings. Refet Pasha appeared to acquiesce and the matter was allowed to drop. The future raising of this, as of most similar questions, is likely to depend on the trend of the negotiations at Lausanne.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 14521/10524/44] No. 837.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 378.)
My Lord, *Sofia, December 19, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Varna, relative to the arrival of Armenian refugees at that port from Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

Enclosure in No. 837.

Vice-Consul Gilliat-Smith to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Varna, December 4, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last six weeks about 4,000 Armenian refugees have arrived at Varna from Constantinople. The greater part of these people are not destitute, and many of them have ample means.

According to the Bulgarian regulations, Armenian refugees must find housing accommodation in the interior, and they may inhabit any district they like, with the exception of the towns of Sofia, Philippopolis, Varna, Bourgas and Rustchuk.

When Armenian refugees first began to arrive, the poorer lot were escorted by the police from the port to the station, where trains received them. Those who could afford it, however, gave suitable gifts to the port authorities and were enabled to settle

in Varna. When this became known to the Prefect of Police, then Ganef, he took measures to divert the flow of baksheesh from the port authorities to himself. I understand that the present Prefect of Police, Gabrowsky, is enforcing the regulations, and that many Armenians who have paid rent in advance are now being required to leave the town. In most cases the rent is not returned to them.

An Armenian committee has been formed in Varna, backed by the Armenian clergy, in order to help the refugees. Their funds are however small, and one of their members told me that the Bulgarian police authorities have insisted on supervising the distribution of these funds. This has proved impracticable in many cases, and the bread is being distributed daily from the Armenian church precincts to the more necessitous refugees without any control on the part of the police.

On the whole no serious complaints appear to have been made against the police, and none at all against the Government policy, in respect of which the Armenians have officially expressed their gratitude. Such cause of complaint as does exist is due to the rapacity of local officials, who are themselves piteously underpaid.

In some cases hardship has been experienced owing to theft of luggage and belongings on board the vessels bringing the refugees to this port. So many complaints were made in this connection against the crew—chiefly Greeks—of the steamship "Berkshire," flying the Egyptian flag, that I allowed the vessel to be searched, on condition that the examination of the vessel should be completed in half an hour and that she should not be delayed. She was not leaving until the following morning. Nothing was found, and I subsequently ascertained that the British authorities at Constantinople had also had her searched.

I have, &c.
B. GILLIAT-SMITH.

[E 14464/13003/44] No. 838.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pasha.—(Received in Foreign Office December 28.)

Lausanne, December 26, 1922.

Dear Ismet Pasha,

I HAVE given careful study to the detailed statement which you sent to me on the 23rd December with regard to the Mosul Vilayet; and I must be permitted to say that while the greater part of the arguments contained in my memorandum of the 14th December remain—even after your prolonged examination of them—untouched and unanswered, the reasons which you now adduce, and which I should be quite willing to submit to the public judgment, do but confirm my opinion that no case whatever can be made out—even on the grounds which have been selected by your Excellency—for the surrender by the British Government of the Mosul Vilayet.

Will you allow me, however, to put the case before you—apart from those particular arguments—in a way which will admit of no further misunderstanding?

The British Government which had been forced into war with the Turkish Government by the unprovoked action of the latter in 1914, ultimately defeated the Turkish forces and expelled them from the entire area of Irak and far beyond.

Those territories have ever since been occupied by British forces, and were for some time administered by British officials.

In the course of the war the British Government entered into a definite and honourable pledge to the Arab inhabitants of those regions to free them from Turkish rule, and at the earliest possible date they took steps to inaugurate an Arab Administration.

They accepted at San Remo in April 1920 a definite mandate under the League of Nations (which the Turkish Government has now intimated its intention to join), and in accordance with article 22 of the Covenant, for the Irak State.

As regards the Kurds in particular, the draft mandate for Irak, which has been published, stipulates that "nothing in this mandate shall prevent the mandatory from establishing a system of local autonomy for predominantly Kurdish areas in Irak as he may consider suitable." I have not found anything in the statement of the Turkish delegation that would lead me to think that your Government contemplates any more liberal régime for the Kurdish populations still remaining in Turkey.

More recently still His Majesty's Government have signed a treaty with the freely elected King of Irak, the Emir Feisal. This treaty contains a clause that

"no territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power."

This chain of events constitutes an obligation which no Government possessing the least self respect can honourably ignore, and from which His Majesty's Government certainly have not the slightest intention to recede. That position is confirmed at every point by the local considerations which your challenge has fortunately enabled me to adduce.

In these circumstances I should merely be deceiving your Excellency and the Turkish delegation if I led you to think that any prolongation of this controversy could make any difference whatever in the attitude which I have felt it my duty to assume.

As I told you, however, at our first meeting on the subject, I shall be prepared at any time to instruct my experts to discuss with yours the precise trace of the northern frontier of the Mosul Vilayet, which will constitute in the treaty the future boundary between Turkey and Irak. Time is slipping by, and the sooner this subject is discussed in the most friendly spirit the better.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 838.

Counter Reply to the Memorandum of the Turkish Delegation concerning the Question of the Vilayet of Mosul.

THE memorandum of the Turkish delegation, far from being convincing, only provides fresh support to the contention that the Mosul Vilayet is naturally and must remain a part of the mandatory area of Irak. Many of the Turkish arguments are disposed of by the previous British memorandum, dated the 14th December. Nevertheless they have again been given full consideration.

1. *Racial.*

Although the Turkish Government ruled the Mosul Vilayet for many centuries, no correct Turkish map of the vilayet exists, nor, so far as the British delegation is aware, are there any pre-war statistics on a racial basis collected by the Turkish Government. On the other hand, British officers during the last few years have made accurate maps of the whole area and have visited every corner of it. The British delegation has, therefore, good reason for thinking that its statistics are more likely to be accurate than those of the Turkish delegation, which, it may be noted, bear no date. The British figures for Kurds do not include those Persian Kurds who simply pass part of their time in Irak. As to the nomad and semi-nomad Arab tribes, the area to which they belong is perfectly well known. Only Arabs of the Mosul Vilayet are included in the British statistics.

The nature of the Turkish statistics can be illustrated by reference to the figures given by the Turkish delegation for the Sulaimaniyeh "liwa." The Turkish delegation states (1) that there are over 7,000 Arabs in this area, whereas not even the most ardent Arab patriot claims that it contains any Arabs at all; and (2) that the Turks are half as numerous as the Kurds, although every traveller knows that to meet a Turk among the Sulaimaniyeh Kurds is almost as rare as it will presently be to meet a Greek in Anatolia. But still more open to question is the Turkish statement that there are only 28,000 Arabs in the Mosul "liwa," when it is notorious that Mosul town alone contains twice that number of Arabs. Apart from the intimate knowledge gained by British officials during the last few years, Mosul was well known to travellers before the war as one of the great Arab towns; yet we are asked to believe that a population who, with insignificant exceptions, talk only Arabic and call themselves Arab, are really Turks who happen to have learned Arabic. This argument is on a par with that in which the Turkish delegation attempts to establish the Turkish character of an area by referring to the Turkish names of some of the villages, forgetting that in the preceding paragraph it had claimed as Turkish an area bearing the purely Arab name of Ashair Saba. By a similar process of reasoning it might be demonstrated that Diarbekr and Marmurat-al-Aziz are Arab towns and that Constantinople, Adrianople, Konia and Angora are Greek cities, an argumentation that would probably not be welcome to the Turkish delegation.

Further, the Turkish contention that Mosul town is Turkish is confuted by a map (Carte éthnographique de l'Empire ottoman) which was produced by Bekir

Sami Bey as an official map during the negotiations in London in March 1921. This map, though it indicates as inhabited by Turks and Kurds rather more territory than is actually occupied by those two races, nevertheless supports fully the claim put forward in the British memorandum of the 14th, viz., that the whole of the great town of Mosul, the whole of the country north of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris as far as the boundary of the vilayet, the whole of the country south of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris, and most of the country south of Mosul on the left bank of the Tigris as far as the Erbil–Kirkuk–Kifri road, are Arab.

Unable, even with the aid of the contentions which have been demolished in the preceding paragraphs, to show that there is a Turkish majority in the Mosul Vilayet, the Turkish delegation then proceeds to reinforce its case by the astounding claim that the Kurds and the Turks are of the same stock. The Turkish delegation can hardly expect credence for such a claim in face of a people who speak an Iranian tongue closely allied to Persian, whose national customs are unlike those of the Turks, who in particular differ from the Turks in their attitude to women to such an extent that the theory of a different origin for the two races could almost be established by that difference alone, and who present in physical appearance so striking a contrast to the Turks that a traveller in any area where the population is mixed can tell merely by looking at the faces of the people whether a particular village is Turkish or Kurdish. But it is enough to say that for this theory there is no historical or other evidence of any weight, and that it is one which the Kurds themselves would reject with scorn.

The British delegation therefore maintains the claim put forward in its previous memorandum, that the only element of the population of the Mosul Vilayet which can be said to be connected with the population of Anatolia by racial affinity is the Turkoman, which numbers only one-twelfth of the total population.

2. *Political.*

Even if it were admitted that the small "Turkish" minority of the Mosul Vilayet would be glad to return to the rule under which they enjoyed so many unfair advantages, the British delegation denies categorically that this view is shared by any other element. The views of the Christians and the Yazidis are so well known that no further argument on this point is required. As to the Arabs, the British delegation not only repeats that these have unanimously voted for inclusion in the Irak State, but maintains that after the exploits of the Arabs during the war and the setting up of an Arab State in Irak with an Arab King at its head, no Arab would hesitate for a moment in preferring to remain a subject of that State rather than return to a rule which did not even recognise the Arab tongue as an official language.

It is regretted that the Turkish delegation has misinterpreted certain admissions which the British delegation, in the desire to be perfectly just and fair, included in its previous memorandum. The people of the Sulaimaniyeh area did not refuse to vote for inclusion in Irak. When the vote regarding the Emir Feisal was taken, they were not asked to vote because, as the previous British memorandum stated, "being a compact body of people of an entirely different race, they obviously required separate treatment." The people of Sulaimaniyeh have always recognised that their fate is bound up with that of Bagdad, which is practically their sole economic outlet.

The statement that "only the minorities of the town of Mosul . . . . voted for Irak," whether it purports to be based on the British memorandum or on other information, is without any foundation in fact. As the British statement on this point has been disregarded, it is desirable to repeat it in greater detail. The proposal that the Mosul Vilayet should be connected with the rest of Irak and should be placed under the rulership of the Emir Feisal as King was supported by the whole of the Mosul "liwa" (Zakho, Dohuk and Agrah included), by the Erbil "liwa," and by the Kifri portion of the Kirkuk "liwa." The amount of "pressure" brought to bear may be estimated from the well-known fact that a deputation from Kirkuk which visited Bagdad could elicit from the High Commissioner no reply to their enquiry as to the wishes of His Majesty's Government regarding the plebiscite, except the unvarying statement that they were free to do as they wished—a statement which the people of Kirkuk acted upon with absolute freedom. It may be admitted, however, that there is good foundation for the contention that many of those of the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet who voted for inclusion in Irak were actuated by self-interest. It is the basis of the British case that it is to the advantage of every inhabitant of the Mosul Vilayet to find himself within the boundaries of the mandatory area, rather than to be united to a race which from the time when the

Tatar hordes destroyed the ancient irrigation system of Babylon has never done Irak any good.

In regard to the Kurdish element, the Turkish delegation puts forward a number of arguments. Perhaps the most curious is its representation of the bombing of Rowanduz and other places to which Turkish troops had penetrated as an attempt to weaken the attachment of the population to Turkey. On the other hand, the Turkish delegation passes over in silence the two important considerations adduced in the previous British memorandum, viz., (1) that in point of fact the Turkish Government was rarely or never in effective control of Southern Kurdistan, and (2) that the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan gave the Turkish Government no help during the great war. If such general considerations as those now adduced by the Turkish delegation are to be admitted, it is legitimate to recall that the Turkish Government had constant trouble with the Kurds in the Dersim and other areas; that in 1914 there was a serious Kurdish revolution in Bitlis, which was put down with difficulty; and that many Kurdish chiefs and their sons were exiled to Constantinople for years at a time lest the spirit of Kurdish nationalism should concentrate around them and break out in revolt against Turkish rule.

The Turkish delegation quotes the Kurdish representatives in the Angora Assembly as demanding that the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan (among others) should be united with Turkey. Since it is obvious that no elections to the Angora Assembly were ever held in Southern Kurdistan, the opinion quoted has no value in respect of the Sulaimaniyeh "liwa." In any case, it is open to anyone to form an independent judgment as to whether the Southern Kurds would prefer to accept an arrangement which, while connecting them with their market and supply centre, Bagdad, leaves them free to use their own language, to be governed by their own tribal leaders and officials, and to develop their native institutions, or to be placed under a Government whose representatives can find nothing to say to their national demands except that all Kurds are Turks.

3. *Historical.*

The British memorandum dealt very briefly with this consideration on the ground that "the argument from history . . . . would justify the demand by any country for any city or province of which it had been deprived as the consequence of defeat in war." But if—for the sake of argument—the Turkish delegation's historical survey is accepted, it only supports the British case. The Turkish delegation will not deny that Mosul was built by Arabs and was an Arab town when the "Turkish" rulers first occupied it; and the claim is made that the Kurds were in possession of Kurdistan long before that date. Then followed, it is said, eleven centuries of Turkish domination. This domination was removed a few years ago, and it was found that the population was mainly, as it had been eleven centuries before, Arab and Kurdish, that it had neither been replaced by Turks nor assimilated to the Turks either in race or in language. A more striking proof of the artificial character of the connection of the Mosul Vilayet with the Turkish Empire it would be hard to find.

4. *Geographical.*

This argument, now raised by the Turkish delegation for the first time, leads nowhere. The Mosul plain, with its long, hot, rainless summer, its snowless winter, and only 13 inches of rain in the year, differs more from Anatolia proper than it does from Bagdad. But it would be possible to prove or to disprove anything by assuming that Anatolia, parts of which are many feet deep in snow for some months of the year while others are so hot that cotton can be grown, is a single geographical unit.

5. *Economic.*

It is a matter for regret that this important aspect of the case, which was treated in great detail in the earlier British memorandum, should have been dealt with by the Turkish delegation in so inadequate a fashion.

The British memorandum stated that the possession of the Mosul Vilayet is essential for the food supply of Bagdad. The Turkish memorandum does not contradict this statement, but adds that Bagdad needs grain from Diarbekr as well as from Mosul. The British delegation does not propose to draw from this argument the logical conclusion that Diarbekr as well as Mosul should be included in Irak. It is satisfied with pointing out that the extension of agriculture in Irak since the

British occupation enables Irak to dispense more and more with Diarbekr grain, so long as the grain-growing areas of Mosul are included in her borders.

One important argument which was advanced in the British memorandum is admirably supported by the Turkish delegation. The latter lays stress on the possible importance to Mosul, in the future, of the Mediterranean ports. The British delegation is prepared to admit that the trade of Mosul with Bagdad and Basra may diminish, and its trade with Alexandretta, Beirut and Haifa increase. The British delegation recognises that the Irak State should enter into the closest economic and commercial relations with the two neighbouring States of Palestine and Syria, and has already pointed out the importance of the cross-desert trade between Syria and Mosul. The transfer of Mosul to Turkey would cut it off not only from Irak but from Syria as well, and would interfere seriously with communications in general between Syria on the one side and Irak and Persia on the other. In fact, three countries would be sacrificed in order to give unimportant economic advantages to one.

It is difficult to decide whether the Turkish case is more seriously damaged by the arguments which they advance or by the British arguments which they ignore. They quote as grounds for the retrocession of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey the trade between Southern Anatolia and Persia, which is quite insignificant, and, in any case, finds its easiest route through Bagdad; the export of buffaloes from Mosul, though buffaloes are bred, not in Mosul, but in Lower Mesopotamia; and the construction of the Bagdad Railway, which, in point of fact, is useful to Mosul, not because it is a link with Anatolia, but because it unites Irak with its neighbour and customer, the Arab country of Syria. Of the British arguments, which the Turkish delegation has preferred to pass over in silence, the most important is the incontrovertible fact that Mosul can never get its principal imports (piece-goods, tea, sugar and coffee) from Anatolia.

6. *Strategic.*

The first argument in this section of the Turkish memorandum appears to be based on the entirely unfounded assumption that in any case Sulaimaniyeh and Kirkuk are to be restored to Turkey. The Vilayet of Mosul is indivisible, and the arguments in this memorandum and in that of the 14th December relate to the vilayet as a whole. The Turkish claim to Mosul (town) as an essential link between Sulaimaniyeh and Kirkuk on one hand, and Anatolia on the other, therefore falls to the ground.

It is not clear why the possession of Mosul should be necessary for the defence of Turkey. As a base for an attack on Irak its value is obvious, but it cannot be seriously argued that Turkey has anything to fear from the new State of Irak, even if the latter includes Mosul. Moreover, unlike the Jubal Hamrin, which is an insignificant range of hills of little importance as a barrier, the present boundary between Irak and Turkey is a serious military obstacle. The western flank is protected by a wedge of Syrian territory which both sides are bound to respect, the eastern by a mass of mountains in which military operations are extremely difficult.

Even if ethnographical, economic and other considerations were not opposed to the separation of Mosul and Bagdad, the Irak State might be pardoned for wishing to be separated from its powerful northern neighbour by the existing boundary rather than by the range of the Jabal Hamrin, which is not only difficult to defend, but is dangerously near to its capital and its vital communications. This question must be considered on its merits, and not confused by comparison with, *e.g.*, the boundary of Eastern Thrace, where many considerations of an entirely different order have to be taken into account.

7. *The National Pact.*

The Turkish delegation ignores the arguments in the British memorandum which show conclusively that by no stretch of interpretation can the first article of the National Pact be read as demanding the retrocession of the Mosul Vilayet. The delegation simply repeat the statement that the National Pact does cover the Mosul Vilayet. More assertion of this sort does not necessarily carry conviction; nor would it be a sound innovation in international practice if documents were to be interpreted, not by what they palpably say, but by what their authors, years afterwards, claim that they meant but failed to say. In any case, it may be worth while to state in the clearest terms what the present claim of the Turkish delegation really means. It means that the Turkish Parliament of February 1920, or the

Angora Assembly of December 1922, is to have the right to decide that the Mosul Vilayet (which is represented in neither body), with its little minority of Turkomans and its enormous majority of non-Turks, is to be taken away from the victors in the great war and to be returned to the vanquished. All intervening events are to be ignored. The growth of Arab and Kurdish nationalism; the development of the mandatory system, and the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of a mandate in respect of the three Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad and Mosul; the setting up of an Arab State with an Arab King; the adhesion of a large part of the population of the Mosul Vilayet to the Arab State; the establishment of an autonomous régime for the Kurds—all of these events are to be disregarded merely because the Turkish delegation chooses to advance this unfounded claim.

The British delegation is unable to deal with the case in this light-hearted and arbitrary manner. Faithful to its obligations to the population of the Mosul Vilayet, to its allies, and to the League of Nations, the British Government is bound to reiterate its refusal even to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul Vilayet, and is unable to see that any advantage can arise from further argument on the subject.

No. 839.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 789.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 28, 1922.*

I ASKED representative of Grand National Assembly yesterday what impression Hassan Bey, who has arrived here on his way to Angora, had given him of peace negotiations. He said not very hopeful impression, and that he thought there would be difficulties in Grand National Assembly, to which Hassan would probably render account on 1st or 2nd January. Adnan Bey said that he himself was glad no longer to be vice-president of that assembly, and hinted that it was not easy to manage it. I told him I would be less optimistic than I was if I did not think that Mustapha Kemal's common sense would triumph over its intransigence. He agreed, and referred warmly also to Reouf Bey's judgment and influence. I expressed hope that Hassan, who is to leave for Angora to-morrow, would be wise enough to put his account of Lausanne negotiations in a favourable light. I asked Adnan to what Grand National Assembly would be likely to take exception. He mentioned Allied demand for inclusion of Moslem minorities in general minorities proposals and for participation of Armenians and Bulgarians in work of special sub-commission. I told him that it was custom at all conferences to hear views of interested parties, even if they had not been officially invited to participate.

Adnan, after harping on constant theme of Allied interference in Turkish internal affairs, said that Turks were losing patience. As local press has been writing in this strain for past week, I took opportunity to speak very strongly to him. If delay there had been, it could only be attributed to Turkish obstinacy and incapacity to appreciate their true interests. Turks would be mad if they allowed their impatience to impel them to any foolish act. Your Lordship was working very hard for peace, a fact Adnan spontaneously and sincerely admitted, and peace was impossible if Turks persisted in their obstructiveness. After so much conciliation on the part of Allies, Turks would put themselves entirely in wrong.

Adnan listened attentively, but complained that Allies (he referred to M. Bompard) would not trust Turkey. I said that so far there was nothing to show that new Turkey, which he asked us to trust, would prove to be different from old Turkey. He pleaded for confidence in this respect, with many professions of sincerity of new Turkey's intentions.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 105.)

No. 840.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 28.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 26, 1922.*

I HAVE just risen from a conversation of more than one and a half hours with Ismet Pasha, the results of which, so far as agreement on any point is concerned, were wholly negative. He is impervious either to argument, warning or appeal, and

can only go on repeating the same catchwords, indulging in the same futile quibbles, and making the same childish complaints. One might just as well argue with the Pyramid of Cheops. I read out to him Refet's assertions at Constantinople, doubtless based on information supplied by himself. He once more repeated asseveration that he wanted to conclude peace, and with myself in particular; but when I came to details and took him point by point through the various questions on which we are at a deadlock, all he had to say in each case was that we were making impossible demands and affronting the sovereign independence of Turkey. I told him that he was rearing up against Turkey the opposition of every State in Europe, that he was turning his back on the chances of peace, and that his policy would mean the ruin of his country. His only reply was that in two days he could settle everything with me, on the basis, of course, that I would concede every Turkish demand.

I then told him plainly what in my mind was the only solution. I said that I had already spent five weeks here and was not prepared to spend five more—much less five months, which at the present rate of progress would be a moderate estimate. I said that I should endeavour to bring all matters to a head in course of ensuing week, and that then it would probably be the duty of Allies to put before the Turkish delegation the draft heads of a treaty with a time-limit in which to accept or to reject. If the Turks rejected, then all the papers would be published and the world would be asked to judge where the responsibility lay. What alternative plan, I asked, had he?

It needed many repetitions of this question to extract any reply. His idea then appeared to be the following: (1) That we should come to an agreement about the Straits, Great Britain yielding, of course, on the few points that remain outstanding —the object manifestly being to get rid of our troops as soon as possible from Constantinople and the Straits: (2) that I should then resume the territorial questions, as to which he declared that nothing had yet been decided, and on which the entire controversy would be reopened. At the end of this an agreement on those points might perhaps be reached. Then the conference should adjourn, and at a later date all the unsettled questions of Capitulations, finance, debts, minorities, &c., could be taken up and settled independently, Turkey *ex hypothesi* being then in a position to settle them in her own way or to refuse to settle them at all. I said at once that I could be no party to such a programme, and that, unless he could make other suggestions in the interval, I saw no alternative but to advise the Allies to proceed on the lines that I had proposed.

I offered to see him again whenever he desired. But I cannot pretend that I believe any such interview will have the smallest effect, and I regard the time consumed in them as altogether wasted. Nothing will bring matters to a head except the sharp alternative of acceptance or refusal, and for this I propose to work.

I do not conceal from the Cabinet that the omens are wholly unfavourable, and I can find no solace in any other reflection than that Ismet, like all other Turks, is doubtless at bottom a true-born son of the bazaars.

No. 841.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 11) to Mr Phipps.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 28.)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 27, 1922.*

FOREIGN OFFICE telegram No. 464.

M. Barrère who has just returned to-day, informs me that he has explicit instructions from President of the Council to the desired effect, and I do not think, therefore, that you need trouble President of the Council to repeat them. I would prefer to wait for some sign of hesitation on the part of French delegation here before urging that pressure be applied.

No. 842.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 102.

I do not [? group omitted] Admiralty explanation. I said nothing about withdrawal of ships from Mudros to Malta for naval reasons. What I complained of was that, according to telegrams from Constantinople, "Iron Duke" with Commander-in-chief on board, one other battleship, two light cruisers and a destroyer flotilla left 20th December to spend Christmas at Malta, and did this at a time of possible crisis without reference either to Foreign Office or to myself. I am grateful for information in your telegram No. 104 that they are now returning.

No. 843.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 2) to Major Marshall.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 28.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 to Foreign Office.

I am endeavouring to work for early signature of a preliminary treaty with Turkey, which would be elaborated later into a final and more detailed treaty. My present idea is not to insert in preliminary treaty any detailed sections relating to detached territories such as sections 7, 8 and 9 of Treaty of Sèvres, but simply to insert general clause whereby Turkey would renounce her rights and interests over all ceded territories. Thus no specific mention would be made of Hedjaz or Hedjaz Railway in preliminary treaty, although section 8 of Treaty of Sèvres relating to Hedjaz and article 360 relating to Hedjaz Railway might be reproduced in final treaty. On the other hand, member of Turkish delegation recently hinted that Turks were themselves going to raise before conference question of inserting in preliminary treaty special provisions for running Hedjaz Railway by international board of Moslems with Caliph at titular president. I am now considering what attitude should be adopted towards this proposal.

No mention of Haramein Wakf occurs in Treaty of Sèvres, but article 425, providing for reciprocal grant of facilities of access to Wakf documents, &c., would probably be reproduced either in preliminary or final treaty. Similarly an attempt will be made to obtain insertion in preliminary treaty of substance or articles 420 and 422 of Treaty of Sèvres, relating to return by Turkey of objects of religious, archæological, &c., interest carried off from detached territories, but it seems very doubtful whether Turks can be induced to agree to restore articles carried off from Prophet's tomb at Medina.

No. 844.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, December 27, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 2 to Jeddah.

Possible proposal of Turkish delegation for dealing with Hedjaz Railway should be considered as soon as possible by Colonial Office, India Office and Foreign Office, and their views telegraphed to me.

No. 845.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, December 28, 1922.*

THIS morning was held a meeting of Second Commission with Marquis Garroni in the chair to receive report of Sir H. Rumbold's Sub-Committee on Capitulations.

This committee, after six sittings, in which they had made every conceivable concession, suggestion and compromise to meet Turkish views, had broken down irretrievably on the subject of judicial Capitulations, in which every proposal made had been categorically refused by Turks as an intolerable infringement of Turkish sovereignty. Marquis Garroni led off with a brief statement of facts and an appeal to moderation and common sense. Sir H. Rumbold followed with a weighty exposition of efforts of his committee and circumstances of their failure. Ismet Pasha then read an absolutely uncompromising declaration, intended, no doubt, for Angora, to the effect that Turkey would accept neither concession nor compromise, that her judicial system was on a level with that of best-governed countries, and that she regarded any proposal to modify it, or to accept foreign judges, or to introduce a provisional system, as an attack upon her sovereign independence. Conference might well have ended upon this note of open defiance. But it was important to obtain declarations of Powers, and these were delivered with a firmness and frankness equal to that of Turks, and greater than any hitherto displayed, and with a unanimity that was most impressive.

M. Barrère declared emphatically that France could not admit of any surrender, and that an agreement on this point was essential to a treaty, and at a later stage his colleague, M. Bompard, speaking as an ex-Ambassador of pronounced Turcophil leanings, expressed his painful surprise at attitude of his former darlings, and repeated unshaken resolve of his Government.

Baron Hayashi warmed into an unprecedented burst of mingled adjuration and appeal.

American delegate read a philosophical statement of America's interest and international rights.

I concluded discussion with a speech in which I answered Ismet point by point, and expounded with some minuteness reasons for which foreigners cannot accept present judiciary system in Turkey, with its lack of competence, its oppression and its intolerable delays, and pointed out, firstly, that British traders would decline to stay and work under such conditions, and, secondly, that Turkey, not being an industrial or manufacturing country and being dependent on capital, brains and technical skill of the outsider, must herself be chief loser by their practical expulsion. I concluded by declining to believe that Turks had said their last word and by inviting Ismet, after studying speeches which had been delivered, to reply on another occasion. He responded in a sentence by accepting invitation and asking for another and early sitting.

(Part II.)

Cabinet must not conclude from this that he is likely to give way. He is probably merely waiting for orders from Angora, and latter, in its stupid isolation, is so *entêté* on the subject that it would probably lose half its kingdom sooner than yield. I am told that at least half the Turkish delegation here would like to surrender. But they are not their own masters.

Advantage of this morning's sitting has, however, been threefold. Firstly, it has demonstrated absolute unity of world opinion as represented by Powers. Secondly, it has committed French Government to a position from which they cannot recede. Thirdly, it has shifted possible or probable cause of rupture to a ground which no one can claim to be a specifically British interest, as might be the case with Mosul or Straits, but which is a world interest equally affecting every foreign State whose nationals live or trade in Turkey.

This afternoon Turks have suspended all participation in sub-committees, and are probably considering their next step.

Should they adhere to this morning's position, we shall have to consider whether it is desirable to present whole draft treaty in our own form. I think it will be advisable to do so, both because every day that passes is a day gained for peace and because it will be well to let the world realise vast generosity of what we shall propose and Turks refuse. I may add that this morning I mentioned to M. Barrère chance of trouble in Constantinople and that he absolutely scouted the idea that we should not stand together to the point of common armed resistance if attacked.

[E 14532/13003/44] No. 846.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Tenth Meeting (Second Meeting of the Straits Commission), December 6, 1922, at 11 A.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 29.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Montagna.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otcha[illegible].	M. Caclamanos.
Admiral Bristol.		

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Spalaikovitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

BULGARIA.	RUSSIA.
M. Stamboliisky.	M. Chicherin.
M. Stancioff.	M. Rakovski.
M. Theodoroff.	M. Mdivani.
	M. Vorovski.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Lindley.	General Weygand.	M. Guariglia.
Admiral Sir R. Keyes.	M. Fromageot.	Admiral Chelotti.
Major-General Burnett-Stuart.	M. de Lacroix.	M. Vitale.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Bargeton.	M. Ciamarra.
Mr. Malkin.	M. Laporte.	M. Galli.
Lieut.-Colonel Heywood.	M. de Percin.	
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Barois.	
Mr. Forbes Adam.		
Mr. Leeper.		
Mr. McClure.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Nagaoka.	General Mazarakis.
Mr. Dwight.	Mr. Sato.	M. Dendramis.
Mr. Heck.	Colonel Saigo.	M. Politis.
	Commandant Tsuru.	
	Mr. Tani.	

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
Colonel Dumitresco.	M. Antitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Ilitch.	Moukhtar Bey.
		Colonel Tevfik Bey.
		Captain Chew Rek Bey.

BULGARIA.	RUSSIA.
Mgr. Stephan.	M. Berens.
M. Mouravieff.	M. Chapochnikof.
M. Morphoff.	
Colonel Noikoff.	
M. Grozkoff.	

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Indelli.
Mr. Ronald.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

BULGARIA.	RUSSIA.
Mlle. Stancioff.	M. Sabanine.
M. Altinoff.	M. Pastoukhof.
	M. Ahrens.
	Mme. Zaretzkaia.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

[The Secretary of State's speech given below is an amended version of that distributed as "Turkey" print, December 8, Section 1.]

LORD CURZON spoke as follows:—

"At the last meeting of this commission we listened to statements made by Russia, Roumania and Bulgaria, followed by a briefer declaration on the part of Turkey.

"I refrained at the time from answering these statements, and promised that after full deliberation a considered reply would be returned on behalf of the Allied Powers. I further undertook to give a general idea of the proposals of the inviting Powers. I will now fulfil both these undertakings, and I will commence by referring to the statement of the Russian delegation.

"M. Chicherin explained at the beginning of his speech that the object of the Russian Government and its allies in the Near East and throughout their foreign policy is to contribute to the establishment and consolidation of the peace of the world. That is a very admirable sentiment. Nor have I any objection to offer to the two fundamental ideas which M. Chicherin went on to declare the intention of his delegation to realise, namely, (1) the equality of the position and rights of Russia and her allies with the position and rights of other Powers, and (2) the assurances of the peace and security of the territories of Russia and the allied republics, as well as the freedom of their economic relations with other countries.

"M. Chicherin proceeded to contend that in the view of the Soviet delegation these important objects can only be attained by the adoption of two principles. The first of these principles is the permanent freedom of commercial navigation through the Straits, the second is the closing of the Straits to men-of-war of all nations, with the exception of those of Turkey. He informed us that this absolute freedom of navigation can only be safeguarded by allowing Turkey to possess a fleet of warships and 'to apply for the defence of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora all the technical machinery of modern warfare.' In order to defend this paradox M. Chicherin had recourse to history and informed us that the methods which he advocated had always been recognised in the past by the States represented at this conference. Although, however, it is true that the policy now advocated by

M. Chicherin is one which the Western Powers consistently followed during the 19th century, it is also one which Russia herself has with equal consistency opposed. The respective policies of Europe and Russia have now been reversed. For whereas the Western Powers have now no longer any intention or desire to impede the free passage of Russian warships through the Straits, it is the Russians themselves who now wish to render such passage impossible.

"The point is historical only and, as such, academic; but as M. Chicherin has appealed to history, it is only logical to point out that the historical argument is not one which will furnish much support to his present contention.

"I have already observed that M. Chicherin put in the forefront of his argument as a fundamental principle, the equality of the position and rights of Russia and her allies with the position and rights of other Powers. But as he proceeded, he appeared to forget all about the other Powers, though their representatives were seated at the table and addressed this conference immediately afterwards.

"It is true that in the past, Russia and Turkey were the only Powers riverain to the Black Sea, but since then there have emerged other States whose interests, on the basis of equality as M. Chicherin himself laid down, are at least equal to those of Russia. I speak of Roumania and Bulgaria. They had no place in his exposition. But a little later, when we listened to their representatives, we discovered that neither of these countries considers that Russia has any right to speak in the name of all the riverain Powers, and that their ideas as to maintaining the peace of the world and the security of their possessions in the Black Sea differed materially from those of M. Chicherin.

"So much for the general principles which were expounded by the Russian delegation.

"I will now proceed to subject to a rather closer examination the proposals themselves, which assume a larger importance than they would otherwise have possessed from the fact that Ismet Pasha told us that they were in general correspondence with the ideas of the Turkish delegation.

"Let us see to what extent they would fulfil in practice the essential objects which M. Chicherin set out to achieve and which I have already defined in his own terms. I am afraid that in many respects they would have a very opposite effect.

"The conference will have recognised that the proposals of the Russian delegation amount in fact to the maintenance of the situation existing in the Straits and the Black Sea before the war, with the important exception that Turkey is to be deprived of the right which she obtained in 1871 of opening the Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers. The peace of the world, the equality of position and rights of Russia and other Powers and the security and commercial freedom of Russia and her allies are to depend firstly upon the unrestricted and sole guardianship by Turkey of the Straits and secondly upon the almost equally unrestricted control of the Black Sea by Russia, since she is without doubt, by the extent of her coast-line and the wealth of her resources and man-power, potentially the strongest naval Power in the Black Sea.

"Now I ask the Powers represented at this conference—both the other riverain Powers of the Black Sea, such as Roumania and Bulgaria, and the Powers, who before the war possessed and to-day possess the bulk of the commercial tonnage trading through these waters, France, Italy, Great Britain, Greece and the United States of America, and also Russia and Turkey—whether these proposals can possibly be regarded as a permanent and satisfactory solution of this problem. What they attempt to do is not to create a stable and durable system, fair alike to all the Powers and all the interests concerned, but to convert the accidental and probably ephemeral grouping of Powers, which has emerged from the recent war, into a permanent control of these areas—whether for purposes of aggression or defence. This is a solution which is not only eminently unjust, but could not hope to endure.

"The history of these regions abounds in examples of the manner in which Russian control of the Black Sea and Turkish guardianship of the Straits has been administered. As regards the former, Turkey will recall the arrival of the Russian fleet at Constantinople in the days of Mehomet Ali and the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. As regards the latter, I need only refer to the disabilities to which neutral trade was exposed during the war between Italy and Turkey in 1911; to the serious obstructions imposed by Turkey upon neutral commerce during the Balkan wars which followed; and to the far-reaching effect of the similar action taken by Turkey in 1914 upon the fortunes of Russia, Roumania and the Allies. After the experience of the past decade, I think that few Powers here will be prepared to return, as a permanent solution of this question, to the situation existing before the war.

"But there are certain more specific criticisms which might be made upon M. Chicherin's formula. In the first place, apart from the fact that it ignores the principle of international law that the passage between the two seas should be regarded as an international highway, it would, if adopted by this conference, give to Russia a position of exceptional and indefensible advantage within the Black Sea. In other words, although Russian and Turkish warships have the right under international law to free passage through the Suez, Panamá and Kiel canals and through all the other straits of the world, M. Chicherin proposes to deny these rights to other nations in regard to the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In the second place, he contended that the opening of the Straits to warships would be to the advantage of the strongest naval Power. But he omitted to mention that the closing of the Black Sea would place the other riverain countries at the mercy of the littoral Power possessing the strongest land forces, in other words, Russia herself.

"Even on the commercial side it may be observed that under M. Chicherin's formula, whereas Russia would be able to protect by means of her Baltic fleet Russian commerce in waters outside the Black Sea, the non-riverain Powers would be precluded from protecting their commerce within that sea. Of the shipping entering the Black Sea only 20 per cent. bears the flag of riverain States, whereas the remaining 80 per cent. belongs to outside Powers. M. Chicherin's loudly expressed love for equality is consistent with a willingness to deny to those Powers all right of protection.

"In fact, the more closely we examine the Russian programme, the more clearly does it emerge that it has only one object in view, viz., to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake with Turkey as the faithful guardian at the gates. Roumania proposed demilitarisation. Not so the Russian delegation. Within the waters of the Black Sea Russia is to reign supreme. She may fortify the coasts. She may create a powerful navy, powerful enough, at any rate, to overawe her neighbours. She may transport her troops from coast to coast. Free from attack elsewhere, except in her ice-bound ports, she may meditate and execute what plans she pleases in the Black Sea area and in the Caucasus. No one else is to have access to this privileged zone. It is to be shut off from the world. M. Chicherin told us that he was very much disturbed at the preponderance of the forces of any Power at the mouth of the Dardanelles. That was perhaps because they happened at the moment to be British. But he does not object to a similar preponderance in the safe seclusion of the Black Sea—provided only that it be Russian. Such is the very remarkable contribution that was made two days ago by the Russian delegation to the doctrine of the equal rights of nations and the peace and contentment of mankind.

"I will now proceed to explain in general terms the proposals of the Allies. They fall under two heads: (1) regulations for the passage of vessels, whether of peace or war, through the Straits; (2) the creation of demilitarised zones on the shores of the Straits. The full text of these two schemes will be laid before the conference at the close of my remarks.

"In framing these proposals, it has been the object of the Allies to seek no special advantage for themselves, but to bear in mind the permanent factors in this problem, without the consideration of which no lasting solution is possible. These factors may be thus described:—

"1. The primary interest in these waters, from the point of view both of economic life and security against attack, of the riparian States of the Black Sea, both great and small, and the necessity of giving equal consideration to the interests of all those States.

"2. The character of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, as an international highway for the commerce of the world between two international seas, and the necessity, therefore, of treating it, as far as possible, in the same manner as other international waterways, whether rivers, straits or canals, with a view to assure the freedom of peaceful commerce.

"3. The existence of the capital of Turkey and the seat of the Caliphate on the banks of this waterway.

"Taking into account all these factors, my colleagues and I propose the following general rules for the navigation of the Straits. For the sake of clearness I will deal separately with ships of commerce and ships of war:—

"1. *As regards ships of commerce*, there will be complete freedom of navigation whatever the flag and the cargo, without any formalities, taxes or charges

whatsoever, in time of peace and in time of war, when Turkey is neutral. In time of war, when Turkey is belligerent, there shall be complete freedom of navigation for neutral vessels, provided no assistance is given to the enemies of Turkey whether by the carriage of contraband, troops, or enemy civilian passengers. The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships from using the Straits shall not be of such a nature as to interfere with the free passage of neutral vessels.

"2. *As regards ships of war*, in time of peace there shall be complete freedom of passage for all flags, without any formality, tax or charge whatever, subject to a limitation on the number and duration of stay of the warships of any one Power in a Turkish port. The signatory Powers shall maintain the same right as before the war to keep *stationnaires* in the waters of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and under the same conditions.

"In time of war, when Turkey is neutral, there shall be complete freedom of passage for neutral warships as in time of peace.

"In time of war, when Turkey is a belligerent, there shall be freedom of passage for neutral warships only.

"It will have been observed that there is one popular misapprehension which these proposals entirely remove. It has often been stated that the desire of the Western Powers is to impose upon Turkey some such solution as would leave the capital of the Turkish State at the mercy of a hostile fleet. The Turkish delegation and the entire conference will now have seen that such is not the case. We feel that Turkey has every right to demand that when she is at war no belligerent warship may pass the Dardanelles and proceed into the Sea of Marmora. On this point the Allied Powers are agreed, and our proposals contain this very important reservation. Further, the conference will also have recognised that under our scheme, when Turkey is at war, the freedom of passage for commercial vessels will also be restricted, and that in such an event Turkey will retain the right of visit and search within her waters in order to prevent the transport either of troops or of contraband. Finally, in the event of a war in which Turkey herself is neutral, the Allied Powers agree to the imposition upon belligerent warships of the conditions and restrictions defined in the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 regarding maritime neutrality.

"I now proceed to the second heading of our proposals regarding demilitarisation. In order to ensure the due carrying out of the above rules, the Allies propose (1) that certain zones to be fixed on the European and Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus shall be effectively demilitarised; (2) that an international commission shall be set up with the necessary technical services both to provide for the buoying, lighting and quarantine defence of the waters of the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and Sea of Marmora, and to supervise and inspect the demilitarisation of the land zones. This commission would be composed of one member each appointed by the Governments of the riparian States of the Black Sea and those Powers who are especially interested in Mediterranean commerce, viz., France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Russia, the United States, Turkey, Greece, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Turkish member should be the permanent president. The exact procedure by which this commission should be constituted and the auspices under which it should work, whether the League of Nations or otherwise, remain for consideration.

"As regards the manner in which the proposed demilitarisation should be carried out, the extent and area of the zones, and the forces that might be required for the defence of Constantinople, these points will be found specified in the second paper which it is proposed to circulate at the close of this sitting.

"There remains a third branch of the subject which I have not so far touched. When we were discussing some days ago the demilitarisation of certain zones on the frontiers of Eastern Thrace, the Turkish delegation enquired whether any, and, if so, what form of guarantee, in the shape of neutralisation or otherwise, could be provided for the security of those regions from attack.

"Perhaps the same question may be put with regard to the demilitarised zones on the Straits which we have now proposed to create. This is a question which we are quite ready to examine with the Turkish jurists, and it is a task which can be taken in hand without further delay.

"I have now completed my summary of the various proposals which my colleagues and I have agreed to submit, not as a mere tentative sketch, but as the result of anxious thought and prolonged deliberation with expert authority. I hope that they may be found to provide a settlement of one of the most vexed and com-

plicated problems of international policy—a problem of which, if this conference were able to arrive at a settlement, we should be held to have justified our labours, however protracted, and to have merited the thanks of the world."

M. BARRERE read the following statement :—

"The conference has listened to a clear and full analysis of the proposals concerning the régime of the Straits which are presented by Lord Curzon conjointly with his allies.

"The conference will doubtless not consider it superfluous that the representative of France should explain the spirit in which the Allies have formulated these proposals and also the principles and ideas by which they are guided.

"Freedom of navigation is an essential condition for the development of relations between States and for the maintenance of peace which is the natural consequence of that development. All the efforts of civilised peoples are directed towards ensuring the application of this principle, and the conscience of mankind has in a sense symbolised that principle by what is called the freedom of the Straits.

"Does this mean that that freedom can be absolute? It must be limited by the necessity of preventing the application of that freedom from impeding the attainment of the desired object.

"The fact that one or two nations own the banks of the sole sea channel connecting two seas cannot confer on that nation or nations the right of forbidding passage through that channel. Conversely, this right of passage must be regulated in such manner that it cannot in itself become a danger for the peace nor constitute a menace for the independence or security of certain States, and, in particular, of those which own the banks of the Strait in question.

In the past, the efforts made to establish a régime for shipping in the Straits with which we are concerned were inspired by political or military considerations which arose rather out of the circumstances of the moment than from a concern for permanent interests. The purpose, then, was to open or close the passage in the interest of certain Powers.

"I may add that France, who is so profoundly attached to the principle of liberty, desires that the various nations may be assured the right to safeguard their legitimate interests without any menace from anyone. Her purpose is to harmonise this right with the interests of all the riverain States of the Black Sea, and especially with the interests of that riverain State which also happens to possess the sovereignty over both shores of the Straits.

"The proposals which have been presented to you on behalf of the Allies by my eminent colleague, Lord Curzon, are in complete harmony with these views. They provide for complete liberty of commercial navigation, the protection of which they guarantee by conferring the right of passage to such extent as is necessary on war ships which are destined to assure that protection in case of need. Our proposals make provision for the restrictions necessary to protect Turkey as a riverain of the Straits from any abuse of this right of passage. The interests of the riverain Powers of the Black Sea are safeguarded by limitations of the exercise of the right of passage. Under these conditions this right cannot constitute for any of the riverain Powers a menace or an injury to their sovereignty; on the contrary, it constitutes a valuable guarantee against any policy of domination which would threaten the security of certain riverain States of the Black Sea, and in particular of Turkey.

"I trust that the wisdom of the proposals made by the three Allied Governments will be appreciated by all Governments which sincerely desire the establishment of a truly liberal and peaceful régime. Any solution of the problem based on circumstances of the moment should be ruled out. A Power which to-day demands the closing of the Straits may perhaps to-morrow demand the opening of the Straits if political conditions should change. The French delegation therefore urge most strongly that other delegations, and the Turkish delegation in particular, who are so greatly interested in an equitable and lasting settlement of this question, should accept the proposals just made, for these proposals pay full heed to all the legitimate interests at stake, and therefore cannot fail to contribute to the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in the East and throughout the world."

MARQUIS GARRONI made the following speech :—

"Italy, like Great Britain and France, fervently desires that the problem of the Straits should be solved in such a way as to pay heed to the interests of all and to arrive at a decision which will remove all possibility of disputes in the future.

"I have no doubt that after our president's detailed statement of the terms in which the question is put, and with the goodwill of all parties interested in a question

of such importance, we shall succeed in solving a problem which has so long preoccupied all mankind—a problem which mankind ardently desires to see settled, so that all pretext for future conflict may be eliminated.

"I hasten for my part to express the wish that our common work may be fruitful and that it may really achieve the purpose which is universally expected of us."

MR. CHILD spoke as follows :—

"I have listened with interest to the points of view of the various delegations on the subject of the Straits, and trust that a statement of the views of the American representatives will not be unwelcome.

"Our position is based upon that policy of our Government which stands for complete and constant freedom, without special privilege, for our commerce and for the commerce of other nations.

"The application of this policy to the question of the Straits is not difficult. We desire, for the good of our own interests, as well as for the good of all, including those peoples and nations which border on the Black Sea, that nothing shall be done which will take from any of them, Bulgaria or Russia, Ukraine or Turkey, Roumania or Georgia, the guarantee that they shall be accessible to the commerce of the world. Accessibility to that commerce is their right. It is equally the right of the commerce of the world to reach the peoples of this region.

"I do not understand that any delegation here would openly deny that right for times of peace. This is not sufficient. It is in keeping with the progress of world administration and enlightened international purposes that the commerce of neutral nations shall not be interrupted during a state of war.

"The freedom of the Straits is a term too limited to cover the field of this discussion. This discussion involves the freedom of all those nations which border on the Black Sea, and of all those nations outside the Straits who desire to reach them on their friendly errands.

"We cannot accept the position stated by anyone who has spoken for the position of the nations on the Black Sea; we have heard no one speak with the assent of all. We cannot accept the position that the future of commerce in the Black Sea is the exclusive affair of the States bordering upon it. We assert that it is the concern of all the nations of the earth. It is untenable that any one nation by the virtue of geographical position should hold the power of depriving every other nation of these rights. This would be not only against the interests of our national policy; it would be against the interests of every nation on the Black Sea; it would be against the whole historical development of the freedom of the Black Sea. The unlimited control of the Straits and the Black Sea by any one nation is against the policy of the world.

"I do not understand that any nation here will deny these fundamental principles of the freedom of the Black Sea. I do not understand that Turkey denies them. I do not even understand that any nation having an eye for extension of territory or seeking to control the policies of Turkey will be heard here to deny them. I assume that these fundamental principles will be established by this conference and, if possible, will be guaranteed by this conference. No other result would satisfy the views of my Government. Without presuming to speak specifically for others, I assume that no other result would satisfy either the nations inside or outside the Straits.

"It is our view that the freedom of the Black Sea is to be gained only by disarmament. More than this, it is our belief that even armament designed to keep the Straits open is in fact a danger to the freedom of the Black Sea.

"If any nation or group of nations representing the interests of all nations accepts the trusteeship of the freedom of the Black Sea, this trusteeship may be carried out, we believe, with greater guarantee of good faith and constancy if reliance is placed upon agreements rather than upon force.

"It is impossible for me to overlook the proposal made by one delegation here that by such agreements all warships should be excluded from the Black Sea. I would find it equally reasonable to exclude warships from every international body of water. No nation has gone farther than the United States in policies of naval disarmament but no nation would be more ready to uphold the good sense of maintaining sufficient naval force to act as police of the free seas, to protect its citizens and their ships wherever they might be, to suppress piracy and other menaces, and to act at times for the public good and to give relief to suffering, just as ships of war have recently acted in the Near East. Ships of war are not necessarily agents of destruction; on the contrary, they may be agents of preservation and serve good and peaceful ends in

the prevention of disorder and the maintenance of peace. We, I believe in common with every commercial nation, wish access to every free body of water in the world, and we will not be satisfied if our ships of war may not pursue their peaceful errands wherever our citizens and ships may go."

M. SPALAIKOVITCH spoke as follows:—

"Now that this conference is preparing to determine the future régime of the Straits from the international point of view, I beg leave to lay before you briefly the factors which confer on my country the right and the duty to take an interest in the settlement of this question and to participate therein.

"When speaking of Roumania the other day, M. Duca stated in eloquent terms the paramount importance of the Straits question as regards the economic and commercial development of the countries in the Danube Basin. Foreign trade and its organisation are indeed intimately connected with means of communication; and I therefore wish for my part to emphasise the point that in this respect the Danube, with its principal affluent the Save, constitutes the natural highway for traffic towards the Black Sea for a large portion of those regions in respect of which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has succeeded the old Danubian monarchy—especially as regards the export of the produce of Western Bosnia, the Srem, the Batchka and the Banat. I may also observe in this connection that the Danube flows through my country for more than 700 kilom. of its course, from the Hungarian to the Bulgarian frontier.

"It is therefore clear that we, who are riverains of the Danube and heirs of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, must not be deprived of the means of reaching the Straits and utilising them for the export of our products viâ the Mediterranean to northern countries such as England, Belgium and Holland.

"The recent international conference on Danubian navigation definitely settled the conditions for navigation and transport on this international river, by instituting a régime in accordance with the common interest of all nations.

"But this work will only be complete when a definite régime has also been devised and put in force for the navigation and passage of ships through the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora, which lies between the two Straits.

"Since our country is now interested in this question in the same way as Austria-Hungary used to be interested in all previous phases of the Straits problem, we are ready to take part in the work before the conference, taking economic considerations and the principles of international law as our guide.

"His Excellency Lord Curzon, in his eminently clear and precise statement, has just outlined certain principles which may be summed up in the following formula: on the one hand, complete freedom of navigation and of passage for merchant vessels, without any formality or restriction; and on the other hand, such guarantees as are indispensable for ensuring this freedom, coupled with respect for the security and sovereign rights of the interested States.

"It may appear difficult to reconcile these two ideas—that of guarantees and that of sovereignty; but the solution suggested by the Allies shows that they are animated with the desire to make peace and re-establish order in that part of the world.

"Without trespassing on the province of the experts, and with the sole purpose of demonstrating our impartiality, I venture to express the sincere hope that Turkey for her part will consent to guarantees of a nature to safeguard the general interest, especially as the Powers for their part are only seeking to secure these guarantees by means compatible with Turkey's sovereign rights.

"Thus, for instance, the presence of foreign troops in Turkish territory must be eliminated in future. It seems to me that on this basis, which will give Turkey full satisfaction on the most essential point as regards her sovereignty, it should not be difficult to reach an agreement."

ISMET PASHA said that in order to express a considered opinion on the proposals made by Lord Curzon in the name of the inviting Powers he required first to study those proposals in detail; he would therefore give his reply later.

M. CHICHERIN made the following speech:—

"While reserving our detailed reply until later, we wish to make some general observations to-day. The chairman is quite right in saying that the rôles of Russia

and of the Western Powers are reversed. Formerly we had a Tsarist Russia which cherished aggressive designs and was a constant menace to Turkey and to peace. Now we have a Soviet Russia which has renounced all imperialist ambitions and is inspired with sentiments of friendship and brotherhood towards the peoples of the East. In former days people used to talk of 'Russian advance in Asia,' if I may be allowed to name a celebrated book; is it not perhaps now a case of 'British advance in Europe?' The best traditions of British conservatism were to establish a partition wall between the Russian and British spheres of influence, and this is what we now propose to do—laying the foundations of this wall on the freedom and sovereignty of the Turkish people. Now that Russia has abandoned her designs on Constantinople and the Straits, two schemes are possible: one is the exclusion of warships from the Straits and the sovereignty of Turkey, *i.e.*, the partition wall; the other is an international deal which will transport the conflicts and rivalries of the whole world into this region.

"Every treaty is merely an outward expression of forces at work underneath. The conflicts which distract the world will unfortunately continue to exist, and an international deal over the Straits will provide the scene of action for these conflicts. The only durable basis for a state of peace in the Near East is the liberty and sovereignty of Turkey. What we advocate is not an ephemeral device, but the maintenance of the rights of the Turkish people, which has victoriously asserted its existence.

"The case of Bulgaria is invoked, and it is apparently forgotten that Bulgaria has been deprived of all her means of defence on land and sea by a treaty to which Russia was not a party—a treaty which she will never recognise.

"As for Roumania, has she been Russia's neighbour since yesterday only? She never protested against the régime of the closing of the Straits. Those who wish to establish such a régime as will perpetuate trouble invoke the security of Roumania; but that is an illusory argument, for our relations with Roumania are governed by what happens on land, not at sea. Russia has no aggressive intention against Roumania; but if she had, Roumania would prepare to defend herself by means of arrangements on land which are well known to us.

"An international deal means the perpetuation of disturbance instead of peace; it means constant violation of the security and sovereignty of Turkey; it means the necessity for Russia to arm, arm, arm. It also means the complete collapse of the Washington naval disarmament treaty. Russia welcomes the idea of the Washington Conference to which, unfortunately, she was not invited. We shall be happy to participate in any general agreement for naval disarmament, but the opening of the Straits would render general naval disarmament impossible.

"Appeal has been made to the treaty of 1871, whereby Turkey was enabled to let Allied fleets enter the Straits for her defence. In the treaty of 1841 that clause did not exist, but nevertheless during the Crimean war Turkey invited Allied fleets to her assistance. If all the parties to a treaty go to war, the treaty between them ceases to exist. We are ready to examine proposals defining what would happen in wartime if the principle of closing the Straits to warships is accepted.

"Mention has been made of the obstacles put in the way of commercial traffic during the war between Italy and Turkey, but there is silence as regards the hindrances imposed on our commerce during the Allied occupation of the Straits.

"Formulas of international law are cited; but those formulas do not date from yesterday. Why then has the principle of closing the Straits been considered up to now as in conformity with these precepts?

"Nothing but a partition wall can separate rivals effectively and give a guarantee for peace and for the independent existence of Turkey. While listening to the chairman I had the impression that the fundamental idea of his speech was to create a system aimed against Russia. We propose peace to you, and you perpetuate the struggle against us. Russia is at the beginning of a new era, and we wish to start this era by creating stable conditions of peace around us whereas you wish to put us in a situation which will force us into war. The Russian revolution has transformed the Russian people into a nation whose entire energy is concentrated in its Government to a degree hitherto unknown in history; and if war is forced upon that nation it will not capitulate. You are uneasy because our horsemen have reappeared on the heights of the Pamirs, and because you no longer have to deal with the half-witted Tsar who ceded the ridge of the Hindookush to you in 1895. But it is not war that we offer you, it is peace, based on the principle of a partition wall between us and on the principle of the freedom and sovereignty of Turkey."

LORD CURZON thought that the Turkish delegation were quite right in postponing their remarks until they had seen the detailed proposals in the papers to be distributed at the end of the meeting. He regretted that M. Chicherin, to whose very eloquent words he had listened with great interest, had not maintained a similar reserve; for he believed that certain of M. Chicherin's fears would be removed when he saw the documents, while his references to Roumania would no doubt be dealt with by M. Duca. M. Chicherin was entirely mistaken in thinking that his (Lord Curzon's) remarks had been directed against Russia. He had meant to convey that in his opinion the Russian proposals would place Russia in a position of supremacy in the Black Sea, with Turkey following obediently behind her. He was delighted to hear of the friendly and innocent intentions now expressed by the Russian Government, in view of which M. Chicherin would doubtless now tear up most of the proposals made by him two days ago.

The experts of the Allied delegations, who had drafted the proposals, were ready to meet the experts of other delegations at 4 o'clock that afternoon and answer any questions on technical points in the documents.

M. CHICHERIN requested that the commission should meet again, since it was necessary that the Turkish delegation should state their views on both the Allied and the Russian proposals.

LORD CURZON said that M. Chicherin had misinterpreted his suggestion. He had only given a general summary of the Allied proposals. The Russian delegation were justified in asking for a further meeting of the commission, when they would have an opportunity to express their views both on his (Lord Curzon's) speech and on the documents about to be distributed; but before resuming the discussion in the commission, a detailed perusal of these documents was obviously necessary. He was quite ready to resume the meeting and hear the reasoned views of all delegates on the following morning, and had proposed for the sake of convenience only that the Allied military and naval experts should in the meantime give the other experts such explanations as the latter might require after reading the documents.

M. CHICHERIN asked that the discussion might be postponed until the 8th December, so as to give his delegation time to examine the documents and prepare their answer.

LORD CURZON said it was most desirable to expedite the work of the commission, and suggested that the next meeting should be held on the afternoon of the 7th December. He asked when the Turkish delegation would be ready with their reply.

ISMET PASHA replied that their answer would not be ready until the 8th December.

LORD CURZON agreed to the next meeting being held on the 8th December at 10·30 A.M.

(*The commission rose at* 1·20 P.M.)

ANNEX A

Document communicated to the Territorial and Military Commission on December 6, 1922, by the British, French and Italian Delegations.

FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS.*

Rules for the Passage of Vessels through the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus.

ARTICLE 1.—*Merchant Vessels, including Hospital Ships, Yachts and Fishing Vessels and Commercial Aircraft.*

(a.) *In Time of Peace.*

Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, tax or charge whatever.

* The term "Straits" for this purpose to include the Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus.

(b.) *In Time of War, Turkey being Neutral.*

Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under the same conditions as above. Turkey agrees not to regard any obligations of neutrality as overriding such freedom.

(c.) *In Time of War, Turkey being a Belligerent.*

Freedom of navigation for neutral vessels and neutral commercial aircraft, if the vessel or aircraft in question is not rendering assistance to the enemy by carrying contraband, troops or enemy nationals. Turkey will have the right to search such vessel or aircraft, and for this purpose aircraft are to land in such areas as are specified by Turkey. The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral ships.

Turkey agrees to provide ships with either the necessary instructions or pilots for the above purpose.

ARTICLE 2.—*War Vessels† and Military Aircraft.‡*

(a.) *In Time of Peace.*

Complete freedom of passage by day or by night under any flag, without any formalities or tax or charges whatever, but with the undermentioned reservation as to the total force :—

1. The total force which any one Power may send through the Straits (and maintain in the Black Sea) is not to be greater than that of the most powerful of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea existing in that sea at the time of passage.
2. In the event of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea agreeing amongst themselves to a total demilitarisation of naval forces, the Powers individually reserve the right to send through the Straits (and maintain in the Black Sea) a force of three ships, not more than one of which may be a vessel exceeding 10,000 tons.

(b.) *In Time of War, Turkey being a Neutral.*

Complete freedom of passage by day or by night under any flag, without any formalities or tax or charges whatever, under the same limitations as in article 2 (*a*), provided, however, that these limitations will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the Black Sea.

Warships and military aircraft of belligerents will be forbidden to make any capture, to carry out the right of search, or carry out any other hostile act within the zone of the Straits, and are forbidden to remain more than twenty-four hours beyond the time necessary to pass through the Straits, unless detained by *force majeure*.

As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, they will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907, dealing with maritime neutrality.

(c.) *In Time of War, Turkey being a Belligerent.*

Complete freedom of passage for neutral warships without any formalities or tax or charges whatever, but under the same limitations as in article 2 (*a*).

Neutral naval aircraft will make the passage of the Straits under the same limitations as in article 2 (*a*), but at their own risk, and will submit to investigation as to their character. For this purpose aircraft are to land in such areas as are specified and prepared by Turkey.

The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral ships.

Turkey agrees to provide ships with either the necessary instructions or pilots for the above purpose.

Note.—The passage of the Straits by submarines of Powers at peace with Turkey must be made on the surface.

† The term "war vessels" for this purpose to include their auxiliaries, troop transports and aircraft carriers.

‡ The term "military aircraft" for this purpose to include the State aircraft attached to the navy, army or air force (flying services) of a nation.

ARTICLE 3.—*Stay in the Ports of the Straits and Black Sea.*

(*a.*) Articles 1 and 2 apply to the passage of ships and aircraft through and over the Straits, and do not affect the right of Turkey to make such regulations as she may consider necessary regarding the number of men-of-war and naval aircraft of any one Power which may visit Turkish ports at one time, and the duration of their stay.

(*b.*) Littoral Powers of the Black Sea will also have a similar right as regards their ports.

(*c.*) The signatory Powers, who before 1914 had the right of maintaining stationnaire ships in the zone of the Straits, shall continue to exercise that right under the former conditions.

(*d.*) The signatory Powers, who have the right of maintaining vessels on the Danube, shall continue to have this right and to replace these vessels by other vessels as necessary.

The vessels mentioned in article 3 (*c*) and (*d*) will be additional to those mentioned in article 2.

ANNEX B.

Document Communicated to the Territorial and Military Commission on December 6, 1922, by the British, French and Italian Delegations.

DEMILITARISATION OF THE ZONE OF THE STRAITS.

(The term "Straits" includes the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus.)

ARTICLE 1.

There shall exist no permanent installation of a military or naval character capable of interfering with the free passage through the Straits.

ARTICLE 2.

Moreover, the zones and islands indicated hereafter shall be demilitarised.

1. Both shores of the passages of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus over the extent of the shores delimited below:—

Dardanelles—

On the north-west, the Gallipoli Peninsula and the area south-east of the line Karachalli-Rodosto (the latter place excluded).

On the south-east, the area included between the coast and the line Eski Stambul Cape (opposite Tenedos)-Bigha-Karabigha.

Bosphorus:

On the east, the area up to the line Shile Gebze-Darija.

On the west, the area up to the line Akbunar-Kutchuk-Chekmeje, with the reservation concerning the special régime for Constantinople (see article 4 below).

2. All the islands in the Sea of Marmora.

3. In the Ægean Sea the Islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos

ARTICLE 3.

The demilitarisation will comprise the following measures:

Destruction of existing fortifications (except works of an artistic nature) as well as of installations of a military or naval nature; the construction of new ones is forbidden.

In the waters of the Straits and the territorial waters of the various zones and islands indicated above, there shall be no submarine engines of war.

No armed force shall stay or move in the demilitarised zones, except the police and gendarmerie forces necessary for the maintenance of internal order, whose

strength shall be fixed in accordance with the average strength of the police and gendarmerie forces employed on the whole Turkish territory (with the reservation concerning the special dispositions applied to Constantinople).

ARTICLE 4.

In view of the special requirments of the capital, there may be maintained at Constantinople and its immediate neighbourhood a garrison whose strength shall be fixed by agreement between the inviting Powers and the Turkish Government (maximum 10,000 men).

ARTICLE 5.

If in case of war Turkey, availing herself of the rights of a belligerent Power, should in any way modify this state of demilitarisation she will be bound to re-establish the *status quo ante bellum* as soon as peace is concluded

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[E 14548/18/44] No. 847.

Consul Morgan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December 29.*)

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, December 13, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Armenian and Greek Christian refugees continue to arrive in Aleppo from Asia Minor.

The Armenian refugees are mostly from Kharput, Diarbekr, Aintab, Killis, Arabkir and Malatia. From the 8th November to the 10th December some 6,000 of them have arrived here.

The Greek Christian refugees are from the interior of Asia Minor, though there are a few from Zonguldak, Kutahia and Smyrna region. They number some 3,000.

They are in a wretched condition here. The refugees from Marash and Aintab state that, after having left their houses and lands, they were attacked on their way to the Syrian frontier by robbers and relieved of their money and valuables.

All have more or less the same story to tell, viz., that the Turks informed them they were free to leave the country during the period of one month (afterwards extended to a second month). The way in which this intimation was conveyed, suggested, as it was evidently meant to do, that those who did not leave might expect the worst.

The Turks also informed the refugees that they were free to dispose of their real property, but of course the refugees could find no purchasers, the Moslems knowing that after the departure of the Christians they could get the houses for very little. I have also heard that such Moslems as wished to purchase houses from Christians before their departure were either threatened with reprisals by their co-religionists or else effected the purchases at extremely low rates.

In sum, the present refugee movement indicates a resolution on the part of the Turks to drive all Christians from Turkey and seize their property and lands.

My American colleague has been instructed to keep in touch with the American representatives at Lausanne, and keep them informed of all particulars of the present refugee movement.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[E 14575/13003/44] No. 848.

Minute written by Mr. Forbes Adam for the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received in Foreign Office, December 29.*)

Lord Curzon,

I ATTACH a memorandum showing in some detail the outstanding points for discussion in the Minorities Sub-Commission. Sir H. Rumbold asked me to draw up a statement on the subject and to obtain your instructions on points I, II, III and IV before the next meeting of the sub-commission on Tuesday afternoon, the 26th December. The other points, V, VI and VII, may still cause difficulty, but, for the present, discussion on them is transferred to the Drafting Committee. The Turks have accepted

the other "stock" articles taken from all the European minority treaties. We have not yet opened a discussion on the Armenian national home, but are to hear the Bulgarians and Armenians on Wednesday—in the absence of the Turks, who refused point-blank to be present when any minority delegations are heard.

E. G. F. ADAM.

Lausanne, December 24, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 848.

Memorandum

THE following are the main points on which discussion with the Turks is still outstanding in the Minorities Sub-Commission :—

I.—*Representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople.*

The article originally proposed by the Allied representatives (really by us, lukewarmly supported by the French and Italians) ran as follows : .

"Le Conseil de la Société des Nations pourra envoyer en Turquie un représentant choisi, après consult tion avec le Gouvernement turc, parmi les ressortissants des Puissances demeurées neutres pendant la guerre de 1914 à 1918 et qui aurait pour mission de s'assurer de l'application des dispositions de la présente partie.

"Ce représentant jouira pendant sa mission des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques conformément à l'article 7 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

"Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission."

The Turks flatly refused to accept this, and there is some reason to suppose that they were encouraged in this attitude by M. Spalaikovitch, the reason being that this particular proposal as a general rule for the European minority treaties was proposed by Professor Gilbert Murray at the first League Assembly, and was turned down after violent opposition from all the European States with minority treaties.

The British delegation then proposed the following formula :—

"Au cas où le Conseil de la Société des Nations proposerait d'envoyer en Turquie un représentant pour se renseigner sur l'application des dispositions de la présente partie, la Turquie se déclare prête à accorder à ce représentant toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission. Le représentant sera choisi d'accord entre le conseil et le Gouvernement turc."

It was proposed to insert this paragraph as an additional paragraph (No. 3) of the article at the end of the clause which is taken from all the European minority treaties and provides for the general League guarantee for the clauses as a whole and their infraction, &c. M. Laroche informed us that he supported this merely to mark Allied solidarity, but that he himself thought the proposal useless and superfluous, mainly because the immediately preceding paragraph in the article in which our proposal is to be introduced provides that any member of the Council of the League has the right to bring infractions, or danger of infractions, of those clauses to the attention of the council, and the council can then proceed "in such manner and give such instructions as may appear to it appropriate and effective in the circumstances." M. Laroche thinks that the latter phrase covers the despatch of a League representative. The Italian delegation take more or less the same view, and merely support us on grounds of Allied solidarity.

Our view is that M. Laroche is not quite right in regarding our proposal as superfluous and covered by the previous paragraph about League action in case of infraction or danger of infraction. Our article would enable the League to send a representative to Constantinople at any time, even when there was no danger of infraction of the minority clauses. Secondly, our article is so drawn up as to leave it indefinite whether the appointment of the League representative is to be permanent or temporary.

On the other hand, the head of the Minority Section of the League has informed me from Geneva that he thinks the League can secure this representative later by negotiation with Turkey when she comes into the League, and that the secretariat themselves do not attach importance to our securing the principle in the treaty itself. There is also the real difficulty that the proposal is not in any of the European minority

treaties, is violently opposed by all the European States with minority treaties and was specifically rejected as a general principle at the recent Assembly.

We shall be glad of the Secretary of State's decision as to whether, in these circumstances, we should continue to reserve our proposal for a final decision in the main commission or drop it now, as the French and Italians wish.

II.—*Exemption of Christians from Compulsory Military Service in Return for Payment of an Equitable Tax.*

The Allied proposal ran as follows :—

"La Turquie s'engage à insérer dans sa législation une disposition permettant aux ressortissants turcs non musulmans d'être exemptés du service militaire moyennant le paiement d'une taxe.

"Cette taxe d'exonération devra être modérée et sera la même pour les musulmans comme pour les non-musulmans, au cas où la Turquie accorderait la même exemption à tous ses ressortissants."

The Turks have opposed a consistent negative to this clause. We have used the exemption of the Irish from conscription in the United Kingdom during the war, the case of the conscientious objectors, special Moslem battalions formed by France during the war, the past history of this question in Greece and Turkey, &c., but the Turks remain obdurate. At one moment they say that they cannot trust the Christians. When it is then pointed out that they should therefore be prepared either to exempt them or to put them into auxiliary service behind the lines, they change their argument and say that in the future, if the Christians are dispersed among the Moslem soldiers, they will get on splendidly together. In the last resort they fall back on the stock argument of interference with Turkish sovereignty and independence.

Finally, the Allies proposed to alter the first two lines of the article to read as follows :—

"La Turquie est prête à considérer avec le Conseil de la Société des Nations la possibilité de permettre aux ressortissants turcs. . . ."

The Turks flatly refuse to accept this, and the article is reserved. We should like instructions as to whether we should continue to reserve this for a meeting of the main commission.

III.—*The Restriction of the Application of the whole Minority Section to Non-Mussulmans.*

The Turks maintain that all the Moslems of Turkey should be regarded for the purposes of minority protection as Turks, and that the actual minorities to be protected should only be religious minorities. This attitude is, of course, quite illogical, as the basis of the other European minority treaties is the application to all minorities of race, language and religion. The Turkish attitude would lump in together Arabs, Kurds, Circassians and Turks.

In practice, however, and except for the possible indirect effect which Allied acceptance of the Turkish claim might have on our arguments as regards the Kurds in the Mosul Vilayet, the Allied delegations did not consider it important to insist upon a refusal of the Turkish claim.

As a compromise, therefore, the Allies have agreed to accept the restriction to non-Mussulmans in all articles except article 2, which is the only one which takes a general principle.

The final draft of this article as proposed by the Allies runs as follows :—

"ARTICLE 2.

"Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder à tous les habitants de la Turquie pleine et entière protection de leur vie et de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langue, de race ou de religion.

"Les minorités jouiront pleinement de la liberté de circulation et d'émigration sous réserve des mesures s'appliquant, sur la totalité ou sur une partie du territoire, à tous les ressortissants turcs et qui seraient prises par le Gouvernement turc pour la défense nationale ou pour le maintien de l'ordre public.

"Les minorités auront droit au libre exercice, tant public que privé, de toute foi, religion ou croyance dont la pratique ne sera pas incompatible avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs."

The Turks appear willing to accept the first paragraph of this article, but they wish the word "non musulmanes" added after the words "les minorités" at the beginning of the second and third paragraphs.

The second paragraph relating to liberty of interior movement and emigration does not appear in the corresponding article 2 of the European minority treaties. It is therefore a little difficult to press for the omission of the word "non musulmanes" in this paragraph of article 2, and the Allied delegations are inclined to drop their claim for its omission.

Paragraph 3, however, like the first paragraph of the article, exactly corresponds to article 2 of the European minority treaties, and as it is a statement of general principles it should be universal and the word "non musulmanes" omitted.

This will come up again for discussion at the next meeting on the afternoon of the 26th December, and the British delegation will be glad of the Secretary of State's instructions on this point.

IV.—*The Reciprocal Treatment of Moslem Minorities in Neighbouring Countries.*

Article 5 of the National Pact reads as follows: -

"The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Allied Powers and their enemies and some of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us, in reliance on the belief that the Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights."

Basing themselves on this article, the Turkish delegation proposed the following article to be added to the minority clauses :—

"Les droits reconnus par les stipulations de la présente section aux minorités non musulmanes de la Turquie sont également reconnus par les États balkaniques et les États voisins de la Turquie aux minorités musulmanes vivant sur tout le territoire de ce pays."

The Allies absolutely refuse to accept this, and have pointed out (M. Spalaikovitch with great vehemence) that corresponding rights for the Moslem, and, indeed, for all religious and racial minorities in the neighbouring States were already guaranteed by the treaties between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, &c., and between the League and Albania; that these treaties were already placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations; that they could not be reopened, and that in none of them was there any clause similar to that now proposed by the Turks, which demanded reciprocity for minorities outside the States in question. The Allies also pointed out that the 5th article of the National Pact, even if it were taken into consideration, merely expressed a pious belief, and laid down no absolute demand for reciprocity.

The Allies proposed, however, with the consent of the Greek delegation, the following clause :—

"Les droits reconnus par les stipulations de la présente section aux minorités non musulmanes de la Turquie sont également reconnus par la Grèce à la minorité musulmane vivant sur tout son territoire."

The Turks have not yet formally accepted this draft, but on juridical grounds alone, quite apart from political grounds, no concession is here possible, and, if necessary, the dispute will pass to the main commission.

V.—*Religious, Charitable and Educational Autonomy of the Minority Communities in Turkey.*

The Allies originally proposed the following article :—

"Le Gouvernement turc convient de reconnaître et de maintenir, sous le contrôle de l'État turc, l'autonomie religieuse, charitable et scolaire à toute minorité ethnique de religion ou de langue en Turquie telle qu'elle existait avant le 1er août 1914.

"Le Gouvernement turc maintiendra de même, à l'égard de ces minorités, toutes dispositions nécessaires pour régler, conformément aux usages de celles-ci, les questions de famille et de statut personnel.

"Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder protection aux églises, synagogues, cimetières et autres établissements religieux des minorités précitées. Pleine reconnaissance et toutes facilités seront assurées aux fondations pieuses et aux établissements religieux et charitables des mêmes minorités actuellement existants en Turquie, et le Gouvernement turc ne refusera pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux et charitables aucune des facilités nécessaires aux autres établissements privés de ce genre."

The Turks absolutely refuse to accept the first paragraph relating to the re-establishment of the rights existing before the 1st August, 1914, and, in order to obtain the second two paragraphs, the Allies agreed to drop this first paragraph.

The Turks even opposed the wording of the second paragraph, because they said it did not enable the Turks properly to ensure the registration of all marriages in Turkey under Turkish law, including those between Christian (or Jewish) Turkish subjects. Basing themselves on the wording of article 10 of the Jugoslav Minority Treaty, the Allies then proposed the following article :—

"Le Gouvernement turc agrée de prendre à l'égard des minorités non musulmanes, en ce qui concerne leur statut familial ou personnel, toutes dispositions permettant de régler ces questions selon les usages de ces minorités et conformément aux mesures qui existaient à cet égard le 1er août 1914. Ces dernières mesures demeureront, à titre transitoire, en vigueur jusqu'à l'adoption des dispositions législatives nécessaires à l'exécution du présent article.

"Les minorités non musulmanes devront, d'autre part, se conformer aux prescriptions de la loi concernant les formalités d'état civil étant entendu que ces formalités ne devront avoir aucun caractère religieux.

"Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder toute protection aux églises, synagogues, cimetières et autres établissements religieux des minorités précitées. Toutes facilités et autorisations seront données aux fondations pieuses et aux établissements religieux et charitables des mêmes minorités actuellement existants en Turquie, et le Gouvernement turc ne refusera, pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux et charitables, aucune des facilités nécessaires qui sont garanties aux autres établissements privés de cette nature."

The Turkish delegates, while not formally accepting this draft, have agreed that it should go to the Drafting Committee of the conference.

VI.—*Amnesty.*

The Allies finally proposed that the following declaration should be signed and annexed to the treaty : —

"Les Puissances signataires conviennent des dispositions suivantes :

"1. Aucun des habitants de la Turquie ne pourra être inquiété ou molesté sous aucun prétexte en raison de sa conduite militaire ou politique ou d'une assistance quelconque donnée aux Puissances autres que la Turquie, signataires de ce traité ou à leurs ressortissants postérieurement au 1er août 1914 jusqu'au 20 novembre 1922; tout jugement prononcé, de ce chef, à l'encontre d'un habitant de la Turquie sera intégralement annulé et toute poursuite en cours sera arrêtée.

"La Grèce s'engage à prendre de son côté des dispositions identiques à l'égard des habitants de la Grèce par rapport à la Turquie.

"2. Amnistie pleine et entière sera accordée par le Gouvernement turc, comme par le Gouvernement grec pour tous crimes et délits, même de droit commun, mais se rapportant à des événements politiques, commis dans la période prévue au paragraphe ci-dessus.

"3. Aucun des habitants des territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent traité ne pourra être inquiété ou molesté en raison de son attitude politique contraire à la Turquie ou, réciproquement, favorable à la Turquie, depuis le 1er août 1914 jusqu'au 20 novembre 1922, ou en raison du règlement de sa nationalité en vertu du présent traité."

The Turks, while maintaining a wish that Mussulman subjects of Turkey (*i.e.*, Circassians, Arabs, &c.) should be excluded from the amnesty, agreed to refer this article to the Drafting Committee of the conference, *i.e.*, to the French, British, Italian, Greek and Turkish jurists. They also agreed that the jurists in company with the military experts should add something to the declaration to make it specifically cover prisoners of war. The matter stands there for the moment.

VII.—*Validation of Action of Allied Powers in Turkey since the Armistice in restoring Women and Children, &c., to their Families and Communities, and giving back Property to those Arbitrarily Dispossessed during the War.*

The original article proposed by the Allies provided not only for this, but also for the continuation of this work in the future. In the course of the discussion, the Allies have been forced to drop the latter, and, indeed, it is generally agreed that it would be hopeless to expect in practice that this work should be continued.

The Turks have throughout maintained a flat refusal to validate previous action, saying that their courts should be allowed to consider any appeals against the decisions of the Allies, in fact, to reopen most of the work that has been done.

Finally, the Allies presented to them the following two alternative drafts:—

"Reconnaissant l'inopportunité qu'il y aurait à revenir sur des questions résultant des déplacements de certains éléments parmi la population de la Turquie entre le 1er août 1914 et le 30 octobre 1918, le Gouvernement turc déclare son intention de ne contester la validité d'aucun acte ni décision faits ou pris entre le 30 octobre 1918 et le 20 novembre 1922, dans le but de rendre à leurs familles ou à leurs communautés des personnes ayant appartenu aux éléments en question ou de remettre des personnes appartenant à ces éléments dans la possession de leurs biens."

Or:—

"Désirant l'oubli complet des événements en Turquie depuis les premiers jours de la grande guerre jusqu'à l'ouverture de la Conférence de la Paix à Lausanne, aussi que le commencement d'une ère nouvelle pour la Turquie, le Gouvernement turc se déclare prêt à se rendre aux vœux exprimés par les autres membres de la conférence et de ne pas revenir sur les décisions prises par les autorités alliées d'accord avec le Gouvernement turc depuis le 30 octobre 1918, pour rétablir les foyers dissous comme suite des circonstances de la guerre et pour restituer des biens."

It was suggested that whichever of these was accepted by the Turks should be added as the final paragraph of the declaration regarding amnesty dealt with above. The Turks have agreed to allow these to be considered by the Drafting Committee.

[E 14533/13003/44] No. 849.

Papers forwarded by the Peace Delegation at Lausanne (No. 63) for the Information of the Foreign Office.—(Received December 29.)

(1.)

Ismet Pasha to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

M. le Président, *Lausanne, le 25 décembre* 1922.

DANS l'ordre du jour des séances des sous-commissions qui doivent se tenir demain, mardi, 26 décembre, j'ai lu avec un profond étonnement que des délégations arménienne et bulgare allaient être entendues à la Sous-Commission des Minorités.

Soit verbalement, soit par écrit, j'ai eu l'honneur d'informer et de prévenir à plusieurs reprises la présidence que la délégation turque ne pouvait accepter la participation à la conférence d'aucun État ni d'aucune association en dehors des Puissances invitantes et de celles qui furent officiellement invitées d'un commun accord avec la Turquie.

L'audition de la délégation gouvernementale bulgare n'avait eu lieu qu'à la suite de notre acquiescement à la voir participer aux négociations relatives au débouché à Dédéagatch. Or, il n'a jamais été question des délégations arménienne et bulgare à propos des questions de minorités et il n'est intervenu à ce sujet aucune décision que je sache. Il est difficile de comprendre comment on a pu accepter d'entendre la délégation dite arménienne. Si cette délégation est invitée comme représentant le Gouvernement arménien, il est utile de rappeler que la Turquie n'a aucune question pendante avec cet État, et, comme aucune délégation n'a été envoyée par ledit Gouvernement, celle qui a été invitée par la conférence ne saurait avoir aucun mandat.

Si la même délégation a été invitée pour parler au nom des Arméniens de Turquie, je considérerais cette initiative comme une intervention inadmissible dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie et serais dans l'obligation d'y opposer la protestation la plus énergique. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale accepte que les minorités vivant sous son administration jouissent des droits semblables à ceux des minorités soumises aux autres Gouvernements; en dehors de cela, il ne peut absolument consentir à aucun régime exceptionnel en faveur des minorités de Turquie.

Si la conférence tient à entendre et à examiner les vœux et les réclamations des minorités vivant dans tous les pays, la délégation turque serait disposée à envisager cette éventualité dans l'application intégrale de la mesure à tous les États représentés à la conférence.

Dans ce cas, la délégation turque propose l'audition des délégations des minorités de Yougoslavie, de Roumanie, de Bulgarie et de Grèce, ainsi que de toutes celles que les pays musulmans ont envoyées à Lausanne.

En attendant qu'une décision soit prise dans ce sens, d'un commun accord, la délégation turque déclare ne pouvoir assister et participer, dans n'importe quelle réunion, commission ou sous-commission, à l'audition des délégations représentant soi-disant des minorités de Turquie et considère ces initiatives et ces contacts, ainsi que les séances tenus sans la participation de la délégation turque, comme officiellement nuls et non avenus.

Veuillez, &c.
M. ISMET.

(2.)

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pacha.

Your Excellency, *Lausanne, December* 26, 1922.

I have received this morning your letter of yesterday regarding the hearing proposed to be given this afternoon by the Sub-Committee on Minorities to representatives of the Bulgarian Government and the Armenian community, and, in the absence of my colleagues M. Barrère and Marquis Garroni, I hasten to send you this reply.

The decision to hear these persons with regard to their minority claims was taken by the sub-committee on its own responsibility and in the exercise of its undoubted right.

The Turkish representatives on the sub-committee were so informed on Friday last, the 22nd December, and they signified their intention to abstain while the statements of the Bulgarian and Armenian representatives are being heard.

No objection was raised to this act of voluntary abstention on their part, and the question may therefore be regarded as having been settled.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 14576/53/44] No. 850.

Revised Memorandum by Mr. Ryan on the Position with regard to the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople.—(Received at Foreign Office, December 29.)

THIS paper is not concerned with the early history of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople or the process by which it achieved its importance in Eastern Christendom. It is enough to say that it held its important position securely at the time of the Turkish conquest. Mohammed the Conqueror treated the then Patriarch with great regard, and conferred on him and his community various privileges. It became a part of the Turkish political system for the heads of the Greek and other communities to exercise definite functions of a civil nature in regard to their communities.

This system has survived through many vicissitudes since the conquest of Constantinople. The position of the Greek Patriarchate before the Balkan wars may be defined as follows:—

(*a.*) It was the supreme ecclesiastical authority for the Orthodox Church in Turkey in Europe and a great part of Turkey in Asia.

(*b*.) It was the repository of the civil privileges enjoyed by the Orthodox community and the defender of these privileges *vis-à-vis* the Turkish Government.

(*c*.) The Patriarch of Constantinople was recognised as *primus inter pares* among the other Orthodox Patriarchs.

As regards to (*a*), the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchs was not co-extensive with the Turkish Empire because the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem also functioned in Turkish territory, as did the Patriarch of Alexandria in territory still theoretically forming part of the Empire.

As regards (*b*), the main privileges enjoyed by the Orthodox community were those of regulating their own questions of personal status and of conducting with a considerable measure of independence the organised life of the community, as, for instance, by having their own system of schools and other institutions organised under the authority of the Patriarchate. Other communities enjoyed similar privileges, but those of the Orthodox Christians were rather more extensive, and by force of numbers and wealth it was the most powerful of the native non-Msolem communities. Although the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarch was limited, he was naturally, owing to his primacy and his residence at the capital, the principal defender of the privileges of the Greeks of the whole Empire.

As regards (*c*), the Orthodox ecclesiastical system consists of a multiplicity of independent churches all in communion with each other. For the most part, these are national churches; the modern Orthodox conception being that the inhabitants of a newly-created State, the bulk of whom are of Orthodox faith, are entitled to an independent ecclesiastical organisation of their own. It results from this that the Patriarchate of Constantinople has no actual jurisdiction outside his own patriarchal province, but his primacy is recognised by the other churches. This primacy amounts to little more than an honorific position. So far as I know, the most definite expression which is given to it at present is that certain other Patriarchs and heads of autocephalous churches receive the holy chrism from the Patriarch of Constantinople, but the principal churches are not merely in communion, but in communication, with each other.

The territorial changes resulting from the Balkan wars affected the territorial extent of the Constantinople Patriarch's jurisdiction. Great areas in Europe having been transferred from Turkey to the Balkan countries, it was natural, in accordance with the conception mentioned above, that the Orthodox dioceses in these areas should be detached from the Patriarchal jurisdiction and included in the churches of the countries to which the territory passed. The actual transfer in such cases is a complicated business, for reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter. All that need be said for the present purpose is that a great part of New Greece is still under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, as the necessary arrangements for their transfer to the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Church of Greece, the head of which is the Archbishop of Athens, have never been completed.

After the armistice of 1918 there was a considerable commotion in the Greek Church in Constantinople. The then Patriarch Germanos was accused of having truckled to the Young Turks. He was driven from office, and Mgr. Dorotheos was installed as acting Patriarch. He held this office until his death in London in 1921, and after that event the acting arrangements were maintained under another prelate for some months. This omission to elect a new Patriarch was due to the unwillingness of the Greeks themselves to take a definite decision, an attitude which was eventually changed by the defeat of M. Veniselos in the Greek elections of November 1901.

From November 1918 onward there is no doubt that the Patriarchate assumed an attitude which, however justified by the circumstances of the time and of the hopes which the Greek minorities had been encouraged to entertain for the future, was wholly incompatible with the pre-war conception of its position *vis-à-vis* the Turkish State. Not very long after the armistice the Patriarchate definitely broke off relations with the Government. From that time on it entirely disregarded the authority of the Government, and when early last year the Patriarchal authorities decided at last to proceed to the election of a new Patriarch, the election was held with an absolute disregard for the rules laid down in the Turkish law on the subject. This law was drawn up in the last century, and amounted to a sort of concordat.

Apart from its disregard of the Turkish Government for official purposes, the Partriarchate became to a much greater degree than ever before a hot-bed of political activity. From a Hellenic point of view, it was a stronghold of Veniselism. The

election of the present Patriarch represented the triumph in Constantinople of Veniselism over Constantinism. Whatever its attitude towards succession Greek Government, however, the Patriarchate stood all along for Hellenic irredentism. Both under Mgr. Dorotheos and, still more, under Mgr. Meletios, it was guilty of great indiscretions, such as telegraphing blessings, congratulations, &c., to the Greek generals in Asia Minor in a public manner, to give only one example.

The present question of the removal of the Patriarchate from Constantinople is an outcome of this immediate past. It arises as follows: In the Exchange of Populations Sub-Commission the Turks at first insisted strongly that the Greek population of Constantinople should be included in the proposed compulsory exchange. The Allies, supported by the Americans, unanimously opposed this. The Turks eventually agreed to exclude the Greek population of Constantinople from the exchange, but attached to this concession certain conditions. It was possible in the sub-commission to bring about an agreement on all of these conditions except one, namely, the removal of the Patriarchate. The Turks insisted that any agreement on the subjects referred to the sub-commission must comprise a clause definitely providing for the removal of the Patriarchate. The Greeks declared that they could not subscribe to such a clause. They not only objected to the removal of the Patriarchate in itself, but they argued that, even if they wished to sign such a clause, the Greek Government had no authority to dispose of the future of the Patriarchate. The sub-commission has reached a deadlock on this question. The chairman, M. Montagna, is very anxious to find a way out. He appears to regard the attitude of the Greek delegates as unreasonable, and to think that the removal of the Patriarchate would not be too high a price to pay for the conclusion of an agreement in other respects satisfactory to both sides. He further argues that, if the Greeks persist in their refusal, the Turks will expel the whole Greek population and the Patriarchate as well, and that in the end the Greeks will be worse off than if they accept the Turkish conditions. There is some force in this argument, but it is very clear from M. Montagna's attitude that he has strong reasons for backing the Turks in their effort to get rid of the Patriarchate. I suspect him of having already committed himself pretty completely to them in private conversations, and I believe he regards it as a matter of interest to Italian policy as such that the Patriarchate should leave Constantinople.

The motives underlying the Turkish demand for the removal of the Patriarchate appear to me to be threefold. Firstly, there is a mixture of sheer vindictiveness and real fear that the Patriarchate as at present constituted organically, even with a change of personal elements, must be a source of political danger. Secondly, they think it will be much easier to do away with the civil and political privileges of the minorities which they are determined to do, except as regards some matters of personal status like marriage and divorce, if they get rid of the institution, which up to 1914 was the principal bulwark of those privileges. Last, and to my mind not least, the Turks wish to strike a spectacular blow at Hellenism in particular, and to the Christian West in general, by showing that not only has Europe failed to evict the Caliphate from Constantinople, but has had to acquiesce in the removal therefrom of the principal Christian institution surviving from the old Byzantine Empire.

It has been suggested that what the Turks are really at is to rid themselves of Mgr. Meletios. I have not seen any indication that it is for them a question of persons. If it were, the matter would be easy of adjustment, because if one thing is more certain than another it is that Meletios must go. He has very fine qualities, but he is too much identified with Hellenic politics, and was elected too irregularly from the Turkish point of view to make it possible for him to remain in Constantinople. If he remained after the departure of the Allied forces he would be either hanged or assassinated.

The Turks want to do more than get rid of Meletios. They want to get rid of the institution, root and branch. They say that they are making no onslaught on religious liberty, and that they are perfectly willing that the Greeks of Constantinople should set up any ecclesiastical organ that pleases them to serve their spiritual needs. They even go further, and talk of non-interference with schools and other institutions of the community. In this they are somewhat insincere as what they really want is that all schools, Greek or other, should depend not on a community organisation, but should be under their own public instruction authorities.

I have been asked whether there is any British interest in this business. There

is no direct British interest, except in so far as certain circles in England are concerned for the fate both of the Patriarch and the Patriarchate. The Archbishop of Canterbury has forwarded a statement drawn up by his experts in Eastern Church matters, urging strongly the necessity that the Patriarch's throne should be in Constantinople, and that he and his synod should enjoy perfect freedom, &c. Most of the detailed suggestions in the Archbishop's paper are wholly unpractical, but it does serve to show the view taken by certain sections of the Church of England. The most practical suggestion in the paper is that the Patriarchate might be transferred provisionally to Mount Athos, and the functions in Turkish territory might be delegated to vicars metropolitan. This would be a solution of the ecclesiastical difficulty, but I think it would be useless to suggest it to the Turks, as the Greek Church in Turkey would, in that case, depend on an authority established in alien territory.

The more general British interest in the matter is this :—

1. We are not responsible for the keenest political activities of the Patriarchate since the armistice; indeed, we have sought to restrain them. But, owing to the hopes we held out to minorities and the attitude observed by British authorities towards the Patriarchate, both in Constantinople and London (where Mgr. Dorotheos spent some time *en mission*, and where Mgr. Meletios was received by the late Prime Minister), we have incurred some responsibility for the Patriarchate's identification in the eyes of the Turks with irredentism.
2. It is not to our interest in our Moslem dependencies that the Turks should add to their successes the spectacular *coup* against the Christian West, of which I have spoken above.

What has now to be decided is whether we are to take an active part in bringing the Turks and Greeks together, which in practice means, I fear, urging the Greeks to consent to the Turkish demand in one form or another, or whether we are to remain passive, even at the cost of letting the exchange of populations proposal break down. My own view is that having stated our strong opinion that the Turks are making an unjustifiable demand, and that their proper course would be to keep the Patriarchate, subject to its composition being reorganised in accordance with the pre-war law (this I urged in the sub-commission a few days ago), we should remain as passive as we can, even if it means no exchange of populations. If Lord Curzon prefers to take an active part, the following alternatives (each of which may have variants) present themselves for consideration :—

(i.) To attempt to promote an arrangement by which the Patriarchate would leave Turkey and function through a vicar in Constantinople. This is more or less what the Archbishop of Canterbury suggests as a *pis aller*, but I do not think the Turks would look at it.

(ii.) To urge the Turks to let the Patriarchate stay in Constantinople on condition that the Greeks accept a clause in the Exchange Agreement recognising that the Patriarchate is an institution solely concerned with the Greeks of Turkey, that it and its subjects must remain Turkish subjects, and that no communication must pass between the Patriarchate and the Greek Government as such, except for temporary purposes connected with the detachment from the Patriarchal jurisdiction of dioceses no longer in Turkish territory, which detachment shall be arranged as quickly as possible. This is a solution I should like best, but I doubt whether it would satisfy the Turks, and the question of dioceses in Western Thrace would give rise to an awkward question under such formula.

(iii.) To urge the Greeks to accept a clause recording the fact that the Turkish Government intended to expel the Patriarchate from Turkish territory, and promising to accommodate it in Greek territory, and agreeing, so far as Greece is concerned, to the creation of a new autocephalous ecclesiastical system for the Greeks in Turkey. Some such formula as this would meet the Greek objection that they are not competent to sign away the rights of the Patriarchate, and it would give the Turks the substance of what they want. It would, however, please neither the Greeks nor the interested circles in England.

ANDREW RYAN.

Lausanne, December 26, 1922.

No. 851.

Mr. Bentinck to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 762.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December* 28, 1922.

MY telegrams Nos. 755 and 760.

With departure of General Pangalos for Thrace I think possibility of an attempt on Constantinople should not be lost sight of. Present régime feel the need of doing something to consolidate their position. Prime Minister and Minister of War have declared emphatically that Greece will never yield on question of Patriarchate. Press states that Colonel Plastiras is proceeding to Thrace to-morrow viâ Thessaly.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 444, and Lausanne, No. 44.)

No. 852.

Mr. Henderson (No. 108) *to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December* 29.)

(No. 791.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 28, 1922.

MY despatch No. 1129.

Smyrna reports that British church has been desecrated within the last ten days. Memorial tablets were torn down, altar flooring destroyed, &c.

In later telegram consul-general reports that Governor has taken energetic steps for punishment of culprits and repair of damage. Governor stated that he would punish the guilty, even if they were regular soldiers, adding that he could not tolerate violation of holy places, even if present situation were to end in war.

I am also addressing note to Adnan Bey.

No. 853.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 793.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 28, 1922.

MY telegram No. 100 to Lausanne.

French High Commissioner informed me to-day that his news from Angora through Colonel Mongin was very disquieting and that extremists seemed to have got the upper hand there.

Reouf Bey also appears to have made most truculent speech in the Assembly, concluding with statement that Turkey could only attain her legitimate aspirations by resort to her army.

Acting consul-general at Smyrna reports concentration of troops on Balikessar line northwards. He is informed that 6th division is under orders to march at a moment's notice and registration of men of military age in the district is being carried out. He also reports rumour that some troops are complaining that their demobilisation orders have been cancelled and that they are being sent to Mosul.

All information here, in fact, shows serious military measures to be in preparation. There is in my opinion considerable element of bluff in them, but not to the extent of excluding possibility of resumption of hostilities. I am still convinced that leaders sincerely desire peace. Their principal means of pressure is Turkish army, and they may be only using it for what it can get for them at critical stage of negotiations. But there is risk lest once movement gets started leaders may no longer be able to control it. This is particularly dangerous owing to numerous points of contact and delicate situation in Constantinople, with its internal Nationalist organisation.

On the other hand, my information is that *moral* of troops has greatly deteriorated since defeat of Greeks and that there has been much desertion.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 110.)

No. 854.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 794.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 28, 1922.*

REPRESENTATIVE of Grand National Assembly has communicated three notes to Allied High Commissioners:—

(*a.*) Complaining that certain foreign merchant-vessels enter port of Smyrna without flying their flag, and asking that they be instructed to do so;
(*b.*) Enclosing for information text of regulations for foreign men-of-war entering Turkish ports in general; and
(*c.*) Informing of special regulations for port of Smyrna in its capacity of fortified place.

Regulations in (*b*) are those communicated by Hamid on 5th November (please see Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 989) when reply was sent to the effect that, in view of Mudros armistice, Allies could not conform to them.

Regulations in (*c*) lay down (1) no men-of-war except smallest kind can stop ("stationner") in port; (2) no two men-of-war can be in port at the same time; (3) full details of each man-of-war entering or leaving must be communicated twenty-four hours in advance to commandant; (4) no man-of-war can enter port before receipt of confirmatory signal from Kensten Island; (5) landing parties must be notified to commandant in advance.

My colleagues and I agreed in principle to return similar answer as before, but are communicating note to Allied admirals for observations in the first instance.

(Sent to Lord Curzon, No. 111.)

No. 855.

Colonel Humphrys to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) *Kabul, December 20, 1922.*

THE Nama Abdul Majid is being read in the khutba in all mosques in Afghanistan, by order. So far, separation of temporal from spiritual power has excited no criticism as a whole.

[E 14600/13003/44] No. 856.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, December 8, 1922, at 10·30 A.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.

(Third Meeting of the Straits Commission.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir Horace Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Montagna.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	**JAPAN.**	**GREECE.**
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Venizelos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Caclamanos.
Admiral Bristol.		

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Spalaikovitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Itakitch	Riza Nour Bey.
		Hassan Bey.

BULGARIA.	RUSSIA.
M. Stamboliisky.	M. Chicherin.
M. Stancioff.	M. Rakovski.
	M. Mdivani.
	M. Vorovski.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Lindley.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Arlotta.
Admiral Sir R. Keyes.	General Weygand.	M. Guariglia.
Maj.-Gen. Burnett-Stuart.	M. Fromageot.	Admiral Chelotti.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. de Lacroix.	M. Vitale.
Mr. Malkin.	M. Bargeton.	M. Nogara.
Mr. Nicolson.	M. de Percin.	M. Ciamarra.
Mr. Forbes Adam.	M. Barois.	M. Salem.
Mr. Leeper.		
Major McLeod.		
Mr. McClure.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Nagaôka.	General Mazarakis.
Mr. Dwight.	Mr. Sato.	M. Dendramis.
Mr. Heck.	Colonel Saigo.	M. Politis.
	Commandant Tanu	M. Michalopoulos.
	Mr. Tani.	

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
Colonel Dumitresco.	M. Antitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Hitch.	Moukhtar Bey.
		Tevfik Bey.

BULGARIA.	RUSSIA.
Mgr. Stephen.	M. Berens.
	M. Chapochnikof.

Secretariat-General.

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Indelli.
Mr. Wicks.		

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.

ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.

BULGARIA.	RUSSIA.
Mlle. Stancioff.	M. Sabanine
	M. Pastonkhof.
	M. Ahrens.
	Mme. Zarotzkaia.

Interpreter: Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood.

LORD CURZON said that at the last meeting most of the delegations had given their views on the subject of the Straits, and the Turkish and Russian delegations had very naturally asked to postpone their full replies until they had had time to examine in detail the documents containing the proposals of the Allied Powers. Since then the Allied military and naval experts had met the corresponding experts of other delegations in order to give them full explanations regarding the technical details of those proposals; should any further explanations now be wanted, Admiral Lacaze would be ready to give them. He would begin by asking the Turkish delegation to speak.

ISMET PASHA read the following statement:—

"The Turkish delegation have listened attentively to the speeches made by the various delegations, and to the explanations of his Excellency Lord Curzon. They have also examined the scheme for the regulation of the Straits put forward in the name of the Allied Powers.

"As a result of this examination, the Turkish delegation have the honour to make the following remarks:—

"For five centuries the Turks have been masters of the Straits, which they have fortified and defended with all the forces at their disposal.

"The fact that the Turks have been guardians of the Straits has exercised a varying influence on the relations of the Black Sea and Mediterranean Powers when at war with each other.

"Thus, for instance, these varying influences led in 1833 to the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which recognised certain rights to the advantage of Russia; this state of things did not bring about a war.

"Later, in 1856, Turkey was engaged together with her allies in fighting against Tsarist Russia, and accordingly allowed her allies' warships to pass through the Straits. Again, quite recently, in 1914, Turkey was placed between Russia and Russia's western allies, and closed and defended the Straits against both parties at once.

"It must be recognised that in all these instances the Turks did nothing contrary to the provisions of the international treaties concerning the régime of the Straits, and never confronted either their friends or their enemies with a situation which had not been foreseen by those treaties.

"It follows that if any complaints can be made in regard to the way in which the Straits were utilised or defended, these complaints can only be directed against the international Acts relating to the Straits, and cannot in any way be connected with the fact that the Straits happened to be defended by the Turks.

"The permanent disarmament of the Straits would influence events just as much as putting the Straits in a state of defence; each party might gain or lose by enforced disarmament in different ways in various future wars, according to the affinities and divergences existing between the Powers at the time.

"Consequently, the influence which the Straits are to exercise on international relations must depend, not on the fact of their being put in a state of defence or not, but on the treaties which lay down the régime to be applied to warships in the Straits.

"Moreover, the defence of the Straits covers the defence of the capital of Turkey, of the Sea of Marmora and of Eastern Thrace.

"The non-fortification of the Straits therefore amounts to leaving the most vulnerable and important districts of Turkey defenceless and at the mercy of a sudden attack.

"None of the Powers represented at the conference is deprived of the right to defend its capital. Turkey, on the other hand, would be constantly exposed to the danger of her capital being suddenly destroyed by a foreign fleet or occupied by foreign troops. The existence of this possibility would obviously expose the capital to the risk of all manner of calamities.

"There is another point which I wish to raise in the interests of general peace. The strategical importance of the Straits is so great that any Mediterranean or Black Sea Power which conquered them would secure an overwhelming advantage as soon as a war broke out. It is therefore only natural that as soon as a possibility of war exists between a Black Sea and a Mediterranean State, each side should try to obtain possession of the Straits as quickly as possible. The first result of this attempt would be to provoke a sudden war over a dispute which might have been settled without recourse to arms. The second result would be to bring about the participation of Turkey in that war, even though she were in no way interested in the dispute, by the mere fact of her having been attacked.

"These considerations show that the state of things created by demilitarising the Straits would render peace illusory between the Black Sea and Mediterranean States on the one hand and Turkey on the other. It is therefore essential that the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and Constantinople should not be accessible through a surprise attack by land or sea. Moreover, our experience in the past shows that this security can only be attained by means of fortifications and defences.

"Once these districts are secured against surprise attack, any State which violated its international engagements would have no chance of gaining an immediate victory, and the Powers would be enabled to take such measures as the circumstances required.

"Turkey for her part would, of course, be bound to observe the line of conduct to which she had committed herself by agreement with the other Powers. It is hard to believe that a single State would dare to repudiate an engagement undertaken by it in face of the whole world.

"In any case, there is hardly any likelihood of such an event taking place. The Allied Powers' proposal recognises that Turkey could not defend herself by the means at her disposal, and so there is almost no reason to fear that Turkey might not fulfil her engagements. The Allied Powers can therefore regard such apprehensions as a completely negligible factor in the solution of the problem.

"The security of Turkish territory also requires that the warships which pass through the Straits should not be of such strength as to endanger the district lying between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

"Turkey entirely agrees with the Powers represented at the conference in recognising that merchant vessels should have complete liberty of navigation and of passage night and day.

"An international commission, similar to that for the Danube, could settle questions relating to the navigation of merchant vessels.

"In war time, whether Turkey be neutral or belligerent, the right for merchantmen to pass could be adapted to the general interests at stake.

"In view of these considerations, the Turkish delegation have the honour to set forth as follows the bases of the régime which they wish to see applied to the Straits:—

"1. A guarantee securing the Straits, Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora against any surprise attack by land or sea.

"2. Limitation of the naval forces which may enter the Black Sea, so that they shall not constitute a danger for the districts between the two Straits and in the Black Sea. These forces could consist of light craft employed for the protection of international commerce.

"3. Freedom of passage both in war and peace for merchantmen; in case Turkey is a belligerent, she will be satisfied with such technical control as is indispensable.

"While reserving the right to make observations on all the articles of the Allied Powers' proposals, the Turkish delegation declare that all the points enumerated below are particularly harmful to Turkey, even regarding the question from the point of view of the Allied Powers:—

"1. The term 'Straits' which is employed in the Allied proposal must not comprise the Sea of Marmora, since defensive preparations on the shores of that sea, though exercising no influence on the freedom of passage for ships, are necessary for the defence of Anatolia and Thrace.

"2. As the railway line constitutes an important means of connection between Anatolia and Thrace, and as Constantinople possesses a garrison, it is useless to have a demilitarised zone round the Bosphorus. It will be sufficient to indicate that there should be no land or sea fortifications on either shore.

"3. It is proposed to prohibit movements of troops in the demilitarised zones; but these movements must be allowed, because the zones in question connect the two parts of the country.

"4. With a view to defending the shores of the Sea of Marmora by means of a fleet, Turkey needs to maintain arsenals and other naval establishments at Constantinople and in the Straits.

"5. The area of the demilitarised zones is too extensive.

"6. As regards the four islands situated near the Straits, Turkish sovereignty must be recognised and affirmed over Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace, and Lemnos should be declared autonomous.

"7. A minimum means of defence should be permitted on the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to protect it against a surprise attack."

M. CHICHERIN wished to make a supplementary statement, which he had been unable to do at the preceding meeting, in reply to Lord Curzon's speech and the proposals put forward in the name of the Allies. He reserved the right to reply later on to the speech just made by Ismet Pasha:—

"Having examined with due care the speech made by the president of the British delegation, in the name of the inviting Powers, at the last meeting of the first commission, the delegation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia are more than ever determined to maintain the views expressed in their statement of the 4th December.

"The president of the British delegation meets our contention with arguments derived from international law, historic precedents, the needs of world commerce and the political interests of the Balkan States bordering on the Black Sea. We will examine these arguments one by one.

"International law and historical precedents in reality only strengthen our case. Lord Curzon described as a paradox the statement that freedom of commercial navigation in the Black Sea can only be assured if Turkey is able to employ all the methods of modern military technique for the defence of the Straits; but, to quote only a single example, we can point to the Panamá Canal, which, though one of the most important world routes, is in point of fact fortified, and also free from any international control. Another example is the Suez Canal, which ought, according to international law, to be under the control of an international commission, but that commission is never convoked now.

"Thus, when Russia and her allies claim that the right to fortify the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be unrestricted, they are only asking for the application of principles which two of the Great Powers represented here apply in their own territory. It is true that the Suez and Panamá Canals are open for the passage of warships, but the last world war has proved that States which own straits can enforce any régime they please without troubling themselves over such-and-such a rule of international law. Moreover, the closing of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to war fleets has been recognised by conventions and treaties, and has thus become a rule of international law. Again, the parallel drawn by Lord Curzon between the Bosphorus and Dardanelles régime and that of other straits is not justified, since the former are not, properly speaking, a passage between two open seas, but the entry and outlet of a sea which many authors, including a former French Minister, regard as a *mare clausum*.*

"The president of the British delegation proclaims his concern to find 'a permanent and satisfactory solution' for the Straits problem. For Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia this concern is even greater, since they are States bordering on the Black Sea. The solution proposed is not ideal, as it creates great disadvantages for Russia and her allies. Russia is ready to undertake of her own free will not to send her Black Sea fleet out into the Mediterranean and to deny herself free passage for that fleet to Petrograd and Vladivostok; these undertakings are a serious restriction and inconvenience for her. Nevertheless, Russia and her allies propose this solution because past experience has proved that it is the only one which satisfies all the interests concerned. If England does not wish to see the Russian fleet at Constantinople as in 1833, and if Russia does not wish to see the British fleet in the Straits as during the Crimean war, the Russian proposal provides this mutual guarantee.

* At this point M. Chicherin read the following passage from "La Guerre des Balkans," by Gabriel Hanotaux (p. 1910):—

"In relation the Black Sea is a blind alley. Its fate is a matter of much interest to nations except the countries bordering on it. As it is reduced by the evolution of an inland sea, its internal and exclusive régime must depend almost exclusively on the will of these countries. Russia, Turkey, Roumania and Bulgaria have to arrive among themselves regardless their common interests. The reconciliation of these interests cannot be delayed much longer. Just as the confederation of the Balkan peoples will—and this will decide the fate of the territories within the Balkan peninsula—so likewise a Black Sea confederation will probably be one of the solutions of the future, and will settle the Straits question in the same way as the tenants of a house settle their entanglements. Levits. I cannot understand why countries [illegible]

"The ideal solution would be to put a stop to all naval armaments on every sea. But in the present situation the only possible compromise between the conflicting interests is for Turkey, as sovereign, to close the Straits to warships.

"Another argument employed against us is that the interests of commerce are alleged to necessitate the presence of foreign fleets. This ancient theory appears very much out of place at the moment when America, simultaneously with an unexampled increase in the size of her commercial fleet, has taken the initiative in putting a stop to naval armaments. Commercial tonnage is on the increase everywhere concurrently with an effort to cut down war fleets. The Western Powers apparently mean to follow the same procedure as in colonial countries, by having their merchantmen convoyed to Russia by warships; but they are greatly mistaken if they think that Russia will acquiesce in this. The obstinate determination of these Powers to supplement commercial traffic on our shores by the maintenance of armed fleets can only imply the intention to substitute might for right. The development of commercial relations in the Black Sea is of vital interest for our people, which is ten times more numerous than the population of Roumania; it is one of the essential tasks which we set before us, whereas the inviting Powers appeal to alleged commercial interests with a view to creating conditions the real purpose of which is to prepare a new blockade of Russia.

"The inviting Powers also advance as an argument against our case the alleged interests of Bulgaria, whom they themselves have disarmed, and of Roumania, who never raised any objection to this régime during the period of the expansionist policy of Tsarism. While they wish to create a state of things which will perpetuate trouble and conflict in the Black Sea, they pretend that their desire is to ensure tranquillity for Roumania. If the Powers at the very moment when they are striking at the vital interests of Russia give as their pretext some alleged interests of Roumania, the latter country will lose much more than she will gain. It is a very poor service to Roumania to make a second Greece of her. Russia and her allies for their part are entirely free from any aggressive intention against Roumania. We are always ready to examine conjointly with Roumania all possible means of putting an end to any disagreement which may arise between us.

"The president of the British delegation was quite right in saying that the former rôles of Russia and of the Western Powers in the Straits question are to-day reversed. Why did our predecessors of the old régime such as Isvolsky and company seek to open the way out of the Straits for the Russian fleet? For purposes of expansion and aggression—to threaten the peace and security of other countries. The closing of the Straits to warships was a barrier which the Western Powers built up as a check on these ambitions. At present the rôles are reversed; it is the new Russia which, having renounced aggressive designs, now wishes to maintain a barrier against aggression from other quarters; and Great Britain, the very Power which formerly sought to protect her world power by means of this barrier, to-day wishes to profit by the momentary weakness of Russia and abolish the old barrier of the Straits, which is a check on her power.

"You do not consolidate peace by piling up armed forces; this was a reproach frequently levelled against Bismarck by the statesmen of the inviting Powers of to-day. Peace is consolidated by the separation of conflicting forces. The barrier which we wish to constitute is based on the principle of nationalities—the principle which, according to all the rulers of Great Britain (Liberal, Conservative and Coalitionist), and also according to many statesmen of the other *Entente* countries, was defended by those countries in the great war. The principle then proclaimed by them is simply abandoned when the heroic Turkish people is concerned. The system advocated in opposition to ours is wholly directed against this very principle as far as Russia and her allies are concerned.

"The system with which we are confronted can be defined thus: How can you best tie Russia's hands and organise war in the Straits? The maintenance of preponderating adverse forces in the Black Sea through this system is not a means of effecting reconciliation with Russia; it is an attempt to terrorise her, but she will not give in. As for the régime which it is proposed to institute in the Straits, it is the organisation, not of peace, but of war. The forces maintained by each Power in the Black Sea are not to exceed those of the strongest naval Power among the riparian States; the combined fleets of the inviting Powers will therefore be three times as strong as that of any one Black Sea Power. The Powers which in this room as in many others speak with one voice will thus have an overwhelming preponderance in the Black Sea. If the riparian Powers come to an agreement for the demilitarisation of their naval forces, every outside Power will nevertheless be able

to maintain three ships in the Black Sea, one ship only out of the three being above 10,000 tons. If two out of these three ships are of 10,000 tons each and the third is of 30,000 tons, each foreign Power will maintain 50,000 tons in the Black Sea as against the riparian Powers, who will be completely disarmed at sea. What a strange way of promoting naval disarmament! In war time, when Turkey is neutral, the Powers attacking Russia can bring their fleets into the Black Sea without any restriction. Turkey, being disarmed in the Straits, will necessarily become a toy in the hands of the Powers.

"The proposal for the demilitarisation of the Straits provides that in the event of war Turkey may modify this régime; but now can a disarmed zone be transferred at one stroke into a defended zone? Turkey is forbidden to make preparations with a view to defending the shores of the Straits. In the whole region surrounding the Straits and the Sea of Marmora no railway and no road can be constructed, for they might be used for the transport of engines of war. The Control Commission which is to supervise the disarmament will be able to interfere in all local affairs, for the interpretation of the disarmament clauses will be in the hands of that commission. The Turkish fleet, if it goes through the Straits, will not even be able to stop in its own country. On the other hand, if Turkey is at war she will be forced to grant complete freedom of passage to neutral warships, and this will cause indescribable confusion as regards the measures for her own defence. It is the end of Turkish independence. Russia cannot accept the régime proposed for the Black Sea; and she regards a free and sovereign Turkey (which is rendered impossible by the régime proposed for the Straits) as a necessary element for peace, just like neutral Switzerland in the heart of Europe, or Belgium.

"Since we have broken with the policy of our predecessors we are not searching any cover for the purpose of preparing attacks against others, as has been insinuated against us. Our Black Sea fleet is purely defensive. The Straits must be closed to us as well as to others. We wish to establish a stable order of things, a fragment of that world-wide stability in the creation of which we wish to co-operate. There will not be any stability without the co-operation of Russia. Russia and her allies must receive guarantees enabling them to develop freely and without hindrance. For this purpose the Straits must be closed to ships of war, and thus the rivalries which now exist will be kept asunder; as the foundation of this system the complete freedom and sovereignty of Turkey must be maintained."

M. DUCA felt bound to reply to the passage in M. Chicherin's speech which concerned Roumania. He noted with satisfaction that the Russian delegation wished to take steps with a view to eliminating the present causes of division between Russia and Roumania.

M. Chicherin had expressed the opinion that Roumania was content with the pre-war régime of the Straits and had never protested against it. This statement was not correct. As a matter of fact Roumania was not satisfied with that régime, but had been constrained to acquiesce in it. Her history as a nation was still short, but she had nevertheless had experience of grave times when she realised how heavily that régime weighed on her destinies. She therefore asked that a régime of freedom should be instituted in the Straits with a view to obviating the recurrence of such a situation. M. Chicherin had stated that in the opinion of the Russian delegation a barrier should be set up in order to keep rivals apart. For Roumania this barrier would be an encircling wall.

M. Duca wished to warn the Russian delegation in a most friendly spirit that Roumania had no desire to play the part of a mere instrument in the hands of other Powers. She demanded the freedom of the Straits not because she was urged to do so by other States, but solely because she considered that her interests required it. Besides, the traditional policy of Roumania—a policy which had secured for her some measure of success—was not to maintain a selfish cause, but to try to harmonise her own interests with great principles and international interests. Such was the attitude of Roumania in the question of the Danube; such was her attitude during the world war. So again in the matter of the Straits the purpose of the Roumanian Government, in demanding freedom of passage, was to bring her interests into line with a great principle and with great international interests.

M. VENIZELOS drew attention to the fact that M. Chicherin had made an insinuation concerning Greece which called for an explanation. M. Chicherin had said that Roumania might become another Greece. Such a statement, made before an international conference, was apparently designed to cast a slight on the prestige of Greece. He requested M. Chicherin to be so good as to explain himself on this point.

M. CHICHERIN said that he had merely wished to allude to the dependence of certain Governments on others, and to the consequences which such a situation might entail.

As regards M. Duca's speech, M. Chicherin took the opportunity of making the following statement:—

"If our system for the Straits is adopted, we are ready to discuss at a special conference with the States bordering on the Black Sea the conditions for the mutual security of their coasts."

M. VENIZELOS thought that M. Chicherin's explanation was somewhat nebulous. In these circumstances he considered it best not to press the point.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the Bulgarian delegation wished to speak.

M. STAMBOLIISKY replied that he had nothing to add to his previous statements

LORD CURZON said he had hoped to hear a more definite statement from the Bulgarian delegation. The situation had changed since the last meeting, when he had put forward on behalf of the Allied Powers a definite scheme for the regulation of the Straits. At the request of the Turkish and Russian delegations a delay of more than a day had been given for the preparation of detailed replies. The commission had just heard the Turkish and Russian answers. M. Duca had given his views in a speech of conspicuous clearness. It was vitally important for the Allies to know the opinion of all the States interested in the question. The inviting Powers had no desire to impose a solution; they wanted to arrive at a decision by common consent, and it was the common interest of every State to contribute to the discussion. He therefore hoped that M. Stamboliisky would reconsider the matter and give his views.

M. STAMBOLIISKY said that he accepted the proposals of the Allies in regard to the question of the Straits.

M. SPALAIKOVITCH said that the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had come to Lausanne for the purpose of negotiating and concluding peace with Turkey and wished to make sure that the interests of their country were safeguarded and harmonised with the interests of all. He accordingly had the honour to confirm the statement which he had made at the previous meeting in regard to the Straits question: the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation concurred in the views and principles set forth by the inviting Powers

M. VENIZELOS accepted the proposals of the inviting Powers on behalf of the Greek Government.

LORD CURZON said that Ismet Pasha had stated the views of the Turkish delegation with great clearness. He had laid down the bases which, in the opinion of Turkey, must underlie any scheme capable of affording a permanent solution of the Straits problem, and had named seven points in the Allied scheme on which he required further explanations. Some of these points could be answered at once, as Ismet Pasha's apprehensions were not justified and could easily be removed; but he (Lord Curzon) thought it would be more respectful to the Turkish delegation and to the conference if a full reply were postponed until he and his Allied colleagues had had time to examine Ismet Pasha's observations in detail—all the more so since M. Chicherin's speech showed that the Turkish statement was as great a surprise to the Russian delegation as to everyone else. He therefore suggested that the commission should adjourn, not as on the previous occasion for a day and a half, but until that afternoon.

M. BARRERE and MARQUIS GARRONI accepted this proposal.

(The commission rose at 11·20 A.M.)

[E 14604/13003/44] No. 857.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs.

(Strictly Confidential.)

TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION.

Draft Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting (Fourth Meeting of the Straits Commission), December 8, 1922, at 4 P.M., under the presidency of Lord Curzon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 30.)

Present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	M. Barrère.	Marquis Garroni.
Sir H. Rumbold.	M. Bompard.	M. Montagna.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Child.	Baron Hayashi.	M. Veniselos.
Mr. Grew.	Mr. Otchiai.	M. Cachamanos.
Admiral Bristol.		
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Duca.	M. Spalaikovitch.	Ismet Pasha.
M. Diamandy.	M. Rakitch.	Riza Nour Bey.
BULGARIA.		RUSSIA.
M. Stamboliisky.		M. Chicherin.
M. Stanciof.		M. Rakovsky.
		M. Mdivani.
		M. Vorovsky.

Also present:

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Sir W. Tyrrell.	Admiral Lacaze.	M. Arlotta.
Mr. Lindley.	General Weygand.	M. Guariglia.
Admiral Sir R. Keyes.	M. Fromageot.	Admiral Chelotti.
Maj.-Gen. Burnett Stuart.	M. de Lacroix.	M. Vitale.
Captain Pound, R.N.	M. Bargeton.	M. Nogara.
Mr. Malkin.	M. de Percin.	M. Ciamarra.
Mr. Nicolson.	M. Barois.	M. Salem.
Mr. Forbes Adam.		
Mr. Leeper.		
Major McLeod.		
Mr. McClure.		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Amory.	Mr. Nagaoka.	General Mazarakis.
Mr. Gillespie.	Mr. Sato.	M. Dendramis.
Mr. Dwight.	Colonel Saigo.	M. Politis.
Mr. Heck.	Commandant Tsuru.	M. Michalopoulos.
	Mr. Tani.	
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
Colonel Dumitrescu.	M. Antitch.	Munir Bey.
	M. Hitch.	Moukhtar Bey.
		Tevfik Bey.
BULGARIA.		RUSSIA.
Mgr. Stephan.		M. Berens.
		M. Chapochnikof.

Secretariat-General:

M. Massigli, *Secretary-General of the Conference.*

BRITISH EMPIRE.	FRANCE.	ITALY.
Mr. Spring-Rice.	M. Lagarde.	M. Indelli.
Mr. Wicks.		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.	JAPAN.	GREECE.
Mr. Belin.	Mr. Hotta.	M. Collas.
ROUMANIA.	SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE.	TURKEY.
M. Constantinesco.	M. Milanovitch.	Rechid Safvet Bey.
BULGARIA.		RUSSIA.
Mlle. Stanciof.		M. Sabanine.
		M. Pastoukhof.
		M. Ahrens.
		Mme. Zaretzkaia.

Interpreter: Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood.

LORD CURZON made the following statement:—

"This morning we listened to the views of the Turkish delegation, and I promised to give them this afternoon the reply of the Allied Governments.

"In the first place, we are glad to recognise that the Turkish delegation accepted in general the principle of demilitarised zones, provided that they can be assured of adequate protection for their territory and interests.

"Secondly, they accepted without qualification the principle of the free passage of ships of commerce in peace and war.

"Thirdly, they accepted the creation of an international commission for the regulation of the navigation of the Straits.

"The Turkish delegation then proceeded to lay down the bases of the régime they would like to see applied to the Straits.

"The first point was that which I have already mentioned, namely, the desire that they should be guaranteed against any surprise attack by land or sea on the Straits, the Marmora or Constantinople.

"Our reply to this is that, in so far as naval and military guarantees are concerned, the proposals of the Allies are believed by them to be adequate. But I indicated the other day—as I did when discussing the question of the demilitarised zones in Thrace—that the question whether further guarantees of a more political character are required is one well worthy of examination. It is a matter that has already been investigated by the Allied judicial experts, and I would suggest that they enter into consultation with the corresponding Turkish experts to see whether a basis of agreement can be found.

"The second Turkish point is their suggestion of a limitation of naval forces permitted to enter the Black Sea. Here we think that the principle laid down in the Allied proposals is sound; but we shall be quite ready to interpret that principle in a liberal way, and I feel sure that after friendly examination a formula can be found which will satisfy the apprehensions of the Turkish delegation.

"The third basis laid down by the Turkish delegation was 'liberty of passage both in peace and war for commercial ships: in case Turkey is at war, she will content herself with the necessary technical control.' There is no dispute about this, because the Turkish contention coincides with the Allied proposals.

"I now turn to the seven points in which the Turkish delegation thought that the Allied proposals might be injurious to the security or interests of Turkey.

"The first point was the Turkish proposal that the Sea of Marmora should be excluded from the expression 'the Straits,' because of the necessity of defending certain ports and railheads on the shores of the Marmora. It is clear, I think, that we cannot definitely exclude the Marmora, because it is a geographical continuation

of the Straits, and because freedom of passage is as necessary there as through the Straits themselves. That is the fundamental principle of our proposals, which is not contested by the Turkish delegation.

"On the other hand, it ought to be quite possible to arrange for the defence within certain limits—that would constitute no menace to the right of free passage—of the ports or railheads referred to, and this is a matter which our experts will be quite willing to discuss with the Turkish experts.

"The second point is that there need be no demilitarised zone at the Bosphorus, because across it lies the main line of connection from the two railheads on the Asiatic and European shores between Anatolia and Thrace. We think that the demilitarised zones should be retained; but it may be possible to make certain modifications in the case of Constantinople.

"The third point is an amplification of the last-named point, viz., that the passage of troops should be permitted from one demilitarised zone to another, *i.e.*, from one bank of the Straits to the other inside the zones. Our answer is that there will be no objection to the passage of Turkish troops from one side to the other provided they are in transit.

"The fourth point is the demand of Turkey to have arsenals and other maritime installations at Constantinople and elsewhere. This is a request that is well worthy of examination and on which it should not be difficult to arrive at an agreement. But I think it will be well to reserve it until we come to discuss the naval and military clauses of the new treaty, which is a part of the work of this commission, and to which I hope that we shall be able to turn in a few days' time.

"The fifth point is the complaint that the demilitarised zones are too large. The Allied military and naval experts are not clear as to what this means, but manifestly the precise geographical boundaries of the zones are a matter for legitimate discussion, and our experts will be glad to hear what the Turkish experts have to say on the matter.

"The sixth point is political. The conference will remember that we spent some time last week in discussing the demilitarisation and political future of the islands outside the Straits. We were disposed to agree that the four islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace and Lemnos should be demilitarised. But the Allies could not agree that the sovereignty of Lemnos or Samothrace could possibly be called in question, and therefore the Allies could not agree to accept an autonomous régime for Lemnos. As regards Imbros and Tenedos, we reserved the question till a later date, and I invited from the Turkish delegation on that occasion a fuller statement of the reasons which could justify them in asking that the exclusively Greek island of Imbros—of which I gave the figures of population—should be transferred to the sovereignty of Turkey.

"The seventh point is a request on the part of the Turks that they should be given 'un minimum de moyens de défense' for the peninsula of Gallipoli in order to save it from a surprise attack. Here, again, the Allied experts do not know exactly what the Turkish delegation desire, and the matter had better be discussed between them in a friendly spirit.

"There is a further point which has not so far been mentioned in our discussion, but upon which the Allied Powers will be compelled to insist. It is that we must ask for the vesting in Allied possession of the ground in several parts of Turkish territory where lie the graves of our brave soldiers and sailors who perished in the war. To us this is sacred soil, and I am convinced that there will be no objection on the part of the Turkish delegation, who have so frequently made an appeal to sentiment and to national feeling, to concede this very natural request."

BARON HAYASHI said that although he had not yet taken part in the present discussion it must not be assumed that Japan took no interest in the matter. In order to avoid that misunderstanding, the Japanese delegation wished to state that Japan had a great interest in the question of the Straits, being one of the great shipping and commercial Powers in the Mediterranean, and having the right to extend her commerce to the Black Sea. The Japanese delegation therefore fully agreed with the proposal made by Lord Curzon on the 6th December, and also entirely associated themselves with the words used by the United States delegate at the same meeting. He (Baron Hayashi) was one of many who had that morning listened with great delight to the statement of Ismet Pasha, who had approached the solution of this question in a conciliatory and sympathetic spirit. After hearing the very clear statement just made by Lord Curzon, he felt that the solution of the problem was coming nearer; and if the question were satisfactorily settled, Ismet Pasha would share with the other delegates the thanks of the world.

M. CHICHERIN said that the Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian delegation had that day become acquainted with the Turkish statement, and were in agreement with the general section of it which dealt with the disarmament of the Straits.

As regards the practical proposals of the Turkish delegation, the final view of the Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian delegation could not be stated until these proposals had been examined in detail by the sub-commission or the committee of experts, and they reserved the right to ask for explanations and definitions in that body. They also maintained their previous reservation as regards the necessity of the Straits being closed to warships by Turkey, the sovereign Power, or being fortified with a view to the preservation of peace in the Black Sea.

LORD CURZON understood M. Chicherin to ask for opportunity to obtain further explanations on certain points of detail, particularly as regards the Black Sea. He need hardly say that the Allied naval and military experts would be glad to give M. Chicherin any explanations which he desired on these points.

M. CHICHERIN replied that that was not quite correct. The Russian delegation could only decide whether to accept or reject the Turkish proposals after detailed examination of them in the form of definite clauses.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the Turkish delegation desired to say anything forthwith in reply to what he had said on behalf of the Allies, or would prefer to speak later. He had proposed a discussion among the experts on various points, and possibly Ismet Pasha might prefer to postpone his reply until that discussion was completed.

ISMET PASHA said he would first like to hear the views of the Allies on the military and naval clauses of the treaty, which were a vital matter for Turkey, and of a character which might involve the whole question of the Straits. As regards the cemeteries on the Gallipoli Peninsula, it was a Turkish tradition to venerate all cemeteries and especially those of soldiers fallen on the field of battle. But he did not quite grasp the meaning of Lord Curzon's words regarding the ground occupied by this cemetery. To sum up, the Turkish delegation would study the question in its new aspect after consulting the experts and obtaining the necessary details.

LORD CURZON said that Ismet Pasha had raised two points. The first was that, before making up his mind about the question of the Straits, he wished to know the views of the Allied Governments upon the naval and military aspects of the case, a perfectly reasonable request, especially in relation to the eventual naval strength of Turkey. He (Lord Curzon) was prepared to discuss that question as soon as possible, and would only ask Ismet Pasha whether he preferred to take the naval question separately as mainly affecting the Straits, or to examine the naval and military questions together. The second point related to the graves: Ismet Pasha said that he awaited an explanation from the Allies as regards the exact meaning of the term "ownership" of the ground in which their soldiers and sailors were buried. He (Lord Curzon) had deliberately used the word "ownership" as distinct from "sovereignty." The question had been fully discussed during the preparation of the Treaty of Sèvres, article 218 of which showed exactly what the Allied case was at that time. The demand which he now made was precisely the same.

M. BARRÈRE recalled in this connection the fact that the French Government had recently granted to Turkey the same privilege as that now demanded by the Allies, in regard to the tomb of Sultan Suleiman Chah.

LORD CURZON desired to give another illustration of the practice to which M. Barrère had alluded. The ground in the Island of Saint Helena, where the great Emperor Napoleon spent the last six years of his life, including the house in which he died, was handed over by Queen Victoria in perpetual possession to the French Government. He himself had visited Saint Helena and found this considerable piece of land in the hands of the French Government, and occupied by the French consul. That was the most direct and effective analogy he could suggest.

ISMET PASHA recognised that there were many points to be discussed with the experts. He thought it absolutely necessary to examine the military and naval clauses of the treaty in close connection with the Straits problem. The second of these two questions could not be approached profitably without information regarding the first.

LORD CURZON said that he would summon an early meeting of the commission to discuss the naval and military clauses, and meanwhile the experts could continue the examination of the points raised that day.

In connection with the communiqué to be given to the press, M. CHICHERIN asked that the communiqué should indicate that the Russians were going to participate in the detailed examination of the proposals with the Turks.

LORD CURZON said he was not quite sure whether he understood the change proposed by M. Chicherin. He had consulted with his Allied colleagues, and their view was that most of the questions at issue were matters for examination between the Turkish and Allied experts. In many of these questions the Russian Government had no concern, and he would be sorry if any words used in the communiqué should create a false impression.

M. CHICHERIN said that the Russian delegation held that the whole question of the Straits and the Black Sea must be examined and decided by a commission in which they participated.

LORD CURZON thought it hardly necessary to repeat what he had said before. He certainly had no desire to exclude the Russian delegation from any discussion in which they were properly interested, but many of these questions—demilitarised zones, the military and naval forces of Turkey, ports, railways, Constantinople—concerned Turkey alone, and Russia had nothing whatever to do with them. He could not, therefore, accept the principle advanced by the Russian delegation. M. Chicherin must trust him and his colleagues to be perfectly fair in this matter.

M. CHICHERIN replied that the question of closing or regulating the Straits had always been regarded as one of direct interest to Russia, Georgia and the Ukraine.

LORD CURZON said that precisely the same case could be made by Bulgaria, Roumania or Jugoslavia, but those Powers did not make any such demand. What they had neither asked nor obtained could not be conceded to Russia. At any stage where matters assumed an international aspect and the Russian delegation were concerned, M. Chicherin could rely on him (Lord Curzon) to give him early notice and full opportunity of being heard.

M. RAKOVSKY said that the precedent of Bulgaria, Roumania and Jugoslavia was not binding on Russia, because the interests of these Powers were defended by the Allied delegates. Russia had been invited to take part in all negotiations and decisions on the various aspects of the Straits question. It was obvious that all questions concerning the armament of Turkey—such as demilitarisation, even in Eastern Thrace—must affect the Straits problem and also that of the Black Sea.

LORD CURZON said that in no decision which had been arrived at or announced was there any question of more than a discussion by experts. It had been proposed that afternoon that on points affecting Turkey the Allied and Turkish experts should consult together. No claim could be based on any letter or document giving Russia, the Ukraine or Georgia any right in that respect, and to that position he must adhere.

M. BARRÈRE said that the Russian experts had every right to consult the Allied experts if they wished to do so; all that was proposed was an exchange of ideas, not the setting up of a special committee.

M. CHICHERIN said that a sub-commission would have to be formed to draw up the text of a treaty, and Russia must be represented on it.

LORD CURZON said that if he understood M. Chicherin aright, the latter had in mind the appointment of a sub-commission to draw up the text of a future treaty. He (Lord Curzon) only wished that the conference had arrived at that point. If M. Chicherin would devote himself to drawing up the text of a treaty, all the delegates would be greatly obliged to him; but as yet matters had hardly reached the stage at which the drafting of treaty clauses could be taken in hand.

M. CHICHERIN said that in these circumstances he would not insist.

(The commission rose at 5 P.M.)

[E 14609/76/44] No. 858.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 3021.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 28th December, respecting the prohibition of the export of war material to Turkey and Greece.

Paris December 29, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 858.

M. Poincaré to Mr. Phipps.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 28 décembre 1922.

PAR votre lettre du 22 décembre, vous avez bien voulu me faire savoir que le Gouvernement britannique proposerait de prohiber, à partir du 1er janvier, l'exportation de matériel de guerre à destination de la Turquie et de la Grèce.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que j'ai déjà donné les instructions nécessaires afin que soient prises en France les mesures à cet effet.

Agréez, &c.

(Pour le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères),
F. DE LA ROCCA, *Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur des Affaires politiques et commerciales.*

No. 859.

Mr. Bentinck (No. 445) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received December 30.)

(No. 765.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December 29, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 269.

I drew attention of Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs privately to statements made by Refet Pasha. I have now received reply stating that there is no truth in assertion that Moslems are not permitted to leave Macedonia or the islands. Those of military age are excepted as a [group omitted] Turkish action in Asia Minor. Secretary-General further specifically denies that Moslems are treated in any way different from the Greeks.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 860.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 796.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 29, 1922.*

ATHENS telegram No. 672 to Foreign Office.

Representative of Grand National Assembly referred to-day to Greek military preparations in Thrace. I told him I considered it out of the question that Greeks should make move on their own. I did not doubt, however, that they were preparing against possible breakdown of conference and were hoping, in that event, through folly of Turks themselves, to recover something of what they had lost. I added that Turkish attitude at Lausanne was certainly encouraging for Greeks.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 114; repeated to Athens, No. 273.)

No. 861.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (No. 57) to Mr. Henderson.—(Repeated to Foreign Office: Received December 30.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, December 30, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 105.

In point of fact Allies have informed Turkish delegation of their readiness to make a great concession to Turkish delegation in departing from precedent of all European minority treaties (precedent accepted in article 5 of National Pact) to the extent of excluding Moslem minorities from all articles of minority section of treaty, including that article which places guarantee for execution in hands of League of Nations. Only exception is an article exactly similar to article 2 of European minority treaties, which constitutes a general declaration as to liberty and protection and freedom of worship of all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, race, language or religion. The latest article was accepted by Turkish delegation without much demur. Adnan's information on this point is therefore a gross travesty of facts.

Equally erroneous is his statement regarding participation of Armenians and Bulgarians in work of Minorities Sub-Commission. What actually passed was that Turkish delegates dissented from proposal of president of sub-commission to hear Bulgarians and Armenians at next meeting. President then stated that representatives of inviting Powers on sub-commission were at liberty to hear what interested parties they wished, but Turks were free to absent themselves. Unfortunately, secretariat erroneously issued notice as to meeting of sub-commission to hear Bulgarians and Armenians, and similar statement also appeared in some papers. Actually there was no meeting of sub-commission, but Bulgarians, Armenians and Agha Petros were heard by representatives of inviting Powers. Mistake of secretariat was satisfactorily explained to Turks, who have no reason to complain except on account of slip by secretariat, and themselves showed singular and unnecessary discourtesy in refusing to be present to hear statements of interested minorities. You should explain matter at once to Adnan, in order that Hassan Bey may not misinform Angora.

No. 862.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 30.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 697.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 29, 1922.*

FOLLOWING sent to Lausanne:—

"I am sending by bag text of report by Sauerwein in this morning's 'Matin' of interview given to him at Lausanne by Ismet Pasha, who, according to Sauerwein, throws whole responsibility for present unsatisfactory situation on your Lordship. Your refusal to agree to Turkish demand for restoration of Mosul is represented as having made the negotiations 'almost tragic': and Ismet maintains that, from the moment that the British delegation realised that the Turks would not give way on the question of Mosul, the discussion of the Capitulations became embittered. He appeals to France to treat Turkey as an independent nation and not to insist on humiliating conditions involved in acceptance of any system approaching Capitulations, and concludes by reiterating that the crisis in the conference would never have taken place if the Turks had yielded to your Lordship on the question of Mosul.

"I do not know how far Sauerwein has distorted Ismet's remarks to him; but the result of the whole interview deliberately conveys the impression that the Turks are entirely moderate and reasonable in their demands and that British intransigence alone prevents a settlement."

No. 863.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 30.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 699.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 29, 1922.*

LEADING article in this evening's "Temps" draws attention to two items of news just received—the departure of the British fleet from Malta for Constantinople, and the rumour that the Greek army in Thrace is meditating an attack on Constantinople. "Temps" (which fails to point out that British fleet is merely returning to take up its former position) connects these two events, observing that the latter piece of news would have little importance if Great Britain appeared ready to make peace; whereas the reinforcement of the British naval forces in the Straits may encourage the Greeks to invade Eastern Thrace at moment when Turkish forces are prevented by British fleet from entering it.

"Temps" then turns to reparation question and refers to insistence of English newspapers on opposition in England to French attitude on pledges to be taken from Germany. "Temps" maintains that taking of pledges, far from causing financial disaster in Germany, will on the contrary improve German financial situation and will thus benefit all the Allies. British opposition to French plan comes at a moment when England, "wishing to keep the rich Vilayet of Mosul, which she had promised to France in 1916, sends her ships to Constantinople to strengthen British domination in the Straits." "Temps" maintains that no draft treaty can be submitted to the Turks until it has been examined and approved at Paris. Why could not Great Britain follow example of France and negotiate separate agreement with the Turks on the subject of Mosul, thus avoiding the postponement of the general Peace Treaty? The interview given by Ismet Pasha to M. Sauerwein (see my telegram No. 697 of to-day) proves that it is the question of Mosul which prevents the Turks from believing in a general agreement, and from showing conciliatory spirit on other points.

As to the British programme which is to be put forward on the question of reparations, the "Temps" declares that, however important the question of inter-Allied debts may be, its solution can have no immediate effect on the position of the French exchequer or on the recovery of reparations. It cannot make France forget the question of pledges. As for the financial reforms and inter-Allied control to be undertaken in Germany, such schemes would oblige the Allies to assume serious responsibilities. "Responsibility for responsibility, we prefer the one which consists in taking pledges."

No. 864.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 31.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 703.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 30, 1922.*

LEADING article in this evening's "Temps" expresses serious alarm at massing of Greek troops in Western Thrace, which it fears must indicate intention to attack Eastern Thrace and even Constantinople. It dismisses other possible explanations, such as that movement is purely defensive or that it is intended to exercise pressure on the Turks. "Is there any Power which is at present preparing to draw the sword against the Turks? One has no right to make such a supposition, for all the Powers concerned are taking part in the conference at Lausanne, which is a Peace Conference." "Temps" urges necessity of immediate Allied representations at Athens to warn Greek Government that no aggression will be tolerated and that they must remove or demobilise part of their troops. If Greece is not forbidden to threaten Eastern Thrace, how, it asks, can the Turkish troops be forbidden to advance to the shores of the Straits?